42 U.S.C. § 1983

A public employee's permanent civil-service status is a property right protected in a § 1983 due-process action, and the employee must receive notice before a transfer can divest that status.

Beckwith v. County of Clark · filed 1987-09-09

... it is clear that Beckwith had a property right in his civil service status and that he was entitled to due process before he could be divested of that property right.

A public employee's § 1983 due-process claim based on termination fails when state law gives the employee no protected property interest in continued employment.

Cooley, William v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency Gerhold, Wayne D. Smith, Karl C. And Donadee, Michael A · filed 1987-09-30

We therefore hold that Cooley is devoid of any proprietary interest in his employment which would afford him the protections of the due process clause. His § 1983 claim for damages, based upon a deprivation of this constitutional right, must fail and summary judgment on this claim was properly entered in favor of the PHFA.

A public employee terminable at will under state law generally has no protected property interest in continued employment and ordinarily cannot base a § 1983 due-process claim on discharge.

Cardona v. Ward · filed 1987-11-04

A public employee who, under state law, can be terminated at will generally has no due process rights in his position, and therefore, his discharge ordinarily is not a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.

A public employer need not postpone a disciplinary hearing until related criminal charges are resolved when the employee may remain silent yet still participate through counsel, call witnesses, and cross-examine adverse witnesses.

Peiffer v. Lebanon School District · filed 1987-11-09

Upon balancing the competing interests, the court concludes that the procedure employed by the School Board comported with the requirements of due process. There is no reason to hold that the Board was constitutionally required to stay its proceedings until the criminal prosecution against the plaintiff was completed.

An unclassified public employee removable by the appointing official has no protected property interest in continued employment for a § 1983 procedural-due-process claim.

Hickman v. Shoemaker · filed 1987-11-13

Based on the above-cited statutes, it is clear that Hickman was an unclassified employee and had no property interest in her continued employment. Thus her claim that the district court's summary dismissal violated her right to procedural due process is without merit.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim concerning public employment requires a property interest created by state law in the position from which the plaintiff was removed.

De Panepinto v. Jose M. Saldana, Etc. · filed 1987-12-02

Appellant’s contention that she was denied the procedural due process guaranteed by the federal Constitution depends, in the first instance, on whether or not she had a property interest in her continued employment as library director. The existence of a property interest in the director’s position depends solely on state law.

A year-to-year public employee with no contractual entitlement to renewal has no property interest requiring a hearing and therefore no § 1983 due-process claim when the position is eliminated.

Graff v. Glennen · filed 1988-01-19

Graff, therefore, was not deprived of a “property right” and has no claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (1982).

Section 1983 does not support a procedural due process claim over a reprimand placed in a personnel file when the officer has suffered no discernible deprivation of a protected property interest.

Lowe v. Kansas City, Missouri Board of Police Commissioners · filed 1988-03-14

Lowe premised this § 1983 action on his assertion that the placing of the letter of reprimand in his file deprived him of a constitutionally-protected property interest without the rightful benefit of a hearing. ... We hold that defendants’ actions did not deprive Lowe of a constitutionally-protected property interest.

A contractual right to 30 days of continued employment can be a property interest supporting a § 1983 due-process claim.

Bithell v. Western Care Corp. · filed 1988-04-28

Furthermore, plaintiff also had a property interest in the 30 days of additional employment pursuant to the notice provision of the contract. ... Therefore, the trial court erred by entering summary judgment on plaintiffs § 1983 deprivation of property interest claim.

Section 1983 provides no due process claim for denial of a prospective promotion because the promotion is not a protected property or liberty interest.

Wu v. Thomas · filed 1988-06-07

Appellant's action is also brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and alleges that by discriminatorily denying her promotion to professor, appellees abridged her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. The district court properly found that there was no merit to appellant's claim because a prospective promotion is not a property or liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.

A § 1983 claim based on termination from public employment requires deprivation of a protected property interest without due process of law.

Elliott v. Kupferman · filed 1984-04-12

This is the sum and substance of Count I. It does not suffice to show the deprivation of a property interest without due process of law, and therefore does not suffice to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of a constitutional right, including a protected property interest without due process.

Maytown Sand And Gravel, Resp/cross-app v. Thurston County, App/cross-resp · filed 2017-04-04

As a threshold issue to asserting a viable substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must prove that the conduct complained of deprived the plaintiff of a cognizable property interest without due process.” Durland, 182 Wn.2d at 70.

Section 1983 does not govern claims that a complaint brings under separate statutory causes of action.

Young v. Trans Union · filed 2007-12-10

The district court improperly treated Young’s Fair Credit Reporting Act and state and federal Right to Financial Privacy Act claims as brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... because Young’s complaint did not purport to allege those causes of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 can supply the statutory basis for constitutional claims even when plaintiffs do not expressly invoke it.

Murphy v. Fort Worth Independent School District · filed 2003-04-24

While plaintiffs have not expressly relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a basis for the assertion in this action of their claims under the United States Constitution, the court considers that § 1983 is the statutory basis for those claims.

Section 1983 can supply a federal cause of action allowing plaintiffs to litigate federal rights in federal court even if they did not plead a § 1983 claim.

Washington State Health Facilities Association v. State Of Washington Department Of Social And Health Services · filed 1982-11-09

Although plaintiffs below did not plead a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, it is clear that they are properly in federal court under this provision.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action through which plaintiffs may proceed in federal court even when they did not plead that cause of action.

Washington State Health Facilities Ass'n v. State of Washington Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1982-11-09

Although plaintiffs below did not plead a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is clear that they are properly in federal court under this provision.

Section 1983 is not necessary for a Maryland court to adjudicate a federal equal-protection claim.

Brown v. Hornbeck · filed 1983-04-14

It is clear to us that the Maryland courts did not need U.S. § 1983 to adjudicate the alleged federal claim in this proceeding.

Section 1983 claim may proceed when a supervisor is alleged to have personally approved and ratified unconstitutional conduct.

Vaughn v. Franzen · filed 1982-10-26

Plaintiff has alleged that Franzen personally approved of and ratified the conduct of the other defendants. That is sufficient to state a claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory damages liability without the supervisor's personal role in the wrongdoing, though a causally related policy adopted by the supervisor may support liability.

Luce v. Hayden · filed 1984-12-13

Section 1983 does not authorize damages liability where an individual had ... no personal role in the wrong doing. ... Courts have generally rejected vicarious liability as a basis for imposing liability upon a supervisor under Section 1983. ... Adoption by a supervisor of a plan or policy, however, which is causally related to a constitutional deprivation may be sufficient to attribute liability to the supervisor.

A policymaking supervisor’s mere failure to correct a subordinate’s constitutional violation does not itself create Section 1983 liability.

Soderbeck v. Burnett County · filed 1985-01-04

Failure to take corrective action cannot in and of itself violate section 1983. Otherwise the action of an inferior officer would automatically be attributed up the line to his highest superior and thence to the local government, since the misconduct of policy-making officials (here the members of the Law Enforcement Committee) is attributed to the government.

