42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims may be barred by state-law claim preclusion even if the state court did not hold a hearing.

Bartel Dental Books Co. v. Schultz · filed 1986-03-12

In light of this reasoning, we apply the doctrine of res judicata to the facts of this case without regard to whether a hearing was actually granted in state court.

Section 1983 claims for damages and declaratory relief are not barred by claim preclusion based on a prior criminal proceeding when those civil claims could not have been raised there.

Carroll v. City of Detroit · filed 2006-01-18

Although Plaintiffs presumably could have challenged the constitutionality of the ordinances as a defense in their criminal proceedings, they could not have raised the cause of action they have asserted here. Plaintiffs seek damages and declaratory relief for constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the City does not explain how Plaintiffs could have obtained such monetary and equitable relief in their criminal proceedings. ... For these reasons, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by res judicata.

Section 1983 lawsuits are subject to res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Bodkin v. Garfinkle · filed 2006-01-30

The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to civil rights lawsuits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are subject to claim preclusion even when the federal claim was not actually litigated in the prior state court action.

Holcombe v. Hosmer · filed 2007-02-22

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to claim pre- clusion even if the litigants did not actually litigate the federal claim in state court.

Section 1983 claims are subject to claim preclusion even when the federal claim was not actually litigated in state court.

Holcombe v. David Hosmer Richard Kirkland, and Dale Liebherr · filed 2007-02-23

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to claim preclusion even if the litigants did not actually litigate the federal claim in state court.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by claim preclusion when the same claims were previously litigated in state court.

Gibson v. Ada County · filed 2008-02-14

Accordingly, Gibson’s earlier state court litigation acts as an “absolute bar” to her current § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims may be precluded by an earlier judgment when the judgment has preclusive effect under state law.

Ward v. Village of Ridgewood · filed 1982-01-25

The consequence is that the first judgment precludes the assertion of a § 1983 claim in a later suit in Superior Court.

Section 1983 claims are subject to claim preclusion.

NICKERSON-MALPHER v. Worley · filed 2008-06-17

Alternatively, the claims against Worley must be dismissed under the law of claim preclusion. In Allen v. McCurry, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to federal suits filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims receive different preclusion treatment from Title VII or ADA claims.

Stone v. Department of Aviation · filed 2008-08-05

Accordingly, preclusion under a § 1983 claim is different than under a Title VII or ADA claim.

Section 1983 claims are subject to ordinary claim preclusion principles, so an earlier state lawsuit can bar claims that could have been raised there.

Hoffman v. Secretary of State of Maine · filed 2008-08-29

The plaintiffs argued orally and in writing that claim and issue preclusion principles do not apply in full force to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They are incorrect. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that § 1983 is not treated any differently for these purposes, Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 85, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984), and the First Circuit agrees, Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1070 (1st Cir.1978).

Section 1983 actions are subject to claim and issue preclusion.

Valley Wood Preserving, Inc. v. Paul · filed 1986-05-20

The doctrines of claim and issue preclusion apply to actions brought under section 1983.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for a deprivation of federal rights, but the claim must be timely, not barred by res judicata, and adequately pleaded.

McAnally v. Clark County · filed 2009-03-20

McAnally is thus barred by res judicata from prosecuting them now. ... We conclude that McAnally has not pled facts sufficient to sustain any remaining § 1983 allegations.

A § 1983 claim is barred by claim preclusion when it arises from the same transaction as a prior suit in which the plaintiff could have raised the issues.

Robbins v. District Court of Worth County · filed 1979-02-21

Thus their § 1983 action is based on the same nucleus of operative fact before the Iowa courts. Appellants had the opportunity to raise these issues before the Iowa Supreme Court and having failed to do so cannot now attempt to circumvent the doctrine of claim preclusion by merely alleging a different theory of recovery where the actions arise out of the same transaction.

A final state administrative decision can preclude a later § 1983 action challenging the same legal issue when the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it.

Krull v. Jones · filed 1999-04-26

As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, Krull’s § 1983 action is barred because he challenges a legal issue, whether the Department’s policy violates federal law, which issue the administrative law judge already decided adversely to Krull. In the Eighth Circuit that holding is entitled to preclusive effect in a subsequent § 1983 action.

A prior grievance against a state agency does not bar a § 1983 claim against its officials in their individual capacities when the agency and officials lack privity.

Brooks v. Arthur · filed 2010-11-19

Furthermore, the non-availability of a qualified immunity defense in the EDR proceedings, in contrast to the ... availability of such a defense here, constitutes a critical distinction between the EDR proceedings and the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. We are thus compelled to follow our precedent in Daw II and conclude that there was no privity between the Department and the defendants.

Section 1983 does not prevent a prior state-court judgment from barring a federal claim through claim preclusion.

Steward v. Town of Paradise · filed 2010-12-07

In Migra, the Court “rejecte[ed] the view that § 1983 prevents the judgment in petitioner’s state-court proceeding from creating a claim preclusion bar in this case.” Id. at 84. ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the ground that Steward’s federal claims are subject to claim preclusion based on prior state court judgments.

Section 1983 retaliation claims may be barred by res judicata when they could have been presented in earlier state court proceedings.

Gbur v. City of Harvey · filed 2011-12-19

The law is clear that Mr. Gbur could have presented his Title VII discrimination claims and his § 1983 retaliation claims in the Illinois state court proceedings.

Section 1983 actions in federal court are subject to claim and issue preclusion under the same rules as other actions.

White v. City of Pasadena · filed 2012-01-17

The rules of claim and issue preclusion apply equally to § 1983 actions in federal courts.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by claim preclusion when the related criminal defense and civil rights claim are not the same claim under Ohio law.

Graves v. Mahoning County · filed 2013-08-15

The district court erred in dismissing Graves’s and Sexton’s claims pursuant to claim and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion does not apply because a criminal defense and a § 1983 claim are not the “same” under Ohio claim-preclusion law. See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 593–94 (6th Cir. 1999). In addition, issue preclusion does not apply because it is undisputed that prior to pleading guilty, neither Graves nor Sexton asserted their Fourth Amendment claims, and therefore these claims were not actually litigated in the criminal proceedings. Fort Frye Teachers Ass’n, 692 N.E.2d at 144. As a result, res judicata does not bar Graves’s and Sexton’s claims.

Section 1983 actions are subject to state-court judgment preclusion under § 1738.

Baxter v. City of Hernando · filed 2014-01-28

Section 1738 applies equally to Section 1983 actions.

A § 1983 damages claim is not barred solely because the plaintiff did not seek damages in an earlier Article 78 proceeding.

Ahmed v. Town of Oyster Bay · filed 2014-03-18

To the extent defendants argue that plaintiffs should have sought damages during the Article 78 proceeding, the Court disagrees. The Article 78 proceeding is not a bar in this situation.

