42 U.S.C. § 1983

Florida Bar disciplinary officials acting as agents of the Florida Supreme Court have absolute immunity and are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Henry v. Florida Bar · filed 2017-07-14

Finally, the individual defendants were entitled to absolute immunity as agents of the Florida Supreme Court and were not “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Washington State Bar Association, as a state agency, is not subject to liability under § 1983; immunity also bars claims against its individual officials.

Block v. Washington State Bar Assn. · filed 2019-02-11

The district court correctly dismissed Block’s suit against the WSBA and WSBA individual defendants on Eleventh Amendment and quasi-judicial immunity grounds. See Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Court of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (discussing immunity of a state bar and state bar judges and prosecutors); Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966) (concluding the Washington State Bar Association is “an agency of the state” and not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

In a Section 1983 action, a state's contracts with others do not defeat its immunity from suit.

Burgo v. Stansbury · filed 2019-07-02

Concerning the dismissals of the United States and the State of Louisiana, Burgo argues that, contrary to the district court’s finding, neither is immune from suit because they entered into contracts with another defendant and others. ... As to the State of Louisiana, Burgo’s argument does not raise a nonfrivolous argument for appeal.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of New Jersey state rules.

BROOKMAN v. TOWNSHIP OF HILLSIDE · filed 2019-07-23

In any event, New Jersey state rules are not enforceable via Section 1983.

Section 1983 preempts state statutes that would immunize a person from liability for conduct actionable under the section.

Parker v. Marston · filed 2019-08-12

Furthermore, a state statute that immunizes a person from liability is pre-empted under § 1983 and therefore unenforceable in a federal civil action.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the Michigan State Police Department because it is a state agency protected by sovereign immunity and is not a person subject to suit.

Perez 404232 v. Michigan State Police Department · filed 2019-09-04

Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has observed that the Michigan State Police Department is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. Lavrack, 1999 WL 801562 at *2 (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 383 (1990)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint against the Michigan State Police Department is properly dismissed.

The University of Texas Medical Branch and the Telford Unit are immune from suit under Section 1983.

Justice v. University of Texas Medical Branch · filed 2019-10-23

On April 15, 2019, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report recommending the lawsuit be dismissed because the only named Defendants are immune to suit. ... ORDERED the Report of the Magistrate Judge (Docket No. 5) is ADOPTED as the opinion of the District Court.

Section 1983 liability cannot be defeated by immunity granted under state law.

Harvey v. Great Circle · filed 2019-10-29

As an initial matter, neither defendant can use Missouri state law to allege immunity under § 1983. State statutory law cannot be used as a shield from liability under federal law.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state agency because an arm of the state is not a person subject to suit under the section.

COUCH v. ITF · filed 2019-08-20

More importantly, the GDC is a state entity entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. ... see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (states and governmental entities that are considered “arms of the state” are not considered “persons” capable of being sued for money damages under § 1983). Plaintiff’s claims against the GDC must therefore be dismissed.

Federal law governs immunity from § 1983 suits; a state rule cannot immunize defendants from federal civil rights claims.

Breck v. Doyle · filed 2019-11-15

But “[i]mmunity under § 1983 is governed by federal law; state law cannot provide immunity from suit for federal civil rights violations.” Wallis ex rel. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1144 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the district court’s finding of immunity for the Individual Defendants based solely on a Nevada Supreme Court rule was erroneous.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a state agency immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

Sallis v. State of South Carolina Child Support Division · filed 2020-03-02

To the extent that Plaintiff’s complaint can be construed as asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the magistrate judge concluded that it is subject to summary dismissal for at least two reasons: (1) because the South Carolina Department of Social Services is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiff has failed to name a defendant amenable to suit under § 1983; and (2) the complaint fails to state any viable claim for relief against Defendant. ... For the reasons set forth above and in the Report, the court overrules Plaintiff’s objections and hereby adopts the Report (ECF No. 9).

State law cannot immunize an official from liability under Section 1983.

O'Connell v. Alejo · filed 2020-03-16

Therefore, the immunities granted in § 19-3-309 do not immunize Tuggle, who is sued under § 1983.

State agencies are immune from damages claims under § 1983.

Melody Hale v. Indiana Department of Child Se · filed 2019-11-20

Lastly, Hale also does not raise, and therefore waives, any challenge to the district court’s proper conclusion that her claims for damages are barred because both defendants are state agencies.

Immunity associated with § 1983 does not apply to state tort claims when the plaintiff brings no federal claim.

Viers v. Baker · filed 2020-05-14

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, federal immunity does not apply because Viers presented no § 1983 claim or any other claim under federal law.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit for money damages against Tennessee because the state is immune from such suits.

Clark v. The State of Tennessee · filed 2020-05-20

And he seeks money damages from the State of Tennessee, which is absolutely immune from any suit for damages under Section 1983.

State law making a remedy exclusive cannot bar a § 1983 claim.