Section 1983 requires personal responsibility for individual liability; supervisory officials who merely follow state law without deliberate or reckless disregard for constitutional rights lack the requisite fault.

Kohn v. Mucia · filed 1991-05-31

Martin and Mucia, by their approval and implementation of a policy of notification by first class mail of owners of impounded vehicles older than seven years, have not acted with deliberate or reckless disregard for Kohn’s constitutional rights. They were simply following state law, which they were entitled to presume was constitutional. The requisite level of fault on the part of Mucia and Martin is missing. Therefore, we dismiss the individual capacity claims against them.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for municipal or supervisory liability, or proof that an official policy or custom inflicted the injury.

McLAUGHLIN v. CITY Of · filed 1981-12-07

In order for a municipality or a supervisor to be liable under section 1983 there must be some personal involvement or evidence that "execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury."

Section 1983 affords a court clerk absolute immunity from damages for a nonroutine act performed under a judge’s explicit instructions.

Hyland v. Kolhage · filed 2008-02-26

Moreover, Hyland’s complaint also alleges that this was not a routine action by Thurston, because Judge Miller explicitly requested that Thurston change the minutes that she had transcribed at Hyland’s sentence hearing without notification to the parties. Thurston is therefore entitled to absolute immunity from a suit for damages.

Section 1983 affords court clerks absolute immunity for judicial acts and qualified immunity for ministerial acts, with a good-faith defense.

Kane v. Yung Won Han · filed 1982-10-28

Applying that test to the alleged facts of this case, defendant Amols is not entitled to judicial or absolute immunity. Plaintiff’s allegations include defendant’s tampering with court records, and a refusal to record him as being present at roll call, purely ministerial tasks. Defendant, however, is entitled to qualified immunity; that is, a defense of good faith is available to him and, if shown, he will be immune from further action on the claim. Whether defendant acted in good faith is, of course, a question of fact which survives a motion to dismiss.

A court clerk acting under a judge’s directions in selecting and excusing prospective jurors is absolutely immune from Section 1983 liability.

McCaw v. Calvin Winter and Honorable Judge Edward Hodge · filed 1984-11-01

The state court judge is absolutely immune from liability under these facts; the judge was presiding over a criminal trial and was clearly acting judicially. Similarly, the clerk of the court, in selecting and excusing the prospective jurors for appellant’s first trial, was acting pursuant to the judge’s directions and, under these narrow circumstances, is therefore absolutely immune.

A court clerk who performs a judicial function, including issuing a writ of attachment, has absolute immunity from a § 1983 damages suit.

McCrory v. Johnson · filed 1988-07-18

A court clerk who performs a judicial function, such as issuing warrants, enjoys absolute immunity in a § 1983 suit. ... Having determined above that a judge, not a clerk, should issue writs of attachment, it follows that the act of issuing such writs is a judicial function. See Scott, supra. Thus, Jacquetta Alexander was entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

A judge and court clerk are immune from damages liability under § 1983 for their actions in a state garnishment proceeding.

Fitzgerald v. Boney · filed 1988-11-18

Moreover, both Judge Kiser and court clerk Mary Bedwell are immune from liability for damages under Sec. 1983.

Court clerks are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for acts performed at the direction of the court.

Rodman v. Maxine Dalton Christopher E. Veidt · filed 1989-02-01

The district court also correctly concluded that court clerks are absolutely immune from liability for acts performed at the direction of the court.

Court clerks performing judicial functions are absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages suits.

Terrell v. Borchert · filed 1989-04-03

Consequently, Borchert would be immune from a suit for damages as his act of filing findings of fact and conclusions of law was a judicial function to which absolute immunity attached.

Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages under § 1983 when performing tasks integral to the judicial process.

Tucker v. Allen · filed 1992-06-30

Here, Allen has absolute immunity from damages because she was performing a task integral to the judicial process when she signed the warrants for Tucker's arrest.

A court clerk has quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 damages for issuing an arrest warrant even when the clerk exceeds her authority, if she does not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.

Boyer v. County of Washington · filed 1992-07-10

Thus, while De-Clue exceeded her authority when she issued the warrant, she did not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. She is therefore entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for issuing the warrant.

Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 damages for signing and issuing arrest warrants as integral parts of the judicial process, even without a judge’s instruction, unless they act in the complete absence of jurisdiction.

Boyer v. County of Washington · filed 1992-08-20

Based on Smith and Mullis, we agree that DeClue is entitled to absolute immunity for signing and issuing the arrest warrant regardless of whether Judge Murphy instructed her to do so because these acts are integral parts of the criminal judicial process. See Burns v. Reed, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1942, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) ("issuance of a search warrant is unquestionably a judicial act"). Although court clerks are not authorized by state law to issue misdemeanor arrest warrants, they are permitted to sign such warrants. See Mo.R.Crim.P. 21.07(b)(6). Thus, while DeClue exceeded her authority when she issued the warrant, she did not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. She is therefore entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for issuing the warrant.

A court clerk acting in a quasi-judicial function has absolute immunity from damages in a § 1983 suit.

Hauck v. Foster · filed 1992-09-25

Secondly, because this defendant was acting in a quasi-judicial function, he is entitled to absolute immunity from this suit for damages, only.

A court clerk has absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim for acts taken under a court order or judge’s instruction, but not for the ministerial act of filing documents.

J.T. Garner v. Carol G. Green, Kansas Appellate Court Clerk · filed 1993-04-13

Although the precise scope of court clerks' immunity is unsettled, see Valdez v. City and County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1287 n. 3 (10th Cir.1989), it is clear that their immunity extends to actions taken pursuant to court orders and judges' instructions, see id. at 1288-89; Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 855-56 (10th Cir.1981). ... Because the filing of documents is a ministerial act, the clerk is not absolutely immune from claims in that regard.

Section 1983 damages claims against court clerks are barred by quasi-judicial immunity for tasks integral to the judicial process, including a clerk's alleged failure to supervise employees who lost pleadings.

Warne v. Zolin · filed 1993-05-24

"Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process." ... Here, Warne's allegation that her pleading papers were lost as a result of Zolin's failure to supervise his employees does not pierce the immunity shield.

A court clerk lacks absolute judicial immunity from a Section 1983 claim for action taken without a judge's direction or a court order.

Rivkin v. County of Montgomery · filed 1993-12-02

Defendants’ other Immunity defenses fare no better. Absent action taken at the direction of a judge or under a court order, a Clerk of Court is not entitled to absolute judicial immunity, McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 4 (4th Cir. 1972).

A court clerk has no absolute immunity from a Section 1983 personal-capacity suit for performing the ministerial task of assembling an appellate record.