Section 1983 claims based on previously litigated conduct are barred by claim preclusion.

Petrossian v. Cole · filed 2015-05-27

We further agree with the District Court that the University’s June 19, 2013 letter to Petrossian did not give rise to a new § 1983 cause of action because it plainly concerned the misconduct and resulting campus-wide ban which Petrossian previously litigated.

A Section 1983 claim can be barred by a prior state court judgment when it arises from the same facts and the state forum could have awarded the full relief sought.

Russo v. City of New York · filed 2017-12-01

We find that dismissal on the basis of res judicata is appropriate in this case because Russo raises claims that are premised entirely on the same set of facts and alleged misconduct as the facts and misconduct alleged in his state court action, and because the initial state forum had the power to award the full measure of relief sought in this Section 1983 action.

A section 1983 claim may be precluded when an agency acted in a judicial capacity and the plaintiff could have raised the claim on state administrative review.

Brown v. City Of Chicago · filed 2019-02-22

Although he chose to pursue the claim in federal court, Brown was able to bring his administrative appeal, including this section 1983 claim, in state court following the police board’s decision. ... Brown’s failure to seek judicial review of the Police Board’s decision in state court does not allow him to relitigate these claims in federal court.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by claim preclusion when they arise from facts resolved in earlier proceedings that gave the claimant a fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional issue.

Polk Properties, LLC v. Grota Appraisals, LLC · filed 2019-10-23

Thus, it is not surprising that Polk really only addresses the assessments from 2015-18, contending that it could not have brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim prospectively in 2014. No matter. As noted above, its claims for those years are based on the same common nucleus of operative facts that were litigated in the 2014 assessment, and because it is precluded from relitigating those facts for the 2014 assessment, it cannot establish cause as to the subsequent years. Summary judgment was appropriately granted.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by state administrative decisions that satisfy the applicable preclusion rules.

Garcia v. Bostic · filed 2020-06-23

The district court did not err by giving preclusive effect to the administrative decisions in Appellants’ § 1983 case.

Section 1983 permits damages that are generally unavailable in an Article 78 proceeding, so an earlier Article 78 action generally does not preclude a later § 1983 damages claim.

Razzano v. Remsenburg-Speonk Union Free School District · filed 2020-09-30

In this case, plaintiff’s Article 78 claims do not preclude her present claims even though they are based on substantially the same events, as she did not seek the same remedy. The damages that plaintiff now seeks under the ADA, § 1983, and the NYSHRL are not “incidental” to the relief she sought through her Article 78 action.

Section 1983 permits substantial compensatory damages, including for actual nonpecuniary injury, when substantive constitutional rights are violated; recovery is not limited to nominal damages.

Corriz v. Emilio Naranjo, Steve Martinez, Canuto Martinez, and Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Department · filed 1982-02-08

We therefore reject defendants’ argument that only nominal damages can be awarded for the deprivation of plaintiff’s substantive fourteenth amendment rights.

Section 1983 compensates injuries caused by constitutional-rights deprivations, but a plaintiff who proves a violation without compensable injury may recover nominal damages.

Kincaid v. Rusk · filed 1982-02-10

Beyond the questions of immunity from liability for damages, we must also ascertain whether any substantial damages may properly be awarded to Kincaid. Because the purpose of section 1983 is to compensate for the injuries resulting from a deprivation of constitutional rights, Kincaid must demonstrate that the restrictions found unlawful here caused some compensable injury. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1047-48, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319, 95 S.Ct. 992, 999, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). Under the circumstances of this case, a compensable injury would be established if, for example, Kincaid demonstrated that the jail conditions were "less desirable" because of the restricted access to reading material, see Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 233 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916, 99 S.Ct. 1234, 59 L.Ed.2d 466 (1979), or that he unsuccessfully attempted to gain access to forbidden reading materials. See Masjid Muhammad-D.C.C. v. Keve, 479 F.Supp. 1311, 1327 (D.Del.1979). ... Nevertheless, Kincaid did establish that his rights were violated by Rusk's enforcement of restrictive policies governing access to reading material, and, thus, he is entitled to an award of nominal damages in the sum of one dollar. See Masjid Muhammad-D.C.C. v. Keve, 479 F.Supp. 1311, 1327-28 (D.Del.1979); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 402 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1053, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978).

Section 1983 does not provide damages for a policy that does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

Colin K. v. Schmidt · filed 1982-04-21

In sum, plaintiffs are not entitled to damages under either the RHA or under the equal protection clause and § 1983 for MSC’s failure to fund residential placement for Colin and Alan during the 1979-80 school year.

A plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for a First Amendment violation under § 1983 without proving consequential injury.

Bell v. Little Axe Independent School District · filed 1985-06-26

To ensure full vindication of these rights, and to deter similar violations, we believe that a plaintiff need not prove consequential injury to recover damages for the violation of a First Amendment right.

An adequate state postdeprivation remedy does not bar a § 1983 claim based on an intentional violation of a substantive constitutional right.

Morello v. James · filed 1987-01-26

Intentional, substantive violations of constitutional rights are not subject to the rule of Parratt.

The availability of a state-law remedy does not defeat a § 1983 claim based on violation of a substantive constitutional right.

Shapiro v. Chapman · filed 1987-02-11

The violation of a substantive constitutionally guaranteed right exists independently of the procedures available to redress that wrong.

A successful Section 1983 plaintiff may recover proved emotional-distress damages caused by a due-process violation and is entitled to nominal damages even if no actual damages are proved.

Santiago v. Garcia · filed 1987-06-05

It is well established that damages are recoverable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for emotional distress caused by due process deprivations. ... Even where no actual damages are proved, the successful section 1983 plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages for due process deprivations.

Section 1983 damages are available only for violations of the plaintiff's own constitutional rights, so an overbreadth challenge based on others' rights cannot support damages.

Advantage Media, L.L.C. v. City Of Eden Prairie · filed 2006-09-07

On an overbreadth challenge Advantage would also be barred from collecting § 1983 damages which are available only for violations of a party's own constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy and permits compensatory damages upon proof of actual injury.

New England Estates, LLC v. Town of Branford · filed 2010-02-16

Applying these principles to the present case, it is evident that money damages are recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of rights guaranteed by the constitution, and that the owners’ recovery of damages in the present case serves the dual purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide redress for an invasion of a right protected under federal constitutional law, and to deter future violations of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides an action for damages based on alleged constitutional violations.

Creamer v. State · filed 2015-01-08

To the extent that Creamer is seeking damages for these alleged constitutional violations, the appropriate vehicle for such claims is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages compensate injuries caused by deprivation of constitutional rights and cannot be based on the abstract value of the right.

