42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims accrue when an adverse governmental decision fixes the claimant’s rights, even if its consequences become painful later.

Universal Outdoor, Inc. v. Elk Grove Village · filed 1997-07-14

Just as in Ricks, Universal’s Section 1983 claims became ripe at that point.

A plaintiff challenging when a § 1983 claim accrued must offer evidence of when he knew of the alleged injury to raise a factual dispute about prescription.

Carter v. Sheriffs Dept Richla · filed 1997-10-28

Because Carter failed to adduce any evidence concerning his knowledge, despite being put on notice by the defendants that his claims might have prescribed, the court did not commit plain error in its determination that there was no material fact question on this issue.

Section 1983 claims use state law for limitations periods and tolling, while federal law determines when a claim accrues.

Parker v. Bruce · filed 2004-09-16

Though statutes of limitation and tolling issues in section 1983 cases are matters of state law, the accrual of a section 1983 claim is a matter of federal law.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the harm; a claim based on forced retirement is timely if the plaintiff first learned of that harm within the limitations period.

Sweeney v. City of New York · filed 2006-06-19

Sweeney filed his initial complaint on June 18, 2003. His claims accruing prior to June 18, 2000 are therefore time-barred. However, because Sweeney did not learn of the harm allegedly caused by the 1999 incidents until he was forced to retire in 2003, his section 1983 claim based on his forced retirement should not have been dismissed as untimely.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury and its connection to the defendant, and Louisiana's borrowed one-year limitations period bars an untimely claim.

Dr. Julia Elizabeth Berry v. The Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., Etc. · filed 1983-09-26

In Lavellee v. Listi, supra, this Circuit held that a cause of action under section 1983 accrues when “the plaintiff is, or should be, aware of both the injury and its connection with the acts of the defendant.” 611 F.2d at 1131. We agree with the district court that this letter reveals that Berry, as a matter of law, was aware of the alleged discriminatory practices on January 16, 1977. Without question, she considered the cause of the alleged discrimination to be LSU. Since her suit was not filed within one year after the accrual of her cause of action, it was barred.

State limitations periods apply to § 1983 actions, but federal law determines when the claim accrues.

George Andrew Lavellee, Jr. v. Carlo Listi, Sheriff, Lafayette Parish, Louisiana · filed 1980-02-15

It was correct to apply the state statute of limitations in this § 1983 action. ... However, in such a suit, “even though a state statute [of limitations] is applied, the question when a federal cause of action accrues is a matter of federal, not state law.”

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know the facts supporting it; in Texas, the applicable limitations period is two years.

Stewart v. Livingston · filed 2015-09-10

He therefore knew or should have known the facts supporting his claims on that date, meaning that his cause of action accrued, and the limitations period began to run, at that time. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001). As the district court determined, the limitations period expired two years later, on September 16, 2010, and the instant lawsuit, filed more than three years after the expiration of the limitations period, is time-barred.

A Section 1983 claim in Louisiana is subject to a one-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury and the defendant’s involvement.

Top Dollar Pawn, Gun, & Car Audio 5, L.L.C. v. Shaw · filed 2015-09-23

The last seizure complained of occurred December 17, 2010. Top Dollar had a year from that date to bring its Section 1983 claims. Instead, it filed suit on March 6, 2012. Top Dollar’s claims are prescribed, and the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED.

Heck does not delay accrual of a § 1983 claim arising from an administrative proceeding that imposed only a monetary penalty.

Horne v. Polk · filed 2020-06-25

Heck applies where there is an underlying criminal conviction or sentence. Its limited extension involves a species of administrative decisions that the Supreme Court has acknowledged is similar to criminal proceedings. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 647 (analogizing the prison disciplinary petitioner in question to a criminal defendant). Plaintiffs’ administrative case, on the other hand, involved only a monetary penalty.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim for defamation or false imprisonment absent a constitutional deprivation.

Stordahl v. Harrison · filed 1982-06-24

Slander or defamation in and of itself does not implicate a liberty or property interest so as to be cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). ... Even where libel is coupled with a charge of false imprisonment against store personnel, there is no claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C., § 1983 (1981).

A guilty plea bars a false imprisonment claim under § 1983.

Corbett v. Dwyer · filed 2004-11-30

Similarly, a claim of false imprisonment under § 1983 is barred by a plea of guilty.

Probable cause defeats a § 1983 false imprisonment claim premised on New York law.

Rutigliano v. City of New York · filed 2009-05-01

We have held that “a finding of probable cause will defeat [New York] state tort claims for ... false imprisonment,” Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir.1985) (internal quotation marks omitted), and hence § 1983 false imprisonment claims premised on New York law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for false imprisonment based solely on state tort law.

Chaney v. Smith · filed 2020-11-30

Second, false imprisonment is a state-law claim that is not actionable under § 1983.

A later discrete act of retaliation does not extend the limitations period for earlier Section 1983 retaliation claims.

Morrow v. Bauersfeld · filed 2020-06-12

Stated differently, even assuming defendant Bauersfeld retaliated against plaintiff by wrongfully disciplining him because plaintiff engaged in protected activity with respect to the alleged wrongdoing by defendants Van Fleet, Perkins, and Graham, this act of retaliation is a discrete event, and therefore cannot serve as a basis for extending the accrual date of the limitations period with respect to plaintiff's retaliation claims against defendants Van Fleet, Perkins, and Graham.

Even if the continuing violation doctrine applies to Section 1983 claims, separate segregation decisions by different officials at different facilities cannot be aggregated for limitations purposes.

Fogle v. Slack · filed 2011-04-08

As the district court noted, however, this court has yet to decide whether the continuing violation doctrine applies in § 1983 cases, and we decline to do so now. Instead, we agree with the district court that each segregation decision was of a discrete nature and that, in many instances, segregation decisions were made by different decision makers across three different correctional facilities, thus making it inappropriate to aggregate all such decisions into one continuing violation for limitations purposes.

A single act that causes continuing injury does not extend the limitations period for a § 1983 claim under the continuing violation doctrine.

Clark v. The City of Braidwood · filed 2003-02-07

And under federal law, the continuing violation doctrine does not save an otherwise untimely suit when “a single event gives rise to continuing injuries” because in such a case “the plaintiff can bring a single suit based on an estimation of his total injuries.” ... That is precisely the situation here. Clark alleges one discrete incident of unlawful conduct — the installation of the pipes on his land. That the alleged trespass is, by Clark’s description, “permanent” does not convert that discrete act into one long continuing wrong.

Section 1983 claims based on sufficiently related discriminatory acts may invoke the continuing violation doctrine to reach acts outside the limitations period.

