42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits equitable restitution of agency fees only when the fees can be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant's possession.

Doughty v. St EE's Ass'n of NH · filed 2020-11-30

And it is true that § 1983 empowers courts to hold a party that violated another's federal rights "liable" in a "suit in equity." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But, as Doughty and Severance do not plead that the specific agency fees they paid can "clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the [Union's] possession," see Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002), their claim is necessarily "one against the union's treasury generally, not one against an identifiable fund or asset," which makes it inherently legal in nature, Mooney v. Ill. Educ. Ass'n, 942 F.3d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, their restitution claim fails, too.

Section 1983 authorizes federal courts to fashion equitable relief for individuals deprived of federally protected rights.

Dedrick v. Wallman · filed 1985-04-02

A person who violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proper proceeding for redress.” This provision gives the Court the authority to fashion an equitable remedy for individuals who have been deprived of federally protected rights. Typically, a federal court, sitting as a court of equity, is given wide discretion when fashioning effective equitable relief.

Section 1983 permits a court to use its equitable powers and enter appropriate orders to remedy deprivation of a substantive right secured by federal law.

Areizaga v. Quern · filed 1977-12-13

A claimant’s right to inspect and make use of his own case file in preparing an administrative appeal is a substantive right secured by the laws of the United States, and in an action brought to redress a deprivation of that right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this court has all the powers of a court of equity and may enter any appropriate order which will effectuate the right and implement the intent of Congress in creating it.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional state law without first violating it when the threatened enforcement is sufficiently concrete.

Morial v. Judiciary Commission of the State of Louisiana · filed 1977-12-13

The court’s power to adjudicate a case arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pursuant to jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, is not conditioned upon a plaintiff’s actually proceeding to violate some assertedly unconstitutional state law prior to bringing suit in federal court.

Section 1983 permits declaratory relief against municipal agencies and officials sued in their official capacities.

Wynne v. Codd · filed 1976-08-06

As to the first proposition, it is certainly true that plaintiffs may not obtain monetary relief either from the municipal agency here in question, or from the individuals sued in their official capacities. ... However, the complaint also seeks declaratory relief, and defendants are “persons” for such purpose. ... Accordingly, the request for declaratory relief must stand under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional-rights action to proceed as an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding, so equitable relief may be awarded.

Incarcerated Men of Allen County v. Fair · filed 1973-10-05

As an action under § 1983, there is no statutory provision for an award of attorney’s fees to a successful party. However, § 1983 provides that the proceeding to redress deprivation of constitutional rights may be by an “action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding.” Thus an award of equitable relief is recognized under § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes a district court to award back pay as an equitable remedy upon finding that a plaintiff's civil rights were violated.

Mabey v. Reagan · filed 1974-04-09

This Court has the authority to grant an award of back-pay as an equitable remedy upon a finding of a violation of plaintiff's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, but this Court reserves the right to grant such an award pending resolution of the outstanding issues of material fact.

Section 1983 permits equitable relief against a judge in a civil rights action when the relief does not interfere with the judge's discretionary functions.

Long v. Powell · filed 1975-02-07

However, the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs here is equitable relief, and there is ample authority for the proposition that a judge is not immune from being ordered to render equitable relief in a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so long as there is no real interference with the discretionary functions of the judge.

Section 1983 equitable relief is subject to the law of equitable remedies, including the clean-hands doctrine.

Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College · filed 1977-07-20

Prospective reinstatement is an equitable remedy. The requirements of the law of equitable remedies clearly applies to § 1983. ... Consequently, the clean hands doctrine should in my view be considered when equitable relief is sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The clean hands doctrine bars Skehan from full reinstatement as a faculty member.

Section 1983 provides equitable relief as a remedy for deprivations, under color of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States.

United States v. Washington · filed 1978-06-30

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the remedy available for such deprivations includes equitable relief.

Section 1983 permits equitable relief against officials accused of unconstitutional conduct, and immunity applicable to damages does not bar a suit seeking only injunctive or declaratory relief.

Fort Eustis Books, Inc. v. Beale · filed 1979-10-26

While a number of the defendants may enjoy such immunity by reason of their office, this immunity applies only in an action for damages under § 1983. In the present case, the plaintiffs seek only injunctive and declaratory relief, not damages. Therefore, the defendants’ claim to immunity is inappropriate.

Section 1983 authorizes an equitable action in federal district court to redress a state actor’s deprivation of constitutional rights, independently of Supreme Court certiorari review.

Fred W. Phelps, Sr. v. Kansas Supreme Court · filed 1981-11-19

Section 1983 explicitly provides for suits in equity where a citizen has been deprived of any “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Absent a clear holding that § 1983 was not designed to redress a denial of due process by a state supreme court’s application of its statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, or usages, we are not at liberty to disregard the congressionally created cause of action. While it is true that a petition for certiorari provides an avenue of relief from unconstitutional state disbarment proceedings, § 1983 provides an independent basis for such actions in the federal district courts.

Section 1983 bars damages claims against an immune state official and does not provide a vehicle to replace appellate review or collaterally attack an earlier judgment.

Swartz v. Commissioner · filed 1982-04-08

The Insurance Commissioner is immune from damages liability under § 1983. See, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1977); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980). Ordinarily, equitable relief in § 1983 actions, which is not barred by immunity doctrines, extends to prospective acts — l.e., to prevent a threatened unlawful or unconstitutional action'. See, Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974). In the instant case relief under § 1983 could only be in the form of a retrospective injunction, which would be equivalent to declaring the earlier decision infirm. However, “42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not intended to be used as a substitute for the right of appeal or to collaterally attack a judgment...” Torres Irizarry v. Toro Goyco, 425 F.Supp. 366, 369 (D.P.R. 1976). Other courts have refused a § 1983 claim when brought as a substitute for appellate procedure although a prima facie case was otherwise haade. See, Coogan v. Cincinatti Bar Association, 431 F.2d 1209, 1211 (6th Cir. 1970); Rodes v. Municipal Authority, 409 F.2d 16 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 861, reh. den. 396 U.S. 950; Reich v. City of Freeport, 388 F. Supp. 953, 956 (M.D. Ill. 1974). Further, the United States Supreme Court recently found § 1983 inapplicable when the State Torts Claim Act was the normal channel of redress. Parratt v. Taylor, 49 U.S.L.W. 4509, 4510 (May 18, 1981).

Section 1983 permits equitable relief, including reinstatement, against a political subdivision for a civil rights violation.

