42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 due-process claim based on a random, unauthorized property deprivation requires pleading and proof that state postdeprivation procedures are inadequate.

Wilson v. Foltz · filed 1987-11-16

Plaintiff failed to adequately plead and prove the inadequacy of state post-deprivation procedures and therefore failed to state a federal cause of action for denial of procedural due process.

A § 1983 property-deprivation claim fails when the defendants had no personal connection to the events and the plaintiff did not show that state courts lacked an adequate remedy.

Roscoe W. Fields, Sr. v. Kyle Testerman, Herbert Kidd, Robert W. Bowers, Duane Ausetts, and Ben McGovern · filed 1988-03-03

This pro se plaintiff appeals the district court's judgment dismissing his civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1985. ... The district court granted summary judgment because the defendants were not personally connected with the events and because the plaintiff failed to show that the state courts did not provide an adequate remedy. ... Upon review, we conclude the district court's action was proper for the reasons stated in its order dated March 19, 1987. Accordingly, we affirm that decision.

Section 1983 provides no federal cause of action for a claimed property injury when government action deprives the claimant of no constitutionally protected property interest.

Calvert Investments, Inc. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District · filed 1988-05-24

MSD’s actions did not deprive Calvert of property within the meaning of the Constitution, and it has no federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the injuries it claims.

Section 1983 does not support a procedural due process claim for a temporary detention of property when the state provides an adequate remedy for any resulting deprivation.

Poindexter v. Town of Rocky Mount · filed 1988-06-09

The district court ruled, however, that the detention of the station wagon for the levy did not support a section 1983 action because the State of Virginia provides an adequate remedy for any deprivation of property rights that might have occurred. Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542 (1981). Finding no merit to the Poindexters' contentions that no such adequate state remedy exists, 2 we affirm that decision of the district court.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming that state officials intentionally deprived him of property to plead specific facts supporting the asserted intent.

Wendell Dale Lewis and Martin Hernandez v. Warden Woods · filed 1988-07-07

In a suit against state officials under § 1983, mere assertions of the intentionality of a challenged act are not enough; the plaintiff must allege specific facts to support such assertions, ... and the plaintiffs here have not done so.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a random, unauthorized deprivation of property without due process to plead and ultimately prove that available state remedies are inadequate.

Bout v. City of Grand Rapids · filed 1988-07-27

In order to state a claim for such an occurrence under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, however, plaintiff must first plead and eventually prove the inadequacy of any state remedies which might be available to him. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Vicroy v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984). As review of the pleadings indicates that plaintiff has failed to satisfy that requirement, the district court did not err in dismissing his complaint.

A fixed-term public employee cannot maintain a § 1983 due process claim for premature discharge when a state breach-of-contract action adequately remedies the loss of employment.

Heath v. Highland Park School District · filed 1992-09-02

Therefore under Ramsey, a state court breach of contract action provides Plaintiff with an adequate state remedy for the loss of his employment, and a § 1983 action cannot be maintained.

A § 1983 procedural due process claim arising from municipal zoning action fails when adequate state review remedies were available for the alleged violation.

Bushey v. Town of China · filed 1994-08-03

Because the Busheys had an adequate state law remedy for any alleged violation by the Town of them civil rights, they are precluded from seeking a federal remedy pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an action challenging municipal taxation when an adequate state remedy exists.

General Motors Corp. v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 1999-01-14

A citizen, like General Motors, may not maintain a section 1983 action challenging municipal taxation when an adequate state remedy exists.

Section 1983 relief is unavailable for a state tax exemption challenge when the State provides an adequate legal remedy.

Tri-State Christian T.V., Inc. v. Dillenberg · filed 2000-09-29

Relief under section 1983 is not available because the State has provided an adequate legal remedy (see, National Private Truck Council v Oklahoma Tax Commn., 515 US 582, 589-591), and thus, there is no basis for an award of attorneys’ fees under section 1988 (see, National Private Truck Council v Oklahoma Tax Commn., supra, at 592).

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 procedural due process claim for a random, unauthorized property deprivation must plead and prove that available state remedies are inadequate.

Mulazim v. Corrigan · filed 2001-03-22

The rule announced in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), permits dismissal of procedural due process claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if: 1) the deprivation was unpredictable or “random”; 2) predeprivation process was impossible or impracticable; and 3) the state actor was not authorized to take the action that deprived the plaintiff of property or liberty. Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir.1995). If these conditions are present, a procedural due process claim will not be stated unless the plaintiff pleads and proves that his available state remedies are inadequate to redress the wrong.

A taxpayer may not maintain a § 1983 claim when the state’s administrative process provides an adequate remedy.

Kowenhoven v. County of Allegheny · filed 2004-04-13

In our 1998 Murtagh decision we cited National Private Truck Council for the proposition that a taxpayer may not maintain a claim raised under § 1983 where the state’s administrative process provides a taxpayer with an adequate remedy. As noted by the trial court, this Court confirmed this holding in Jordan, cited above. Based upon these decisions, and upon our conclusion above that an adequate statutory remedy exists, we conclude that the trial court did not err.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to state a claim when jail officials fail to return property taken from him during custody.

Kimbrough v. Dave O'neil, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of St. Clair County, Illinois · filed 1975-09-26

Plaintiff’s allegation that the ring which was taken from him by defendants was not returned to him upon his release from their custody is sufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for an alleged taking of property when the state provides an appropriate remedy.

Primary Care Physicians Group v. Ledbetter · filed 1986-02-21

The court, however, also holds that the plaintiffs’ complaint does not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There is no allegation that the state does not provide an adequate remedy to challenge the alleged unconstitutional deprivation of the plaintiffs’ property rights. As long as the state provides an appropriate remedy for the alleged taking of property, there is no violation of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for a due process suit when a constitutionally adequate state tort claims act supplies a suitable remedy.

Hossman v. William Spradlin, James Kimmel and Jack R. Duckworth · filed 1987-01-13

To the extent that appellant seeks to distinguish his case from Daniels and Hudson, appellant fails to realize that the common thread between the two cases, and their relevance to the instant case, is not their factual similarity but rather what each has to say about the extent to which the requirements of due process are implicated in a § 1983 suit and the extent to which due process can be satisfied by remedies other than a civil rights suit under § 1983. Thus, despite appellant’s assertion to the contrary, Daniels and Hudson are not only instructive, they are dispositive of his second argument.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for negligent deprivation of property or intentional random deprivation when adequate state remedies are available.