Hess v. Multnomah County · filed 2001-12-07

As discussed above, Hess’s many complaints involve the same actor and relate closely enough to constitute a continuing violation. Accordingly, none of Hess’s 42 USC § 1983 claims are time barred.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a past discriminatory act when the current policy is neutral and creates no present violation.

White v. Columbus Board of Education · filed 1982-07-15

There being no present violation of Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code, or of the Fourteenth Amendment, we must affirm the trial court’s decision in this matter.

A Section 1983 plaintiff cannot establish a continuing violation from the ongoing effects of a past discriminatory act; a discriminatory act or policy must exist within the limitations period.

Velazquez v. Chardon · filed 1984-06-21

Thus, appellants cannot succeed by alleging that their 1977 demotions were politically motivated, and that they have since been unsuccessful in regaining their lost positions. They must allege that a discriminatory act occurred or that a discriminatory policy existed in the year before they filed suit.

A Section 1983 plaintiff may invoke continuing-violation tolling only by diligently challenging the law while the government continuously opposes the plaintiff and enforces it.

Jordan v. Rocco · filed 1986-11-26

First, the citizen challenging the validity or constitutionality of the ordinance must be diligent and vigilant in pursuing his or her remedies against the validity of the ordinance. Second, the governmental agency must continuously oppose the individual and enforce the ordinance. This “continuing controversy” with both sides taking differing views forms the basis of a continuing wrong or a continuing violation.

A Section 1983 plaintiff may recover for damages outside the limitations period when they are part of a continuing civil-rights violation with at least one incident inside the limitations period.

Ferner v. Village of Sheffield · filed 1987-03-20

Accordingly, ... Havens, ... rather than ... Sevako, ... is controlling in this case, and Femer will be permitted to recover for damages occurring as part of a continuing free speech violation with at least one incident within the one-year limitations period, provided that such a continuing violation is proved.

A prisoner's § 1983 medical-treatment claim may allege a continuing violation that keeps claims concerning earlier preoperative care within the limitations period.

Vester v. Mapp · filed 1987-10-26

Viewing plaintiff's complaints about the medical attention afforded his hip problem as alleging a continuing violation, we find plaintiff's claims related to preoperative treatment not to be time barred.

A § 1983 claim alleging a continuing pattern of discrimination must identify at least one related act within the limitations period.

Redding v. Anne Arundel County, Md. · filed 1998-03-13

Plaintiff thus alleges a “serial violation”, which requires him to allege and prove both the existence of the pattern or practice of discrimination, and the existence of at least one related act within the limitations period, as discussed above.

Section 1983’s continuing violation theory does not apply when the plaintiff provides no factual basis linking earlier incidents to an incident within the limitations period.

Brew v. City of Emeryville · filed 2001-04-02

As in Bullock, plaintiff has not provided any specific reason why or how these incidents are related to those on September 1, 1998. Thus, the continuing violation theory does not apply to this case.

A federal continuing violation doctrine applies to § 1983 claims and can allow a plaintiff to recover for an ongoing violation that began outside the limitations period.

Heard v. Sheahan · filed 2001-06-13

Numerous cases assume that a federal doctrine of continuing wrongs is indeed applicable to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We agree.

For a § 1983 claim, later effects of a completed decision do not constitute continuing violations that restart the limitations period.

Knox v. Davis · filed 2001-08-08

The continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable because Knox has failed to establish that a new violation occurs each time she is denied her visitation or mail privileges. Rather, the CDC’s subsequent and repeated denials of Knox’s privileges with her clients is merely the continuing effect of the original suspension.

Section 1983’s continuing violation doctrine does not restart the limitations period when later denials merely carry out an earlier permanent suspension.

Knox v. Davis · filed 2001-08-08

Since Knox has failed to plead facts showing a continuing violation, her §§ 1983 claim is time-barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a filing deadline; the continuing violations doctrine does not extend it merely because the effects of an earlier act persist.

Cowell v. Palmer Township · filed 2001-08-27

As the plaintiffs concede, the applicable statute of limitations for their S 1983 claims is two years. ... The mere existence of the liens does not amount to a continuing violation. Neither was the Township's refusal to remove the lien an affirmative act of a continuing violation.

Section 1983’s two-year limitations period does not bar a claim based on older conduct if there has been a continuing violation.

Bell v. Ostrow · filed 2002-06-04

Finally, we find that the District Court also erred by treating the two-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims as a bar to plaintiffs’ claims without addressing the “continued violation” doctrine.

A § 1983 plaintiff alleging First Amendment retaliation cannot invoke the continuing violations doctrine without evidence of retaliation for protected speech within the limitations period.

Crosland v. Safir · filed 2002-12-20

Without evidence that a plaintiffs protected speech caused maltreatment, a hostile working environment, or an adverse employment action within the limitations period, a plaintiff cannot invoke the continuing violations doctrine.

A § 1983 claim alleging a continuing policy or custom may invoke the continuing violations doctrine to reach earlier acts that are part of that violation.

Branch v. Guilderland Central School District · filed 2003-01-10

As such, the Amended Complaint alleges facts that, if believed by the jury, form a permissible and appropriate basis for invocation of the continuing violations doctrine, and those actions of defendants occurring prior to February 19, 1999, that are part of the continuing violation can be considered in plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims based on discrete acts outside the limitations period cannot be revived merely because those acts are related to timely alleged discrimination.

Sharpe v. Cureton · filed 2003-02-13

We can find no principled basis upon which to restrict Morgan to Title VII claims, and we therefore conclude that the Supreme Court’s reasoning must be applied to the firefighter’s § 1983 claims. ... Accordingly, Morgan overturns prior Sixth Circuit law addressing serial violations, i.e., plaintiffs are now precluded from establishing a continuing violation exception by proof that the alleged acts of discrimination occurring prior to the limitations period are sufficiently related to those occurring within the limitations period.

Section 1983 claims based on conduct outside the limitations period require facts showing a continuing violation connected to conduct within the period.

Bullock v. Town of Woodside · filed 2003-04-07

To avoid dismissal, Bullock was required to “state facts sufficient ... [to] support[] a determination that the alleged discriminatory acts are related closely enough to constitute a continuing violation, and that one or more of the acts falls within the limitation period.” ... The district court properly dismissed Bullock’s pre-limitation period claims because Bullock failed to allege a continuing violation.

Section 1983 failure-to-promote claims are not extended by the continuing violation doctrine.

Blume v. Meneley · filed 2003-09-25

This court has also declined to apply the continuous violation doctrine to § 1983 claims. ... The court declines to apply the continuing violation doctrine.

Individually actionable claims under § 1983 expire after the applicable limitations period and cannot be revived by treating discrete acts as a continuing violation.