Herrin v. Newton Central Appraisal District · filed 1988-07-08

The District is a political subdivision of the State of Texas, amenable to the laws of the State of Texas and the United States of America. Both sovereigns, through their authorized legislative bodies, deemed it necessary and appropriate to subject entities such as the Appraisal District to the requirements of civil rights legislation. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and TEX. CIV.ST.ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon 1987). This court is therefore required to give full force and effect to such legislative acts of Congress and of the Texas legislature. Such legislation authorizes this court to fashion for deserving litigants equitable relief such as reinstatement.

Section 1983 leaves the grant of equitable relief to the district court’s sound discretion, reviewable for abuse of discretion.

Paul Frederick Lenea, Cross-Appellant v. Michael P. Lane, Cross-Appellees · filed 1989-08-11

Granting equitable relief under § 1983 is within the district court’s sound discretion; and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.

Section 1983 affords damages and equitable relief for an arbitrary deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest by a public school board.

Stewart v. Fort Wayne Community Schools · filed 1989-10-16

FWCS has deprived Stewart of a property interest secured by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This deprivation entitles her to damages and equitable relief pursuant to Section 1983, and to attorney fees under Section 1988.

Section 1983 execution claims seeking equitable relief are subject to equitable considerations.

Gomez v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California · filed 1992-04-21

Whether his claim is framed as a habeas petition or as a § 1983 action, Harris seeks an equitable remedy.

Section 1983 permits equitable relief, so a claim for compensatory educational services is not defeated by the bar on damages against state officials in their official capacities.

Fetto v. Sergi · filed 2001-12-28

... DCF’s argument that the § 1983 claim must fail because state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons under § 1983 and therefore cannot be sued for damages under that statute is inapplicable here, where the plaintiff requests only compensatory educational services.

Section 1983 permits injunctive or other equitable relief against a school board or district.

Williams v. San Francisco Unified School District · filed 1972-03-21

The action is properly brought, however, under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... An equally respectable line of authority has restricted Monroe v. Pape, supra, to its particular holding and has permitted the granting of injunctive or other equitable relief against school boards or districts.

Section 1983 permits reinstatement and back pay as equitable relief for a teacher whose contract was not renewed because of protected speech.

Morrison v. Salida School District R-32-J · filed 1984-12-20

The district claims that the order reinstating Morrison for two years with back pay and granting other equitable relief was excessive. We disagree. ... The remedy fashioned by the trial court was appropriate.

Section 1983 equitable relief can include a mandatory injunction privatizing prison health care in exceptional circumstances.

Morales Feliciano,et v. Rullan · filed 2004-08-06

While the privatization remedy constitutes extraordinary relief and can be justified in only the most exceptional circumstances, the nature of the remedy is no different than that of a garden-variety mandatory injunction.

Equitable remedies in § 1983 employment discrimination cases are generally analogous to Title VII remedies, except for reinstatement.

Grace v. City of Detroit · filed 2004-10-18

The Special Master properly notes that remedies available under Title VII or § 1983 cases are analogous in most situations excluding reinstatement.

Section 1983 permits method-of-execution challenges, but equitable relief may be limited when the challenge is filed at the last minute.

White v. Johnson · filed 2005-11-02

These rules, however, were declared by the Court in the context of last-minute § 1983 method of execution challenges as well as last-minute stay requests. Id. The principles enunciated by the Court are equally applicable to all types of equitable relief, including permanent injunctions, sought by inmates facing imminent execution.

Equitable relief in a § 1983 method-of-execution suit may be denied when the plaintiff delays filing until shortly before execution.

Smith v. Johnson · filed 2006-02-14

Whether or not Smith properly states a claim under § 1983, he is not entitled to the relief he seeks due to his dilatory filing.

Section 1983 equitable relief may be denied when a prisoner unnecessarily delays a method-of-execution claim until shortly before execution.

Rutherford v. McDonough · filed 2006-10-05

If that means anything, it means that we must affirm the district court’s dismissal of Rutherford’s § 1983 complaint on the alternative ground that he is not entitled to equitable relief because he delayed unnecessarily in bringing the claim, deliberately waiting until the Friday night before the scheduled execution on Tuesday to file, knowing full well that the discovery, evidentiary hearing, and decision on the merits that he demands could not possibly be accomplished in that short period of time.

A court may deny equitable relief in a § 1983 method-of-execution challenge when the prisoner delays filing without adequate justification.

Dickson v. Livingston · filed 2007-04-26

The district court dismissed Dickson’s suit because he was dilatory in filing his action for equitable relief. We AFFIRM.

Section 1983 allows equitable relief as a remedy for deprivations of rights under color of state law.

United States v. Michigan · filed 1980-05-09

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the remedy available for such deprivations includes equitable relief.

Section 1983 permits equitable remedies, including backpay, to fully remedy constitutional employment discrimination.

Gurmankin v. Costanzo · filed 1980-06-30

Therefore, since the factors relied on by the trial court and the weight given to them were not in accordance with the exercise of sound discretion, we will vacate so much of the Court's order of July 12, 1978 as denied appellant's request for backpay for the period prior to March 31, 1976 and direct the entry of an order granting backpay for the period beginning September 1970.

Section 1983 allows foster parents to request return of a foster child as a remedy for an alleged equal protection violation, even if state law denies them standing to seek custody.

McLaughlin v. Pernsley · filed 1987-03-10

With these considerations in mind, and the additional consideration that federal courts have broad powers to remedy federal constitutional violations, this Court finds that the plaintiffs have standing in this Court to request as a remedy to the alleged violation by defendants of their equal protection rights that the child be returned to their custody and care.

Section 1983 permits courts to fashion appropriate equitable relief even though it does not specify the scope of available relief.

Knecht v. Gillman · filed 1973-12-05

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not specify the scope of judicial relief available in an action successfully sustained under its terms. Yet this fact does not limit the courts in framing appropriate relief.

Section 1983 allows suits for equitable relief.

C.F. v. Capistrano Unified School District · filed 2009-07-27

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Farnan's FAC specifies that this action was brought pursuant to Section 1983 of the United States Code, which allows for suits in equity.

Section 1983 gives district courts broad equitable power to fashion relief in Medicaid Act cases.

Doe v. Kidd · filed 2011-03-24

In actions brought under § 1983 in the context of the Medicaid Act, the district courts are invested with broad equitable powers to style any appropriate remedial relief.