Cox v. Denning · filed 2016-06-15

“Damages are available for violations of § 1983 to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.” ... But an award may not be based “on the abstract value of the constitutional right rather than on the actual injuries [the inmate] suffered from the denial of that right.”

Section 1983 permits damages against prison employees for deliberate constitutional violations when the state’s postdeprivation process is inadequate because of excessive delay.

Lucien v. Watts C. Johnson · filed 1995-07-31

If the acts of which he complains violated his constitutional rights (which means, if they were deliberate and not merely negligent), and if the state’s postdeprivation process— which is to say the remedial procedure available in the Illinois Court of Claims — is inadequate because of excessive delay, then he has a good claim for damages under section 1983 against those employees.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on officials' unauthorized failure to follow adequate state employment procedures fails when the state provides an adequate postdeprivation hearing.

Goolsby v. City of Montgomery · filed 1986-12-10

We find that plaintiff was provided with an adequate postdepri-vation hearing.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on employees' random, unauthorized failure to follow adequate commitment procedures is barred when the state supplies a constitutionally sufficient postdeprivation remedy.

Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc. · filed 1986-12-03

Burch’s claim is, at most, one for damages resulting from the denial of procedural due process, and Florida provides him with a postdeprivation remedy sufficient to satisfy the Constitution’s requirement.

A § 1983 procedural due process claim fails when an official's conduct was random and unauthorized and the state supplied an adequate postdeprivation remedy.

Leber v. Smith · filed 1985-11-06

Here, as in Wilson v. Beebe, the conduct of the arresting officer was random and unauthorized and not the result of an established state procedure. ... As to whether the State of Ohio provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy, the jury in the state court proceedings awarded over $10,000,000.00 to Leber and $150,000.00 to his parents. ... Because Leber has failed to establish either a procedural or a substantive due process violation, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that as a matter of law there existed no claims under Sec. 1983 against Deputy Smith, the Sheriff, the Board or the Commissioners.

An adequate state postdeprivation remedy satisfies due process for a § 1983 claim when a random, unauthorized act causes the deprivation and a predeprivation hearing is impracticable.

Alvarado v. City of Dodge City · filed 1985-10-25

We have concluded that under the factual circumstances shown in this case, the Kansas tort actions for false imprisonment, battery, and defamation provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Clearly in this case, any deprivation of a liberty interest of the plaintiff resulted from a random and unauthorized act by an off-duty police officer and there is no way that the State could have provided a meaningful predeprivation hearing. Hence, due process can be satisfied through a meaningful postdeprivation hearing.

A negligent deprivation does not support a Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim when state law supplies a damages remedy.

Roberts v. City of Troy · filed 1985-09-30

... where a negligent act of a state officer deprived a person of a liberty interest and the law of the state provided a remedy in damages, there is no procedural due process claim under Sec. 1983.

A procedural-due-process claim under Section 1983 fails when negligent conduct caused the deprivation and adequate state postdeprivation remedies exist.

McGowan v. Riley · filed 1985-09-30

Since the alleged deprivations were caused by negligent acts and omissions, the existence of postdeprivation remedies must be examined. ... Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot maintain a procedural due process action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a federal due-process claim for a property deprivation only after the plaintiff first pursues available state postdeprivation procedures.

Carter v. City of Boston · filed 1982-02-17

Under Parratt, those in the position of plaintiff must first look to state postdeprivational procedures before they can claim in federal courts under § 1983 that they have been deprived of their constitutional right to due process of law.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal property-deprivation remedy for an intentional tort when the plaintiff has an adequate state postdeprivation remedy.

Frazier v. Collins · filed 1982-04-05

Thus, insofar as plaintiff’s claim is founded upon intentional tort, he has an adequate state postdeprivation remedy for conversion or detinue.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim to proceed when a deprivation results from an established state practice, procedure, or custom, because a state post-deprivation wrongful-death remedy is not adequate in that circumstance.

Pantoja v. City of Gonzales · filed 1982-05-06

Where the deprivation occurs as a result of the established practice, procedure or custom of the state authority, as alleged here, the result is not unpredictable and the state has a constitutional duty to prevent it. A post-deprivation hearing provided by the state in the course of a wrongful death action, which may satisfy due process in cases of random and unpredictable acts, is not adequate here.

Section 1983 does not support a procedural due process claim when the plaintiff ignores reasonable state-law remedies that redress the alleged administrative error.

Liotta v. RENT GUIDELINES BD., ETC. · filed 1982-09-27

Plaintiffs cannot manufacture a § 1983 claim by pointing to the allegedly defective meeting while ignoring that part of the regulatory process that serves to redress administrative error.

Parratt does not bar a § 1983 procedural-due-process claim alleging an intentional property deprivation by state officials.

McCrae v. W.T. Hankins · filed 1983-12-05

We conclude that ... does not apply to procedural due process claims grounded in allegations of intentional deprivations of property by state officials.

An available state tort remedy does not bar a Section 1983 claim alleging an intentional violation of substantive constitutional rights by abuse of state police power.

Bullard v. Valentine · filed 1984-06-18

This case alleges precisely the type of abuse of state police powers that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was intended to redress. ... Unless and until the Supreme Court specifically articulates otherwise, claims such as the instant one, involving intentional violations of substantive rights, should remain in the federal courts.

A state postdeprivation remedy defeats a Sec. 1983 procedural due process claim only if it can actually provide the relief the plaintiff seeks, not merely some monetary award through a claims commission with limited jurisdiction and payout caps.

Bumgarner v. Bloodworth · filed 1984-07-17

We do not agree that the Arkansas State Claims Commission is empowered to grant plaintiff adequate relief. ... Only the claim against the state trooper is subject to the jurisdiction of the Claims Commission and since the Commission can make only monetary awards, even a judgment in plaintiff's favor against the trooper would not give the plaintiff the relief he seeks, return of specific property.

In a Section 1983 challenge to vehicle immobilization, due process did not require a predeprivation hearing, but the city's use of its own Assistant Corporation Counsel as the postdeprivation hearing officer was constitutionally infirm.

Grant v. City of Chicago · filed 1984-10-03

We conclude, therefore, that due process does not require a pre-deprivation hearing. Moreover, the only constitutional infirmity in the current post-deprivation hearing procedure is the use of the Assistant Corporation Counsel as hearing officer.

An adequate state postdeprivation remedy precludes a § 1983 due-process claim based on unauthorized irregularities in a public-employment hearing.

Lee v. Hutson · filed 1984-10-11

A determination that a person was deprived of a property interest under color of state law, however, does not establish entitlement to a section 1983 remedy. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution protects only against deprivation of a property interest without due process of law. ... For the reasons given above, the court concludes that there appear to be adequate remedies at state law to redress the grievances which plaintiff has brought in this section 1983 action.

A good-faith local planning-board error does not support § 1983 due-process damages when state judicial review hears the challenge and orders relief.

