42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence alone.

McLaughlin v. Farries · filed 2004-09-13

At most, he has alleged a claim of negligence, which is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Negligent actions or inactions are not cognizable under § 1983.

Charles v. Rodriguez · filed 2004-10-13

Charles’s claims of false arrest and prosecution fail because, at the most, the defendants’ actions or inactions amounted to negligence, which is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for loss or injury caused solely by an official’s negligence.

Reed v. Moore · filed 2004-12-17

The negligent act of an official causing loss or injury will not, standing alone, state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for negligent conduct.

Webb v. Tallahassee Police Dept. · filed 2005-05-04

Allegations of negligent conduct are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a merely negligent deprivation; gross negligence may be sufficient.

Nilsson v. Coughlin · filed 1987-10-02

Such a § 1983 suit may not be predicated on a merely negligent deprivation of life, liberty or property, Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986), but the Davidson court left open the question of whether recklessness or gross negligence makes out a cause, Lunde v. Oldi, 808 F.2d 219, 221 n. 4 (2d Cir.1986), and thus the Villante rule is still the law of this Circuit.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based only on negligent conduct that does not violate a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Sorey v. Kellett · filed 1987-10-15

The Court is of the opinion that no cause of action has been stated against these Defendants under Section 1983.

In this action, the court held that negligence could not found a § 1983 claim.

Loubser, Annare v. Thacker, Robert W. · filed 2006-03-08

Section 1983 claims cannot be founded on negligence.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligent conduct.

Wright v. Pennington · filed 2006-04-18

Negligent conduct is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for negligent conduct alone.

Jackson v. Houck · filed 2006-05-17

Insofar as Jackson may be claiming Judge Houck and Dargan were negligent, he is not entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for gross negligence.

Polaski v. Colorado Department of Transportation · filed 2006-08-02

Because appellant cannot overcome CDOT’s Eleventh Amendment immunity or show that a claim for gross negligence is cognizable under § 1983, we affirm the dismissal of her suit.

Section 1983 requires more than an isolated negligent failure to afford constitutional rights to state an equal protection claim.

Barnes v. Armour · filed 1974-12-13

This Court is of the opinion that the alleged negligence of Mr. Collins, in failing to notify the Department of Safety that Mr. Barnes had not been convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, an offense for which Mr. Barnes had admittedly been arrested, constituted no denial of equal protection cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to be actionable thereunder as a denial of equal protection, more than an isolated incident of negligent failure to afford a citizen his constitutional rights must be alleged.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery for mere negligence.

Joyner v. McClellan. · filed 1975-06-18

The claim of negligence in Count 8 is deficient because mere negligence is not a basis for recovery under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action for allegations amounting only to negligence.

Heredia v. Doe · filed 2007-02-06

Even reading Plaintiffs Amended Complaint broadly, the pleadings fail to state facts which constitute anything more than a claim for negligence, for which there is no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for mere negligence.

Smith v. Leonard · filed 2007-06-14

As to Smith’s claims against Leonard, to the extent that Smith is arguing that Leonard merely was negligent in failing to provide a shower mat, negligence does not impose liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deliberate deprivation of constitutional rights; negligence alone does not create liability.

Jones v. Salt Lake County · filed 2007-09-28

Such negligence does not state a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for negligent conduct.

Andrews v. Belt · filed 2008-04-15

Andrews’s assertion that the defendant may have known about the leaky toilet but failed to repair it at most alleges negligence, which is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a negligence-based claim when the negligence deprives a person of a constitutional right.

Snyder v. Blankenship · filed 1979-07-16

This court therefore considers it established that allegations of negligence are sufficient to state a cause of action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when a constitutional right is abridged.

Section 1983 does not make an officer’s mere negligence in deciding to pursue a suspect actionable.

Beckett-Crabtree v. Hair · filed 2008-10-23

However, even if Deputy Hair made an error in judgment in deciding to pursue Mr. Crabtree, this is nothing more than negligence, which is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires more than mere negligence to establish a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Browell v. Davidson · filed 2009-01-16

As a basic and fundamental matter, it must be remembered that the standards required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require something more than mere negligence.

Section 1983 requires more than negligent conduct to state a claim.

Uram v. County of Allegheny · filed 1989-12-13

Similarly, Appellant has failed to state a cause of action under § 1983 against Tosic. More than negligent conduct is required to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support claims based only on negligent conduct causing deprivation of a protected interest or denial of access to the courts.

Mills v. Connors · filed 2009-04-07

Because negligent conduct is insufficient to support a claim for the deprivation of a protected interest or the denial of access to the courts, Mr. Mills’s § 1983 claims were properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a constitutional deprivation based on negligence alone.

Onley v. Simms · filed 1979-09-20

under the above described standard Simms’ negligence did not rise to a level actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a police officer based on mere negligence; the court requires gross or culpable conduct.

Loopman v. Hurley · filed 1979-08-15

It is with this guideline that defendant’s conduct must be judged. Mere negligence is insufficient, ... In this case, there isn’t any allegation of conduct upon the part of defendant Hurley to indicate gross negligence or more than ordinary negligence.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for simple negligence when officials who know of misconduct act reasonably to prevent future harm.