Francis v. State of Maryland Howard County, Maryland Howard County Police Department · filed 1987-06-01

The claims of unlawful conversion or negligent loss fail to state a claim under Sec. 1983. Negligent deprivation of property does not state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Daniels v. Williams, --- U.S. ----, 54 U.S.L.W. 4090 (Jan. 21, 1986). Further, intentional deprivation of property through random action by a state employee does not state a cognizable claim under Sec. 1983 if there are adequate state remedies available. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a state actor’s unauthorized deprivation of a prisoner’s property when an adequate post-deprivation remedy is available.

Laufgas v. Speziale · filed 2008-02-04

Next, the District Court properly dismissed Laufgas’s claim that prison officials impermissibly disposed of his personal property, as a prisoner’s cause of action based on unauthorized deprivation of property by a state actor is not actionable under section 1983 unless there is no adequate post-deprivation remedy available.

Section 1983 plaintiffs claiming a deprivation of property without procedural due process must prove that state remedies are inadequate.

Wagner v. Higgins · filed 1985-02-08

Our court has held twice recently that in an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for deprivation of property under color of law without due process, the plaintiff must prove the absence of adequate state remedies as an element of the constitutional tort. ... We agree with the district court that under Parratt v. Taylor Wagner's complaint fails to state a cause of action cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a negligent or intentional deprivation of a prisoner's property when the state offers an adequate post deprivation remedy.

Riper v. Nevada State Prison Officials · filed 2009-09-01

The district court properly dismissed Ki-per’s claim that defendant Adamson deprived him of property without due process because Riper had an adequate post deprivation remedy under Nevada law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional deprivations, but an adequate post-deprivation remedy can defeat a procedural due process claim brought under it.

Attallah v. New York College of Osteopathic Medicine · filed 2015-03-27

In sum, because an adequate post-deprivation remedy exists for review of plaintiffs expulsion, there can be no Fourteenth Amendment violation to support a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for a deprivation caused by an unauthorized state act when an adequate post-deprivation remedy is available.

O'Keeffe v. Erkenbrecher · filed 2015-04-08

We hold that the remedy provided by California in this case, under these facts, was an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Therefore, assuming, without deciding, that O’Keeffe’s due process rights were violated, he nonetheless received the appropriate state remedy. Under the facts of this case, due process was satisfied by the remedy provided. O’Keeffe chose to not avail himself of the post-deprivation remedy. Thus, O’Keeffe cannot state a claim under Parratt.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner's property loss when an adequate state law remedy is available.

Palmer v. John Doe Sergeant · filed 2016-05-05

To that end, a Section 1983 action cannot be brought to vindicate a prisoner’s right to property where the deprivation occurs as a result of a tortious act of a state employee and where an adequate remedy exists to compensate those who suffered tortious loss at the hands of the state.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for deprivation of personal property when an adequate post-deprivation state remedy is available.

Moore v. Corpening · filed 2019-09-30

To the extent Plaintiff seeks return of personal property, a claim based on the deprivation of his personal property is not actionable under § 1983 unless there is no adequate post-deprivation remedy available.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a prison official’s unauthorized deprivation of property when the state offers an adequate post-deprivation remedy.

(PC) Bland v. Cox · filed 2020-06-16

Because plaintiff can recover under California law, § 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle for relief.

A § 1983 claim that cannot be resolved without examining the validity of the plaintiff’s confinement must be dismissed without prejudice.

Copus v. City of Edgerton · filed 1996-09-25

When a plaintiff files a § 1983 action that cannot be resolved without inquiring into the validity of confinement, the court should dismiss the suit without prejudice.

A challenge to the disallowance of good time credits, which affects the duration of custody, belongs in habeas corpus rather than a § 1983 action.

Stevenson v. Larry Smith and Fred Allenbrand · filed 1992-11-18

"[S]tate prisoners' challenges to the disallowance of good time credits [are] a challenge to the duration of their imprisonment.... [T]he writ of habeas corpus [is] the appropriate remedy for such claims." Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d at 951 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-90 (1973)). Hence, we will not address the claim in this § 1983 proceeding.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; a claim that could lead to earlier release must be pursued through habeas corpus before it may be refiled under § 1983.

Goforth v. Collins · filed 1988-04-08

Nonetheless, the plaintiff's suit must still be dismissed. Federal courts should not entertain a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 if the matter challenges the fact or duration of confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir.1985) (per curiam). Inasmuch as adjudication of the plaintiff's civil rights claims could ultimately result in an earlier release date, the district court should dismiss this action without prejudice to the plaintiff's opportunity to refile his Sec. 1983 claims if he establishes, through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, that his constitutional rights have been violated.

A prisoner attacking the duration of confinement and seeking speedier release must proceed by habeas corpus rather than Section 1983.

Johnson v. Livesay · filed 1987-05-13

Petitioner attacked the duration of his confinement and sought a speedier release. His sole remedy, therefore, was a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. SS2254.

A pleading styled as a Section 1983 action must be treated as habeas corpus when it primarily challenges continued custody resulting from an adverse parole decision.

Jackie M. West v. Parole Commissioner · filed 1986-12-12

Even though appellant initially characterized his complaint as an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the district court properly construed it as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241 as it primarily stood as a challenge to his continued custody in consequence of an adverse decision regarding his eligibility for parole.

A prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement must proceed through habeas corpus rather than Section 1983.

Morrison v. Gage · filed 1986-03-10

To the extent plaintiff questions the fact or duration of his present confinement he must pursue remedies available under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254, not the civil rights statutes.

Section 1983 is not the vehicle for a prisoner's action attacking the length of confinement; the court treats such a complaint as an application for habeas relief.

Roderick v. Bond · filed 1982-12-06

When a prisoner files an action that attacks the length of his confinement, his sole remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. ... Thus, the Court will treat the § 1983 complaint as an application for habeas relief.

Section 1983 does not cover prison classification or sentence-computation claims that implicate the duration of confinement.

Williams v. Wilkinson · filed 2003-10-20

Williams’s claims that Mr. Bell assigned him to the wrong prison classification and miscomputed his sentence are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they implicate the duration of Williams’s confinement.

Section 1983 cannot be used for a prisoner’s challenge to the fact or duration of confinement when the claim must proceed through habeas corpus and state remedies must be exhausted.

Harper v. Gibson · filed 1987-08-04

Thus, where a prisoner challenges a review board’s determination, and does not challenge the constitutionality of the procedures on the statutory regulation used by the prison review board in revoking good-time credits or determining parole, that challenge cannot be brought under § 1983.