Mathews v. City of Booneville, Mississippi · filed 2020-05-22

State exclusivity provisions do not, therefore, preclude § 1983 relief.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on states, and North Carolina’s corrections department is immune from suit where the state has not waived its immunity.

Settlemyer v. Hampton · filed 2020-06-09

Congress has not imposed § 1983 liability upon states, and the state of North Carolina has done nothing to waive its immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on states, and North Carolina has not waived its immunity from such claims.

Collington v. North Carolina Department of Public Safety · filed 2020-06-23

Congress has not imposed § 1983 liability upon states, and the state of North Carolina has done nothing to waive its immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state corrections department that is immune as an arm of the State.

Wagner v. T.D.O.C. · filed 2020-06-23

However, Defendant TDOC is immune from suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state department of correction because it is an arm of the state.

Campbell v. Tennessee Department of Correction · filed 2020-06-23

However, Defendant TDOC is immune from suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against a state agency are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

QUEENER v. WEXFORD OF INDIANA LLC · filed 2020-07-22

First, any claim against the IDOC is dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ... As a state agency, Eleventh Amendment immunity would apply to any claim for damages raised against the IDOC.

A state agency is immune from a § 1983 suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment.

Ellerbe v. Cook · filed 2020-08-21

Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that SCDC is immune from suit in federal court for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but instead argues that SCDC is liable for the acts of its employees under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”). ... Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add SCDC as a defendant, such amendment would be futile, and his motion is denied in this respect.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state agency protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

(PC) Coons v. C.D.C.R. · filed 2020-10-07

CDCR is not a proper defendant because it is a state agency that is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce state law.

Smith v. Lacy · filed 2020-10-27

This is so as § 1983 may not be used to enforce state law.

Section 1983 does not support a Monell claim against a state entity protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Arellano v. Guldseth · filed 2020-10-30

Plaintiff’s Monell claim against CCHCS fails because the Eleventh Amendment bars the application of Monell against a state or state entity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on states, and a state agency is immune from suit unless the state waives its immunity.

Cromartie v. North Carolina Department of Public Safety of Prisions · filed 2020-11-12

Congress has not imposed § 1983 liability upon states, and the state of North Carolina has done nothing to waive its immunity.

State statutory immunity cannot bar a § 1983 claim against a state employee in an individual capacity.

Jan G. v. Semple · filed 2021-01-12

Accordingly, we conclude that the court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims brought against the defendants in their individual capacities on the basis of statutory immunity pursuant to § 4-165 (a).

Section 1983 preempts a state reimbursement law as applied to let the state recoup money it paid to satisfy a § 1983 judgment against its employee.

Hankins v. William C. Finnel, State of Missouri · filed 1992-06-25

We thus conclude that section 1983 preempts the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act as it is applied in this case. To the extent that the Act permits the State to recoup the very monies it has paid to satisfy a section 1983 judgment against one of its employees, the Act is invalidated under the Supremacy Clause.

Section 1983 does not preempt applying Iowa’s victim restitution law to damages recovered under the section when restitution does not undermine its compensatory and deterrent purposes.

Corvelle Beeks Donta T. McKenzie Anthony Quinn Larry Starks, Jr. v. Thomas C. Hundley John Emmett, John Henry Paul W. Gr · filed 1994-09-07

Because enforcement of the Iowa victim reimbursement statute is not inimical to the core purposes of § 1983, Curtis applies and we must reverse.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal cause of action for conduct that is merely negligent.

Mercado v. City of Orlando · filed 2006-05-04

Moreover, the instruction was consistent with Supreme Court precedent because the Supreme Court has long held that a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not extend to conduct that is merely negligent.

Section 1983 does not make negligent conduct by state officials actionable.

Mellin v. Flood Brook Union School District · filed 2001-12-21

Even if plaintiff had a protected liberty interest in this case, her due process claims were properly dismissed because her allegations state nothing more than negligent conduct by the state officials, and negligent conduct is not actionable under § 1983.

Mere negligence does not state a constitutionally cognizable § 1983 claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.

White v. Terry Sanders and Joe Wilkerson · filed 1988-02-08

Plaintiff failed to state a constitutionally cognizable cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Mere negligence is insufficient to support a claim under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

Mere negligence does not support a Section 1983 claim.

Thompson v. Spikes · filed 1987-06-22

If plaintiff means to assert some general claim of negligence in this connection, clearly such a claim is not actionable under § 1983.

Mere negligence by officials does not implicate due process and therefore cannot support a Section 1983 due-process claim.

Ortega v. Rowe · filed 1986-08-11

We affirm the district court’s judgment for appellees, concluding that, in the light of recent Supreme Court cases requiring due process violations to be based on more than government officials’ mere negligence, the class failed to demonstrate the existence of unconstitutional behavior.