Knight v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF COLO. · filed 1980-08-29

In addition, I note that under the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1979), the defendants avoid liability under § 1983 for this simple negligence because although they were in a position of responsibility and knew of the misconduct, they acted in a reasonable manner to prevent future harm.

Section 1983 requires more than negligence to state a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights.

Bonita Johnson, F/k/a Bonita Anderson v. Kansas Department of Corrections Topeka Correctional Facility Nurses Staff, Top · filed 1997-07-10

As to Ms. Johnson's claim her constitutional rights were violated due to the employees' negligence, we agree with the district court Ms. Johnson fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for an isolated negligent failure to inquire about a prisoner's inaccessible work product when the prisoner neither asks about the closure nor requests its return.

Howard v. Webster · filed 2009-07-22

Maybe Webster should have thought to inquire, but her failure to do so was, at most, an isolated negligent act, which, absent Howard inquiring into the closure or demanding that his work product be returned, is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a defendant’s negligent acts.

Tassin v. Correctional Center Lafayette Parish · filed 2009-07-22

Further, defendants may not be held liable for their alleged negligent acts under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a claim of negligence alone.

Noble v. Grimes · filed 2009-10-26

Instead, Noble’s complaint, at most, alleges a claim of negligence, which is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on mere negligence.

Allen v. Wende · filed 2009-11-19

Mere negligence will not support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not support a procedural due process claim based on a school district’s merely negligent handling of a hearing request.

Chambers v. School District of Philadelphia Board of Education · filed 2009-11-20

The record suggests only that the School District’s error — and the School District concedes that it made a mistake— was negligent at most. Such conduct is not actionable under § 1983 under these circumstances.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a negligence claim.

Hicks v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-03-02

Plaintiff invokes constitutional provisions but he has not stated any facts supporting a constitutional violation; his negligence claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence alone.

Spencer v. the District of Columbia · filed 2010-06-11

Although the complaint appears to attempt to assert a claim for negligence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such a claim is not cognizable.

Section 1983 does not make negligent conduct actionable.

Coleman v. Sellars · filed 2015-05-27

This claim, too, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; negligent conduct is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligent conduct.

Suria v. Richard Wathen, Warden · filed 2015-09-23

However, as the district court correctly determined, negligent conduct is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a constitutional deprivation based on mere negligence.

Carrow v. Williams · filed 2018-02-16

The deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an intentional deprivation of rights; mere negligence is insufficient.

Harvey v. Holloway · filed 2018-02-28

The deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligent deprivation of a constitutional right.

Gibson v. Holloway · filed 2018-02-28

The deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under § 1983. ... To the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert a negligence claim, it is insufficient as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires an intentional deprivation of a federal right; mere negligence does not state a claim.

Block v. Glen · filed 2018-08-15

The deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief when a complaint alleges only negligent conduct by a state official.

Wynn v. Postal Service · filed 2018-08-24

Because Wynn’s allegation, taken as true and liberally construed, alleges only negligence, his complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for injuries alleged to result only from negligence.

Joyce v. Fields · filed 2019-04-23

Even if his April 15th letter is considered an attempt to amend the complaint, Joyce still fails to state a claim under § 1983 because he continues to allege only negligence.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a defendant’s merely negligent conduct.

DePaola v. Clarke · filed 2019-07-29

A defendant’s merely negligent conduct is not sufficient for liability under § 1983 or RLUIPA.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest on negligence inferred through res ipsa loquitur.

Brashear v. Board of County Commissioners of Oklahoma County · filed 2019-08-05

But res ipsa loquitur is a potential basis for inferring liability for negligence, and negligence is an insufficient basis for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence.

African Americans United States v. United States Office of the President · filed 2019-09-09

The Magistrate Judge observed that any claims by Plaintiff regarding negligence are not actionable under § 1983. ... The court concurs in the Report and Recommendation and incorporates it herein by reference.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence or gross negligence.

Williams v. Ellefson · filed 2019-10-01

This is because negligence or even gross negligence is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence.

Nova v. Smith · filed 2019-10-18

To the extent that plaintiff intended to assert a negligence claim against defendants Doe 1 and Woodruff, that claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a public official’s merely negligent conduct.

Wahl v. Doe · filed 2019-12-09

At most, Defendant might have been negligent in placing the mattress on the floor or in failing to remove Plaintiff’s restraints. This is insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support an access-to-courts claim based only on negligent loss of a prisoner’s legal papers.

Sharpe v. Bush · filed 2019-12-10

Therefore, mere negligence cannot sustain a § 1983 action for denial of access to courts.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for an ordinary negligence claim arising from a prisoner's slip and fall.

Bowens v. Brewer · filed 2020-02-26

As the United States Supreme Court has explained: “Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under traditional tort-law principles.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Bowens has failed to state a constitutional claim for the slip and fall incident of July 17, 2017.

Section 1983 does not allow claims based on negligence, even gross negligence.