O'Connor v. Newark · filed 2006-03-13

The principles at work in Morgan apply with equal force to § 1983 claims. Morgan held simply that causes of action that can be brought individually expire with the applicable limitations period.

A continued failure to act does not extend the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim, and acts by others do not extend the period for suing the defendants at issue.

Lynch v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2006-07-26

Lynch’s second amended complaint alleged only inaction by the Commonwealth defendants, that is, the continued failure to comply with the Commonwealth Court’s order. The repeated affirmative acts of wrongdoing were allegedly performed by others; as such, they do not extend the limitations period for filing suit against the Commonwealth defendants.

Section 1983’s continuing-violation doctrine does not extend the limitations period for earlier discrete acts merely because they relate to timely acts.

Baar v. Jefferson County Board of Educ · filed 2009-02-18

We have applied this same doctrine to § 1983 actions, holding that claimants are “precluded from establishing a continuing violation exception by proof that the alleged acts of discrimination occurring prior to the limitations period are sufficiently related to those occurring within the limitations period.” See Sharpe, 319 F.3d at 268.

Section 1983’s continuing violation doctrine does not make discrete, time-barred acts timely merely because they relate to timely claims.

McCollum v. California · filed 2009-02-23

While Morgan is a Title VII case, the Ninth Circuit has applied it to section 1983 claims “predicated on discrete time-barred acts, not-withstanding that those acts are related to timely-filed claims.” ... The claims in this lawsuit allege discrete discriminatory acts by different people at different times and at different institutions and thus the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable.

A continuing violation under § 1983 requires continued unlawful acts; the continuing effects of an earlier act do not extend the limitations period.

Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County Dep't of Children & Family Services · filed 2010-05-26

A continuing violation in a § 1983 action occurs when there are continued unlawful acts, not by continued ill effects from the original violation.

Section 1983 claims cannot use the continuing violations doctrine to avoid the statute of limitations.

Mercer-Smith v. New Mexico Children, Youth & Families Department · filed 2011-03-21

The Mercer-Smiths’ argument clearly fails because the doctrine of continuing violations does not apply to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 racial profiling and selective enforcement claims accrue when each discriminatory enforcement action occurs; separate incidents do not form a continuing violation.

Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel · filed 2011-10-11

Even if the doctrine applies to § 1983 actions, it does not apply to a racial profiling claim involving many discrete acts of racial profiling and selective enforcement. Unlike a hostile work environment in which not every inappropriate comment or glance is actionable in itself, racial profiling involves a series of discrete actionable incidents. A claim based on racial profiling or selective enforcement accrues at the time of the discriminatory enforcement action.

Section 1983 permits the continuing violation doctrine for Eighth Amendment sexual harassment and assault claims when an abusive act occurs within the limitations period.

Castillo v. Bobelu · filed 2014-02-27

At least for purposes of determining when the claim accrues, the court sees no persuasive basis for distinguishing between sexual harassment/assault claims brought under Title VII and those asserted as Eighth Amendment violations under § 1983. Behavior outside the statutory time period will be considered for purposes of assessing defendants’ liability, if an abusive act took place within it.

A § 1983 due process claim over automatic deductions from an inmate account accrues with the first deduction; later deductions under the same policy do not create a continuing violation.

Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2014-08-15

The DOC’s decision to enforce the DOC Policy against Montañez and its first deduction from his prison account constituted a discrete and independently actionable act, which triggered Montañez’s obligation to assert his rights. The fact that the DOC made subsequent deductions pursuant to the DOC Policy does not make out a continuing violation.

Section 1983 claims based on deliberate indifference to serious medical needs accrue when the continuing violation ends, generally when treatment is provided or the inmate is released.

Ruiz v. Williams · filed 2015-11-17

“Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is a continuing violation that accrues when the defendant has notice of the untreated condition,” and typically “ends only when treatment is provided or the inmate is released.”

A Section 1983 complaint alleging an ongoing policy of deliberate indifference to medical needs requires consideration of the continuing violation doctrine before dismissal as untimely.

Lopez v. Annucci · filed 2017-05-09

Here, the district court concluded that plaintiffs claims were barred by the statute of limitations without assessing whether his complaint alleged a continuing failure to monitor inmate health and provide follow-up care after changes in medication. The pro se complaint, read broadly, should have been construed as alleging an ongoing policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

A prisoner may bring a Section 1983 continuing violation claim for repeated deliberate indifference to an ongoing serious medical need, with the limitations period beginning when adequate treatment is provided.

DePaola v. Clarke · filed 2018-03-09

Consistent with these views expressed by our sister circuits, we conclude that a prisoner may allege a continuing violation under Section 1983 by identifying a series of acts or omissions that demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious, ongoing medical need. The statute of limitations does not begin to run on such a claim for a continuing violation of a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights until the date, if any, on which adequate treatment was provided.

A Section 1983 hostile work environment claim may include acts outside the three-year limitations period when at least one contributing act occurred within that period.

Bailey v. Sheehan · filed 2019-08-22

Consequently, because a claim for hostile work environment by its very nature is a series of acts that constitutes a single unlawful employment practice and Plaintiff has alleged that at least one act contributing to her claim occurred within the statutory period, all of Plaintiff’s alleged acts may be considered as part of a continuing violation when deciding this motion, including those that otherwise would fall outside the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A new limitations period for a Section 1983 claim begins with each new injury caused by a statute’s continued enforcement.

Flynt v. Shimazu · filed 2019-10-07

When the continued enforcement of a statute inflicts a continuing or repeated harm, a new claim arises (and a new limitations period commences) with each new injury.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York ordinarily accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury; the continuing violation doctrine does not extend accrual beyond the last alleged act.

Sides v. Paolano · filed 2019-10-22

Section 1983 claims brought in New York ordinarily accrue when the “plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury” on which his claim is based. ... The continuing violation doctrine does not extend the accrual date of the plaintiff’s claim beyond that date. Accordingly, the three-year limitations period began to run no later than September 28, 2012.

In a Section 1983 claim alleging a continuing denial of medical treatment, the plaintiff must allege the defendant’s involvement in the ongoing acts or omissions to avoid a limitations bar.

Shabazz v. Delaware Department of Corrections · filed 2019-11-05

For the course of conduct to be “continuing,” such that the statute of limitations does not bar Plaintiffs claim, Dr. Carr needs to have been involved in some capacity in the acts and omissions alleged.

The continuing violation doctrine does not keep a § 1983 claim timely when an ongoing restriction is only the effect of an earlier act.

(PC) Consiglio v. Brown · filed 2019-11-27

The continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable because Plaintiff has failed to establish that a new violation occurs every day that the bans on access to the Internet and computers with the capability of connecting to the Internet are in effect. Rather, the fact that Plaintiff has been continually prohibited each day from personally possessing a computer that has the capability to connect to the Internet since he arrived at DSH-C is merely the continuing effect of the bans imposed by the enactment of the challenged regulations.