Section 1983 does not require specific intent, but relief still requires that the challenged conduct deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Yates v. Wellman · filed 1974-03-27

It would be incorrect as a general rule, and misleading in this particular case, to state that the negligent conduct of these defendants, acting under the color of state law can not be the basis for relief under § 1983. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the Supreme Court expressly rejected any contention that a plaintiff under § 1983 must establish the defendants’ specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right. In reliance upon this ruling by the Supreme Court, numerous courts including this Circuit have recognized that various types of tortious conduct — even some forms of negligence — can be the basis for relief under § 1983. See: Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1387 (6th Cir. 1972). These decisions do not, however, eliminate the requirement under § 1983 that the plaintiff establish a deprivation of his constitutional rights through the allegedly negligent conduct of these defendants.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely for negligent conduct by a state official acting under color of state law.

Davis v. Quarter Sessions Court · filed 1973-07-20

Negligent conduct by a state official, even acting under color of state law, is not, in and of itself, sufficient to impose liability under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for mere negligence in failing to provide medical care.

Lunsford v. Reynolds · filed 1974-05-10

The court finds the petitioner’s allegations inadequate for several reasons. The inmates who allege they requested medical attention on January 31st merely present evidence of an isolated instance of failure to provide medical care. This would constitute mere negligence and, therefore, not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal cause of action for ordinary negligence that does not deny a constitutional or federally protected right.

Di Febo v. Keve · filed 1975-06-06

Accepting all of the above allegations as true, the complaint charges the defendants simply with ordinary negligence in the course of the handling and the treatment of the plaintiff’s medical complaint. While such negligence is a tort and would be cognizable under Delaware law, it does not amount to a denial of a constitutional or federally protected right that can be redressed in this court under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 may support a constitutional claim based on a pattern of negligence, even though an isolated negligent incident may be insufficient.

Smith v. Sheriff Mike Sullivan, Hector Salvida Amaya v. Sheriff Mike Sullivan · filed 1977-05-19

Though isolated incidents of negligence might not constitute sufficient basis for Sec. 1983 jurisdiction, patterns of negligence may. ... We believe the District Judge was fully justified in finding that the totality of circumstances in the El Paso jail amounted to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Mere negligence is insufficient to sustain a § 1983 claim.

Walnorch v. McMonagle · filed 1976-03-31

the conduct alleged amounted to mere negligence, which under the law of this Circuit, is insufficient to sustain a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for liability when the claim rests only on negligence.

Croswell v. O'HARA · filed 1978-01-27

I do not believe that actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, part of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, can be based on negligence.

Section 1983 reaches only persons acting under color of state law and does not provide a claim based solely on negligence.

Butler v. Jenkins · filed 1978-05-01

First, the Court must dismiss defendant Pendleton, for he was not a person acting under color of state law. ... Such a theory of negligence is not sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach a state agency's mere negligence causing property damage; actionable conduct requires a constitutional deprivation supported by greater culpability.

Keller v. BD. OF EDUC. OF JONESBORO · filed 1978-12-29

Under appropriate circumstances, State action causing a deprivation of the right to property is subject to redress under section 1983. In the instant case, however, plaintiffs only alleged mere negligence on the part of the Board. ... The majority of Federal courts have refused to extend the scope of section 1983 to encompass all torts committed under color of law and, to that end, have required a degree of culpability by a defendant greater than “mere negligence” to be actionable under section 1983. ... Hence, the accepted view is that negligent conduct of a State agency, although resulting in damage to a person’s property, does not amount to a deprivation of that person’s constitutional right to property.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a government employee’s mere negligence; a plaintiff must allege facts showing conduct more serious than negligence.

Williams v. Wolke · filed 1979-08-28

The above-cited cases indicate that mere negligence of a government employee does not give rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

For a § 1983 claim based solely on a Fourteenth Amendment due-process deprivation, culpability must exceed simple negligence and amount to gross negligence or recklessness.

Popow v. City of Margate · filed 1979-08-31

Nevertheless, this court is of the opinion that the degree of culpability must exceed simple negligence and amount to gross negligence or recklessness, at least where the constitutional deprivation alleged finds its source solely within the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for negligence that is not an abuse of governmental power.

Mann v. Village of Walden · filed 1979-11-26

We hold that it would not since it did not constitute an abuse of power.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for mere negligence; the alleged conduct must be intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Auther Stringer v. Rowe · filed 1980-04-30

To state a cause of action under section 1983, it must be alleged that the guards’ actions were either “intentional or in reckless disregard of [plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 does not make simple negligence claims cognizable against state officials.

Carter v. Kamka · filed 1980-12-12

However, many of the IGC appeals are claims of alleged negligence on the part of state officials, and simple negligence claims are concededly not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make mere negligence actionable absent a deprivation of a constitutional right.

Robinson v. Cuyler · filed 1981-01-15

Unless defendants deprived him of a constitutional right, their alleged negligence is irrelevant. ... Mere negligence is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim based only on simple negligence, because simple negligence does not amount to misuse of official power or position.