Curry v. Pucinski · filed 1994-10-05

What is certain is that the assignment was designed to be purely ministerial. In performing such a non-diseretionary function, Pucinski was disentitled to any mantle of absolute immunity and is subject to suit in her personal capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on court clerks for alleged delays in scheduling an appeal when they perform functions protected by judicial immunity.

Rodriguez v. Weprin · filed 1997-06-19

Thus, even if viewed as performing an administrative task, the court clerks are entitled to immunity for harms allegedly related to the delay in scheduling appellant’s appeal.

Section 1983 claims against court clerks for appellate scheduling delays are barred by absolute judicial immunity when the clerks perform the court’s docket-control function.

Rodriguez v. Weprin · filed 1997-06-19

A court's inherent power to control its docket is part of its function of resolving disputes between parties. This is a function for which judges and their supporting staff are afforded absolute immunity.

Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 damages claims for acts specifically required by a court order or a judge’s direction.

Waite v. Asmussen · filed 1997-12-23

We conclude summary judgment was proper, as the evidence showed the clerks were directed by Nebraska judges not to file Waite&s pleading. See Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 1988) (clerks of court have absolute quasi- judicial immunity from actions for damages arising from acts that “they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge&s direction”); Moses v. Parwatikar, 813 F.2d 891, 892-93 (8th Cir.) (conspiracy claim cannot overcome absolute immunity), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 832 (1987).

Court clerks acting in the course of their duties have judicial immunity from § 1983 claims.

Thompson, Lawrence v. Bernice Coleman and Becky Pierpoint Doolan · filed 2002-06-20

Court clerks, acting in the course of their duties, are accorded judicial immunity because they function as an arm of the court. ... Therefore, the clerks were entitled to judicial immunity and the directed verdict was proper.

Court clerks have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims only for discretionary acts or acts taken at a judge’s direction or according to court rule.

Geitz v. Overall · filed 2003-04-11

Clerks are absolutely immune only for acts that may be seen as discretionary, or for acts taken at the direction of a judge or according to court rule.

Section 1983 claims against a court clerk are barred by judicial immunity when the clerk’s duties concerning issuance of a summons are integral to the judicial process.

Coleman v. Farnsworth · filed 2004-02-24

While a clerk’s disregard of a court’s order or instructions cannot be condoned, a clerk’s duties with respect to the issuance of a summons nevertheless involve a judicial act, or one having an integral relationship with the judicial process, which must be afforded the defense of immunity.

Court clerks performing ministerial duties are not absolutely immune from § 1983 damages claims; whether qualified immunity applies depends on the evidence.

Marty's Adult World of New Britain, Inc. v. Guida · filed 1978-06-29

Because the tasks required of Mr. Lynch do not involve the use of discretion or any decision-making duties, there is no need to consider the applicability of absolute immunity. Whether qualified immunity would protect Mr. Lynch from liability for his alleged delays is a question to be determined at trial upon the evidence. However, the motion to dismiss cannot be granted on the ground of immunity for court clerks.

A court clerk who independently rejects a litigant’s pleadings is not entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Snyder, James R. v. Nolen, Jack T. · filed 2004-08-13

It is the unanimous opinion of the court that Mr. Nolen is not protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

A court clerk is not entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for refusing to file technically sufficient papers without judicial direction.

Snyder v. Nolen · filed 2004-08-13

Here, Mr. Nolen’s duty under the law of Illinois to maintain the official record was purely ministerial; he had no authority to resolve disputes between parties or to make substantive determinations on the worth or merits of a filing. ... At this point in the litigation, there is no claim that Mr. Nolen was acting at the direction of any judicial officer in returning Mr. Snyder’s papers. ... Accordingly, we must conclude that, on this record, there is no basis for dismissal of the action on the ground of absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Court clerks are absolutely immune from § 1983 claims arising from their assistance with judges’ essential judicial functions, including handling motions and scheduling proceedings.

Argentieri v. Clerk of Court for Judge Kmiotek · filed 2006-03-21

Inasmuch as plaintiff claims that defendants violated his rights by refusing to acknowledge his motions or to schedule his court proceedings, defendants were assisting judges in performing essential judicial functions. As a result, plaintiffs claims are barred by absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not give a court clerk absolute judicial immunity for failing to perform a required ministerial act such as filing papers.

McCray v. State of Maryland · filed 1972-02-29

Thus there is no basis for sheltering the clerk from liability under section 1983 for failure to perform a required ministerial act such as properly filing papers.

A court clerk’s ministerial refusal to present an in forma pauperis application to a judge is not protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity in a § 1983 suit.

Maness v. District Court of Logan County-Northern Division · filed 2007-08-13

As to absolute quasi-judicial immunity, there is no suggestion in the record that Kellar’s alleged refusal to present Maness’s IFP application to a circuit judge was discretionary rather than ministerial. ... Thus, Kellar was not shielded by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Section 1983 claims for damages against court clerks are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when the clerks perform tasks integral to the judicial process.

Coulter v. Roddy · filed 2011-12-20

We agree with the district court that the alleged actions fall within the scope of the Clerk of the Court's duties that are an integral part of the judicial process. Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process).

Section 1983 does not permit a suit for monetary damages against a state supreme court.

Amatucci v. NH Supreme Court · filed 2014-04-22

Moreover, the New Hampshire Supreme Court is immune from suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a court clerk for refusing a filing pursuant to a court order.

Macleod v. Bexley · filed 2018-04-17

Insofar as Macleod claims monetary damages, the clerk is entitled to absolute immunity because he declined to file Macleod’s pleading pursuant to a court order.

A court clerk acting under a court’s direction is immune from a § 1983 suit unless acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Womack v. Finkelstein · filed 2019-06-06

The Defendant is therefore immune from suit, and the Plaintiff's claims against her must be dismissed.

A clerk sued under Section 1983 cannot obtain dismissal based on absolute judicial immunity for an alleged failure to perform a routine recordkeeping duty when no judicial instruction is alleged.

Dupard v. Lopinto · filed 2020-03-30

Accordingly, dismissal of the claims against Gegenheimer based on absolute immunity is not warranted at this stage.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages to establish each defendant's personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right.

Roscom v. City of Chicago · filed 1982-11-03

To recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish defendants’ personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right.

Personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation is required for an award of damages under § 1983.

Augustyniak v. Koch · filed 1984-05-17

“[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”

A Section 1983 claim cannot proceed against an official who had no responsibility for the challenged conduct.

Houghton v. Carroll v. South · filed 1984-10-02

Houghton’s section 1983 claim with respect to the manner in which he was committed is directed toward the wrong official. South had nothing to do with that.

Section 1983 liability for denial of court access requires personal involvement or knowledge, so a transferring prison's warden is not a proper defendant based only on institutional supervision.