A continuing violation can bring earlier acts into a § 1983 hostile work environment claim when at least one contributing act occurred within the filing period.

Josephson v. Ganzel · filed 2020-03-24

The Sixth Circuit has recognized the “continuing violation” doctrine as an exception to the one-year statute of limitations in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims alleging a continuing violation can include conduct outside the two-year limitations period when the alleged violation continues into that period.

FAVELA v. BROWN · filed 2020-11-20

Accordingly, Mr. Favela's Eighth Amendment claims fall within the continuing violation doctrine and are not barred by the statue of limitations.

A § 1983 claim against prosecutors must specifically identify their acts so the complaint shows impropriety and a constitutionally significant injury.

MacRae v. Motto · filed 1982-07-23

In order to go forward with a section 1983 suit against prosecutors, the allegations should be specific as to what the prosecutors did so that it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the actions complained of were improper and the injury suffered was of constitutional proportion.

Section 1983 requires specific, nonconclusory allegations identifying the officials responsible for alleged mistreatment.

Sharrock v. Gunter · filed 1993-04-13

Plaintiff's remaining allegations concerning denial of due process are conclusory and lack the specificity required to pursue a § 1983 suit. See Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir.1986). Plaintiff's vague assertions that an unwritten policy was implemented against him fail to identify any staff members who allegedly singled him out for mistreatment.

A Section 1983 complaint against supervisory officials must allege their personal involvement in the deprivation of rights or an arguable basis for vicarious liability.

Tuley v. Louis Heyd, Jr., Criminal Sheriff, Orleans Parish · filed 1973-08-03

The inadequacy of the complaint to state a claim under Section 1983 against Heyd or Falkenstein is patent. These two defendants are not named or otherwise identified in the body of the complaint. The pleading thus not only fails to indicate any direct, personal involvement of either defendant in the alleged deprivation of civil rights, but also fails to allege any arguable basis for vicarious liability.

Section 1983 claims against government officials in their individual capacities must identify what each defendant did so each has fair notice of the claim.

Hunt v. Crownover · filed 2020-03-20

As a result, in cases where a plaintiff alleges claims against government actors sued in their individual capacities under § 1983, “it is particularly important in such circumstances that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished from collective actions against the state.” Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1249–50 (emphasis in original). The complaint meets this standard. The complaint alleges in extensive detail that each individual CYFD Defendant acted or failed to act either in the (1) licensure of the homes or in the (2) investigation or monitoring of the foster children and foster homes.

Section 1983 allows a district court to consider a claim even when it conflicts with a college disciplinary board’s findings.

Professional Ass'n of College Educators v. El Paso County Community College District · filed 1984-04-20

We recognized, however, that an unconstitutional result could be reached despite procedural and substantive regularity and therefore carefully avoided holding that federal courts are bound by the determinations of college disciplinary boards. ... Furguson, therefore, cannot support The College’s argument that a district court errs by considering a claim asserted to be inconsistent with a finding of the Board of Trustees.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for errors in a school official’s exercise of discretion unless they violate specific constitutional guarantees.

Pirschel v. Sorrell · filed 1998-03-13

In addition, § 1983 is not a vehicle for correction of errors in the exercise of a school official’s discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guarantees.

Section 1983 does not let a plaintiff relitigate evidentiary questions or school-regulation construction in federal court, or correct discretionary school-administration errors absent a specific constitutional violation.

Boynton v. Casey · filed 1982-07-23

It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. Public high school students do have substantive and procedural rights while at school. But § 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations. The system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members, and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal-court corrections of errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guarantees.

Section 1983 does not permit federal relitigation of evidentiary questions from school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations when due process was already afforded.

Jordan v. Board of Regents, University System of Georgia · filed 1983-09-30

“§ 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising out of school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations.”

When a state provides ample administrative and judicial remedies, litigants ordinarily cannot use § 1983 to obtain federal review of local zoning and planning disputes.

Raskiewicz v. The Town of New Boston · filed 1985-02-07

While the Supreme Court has yet to provide precise analysis concerning claims of this sort, we feel confident that where, as here, the state offers a panoply of administrative and judicial remedies, litigants may not ordinarily obtain federal court review of local zoning and planning disputes by means of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal court to relitigate evidence or interpret school rules in a disciplinary proceeding absent a violation of a specific constitutional guarantee.

Fuller v. Decatur Public School Board of Education School District 61 · filed 2000-01-11

But § 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations.

Section 1983 does not turn a state-law claim into a federal due-process claim merely because the plaintiff labels it as due process.

Harvey v. Board of Registration in Nursing · filed 1982-07-23

Merely labeling such state claims as “due process” is insufficient to raise a federal question under § 1983.

A § 1983 due-process theory presented no federal question where state law supplied a prompt hearing.

Oil Resources, Inc. v. Florida, Department of Banking & Finance · filed 1984-04-06

The Plaintiffs’ claims under the Due Process Clause would present grounds for federal jurisdiction, but for the fact that the relevant Florida statute provides a prompt hearing.

Section 1983 authorizes redress for violations of federal law, but not for official conduct that violates only state law.

Bettio v. Village of Northfield · filed 1991-10-18

However, it must be remembered that § 1983 only authorizes redress for violations of federal law; “[i]t does not cover official conduct that allegedly violates state law.”

Section 1983 provides relief only for violations of federal law; a state constitutional claim alone does not qualify.

Hanrahan v. Housing & Redevelopment Authority of Duluth · filed 1995-11-13

Only a violation of Federal law may serve as a basis for Section 1983 jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of the Interstate Corrections Compact or an interstate prisoner transfer agreement because they are not violations of federal law.

Smith v. Warden, NH State Prison · filed 2008-01-31

Any violations of the ICC and the transfer agreement are not violations of federal law and are not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for violations of federal law; failure to follow state procedures alone does not establish a claim.

Alice Chathas and Byron Ellis v. Norbert Smith, Individually and as Chief of Police of Village of Evergreen Park · filed 1989-09-05

However, § 1983 only provides a remedy for federal law violations.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal law, not state or local law.

Romero v. Hayman · filed 2012-07-06

Romero’s complaint is light on facts and appears, at times, to allege injuries for which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an improper legal remedy; for example, he repeatedly claims that the ... defendants violated state administrative procedures, but fails to realize that, “by its terms, [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal, not state or local, law.”

Section 1983 allows claims for violations of federal law, but a violation of prison policy alone does not support a claim.