Equitable relief under § 1983 must be tailored to the constitutional violation; an apology from the District did not fit the violation where the people responsible for releasing information to the press were no longer its employees.

Campbell v. District of Columbia · filed 2016-01-20

Absent an apology from the most culpable individuals, an apology letter from the District is not a remedy tailored to fit the constitutional violation in this case. Accordingly, the Court will deny Dr. Campbell’s request for equitable relief.

Section 1983 permits a claim for equitable relief against an official when alleged facts show an unconstitutional policy or custom supporting the claim.

Moody v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation · filed 2019-09-03

After conducting a de novo review of the related portions of the Report and Recommendation and considering the entire file, including Defendants’ objections, the Court finds that the Report and Recommendation correctly concluded that the facts alleged in the Complaint demonstrate an unconstitutional policy or custom supporting Plaintiff Jones’s claim for equitable relief against Defendant Paramo.

A prisoner who unreasonably delays bringing a § 1983 challenge to an execution method may be denied equitable relief.

Harris v. Johnson · filed 2004-07-01

We do not decide whether Harris properly states a claim under § 1983, because even if he does, he is not entitled to the equitable relief he seeks. ... Harris has been on death row for eighteen years, yet has chosen only this moment, with his execution imminent, to challenge a procedure for lethal injection that the state has used for an even longer period of time.

Section 1983 treats a law as applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia when it can apply only within the District, even if it does not apply throughout the District.

Lederman v. United States · filed 2008-02-29

Lederman correctly observes that the pertinent analytical question posed by exclusivity requirement in § 1983 is whether the law at issue can be applied only, that is, exclusively, in the District. For the regulation at issue here, the answer is yes. It is irrelevant for purposes of § 1983 that the regulation was not applicable everywhere within the District. What is relevant is that the regulation was applicable only in the District.

Section 1983 does not cover officers of the District of Columbia because the District is neither a state nor a territory within the statute's meaning.

Dellums v. Powell · filed 1977-11-14

We begin our analysis by noting that Section 1983 does not apply to officers of the District of Columbia. In District of Columbia v. Carter,409 U.S. 418, 93 S.Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973), a unanimous Supreme Court held that the phrase "(e)very person who, under color of any statute * * * of any State or Territory," which describes those subject to Section 1983 liability, does not apply to officers of the District of Columbia since it is neither a state nor a territory within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to damages suits arising under color of District of Columbia law because the District is not a State or Territory, but that limitation does not foreclose federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331 for constitutional claims.

Den Hartigh v. John Latin, Jr. Michael H. Marsh v. Walter W. Hollingsworth · filed 1973-10-05

In District of Columbia v. Carter, the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to suits for damages arising under “color of law” of the District of Columbia, since the District of Columbia is not a “State or Territory” within the meaning of the statute. ... We believe that extension of the Carter case to be erroneous.

Section 1983 does not apply to the District of Columbia.

Tatum v. Morton · filed 1974-12-14

It should be noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to the District of Columbia.

Section 1983 covers deprivations of rights committed under color of District of Columbia law as well as state law.

Lewis v. Green · filed 1986-02-28

42 U.S.C. § 1983 redresses deprivations of rights accomplished under color of District of Columbia, as well as state law.

For § 1983 purposes, an Act of Congress that applies solely to the District of Columbia is District of Columbia law.

Turner, Wayne v. DC Bd Elect Ethics · filed 2004-01-23

The unique relationship between Congress and the District of Columbia under the Constitution simply means that there will be occasions when the District of Columbia government must pay attorney’s fees for successful § 1983 lawsuits challenging laws that the District Government did not enact, for any Act of Congress that is solely applicable to the District of Columbia is a law of the District of Columbia for § 1983 purposes.

An Act of Congress applicable solely to the District of Columbia is treated as a District of Columbia law for § 1983 purposes.

Turner v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics · filed 2004-03-10

The unique relationship between Congress and the District of Columbia under the Constitution simply means that there will be occasions when the District of Columbia government must pay attorney’s fees for successful § 1983 lawsuits challenging laws that the District Government did not enact, for any Act of Congress that is solely applicable to the District of Columbia is a law of the District of Columbia for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not exempt a federal suit challenging state tax collection from the federal policy of noninterference when adequate state procedures exist.

Isadore Ludwin, Etc. v. City of Cambridge · filed 1979-02-16

This policy is applicable even where, as here, the complaint is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not overcome the jurisdictional bar of 28 U.S.C. § 1341 when a suit seeks to enjoin, suspend, or restrain state tax collection and an adequate state remedy exists.

Kimmey v. H. A. Berkheimer, Inc. · filed 1974-05-20

The Court here is indeed acutely aware that the instant actions seek vindication for civil rights encroachments, but where jurisdiction is circumscribed by § 1341, premising the Court’s power on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional analogue, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, will not compel a contrary result.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action without prior exhaustion of state judicial remedies, but that rule does not override the Tax Injunction Act's exhaustion requirement.

Evangelical Catholic Communion, Inc. v. Thomas · filed 1973-10-17

The rule allowing civil rights actions to be maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without the prior exhaustion of state judicial remedies does not constitute an exception to the exhaustion requirement of the Tax Injunction Act.

Section 1983 does not, by itself, permit a federal action to enjoin state tax assessment, levy, or collection when § 1341 bars the action.

Miller v. Bauer · filed 1975-06-02

The fact that the complaint is based in part on § 1983 does not avoid the prohibition contained in § 1341.

Section 1983 does not prevent the Tax Injunction Act from barring a federal action challenging state tax assessments when an adequate state remedy exists.

Miller v. Bauer · filed 1975-07-16

The fact that the complaint is based in part on § 1983 does not avoid the prohibition contained in § 1341.

Section 1983 actions challenging state tax collections are subject to § 1341, which requires exhaustion of available state remedies.

Kelly v. H. E. Springett, Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement · filed 1975-10-20

It is true that appellant’s action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the jurisdictional statute of which is 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and, consequently, does not require prior exhaustion of remedies. However, where § 1343(3) actions are confronted with the § 1341 provision, the latter control and exhaustion of state remedies is required.

Section 1983 does not allow a federal damages action to circumvent the federal tax-injunction statute when the requested damages would interfere with state tax collection and adequate state remedies exist.

Advertiser Co. v. Wallace · filed 1978-03-08

Yet, the same policies which preclude awarding anticipatory relief or a refund should also preclude an award of the damages sought in this case.