Hudson v. Israel · filed 1984-10-04

A necessary corollary to this general principle and the underlying rule that § 1983 liability cannot be imposed absent personal involvement or knowledge is that a warden, absent some greater involvement in the transfer decision other than his or her mere supervision over the institution from which the prisoner was transferred, is not a proper defendant in a denial of judicial access suit like the present.

Individual defendants are liable in a Section 1983 action only if they proximately caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Brown v. County of San Joaquin · filed 1985-01-22

However, regardless of the capacity in which the individual defendants are sued, they are not liable to the plaintiffs unless the plaintiffs prove that the individual defendants proximately caused the deprivation of constitutional rights of which the plaintiffs complain.

County jail officials are not liable under Section 1983 for a state parole board's failure to schedule a revocation hearing when state law assigns the hearing duty to the board and only requires the county to hold the parolee.

Waller v. Drago · filed 1985-03-19

Given Oregon’s division of functions, the Umatilla County defendants cannot be held liable in this case for the State Parole Board’s failure to schedule a hearing.

Section 1983 damages liability requires personal responsibility for the constitutional deprivation, but not direct participation when an official deliberately or recklessly disregards the plaintiff's rights or directs or knowingly consents to the conduct.

Smith v. Charles Rowe, John Platt, Frank Deere, Charlotte Nesbitt, Defendants · filed 1985-04-26

To recover for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish defendant’s personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right. ... However, a defendant’s direct participation in the deprivation is not required. An official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 if she acts or fails to act with a deliberate or reckless disregard of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at her direction or with her knowledge and consent.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for an officer directly responsible for a constitutional deprivation.

Kimbrew v. Evansville Police Department · filed 1994-09-30

Walter Kimbrew has, however, provided this Court with evidence sufficient to determine Officer John Evans was directly responsible for the unlawful search and seizure contravening Walter Kimbrew’s Fourth Amendment rights and thus may be held hable under § 1983.

Section 1983 can impose individual liability on a teacher who disregards a state law duty to guard against a student’s sexual abuse.

Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. Rains Independent School District · filed 1994-09-30

As state law imposes a duty on teachers to guard against the sexual abuse of school children, it follows that teachers who disregard that duty can be held liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to assert the deprivation of a right personally held by that plaintiff.

Hannah v. City of Dover · filed 2005-10-11

Thus, a plaintiff must adequately assert the personal deprivation of a right before she can pursue a suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages when an official personally causes a constitutional deprivation or acts with deliberate or reckless disregard, or directs or knowingly consents to the conduct causing it.

Crowder v. Lash · filed 1982-11-08

To recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish defendants’ personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right. ... However, a defendant’s direct participation in the deprivation is not required. An official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 if she acts or fails to act with a deliberate or reckless disregard of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at her direction or with her knowledge and consent.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to explain how the defendant’s conduct deprived them of a constitutional right; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Frank C. Johnson, Jr. v. J. K. Buddy Irby · filed 2010-11-23

And Plaintiffs did not explain -- other than in conclusory terms -- how Defendant’s acts deprived them of a constitutional right for section 1983.

Section 1983 claims require identifying personally responsible individuals and alleging deprivation of a constitutional right.

Nguyen v. Milliken · filed 2015-04-21

Section 1983 claims generally must be brought against the individuals personally responsible for the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, not against thé government entities or agencies where those individuals are employed. ... Because there are no allegations against either Defendants Milliken or Raab to show that they were personally involved in any action against Ms. Nguyen, the Complaint is dismissed as to Milliken and Raab in them individual capacities. ... As Ms. Nguyen has not stated facts that indicate that Carrillo or any other Defendant was involved in the January 29, 2015 event, or that she was deprived of a constitutional right when she received a lower-than-expécted grade, her Section 1983 claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant .to -28 ’ U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be personally responsible for the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Jordan v. Milwaukee County House of Corr · filed 2017-02-27

Jordan has provided no evidence that any of the medical defendants knew of the freezing temperatures, and § 1983 requires personal responsibility.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation before that defendant can be held liable.

CAPLER v. SAMUEL · filed 2019-07-25

This matters because no defendant may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless he or she has some personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not turn every breach of contract claim against a city into a federal claim.

Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Port Of Oakland · filed 1989-03-13

As far as precedent goes in the area of civil rights, San Bernardino Physicians Services Medical Group v. County of San Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.1987), is dispositive. There the court indicated that it was not the intent of Sec. 1983 to convert every breach of contract claim against a city into a federal claim or to shift the whole of public law of the state into the federal court or to turn into issues of federal constitution the entire state law of public contracts.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for interference with a contractual employment benefit when a state breach of contract action can redress the loss.

Ramsey v. Board Of Education Of Whitley County · filed 1988-04-25

We do hold, however, that an interference with a property interest in a pure benefit of employment, as opposed to an interest in the tenured nature of the employment itself, is an interest that can be and should be redressed by a state breach of contract action and not by a federal action under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a procedural due process claim over a municipal service contract when the contractor has no protected property or liberty interest in continued performance or prompt payment.

Maintenance Co., Inc. v. Goldin · filed 1988-04-14

S & D Maintenance Co., Inc. ("S & D") brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982), against the City of New York and six City officials, 1 alleging a denial of procedural due process in connection with the City's refusal to pay S & D for services rendered to maintain parking meters. ... Because S & D fails to assert a property or liberty interest entitled to procedural due process, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Section 1983 does not convert an alleged breach of a settlement agreement into a due-process claim when state appeal and contract remedies are available.

Moody v. Town of Weymouth · filed 1986-11-20

Hence, we reject plaintiff’s attempt to turn this contract action into a constitutional case.

Section 1983 does not create federal contract law governing ordinary contractual breaches by a state.

Buck v. Village of Minooka · filed 1982-11-15

Surely it was never intended to create, via Section 1983, a font of contract law governing ordinary contractual breaches by the state.

A public-sector collective bargaining agreement does not fit the individual protected-employment-property exception that can support a Section 1983 contract claim.

Chicago Teachers Union v. Bd. of Ed. of Chicago · filed 1983-08-11

CTU’s collective bargaining agreement, though it is surely employment-related, does not fit under the rubric of individual enforcement of protected employment “property” interests for which the courts have carved out a kind of historical exception.

A public employer’s alleged breach of an employment contract does not become a Section 1983 claim when state contract remedies provide the process due.

New Castle County Vocational Technical Education Ass'n v. Board of Education · filed 1983-08-29

Federalizing contract actions in this manner would not uphold any value inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment, and I, accordingly, decline to entertain the Association’s claim. The Board’s motion to dismiss will be granted with regard to the Association’s claims under section 1983.

A Section 1983 due-process claim based on unauthorized interference with contractual property rights fails when state courts provide adequate process for resolving the dispute.

Weinstein v. University of Illinois · filed 1987-03-11

To the extent he complains about the University’s deviation from ordinary procedures, he complains about an unauthorized or random act; the courts afford due process for such cases. More generally, however, courts offer all the process that is “due” for resolving disputes about contracts and inducements to break them.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federal right; a municipality’s alleged breach of contractual rights does not state a claim when an adequate state contract remedy is available.