Hambright v. Kemper · filed 2017-12-08

But § 1983 applies only to violations of federal law, so Hambright cannot bring a claim based on an alleged violation of RCI’s policies.

Section 1983 remedies violations of federal law; a prison official’s failure to follow prison policy alone does not establish a claim.

Evans 367619 v. Brege · filed 2020-09-25

Section 1983 is addressed to remedying violations of federal law, not state law.

A Section 1983 plaintiff alleging a procedural due process violation must plead that state remedies for the wrong are inadequate.

Perry v. Southeastern Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc. · filed 2006-02-16

Under § 1983, however, plaintiffs “must plead ... that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.”

Section 1983 provides relief only for deprivation of a federal right, and an adequate state remedy can satisfy due process without matching § 1983 relief.

Buddy J. Loftin v. Carl Thomas, Sheriff · filed 1982-07-26

Loftin’s claim is based on negligent deprivation of his property without due process of law, as indeed it must be, for § 1983 would permit relief only if he has been denied a federal right, in this case, due process of law. ... To satisfy the requirement of due process, the state remedy need not provide relief coextensive with that afforded by § 1983.

Section 1983 is an inapt vehicle for a mandamus action against municipal officials to enforce municipal law when adequate state-law mandamus remedies are available.

Flower Cab Company v. Petitte · filed 1982-08-04

The federal courts are an odd place to litigate compliance with municipal law, and section 1983 an inapt vehicle for bringing mandamus actions against municipal officials. ... We think in short that this case probably comes within the principle of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), that not every act of a state officer that deprives a person of his property rights violates the due process clause, at least where there are adequate postdeprivation remedies under state law, such as mandamus, as there appear to be here.

A section 1983 due process claim attacking a state court judgment fails to state a claim when the judgment is not facially unconstitutional and the state provided adequate appellate review procedures.

Collins v. Collins · filed 1984-06-29

Accordingly, the court would find that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the existence of adequate review procedures under Georgia law has accorded plaintiff sufficient due process.

A plaintiff cannot maintain a section 1983 claim for deprivation of property without procedural due process unless he proves that available state law remedies are inadequate.

Kondrat v. Byron · filed 1984-07-09

Kondrat must prove the inadequacy of state law remedies before he can pursue a § 1983 action for deprivation of property without due process.

A procedural due process claim under § 1983 fails where an adequate state-court remedy, such as an action in the nature of certiorari, was available to correct the local official's decision, even though no formal administrative hearing was held.

Quinn v. Bryson · filed 1984-07-17

Similarly, we believe that the procedures afforded the plaintiffs in this case were adequate. They were given a prompt written notice which stated the reasons for the denial of their application...The state courts were available to redress errors even during the period that appellate administrative review was unavailable. We do not think that these plaintiffs were denied procedural due process.

A section 1983 procedural due process claim will not lie where the state provides adequate post-deprivation remedies to redress the deprivation of a protected property interest.

Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield · filed 1984-08-13

Where state law provides adequate redress to a plaintiff deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest, no section 1983 action will lie.

A section 1983 claim for excessive force premised on a deprivation of a liberty interest fails, and is not a constitutional violation redressable under the statute, where the state provides an adequate post-deprivation tort remedy for the conduct.

Dobson v. Green · filed 1984-09-06

Based on the above, the court determines that where adequate state post-deprivation remedies are available to remedy the alleged use of excessive force by persons acting under color of state law there is no deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of law and thus no Constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not support a due process claim for deprivation of a property interest when state law already provides an adequate remedy to redress the wrong.

City of Lake Worth v. Walton · filed 1984-09-19

Accordingly, because Walton had a state remedy for the City’s failure to promote him, we hold that he was not entitled to pursue a civil rights action under Section 1983, since his constitutional right to due process was not violated.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim does not lie for a random and unauthorized deprivation of liberty when state law supplies an adequate postdeprivation remedy.

Kolpak v. Bell · filed 1985-08-14

Because John’s death was caused by such an unauthorized act, and because plaintiffs agree that they have a remedy under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to the procedural due process claim.

A plaintiff with adequate state tort remedies for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution cannot use § 1983 to recover for the same injuries as a procedural-due-process claim.

Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc. · filed 1985-08-15

Rodgers’ access to state tort claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution precludes him from using Section 1983 to compensate him for his injuries.

A Section 1983 due-process claim fails when no predeprivation hearing is constitutionally required and an adequate postdeprivation remedy exists.

Tomai-Minogue v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 1985-08-19

Because a pre-deprivation hearing was not required when plaintiff’s license was suspended, and an adequate post-deprivation remedy existed, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim cannot prevail, as there has been no denial of due process.

A State satisfies due process for a § 1983 claimant by making a constitutionally sufficient administrative remedy available, even if the claimant fails to use it.

Bohn v. County of Dakota · filed 1985-09-11

The availability of recourse to a constitutionally sufficient administrative procedure satisfies due process requirements if the complainant merely declines or fails to take advantage of the administrative procedure.

Section 1983 does not support a negligence claim based only on denial of procedural due process when adequate state tort remedies exist.

O'Quinn v. Albert Manuel, T.A. Morvant, Robert Searcy, Calcasieu Parish, Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Depart · filed 1985-10-07

section 1983 does not support a negligence claim based solely on the denial of procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment where adequate state tort remedies are available.

An intentional police excessive-force claim implicating substantive due process is actionable under § 1983 regardless of whether state tort remedies are available.

Evonne J. New v. City of Minneapolis, Alva Emerson and William Scott · filed 1986-06-04

Since claims of this nature involving substantive due process are to be considered without regard to whether adequate state tort remedies provide an alternate form of redress, the district court incorrectly entered summary judgment against appellant.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim for property deprivation requires the plaintiff to use available state remedies or plead and prove that those remedies are inadequate.

Fisichelli v. Town of Methuen · filed 1987-02-23

Thus, in order to prevail on a claim of a deprivation of procedural due process, “the claimant must either avail himself of the remedies guaranteed by state law or prove that the available remedies are inadequate.”

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on a state employee's random, unauthorized act fails when the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy.

Smith v. Cantor · filed 1987-03-09

If a state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for random, unauthorized action taken by one of its employees, a procedural due process claim will fail.

An available state tort remedy does not bar a § 1983 procedural-due-process claim when an established state procedure caused the deprivation and predeprivation process was feasible.

Messick v. Leavins · filed 1987-03-09

The district court entered judgment for the defendants on the basis of “adequate state remedies” available to redress the plaintiffs’ loss. However, as will be seen, the availability of a state tort action is irrelevant to a claim for deprivation of a protected interest which is carried out by persons acting under color of state law pursuant to an established procedure where predeprivation process is feasible.