Close v. Voorhees · filed 1982-06-18

The central focus of §1983 is to provide a remedy for the misuse of power or position possessed by virtue of state law. ... Despite this lack of controlling precedent, however, this Court believes that the' common pleas court is correct in stating that by making allegations of simple negligence the Plaintiffs have failed to implicate the central focus of §1983, misuse of official power or position, and have thus failed .to state a cause of action under §1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on negligent conduct by a state actor when the conduct deprives a person of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.

Flores v. Edinburg Consolidated Independent School District · filed 1983-01-07

Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that a sufficient claim has been alleged under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not make a prisoner's slip-and-fall injury from an allegedly negligently maintained floor actionable absent a deprivation of constitutional magnitude.

Mitchell v. State of W. Va. · filed 1983-01-24

To state a claim under § 1983, it must be alleged that the conduct complained of deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the conduct was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. ... It is the opinion of the Court that this series of events, though unfortunate, states no deprivation of constitutional magnitude. ... A “slip and fall,” without more, does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.

Mere negligence by an attorney is not actionable under Section 1983.

Gay v. Watkins · filed 1984-12-26

At the very most, such allegations amount to a claim of negligence which is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Ordinary negligence by a state employee is not sufficiently egregious or constitutionally tortious to support § 1983 liability.

Voorhies v. Conroe Independent School District · filed 1985-06-04

Not every tort or trespass committed by a state official or government is a violation of constitutional rights. Likewise, the § 1983 remedy was not intended to be superimposed on the states to redress each and every tort committed by a state official.

Section 1983 enforces constitutional rights, not duties of care arising solely under tort law.

Marie Ellsworth & Paul Ellsworth v. City of Racine, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1985-09-23

However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the City was negligent, § 1983 “imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under traditional tort-law principles.”

Simple negligence cannot support Section 1983 liability.

Kevin McKenna and Barbara McKenna v. City of Memphis and William Sarden · filed 1986-03-12

It is clear since the decisions of the Supreme Court in ... that there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for simple negligence.

Mere negligence by state officials does not support a § 1983 action for a Fourteenth Amendment due-process violation.

Dunster v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1986-06-24

However, as pointed out earlier, mere negligence is insufficient to support an action for a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation.

Mere negligence by a government or its agents does not deprive a person of a constitutionally protected right under the Fourteenth Amendment or § 1983.

Cooper v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 1986-07-01

“. . . Where a government or its agents act is merely negligent, there is no constitutionally protected right to file for injury to life, liberty or property under the 14th Amendment or under section 1983.”

A state official's mere lack of due care is insufficient to sustain a Section 1983 claim.

David Hale Schubert v. Joe Fowler, Sheriff of Knox County · filed 1986-07-29

Mere lack of due care, by a state official is insufficient to sustain a claim under 91983.

Mere negligence by a state officer does not sustain a Section 1983 claim because the statute protects federal constitutional and statutory rights rather than superseding state tort remedies.

Velazquez v. Rico · filed 1986-09-29

Section 1983 affords relief for a violation of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. This statute was not intended to supersede civil or common law tort remedies. Mere negligent conduct by a state officer, actionable under state law, is insufficient to sustain a 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 claim.

Allegations of negligence do not state a claim under § 1983.

Loftus v. Mingo · filed 1987-07-16

Allegations of negligence will not support a claim under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 (1982)).

Mere negligence by state officials does not state a cause of action under § 1983.

Caudell v. Capots · filed 1987-08-17

In addition, plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, as the inaction of state officials was the result of mere negligence.

Conclusory allegations of gross negligence do not transform negligent maintenance of prison facilities into a constitutional tort actionable under § 1983.

Marshall v. Seiter · filed 1987-08-20

Although plaintiff alleges gross negligence, these allegations are conclusory and are insufficient as a matter of law to convert a negligent claim into a constitutional tort.

Negligent handling of a prisoner’s mail, without alleged reading or harm, does not trigger procedural or substantive due-process protection and cannot sustain a § 1983 claim.

Shuler v. Harry Allsbrook, Roger Dickerson, Joseph Callahan · filed 1987-08-18

[T]he protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.

A negligent, unauthorized failure to provide notice does not cause a Fourteenth Amendment deprivation actionable under § 1983, even if no state remedy remains available.

Frankfurth v. City of Detroit · filed 1987-09-17

Because the act was negligent, no fourteenth amendment deprivation is involved and there is no constitutional need to provide a remedy. Thus, the absence of a state remedy by appellant does not act to preclude the dismissal of his Sec. 1983 claim.

Simple negligence does not support a claim against any defendant under § 1983.

Chapman v. STATE, DEPT. OF HEALTH & REHAB. SERV. · filed 1987-12-29

Moreover, no action lies against any defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a claim of simple negligence.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for conduct that amounts only to negligence.

Stewart v. McMickens · filed 1988-01-20

Plaintiffs allegations of how his injury came about do not rise above the level of negligence, which is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a due process claim for a property loss caused by officials’ merely negligent conduct.