Alton Land Trust and Cedar Mountain Development Corporation v. Town of Alton · filed 1984-10-12

Appellants claim that the Town violated their rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments by unreasonably denying their applications for subdivision, and that they are therefore entitled to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Appellants were not denied due process. New Hampshire law provided them with the right to appeal to the courts from the Board’s denial of a permit. When they appealed, their contentions were heard and, indeed, relief was ordered in their favor.

A Section 1983 substantive-due-process claim is not barred by the availability of post-deprivation state remedies because the constitutional violation exists independently of remedial procedures.

Ramos v. Gallo · filed 1984-10-24

Parratt’s concern with the adequacy of post-deprivation state remedies simply has no place in the context of an alleged substantive due process violation. The constitutional violation exists independently of the adequacy or inadequacy of procedures that are available for redressing the deprivation. ... For these reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim must be denied.

An adequate state postdeprivation judicial remedy defeats the due-process element of a § 1983 claim based on termination of a government contract.

Economic Development Corp. v. Stierheim · filed 1984-11-30

Accordingly, the Court finds that Florida’s judicial system does provide the Plaintiff with adequate post-deprivation redress within the letter and spirit of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, consequently, the Plaintiff has not properly alleged the due process prong of the Fourteenth Amendments 1983 claim.

When the state deprives a prisoner of property through the very hearing meant to provide process, a later state remedy is inadequate and Section 1983 supplies an independent federal remedy.

Jones v. Clark · filed 1984-12-06

If the state deprives a person of property unlawfully in the process of the very hearing purporting to grant due process, the due process clause is violated. To suggest that a postdeprivation remedy is adequate protection is to deny the effect of section 1983 as an independent federally created remedy for violations of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 adds no substantive rights and cannot support a property-due-process claim when available state remedies provide due process in both form and substance.

Eaton v. City of Solon · filed 1984-12-13

In conclusion, § 1983 confers no added rights on plaintiff beyond providing a remedy for violation of her federal constitutional and statutory rights. Thus, § 1983 cannot be used as the principal source of relief in a property-due process case if the state remedies available to plaintiff provide due process, both in form and substance.

An unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state official does not support a Section 1983 due-process claim when a meaningful state post-deprivation remedy is available.

Hubenthal v. County Of Winona · filed 1984-12-27

But even an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state official does not violate due process requirements if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available.

A § 1983 plaintiff alleging a procedural-due-process property deprivation bears the burden of showing that available state remedies are inadequate.

Ryman v. Reichert · filed 1985-02-22

In the present case, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the post-abolishment remedy of mandamus is inadequate.

A local permitting dispute does not support Section 1983 procedural-due-process relief when the state supplies adequate administrative and judicial remedies.

Clark v. Bissonnette · filed 1985-03-14

Because adequate procedural due process is available, this case is not of constitutional dimension. and plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to § 1983.

An adequate state tort remedy supplies due process for a random and unauthorized intentional deprivation of liberty, defeating a § 1983 procedural-due-process claim when predeprivation process was impracticable.

Hanson v. Larkin · filed 1985-03-22

This court concludes that when a state provides an adequate, postdeprivation remedy in tort for an unauthorized, intentional deprivation of a liberty interest, that remedy itself constitutes the due process required by the fourteenth amendment.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim for deprivation of liberty cannot proceed when the challenged act was random and unauthorized and the state provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy.

Larry T. Wilson, Cross-Appellant v. Thomas L. Beebe, Cross-Appellee · filed 1985-08-12

Having determined that ... applies to cases involving deprivations of liberty interests as well as of property, we conclude that the procedural due process claim in the present case may not be maintained under § 1983 because the Michigan postdeprivation remedy is adequate.

An adequate state remedy satisfies procedural due process for a random, unauthorized property deprivation even when the plaintiff did not use it.

Jenkins v. McMickens · filed 1985-10-15

Moreover, the fact that the plaintiff did not avail himself of the procedure did not affect the adequacy of the state remedy.

A state postdeprivation remedy does not foreclose a § 1983 due-process claim when the challenged deprivation resulted from an established official policy.

Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tenn. · filed 1985-10-30

Wall and Fiser's conduct is alleged to be neither random nor unauthorized but in accordance wth established procedure. Plaintiffs allege that this policy should never have been established. Therefore, Parratt does not govern the present case.

The availability of state postdeprivation remedies does not bar a § 1983 excessive-force claim grounded in the Fourth Amendment.

Bynum v. City of Pittsburg · filed 1985-11-27

Plaintiffs’ allegations are grounded on the Fourth as well as the Fourteenth Amendment. The availability of state postdeprivation remedies does not bar Fourth Amendment claims.

An adequate state postdeprivation remedy supplies all process due and defeats a § 1983 procedural-due-process claim.

Willis v. Barksdale · filed 1985-12-11

Therefore, Tennessee’s post-deprivation remedy is adequate and provides plaintiff all the process that is due. Consequently, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim alleging a violation of procedural due process must fail.

A random and unauthorized injury does not support a § 1983 procedural-due-process claim when the state supplies an adequate postdeprivation remedy.

Johnson v. Pike · filed 1985-12-19

Having found that defendant’s acts were random and unauthorized, and that the state provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy for this conduct, plaintiff may not maintain a cause of action pursuant to § 1983 for a claim of procedural due process.

Negligent loss of a prisoner's property does not support § 1983 relief when the state supplies an adequate postdeprivation remedy and the conduct is not independently egregious enough to be a constitutional tort.

Vincent v. Lynch · filed 1985-12-24

For these reasons, the court concludes that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed as frivolous, on the grounds that the conduct alleged is not sufficiently egregious to amount to an independent constitutional tort, and to the extent that it is construed as alleging a violation of procedural due process, the state has provided an adequate post-deprivation remedy.

Written review is an adequate opportunity to be heard for a prisoner’s challenge to the purely mathematical calculation of custody and release dates; a full adversarial hearing is unnecessary.

Toney-El v. Gayle F. Franzen, Director of the Department of Corrections, James W. Fairman, Warden, and Paul Hos · filed 1986-01-15

The purely mathematical nature of these calculations makes written review an adequate opportunity to be heard for purposes of the due process clause.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process plaintiff seeking damages for property deprivation bears the burden to plead and prove that available state remedies are inadequate.

Bender v. Elyria City Police Department Sears Company · filed 1986-01-21

Under the authority of Parratt, in Section 1983 damage suits for deprivation of property without procedural due process, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving the inadequacy of state processes including state damage remedies to redress the claimed wrong.

A random and unauthorized demolition without notice does not support a § 1983 procedural-due-process claim when state inverse-condemnation law provides an adequate and meaningful postdeprivation remedy.