A § 1983 due-process challenge to termination of welfare benefits must allege and prove that available state remedies are inadequate.

Leo v. Savage v. Franklin County Welfare Department · filed 1987-10-13

Plaintiff failed to allege and prove inadequate state remedies. Additionally, recovery was barred on the basis of immunity and res judicata principles.

Section 1983 provides no procedural due process claim when predeprivation process is impractical and adequate state remedies are available after the deprivation.

Reich v. Beharry · filed 1988-06-24

Defendant Beharry has filed a Motion to Dismiss challenging the efficacy of plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim. ... Under Parratt v. Taylor, where pre-deprivation process is impractical and adequate post-deprivation remedies are available, plaintiff is relegated to the available state remedies.

In the Sixth Circuit, a § 1983 plaintiff alleging deprivation of a property or liberty interest without procedural due process must plead and prove that state remedies are inadequate.

Gibbs v. Robert J. Hopkins Pat Leavenworth · filed 1993-11-22

In Vicory, we held that in a § 1983 case “claiming the deprivation of a property [or liberty] interest without procedural due process of law, the plaintiff must plead and prove that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.” 721 F.2d at 1066. Here Gibbs has not pled or shown that Michigan’s judicial remedies are inadequate or that it would be futile to make the argument in the courts of Michigan that prison officials should not have kept him in segregation after May 12 without a hearing or other procedures.

A § 1983 procedural due process claim for deprivation of property is unavailable when adequate state remedies exist to redress the harm.

Franken Investments, Inc. v. City of Flint · filed 2002-08-30

This Court GRANTS Defendants motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 procedural due process claim because alternative state court remedies exist for Plaintiffs to redress their alleged harm.

Section 1983 provides no cognizable claim for an excessive local improvement assessment when the owner failed to use statutory challenge procedures that satisfy due process.

Tiffany Family Trust Corp. v. City of Kent · filed 2003-08-11

Unless it is shown that statutory procedures for challenging assessments do not satisfy due process requirements, one who fails to utilize those procedures has no cognizable claim for injury under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if it can belatedly prove that an assessment exceeds special benefits.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional challenge against a private party who sets a state attachment procedure in motion, but shields that party from monetary liability when the party neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the statute was unconstitutional.

Folsom Investment Co. v. Moore · filed 1982-08-06

The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit in Lugar and held that when a § 1983 plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a state attachment procedure, as opposed to making mere nonconstitutional allegations of misuse or abuse of the statute, the private party who sets that attachment scheme in motion is to be considered a state actor. ... Thus, insofar as Folsom and the Scullins have alleged that the Louisiana attachment scheme is violative of the constitution, the private parties who set that scheme in motion acted under color of state law. ... We hold that a private party who attempts to secure rights under a presumptively valid attachment statute may establish that he is immune from monetary damages and set forth standards for such an immunity. ... We hold that a § 1983 defendant who has invoked an attachment statute is entitled to an immunity from monetary liability so long as he neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the statute was unconstitutional.

Section 1983 does not displace a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from retroactive relief.

Glosen v. Barnes · filed 1984-02-02

We hold that Quern conclusively forecloses appellant's claim that the State of Nevada is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from retroactive relief in Sec. 1983 actions.

Defendants who are immune from § 1983 liability cannot be held liable under the section.

Hardage v. Reynolds · filed 2003-12-05

... we affirm, because some defendants are immune from section 1983 liability, and Mr. Hardage failed to state a claim as to the remaining defendants.

Section 1983 immunizes judicial conduct and prosecutorial conduct from suit in the circumstances described, and public defenders are immune from Section 1983 suits.

Groff v. Eckman · filed 1981-10-16

Defendant Eckman properly asserts that Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), immunizes his judicial conduct from suit under Section 1983 where there is no allegation to indicate that he acted in any way inconsistent with his judicial authority or jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits immunity doctrines to defeat claims against certain state officials, including prosecutors acting as part of the judicial process.

DeBoer v. Martin · filed 1982-04-30

Applying the law to the present case, the court concludes that Martin and Petka as state prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1980) for the actions taken against DeBoer.

Section 1983 claims are barred when defendants have absolute or quasi-judicial immunity for the challenged actions.

Chrzanowski v. Assad · filed 2008-04-24

Chrzanowski brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Judge Assad and Marshal Saavedra, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. ... We first hold that neither exception to absolute judicial immunity saves Chrzanowski’s claims against Judge Assad. ... We therefore affirm the district court’s decision that Judge Assad had absolute immunity for his actions.

Section 1983 damages claims against individual military defendants may be barred by military immunity.

Egloff v. New Jersey Air National Guard · filed 1988-04-27

We previously held that Jorden v. National Guard Bureau, supra, a case out of our own Third Circuit and binding upon this court required us to find that the individual defendants here were absolutely immune from suit for damages under the federal civil rights statutes.

Section 1983 claims are subject to absolute judicial immunity and qualified immunity.

Weinstein v. Bogacz · filed 2009-04-07

We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court. Defendants Bogacz, McGowan, and Rood are protected by absolute judicial immunity; defendants Weinberger, Calderon, and Alomar are entitled to qualified immunity; and Younger abstention was appropriate in light of the then-pending appeals of the various sanctions orders entered in the state court proceeding.

Section 1983 allows a person injured under color of state law to sue for deprivation of federal rights, subject to immunity limits for state officials.

In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633 in Circuit Court for Washington County · filed 1994-09-02

Although the action taken by Engle against the Mauks was in no way commendable, we hold that he is cloaked with immunity against monetary liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he acted as a state official.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Martin v. Hendren · filed 1997-10-14

Hendren is thus entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 liability for carrying out the judge’s orders to handcuff Martin and remove her from the courtroom.

Section 1983 damages claims may be barred by sovereign immunity or prosecutorial immunity.

White v. Blackwell · filed 2009-09-01

To the extent that Mr. White seeks damages against Ms. Blackwell in her official capacity, his suit is barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. ... And to the extent that Ms. Blackwell has been sued in her individual capacity, she is entitled to absolute immunity. ... As a prosecutor, she is protected by prosecutorial immunity.

Section 1983 claims against an entity immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment cannot proceed.

Morgan v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation · filed 2010-01-19

The district court properly dismissed Morgan’s section 1983 claims because CDCR is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 claims against state medical board participants may be barred by absolute immunity.

Chung v. Johnston · filed 2011-07-06

Wayne Chung, M.D., appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from the suspension and probation of his medical license by the Medical Board of California. ... Dismissal of Chung’s federal constitutional claims was proper on the basis of absolute immunity.

Section 1983 claims against state officials are subject to immunity doctrines, and quasi-judicial immunity covers only functions integral to the judicial process.