A federal court must stay its hand on a Section 1983 damages action when deciding it would imply a ruling on the legality of the fact or duration of confinement.

Galloway v. Watts · filed 1975-05-01

While requests for monetary relief properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not controlled by Preiser, this Court finds that the reasoning of that case and the policy considerations underlying the principle of comity require a federal court to stay its hand where disposition of the damage action would imply a ruling on the legality of the fact or duration of confinement.

Section 1983 does not authorize service of process.

Burstein v. The State Bar of California · filed 1982-12-14

We find that, since the federal statutes under which the claim in this case is made, sections 1983 and 1343, do not authorize service of process, the second sentence of rule 4(e) requires that we find amenability to personal jurisdiction only “under the circumstances” in which a Louisiana court could.

Section 1983 claims do not require service of process on the Florida Department of Insurance under section 768.28(7), Florida Statutes.

Matthews v. Wells · filed 1994-08-19

Eugene F. Matthews appeals a final judgment entered pursuant to a directed verdict on his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The trial court directed a verdict because Mr. Matthews had failed to serve process on the Department of Insurance, pursuant to section 768.28(7), Florida Statutes (1989). We reverse because such service of process is not required for a federal civil rights claim.

Section 1983 does not authorize nationwide service of process.

Scherer v. Curators of the University of Missouri & Law School Admission Council · filed 2001-07-18

Neither of these two prongs is met in the instant case. First, the Tenth Circuit has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for nationwide service of process.

Section 1983 lacks a service-of-process provision, so courts use the forum state's jurisdictional statutes to reach out-of-state defendants.

Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Antt · filed 2008-06-18

We adopt Texas’s jurisdictional statutes to reach out-of-state defendants, because § 1983 lacks a provision for services of process.

Section 1983 does not itself provide rules for serving process, so personal jurisdiction is determined under the forum state's law.

Kinslow, Jimmy v. Pullara, Frank · filed 2008-08-14

Though some federal statutes expressly provide rules for service of process (such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa), § 1983 is not one of them.

Section 1983 has no service-of-process provision, so federal courts use state jurisdictional statutes to reach out-of-state defendants.

Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski · filed 2008-01-14

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lacks a provision for service of process,... federal courts adopt state jurisdictional statutes to reach out-of-state defendants.

Section 1983 does not provide for nationwide service of process; personal jurisdiction depends on forum law and due process.

Hoeller v. Village of Barrington Manager · filed 2015-10-23

Because § 1983 does not provide for nationwide service of process, see Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2008), the Eastern District of Wisconsin acquires personal jurisdiction only to the extent permitted by the law of Wisconsin and due process.

Section 1983 does not provide for nationwide service of process.

Mandeville v. Crowley · filed 2017-06-07

The only federal statute cited by Mandeville in his complaint, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not “provide[] for nationwide service of process.” Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070; see Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006).

Section 1983 does not authorize nationwide service of process.

Ramirez-Fort v. Medical University of South Carolina · filed 2020-04-20

Ramírez provides no citation to any nationwide service of process section in the statutes upon which she purports to bring her federal claims—Title VII, Title IX, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Equal Pay Act, and HIPAA—and, indeed, seems to concede the absence of any such provision. See Docket No. 20 at pp. 7–9. The Court has not identified any such provisions.

A Section 1983 claim for interference with the right to counsel requires actual interference that was wrongfully motivated or lacked adequate justification.

Lee v. Mihalich · filed 1986-02-12

In order to prevail on this claim arising under section 1983, plaintiffs must show that defendants interfered with their right to counsel and that “the interference was either wrongfully motivated or without adequate justification.”

Section 1983 does not provide relief where the defendants' conduct did not deny plaintiffs access to counsel of their choice.

Susan B. ex rel. Lisa S. v. Planavsky · filed 1982-12-21

The forecast of evidence in this case does not show that defendants, or any of them, denied plaintiffs their rights to the advice of counsel, but rather shows that plaintiffs sought and obtained the advice and assistance of counsel during plaintiffs’ period of commitment to Dix Hospital. While the forecast of evidence does regrettably show that defendants manifested a significant degree of resentment toward and disapproval of plaintiffs’ use of “outside” counsel, such resentment and disapproval did not result in a denial of plaintiffs’ rights in any respect. Under this forecast of evidence, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985) claims on their alleged denial of their rights to or access to counsel of their choice.

Appointment of counsel in a § 1983 action is authorized only in exceptional circumstances, assessed principally from the type of case and the plaintiff's ability to represent himself.

Paul Edward Archie, Paul Edward Archie v. Christian · filed 1987-03-17

Appointment of counsel is authorized in § 1983 actions only in “exceptional circumstances.” ... The existence of such circumstances depends primarily on the type of case and the abilities of the plaintiff to represent himself.

Section 1983 permits a decedent’s estate to seek damages for pain and suffering the decedent experienced before death.

Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit · filed 2011-05-10

This court, however, has previously considered this issue and concluded that limitations on the recovery of pain and suffering damages are inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983. ... The court discerns no principled reason to depart from its conclusion in Williams.

Section 1983 permits damages for physical injuries caused by unconstitutional conduct even when the plaintiff’s conviction remains intact.

Pearson v. Weischedel · filed 2009-10-19

Such physical injuries are distinct from the “injury” of being convicted and imprisoned and are compensable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages for pain and suffering caused by a defendant’s acts even without proof of external injury.

Henson v. Thezan · filed 1988-11-02

In any case, if plaintiff can prove his allegations with regard to the treatment he received from defendants, then he can recover damages for any pain and suffering occasioned by their acts.

Section 1983 permits recovery for physical and intangible injuries, including pain and suffering, humiliation, mental distress, and embarrassment.

Rollins Freeman v. Gayle Franzen, Rollins Freeman v. Alfred Branche · filed 1982-12-15

Physical injury as well as intangible injuries, such as pain and suffering, personal humiliation, mental distress, and embarrassment are compensable injuries under Section 1983.

Section 1983 compensatory damages may cover economic harm, pain and suffering, mental and emotional distress, and other losses caused by the violation of federal rights.

Cole v. Snow · filed 1984-05-09

Under section 1983, Blackburn is entitled to compensation for economic harm, pain and suffering, mental and emotional distress, as well as any other losses that result from the violations of her rights.

Section 1983 compensates mental and emotional distress caused by a constitutional violation even when the plaintiff lost no salary.