Section 1983 permits a damages action against state or county tax officials for intentional or reckless violations of clearly established constitutional rights, and § 1341 does not bar that action.

Fulton Market Cold Storage Company v. Cullerton · filed 1978-08-07

While we now hold that § 1341 does not bar a § 1983 action for damages, that is not to say that whenever a tax official raises a property assessment he exposes himself to a § 1983 suit. ... Therefore, we hold that a state or county tax official will be liable for damages under § 1983 only if he violated the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights intentionally or with reckless disregard of those rights. Inadvertence or negligence will not be enough. ... Accordingly, in light of all the foregoing, we now hold that the plaintiff, Fulton Market Cold Storage Company, has stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which is not barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1341.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal claim for back-tax refunds when the state provides a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy under the Tax Injunction Act.

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Lennen · filed 1981-07-07

These cases reiterate that on those occasions when it is proper for the federal courts to grant relief although state procedures have not been complied with, the public interest should be benefitted, or at least not harmed. Allowing § 1341 to be disregarded on a § 1983 claim for back taxes would emasculate the long-accepted Tax Injunction Act. We hold that § 1341 bars the railroads’ claims for back taxes in Kansas because the state remedy is plain, speedy and efficient and the Congressional purpose in enacting § 1341 is furthered by our holding.

Section 1983 does not create an exception to the State Tax Injunction Act, so a federal challenge to state taxation under Section 1983 remains barred when the Act applies.

Hawaiian Telephone Company v. State · filed 1982-11-04

In accordance with the existing law of this circuit, we hold that section 1983 is not an exception to the State Tax Injunction Act.

Section 1983 does not create an exception to the State Tax Injunction Act for challenges to state taxes.

Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. Hawaii Department of Labor & Industrial Relations · filed 1982-11-04

In accordance with the existing law of this circuit, we hold that section 1983 is not an exception to the State Tax Injunction Act.

A Section 1983 state-tax challenge survives dismissal when the complaint sufficiently alleges that state remedies are not plain, speedy, and efficient.

Coleman v. McLaren · filed 1983-10-04

By contrast, on the current Rule 12(b)(6) motion all that is at issue is the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations, not the truth of those allegations. In those terms Complaint ¶¶ 1 — 14, 1-15 and 1-16, which describe the respects in which Illinois remedies are inadequate, surely suffice.

The Tax Injunction Act bars a Section 1983 injunction action contesting a state tax when a plain, speedy, and efficient state remedy is available.

Hamer v. Anderson · filed 1984-09-27

This statute bars a taxpayer from contesting the validity of a state tax in a section 1983 injunction action if there is a “plain, speedy and efficient” state remedy available.

Section 1983 does not bypass the Federal Tax Injunction Act for tax refund claims when adequate local remedies exist.

Jenkins v. Washington Convention Center · filed 1999-08-12

In the case before this Court, Plaintiffs’ invocation of § 1983 does not obviate the fact that their claims amount to an action for a tax refund, one necessarily governed by the FTIA.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to avoid the Tax Injunction Act, even though it does not require prior exhaustion of administrative remedies.

First United Methodist Church v. City of Syracuse · filed 1980-05-05

and cannot be avoided by invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — a provision which does not require prior exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to pursue a cruel and unusual punishment claim based on prolonged exposure to sewage from a broken toilet when material facts about the conditions remain disputed.

Wilson v. Michael C. Samberg, Warden · filed 1988-04-25

Melvin C. Wilson appeals from the district court's order entering summary judgment for the defendants in his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. ... Wilson's description of his broken commode, if taken as true, may well state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment. ... As to this claim, we vacate and remand the case for further factual development.

An inmate's claim that officials confined him in an unheated cell during sub-zero weather states a § 1983 cause of action that cannot be dismissed on the complaint alone.

Johnson v. Michael Dutton, Warden Anthony Eanes, Guard, Cpl. Lepage C. Thomas, Disciplinary Board and R. Pa · filed 1985-01-18

At the very least, plaintiff's claim of cruel and unusual punishment constitutes a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 which should not have been dismissed on the basis of the complaint alone.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a claim concerning the conditions of confinement, rather than a claim based on the loss of good-time credits, under the Civil Rights Act.

Cooper v. Lockhart · filed 1973-12-27

Here the alleged constitutional deprivation relates to the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide monetary relief for jail conditions that, although disgusting and unjustified, do not amount to a sufficiently serious constitutional violation.

Green v. Kent · filed 1974-01-07

Nevertheless, this court is of the opinion that Green did not suffer such a violation of his constitutional rights sufficient to sustain an action under the Civil Eights Act. ... In concluding that plaintiff has failed to state a claim suitable for monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this court finds support in the decision in Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F.Supp. 415 (D.C.Md. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877, 88 S. Ct. 175, 19 L.Ed.2d 165 (1966).

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to challenge excessive or inadequate jail heat as an Eighth Amendment violation and obtain injunctive relief.

Rhem v. Malcolm · filed 1974-01-07

A prisoner’s claim of excessive or inadequate heat states a claim under the Eighth Amendment and 42 U. S.C. § 1983 (Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972), and injunctive relief may be granted against such burdens.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for challenging constitutional deprivations relating to the conditions of a prisoner's confinement.

Pavia v. Hogan · filed 1974-12-31

Furthermore, the alleged constitutional deprivation here relates to the conditions of petitioner’s confinement, cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S.Ct. 407, 30 L.Ed. 2d 418 (1971).

Section 1983 provides the vehicle for a prisoner's conditions-of-confinement claim, rather than a habeas petition under § 2254.

Doss v. Correctional Department Unit 24 · filed 1975-04-23

Petitioner’s final claim relates not to his conviction but to the conditions of confinement. It, therefore, may not be considered under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This court, however, has treated this claim as one arising under 42 U.S. C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits state prisoners and pretrial detainees to challenge unconstitutional conditions of confinement rather than the fact or duration of confinement or seek immediate release.

Rodriguez v. Jimenez · filed 1976-02-18

This action is properly brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1983, in that plaintiffs, all of whom are state prisoners or defendants awaiting trial held by state authorities, are not challenging the fact or duration of their physical confinement itself, nor seeking immediate release or a speedier release from that confinement, but rather are challenging the conditions of their confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for confinement conditions that do not reach constitutional proportions.