Olrich v. Kenosha County · filed 2020-03-11

Because negligence, even gross negligence, is not actionable under §1983, the plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for claims based solely on negligence.

Morgan v. Semple · filed 2020-04-24

It is well established that negligence claims are not cognizable for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims based on negligence alone.

Morgan v. Semple · filed 2020-05-06

It is well established that negligence claims are not cognizable for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on mere negligence.

Jones (ID 0007371) v. Easter · filed 2020-05-15

A § 1983 claim cannot be based on mere negligence.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence alone.

Gish v. Neosho County Jail · filed 2020-06-12

Plaintiff’s claim suggests, at most, negligence, and is not properly brought in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a public official’s negligence.

Cavallero v. State of Idaho · filed 2020-06-30

Negligence is not actionable under § 1983, because a negligent act by a public official is not an abuse of governmental power but merely a “failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986). ... These allegations plausibly suggest, at most, that Coby acted negligently in failing to obtain shoes for Plaintiff the day before when Plaintiff asked for them.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligent failure to repair a cell door.

Bradley v. Ash · filed 2020-07-01

First, plaintiff’s claim regarding a failure to repair the cell door is a claim of negligence which is not grounds for making a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on negligence.

Rogers v. Davis · filed 2020-07-07

The court notes that a claim of negligence is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for negligence claims.

Bradley v. Ash · filed 2020-07-09

The court has previously cited case authority in a screening order to hold that plaintiff’s negligence claims fail to state a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery for mere negligence.

Torres v. Davis · filed 2020-07-21

Section 1983 “will not support a recovery for mere negligence.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison employee for a mistake or negligence alone.

Schrock v. Sevier · filed 2020-08-27

A mistake or negligence on the part of a prison employee is not enough to impose liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence alone.

Bryant v. Thompson · filed 2020-10-08

Further, while still maintaining that negligence occurred, Plaintiff has not countered the well-established law providing that a claim of negligence is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on negligence alone.

Jones v. Douglas County Sheriff's Office · filed 2020-12-02

It is well-established that negligence does not support a claim for a § 1983 violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for negligence.

Lofquist v. Cecil · filed 2020-12-03

A defendant can never be held liable under § 1983 for negligence.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence alone.

Gamble v. Officer Simmons · filed 2020-12-29

Generally, negligence is not actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims cannot rest on a state actor’s mere negligence.

FRYER v. PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY · filed 2021-01-05

The United States Supreme Court has held that § 1983 claims may not be predicated on a state actor’s mere negligence. ... Because negligence cannot be the basis for a constitutional claim, the § 1983 claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not allow prison claims based on negligence or gross negligence.

Robertson v. Doe · filed 2021-01-06

However, neither negligence nor gross negligence is actionable under § 1983 in the prison context.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on allegations of negligence.

Hartley v. Carter County · filed 2021-01-15

Additionally, Plaintiff complains of new evidence of negligence, but allegations of negligence will not sustain a suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make ordinary negligence actionable.

Hewitt v. Young · filed 2021-01-19

Further, negligence, in general, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for negligence alone on constitutional claims.

Taylor, Corey v. La Crosse County · filed 2021-01-22

Negligence cannot be the basis for liability on constitutional claims like Taylor’s brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim where prison procedures for access to notary services do not violate the prisoner’s due-process rights.

Washington v. Vincent · filed 1973-07-23

The current procedures do not violate the plaintiff’s due process right and, therefore, do not give rise to a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of substantive due process under color of state law.

Richardson v. CIVIL SERV. COM'N OF STATE OF NEW YORK · filed 1973-12-26

The Court finds that the complaint states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of substantive due process. The complaint alleges that all of the plaintiffs have performed the functions of a permanent NRC; that, but for the fact that the Black plaintiffs are not permitted to take the examination and the White plaintiff failed the examination, all would have received permanent appointment to the position of NRC; and that the testing procedures are not indicative of a person’s ability to be an NRC. Accordingly, so much of defendants’ motion as is directed to this claim is denied.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of property without due process of law.

Blankner v. The City of Chicago · filed 1974-11-21

Since she was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to contest the designation and taking, she has a right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of her property without due process of law.

Section 1983 permits a fundamental-due-process claim for stigmatization only when the plaintiff alleges a plausible deprivation of a property or liberty interest in addition to reputational stigma.

Tanner v. McCall · filed 1977-10-20

The upshot of those decisions, with respect to stigmatization, is that one must meet the “stigma-plus” test to assert a claim for fundamental due process under § 1983. ... The Court concludes that plaintiffs have stated no federal claim, under § 1983, that their good names, reputations, and integrity have been stigmatized. Consequently, they are not entitled to the basic guarantees of Fourteenth Amendment due process for such claims.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for a due-process claim when defendants deny a person a meaningful opportunity to challenge the scope of an eminent-domain taking.

Goadby v. Philadelphia Electric · filed 1980-10-02

Because plaintiff was denied that opportunity, this Court concludes that he has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits in his claim against defendants, both under Section 1983 and under the 14th Amendment.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a procedural-due-process claim when the plaintiff would have been terminated even if more elaborate procedures had been provided.