Anderson v. Central Point School District No. 6 · filed 1984-10-29

Defendants’ position, however, confuses the cause of action with the nature of the damages suffered. ... Here, the protected interest is the appellant’s first amendment rights, and his damages are the result of a violation of those rights. ... where injury such as mental and emotional distress is caused by the constitutional violation, that injury is compensable under section 1983.

Section 1983 compensatory damages are limited to actual damages proven with sufficient certainty to be a direct and proximate result of the constitutional violation.

Bass Plating Co. v. Town of Windsor · filed 1986-04-23

The basic purpose of an award of damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 is to compensate for the injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights. ... As compensatory damages the plaintiff is entitled to recover only those actual damages which it proved with sufficient certainty to be a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful acts.

Section 1983 permits compensation for intangible constitutional injuries, but recovery beyond nominal damages requires proof of actual injury.

Lebron v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1987-03-05

A plaintiff may recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional torts which inflict only intangible injuries. ... However, because recovery under § 1983 rests upon the principle of compensation, ... monetary recovery is limited to actual, demonstrable injuries; when injury is presumed, rather than proven, only nominal damages may be awarded.

Section 1983 compensatory damages follow common-law tort principles and may include monetary loss, humiliation, mental anguish, and suffering.

Hagge v. Bauer · filed 1987-08-17

Compensatory damages in § 1983 cases are ordinarily determined according to the principles derived from the common law of torts. It is unquestioned that compensation includes out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, as well as personal humiliation, mental anguish and suffering.

Section 1983 permits damages for proven mental and emotional distress caused by a constitutional violation.

Jones v. City of Key West, Fla. · filed 1988-02-25

Damages for mental and emotional distress are recoverable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for proven actual injury caused by a procedural due process violation, including mental and emotional distress.

Stevens v. F.H. McHan Major, Cummins Unit, A.D.C. · filed 1993-09-07

A § 1983 plaintiff who can prove actual injury from a procedural due process violation is entitled to compensatory damages. ... Mental and emotional distress caused by a denial of procedural due process are compensable injuries in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits recovery for emotional harm from police brutality even when physical injuries are minor.

Ingram v. City of Columbus · filed 1999-07-19

As we recognized in Holmes, a victim of police brutality may recover under § 1983 for “emotional harm [that] can often be quite difficult to measure in mere monetary terms.” 78 F.3d at 1048. In accordance with these legal precedents, the district court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the officers did not use excessive force against Ingram and Collins on the grounds that they did not suffer sufficient injuries.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil-rights action for injuries from a parolee's crime when the crime is too remote from the parole authorities' state action.

Humann v. Wilson · filed 1983-01-05

Both of these conditions obtain in the present case, and contribute to the remoteness of the crime from any action by the state. Thus, on the facts before us there is no civil rights violation, and the dismissal of the Sec. 1983 claim was proper.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil-rights action for injuries from a crime that is too remote from the state's action.

Humann v. Wilson · filed 1983-01-05

In the present case the actions of the parole board were also too remote from the crime to give rise to a civil rights action.

Section 1983 excludes liability when the injury did not result directly from the act of a person acting under color of state law.

Sherrill v. Wilson · filed 1983-06-30

... in excluding liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for injury not resulting directly from the act of a person acting under color of state law, shows that Count IV of the amended petition, referring to violation of the decedent’s “Fourteenth Amendment rights,” does not state a separate claim which might support recovery.

An independently initiated criminal prosecution severs the causal chain between an earlier unlawful police search and post-charge defense costs or distress claimed as Section 1983 damages.

Novick v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1983-10-19

The connection between acts leading to arrest and a prosecution must be severed for purposes of awarding damages in section 1983 suits. There is no constitutional right of which we are aware to be free from having to defend oneself against criminal charges initiated in good faith. Likewise, there is no constitutional violation from having to defend oneself against a criminal charge brought in good faith. Correlatively, not every injury involving a state official is actionable under United States Code section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make state licensing officials liable for injuries when their failure to revoke liquor licenses or enforce state law was not the proximate cause of those injuries.

King v. Pace · filed 1983-11-29

Therefore, with regard to the first element of a § 1983 action — whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law — I conclude that the plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that the defendants’ inaction was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the decedents.

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant caused the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Touchton v. Kroger Company · filed 1987-06-26

Given this recognition, then, for a plaintiff to state a cause of action under § 1983, he must allege facts which, when taken as true, state that the defendant caused plaintiff to be subjected to a deprivation of his constitutional rights.

Allegations that state officials devised and carried out the challenged acts can satisfy § 1983’s state action and causation requirements.

Joubert-Vazquez v. Alvarez-Rubio · filed 2011-10-24

In this case, Plaintiffs’ complaint easily satisfies the first prong of the foregoing requirements. Their complaint alleges that co-defendants Alvarez and Rivera, acting as SIFC officials, devised and carried out the actions giving rise to this suit. Likewise, these allegations also satisfy the causality requisite of § 1983. Defendants’ motion is therefore deficient as to these points.

Section 1983 conspiracy and failure to supervise claims require an underlying constitutional violation.

Henry v. Johnson · filed 2020-02-20

Under our precedent, Henry is “required to prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege in order to prevail on a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim.” Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1999). Similarly, a failure to supervise claim brought under § 1983 will “automatically fail for lack of an underlying constitutional violation.” Mendoza v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 849 F.3d 408, 419–20 (8th Cir. 2017). We therefore hold Henry’s civil conspiracy and failure to supervise claims fail as a matter of law.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires allegations describing the conspiracy in some detail and facts supporting its existence.

Specht v. Guy Pierce, Lieutenant Leibach, B. Wheeler · filed 1994-09-06

In order to state a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the plaintiff must plead conspiracy in some detail and provide some factual basis supporting the existence of a conspiracy.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for conspiracy alone; the conspiracy must result in an actual denial of a civil right.

Coleman v. Ballentine · filed 1983-01-13

Section 1983 does not, however, punish conspiracy; an actual denial of a civil right is necessary before a cause of action arises.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires more than merely endorsing or encouraging legislation that later proves unconstitutional.

Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Miguel A. Rivera Rios · filed 1987-03-11

One who conspires with state actors to violate another’s civil rights under color of state law may be liable under section 1983. ... Something more, however, than simple endorsement and encouragement of legislation that turns out to be unconstitutional is a necessary element of a section 1983 claim based upon a conspiracy theory.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires evidence of a shared unlawful objective; correspondence and discussions alone do not establish one.