Pinehurst Enterprises, Inc. v. Town of Southern Pines · filed 1988-06-24

Under section 1983, a party must allege the deprivation of a federal right. This plaintiffs have failed to do. ... Claim III merely alleges that defendants have breached rights arising under contracts. Therefore, it fails to state a cognizable claim under section 1983 and will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a mere breach of contract without a violation of constitutional rights.

Whiting v. University of Southern Mississippi · filed 2006-06-02

A mere breach of contract will not suffice for an action under § 1983 without a violation of due process rights.

Section 1983 does not provide federal relief for an ordinary breach of a public employment contract.

Blazy v. Jefferson County Regional Planning Commission · filed 2011-08-19

And, Blazy cannot seek federal relief pursuant to § 1983 for this alleged breach of contract.

Section 1983 claims should not be considered by a federal district court while related state criminal proceedings are ongoing, absent an exception to Younger abstention.

Wilcox v. Honorable Edward Miller · filed 1982-11-15

Since Wilcox’s case falls within none of the exceptions recognized in ... Younger, ... the district court should not have considered his section 1983 claim while there were ongoing state criminal proceedings.

Younger abstention does not bar a Section 1983 damages action when no ongoing state proceeding involves the federal plaintiff.

Coleman v. Stanziani · filed 1983-09-14

This purpose is furthered by allowing the plaintiff in a § 1983 damages action to file suit in federal court. Because there are in this case no ongoing state proceedings to which a plaintiff in a § 1983 damages action is a party, the problem of federal intervention in a state proceeding is non-existent.

A federal court may dismiss a Section 1983 claim under Colorado River when parallel state litigation is substantially advanced, splitting identical federal claims would cause piecemeal litigation, and the state forum is adequate.

Glover v. City of Portland, Tenn. · filed 1987-12-16

This Court concludes that the section 1983 claim against the City should be dismissed. Many of the factors described by the Supreme Court as valid considerations promoting dismissal are present. Piecemeal litigation will result from separate trials on the section 1983 claims that arise under one fact pattern. Extensive progress has been made in state court on the federal claim while the City was a party to the state court suit; virtually no progress has been made in this Court.

A federal court may stay Section 1983 claims under Colorado River when exceptional circumstances exist, the federal constitutional issues substantially overlap ongoing state proceedings, and the state forum adequately protects federal rights.

Dr. William D. Allen, Cross-Appellee v. Louisiana State Board of Dentistry, Cross-Appellants · filed 1988-01-05

Nonetheless, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in abstaining from hearing the § 1983 actions in this case. ... Thus, we find the exceptional circumstances necessary to defer to ongoing proceedings in state court.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bypass habeas procedures to obtain federal intervention in pending state criminal proceedings when the state courts can address the constitutional claims.

Foster v. Kassulke · filed 1990-03-22

Section 1983 should not be used to make an end run around habeas corpus procedures.

Section 1983 suits seeking federal intervention in a pending state criminal appeal are subject to Younger abstention when state courts can address the claimed constitutional violations.

Foster v. Kassulke · filed 1990-05-04

Any constitutional violations should be vindicated in the state court in the first instance and, failing vindication there, by the federal court upon habeas review, rather than a federal section 1983 action brought while the state proceeding is still pending.

A Section 1983 litigant may preserve federal constitutional claims for a federal action by omitting them from a parallel state action.

Tepper v. Galloway · filed 1979-12-21

This argument ignores ... cases which hold that in this circuit a litigant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can preserve federal constitutional claims for his federal court action by omitting them from his state court action.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to grant injunctive relief against state action despite a pending state proceeding when immediate, irreparable harm to constitutional rights warrants intervention.

New Jersey-Philadelphia Presbytery of the Bible Presbyterian Church v. New Jersey State Board of Higher Education · filed 1980-01-04

Surely neither Younger nor Pullman nor their descendants prevent a Federal Court from acting pursuant to its unquestioned § 1983 powers to prevent such acts by a State Court.

When a Section 1983 claim is broader than coincidental state claims and lacks a truly analogous state cause of action, the court must independently select the state's most appropriate limitations period for the federal claim.

Banks v. City of Forest Park · filed 1984-10-09

The point here is that when a constitutional claim or a § 1983 claim is necessarily broader than coincidental state claims due to the absence of any truly analogous state cause of action, the district court should, in addition to examining the statutes of limitations applicable to any coincidental state claims, conduct an independent inquiry to determine which statute of limitations, within a state’s statutory scheme, is most appropriate for the federal claim.

Section 1983 actions in Oregon are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Loiseau v. Dept. of Human Resources of State of Or. · filed 1983-02-28

A two-year statute of limitations applies in Oregon to § 1983 actions.

Because Section 1983 supplies no federal limitations period, federal courts borrow the most appropriate state limitations period and relevant state tolling provisions.

Auletta v. Tully · filed 1983-10-03

Since Congress has provided no federal limitations period for § 1983 actions, federal courts must look to the most appropriate state limitations period as well as relevant tolling provisions to determine if an action brought pursuant to § 1983 has been timely commenced.

Because § 1983 has no specially enacted limitations period, federal courts borrow the state limitations period governing the most analogous cause of action.

Suthoff v. Yazoo County Industrial Development Corporation · filed 1983-12-22

Because no statute of limitations was specifically enacted to govern actions brought pursuant to § 1983, federal courts must “borrow” the state statute of limitations governing analogous causes of action.

Section 1983 actions borrow the state limitations period governing an analogous cause of action.

Perri v. Aytch · filed 1983-12-22

In actions under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, it is necessary to borrow "the state law of limitations governing an analogous cause of action."

To select a limitations period for a § 1983 claim, courts in the Sixth Circuit looked to the claim’s underlying common-law analogue and applied that analogue’s state limitations period.

Leithauser v. City of Madison Heights · filed 1984-01-20

Regardless of the rationale, I have no choice but to conclude that the law in this circuit requires courts to look to the common law action which underlies a § 1983 claim to determine the most analogous statute of limitations, and to apply that limitation to the § 1983 action.

For limitations purposes, every § 1983 claim in the Tenth Circuit was uniformly characterized as an action for injury to personal rights.

Garcia v. Richard Wilson and Martin Vigil · filed 1984-03-30

Accordingly, we conclude that every section 1983 claim is in essence an action for injury to personal rights. Henceforth, all section 1983 claims in this circuit will be uniformly so characterized for statute of limitations purposes.

The Tenth Circuit’s new uniform method for selecting a § 1983 limitations period did not apply retroactively when plaintiffs reasonably relied on prior circuit law making their claims timely.