Pollock v. Baxter Manor Nursing Home · filed 1982-04-14

The Plaintiff is not entitled to relief, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where as here, she would have been terminated from the Defendant Nursing Home’s employ even had more elaborate procedures been afforded to Plaintiff in connection with her discharge.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim for an isolated negligent deprivation of property when adequate state administrative and tort remedies satisfy procedural due process.

Al-Mustafa Irshad v. Spann · filed 1982-07-19

The court holds that Irshad has not stated a cognizable section 1983 claim, because the Virginia administrative and tort remedies meet the requirements of procedural due process.

Section 1983 permits a claim against state officials when an arbitrary suspension without pay violates a public employee's substantive due process rights.

Gargiul v. Tompkins · filed 1983-03-29

Early in the course of the state proceedings, Gargiul commenced this action in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterparts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3). ... Therefore, we conclude that Gargiul’s complaint does state a claim against defendants for violation of her substantive due process rights in connection with her suspension without pay.

A prisoner cannot recover under Section 1983 for prison discipline when the facts establish neither denial of due process nor lack of fair notice.

Hadden v. James Howard, William Robinson, Charles Kozakiewicz, Robert Maroney, James Wigton, Thomas Seiverling, An · filed 1983-08-11

The facts found by the magistrate do not establish a violation of Hadden’s due process rights under any of these theories. Accordingly the judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

Section 1983 is not insurance against every mistake by state actors; it remedies only deprivations occurring without due process.

Haygood v. Evelle J. Younger, Etc., and Harold Cranke and Benjamin Seymour · filed 1983-10-25

It is not an insurance policy against mistakes being made by those acting under the color of state law. It only insures against mistakes made in the absence of “due process.”

A Section 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process must allege either that the state has established a procedure that is itself constitutionally deficient or that it provides no adequate remedy for random, unauthorized departures from established procedures by its employees.

Collins v. John T. King, Secretary, Department of Corrections · filed 1984-09-24

that in a Section 1983 action grounded in denial of procedural due process by a state, one must plead either or both that the state has established a procedure that itself is constitutionally deficient or that it has provided no adequate remedy for aberrational departures by its servants from proper procedures.

Once a section 1983 procedural-due-process claim accrues from failure to provide a required prior hearing, a later state postdeprivation remedy cannot extinguish it.

Patterson v. Thomas A. Coughlin, Iii, Charles P. Hernandez (Sic Charles P. Hermanderz), Harold J. Smith, N. · filed 1985-05-09

In view of our holding that an adequate prior hearing was required, a post-deprivation hearing, by way of an Article 78 proceeding or an action for damages in the Court of Claims, is inadequate, by definition, to meet the requirements of due process. This may be tautological, but it is a point that appears to have been missed by appellees and by the district court. Once a cause of action for a constitutional violation accrues, nothing that the state does subsequently can cut off the § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim requires more than official negligence; any deficiency in the challenged procedures must result from more than a lack of due care.

Deretich v. Office of Administrative Hearings · filed 1986-08-13

Second, a procedural due process claim under section 1983 must show that the constitutional infringement resulted from “more than lack of due care by a state official.” ... If OAH’s procedures were deficient, Deretich must show that the deficiency resulted from more than mere negligence.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim fails when alleged inadequacies in state procedures caused the plaintiff no actual harm.

Miener v. Missouri · filed 1986-09-04

We simply see no way in which the inadequacies she alleges can have actually harmed her, and therefore conclude that she has not stated a due-process claim on which any relief may be granted.

Negligence causing unintended injury or death does not establish the constitutional deprivation required for a Section 1983 due-process claim.

Dent v. City of Dallas · filed 1986-11-20

Plaintiffs have pleaded only negligence and have neither pleaded nor proved that Officer Reed or the city ... intended ... to take Dr. Dent’s life without due process of law. Consequently, no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been shown.

A prisoner's reassignment does not support a § 1983 due-process claim when state law places no substantive limits on prison officials' discretion to make that assignment.

Hall v. Unknown Named Agents Of The New York State Department For Correctional Services For Appu Unit At Cl · filed 1987-07-29

The applicable New York State statutes and regulations place no limits on the discretion of state prison officials to assign inmates already in voluntary protective custody to the APPU.

An incomplete but truthful prison-infraction notice does not support § 1983 liability when the inmate receives the required disciplinary process and the omission was not reckless, willful, or malicious.

McCoy v. D. Crest, Officer, Ms. Supple, Assistant Warden Major Thompson Sergeant Peguese · filed 1987-08-26

The statement contained in the Notice of Infraction was true, although it was incomplete. The notice resulted in a hearing which comported with due process. The writing of the notice, which omitted the exculpatory information, was not found to have done recklessly, willfully or maliciously. This omission, while it might support a state cause of action, does not support a finding of a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a due process claim based on prison officials’ mistakes or errors.

Johnnie F. Flournoy, Jr. v. Sgt. Earl Kelly and Ronald C. Marshall · filed 1988-02-18

Relief cannot be granted in a Sec. 1983 due process action predicated on prison officials' mistakes or errors.