Vieux v. East Bay Regional Park District · filed 1990-01-10

In order to prove a civil conspiracy, the parties to have conspired must have reached "a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement." ... Although appellants showed correspondence or discussions between the Park District and other defendants, they have not shown an "illegal objective."

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires pleading and proof of both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of rights.

Dixon v. City of Lawton, Oklahoma · filed 1990-03-08

Thus, we join those courts which have recognized that to recover under a Sec. 1983 conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must plead and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of rights; pleading and proof of one without the other will be insufficient.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires a deprivation of a constitutional right, and evidence of an agreement may include conduct preceding that deprivation.

Snell v. Tunnell · filed 1990-11-30

While a deprivation of a constitutional right is essential to proceed under a Sec. 1983 conspiracy claim, proof of an agreement to deprive often will require examination of conduct occurring prior to the deprivation.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim against a state employee in her individual capacity despite the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine when the alleged conduct is unconstitutional.

Snell v. Asbury · filed 1991-11-04

However, such section 1983 conspiracy, suits may proceed against state officials acting in their individual capacities because when an. officer acts unconstitutionally, then the officer is “ ‘stripped of his [or her] official or representative character and is subjected in his [or her] person to the consequences of his [or her] official [individual in original] conduct.’ ” Barger v. Kansas, 620 F.Supp. at 1437 (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 453-54, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)). The Court finds this reasoning compelling in light of the findings and legal conclusions by the Tenth Circuit regarding defendant Asbury. Therefore, the Court believes that plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim should go forward against defendant As-bury, but only in her individual capacity.

The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars section 1983 conspiracy claims against school administrators for conduct within the scope of their official duties.

Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Hononegah School Dist. 207 · filed 1993-09-30

The remaining issue is whether the intracorporate immunity doctrine should also apply to bar any conspiracy claims under section 1983. ... This court believes the same reasoning applies with equal force to a conspiratorial section 1983 claim in this context. Section 1983 is of the same Congressional vintage as section 1985. Furthermore, a section 1983 conspiracy claim would also have potentially the same disruptive effect on business decisions as a section 1985 conspiracy action. Thus, plaintiffs conspiracy claims premised on section 1983 against Kern, Spurlock and Davison are barred as well.

A conspiracy claim under Section 1983 requires a factual basis and cannot rest on mere conclusory allegations.

Placido Laboy, Jr. v. Pucinski · filed 1993-10-15

His complaint is insufficient to establish a conspiracy at all, much less a conspiracy that aims to deprive him of his constitutional rights. See Bowman, 980 F.2d at 1107 ("a complaint must contain more than mere conclusory allegations of a conspiracy" under Sec. 1983; a factual basis for such allegations must be provided).

Section 1983 permits no liability for a conspiracy to conceal excessive force when issue preclusion bars a finding that excessive force occurred.

Ashford v. Skiles · filed 1993-11-12

If issue preclusion operates to bar a finding that excessive force was employed by the defendant officers, there can be no liability for conspiracy to cover-up excessive force in violation of § 1983.

A conspiracy claim under Section 1983 requires evidence that the participants shared a common unlawful objective.

Martinez v. City of Stockton, Cal. · filed 1993-11-19

In an action alleging conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. 1983, "each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy." United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989). Martinez fails to make clear how, in the space of mere seconds, the officers arrived at a conspiracy. Martinez also fails to establish that the officers' common purpose, if any, was unlawful. ... Even drawing all inferences in favor of Martinez, as this court is required to do, there is not enough evidence on the conspiracy claim to merit consideration by a jury. The district court properly dismissed the conspiracy charge.

A conspiracy to deprive a person of civil rights is not actionable under § 1983 when the underlying civil-rights claims fail.

West v. Carson · filed 1995-03-03

Applied to West's case, the jury's finding that Carson and Will did not deprive him of his civil rights precludes a recovery for conspiracy to deprive West of those same rights.

Section 1983 permits liability to be imputed to conspirators when a constitutional deprivation occurs under color of state law in the course of their conspiracy.

Rojicek v. Community Consolidated School District 15 · filed 1995-07-10

In the second situation, a number of actors conspire and the conspiracy effectively deprives another of a constitutional right under color of state law. Here, the allegation of conspiracy allows the plaintiff to impute liability onto multiple defendants provided the underlying deprivation was performed in the course of the conspiracy.

Section 1983 allows a federal civil rights conspiracy claim against an employer and its employees acting in their official capacities when the plaintiff pleads an underlying federal right.

Butler v. City of Prairie Village · filed 1997-04-11

The plaintiff has properly averred an underlying federal statutory and constitutional basis for his § 1983 conspiracy. ... Moreover, the Brever decision specifically undermines the moving defendants’ argument that a corporation and its corporate employees acting in their official corporate capacities cannot conspire with each other to violate another employee’s federal civil rights.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require evidence that defendants acted together and committed an overt act that caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Puglise v. Cobb County, Ga. · filed 1998-04-08

To establish a civil conspiracy under §§ 1983 or 1985, the plaintiffs must present evidence that the defendants acted in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy which resulted in the plaintiffs’ deprivation of a constitutional right.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts supporting an agreement to commit an illegal act and a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Rodriguez v. Neeley · filed 1999-03-05

Plaintiffs must develop facts from which a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Neeley agreed with others to commit an illegal act and that a deprivation of constitutional rights occurred.

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of a constitutional right; a conspiracy to deprive someone of that right is insufficient by itself.

Villanueva v. McInnis · filed 1984-01-23

Yet, it remains necessary to prove an actual deprivation of a constitutional right; a conspiracy to deprive is insufficient.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an actual violation of a constitutional right; a conspiracy alone is not actionable.

Venable v. Keever · filed 1999-08-24

Liability may be imposed under § 1983 based upon a conspiracy; however, a conspiracy claim is not actionable unless there is an actual violation of § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim fails without an underlying constitutional violation.

William Cefalu and Tyrone Cefalu, Plaintiffs-Appellants/cross-Appellees v. Village of Elk Grove, Defendants-Appellees/cr · filed 2000-05-10

First, because the jury exonerated the defendants of any substantive constitutional violation, the conspiracy claim necessarily falters under this circuit’s precedents.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires an understanding to deprive someone of constitutional rights and willful participation in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Williams, Norval v. Seniff, Rick · filed 2003-08-20

To establish § 1983 liability through a conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) a state official and private individual(s) reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, Starnes [v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 39 F.3d 1394, 1397 (7th Cir. 1994)]; and (2) those individual(s) were “willful participant[s] in joint activity with the State or its agents.” Adickes [v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)].