Draine v. Leavy · filed 2012-11-09

Whether a defendant is entitled to immunity from a § 1983 action is a question of federal law. ... This general, routine, investigative act is neither an adjudicative task nor a task “so integral or intertwined with the judicial process such that quasi-judicial immunity applies. ... In that situation, only qualified immunity applies. ... Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal on the basis of absolute immunity and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 suits against state agencies are barred when the agencies are immune under the Eleventh Amendment.

Ross v. Texas Board of Pardon & Parole, et · filed 2014-12-11

The TBPP and TDCJ are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from Ross’s suit.

Section 1983 authorizes a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of a federal right.

Parten v. Alabama Department of Tourism · filed 2015-04-20

There is no question that the Eleventh Amendment bars Parten from suing the State of Alabama directly under § 1983 and that state agencies share this absolute immunity from suit. ... Because Parten’s First Amendment claim under § 1983 is asserted directly against the Tourism Department, both for damages and for equitable relief, summary judgment in favor of the department on this claim is appropriate in all respects.

Section 1983 bars damages suits against a state agency or a state official acting in an official capacity.

Johnson v. Board of Bar Overseers of Mass. · filed 2004-05-26

It is settled law “that neither a state agency nor a state official acting in his official capacity may be sued for damages in a section 1983 action.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy when government officials violate a person's federal rights, and Ohio's statutory political subdivision immunity does not bar such an action.

Paul C. Harger Trust v. Morrow Cty. Reg., Unpublished Decision (12-6-2004) · filed 2004-12-06

In summary, and based solely on a reading of the complaint, we find that appellant Morrow County Regional Planning Commission is entitled to immunity with respect to appellees' state claims but is not entitled to immunity with respect to appellees' Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional violations subject to absolute and qualified immunity defenses.

Barber v. Miller · filed 2015-12-02

“Whether a defendant is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a legal question that this Court reviews de novo.” ... “Miller thus enjoys absolute immunity against allegations of false and misleading statements to the family court.” ... “Accordingly, Miller enjoys qualified immunity from these Fourth Amendment claims.”

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional violations, subject to judicial and prosecutorial immunity.

Caruso v. Zugibe · filed 2016-04-20

The remaining defendants are similarly immune from Caruso’s claims. ... “Judges are granted absolute immunity from liability for acts taken pursuant to their judicial power and authority.” ... Thomas Zugibe, the District Attorney, is also immune from Caruso’s claims. ... “Absolute immunity bars a civil suit against a prosecutor for advocatory conduct that is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” ... Accordingly, the District Attorney is absolutely immune from Caruso’s claims.

Section 1983 allows absolute immunity for local legislators acting within legitimate legislative activity and qualified immunity for officials who did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

24 Franklin Ave. R.E. Corp. v. Cannella · filed 2016-05-04

Local legislators are “absolutely immune from suit under [42 USC] § 1983 for their legislative activities” (Bogan v Scott-Harris, 523 US 44, 49 [1998]), and such immunity is applicable to all actions within the “sphere of legitimate legislative activity” (Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367, 376 [1951]).

Section 1983 claims are not barred by a state statute that grants immunity from tort liability.

EASTMAN v. SMITH · filed 2019-10-11

Defendant is not entitled to immunity. The Pennsylvania immunity statute is effective against a state tort claim, but has no force when applied to federal claims under the Civil Rights Acts. The supremacy clause of the Constitution prevents a state from immunizing entities or individuals alleged to have violated federal law.

A § 1983 complaint is subject to dismissal when every named defendant is immune from suit.

Brown v. SC Department of Corrections · filed 2020-06-04

On the same day, the magistrate judge also issued an order noting that Plaintiff’s complaint was subject to summary dismissal because the Defendants are not subject to suit under § 1983 and the allegations failed to state a claim for relief. ... Now before the court is the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (“Report”), recommending that the court summarily dismiss this action with prejudice and without issuance and service of process for the same reasons identified in the April 7, 2020 order. ... Thus, having reviewed the Report and finding no clear error, the court agrees with, and wholly adopts, the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in the Report (ECF No. 16), which is incorporated herein by reference.

Section 1983 claims against a state protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity or a judge protected by judicial immunity must be dismissed.

Conroy v. Gordon · filed 2020-07-20

The district court properly dismissed Conroy’s action because defendants are immune from suit.

Defendants immune from suit under Section 1983 cannot be held liable under that section.

Blasco v. South Carolina, State of · filed 2020-10-06

Subsequently, on August 4, 2020, the magistrate judge issued an order noting that Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to summary dismissal because each of the defendants is immune from suit under § 1983 and the allegations in the Complaint fail to state a claim for relief. ... Thus, having reviewed the Report and finding no clear error, the court agrees with, and wholly adopts, the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in the Report (ECF No. 24), which is incorporated herein by reference.

A consent decree settling a Section 1983 action is based on the parties’ agreement, not the statute, and therefore does not itself authorize an injunction against nonparties under the Anti-Injunction Act.

Dunn v. James B. Carey, Delaware County Sheriff · filed 1986-12-16

The consent decree, however, is not based on § 1983 and therefore does not “expressly authorize” an injunction against third parties. Consent decrees are contracts. Their force comes from the agreement of the parties, not from the statute on which the complaint was based.

A remedial court decree, standing alone, does not create a federal right enforceable through § 1983.

Galloway v. State of Louisiana · filed 1987-05-29

Therefore, "a remedial court order, standing alone, does not serve as the basis for Sec. 1983 liability."

A remedial court order does not itself create or enlarge constitutional or federal statutory rights and cannot alone support § 1983 liability.

Galloway v. Louisiana · filed 1987-05-29

although “remedial decrees are the means by which unconstitutional conditions are corrected ... they do not create or enlarge constitutional rights.” ... Nor do judicial decrees create rights secured by laws within the meaning of section 1983. ... Therefore, “a remedial court order, standing alone, does not serve as the basis for § 1983 liability.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violating a consent decree unless the violation also implicates constitutional rights.

Jackson v. Lane · filed 1988-07-19

This Court has not troubled to check that assertion, because even if it were true defendants’ failure to comply with contractual undertakings (even though embodied in a court order) would not ground a Section 1983 claim unless that failure also implicated constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not supply a separate remedy for a jail library policy dispute governed by a consent decree; relief must be sought through enforcement of that decree.

Martin v. Davies · filed 1988-09-19

Since Martin’s proper remedy lies within the confines of the consent decree, this court dismisses Martin’s complaint in its entirety.

Section 1983 does not provide a direct civil rights action for violation of a consent decree alone.

DeGidio v. Pung · filed 1989-01-19

Nothing in the language of § 1983 or its legislative history suggests that such agreements were intended to or should provide the basis for a federal civil rights action.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to enforce a consent decree whose sanctions are integral to remedying a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation.