Moore v. Lake County Regional Correctional Facility · filed 1988-01-21

However, the protections of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment are not triggered by officials' conduct which is merely negligent. ... Therefore, plaintiff's loss is simply not actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and the district court properly dismissed the complaint as frivolous.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery based on negligence alone.

Colon v. Sullivan · filed 1988-03-15

In addition, plaintiff has made no allegation of intentional wrongful conduct. Therefore, even assuming that the actions of defendants were negligent, the complaint must be dismissed because there can be no recovery under section 1983 on the basis of negligence.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable procedural due process claim based on mere negligence by officials.

Jones v. Lt. Wm. Adams, Officer Waits, (Ksp), David Dixon, Steve Gardner, and Richard Clark · filed 1988-05-19

Upon consideration, we conclude that plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed for frivolity because it was based on mere negligence which is simply insufficient to invoke due process protection and state a cognizable claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires more than mere negligence to recover for a due process violation.

City of Watauga v. Taylor · filed 1988-06-08

There must be more than mere negligence to recover for due process violation under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a due process claim for continued detention based on police investigative conduct that amounts only to negligence.

Allen Wade Simmons, Et Ux. v. Sheriff Wayne McElveen · filed 1988-06-08

This appeal narrows down to whether the conduct of the defendants amounts to more than negligence thereby providing Simmons with a 1983 cause of action. ... Therefore, in light of all circumstances, we cannot say that the defendants’ conduct was more than mere negligence.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federal right; an official’s mere negligence does not establish liability.

Terrell Ex Rel. Terrell v. Shope · filed 1988-07-05

A defendant cannot be held liable under Section 1983 merely for the commission of a common law tort. Instead, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct was constitutionally tortious and violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or legal right.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on mere negligence.

Mulazim v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections · filed 1988-07-20

The responsive pleadings as well as the complaint established that the only claim advanced is one of mere negligence. This, alone, is not grounds for a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Negligence alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie claim under § 1983.

Albert W. Thomas, Sr. v. Perry M. Johnson, Robert Brown, Jr., William E. Grant, Charles E. Anderson, Duane Holes, Arzell · filed 1988-07-20

We believe Thomas has, at best, alleged negligence on the part of the defendants. This is insufficient grounds to establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a deprivation of constitutional rights based solely on a government official’s ordinary negligence.

Wells v. Walker · filed 1988-07-26

From these factual allegations and all favorable inferences drawn from them, it is evident to us plaintiffs’ section 1983 action is bottomed on a claim of ordinary negligence by the defendants. The Supreme Court, however, has held that negligent conduct by government officials cannot be the source of a “deprivation” of constitutional rights for section 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a defendant’s mere negligence resulting in a violation of a plaintiff’s protected rights.

Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Adams County · filed 1989-02-16

Western correctly argues there is no remedy under section 1983 based on a defendant’s mere negligence resulting in a violation of a plaintiff’s protected rights.

Section 1983 requires more than negligent official conduct to support a prisoner’s claim for infringement of constitutional rights.

Rogers v. Isom · filed 1989-04-03

And further, convicts may sue for infringement of their rights under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 if they can show that the infringement resulted from non-negligent official conduct.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for officers’ negligent misplacement of evidence that delays its production.

Cooks v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1989-04-07

If it could be said that the officers were negligent in mislaying the card, and thus delaying its production to Cooks, such negligence cannot legally support a cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on mere negligence.

Richard v. The State of Michigan, L. Brooks Patterson, Oakland County · filed 1989-05-18

Mere negligence is not actionable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for mere negligence in officers’ preparation to serve a warrant.

Brandenburg v. Harry E. Cureton, Lynn Murphy, Calvin Morton, Jr., Appeal of Warren G. Hatfield, Roy Sharp an · filed 1989-08-11

We first note that the claim based upon the poor tactical preparation of the law enforcement officers should not have been submitted to the jury. This court has held that outrageous cases of “gross” negligence may give rise to a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while mere negligence cannot.

Negligence is insufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983.

Rudolph v. Ralph Bleemil Arnold Johnson Hill Bleemil Clifford F. Haley, Jr. · filed 1989-11-16

Negligence is insufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a claim alleging only negligence by government officials.

Walker v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1990-02-27

In Wilhelm v. Gray, Okl., 766 P.2d 1357 (1988), we held that “because the appellants amended petition sounds only in negligence,” there could be no § 1983 relief. ... The allegations of plaintiffs trial court petition alleging mere negligence fall far short of stating a claim against either the appellee court clerk or the Board of County Commissioners of Muskogee County.

Section 1983 requires allegations of more than mere negligence to state a claim for interference with an inmate’s mail rights.

Love v. Lord · filed 1990-11-19

In order to state a cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 for interference with an inmate’s mail rights, therefore, more than “mere negligence” must be alleged (Guffey v Trago, 572 F Supp 782, 784; see, Valiant-Bey v Morris, 829 F2d 1441; Averhart v Shuler, 652 F Supp 1504, 1509).