Crowe v. William D. Leeke, Director of S. C. Department of Corrections, and Joe Martin, Warden, Central Correction · filed 1976-08-25

Finding that this claim did not reach constitutional proportions, the district court dismissed the complaint. We affirm.

Section 1983 provides a federal vehicle for constitutional challenges to the treatment of inmates and other institutionalized persons.

Lucas v. Wasser · filed 1976-08-26

Indeed, § 1983 challenges to the constitutionality of institutional treatment of inmates, including juveniles and mental patients, are now routinely heard by federal courts, ... .

Section 1983, rather than habeas corpus, is the proper remedy to seek state-provided psychotherapy or protection from prison assaults.

1977-01-19 · filed 1977-01-19

Even if the state provided no psychiatric care at all for its prisoners, petitioner would not be entitled to the grant of habeas corpus. Assuming, arguendo, that there is an obligation to provide such treatment, the proper remedy is a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to compel the state to afford prisoners access to psychotherapy. ... Furthermore, since we do not question that conduct like this can be prevented, the proper remedy again is not release, but a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See James v. Wallace, 382 F.Supp. 1177 (M.D.Ala.1974).

Section 1983 provides the proper remedy for compelling a state to provide prisoners constitutionally required psychotherapy or protection from preventable assaults, rather than obtaining release through habeas corpus.

Fielding v. LeFevre · filed 1977-01-19

Assuming, arguendo, that there is an obligation to provide such treatment, the proper remedy is a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to compel the state to afford prisoners access to psychotherapy. ... Furthermore, since we do not question that conduct like this can be prevented, the proper remedy again is not release, but a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a § 1983 action challenging jail conditions, courts generally defer to prison officials’ discretion and require unreasonable, arbitrary conduct or an abuse of discretion to justify judicial interference.

Williams v. Hoyt · filed 1977-10-12

The general rule is that courts should not interfere in the internal management or functions of state jails or prisons. ... “Prison officials have broad discretion in the area of conditions of confinement”. ... We cannot rule, as a matter of law, that this action was so unreasonable or arbitrary, or that the officials so abused their discretion, as to justify judicial interference.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to directly challenge denial of temporary home furlough as a condition of confinement without exhausting state remedies or proceeding through habeas corpus.

Wright, Thomas v. Cuyler · filed 1980-07-08

We therefore hold that under the facts presented here failure of appellant to gain admission to the home furlough program was a condition of a prisoner's confinement, which can be challenged in a direct action under section 1983 without exhausting state remedies or suing in habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge denial of temporary home furlough as a condition of confinement in a direct action without exhausting state remedies or proceeding in habeas corpus.

Wright v. Cuyler · filed 1980-06-30

We therefore hold that under the facts presented here failure of appellant to gain admission to the home furlough program was a condition of a prisoner’s confinement, which can be challenged in a direct action under section 1983 without exhausting state remedies or suing in habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to pursue a claim based on intentional confinement in conditions that allegedly violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Bienvenu v. Beauregard Parish Police Jury · filed 1983-05-31

Clearly, Bienvenu’s statements that the defendant party intentionally subjected him to a cold, rainy, roach-infested facility and furnished him with inoperative, scum-encrusted washing and toilet facilities sufficiently alleges a cause of action cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

Prisoners state a § 1983 claim by alleging that disciplinary work deprived them of rest and caused extreme exhaustion, physical pain, and mental suffering.

Howard v. King · filed 1983-06-16

Considering the full pleadings in light of both general eighth amendment jurisprudence and the above-cited analogues, the inmates have pleaded a cause of action cognizable under the eighth and fourteenth amendments and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

In Section 1983 jail-conditions litigation, a court may not reject a constitutionally adequate official remedial plan and order a more intrusive transfer of prisoners.

Union County Jail Inmates v. Di Buono · filed 1983-08-11

We therefore hold that the district court, in its zeal to correct what it perceived as unconscionable conditions, improperly exercised its discretion by rejecting the Commissioner’s proposed remedial scheme and by ordering the removal of state prisoners from the county facility.

A prisoner’s challenge to the conditions of confinement is cognizable under Section 1983 rather than habeas corpus.

Winslow v. M.C. Samberg, Warden · filed 1986-11-14

Nevertheless, if the challenge is to the conditions of the confinement, the action is cognizable as a Sec. 1983 claim.

Prison overcrowding alone does not state an Eighth Amendment § 1983 claim, but allegations that overcrowding causes stress, communicable disease, and increased inmate confrontations may do so.

Akao v. Shimoda · filed 1987-11-09

The district court properly held that an allegation of overcrowding without more does not state a claim under the eighth amendment. ... But more was alleged here: "Due to population increase in Module-1, there is an increase in stress, tension, communicable diseases, and a high increase in confrontations between inmates."

A Section 1983 conditions-of-confinement claim does not require malicious intent; allegations of overcrowded, unsanitary conditions causing tuberculosis may support Eighth Amendment damages.

Gillespie v. Crawford · filed 1987-11-30

Prison conditions may violate the eighth amendment even if they are not imposed maliciously or with the conscious desire to inflict gratuitous pain. ... We hold that these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for damages under section 1983.

A genuine dispute over the actual temperature of a prisoner's cell block precludes summary judgment on a § 1983 claim alleging unconstitutional cold conditions.

Williams v. Anthony Palmer & Elton Scott · filed 1987-12-07

As the Magistrate recognized that "there is a factual dispute as to actual temperature in the housing unit on December 26, 1983," the granting of summary judgment was not proper in this case as the factual dispute as to the actual temperature is a genuine issue of material fact.

A pretrial detainee's Section 1983 conditions-of-confinement claim is evaluated under due process by asking whether the conditions constitute punishment or instead serve a legitimate governmental interest.

Lyons v. Powell · filed 1988-02-04

Thus, whether appellant’s initial or amended complaints stated a viable cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be evaluated in light of whether the alleged conditions of his confinement at New Hampshire State Prison (NHSP) constituted punishment, or in fact served some legitimate governmental interest.

Section 1983 covers claims concerning the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement.

Abdul-Hakeem v. Koehler · filed 1989-08-25

Moreover, as Hakeem’s claims regarding the conditions of his confinement are properly considered under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), see Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1840-41, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), federal law provides the rule of decision for Hakeem’s suit.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action to challenge conditions of confinement.

Jackson v. Hatcher · filed 1992-10-08

A petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper method of challenging the legality or duration of confinement, while a civil rights action is the proper method of challenging conditions of confinement.