Jackson v. City Of Bloomfield · filed 1984-03-30

In sum, upon consideration of the Chevron factors, we conclude that the Garcia method for selecting the appropriate statute of limitations should not be retroactively applied in this case. Even assuming that retroactivity might further the concerns addressed in Garcia, this factor is greatly outweighed by the substantial inequity that would result. We will not bar plaintiffs' right to their day in court when their action was timely under the law in effect at the time their suit was commenced.

A 60-day state limitations period cannot govern § 1983 claims when it would deny an adequate opportunity to prepare and bring civil-rights suits.

Amico v. New Castle County · filed 1984-04-06

The federal policy behind 42 U.S.C. § 1983 clearly mandates that plaintiffs have available to them a broad, or at the very least an adequate, opportunity to prepare for, investigate, and institute suits to prevent deprivations of civil rights under color of state law. A 60 day limitation period would not provide such an opportunity: at best, it would result in a number of hasty, ill-informed, and perhaps erroneous decisions to sue; at worst, it would deter or prevent a number of meritorious suits and encourage the deterioration of first amendment freedoms through the inability to challenge potentially unconstitutional zoning ordinances.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim is borrowed from the state limitations period governing the most analogous state-law claim.

Steinle v. Warren · filed 1984-04-25

The limitation period for claims under 42 U.S'.C. § 1983 is the state law limitation period for state law claims most analogous to the federal claim.

Because § 1983 has no federal limitations period, courts apply the state period governing the most analogous action.

Henson v. American Family Corp. · filed 1984-06-15

Because Congress did not establish a statute of limitation for § 1983 actions, the applicable limitation period is determined by reference to the limitation period governing analogous actions under state law.

The state limitations period is selected from the essential nature of the § 1983 claim rather than its label.

Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin · filed 1984-06-15

To put it simply, the “essential nature” of Jones’ complaint does not involve an attachment bond. Rather, the gravamen of his complaint is an alleged due process deprivation.

Section 1983 claims borrow the applicable state limitations period, and a claim filed after the borrowed one-year period is time-barred.

Altair Corp. v. Busquets · filed 1984-10-10

Since no federal statute prescribes the limitations period applicable to 1983 claims, the period for filing such actions is controlled by the applicable state statute of limitation. ... Furthermore, plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is time-barred, having been brought more than one year after July 14, 1980.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state's most appropriate limitations period governing an analogous cause of action, and relabeling the same conduct under constitutional or other civil-rights theories does not change the period.

Fricker v. Town of Foster · filed 1984-10-24

The parties agree that, in undertaking a limitations analysis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal courts must borrow from the state larder and must identify the “most appropriate” state statute of limitations, ... that is, “the state law of limitations governing an analogous cause of action.” ... So long as the acts or omissions complained of are essentially the same, it matters not whether the plaintiff garbed his suit in the raiment of constitutional law (First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment) or of the Civil Rights Acts (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2)).

Because Section 1983 supplies no limitations period, California's three-year statutory limitations period governs Section 1983 claims arising there.

Tosti v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1985-03-04

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself does not provide a statute of limitations for civil rights actions brought under that section, the applicable limitations period is the three year statute of limitations provided in section 338(1) of the California Code of Civil Procedure.

Pennsylvania’s two-year personal-injury limitations period governs § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania.

Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 1987-05-12

In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for purposes of Sec. 1983 civil rights actions is the statute of limitations for the relevant state's personal injury statute. ... The appropriate limitation period for Sec. 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania is the two-year limitation period provided by 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Sec. 5524. Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir.1985).

California’s one-year personal-injury limitations period governs § 1983 actions arising in California.

Thompson v. Weisenberger · filed 1987-05-18

In California, where Thompson’s claim arose, the applicable period is one year. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340 (West 1986).

Because § 1983 has no federal limitations period, the limitations law of the state where the claim arose controls.

Glover v. R.C. Johnson · filed 1987-11-04

There is no federal statute of limitations covering § 1983 claims; the law of the state in which the alleged action arose controls.

Section 1983 vindicates federal rights but does not provide relief for property loss when an adequate state remedy is available.

Johnson v. Kretzer · filed 2020-03-06

Section 1983 vindicates federal rights, but not tort claims for which there are adequate state law remedies. ... The right to seek damages and injunctive relief in Maryland courts following exhaustion of applicable administrative remedies under the Maryland Tort Claims Act constitutes an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Thus, Plaintiff may seek redress for the loss of his property in the courts of Maryland.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to a property deprivation caused by a public body's policy despite the limits on claims for unauthorized property losses.

Lyons v. Dart · filed 2018-08-23

Parratt and Hudson do not block challenges to public bodies' policies, formal or informal; they are limited to losses caused by the sort of deviations from those policies that make pre-deprivation process impractical.

A property deprivation is not actionable as a denial of due process under § 1983 when a predeprivation hearing was impracticable, the act was random and unauthorized, and adequate state postdeprivation remedies existed.

Engsberg v. Town of Milford · filed 1985-01-31

a deprivation of property is not “without due process” if (1) a predeprivation hearing was impracticable; (2) the deprivation was random and unauthorized; and (3) state postdeprivation remedies for the property loss are adequate.

An intentional property loss caused by a state official does not violate due process or state a Section 1983 claim when the state provides an adequate remedy for the loss.

Gibson v. Mike Dutton, Warden and Al Rivers, Internal Affairs · filed 1985-03-07

A prisoner's loss of property due to the intentional acts of a state official is not a violation of due process if the state provides a means to remedy the loss.

An adequate state post-deprivation remedy does not defeat a Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim when the property deprivation was planned and authorized and a pre-deprivation hearing was practicable.

Lavicky v. Burnett · filed 1985-03-19

Although we agree that postdeprivation state remedies can provide adequate process for some intentional deprivations, we do not agree that plaintiff in this case should be restricted to his postdeprivation remedy. ... This action, planned and authorized, is not the sort of action for which postdeprivation process will suffice.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on random and unauthorized errors in a municipal removal hearing must be dismissed when state mandamus proceedings provide an adequate remedy.

McIntosh v. City of Live Oak, Fla. · filed 1985-04-02

The plaintiff having an adequate remedy under state law, the Court, by separate order entered on this date, will dismiss Counts I, II, and III, which seek relief pursuant to section 1983.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on a random and unauthorized suspension of a business license fails when state tort law supplies an adequate remedy.

Delahoussaye v. Seale · filed 1985-04-11

Louisiana law affords plaintiffs a tort cause of action against all of the defendants in this suit. ... The availability of this remedy provides the plaintiffs with all the process that is due, and their complaint should therefore be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for an inmate's negligent property loss when an adequate state-law tort remedy exists.

Campbell v. White · filed 1982-12-03

This Court has held under similar circumstances that prison inmates sustaining a loss of property are provided an adequate remedy under Missouri law, and are therefore precluded from bringing such a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide an actionable claim for negligent property loss when an adequate state post-deprivation remedy satisfies due process.