Yates v. Jamison · filed 1986-02-03

We hold that ... requires the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint because they possess an adequate and meaningful postdeprivation remedy in the form of an action for inverse condemnation in state court.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on random, unauthorized conduct requires the plaintiff to show that state remedies are inadequate.

Davey v. Tomlinson · filed 1986-05-15

Or, second, plaintiff can make out his procedural due process claim by showing that defendants’ actions were only “random and unauthorized" conduct. If this is alleged, then plaintiff would have to show that state remedies are inadequate.

Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 65.1 supplied an adequate state remedy for a property seizure challenged under § 1983.

Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin · filed 1986-05-28

Alabama’s Rule 65.1 provided an “adequate” remedy.

Available postdeprivation remedies do not defeat a § 1983 procedural-due-process claim when predeprivation process was practicable.

Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau · filed 1986-06-17

The availability of post-deprivation remedies is not a defense to the denial of procedural due process where predeprivation process is practicable.

A public employee who voluntarily forgoes available review procedures cannot establish a § 1983 procedural-due-process deprivation based on the absence of that review.

Marshall v. City of Cape Coral · filed 1986-09-03

All Mr. Marshall had to do was ask, which he never did. A volitional choice to forego available procedures, however unwise, cannot give rise to a subsequent complaint that one has been “deprived” of procedural protections.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim fails when the state provides adequate review procedures and the plaintiff abandons an available appeal that could correct the alleged deprivation.

Jacobus v. Heydinger · filed 1986-09-15

The question of whether Jacobus’ due process rights were observed is measured in this case by what was available to Jacobus, not by what Jacobus actually availed himself of. A civil rights plaintiff seeking redress for deprivation of property without due process ignores available state procedures at his own peril.

An adequate state corrective process precludes recovery under Section 1983 for a procedural due-process challenge to a state election dispute.

Curry v. Baker · filed 1986-10-01

To the extent that a procedural due process claim is asserted, the existence of adequate state law remedies precludes plaintiffs from recovery under Sec. 1983.

A Section 1983 procedural due-process plaintiff alleging intentional loss of property must plead and prove that available state processes are inadequate to redress the injury.

Watsy v. Mary Lantis Robert Ficano Wayne County Jail · filed 1986-10-15

Plaintiff was required to plead and prove the inadequacy of state processes to redress the alleged injury. ... Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden.

A state agency's failure to follow its internal pretermination procedures does not by itself establish a Section 1983 due-process violation if constitutional minimum procedures were provided.

Brown v. Texas a & M University · filed 1986-11-17

The failure of a state agency to comply with its internal regulations is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a violation of Due Process, because constitutional minima nevertheless may have been met.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on a random, unauthorized act contrary to state law fails when an adequate state remedy is available.

Griffin-Bey v. Carter · filed 1987-05-18

Plaintiff asserted a claim of illegal deprivation of his liberty which is contrary to established state law. It is thus a random and unauthorized act under state law. ... As such, the claim fails to state a violation of procedural due process if there is an adequate state remedy to pursue under state law.

Negligent property deprivation is not actionable under § 1983, and intentional property deprivation is not actionable when adequate state remedies are available.

Morton v. Arnold J. Hopkins Jon P. Galley, Warden Captain Keadle, Property Officer William T. Sommerville, Co II · filed 1987-05-19

The negligent deprivation of property does not state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... The Supreme Court has also determined that the intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not state a cognizable claim under Sec. 1983, if there are adequate state remedies available.

A procedural-due-process plaintiff under § 1983 must plead and prove the absence of an adequate state corrective remedy.

Benjamin Gordon Pauline Gordon and B & G Associates v. Deryck · filed 1987-06-11

In Victory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984), this Court held that a plaintiff must plead and prove the absence of adequate state remedies in a procedural due process case under section 1983. ... In the case before this Court, plaintiffs do not deny that they failed to plead and prove the absence of adequate state remedies.

For a Section 1983 claim based on a random and unauthorized deprivation, the plaintiff must plead and prove that state remedies are inadequate.

Bennett v. Robert Brown, Jr., and Dale Foltz · filed 1987-10-14

This deprivation of an alleged liberty interest was allegedly the result of a random and unauthorized act. ... Therefore, in order to state a claim, plaintiff was required to plead and prove the inadequacy of Michigan state remedies.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on a random, unauthorized state action requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that available state remedies were inadequate.

Alexander v. Frank Elo and Herbert Grinage · filed 1987-10-19

Even assuming a vested liberty interest, we conclude that plaintiff failed to assert a procedural due process violation as plaintiff did not plead and prove that state remedies were inadequate to redress this alleged random and unauthorized action in contravention of state law.

A § 1983 due-process plaintiff alleging property loss or a transfer without a hearing must plead and prove that available state-court remedies are inadequate.

Bradford-Bey v. Chris Daniels, and Officer Adams, Guard · filed 1987-10-20

Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of his civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in which he alleged that defendants deprived him of photocopies of legal documents and transferred him to another prison without a hearing. We affirm the judgment of the district court because plaintiff failed to plead and prove that his state court remedies are inadequate.

A § 1983 claim based on a random and unauthorized deprivation of property requires the plaintiff to plead and ultimately prove that available state remedies are inadequate.

Abbott v. Beckett and Chambers Moving, Inc. North American Van Lines Company O'Telia Abbott William Golstein · filed 1987-10-26

Such acts, which are random in nature and unauthorized by state law, policy, regulation or custom, cannot serve as the basis of a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 unless the plaintiff first pleads and ultimately proves the inadequacy of any available state means of redress.

A § 1983 due-process claim based on a random, unauthorized deprivation requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that available state corrective procedures are inadequate.

Toster v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1987-11-13

Plaintiff has further failed to plead and prove the inadequacy of state corrective procedures for the alleged liberty deprivation. ... Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim of constitutional magnitude.

An unintended property loss caused by official negligence is not actionable under § 1983, and even a random unauthorized intentional loss creates no due-process claim when the state supplies an adequate postdeprivation remedy.

Slaughter v. Anderson · filed 1987-11-19

Defendants’ failure to secure Slaughter’s apartment before leaving amounts to nothing more than negligence. As such, it is not actionable under Section 1983. ... Thus, even to the extent Slaughter’s complaint can be stretched to allege intentional misconduct on defendants’ part, the availability of a state postdeprivation remedy bars any constitutionally cognizable claim for relief.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process plaintiff need not exhaust state remedies, but must show that available state procedures were inadequate to correct a random, unauthorized procedural error.

Marino v. Anthony Ameruso, Commissioner of the Department of Transportation of the City of New York · filed 1988-01-08

Although one need not exhaust state remedies before bringing a Section 1983 action claiming a violation of procedural due process, one must nevertheless prove as an element of that claim that state procedural remedies are inadequate.

A Section 1983 procedural due process claim based on a random and unauthorized deprivation requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that the state’s corrective process is inadequate.