Section 1983 permits an Eighth Amendment challenge to prison conditions, while a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement must proceed through habeas corpus.

Sammie Kelley, Jr. v. Rockett · filed 1993-02-26

To the extent that he is challenging the fact or duration of his confinement as extended by the disciplinary sanctions, his sole federal remedy is by writ of habeas corpus. ... Kelley may of course raise an Eighth Amendment claim in his action under § 1983 if he is challenging the conditions of his confinement.

Section 1983 provides the vehicle for a prisoner’s conditions-of-confinement claims, and a pro se habeas petition raising those claims should be treated as a § 1983 complaint.

Joseph v. Nash v. Carl Sparks, Sheriff, of Kern County W.H. Seifert, Warden, of the Metropolitan Detention Center, in Lo · filed 1993-06-04

In the petition, Nash challenged various conditions of confinement, including access to the law library, lack of basic hygiene supplies, denial of religious services, and improper dispensation of medical supplies. ... Therefore, Nash's petition should have been treated as a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a means to seek relief for unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

In Re Ronald Jerry Sawyer · filed 1994-02-28

To the extent that Sawyer challenges the conditions of his confinement and claims the deprivation of constitutional rights, his claims may be addressed in a petition for relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988).

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a challenge to the conditions of confinement.

Hartman v. Summers · filed 1995-03-30

Rather, it involves a complaint about the conditions of confinement and is more appropriately raised in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides the appropriate remedy for a claim seeking treatment that concerns only the conditions of confinement.

Wymore v. Oregon State Hospital · filed 1995-06-29

Because Wymore's claim for treatment addresses only the conditions of his confinement, his appropriate remedy lies in section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge the conditions of confinement when the claim does not challenge the lawfulness of the confinement.

Scales v. District of Columbia · filed 1995-07-25

Because Plaintiff in the case at hand challenges only the conditions of his confinement, not its lawfulness, his claim is properly brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a person to challenge the conditions of confinement in a district court action.

In Re: Reginald L. Frazier · filed 1996-02-26

To the extent that Frazier seeks to challenge the conditions of his confinement, he may file an action in district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

Section 1983 permits an action in district court to challenge conditions of confinement.

Frazier v. · filed 1996-02-26

To the extent that Frazier seeks to challenge the condi- tions of his confinement, he may file an action in district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s claim about the conditions of confinement on death row.

Austin v. Bell · filed 1996-05-09

The Court finds that Petitioner must bring this claim regarding the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement or prison procedures when success would not automatically entitle the prisoner to earlier release.

Carson v. Johnson · filed 1997-06-02

Generally, § 1983 suits are the proper vehicle to attack unconstitutional conditions of confinement and prison procedures.

Section 1983 permits a civil action for a prisoner’s challenge to conditions of confinement, including inadequate law library facilities, that was presented in a pro se habeas petition.

Hall v. Flowers · filed 1998-01-06

Therefore, Appellant’s petition challenging a condition of confinement should have been construed as a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A pro se habeas petition challenging a condition of confinement should be construed as a § 1983 complaint.

Hall v. A.M. Flowers K. Reid J.M. Wilner Lieutenant Phemiester and Mr. Crook, (w.d.okla.) · filed 1998-01-06

Therefore, Appellant's petition challenging a condition of confinement should have been construed as a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for damages or injunctive relief over inadequate medical treatment in custody when the defendants are state actors.

Kamara v. Farquharson · filed 1998-03-23

Consistent with this general rule, a claim of inadequate medical treatment while in legal custody is ordinarily brought as a civil rights suit for damages or injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where the defendants are state actors, or on a Bivens theory, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971, where the defendants are federal actors).

Section 1983 provides the vehicle for challenging forced medication as a condition of confinement.

Kolocotronis v. Reddy · filed 1999-02-03

Although Kolocotronis captioned his complaint as a federal habeas petition, his claims should have been brought as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging forced medication as a condition of his confinement.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

In re the Detention of Turay · filed 1999-10-21

Turay’s remedy for the unconstitutional conditions is a § 1983 suit or an injunction action, such as he has already instituted.

Section 1983 provides a way to challenge conditions of confinement, including administrative segregation.

Kelley v. Johnson · filed 1999-12-15

Because Kelley is challenging the condition of his confinement in administrative segregation, the district court did not err in treating his complaint as a § 1983 action and in applying the PLRA to his action.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for unconstitutional conditions of confinement in a civil commitment facility.

In Re Detention of Turay · filed 1999-12-22

Turay's remedy for the unconstitutional conditions is a § 1983 suit or an injunction action, such as he has already instituted.

Section 1983 is the vehicle for constitutional claims challenging forced medication in prison as a condition of confinement.

Closs v. Weber · filed 1999-12-23

Any claim as to forced medication in prison must be brought as a constitutional claim challenging the conditions of confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement when the claim does not imply that the fact or length of custody is invalid.

Gibson v. Puckett · filed 2000-02-14

The rationale of Edwards, Heck, and P'reiser, requiring such claims to be brought in habeas actions, thus does not apply. There is no bar to Gibson's raising his current claim in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a separate action for claims about conditions of confinement.

Farris v. Poppell · filed 2000-07-19

Further, the district court properly dismissed Mr. Farris’s claims regarding the conditions of confinement without prejudice to the filing of an action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is a more appropriate vehicle than habeas for claims challenging conditions of confinement.

Dukeminier v. Williams · filed 2000-09-13

Claims challenging the conditions of confinement are more properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is not a claim petitioner has asserted in this action.

Section 1983 is a more appropriate vehicle for claims challenging conditions of confinement than a habeas petition under § 2241.

Sedillo v. Williams · filed 2000-09-13

Claims challenging the conditions of confinement are more properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is not a claim petitioner has asserted in this action.

Section 1983 covers a prisoner’s challenge to conditions of confinement when the alleged conduct would not affect the duration of the sentence.

Easley v. State of Texas · filed 2001-08-31

The district court properly characterized Easley’s claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he is challenging the conditions of his confinement, and he has not asserted that the defendant’s conduct will have any effect on the duration of his sentence.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s challenge to conditions of confinement that does not contest the fact or length of custody.

Turnboe v. Gundy · filed 2001-09-25

When a prisoner challenges the conditions of his or her confinement but not the fact or length of his custody, the proper mechanism is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the vehicle for a prisoner's constitutional challenges to conditions of confinement.