Section 1983 does not support a public employee’s due process claim based on loss of employment when the employee resigns before discharge and offers no evidence that the employer would deny required procedures.

Miller v. State of Ill. · filed 1988-03-08

Miller can also press a claim under Section 1983 if defendants’ actions deprived him of property or liberty without due process of law. ... But Miller was not discharged after the meeting—he quit. Absent any showing Department would have ignored its regulations that clearly satisfy due process (and nothing of the sort is suggested here), Miller cannot now be heard to complain.

Section 1983 does not support a due process claim based on a prison official’s mere negligence in delaying release from disciplinary detention by at most one day.

McGinnis v. Woods · filed 1988-03-16

Upon review we conclude that the plaintiff failed to state cognizable claims under section 1983. Plaintiff's claim that his release from disciplinary detention was one day late at most alleges mere negligence on the part of prison officials and is therefore insufficient to invoke due process protection.

Section 1983 does not support a due process claim over postjudgment seizure of allegedly exempt property when the debtor had a meaningful opportunity to contest the seizure through an available judicial procedure but did not use it.

M. Le Ann Huxall v. First State Bank, Commerce, Oklahoma, a Banking Corporation · filed 1988-03-24

Unlike appellant, we do not interpret the district court’s order to impose a requirement that a § 1983 plaintiff must allege that no state judicial remedy exists. Rather, the court correctly concluded, as discussed below, that appellant was afforded sufficient due process to protect her property interest and that she failed to avail herself of the state judicial procedure. As a consequence, appellant is unable to state a viable claim of an unconstitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for police conduct that shocks the conscience even when the person affected is not in custody.

Dumond v. Conlee · filed 1988-04-06

Certainly law-abiding citizens, or suspects free on their own recognizance, may not be subjected to arbitrary police conduct which “shocks the conscience” without having a remedy under Section 1983.

Section 1983 supports a prisoner’s due process claim when a person acting under color of state law deprives the prisoner of a protected liberty interest without due process.

Parker v. Lane · filed 1988-05-19

To recover under Section 1983, Parker must show someone acting under color of state law deprived him of a protected liberty interest, without his receiving due process of law. At the threshold, then, Parker must establish he had a protected interest in remaining in the Honor Dormitory rather than the general population.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest for a due process claim based on termination of water service.

Coghlan v. Starkey · filed 1988-05-23

However, the failure to demonstrate a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected interest obviates the need to determine whether a section 1983 plaintiff was afforded due process of law.

A § 1983 due process claim for property damage requires evidence that officials did more than act negligently.

Robert L. Mitchell and Martha C. Mitchell v. Mills County, Iowa Mills County Board of Supervisors and Mills County Engin · filed 1988-05-26

Therefore, in order to establish their constitutional claim, the Mitchells were required to set forth specific facts showing that the damage to their property stemmed from something more than negligent road improvement by county officials. We think the District Court correctly concluded that the Mitchells failed to produce evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that county officials deliberately damaged their property.

Section 1983 does not support a due process claim based on an official’s merely negligent failure to warn of a risk to property.

Cole v. Finsel · filed 1988-06-20

Section 1983 authorizes a court to grant judicial relief when an individual’s federally protected rights are violated by a state or local official. ... Although one can certainly argue that he could have handled the situation more prudently, any failure on his part does not reflect the exploitation of government power that the Due Process clause seeks to condemn. Accordingly, the court finds a reasonable jury could at most conclude that Defendant Reinhardt’s conduct was negligent and, thus, will grant Defendant Reinhardt’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 1983 authorizes a claim that state officials violated due process rights in administering public benefits.

Moore v. Perales · filed 1988-06-29

Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code authorizes such ... a claim, and plaintiffs’ claim of violation of due process rights falls clearly within the purview of that statute.

Section 1983 permits a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim when officers’ grossly negligent or reckless pursuit and roadblock allegedly create an unreasonable risk of serious harm.

Reed v. County of Allegan · filed 1988-07-21

However, plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently states a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, since it alleges that the defendants deprived plaintiff of his liberty through grossly negligent or reckless conduct. Because I believe that, if supported by evidence, the allegations in the complaint could provide a basis for relief on this theory, the motion to dismiss will be denied for those claims.

Section 1983 due process claims require proof that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a fundamental right while acting under color of state law.

Russell v. City of Kansas City, Kan. · filed 1988-08-03

To state a due process claim under § 1983, plaintiff must prove two elements: first, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant deprived him of a fundamental right; second, he must prove that the defendant acted under color of state law.

A prisoner who pursues an administrative appeal waives a § 1983 procedural due process claim based on errors he did not raise in that appeal.

Santiago v. Ware · filed 1996-09-30

We conclude he has waived his right to pursue a § 1983 claim on the errors he did not raise in his administrative appeal before Danner.

Section 1983 is the vehicle for parents of children with disabilities to bring Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, and a court may read a pro se due process claim as invoking it.