Gallon v. Hogan · filed 1988-02-03

Plaintiff failed to state a claim cognizable under Sec. 1983 because this alleged deprivation of a claimed liberty interest without due process was the result of a random and unauthorized act and he failed to plead and prove the inadequacy of the state's correctional process.

A Section 1983 procedural due process claim requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that available state remedies are inadequate.

Gross v. Harold Buchignani, Individually and in His Capacity as Fayette County Jailer · filed 1988-03-22

Likewise, plaintiff failed to state a procedural due process claim because he failed to plead and prove the inadequacy of Kentucky state remedies.

Section 1983 procedural due process claims arising from established state procedures are not barred by the availability of state postdeprivation remedies.

Bobby Watts, M.D. v. John H. Burkhart, M.D. · filed 1988-08-12

The rule of Parratt and Vicory is clearly inapplicable “where a deprivation of property is caused by conduct pursuant to established state procedure, rather than random and unauthorized conduct.” ... Since any predeprivation actions taken in the instant case were done pursuant to established state procedures, the district court erred in applying Parratt.

In a procedural due process action under Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege that state remedies are inadequate to correct the violation in addition to proving the substantive wrong.

Deborah Coker, as Next Friend on Behalf of Craig Coker v. James Henry, Cindy Doyle and Rick Zimmerman · filed 1994-05-25

In a procedural due process case under Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must allege that state remedies are inadequate to correct the due process violation in addition to proving the substantive wrong.

A procedural due process claimant must use appropriate, available state procedures before bringing a claim under § 1983.

Zimmerman v. Cherokee County · filed 1995-12-27

Under McKinney, which applies retroactively, plaintiff was required to utilize “appropriate, available state procedures” before bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 plaintiffs seeking damages for deprivation of property without procedural due process must plead and prove that state remedies are inadequate.

Vicory v. Robert R. Walton, Sheriff of Butler County and John F. Holcomb, Butler County Prosecutor · filed 1984-03-28

In a procedural due process case under section 1983, the plaintiff must attack the state’s corrective procedure as well as the substantive wrong.

A plaintiff seeking § 1983 damages for deprivation of property without procedural due process must plead and prove that state remedies are inadequate.

Parks v. City of Chattanooga · filed 2003-07-16

“In section 1983 damage suits for deprivation of property without procedural due process!,] the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving the inadequacy of state processes, including state damage remedies!,] to redress the claimed wrong.” ... Absent a proven allegation that the City’s postdeprivation processes are inadequate to redress Parks’s complaints, we cannot conclude that he lost his job as a patrolman without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a procedural due process claim to show that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.

Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Baird · filed 2003-08-15

Because Plaintiffs bring their procedural due process claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they must demonstrate that “state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.”

A plaintiff seeking relief under Section 1983 for a procedural due process violation must plead and prove that state or administrative remedies are inadequate.

Jefferson County Public School System v. Jefferson · filed 2004-03-04

Plaintiff may not seek relief under Section 1983 without first pleading and proving the inadequacy of state or administrative processes and remedies to redress her due process violations.

In a § 1983 damages suit alleging deprivation of property without procedural due process, the plaintiff must plead and prove that state processes, including damages remedies, are inadequate.

National Communication Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission · filed 1986-04-25

in section 1983 damage suits for deprivation of property without procedural due process the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving the inadequacy of state processes, including state damage remedies to redress the claimed wrong. ... Plaintiffs failed to plead the inadequacy of state processes.

A plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 for deprivation of property without procedural due process must plead and prove that available state procedures are inadequate.

National Communication Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission · filed 1986-04-25

This then is simply a § 1983 damage suit for deprivation of property without procedural due process. ... Plaintiffs failed to plead the inadequacy of state processes.

A plaintiff bringing a due process claim under § 1983 must plead what state remedies are available and why they are inadequate.

Perry v. SE Boll Weevil · filed 2005-11-15

Under § 1983, however, plaintiffs “must plead. . . that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.” ... Plaintiffs have not met their pleading burden. They have not pleaded what state remedies, if any, existed, and how they were inadequate.

A procedural due process claim under § 1983 is unavailable until the plaintiff has used available state remedies.

Mason v. Clayton County Board of Education · filed 2009-05-19

Moreover, Mason’s assertion that she was barred from filing a mandamus petition against the CCBOE because she had the legal remedy of filing a § 1983 action is without merit because she did not have the remedy of filing a § 1983 action available until she utilized all state remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against individuals for violations of the federal FOIA because that law’s comprehensive scheme forecloses such a claim.

Neff v. Waller · filed 2009-02-26

The comprehensive nature of the federal FOIA forecloses a claim against individuals under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act because Congress intended review under the Administrative Procedure Act to be exclusive.

Ackerley Communications of Florida, Inc. v. Henderson · filed 1989-08-24

We find that Congress intended that the Administrative Procedure Act would be the exclusive remedy for alleged violations of the URA. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 to consider this case, and we therefore remand the case and order that it be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits an action based on handicap discrimination under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because that Act does not provide an exclusive enforcement scheme.

Rothschild v. Grottenthaler · filed 1989-07-12

Thus, in the absence of evidence of congressional intent to the contrary, we conclude that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not preclude an action pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on handicap discrimination.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a CETA statutory claim when CETA provides an exclusive administrative remedy.

Uniformed Firefighters Association, Local 94, Iaff, Afl-Cio v. The City of New York · filed 1982-03-25

Since we find § 1983 unavailable to support appellants’ statutory claim because CETA provides an exclusive administrative remedy, we need not consider whether CETA creates “rights, privileges, or immunities” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim when the underlying federal statute provides only equitable relief and allowing damages would circumvent that statute's remedial scheme.

Manecke v. School Board of Pinellas County · filed 1982-12-21

In view of the Court’s previous conclusions regarding Congress’ intent in enacting Section 504, the issue now before the Court is whether the rights created by Section 504 can be asserted within the remedial framework of Section 1983. The Court has determined that Section 504 only provides for equitable relief to private litigants. To conclude that damage claims are allowable under Section 1983 would circumvent the Court’s ruling and the Court’s determinations of Congress’ intent upon which that ruling is based. Therefore, the Court holds that the plaintiffs can not assert a claim for damage under Section 1983.

The Education for All Handicapped Children Act’s comprehensive and exclusive remedial scheme precludes a cause of action under Section 1983 for conduct protected by that Act.

Department of Education v. Katherine D. · filed 1983-11-07

We hold that the complex provisions of section 1415 of the EAHCA, which establish detailed procedures for administrative and judicial review of the state’s proposals to educate handicapped children, create a comprehensive and exclusive remedial scheme that precludes reliance upon a cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 is unavailable when another statute’s remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate Congress’s intent to preclude that remedy.