A conspiracy claim under Section 1983 requires facts showing an agreement to violate constitutional rights; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Woodrum v. Woodward County · filed 1989-01-25

To prove conspiracy between Rosson and the social services employees under Sec. 1983, an agreement or meeting of minds to violate the Woodrums' constitutional rights must be shown. ... Woodrum's conclusory allegations that Rosson and the social workers conspired do not support a claim for violation of his constitutional rights under Sec. 1983.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires joint action and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that deprives someone of a constitutional right.

Washington v. Buraker · filed 2004-06-23

To establish a civil conspiracy under § 1983, Washington must present evidence that the defendants “acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy which resulted in [Washington’s] deprivation of a constitutional right.”

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires both a conspiratorial agreement and an actual abridgment of a federally secured right.

Abdullah v. Kennet · filed 2004-07-15

“In order to make out an actionable conspiracy under section 1983, a plaintiff has to prove not only a conspiratorial agreement but also an actual abridgment of some federally-secured right.” ... Appellant has failed to state a claim for violation of the First or the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore, likewise has no cause of action for conspiracy under Section 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires factual allegations of an agreement and concerted action; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Bonilla v. Del Valle · filed 2004-09-22

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff failed to state a claim of conspiracy under to § 1983 simply because the allegations are merely conclusory.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim based on a First Amendment free exercise claim fails when the underlying claim does not survive summary judgment.

Ahmad v. Ehrmann · filed 2004-09-29

Because this claim does not survive summary judgment, neither can his related conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make alleged co-conspirators liable for another person’s acts without facts supporting agency, partnership, or joint venture.

Illinois Traffic Court Driver Improvement Educational Foundation v. Peoria Journal Star, Inc. · filed 1986-06-20

In the case at bar, the amended complaint contains no allegation that Goeken was acting under the direction or control of Covey or Barra, or of any agreement existing between the parties. It merely alleges the conclusion that they conspired to injure the plaintiffs. Therefore, in view of the plaintiffs’ failure to plead facts which would support a finding of agency, partnership or joint venture, we cannot find that Covey and Barra may be held liable for Goeken’s actions.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires allegations of facts sufficient to show that a conspiracy existed.

Buford v. J.G. Bozwell, Inc. · filed 2005-04-11

The district court properly dismissed Buford’s second amended complaint because he did not allege facts sufficient to show either the existence of a conspiracy, see Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.1992), or the mental state necessary to establish any Eighth Amendment violation, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).

A section 1983 conspiracy claim fails when the underlying civil rights claims are deficient.

McCracken v. City of Chinook, Mont. · filed 1987-01-30

As previously noted, the plaintiffs cast their section 1983 claims, not only in terms of individual conduct on the part of the named defendants, but also in terms of a conspiracy amongst the numerous defendants. ... More importantly, any claim of conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs of their civil rights necessarily fails, given the fatal deficiency of their substantive claims.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot survive summary judgment on conclusory allegations that defendants acted together to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Lashley v. Wakefield · filed 2005-05-02

Plaintiff offers only conclu-sory allegations that defendants acted in concert with each other to deprive him of his First Amendment rights. There is no evidence in the record to support that claim. Therefore, summary judgment is warranted.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim fails when the substantive constitutional claims on which it rests lack merit.

Vavrus v. Russo · filed 2005-05-10

And, the conspiracy claims were properly dismissed because they were grounded in substantive constitutional claims that are meritless.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot proceed against the sole remaining alleged participant when the claim against the only other alleged participant has failed.

Good v. Board of County · filed 2005-07-25

Because only Ms. Hamilton and Ms. Gordy allegedly participated in the conspiracy, and the district court had found no conspiracy concerning Ms. Gordy, the court correctly concluded Ms. Hamilton could not conspire alone.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to inflict an unconstitutional injury and an overt act causing damages.

Sylvester v. City of New York · filed 2005-09-06

A conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires the plaintiff to show: (1) an agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an actual deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Aguilera v. Baca · filed 2005-09-15

In any event, a conspiracy claim under § 1983 is not actionable unless there has been an actual deprivation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Section 1983 civil conspiracy requires joint action and an overt act that deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Curry v. Weiford · filed 2005-09-21

Moreover, to establish a civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that the defendants acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy which resulted in the plaintiffs deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not support a conspiracy claim without an actual deprivation of a protected right.

Gravely v. Speranza · filed 2006-01-17

Section 1983 does not create a cause of action for conspiracy to deprive a person of their constitutional rights without an actual deprivation of rights protected by the statute.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims cannot proceed against employees of the same public entity under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.

Anemone v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2006-01-24

Because Sansverie and all of his co-defendants are MTA employees, plaintiff cannot state free speech and due process conspiracy claims under § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim can proceed when factual allegations support a claim that defendants conspired to imprison the plaintiff on false charges.

Scinto v. Preston · filed 2006-03-14

Scinto’s assertions that the police and other defendants conspired to unlawfully imprison him on false charges state a claim. Further, we find that Scinto’s allegations are more than merely conclusory, because he offers evidence of the falsity of the charges and contends that Defendants failed to properly prosecute him and that all charges against him were dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a conspiracy to prove both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of rights.

Gilchrist v. City of OKC · filed 2006-04-04

To recover under a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) a conspiracy and (2) an actual deprivation of rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim must plead facts tending to show agreement and concerted action.

McDonald v. Coyle · filed 2006-04-06

Moreover, McDonald presents no facts to support his conspiracy allegations. Thus, they cannot survive dismissal because “the pleadings [in a conspiracy claim] must specifically present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action.”

Section 1983 does not make conspiracy an independent basis of liability.

Lewis, Peter A. v. Washington, Odie · filed 2006-04-28

Lewis appears to have misled the court into thinking that conspiracy is an independent basis of liability under § 1983; it is not.

A § 1983 conspiracy complaint survives dismissal when its factual allegations support a reasonable inference of an agreement to deny a constitutional right.

Lynn v. Christner · filed 2006-06-09

Although Lynn’s unduly rambling and repetitive Amended Complaint is not a model of clarity, we are constrained to conclude that the allegations state a § 1983 conspiracy claim sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and that summary judgment is premature.