Wenger Ex Rel. Wenger v. Canastota Central School District · filed 1997-04-14

The Court notes that while parents of children with disabilities are entitled to bring actions based on alleged violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, these actions must be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In the present case, Plaintiff failed to bring his due process claim pursuant to § 1983. However, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court reads Plaintiff's claim as if it included § 1983.

Section 1983 is the vehicle for parents of children with disabilities to bring Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, and a court may read a pro se due process claim as invoking it even when the pleading does not cite it.

Wenger v. Canastota Central School District · filed 1997-10-03

The Court notes that while parents of children with disabilities are entitled to bring actions based on alleged violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, these actions must be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In the present case, the Plaintiffs failed to bring their due process claim pursuant to § 1983. However, because the Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the Court reads the Plaintiffs' claim as if it includes § 1983.

A prisoner’s due process challenge to a disciplinary proceeding is not necessarily actionable under § 1983.

Ostrander v. Williams · filed 1999-11-17

Ostrander cannot bring his due process suit as a § 1983 action, and his allegations of retaliation were wholly conclusory.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim based on Ex parte Young to be raised alongside a Declaratory Judgment Act claim.

Pactiv Corp. v. Chester · filed 2006-09-28

Based on this precedent, I believe that the due process elements of Ex parte Young allow this issue to be raised under the Declaratory Judgment Act in conjunction with § 1983 as one type of due process claim.

Section 1983 allows a person to bring a federal procedural due process claim when a person acting under color of state authority deprives them of a protected interest without due process of law.

Phillips v. DeAngelis · filed 2008-08-12

A person may bring a procedural due process claim in federal court under § 1983 if deprived of a protected interest without due process of law by a person acting under color of state authority.

Section 1983 permits a procedural due process claim only when the state fails to provide an adequate remedy for the deprivation.

Reams v. Irvin · filed 2009-03-09

It is well-settled that a constitutional violation is actionable under § 1983 “only when the state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation.”

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for constitutional violations by state actors, but an adequate postdeprivation remedy defeats a procedural due process claim.

Gilbert v. North Carolina State Bar · filed 2009-03-20

Because these postdeprivation remedies adequately safeguard plaintiff’s right to procedural due process, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to state a procedural due process claim for which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows prisoners to pursue claims for deprivation of property rights even when prison rules prohibited them from possessing the property.

Dennis Sell and Edward Konder v. Robert F. Parratt, Warden, Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex · filed 1977-02-02

In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972), the Supreme Court rejected the idea that there is any distinction, as far as suits under § 1983 are concerned, between personal liberties and proprietary rights. ... As to the instant case, defendants say that the moneys taken from the plaintiffs were contraband, that plaintiffs’ possession of the funds was unlawful, and that they had no property rights in them. We reject that argument.

Section 1983 permits procedural due process claims against state actors for deprivation of a property interest without constitutionally adequate process.

Febus-Rodriguez v. QUESTELL-ALVARADO · filed 2009-10-02

In order “to establish a procedural due process claims under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a property interest by defendants acting under color of state law and without the availability of a constitutionally adequate process.” ... Thus considering the above-cited case law, and that adequate post-deprivation remedies were afforded to Plaintiffs, their procedural due process claims fail. ... Therefore, the career Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.

Section 1983 provides a separate action for alleged procedural due process violations in IDEA administrative proceedings, supported by appropriate factual allegations.

C.H. v. Cape Henlopen School District · filed 2010-05-25

Thus, any claim for deprivation of procedural due process in the state administrative proceedings cannot be redressed by the remedial provisions of the IDEA; the aggrieved party must file a separate § 1983 action in the District Court, supported by appropriate factual allegations.

Section 1983 does not support a stigma-plus or due process claim where the alleged statements were true and the plaintiff received notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Smith v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2011-07-18

Although Smith has not elaborated upon the nature of this claim in the Second Amended Complaint, and merely repeats this allegation in his opposition to the instant motion for summary judgment, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial under any colorable theory of liability under § 1983. ... Those very statements were found to be true in the First and Second Hearings and those findings were upheld in Article 75 proceedings. Accordingly, we find that Smith cannot successfully maintain a stigma-plus claim in this action. ... Accordingly, because Smith received all the process due to him — namely, notice and an opportunity to be heard on the charges against him — he cannot rebut defendants’ showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional-rights deprivations by persons acting under color of state law and requires sufficient facts to state a substantive due process claim.

Keitz v. Unnamed Sponsors of Cocaine Research Study · filed 2011-12-16

Hence, because the plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights were not implicated by the facts as alleged in the amended complaint, the amended complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights and requires due process claimants to show a protected interest and deficient process.

Whitmore v. Hill · filed 2012-01-10

An inmate pursuing § 1983 relief for the deprivation of due process must first establish that he was deprived of an interest protected by due process. See id. If the inmate can establish that, he must further show that the process afforded him was deficient. See id.

Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals acting under color of state law who violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Yanes v. Maricopa County · filed 2012-11-13

Thus, the issue in this ease is whether Yanes’ alleged due process right to be free from prosecution without probable cause constitutes a valid, actionable basis for his § 1983 claim. Based on Albright and the majority of federal court decisions interpreting Albright, we conclude as a matter of law that Yanes’ § 1983 substantive due process claim was not actionable.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a procedural due process claim to identify a protected life, liberty, or property interest and show that governmental action deprived the plaintiff of it.