Mabry v. State Board for Community Colleges & Occupational Education · filed 1984-11-20

When remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.

A plaintiff cannot pursue § 1983 relief for rights governed exclusively by the Education of All Handicapped Children Act.

Detsel by Detsel v. Board of Educ. of Auburn · filed 1986-06-23

The plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed. The EAHCA constitutes her exclusive form of relief.

Section 1983 provides a proper vehicle for a prisoner's prospective challenge to considering detainers when determining eligibility for prison programs, when the claim does not challenge the detainers' validity.

Stevens v. Jack Heard, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Harris County, Texas · filed 1982-04-23

This claim was properly brought under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of constitutional rights, but not for state tort-law violations; an arrest based on mistaken identity pursuant to a facially valid warrant is not itself a constitutional violation.

Clark v. Heard · filed 1982-05-03

Thus, an arrest based on mistaken identity, in itself, does not give rise to a constitutional violation if made pursuant to a warrant meeting the requirements of the fourth amendment — that is, a facially valid warrant. ... There having been no constitutional deprivation in this case, plaintiffs only avenue of redress is under the principles of state tort law.

For a Section 1983 mistaken-arrest claim, an independent grand-jury indictment breaks the causal chain and insulates the initiating police officers and municipality from liability.

Von Williams v. City of Bridge City, Tex. · filed 1984-06-20

There is no question here ... that the Orange County Grand Jury was a wholly separate entity from the City of Bridge City. This Court interprets ... to say that a grand jury indictment breaks the causal chain and insulates all “initiating parties” from suit: including the City of Bridge City.

A valid arrest warrant does not bar a § 1983 action.

Johnson v. Calhoun County · filed 1995-06-30

We agree that a valid arrest warrant does not bar a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 generally does not support an unlawful arrest claim against an officer who executes a facially valid warrant without reason to know it is invalid.

Walker v. Shafer · filed 2020-03-02

Because Officer Shafer simply obeyed a facially valid judicial command to arrest plaintiff, he is entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff’s claims based on the warrant’s validity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff for an eviction carried out pursuant to a state-court order, and state-court proceedings that afford due process defeat a section 1983 deprivation claim.

Tymiak v. Omodt · filed 1982-04-27

The district court correctly held that Sheriff Omodt was immune from Tymiak's section 1983 claims for damages. This Court previously has held that a sheriff who, pursuant to a state court order, evicted several persons from the homes they occupied was immune from a section 1983 lawsuit which sought damages and injunctive relief based on that eviction. ... Even if we assume Tymiak had a constitutionally protected interest in the property which was taken by the remaining defendants under color of state law, the Hennepin County state district court proceedings with respect to the Wikman-Morse property clearly afforded Tymiak due process of law.

An official's immunity is an affirmative defense to a § 1983 claim, rather than a defect in the existence of the cause of action.

Davidson v. Scully · filed 1982-11-26

However that may be, immunity is an affirmative defense and does not go to the existence of a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 gives court clerks absolute judicial immunity only for quasi-judicial acts or acts performed under a court order or a judge's express direction.

Cook v. City of Topeka · filed 1982-12-03

We conclude that the weight of federal authority extends absolute judicial immunity under § 1983 to court clerks only when they are acting: (1) in a quasi-judicial capacity; or (2) under court order or under the express direction of a judge thereof.

Section 1983 permits compensatory-damages claims against a county despite sovereign immunity, but municipalities and county boards are immune from punitive damages and legislators acting within their legislative capacity are absolutely immune.

Tolbert v. County of Nelson · filed 1981-11-30

This court is in agreement with the plaintiff and has determined that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar the plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages against the County of Nelson. However, in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) the United States Supreme Court recently held that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against the County of Nelson will be dismissed. ... In light of the decision in Bruce, this court has determined that the individual members of the Nelson County Board of Supervisors were acting within the scope of their legislative activity when they voted on the rezoning request and therefore are entitled to absolute legislative immunity. ... The rationale used in Newport applies equally to a claim for punitive damages against a County Board of Supervisors as it does to a claim for punitive damages against the County itself. In both instances there is no evidence that Congress intended to disturb the common law immunity from punitive damages given these entities when it enacted § 1983 nor are there sufficient policy considerations to expose these entities to punitive damages for the alleged bad faith of its officials. For these reasons, the claim for punitive damages against the Nelson County Board of Supervisors and the County of Nelson will be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging deprivation of a protected right to show that the deprivation occurred without meaningful due process.

SW BY JW v. Warren · filed 2007-11-16

Because plaintiffs fail to allege that they were deprived of meaningful due process we grant the motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek relief for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, including denial of due process.

Di Lella v. UNIVERSITY OF DIST. OF COLUMBIA · filed 2008-08-05

Di Lella's complaint indicates that she was afforded notice of the charges against her, received copies of all the evidence considered, and took advantage of four separate opportunities to present her side of the story. These facts establish that Di Lella cannot prevail on her § 1983 claim. Accordingly, Di Lella's § 1983 claim is subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 immunity depends on whether the official's claimed privilege has a common-law counterpart.

Enlow v. Tishomingo County, Mississippi, Jim Wall, in His Individual Capacity · filed 1992-08-06

In determining whether an immunity defense is available in a section 1983 suit, a critical initial question is "whether an official claiming immunity under § 1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he asserts.”

Although a state statute of limitations borrowed for a § 1983 damages claim supplies the length of the limitations period, federal law governs when that period begins to run, which is when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Sevier v. Turner · filed 1984-09-20

Although state law provides the statute of limitations to be applied in a § 1983 damages action, federal law governs the question of when that limitations period begins to run. ... The statute of limitations commences to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against local officials when the plaintiff establishes a constitutional entitlement or unconstitutional discrimination.

Culebra Enterprises Corp. v. Rios · filed 1985-10-29

Only by establishing a constitutional entitlement to the use of property or by establishing unconstitutional discrimination by local officials can a party make out a Section 1983 claim for damages.

Section 1983 permits a tenant to pursue a claim when a state actor arbitrarily terminates Section 8 benefits in violation of an enforceable federal right.

Gammons v. Massachusetts Department of Housing & Community Development · filed 2007-11-28

Accordingly, I conclude that a tenant who claims her Section 8 benefits have been arbitrarily terminated because a hearing officer’s decision is not based on a preponderance of the evidence pressed at the hearing sufficiently states a claim under § 1983.

A § 1983 false arrest claim accrues on the date of the arrest.

McCune v. The City of Grand Rapids, a Municipal Corporation Francis Pierce Gerald Steele John Doe and Richard R · filed 1988-03-25

When the claim is for false arrest, a section 1983 cause of action accrues on the date the arrest was made.

Section 1983 claims in Alabama are subject to Alabama’s one-year limitations period, and a salary raise recommendation that was never adopted is not a protected property interest whose denial requires due process.