Williams v. Larry Morris, Samuel Smith, Lt. Caldwell, and Officer Seals · filed 1982-12-06

Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Williams has not stated a claim actionable under section 1983, and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his complaint.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligent deprivation of property when an adequate state remedy provides due process.

Ayers v. Jackson Tp. · filed 1983-04-05

Since the court finds that an adequate state remedy exists, I hold that plaintiffs have no claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon which relief can be granted.

A random, unauthorized intentional or negligent deprivation of property is not actionable under Section 1983 when an adequate state postdeprivation remedy satisfies due process.

Wilkins v. Gordon Lee Whitaker, Detective, H.P.P.D. John Faircloth, Chief of Police, H.P.P.D. · filed 1983-08-04

Whether Detective Whitaker deprived Wilkins of his property intentionally, as Wilkins alleges, or negligently, as the district court concluded, ... Palmer ... and ... Parratt ... control the outcome of this case for Whitaker’s action was a random, unauthorized action with which ... Parratt ... and ... Palmer ... dealt. In either case, a postdeprivation remedy satisfies due process.

For Section 1983 due-process purposes, a final municipal official’s discretionary decision that violates written municipal procedures can constitute established state procedure requiring predeprivation process.

Burtnieks v. City of New York · filed 1983-08-26

In our view, however, decisions made by officials with final authority over significant matters, which contravene the requirements of a written municipal code, can constitute established state procedure.

Negligent errors in applying local zoning law do not violate due process under Section 1983 when adequate state procedures are available to correct them.

Robert and Sharon Albery v. Cal Reddig, Both Individually and as Zoning Administrator for the City of Rock Island · filed 1983-10-03

The allegedly negligent errors in applying local law do not violate the plaintiffs’ due process rights as long as adequate state procedures are available to remedy those errors. The complaint’s conclusory allegations of “gross” negligence and “wanton” behavior do not change the analysis of this case.

A government tax-refund intercept program controlled and foreseeable by the state requires notice and an opportunity for a predeprivation hearing under Section 1983 due process.

Marcello v. Regan · filed 1983-11-08

There is no indication, nor any basis to believe, that predeprivation proceedings would be impossible or impractical in this situation. The state knows when the intercept process will begin; indeed, it controls the initiation of that process. It is not constitutionally necessary, in any event, that the administrative hearing antedate the certification of the census by the state to the Service; it is sufficient if a proper notice is given and the hearing held prior to the time the refundable amount would ordinarily be in order for disbursement.

A § 1983 due-process claim fails absent a final property deprivation when state procedures remain available to vacate a default judgment.

McCulloch v. County of Washoe · filed 1983-11-15

Thus, McCulloch has failed to show that he has been deprived of his property. ... Nevada affords McCulloch all the process that was due him.

A procedural-due-process claim under § 1983 fails when adequate state remedies exist and the plaintiff does not challenge their constitutionality or adequacy.

Atkinson v. City of Fort Collins, Colo. · filed 1984-04-20

Plaintiffs have not contended that these state remedies are unconstitutional or inadequate. Accordingly, it is difficult to conceive the manner in which they were deprived of due process without law.

A § 1983 due-process claim based on an allegedly coerced resignation fails when a meaningful state proceeding was available to challenge voluntariness after the resignation.

Giglio v. Dunn · filed 1984-04-20

Where, as here, Article 78 gave the employee a meaningful opportunity to challenge the voluntariness of his resignation, he was not deprived of due process simply because he failed to avail himself of the opportunity.

Using postjudgment garnishment procedures after a default and money judgment does not violate § 1983 due process merely because the judgment had not yet been formally certified as final.

Georgia Farm Buildings, Inc. v. Willard · filed 1984-05-04

Where a defendant has defaulted and a money judgment has been obtained against it, there has been a “judgment” on the merits and the use of Georgia’s post-judgment garnishment procedures to enforce the judgment provides that defendant with the process to which it is due under the Constitution.

An administrative body’s unauthorized legal error does not create a § 1983 due-process claim when adequate correction is available through the state judiciary.

Cohen v. City Of Philadelphia · filed 1984-06-06

We thus join the First and Seventh Circuits in holding that substantive mistakes by administrative bodies in applying local ordinances do not create a federal claim so long as correction is available by the state's judiciary.

A section 1983 due process claim is not defeated by Parratt v. Taylor merely because state administrative and judicial review were available, when the deprivation resulted from the effect of an established state procedure rather than a random, unauthorized failure to follow procedure.

Vari-Build, Inc. v. City of Reno · filed 1984-09-18

However, the opinion emphasizes, on p. 543, 101 S.Ct. p. 1916, that “the deprivation did not occur as a result of some established state procedure.” The deprivation had occurred as a result of the unauthorized failure of the state’s employees to follow established procedure. ... Here it is the effect on Plaintiff of the established State procedure that has given rise to this litigation. From Plaintiff’s point of view, Defendants’ decision against him was arbitrary. An arbitrary decision cannot be validated by a procedurally correct review process that produces an equally arbitrary ruling.

A negligent deprivation of prisoner property is not actionable under Section 1983 when state tort and administrative remedies provide due process.

Ausley v. Mitchell · filed 1984-11-16

That being true, although Ausley and Poole were negligently deprived of their property, the deprivations were not without due process of law under Parratt v. Taylor.

A negligent deprivation of prisoner property is not actionable under Section 1983 when state tort and administrative remedies provide due process.

Ausley v. Mitchell · filed 1984-11-16

Thus, actions could have been brought in the Virginia courts for the value of the property lost. ... A sufficient alternate reason for our decision is that the inmates had an administrative remedy by way of grievance.

An unauthorized property deprivation violates Section 1983 only when available state remedies fail to provide due process; an adequate state forum prevents the deprivation from becoming a constitutional violation.

Stana v. School District · filed 1984-12-04

A plaintiff establishes a violation of § 1983 only if the remedies available within the state do not comport with the requirements of due process, since, under the rule of ... a deprivation of property does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation so long as the state provides a forum within which redress may be had.

Section 1983 does not support a federal claim for a prisoner’s property loss when state law provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy.

Preston v. John L. Smith, David Bland and Donald Bordenkircher · filed 1984-12-19

Any federal claim as to loss of property is barred by ... Hudson v. Palmer, supra, ... since Kentucky does provide a state court remedy for the damages in question.

A section 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on an unauthorized property taking fails when state replevin provides adequate relief.

Allen v. City of Kinloch · filed 1985-05-31

We see no reason to suppose Allen could not have obtained adequate relief for the taking of his trucks in a replevin action. ... Accordingly, we must hold that Allen failed to establish any violation of his constitutional rights.

A state postdeprivation remedy does not defeat a section 1983 property claim when a predeprivation hearing was practical and feasible.

Stachura v. Truszkowski · filed 1985-06-03

The holding in Parratt that the provision of post-deprivation remedies by state courts will, in some cases, suffice to provide all of the process due in property deprivation claims applies only where, as in Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540-542, 101 S.Ct. at 1915-1916, a pre-deprivation hearing was "impracticable" or "impossible." Here a pretermination due process hearing was both practical and feasible.