Section 1983 permits an action for conspiracy to deprive a person of federally protected rights.

Birnbaum v. Trussell · filed 1966-12-28

We therefore conclude that an action may be maintained for conspiracy to violate See. 1983.

A § 1983 claim based on conspiracy requires evidence of the conspiracy; unsupported allegations in pleadings or affidavits do not suffice.

900 G.C. Affiliates, Inc. v. City of New York · filed 1973-11-16

While conspiracy must often be proved by inference rathér than by direct proof, the unsupported allegation that a conspiracy existed, whether it is contained in the pleadings or in affidavits, does not constitute sufficient evidence tending to show that a conspiracy existed.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires evidence that the defendants reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Mark v. Gustafson · filed 2006-08-30

[T]o succeed on his claim under § 1983, he will need to adduce evidence showing that defendants reached an understanding to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim only when the alleged agreement results in deprivation of a federally protected right.

Thore v. Howe · filed 2006-10-27

Thus, an allegation of conspiracy to deprive someone of, say, his constitutional right to due process states a claim under § 1983, cf. Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 1977), but an allegation of conspiracy to justify an illegal shooting does not.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a co-conspirator without alleging that each defendant personally used excessive force or made an unlawful arrest, if fellow conspirators committed those acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Garagher v. Marzullo · filed 2006-11-06

Co-conspirators are liable for acts taken by fellow conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. ... Accordingly, plaintiff need not allege each individual defendant engaged in the use of excessive force and unlawful arrest in order to state a claim for relief against the co-conspirators listed in counts I-V.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim cannot rest solely on conclusional allegations unsupported by specific facts.

Rosas v. Perez · filed 2006-11-16

The court dismissed the claim that Perez and Clark conspired to deprive Rosas of his opportunity to litigate his paternity suit, because the claim was based solely on conclusional allegations that were unsupported by any specific factual allegations. On appeal, Rosas has not alleged any factual basis supporting his claims. The district court did not err in finding that Rosas’s conclusional al- legations are insufficient to state a claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires facts showing an agreement among the alleged conspirators.

Ruttenberg v. Jones · filed 2006-12-13

It should be noted, however, that even if any of plaintiffs’ underlying claims were proper, dismissal of this conspiracy claim is proper because plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege any facts demonstrating an agreement amongst the alleged co-conspirators.

A conclusory allegation of conspiracy is insufficient to establish a claim under § 1983.

Sims v. Dretke · filed 2006-12-13

Sims’ conclusory allegation of a conspiracy is also insufficient to establish such a claim.

A section 1983 conspiracy claim requires a meeting of the minds and concerted action to violate constitutional rights.

Montoya v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2007-03-14

To state a section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the alleged conspirators had a meeting of the minds and engaged in concerted action to violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights.

A § 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires an underlying constitutional violation and particularized allegations that the defendants agreed to violate rights.

Youngblood v. Florida Department of Health · filed 2007-03-28

The district court also properly granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim. Plaintiffs have failed to prove the threshold element of this claim: the existence of an underlying constitutional violation. GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998). Also, Plaintiffs have presented no particularized allegations that Defendants reached an understanding to violate Plaintiffs’ rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against officers fails without evidence that they agreed to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Antoine Moody v. City of Albany, Georgia · filed 2007-04-09

In the complete absence of evidence of any agreement between the county deputies and the city officers to deprive him of a constitutional right, Moody’s claim must fail.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires evidence of an agreement to violate constitutional rights; an allegedly inadequate investigation alone does not establish one.

Sullivan v. Stein · filed 2007-05-30

And their bald assertion that the Inspectors should have done a more extensive investigation cannot itself provide any legitimate inference for a reasonable jury to conclude that there was an agreement between the Inspectors and Mr. Sullivans’ relatives to violate the Sullivans’ constitutional rights.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires evidence that the defendants agreed to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Bevan v. Durling · filed 2007-06-15

However, Bevan points to no evidence that would support the existence of an agreement to violate his constitutional rights, which is an essential element needed to prove Bevan’s conspiracy claim.

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires more than vague and conclusory allegations.

Brenner v. Heavener · filed 2007-06-25

The Court finds that Brenner has not provided sufficient evidence to sustain a claim of conspiracy under § 1983. A claim of conspiracy cannot be grounded on nothing more than vague and conclusory allegations such as those on which Brenner’s cause of action is based.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Martinez v. Golding · filed 2007-07-27

Accordingly, to succeed in a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must prove not only a conspiracy, but an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not provide a conspiracy claim without an actual violation of civil rights.

Florance v. Buchmeyer · filed 2007-07-31

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for conspiracy to deny civil rights unless there is an actual violation of civil rights.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires evidence of an agreement or overt act connecting the defendant to the conspiracy.

Eichelman v. Lancaster County · filed 2007-08-21

While Plaintiff suggests that there was an “understanding” among corrections officers and supervisory staff to ignore risks to particular inmates, this does not provide the agreement or overt act required to assign liability to Warden Guarini on a § 1983 conspiracy theory.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires proof of both a conspiracy and a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Backus v. Ortiz · filed 2007-08-30

Finally, to succeed on a claim for conspiracy to deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional rights, Backus must prove both the existence of the conspiracy and the deprivation of constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim fails when the conspiracy allegations are conclusory and the arrest was supported by probable cause.

Spooner v. Jackson · filed 2007-10-24

Because Detective Mitchell had probable cause to arrest Spooner, and because, as the district court correctly noted, Spooner’s allegations regarding a conspiracy are conclusory, the defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Spooner’s conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require detailed allegations with a factual basis supporting the existence of a conspiracy.

Nickerson v. T.D.C.J. - I.D., David Doughty and Bonnie Young · filed 2007-11-08

To state a section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must establish conspiracy in some detail and provide a factual basis for supporting the existence of a conspiracy.

A civil rights conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation.

MacDonald v. Town of Windham · filed 2007-11-15

In the absence of a constitutional violation, no grounds exist to support the MacDonalds1 claims of a civil rights conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires sufficient evidence of an agreement and concerted action to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Kennedy v. Smith · filed 2007-12-26

Having thoroughly reviewed the summary judgment record, we agree with the district court that there is insufficient evidence to establish a § 1983 conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires allegations supporting an agreement to deprive someone of rights; unfavorable judicial orders alone do not support that inference.