Section 1983 does not make government officials liable for mere negligence.

Johnson v. Lynaugh · filed 1990-11-21

Mere negligence by government officials is not actionable under § 1983.

Gross negligence by prison guards during an inmate fight is not actionable under Section 1983.

Hoskins v. Rishi · filed 1991-02-12

At best, Hoskins has alleged that the defendant guards were negligent in not separating the two combatants earlier and for not waiting for back-up. But even gross negligence is not actionable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires a breach of duty greater than mere negligence to support a claim.

Irion v. Peterson · filed 1991-03-19

The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that in order to set forth a valid cause of action under this statute, a plaintiff must allege a breach of a duty that is greater than mere negligence. ... Such allegations do not support an action under 5 1983.

Section 1983 creates no rights and does not authorize recovery for negligence or other common law torts alone.

Lucy Quezada, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Berlinda Griego, Deceased v. The County of Bernalillo Patrick · filed 1991-09-09

The law creates no rights and is not a carte blanche statute authorizing recovery for negligence or other common law torts standing by themselves.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for an official’s negligent act causing unintended loss or injury to life, liberty, or property.

Tittle v. Mahan · filed 1991-12-12

First, we note that Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a negligent act of an official which caused unintended loss or injury to life, liberty, or property.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for negligence that breaches only a tort duty of care without violating a constitutional right.

Pauline Bourcier and James Troyer v. City of Manistee · filed 1992-03-17

The § 1983 claim is based solely on alleged negligence and § 1983 "imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under traditional tort-law principles." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1983).

Section 1983 does not impose liability for conduct amounting only to negligence or lack of due care.

Frederick v. Britcher · filed 1992-07-02

The conduct alleged to have caused the deprivation of a constitutional right must amount to more than lack of due care or mere negligence. ... Britcher's failure to notice Frederick's tag, or his alleged misstatement that the meat was beef, amount, at most, to negligence or lack of due care.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for mail tampering that amounts to no more than negligence.

Henderson v. Stewart · filed 1992-08-11

We agree with the court that Henderson's evidence on mail tampering showed no more than negligence, which is not actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a state official’s mere lack of due care.

KING BY KING v. Fallon · filed 1992-08-31

A mere lack of due care by a state official does not create liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a state official’s mere lack of due care.

King ex rel. King v. Fallon · filed 1992-08-31

A mere lack of due care by a state official does not create liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make mere negligence by government officials actionable.

Hardin v. Terry Pitcher Joseph Hosey Robert Heller James R. Zummer Steven A. George Michael Turnbull Douglas Catr · filed 1992-10-09

As a general proposition of law, mere negligence is not actionable under § 1983, Chesney v. Hill, 813 F.2d 754, 755 (6th Cir.1987) (per curiam), and negligence does not become gross simply by saying so; facts must charge government officials with outrageous conduct or arbitrary use of government power.

Section 1983 requires an intentional or grossly negligent deprivation of constitutional rights; mere negligence does not establish a cognizable claim.

Reneer v. Sgt. D.R. Jones, Mail Room Supervisor Roberta Shephard, Mail Room Clerk Donna Roberts, Mail Room Clerk Do · filed 1993-03-04

Generally, plaintiff must show that a deprivation of constitutional rights was intentional or the result of gross negligence to establish a claim cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims must allege more than mere negligence.

Harrison v. Stokke · filed 1993-03-24

In addition, a claim under section 1983 must allege more than mere negligence.

In a Section 1983 action alleging unlawful arrest and excessive force, evidence of an officer’s negligence may be excluded because the action is not a tort action.

Estes v. Aaron J. Moore, Michael Martin, Marvin Bauer, John Hibberd, George Amen, City of Lincoln, State of Neb · filed 1993-08-05

Estes also argues that the district court erred in excluding evidence of any negligence on the part of Moore. The district court was correct in excluding such evidence ... as Estes’s claims were brought pursuant to § 1983. This was not a tort action.

An isolated instance of negligent mishandling of a prisoner's mail is insufficient to establish liability under § 1983.

Reynolds v. Potts · filed 1993-09-17

At most, Reynolds states a negligence claim against Potts arising from an isolated instance of mail mishandling. Thus, it is insufficient to establish liability under section 1983.

Damages under § 1983 for deprivation of a prisoner's liberty interest require gross negligence or deliberate indifference by prison officials.

Howard v. Herbert Grinage Dan Bolden James Stegal and Kenny Robinson · filed 1993-10-01

For the reasons aforesaid, the district court’s decision is REVERSED and REMANDED to determine if the prison officials’ conduct constituted gross negligence or deliberate indifference necessary to award damages and, if so, the amount of damages, if any, to which plaintiff may be entitled pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence.

Pippins v. Adams County Jail · filed 1994-05-10

Negligence is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on negligence alone.