Kozlowski v. Coughlin · filed 1989-03-17

Judge Stewart's finding that the sanctions and procedures in the decree were inextricably intertwined indicates that the sanctions served to further the objectives of the underlying law--the procedural dictates of the fourteenth amendment. The question of how to remedy a violation of the fourteenth amendment in a section 1983 claim was thus within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not provide an action to enforce a consent decree.

Degidio v. Pung · filed 1990-12-04

Accordingly, we decline to hold that a consent decree may be enforced through a section 1983 action.

A class member may not use a Section 1983 complaint to revisit conditions previously discussed and resolved in a consent decree covering the class.

Rice v. Al C. Parke, Tony Williams, John Parker, and His Personnel at Tool Room · filed 1991-02-20

Moreover, Rice may not now complain, in a Sec. 1983 complaint, of conditions previously discussed and resolved in a prior consent decree covering the class of which he is a member.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for enforcing rights under a consent decree; those rights must be enforced through an action for contempt.

Miller v. Department of Correction · filed 1993-07-14

Finally, even if Miller's rights under the applicable consent decree were violated, the appropriate vehicle for their enforcement is not a section 1983 action but an action for contempt (like the one filed by the Bruder plaintiffs two years after Miller commenced this action).

Section 1983 does not provide a separate damages action for injuries alleged to arise from violation of a consent decree; those allegations are properly pursued as an action to enforce the decree.

Johnathan Lee X v. Casey · filed 1994-01-05

The magistrate judge's dismissal of X's original complaint was proper. His complaint, which alleged multiple violations of the consent decree in Brown was, in effect, a motion for a finding of civil contempt for violation of the religious diet provisions of the consent decree. His request for damages identified injuries which were caused by the Defendants' alleged failure to obey the court order. ... The magistrate judge correctly referred the complaint to the attorney for the class and dismissed the complaint so that it could be brought as an enforcement action.

Section 1983 does not allow a suit based solely on an alleged violation of a consent decree.

Harrelson v. Elmore County, Ala. · filed 1994-08-03

Therefore, the court holds that an alleged violation of a consent decree cannot be the basis for a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of a remedial consent decree alone because the decree does not create rights secured by the laws.

Connall v. Collins · filed 1995-11-01

To the extent that Connall's claim concerns a violation of a consent decree, it is not cognizable under §1983 because, under the law of this circuit, a remedial decree does not create rights secured by the laws within the meaning of §1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of the Ruiz consent decree alone.

Gill v. Texas Department · filed 1996-01-30

Violations of the Ruiz decree are not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a means to enforce a consent decree because the decree does not itself create or enlarge rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Klein v. Zavaras · filed 1996-04-02

Remedial decrees do not create or enlarge constitutional rights, or create “rights ... secured by the laws,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “sufficient to serve as a basis for liability under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide a means to enforce a consent decree because the decree does not create rights secured by the Constitution or laws.

Klein v. Zavaras · filed 1996-05-02

With respect to this claim, we adopt the view taken by the Fifth and Eight Circuits and hold that a § 1983 action is not an appropriate means to seek enforcement of a consent decree.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to enforce the Ruiz consent decree.

Hicks v. USA · filed 1996-08-09

But, the district court has discretion whether to review pendent state law claims, Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1981); and, the Ruiz consent decree claim is not cognizable under § 1983, see Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1986).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of a consent decree.

Wilson v. Harper · filed 1996-11-14

A violation of a consent decree, however, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to enforce the Hines consent decree governing medical care at Minnesota’s maximum security prison.

Long v. Barry · filed 1998-05-28

As to Long&s claim that defendants violated the Hines v. Anderson, 439 F. Supp. 12 (D. Minn. 1977) (Hines), consent decree which governs medical care at Minnesota&s maximum security prison, we agree with the district court that Long cannot enforce the consent decree in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims based on violations of remedial consent decrees.

Lewis v. Jones · filed 1998-07-29

The district court did not err in dismissing Lewis’s claim that the defendants violated the Lamar1 and Ruiz2 consent decrees because remedial decrees cannot serve as a basis for a claim of damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a consent decree.

Kellensworth v. Norris · filed 2000-05-18

A consent decree cannot, however, be enforced through a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for mere violations of court orders in a prison conditions consent decree.

Sanders v. Johnson · filed 2001-07-09

The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that, inasmuch as Sanders was alleging mere violations of court orders in the Ruiz litigation, his claims were not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and were frivolous.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a consent decree.

Floyd v. Ricketts · filed 2002-08-28

Moreover, enforcement of the Agreement would seem to be Ingram’s only remedy; he cannot file his own § 1983 action seeking to enforce it.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate action to enforce complex consent decrees; enforcement must be sought in the issuing court.

Holiday v. Martinez · filed 2003-05-29

In any event, given the complex nature of these consent decrees, ... potentially interested parties must seek enforcement through the issuing court, not through a separate action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to assert violations of consent decrees as civil rights claims.

Dupont v. Silva · filed 2003-07-02

Furthermore, the judge correctly found that he cannot assert violations of consent decrees in his civil rights action.

An alleged violation of a prison consent decree supports relief under § 1983 only if the underlying conduct independently violates the Constitution.

Allen H. Beck, and Arnulfo Cantu and Jimmy Mark Appleman v. James A. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1988-04-18

These allegations must, on their own merit apart from the Ruiz consent decree, represent constitutional violations for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not let individual prisoners enforce a remedial decree solely because the decree exists; the decree itself creates no constitutional rights.

Simmons v. William Stephens, Director, et · filed 2014-03-31

The Ruiz decree, by itself, does not create constitutional rights that may be vindicated in Section 1983 suits by individual prisoners.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for breach of a consent decree; the remedy is a contract suit or enforcement of the decree through judicial sanctions.

Walker v. City of N.Y. · filed 2019-02-12

To the extent Plaintiff raises them as civil rights violations, the claims fail. "The remedy for breach of [a consent decree] is a suit for breach of contract or enforcement of the decree through judicial sanctions, including contempt, not an action under § 1983."

Section 1983 permits monetary relief for denial of rights guaranteed by Titles IV and XX of the Social Security Act.

Joseph A. by Wolfe v. NM Dept. of Human Services · filed 1983-09-23

It is also clear that if the plaintiffs have been denied rights guaranteed by the Social Security Act, monetary relief for this denial is available in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).

A state’s violation of Social Security Act requirements can state a cognizable § 1983 claim.

Ohio State Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Creasy · filed 1984-04-20

Plaintiffs’ allegation that the State’s budget management policies violate certain provisions of the Social Security Act states a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.