Ogden v. Bravo · filed 2002-01-28

Finally, we agree with the district court that to the extent Ogden seeks to assert constitutional challenges to his conditions of confinement, he must do so in an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for federal claims concerning conditions of confinement.

Tyree v. Boone · filed 2002-02-07

Federal claims concerning the conditions of confinement are more ... properly brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s challenge to conditions of confinement when the claims would not entitle the prisoner to release.

Staten v. Garret · filed 2002-04-30

None of Staten’s claims would entitle him to release from custody. The district court did not err by construing the complaint as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for prisoners to challenge conditions of confinement.

Woodruff v. Everett · filed 2002-07-23

Because plaintiffs’ petition unquestionably seeks to challenge conditions of confinement, it must be brought as a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides a damages action for complaints about prison conditions that do not allege an illegal extension of confinement.

Khaimov v. Crist · filed 2002-07-25

Finally, his remaining complaints regarding prison mail and segregation must first be brought in an administrative grievance or an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because he has not alleged that either action illegally extended his period of confinement.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for claims concerning conditions of confinement.

Rivero-Proenza v. Ashcroft · filed 2003-04-10

Claims concerning the conditions of confinement should be brought in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action and not in a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 proceeding.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s claim about the conditions of confinement.

Young v. Martin · filed 2003-12-05

It is clear under current law that a prisoner complaining about the conditions of his confinement should bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 conditions-of-confinement claim against prison officials requires proof of deliberate indifference and that the conditions were part of an official governmental policy or custom.

Ullrich v. Canyon County Detention Center · filed 2003-12-10

Finally, in order to succeed on a § 1983 claim against prison officials for conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must demonstrate both deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials and that the conditions plaintiff faced were part of an official governmental policy or custom. Appellant fails to provide evidence supporting either of these points.

Section 1983 is a vehicle for a prisoner’s claim seeking medical care as a condition of confinement.

Barroca v. Maggy · filed 2003-12-18

Because Barroca seeks emergency medical care, the district court properly construed his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint.

A prisoner’s challenge to the conditions of confinement may be treated as a Section 1983 action.

Joyce v. Travis County · filed 2004-02-16

The district court did not err in treating his complaint as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action because Joyce challenged the conditions of his confinement.

Section 1983 permits relief for claims concerning prison conditions, including inmate legal assistance and mail censorship.

Robert O. McDonnell Etc. v. Charles L. Wolff, Jr., Etc., Robert O. McDonnell Etc. v. Charles L. Wolff, Jr., Etc. · filed 1973-09-12

We turn next to the questions of whether the Complex’s regulations relating to inmate legal assistance and mail censorship are unconstitutional and should be enjoined. These questions clearly relate to conditions of confinement, and thus relief may be granted under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement when the requested relief would not shorten incarceration.

Jamieson v. William B. Robinson, Commissioner of Correction of Pennsylvania, and James F. Howard, Warden of St · filed 1981-02-12

Central to our decision in that case was the distinction between a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement, such as a request for an immediate or speedier release from confinement, which is the core of habeas corpus, and an attack on the conditions of confinement, which is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The present suit is also distinguishable from a habeas corpus proceeding. As Jamieson points out, the relief he requests would not serve to diminish the length of his.incarceration; rather, he seeks only to alter the conditions of his confinement.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for most challenges to the constitutional adequacy of medical care.

Kane v. Winn · filed 2004-05-27

This Court is of the view that, with the exception of extreme cases where transfer or release might be a necessary remedy, most challenges to the constitutional adequacy of medical care should proceed as civil rights claims under Bivens or Section 1983, or as an ordinary civil action under federal law.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a claim challenging only a condition of confinement, rather than the fact or duration of confinement.

Lynch v. Alameida · filed 2004-10-22

The district court denied this contention on the basis that it should have properly been brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than 28 U.S.C. § 2254, because it only relates to a condition of Lynch’s confinement. We agree and affirm.

Section 1983 provides the proper civil action for challenges to conditions of confinement that would not shorten confinement.

Olajide v. B.I.C.E. · filed 2005-11-30

This conclusion follows from the settled rules that habeas corpus relief is appropriate only when a prisoner attacks the fact or duration of confinement, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); whereas, challenges to the conditions of confinement that would not result in a definite reduction in the length of confinement are properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Strader v. Troy, 571 F.2d 1263, 1269 (4th Cir.1978).

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a civil rights claim challenging conditions of confinement, including lack of access to a prison law library.

Henderson v. Ray · filed 2006-01-26

However, such a challenge to the conditions of confinement is properly brought as a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a means to seek relief for mistreatment and conditions of confinement in state prison.

Hodges v. Bell · filed 2006-03-02

Hodges’s complaints and allegations of mistreatment and the conditions of his confinement, therefore, are governed by and may be redressed pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for claims about prison conditions that do not challenge the fact or length of confinement.

Abdulhaseeb v. Ward · filed 2006-03-27

Because these counts relate to the conditions of Abdulhaseeb’s confinement, rather than the fact or length of his confinement, they are improperly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and should be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights proceeding for a prisoner's claim challenging conditions of confinement, after exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Cotten v. Ward · filed 2006-08-04

“that this claim challenges the conditions of his confinement, and thus should be properly raised in a civil rights proceeding under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after exhaustion of administrative remedies. This claim does not state a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief.”

Section 1983 is the vehicle for state prisoners’ claims about conditions of confinement, including restrictions on writing supplies.

Lynn v. Roberts · filed 2006-09-01

As the district court explained to Mr. Lynn, these types of conditions-of-confinement claims by state prisoners must be brought in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; they do not justify habeas relief.

Section 1983 is the vehicle for state prisoners’ conditions-of-confinement claims, including complaints about restrictions on writing supplies.

Lynn v. Roberts · filed 2006-11-28

As the district court explained to M r. Lynn, these types of conditions-of-confinement claims by state prisoners must be brought in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; they do not justify habeas relief.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement, but a challenge to the fact of confinement belongs in a habeas petition.

Jackson v. Johnson · filed 2007-01-03

A prisoner may file a § 1983 action to challenge the conditions of confinement, whereas a challenge to the fact of confinement is properly presented in a habeas petition.

Section 1983 liability for violations of a detainee’s rights can rest on conditions of confinement or on officials’ episodic acts or omissions.

Hebert v. Maxwell · filed 2007-01-19

Section 1983 liability for alleged violations of detainee’s rights can be premised on two the- ories: (1) that the conditions of confinement violated the detainee’s rights or (2) that epi- sodic acts or omissions of officials violated those rights.