Rambo v. Daley · filed 1994-05-10

Negligence is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Negligence by prison staff causing inconsistent detention and disciplinary reports is not actionable under § 1983.

Scaife v. Wilson · filed 1994-08-31

Second, plaintiff does not contest information in the record indicating the inconsistency in the reports resulted from a breakdown in communication between prison staff. Such negligence is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence.

Jose L. Admiral Rossell v. Neil Emore Lisa Enfield · filed 1994-11-22

Finally, any claim Rossell might have for negligence simply is not cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for an injury caused only by negligence.

Stauch v. Charleston County Jail · filed 1995-03-09

Nevertheless, we find that, even accepting Stauch's version of the facts as true, his injury resulted from negligence which is not actionable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence in prison medical care.

White v. E.C. Morris W.P. Rogers Don Guillory · filed 1995-04-11

At most Appellant's complaint and attachments could support a claim of negligence, which is not cognizable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for an ordinary negligence claim for property damage.

Marsh v. Johnnie W. Jones, Jr., Warden · filed 1995-06-02

Because Marsh’s claim for damage to her engagement ring is a garden-variety negligence claim, we hold that it is not actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for conduct amounting only to negligence.

Dillard v. M. Cox, Sheriff Medical Department Amherst County Jail R. Pitsen Barget, Nurse Alfred Roses, Lieutenant · filed 1995-07-06

Appellant's claim that Appellees' actions resulted in his exposure to, and contraction of, tuberculosis while Appellant was incarcerated amounts, at most, to a claim of negligence, and is therefore not cognizable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of constitutional rights, not for breaches of tort duties of care.

Bazile v. Burge · filed 1995-08-08

Regarding Bazile's assertion that the failure to provide him compensation resulted in a civil rights violation, section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.

Section 1983 permits an action based on negligence.

Jones v. Graham (In Re Graham) · filed 1995-12-05

But negligence is sufficient to sustain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence alone.

Webb v. Lawrence County · filed 1996-03-18

Section 1983 is inapplicable to negligence claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a police officer’s merely negligent post-arrest investigation.

Mehdipour v. City of Oklahoma · filed 1997-12-03

Therefore, plaintiffs’ claim that Officer Byrne failed to conduct an adequate investigation after their arrests describes nothing more than negligent conduct which is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a government official for merely negligent conduct.

Brinson v. McKeeman · filed 1997-12-31

In addition, merely negligent conduct on the part of a government official cannot meet the rather stringent standard for liability under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for unsuccessful medical treatment, negligence, neglect, or medical malpractice.

Chumbley v. Ferguson · filed 1998-08-20

Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, neglect, or medical malpractice are insufficient to give rise to a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for injury caused solely by the negligent operation of a state owned vehicle.

Ellsworth v. Mockler · filed 1983-01-12

It is most difficult to conceive Justice Rehnquist, in particular, and the Parratt majority, in general, intended to find a § 1983 remedy for every citizen injured by the negligent operation of a state owned vehicle. Such a conclusion would be well beyond the reach of Parratt and would turn the legislative history of § 1983 on its end. For this reason, Count III of plaintiff’s amended complaint is stricken and dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for ordinary negligence by local government officials unless the conduct amounts to an abuse of governmental power.

Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County · filed 1983-12-09

The court finds that the allegations of tortious conduct against DeKalb and Stewart do not rise to constitutional proportions and are thus not cognizable in a section 1983 action. The case law indicates that the claimants must establish that the conduct of the local government complained of constitutes an abuse of power as a prerequisite to maintaining such an action.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on a government official’s negligent conduct.

Howard Harrell and Sarah Harrell v. Donald Cook, Jack Woods, John Keenan, and a Police Officer Unknown To · filed 1999-02-17

It is well established that negligent conduct by a government official is insufficient to support a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for negligent excessive detention while officers identify an arrestee.

Salazar v. City of Oklahoma City · filed 1999-03-16

Federal civil rights disputes brought under § 1983 do not afford protection against negligence in causing excessive restraint pending an arrestee’s identification.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for negligence.

Jackson v. Scott · filed 1999-04-29

Because negligence is not actionable under § 1983, we also affirm the district court’s dismissal of Jackson’s claim that a prison officer failed to properly maintain the prison restroom area.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligent prison medical treatment.

Hickman v. Moya · filed 1999-05-24

If Hickman was treated improperly this was, at most, negligence, and therefore not subject to a § 1983 claim.

Negligence alone is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Williams v. Polunsky · filed 2000-02-07

Alternatively, the claim is essentially one of negligence, which is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make negligent conduct or failure to follow prison policy actionable.

Sharp v. Anderson · filed 2000-06-19

Negligent conduct is not actionable under § 1983; nor is failure to follow prison policy.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for claims based on mere negligence.

Martinez v. Chastain · filed 2000-08-23

Martinez’s claims against Brice and Shepherd and his claims against McMillan are mere negligence claims which are not sufficient to give rise to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action.