An alleged abuse of established state procedure with the knowledge and cooperation of state officials is actionable under section 1983 despite the availability of state remedies.

Huron Valley Hospital, Inc. v. City of Pontiac · filed 1985-06-17

This case involved the alleged abuse of established state procedure, with the knowledge and cooperation of state officials, and the complaint therefore is sufficient.

A state's postdeprivation remedies are immaterial to a Section 1983 claim alleging a substantive Fourth Amendment violation.

Jackie King v. Massarweh · filed 1986-02-11

Moreover, where plaintiffs allege violation of substantive constitutional rights apart from due process rights, availability of state remedies is immaterial.

A property deprivation does not support a Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim when an adequate state tort process provides an ultimate judicial determination of liability.

City of Gary v. Redmond · filed 1986-02-18

We conclude then that the Indiana Tort Claims Act gave Redmond the opportunity for an ultimate judicial determination of liability, satisfying the requirements of procedural due process. Hence, as in Parratt, the facts of this case do not present a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988.

Under controlling Second Circuit law, a meaningful state post-deprivation remedy forecloses a Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim for deprivation of a prisoner’s property.

Morello v. James · filed 1986-02-19

Morello’s complaint, to the extent that it alleges a claim that he was deprived of his property without due process of law, is clearly foreclosed by ... and ... since the State of New York provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy in the Court of Claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a due-process claim for an improper deprivation of liberty when adequate state procedures are available.

Lundblade v. Franzen · filed 1986-03-19

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for every wrongful or improper deprivation of liberty by a state. Only such deprivations which occur in the absence of adequate procedural protections state recognizable Section 1983 actions.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on an allegedly biased judge fails when the bias was a random unauthorized act and the state judicial system provides an adequate right of appeal.

Holloway v. Judge Dee Brown Walker · filed 1986-03-19

The Texas court system provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy through the right of appeal to restore any wrongfully taken property to its owner.

An intentional tort by a state employee does not support a Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim when a meaningful state post-deprivation remedy is available.

Weber v. City of Cedarburg · filed 1986-04-02

We therefore hold that a person does not sustain a deprivation of due process of law when that person suffers a loss of a property or liberty interest as a result of an intentional tort of a state employe acting under color of law, provided that a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available to the person.

Adequate postdeprivation remedies do not bar a Section 1983 due-process claim alleging a systematic, intentional course of conduct that could have been addressed by predeprivation safeguards.

McCartney v. Barg · filed 1986-04-03

Defendants’ argument is defeated by allegations in the complaint which indicate that defendants’ actions were not random and unauthorized, but rather a systematic, intentional course of action which could have been addressed by predeprivation due process protections.

Available state postdeprivation remedies do not bar a Section 1983 claim alleging violation of a specific Bill of Rights guarantee such as the Fourth Amendment.

Willson v. City of Des Moines · filed 1986-04-16

We conclude ... does not apply to bar a section 1983 suit despite the availability of state postdeprivation remedies where the alleged deprivation violates specific Bill of Rights provisions. Such conduct would be actionable under section 1983 irrespective of the procedural protections accompanying it which are afforded by the state.

A Section 1983 due-process claim fails when officials merely fail to follow established workers' compensation procedures that themselves provide adequate enforcement remedies.

Coollick v. Town of Windham · filed 1986-04-22

The failure of the officials to perform in accordance with their duty, to the detriment of the plaintiff, is not a violation of due process but a failure to follow established procedures. ... We agree with the trial court’s ruling that no civil rights action was properly pleaded sufficient to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that under the circumstances the exclusive jurisdiction of the plaintiff’s claims lies with the workers’ compensation commission.

A § 1983 property-due-process claim fails when the plaintiff receives a meaningful and sufficient postdeprivation remedy.

Winnick v. Chisago County Board of Commissioners · filed 1986-07-01

Appellant was afforded sufficient postdeprivation process to satisfy the Due Process Clause and we therefore affirm the summary judgment against him on his section 1983 claim.

In Wisconsin state court, a § 1983 complaint must allege that no adequate state remedy exists.

Davis v. City of Elkhorn · filed 1986-07-02

We therefore hold that the nonexistence of a state remedy must be alleged in a § 1983-type complaint.

An unauthorized state-law deprivation does not state a procedural-due-process claim under § 1983 when the state provides an adequate remedy, and the plaintiff must plead and prove that adequate state remedies are unavailable.

Rodman v. Richard P. Seiter Raymond E. Capote Gale A. Weller Howard E. Hall · filed 1987-01-29

As such, the claim fails to state a violation of procedural due process if there is an adequate remedy to pursue under state law. ... In addition, the plaintiff has failed to plead and prove that he does not have adequate state remedies at his disposal.

An unauthorized property deprivation does not state a § 1983 procedural-due-process claim when state law supplies an adequate post-deprivation remedy, and the plaintiff must plead and prove that adequate state remedies are unavailable.

Comsia v. Mangnone · filed 1987-02-19

As such, the claim fails to state a violation of procedural due process if there is an adequate remedy to pursue under state law. ... The state of Ohio provides an adequate post-deprivation proceeding for the plaintiff to pursue which satisfies the requirements of procedural due process. ... the plaintiff has failed to plead and prove that she does not have adequate state remedies at her disposal.

A Section 1983 due-process challenge to an eviction fails when the state provides notice, trial, and appeal and no eviction order or facial defect in the procedure has been alleged.

Hancich v. Michael Gopoian, Catherine M. Gopoian, Albo, Inc., and Robert J. Jagoda · filed 1987-04-08

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that even if appellant can show that she may be deprived of some property interest under color of state law, she has not alleged that the Connecticut summary process statute is facially infirm.

Section 1983 does not provide a due-process claim for an intentional property deprivation when adequate state remedies exist to redress the loss.

Myers v. Adams · filed 1987-05-06

Assuming that their wrongful conduct, if any, can be construed as intentional, Adams has nevertheless failed to state a § 1983 claim because adequate state remedies exist to redress his loss.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on a random and unauthorized deprivation requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that available state remedies are inadequate.

Sanders v. Gene Borgert, James Pogats, Kenny Robinson · filed 1987-09-22

Having failed to plead and prove the inadequacy of state remedies to redress the alleged wrongs, plaintiff simply failed to state a claim for violation of his procedural due process rights.

An alleged deprivation of personal property is not cognizable under § 1983 when an adequate state remedy exists.

Howell v. Bob Richardson, Sheriff George Rogers, Chief Deputy Gary Robbins, Detective Curtis Biggs, Deputy Vaug · filed 1987-10-20

First, plaintiff's claim based upon defendants' alleged deprivation of his personal property was properly dismissed because such a claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 if an adequate state remedy exists to redress such a deprivation.