Section 1983 provides the action for prisoners challenging conditions of confinement rather than the fact or duration of confinement.

Williams-Bey, Joseph v. Buss, Edwin G. · filed 2008-02-14

It is well-established that a prisoner who challenges neither the fact nor duration of confinement but instead challenges the conditions of confinement—such as exclusion from programs and loss of privileges—must do so in an action under § 1983 or another federal statute, not a petition for habeas corpus.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a conditions-of-confinement claim when success would not automatically entitle the prisoner to accelerated release.

Ruiz v. Campos · filed 2008-03-25

If Petitioner prevails on his claims, he will not be immediately released from custody. As a decision in Petitioner’s favor “would not automatically entitle [him] to accelerated release, ... the proper vehicle [for his claims] is a § 1983 suit.”

Section 1983 is generally the proper vehicle for a state inmate’s conditions-of-confinement claim rather than a habeas petition.

Jackson v. Friel · filed 2008-07-11

However, conditions-of-confinement claims by a state inmate generally must be brought in a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than in a habeas petition.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a challenge to prison conditions that would not affect the validity of a conviction or the duration of confinement.

Dickerson v. DiGuglielmo · filed 2009-01-15

Appellants’ claim has no bearing on the validity of their convictions, nor would a favorable resolution of it result in a speedier release from prison. The claim is essentially a challenge to the conditions of confinement and is properly brought as a civil rights action, which appellants have already, albeit unsuccessfully, done.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for individual detainees to challenge their conditions of confinement.

Fuller v. State of Kansas · filed 2009-04-22

Likewise, with respect to the § 2241 petition underlying appeal number 08-3305, reasonable jurists could not debate the federal district court’s determination that petitioners’ allegations should be raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by each individual in separate actions.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a prisoner’s claims about administrative segregation and prison privileges when those claims do not affect the duration of custody.

Gee v. Wyoming Department of Correcti · filed 2009-04-27

Since, as explained above, Mr. Gee’s petition challenges only administrative decisions affecting his day-to-day circumstances and prison privileges, then, under the facts presented here, § 1983, not § 2241, is the statute under which he must proceed.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner challenging the effect of a detainer on conditions of confinement.

Hawkins-El v. Hawkins · filed 1975-02-20

What Hawkins-El is challenging herein is not the legality or the duration of the conviction for which he is presently confined, but rather the effect of the District of Columbia detainer upon the conditions of HawkinsEl’s confinement in Maryland. As such he is not, despite his assertion to the contrary, entitled to habeas corpus relief, in connection with which he would seemingly have to exhaust his state remedies in the courts of Maryland pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, see Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), before proceeding in this Court, but rather, if he is entitled to any relief in this case, his entitlement is under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to bring a civil action challenging the conditions of confinement when the suit does not seek immediate or quicker release.

Mitchem v. Melton · filed 1981-05-12

What is before us is a suit which does bear the hallmark of a §1983 action since it challenges the conditions of confinement and does not seek a determination that the prisoner is entitled to an immediate or quicker release from confinement.

Section 1983 is the avenue for prisoners to challenge the conditions of their confinement, rather than its fact or duration.

Hornsby v. Jones · filed 2010-08-20

His arguments fail, however, because prisoners who wish to challenge the conditions of their confinement, as opposed to its fact or duration, must do so through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not through federal habeas proceedings.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to challenge conditions of confinement when success would not alter their sentence or undo their conviction.

Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2012-01-25

As such, the prisoners raise “conditions of confinement” claims that do not lie at the core of habeas and thus are properly brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s claim challenging the conditions of confinement rather than the fact or duration of confinement.

Knox v. Morgan · filed 2012-01-25

Knox argues on appeal that dismissal of his petition was improper, claiming that it was properly brought under § 2254 because he sought release from the mental health unit, into which he was placed without a hearing or other process. We disagree. Given that Knox did not challenge the fact or duration of his confinement, merely the conditions, this conclusion is amply supported by applicable law. Standifer v. Ledezma, 653 F.3d 1276, 1280 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding it “well settled” that condition-of-confinement claims must be brought under § 1983 rather than in a habeas petition).

Section 1983 provides a civil action for a prisoner’s claims challenging conditions of confinement.

Grindling v. Thomas · filed 2012-07-26

Because Grindling should have brought his claims in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than as a habeas petition, the district court properly dismissed Grindling’s action without prejudice.

Section 1983 provides the proper civil action for challenging conditions of confinement.

Franklin v. Kelley · filed 2015-05-20

Because this pleading clearly contains civil rights allegations and makes no reference to Franklin’s habeas claims, it should not have been construed as a notice of appeal in the habeas case. Rather, it should have been filed as a new 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action, the proper avenue in which to challenge conditions of confinement.

Section 1983 provides an avenue to challenge the conditions of solitary confinement.

Woodfox v. Foti · filed 2015-11-09

In fact, the two decisions cited by the district court to support its consideration of Woodfox’s solitary confinement indicate that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions are the appropriate avenue for addressing the conditions of solitary confinement.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for challenging unconstitutional conditions of solitary confinement.

Woodfox v. Foti · filed 2015-12-07

In fact, the two decisions cited by the district court to support its consideration of Woodfox’s solitary confinement indicate that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions are the appropriate avenue for addressing the conditions of solitary confinement.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a state prisoner’s challenge to conditions of confinement that would not alter the fact or duration of confinement.

Carver v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2016-01-22

The District Court construed Carver’s challenge as one to the conditions of his confinement that would not alter the fact or duration of that confinement. The District Court further concluded that such challenges by state prisoners are not cognizable under § 2254 and must be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 instead. We agree with that analysis as far as it goes.

Section 1983 provides an avenue for a prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement, including denial of medical treatment.

Hamilton v. Bird · filed 2016-05-24

The district court correctly held that Ms. Hamilton may not assert such a claim in a habeas action; the proper avenue is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides an available remedy for an inmate seeking a housing change based on a protected right.

State v. McCoy · filed 2016-06-28

In addition, an inmate who seeks a change of housing units on the basis of a right protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has an available remedy under that statute.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a state prisoner's conditions-of-confinement claims that do not challenge the fact or duration of imprisonment.

Williams v. Warden Lackawanna County Priso · filed 2016-06-29

Such claims by a state prisoner like Williams are properly brought in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not a habeas petition.