Jiricko v. Allison · filed 2007-12-28

We further conclude that the amended complaint fails to state a conspiracy claim under § 1983. The allegations of an ongoing conspiratorial relationship between Judge Allison, Haggerty, and Swartz Campbell LLC are entirely conjectural. The mere fact that Judge Allison issued orders that were unfavorable to Jiricko is insufficient to give rise to an inference of an agreement between the defendants to deprive Jiricko of his rights.

Section 1983 conspiracy requires an agreement to deprive someone of constitutional rights, an overt act furthering the conspiracy, injury, and an actual constitutional deprivation.

Theodore W. White, Jr. v. Detective McKinley · filed 2008-01-30

To prove a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant conspired with others to deprive him of constitutional rights; (2) that at least one of the alleged co-conspirators engaged in an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) that the overt act injured the plaintiff. Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff is additionally required to prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege in order to prevail on a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires evidence of an agreement to deprive constitutional rights, but each participant need not know the exact limits of the plan.

White v. McKinley · filed 2008-02-26

For a claim of conspiracy under Section 1983, the plaintiff need not show that each participant knew “the exact limits of the illegal plan ...,” but the plaintiff must show evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendants reached an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of constitutionally guaranteed rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to inflict an unconstitutional injury and an overt act causing damages.

Jean-Laurent v. Wilkinson · filed 2008-03-24

To support a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an agreement between two or more state actors or a state actor and a private party, (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy to serve as the basis for a civil rights claim.

Sowell v. Israel · filed 1980-11-14

A conspiracy may be the basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a constitutional deprivation and the defendant’s acts or omissions, and negligent failure to supervise alone is insufficient.

Webster v. Foltz · filed 1983-12-06

Moreover, the language of section 1983 demands a causal connection between the constitutional deprivation and the defendant’s acts or omissions. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1979). Thus, a simple negligent failure to supervise does not state a claim under section 1983. The defendant must have participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation or acted in such a way as to exhibit a “deliberate indifference” to the plaintiffs constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual denial of constitutional rights underlying the conspiracy.

Hadley v. Gutierrez · filed 2008-05-06

Hadley has the burden to show an actual denial of his constitutional rights underlying the cover-up conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim fails when the plaintiff alleges no actionable violation of a federal right.

Hernandez v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2008-06-09

We also affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hernandez’s conspiracy count because he did not state such a claim under 42 U.S.C § 1983 or § 1985. As noted above, he failed to state a claim regarding any substantive violations of his federal rights, and accordingly, he did not allege any actionable conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an unconstitutional injury; a constitutional arrest cannot support that claim.

Maliha v. Faluotico · filed 2008-06-20

The district court properly dismissed Maliha’s claims against Sara Maliha because Maliha’s arrest was constitutional. See Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.1999) (stating that a § 1983 conspiracy requires, inter alia, “an agreement ... to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury”) (emphasis added).

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires evidence of an agreement or meeting of the minds among the alleged conspirators.

Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania · filed 2008-07-15

The District Court held, and we agree, that there is no evidence from which one could infer that Philly Pride and the City had an understanding or agreement to conspire against Appellants. To constitute a conspiracy, there must be a “ ‘meeting of the minds.’ ”

A § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot rest on conclusory allegations of conspiracy.

Hudson v. City of Laurel · filed 2008-08-25

Hudson’s claims of a conspiracy are conclusional and insufficient to support a conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 does not make conspiracy an independent basis of liability.

Tommy Smith, Jr. v. Gomez · filed 2008-12-15

We note at the outset that conspiracy is not an independent basis of liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require facts supporting an agreement to deny the plaintiff’s rights; vague allegations are insufficient.

Burge v. Ferguson · filed 2008-12-16

Additionally, the complaint fails to state a Section 1983 conspiracy claim as to Ferguson and Bowlin. ... The complaint alleges no facts showing that the defendants reached an understanding to deny the plaintiffs rights and insufficient facts from which an inference of a conspiracy can reasonably be drawn.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require an agreement to deny the plaintiff’s rights and an actionable underlying wrong.

Wilbourne v. Forsyth County School Dist. · filed 2009-01-05

To prove a§ 1983 conspiracy, “a plaintiff must show that the parties reached an understanding to deny the plaintiff . . . her rights and prove an actionable wrong to support the conspiracy.” ... Wilbourne failed to present evidence the defendants had an agreement to violate her rights.

Section 1983 requires more than an opposing party’s success in litigation or conclusory allegations to plead a conspiracy with a judge.

Wisdom v. Katz · filed 2009-01-13

In his § 1983 claim, Wisdom, in effect, asserts that his attorneys and the opposing parties who prevailed in state court proceedings conspired with the judge against him, as shown by the success of the opposing parties in the litigation. But mere victory or conclusory allegations that a judge conspired with law firms or individuals does not show conspiracy.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require an agreement to inflict an unconstitutional injury, concerted action, and an overt act causing harm.

Keating v. City of Miami · filed 2009-01-20

In order to state a claim for a conspiracy under section 1983, Plaintiffs must allege “1) an agreement between two or more state actors or a state actor and a private entity; 2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and 3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal, and causing some harm.”

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires evidence that two or more people agreed to deprive someone of a constitutional right under color of law.

Royster v. J Beard · filed 2009-01-22

In order to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy under section 1983, “a plaintiff must show that two or more conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a constitutional right under color of law." Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. 1993). We agree with the District Court that Royster failed to present any evidence that would have satisfied that requirement.

Vague allegations of a conspiracy to deprive someone of constitutional rights do not state a Section 1983 conspiracy claim.

Razzano v. County of Nassau · filed 2009-02-14

Such vague allegations are clearly not sufficient to state a Section 1983 conspiracy with the requisite particularity.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an agreement to violate constitutional rights and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Marr v. Anderson · filed 2009-02-25

In addition, to establish a conspiracy pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff must show an agreement or meeting of minds to violate his constitutional rights and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Cornelius v. City of Andalusia · filed 2009-02-26

To prove a § 1983 conspiracy, “ ‘a plaintiff must show an underlying actual denial of [his] constitutional rights.’ ” ... Putting aside the question of whether Cornelius has presented sufficient evidence that there was an understanding between Defendants to violate his rights, there was no underlying constitutional violation.

A Section 1983 conspiracy allegation adds nothing when the plaintiff already alleges that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Walck v. Dunkerson · filed 2009-03-04

Walck’s proposed amendments alleging conspiracy under section 1983 would not have contributed anything to Walck’s action because he already claimed that the defendants acted under color of state law.