Craig v. City of Yazoo City · filed 2013-10-28

“To bring a procedural due process claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must first identify a protected life, liberty or property interest and then prove that governmental action resulted in a deprivation of that interest.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff asserting a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim to show a protected interest was deprived under color of state law without adequate process.

Mines v. Barber · filed 2015-04-28

To successfully assert a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant deprived him of a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law; and (3) he was not provided with constitutionally adequate process to redress the harm.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional violations, but a substantive due process theory cannot be used when a more specific constitutional provision governs the conduct.

Miller v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2015-11-19

“However, “where a specific constitutional provision prohibits government action, plaintiffs seeking redress for that prohibited conduct in a § 1983 suit cannot make reference to the broad notion of substantive due process.” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 94 (2d Cir. 2005). “For a substantive due process claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, it must allege governmental conduct that ‘is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’” Id. at 93-94 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998)). ... All of the plaintiff’s substantive due process allegations are subsumed by allegations that the same conduct violated other, more specific, constitutional provisions, i.e., retaliation for protected speech and the equal protection clause.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by federal law.

Estate of Levinson v. Mucker · filed 2003-10-27

In order to show a 'prima facie case under § 1983, Plaintiff must prove that: (1) Defendants were “acting under the color of state law,” and (2) their conduct “deprive[d] [Plaintiff] of rights secured by federal law.” ... The Court agrees. Plaintiff does not have a substantive due process claim for the unfair termination of Levinson’s job. ... Plaintiffs claims under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment are dismissed.

Section 1983 remains available for procedural challenges seeking damages when success would not necessarily invalidate the underlying disciplinary deprivation.

Cox v. Clark · filed 2009-04-08

“Wolff makes clear that § 1983 remains available to procedural challenges where success in the action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier relief for the prisoner.”

Section 1983 permits a substantive due process claim to proceed without first pursuing an available state law remedy.

Town of Beech Mountain v. Genesis Wildlife Sanctuary · filed 2016-05-10

Accordingly, we hold Genesis’ substantive due process claim is not barred by Genesis’ ability to bring an inverse condemnation action.

A § 1983 procedural due process claim concerning seized property is not ripe until the plaintiff has pursued available state procedures and the state has denied due process.

Pinder v. Mitchell · filed 2016-11-29

It is that denial that forms the prerequisite for a § 1983 challenge, and that necessarily requires the plaintiff to explore what state-level process is available.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for a constitutional violation committed under color of state law.

Secondo v. Campbell · filed 2009-04-08

We analyze a § 1983 excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.

A Section 1983 excessive-force claim considers the need for force, the relation between that need and the force used, the injury, and whether force was used in good faith or maliciously to cause harm.

Phipps v. Calvin Edwards, Larry Cox, J.W. Nevins, R. Finch, W. Westley · filed 1988-02-04

The correct standard for determining whether the alleged beatings violated plaintiff's constitutional rights and are actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is set out in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). The Johnson criteria include: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of injury inflicted; and (4) whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.

Excessive force is actionable under Section 1983 when it causes severe injury, is grossly disproportionate to the need, and is malicious enough to shock the conscience.

Raley v. Thomas Fraser and Gary Trupe · filed 1984-11-26

If the state officer’s action caused severe injuries, was grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances, and was inspired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience, it should be redressed under Section 1983.

In a Section 1983 excessive-force action, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the officer used excessive force during the arrest.

Wing v. George Britton and the City of Springdale, Arkansas · filed 1984-11-26

In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant, while acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Thus, in a case where the alleged deprivation is the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant used excessive force while arresting him.

Section 1983 provides a constitutional remedy against police force that is excessive, conscience-shocking, or malicious rather than reasonably necessary and applied in good faith.

Brudney v. Ematrudo · filed 1976-06-21

It is now settled law that the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, neither permits police brutality nor allows police conduct which “shocks the conscience.” ... In determining whether a police officer in a physical confrontation with a citizen has crossed the constitutional line, a court must weigh such factors as “the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” ... Applying these standards to the instant case, it is the Court’s opinion that the defendant’s conduct did not offend the constitutional rights of the plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits damages against officers acting under color of state law when their use of force deprives a person of constitutional rights.

Smith v. Jones · filed 1973-10-04

The initial question raised by the defendants is whether or not the defendants’ conduct took place “under col- or of law” as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is obvious that the defendant policemen were acting under color of law at the time of the incident in question. ... If defendants deprived the deceased of his life without the constitutionally required due process of law, then plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The court holds that the defendant officers violated none of the rights of the deceased under either federal or state law. This suit is hereby dismissed in its entirety.

Section 1983 permits damages against a police officer for excessive force used in making an arrest.