Doyle v. The University of Alabama in Birmingham · filed 1982-07-19

There is no dispute that Alabama’s one-year statute of limitations applies to all the § 1983 claims raised here. ... The salary claim, although not barred by the statute of limitations, must nonetheless be dismissed here because Doyle fails to allege facts sufficient to establish that she was deprived of a protected property interest. ... Doyle had no protected property interest in the mere recommendation for a raise; thus she was not entitled to due process safeguards when the recommended raise was disapproved by the University.

Section 1983 actions borrow an analogous state limitations period, but state-law notice and waiting requirements do not restrict the federal action.

Peltack v. Borough of Manville · filed 1982-09-23

Plaintiff, Francis Peltack, has brought this suit under the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, against the Borough of Manville and certain public officials of that municipality alleging that the defendants’ failure to restore him to his office as Borough Clerk, pursuant to the statute just quoted violated due process. ... The Borough recognizes correctly, I believe, that an action under the civil rights statutes borrows the limitations period from an analogous state statute of repose. ... However, the federal action is not thereby restricted to the full parameters of the tort claims act. ... I find that the six month repose period cannot be appended to a federal civil rights suit for the reasons articulated in the cases just cited with respect to the notice provision. ... I will therefore deny the Borough’s motion to dismiss on this ground.

A § 1983 claim alleging denial of a fair trial resulting in wrongful conviction and incarceration accrues when the conviction is reversed.

Venegas v. Wagner · filed 1983-04-28

Where denial of a fair trial is alleged, the primary injury is the wrongful conviction and resulting incarceration. See id. Such a claim does not accrue until the primary injury complained of occurs. In contrast, where false arrest or illegal search and seizure is alleged, the conduct and asserted injury are discrete and complete upon occurrence, and the cause of action can reasonably be deemed to have accrued when the wrongful act occurs. ... Under the holding of Cline, the limitations period on Venegas' civil rights claim did not begin to run until reversal of his conviction by the California Supreme Court on September 17, 1974.

A § 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Arquette v. Hancock · filed 1983-07-29

The cause of action accrued when Arquette knew or had reason to know of the injury.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the tortfeasor interferes with the victim's rights.

Bell v. Metropolitan School Dist. of Shakamak · filed 1983-08-24

A claim pursuant to § 1983 arises at the time a tortfeasor interferes with a victims rights.

State law supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims, but federal law determines when the federal cause of action accrues.

Compton v. Ide · filed 1984-05-08

The statute of limitations for claims under section 1983 is determined by state law. ... Federal law, however, determines when a cause of action accrues.

A cause of action under section 1983 accrues, for statute-of-limitations purposes, according to federal law rather than state law.

Tirolerland, Inc. v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc. · filed 1984-06-28

Federal law determines when a claim accrues under § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows the facts establishing the constitutional injury, even if the plaintiff learns the injury's full ramifications later.

Marrapese v. The State of Rhode Island · filed 1985-02-19

Under these circumstances, Marrapese had a clear section 1983 claim against the defendants, on other but related grounds, notwithstanding his ignorance of the malignant properties of benzidine.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury forming the basis of the action.

Rowe v. Lewis · filed 1986-04-15

The time of accrual of a civil rights claim is “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis for the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

A Section 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury forming the basis of the action.

Drum v. Nasuti · filed 1986-11-25

A plaintiff’s civil rights cause of action accrues when the plaintiff “knew or had reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of this action.”

Federal law governs accrual of a § 1983 claim, which occurs when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury giving rise to the action.

Balzano v. Township of North Bergen · filed 1986-12-23

In determining when a cause of action ... accrues ... under § 1983, however, I must look to federal rather than state law. ... Under the facts of the case at bar, I find more persuasive the cases cited by plaintiff which hold that a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury giving rise to the § 1983 action.

A § 1983 claim borrows the forum state’s tort limitations period but accrues under federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the action.

Medina v. Almodovar · filed 1987-05-15

In Section 1983 actions, which sound in tort, the applicable prescription period is the forum State’s statute of limitations for tort claims. ... Under federal law a Section 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action”.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of the action.

Syre v. Pennsylvania · filed 1987-05-27

Plaintiffs section 1983 claim accrued on the date he knew or had reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.

A § 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury forming the basis of the action.

Smith v. City of Gardendale · filed 1987-05-29

The Smiths knew or had reason to know of their injury, which is the basis of this action, at least as early as July 28, 1979, the date on which Mr. Smith acknowledged receipt of the mayor's letter notifying Mr. Smith that "[i]t appears that your house is located less than the required rear set back line."

A Section 1983 limitations period accrues under federal law when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury forming the basis of the claim.

Williams v. Dayton Police Department · filed 1987-06-10

The statute of limitations commences to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action. ... A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence. ... Thus, the Plaintiffs’ claim accrued in this case on the date that they discovered or should have discovered the alleged violation of their civil rights.

A § 1983 action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury forming the claim.

Fairley v. Hon. Bill Allain, Governor, State of Mississippi · filed 1987-07-02

Fairley’s action, therefore, was time-barred one year from the date when he knew or had reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action.

A § 1983 conspiracy allegation does not postpone accrual of claims based on the conspirators’ separate wrongful acts.

Jones v. Coughlin · filed 1987-06-30

The time at which plaintiff becomes aware of an injury for which he or she may recover damages in a civil suit, is the moment the statute begins to run. ... Consequently, under the rule of ... no matter how recent the most current in a chain of constitutional torts, § 1983 violations committed outside the statute of limitations cannot be brought inside by an allegation of the existence of a conspiracy.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury forming the basis of the action.

Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage · filed 1987-10-09

The federal rule is generally stated to be that a section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Craig v. Township of Ewing · filed 1988-02-16

A cause of action asserted pursuant to Section 1983 accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the action.

Santiago v. Perez · filed 1988-07-01

Under federal law a Section 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.”

Section 1983 claims accrue when the alleged deprivations initially occur, rather than when their consequences become more painful.

Farmer v. Seiter · filed 1988-10-19

Upon consideration we conclude that this action was properly dismissed because Farmer's claims accrued on the dates the events initially occurred, and not at a later time when the consequences of the alleged deprivations became more painful.

Federal law governs when a § 1983 claim accrues, and reasonable diligence in discovering the claim bears on whether the limitations period has expired.

D'ANGELO v. City of New York · filed 1996-05-28

Instead, more recent decisions in this circuit have treated the issue of when a cause of action accrues in § 1983 actions as an issue to be resolved by federal, not state, law. ... Under the federal law of accrual, to be entitled to summary judgment, defendants must establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether plaintiff could, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been aware of the claim within three years of the filing of this complaint on November 8, 1994.