Negligence alone cannot support a claim under § 1983.

Crudup v. Schulte · filed 2001-04-10

To the extent Crudup’s claims are based on negligence, the district court correctly dismissed them on the ground that negligence cannot serve as the basis for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 generally does not provide a claim for a police officer’s negligence.

Young v. City of Little Rock · filed 2001-05-02

Ms. Shook's mistake, and Officer Brown's reliance on it, amounted to nothing more than negligence, which normally does not give rise to a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for mere negligence.

Breakiron v. Neal · filed 2001-05-08

Mere negligence is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a negligent failure to detect a detainee’s medical condition actionable.

Gibbs v. Grimmette · filed 2001-06-15

If Gibbs was exposed to tuberculosis during his incarceration at the facility, then failure of the jail and health department officials to detect an active case of tuberculosis amounted to, at most, negligence, which is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for negligence.

Lehn v. Hartwig · filed 2001-06-27

And we also find no error in the remaining instruction, which simply states the well-established proposition that negligence does not provide a basis for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for merely negligent conduct.

Hughes v. Hamlin · filed 2001-10-25

Hughes has done nothing more than allege negligent conduct, which is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence.

McDowell v. Seachrist · filed 2001-10-31

Negligence is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence.

Benton v. Grant · filed 2001-12-28

As for Benton's complaint that the defendants knew about the leak in the ceiling but failed to repair it, we conclude that, at most, Benton alleges a claim of negligence, which is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make mere negligence actionable.

Warren v. Doe · filed 2002-01-25

Thus, the district court properly dismissed Warren’s case because his allegations involved mere negligence that is not actionable under § 1983.

Proof of negligence alone is insufficient to support a claim under Section 1983.

Allen v. Iranon · filed 2002-03-13

The district court properly stated the rule that proof of negligence is insufficient to support a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence arising from a prison work assignment.

Hines v. Ryce · filed 2002-04-12

Hines’s claim that his work assignment constituted cruel and unusual punishment amounts to a claim of negligence, which is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages are not reduced under state comparative fault statutes because doing so would undermine the statute’s deterrent and compensatory purposes.

McHugh v. Olympia Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2002-05-28

To apply comparative fault statutes in civil rights actions would result in the protection afforded under § 1983 to differ from state to state and would be inconsistent with the underlying policy of deterrence and compensation.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence alone.

Leffall v. Johnson · filed 2002-08-23

We conclude that, at most, Leffall alleges a claim of negligence, which is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence alone.

Mack v. Johnson · filed 2002-08-23

As for Mack's complaint that the defendants knew about the leak in the shower but failed to repair it, we conclude that, at most, Mack alleges a claim of negligence, which is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Negligence alone is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.

Brown v. Kordis · filed 2002-09-13

Given the circumstances of the arrest, the district court properly concluded that, at most, Kordis’s actions could be termed negligent, and negligence is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for mere negligence.

Evans v. Ready · filed 2002-09-18

At most, Evans’s allegations against these defendants stated a claim of negligence, which is insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Negligence alone does not state a claim under Section 1983.

Vest v. State of Mississippi · filed 2003-01-16

The gravaman of the Vests’ complaint is negligence, and, therefore, it does not state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on negligence alone.

Moten v. Renwick · filed 2003-01-16

The district court properly dismissed Moten’s negligence cause of action because negligence cannot form the basis of a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for negligence alone.

Pointer v. Johnson · filed 2003-02-19

In fact, he refers to the hospital’s “negligence,” for which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for negligence claims based on a failure to maintain equipment.

Nickson v. Valdez · filed 2003-02-19

Nickson’s negligence claims against defendants Valdez and Knox for breach of their duty to maintain the steam press are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proceeding and were therefore properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for negligent warrant data entry or negligent training and supervision that causes an arrest.

Johnson v. Scotts Bluff County Sheriff's Department · filed 2003-02-24

Unfortunately for the plaintiff, such negligent conduct simply does not give rise to a constitutional claim pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for negligent conduct alone.

Brown v. City of Bloomington · filed 2003-08-26

Negligent conduct fails to establish a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for negligence.

Iwachiw v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles · filed 2004-01-23

First, negligence is not a valid basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence alone.

Todd v. Burns · filed 2004-04-19

To the extent that the defendants’ conduct was negligent, the district court correctly held that negligence claims are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence.

McEachin v. Beard · filed 2004-05-24

However, negligence is not a cognizable claim in a section 1983 action.

Defamation by a state official, by itself, does not state a Section 1983 claim.

Ca'Paldo v. Prez · filed 1988-01-08

Defamation by a state official, by itself, is insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for negligence alone.

Hogan v. Harold Koon John H. Will Frank Minnie Janice Benzler and Brady Cartwright · filed 1992-01-08

Instruction 48 correctly stated that negligence does not support a claim for relief under § 1983.