Clark v. Ziedonis · filed 1973-10-29

His victims claim that excessive force was used in connection with the arrest and seek damages under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The liability issue turns upon the question of justification for his use of deadly force. ... I conclude that the defendant’s second shot, which was aimed directly at the suspects, was clearly unreasonable and unjustified. ... I conclude that this shooting constituted the use of unreasonable force under the circumstances.

Section 1983 provides a claim when a state or local law-enforcement official causes a person’s death through an illegal use of force.

Phillips v. Ward · filed 1976-05-18

Deprivation of life by a state or local law enforcement official clearly constitutes a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if the deprivation of life results from an illegal use of force by the law officer.

Section 1983 permits a private citizen to recover damages for an arrest carried out with excessive force, but no recovery lies when the force used is reasonable and not excessive.

Hausman v. Tredinnick · filed 1977-04-20

The plaintiff as a private citizen is entitled to recovery of damages where an arrest is effected through the use of excessive force. ... The force used by Trooper Fiorenza when Barry Lee Hausman turned upon him was not excessive, as defined in cases interpreting § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. ... The force used by Trooper Fiorenza was reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. ... The degree of force exercised by Trooper Fiorenza was reasonable and was not excessive under the circumstances. ... The plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory rights were not violated and he is not entitled to the recovery of damages.

Section 1983 allows civil liability for state-law enforcement officers who act under color of state law and use excessive force or otherwise deprive a person of constitutional rights.

Bellows v. Dennis Dainack and Brian Van Houten · filed 1977-05-16

It is well-established that local law enforcement officers who act under color of state law and who use excessive force in the enforcement of state laws are subject to civil liability under § 1983 when their actions deprive persons of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... Where, as here, the plaintiff alleges an illegal arrest and detention, the guarantee of “liberty” under the Due Process Clause is clearly involved.

Section 1983 makes the use of excessive or unreasonable force by a police officer in the exercise of his authority actionable.

Durkin v. Bristol Township · filed 1980-12-10

The use of excessive or unreasonable force by a police officer in the exercise of his authority is actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit officers to rely on reasonable-force or good-faith defenses based on a prisoner's pre-surrender conduct when the claim concerns beating a prisoner who has quietly submitted.

Feemster v. Tony Dehntjer, Ted Brand, Don Cooksey · filed 1981-10-07

Count I of the amended complaint, which pleaded both these theories, was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The instructions are in general a correct statement of the law, but in this case they were inapposite, because they could properly apply only to the claim (later abandoned) based on defendants’ pre-surrender conduct. ... There is no occasion for the use of any force against a prisoner who quietly submits. “Reasonable force” and “good faith” might still have been relevant on the counterclaim, but the instructions were not so limited. As given, the instruction left it open to the jury to return a verdict for defendants because of plaintiff’s provocative presurrender conduct. ... No matter how difficult it is to apprehend a prisoner, the law does not permit officers to beat him once he is securely in custody. They may use force to subdue him if necessary, but they may not avenge themselves for his pre-surrender conduct by punishing him bodily after he has submitted.

Police force becomes actionable under § 1983 substantive due process when it abuses official power under factors including the need for force, the injury, and the officer's motive.

Damm v. Sparkman · filed 1985-05-22

Therefore, in determining when use of excessive force by a peace officer rises to a constitutional violation cognizable under § 1983, this Court is guided by the principle that abuse of official power is the fundamental standard governing denial of substantive due process rights, and by the general guidelines enunciated in the relevant factors test.

A prisoner states an actionable § 1983 excessive-force claim by alleging force grossly disproportionate to the need, including repeated stomping while fully restrained.

Harrison v. Don Byrd, Sheriff · filed 1985-07-15

These allegations are sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the force used against Harrison was grossly disproportionate so as to constitute an actionable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Force is actionable under § 1983 when it exceeds what is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances.

Hodgin v. Agents of Montgomery County · filed 1985-10-21

Use of force is, however, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it exceeds “that which is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances.”

Tight handcuffs causing only bruised wrists use too little force to support an excessive-force claim under § 1983.

Elrich v. Wright · filed 1987-09-16

The excessive force complained of by the plaintiffs during the arrest was that the handcuffs were tight and bruised Elrich's wrists. The amount of force used was insufficient to rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 excessive-force liability has a higher threshold than ordinary tort liability and requires force that exceeds official privilege under the circumstances.

Justice v. John W. Dennis, Individually and in His Official Capacity as North Carolina State Highway Patrolman · filed 1987-11-25

While liability may be assessed under section 1983 when the limits of privileged force are exceeded, the threshold for that liability must be higher than that set for a normal tort action.

A § 1983 excessive-force claim arising from an arrest is governed by Fourth Amendment reasonableness rather than a substantive-due-process shocks-the-conscience test.

Blaska v. Fuentes · filed 1988-01-06

the issue was whether there had been an "unreasonable" seizure of the sort prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

Intentionally placing a police vehicle so close in a fleeing motorcyclist's path that collision and serious injury are immediate can constitute unreasonable force under § 1983.

Kuhar v. Hanton · filed 1988-01-08

Here, the officer's movement of his vehicle in the path of plaintiff when he was so close as to create an immediate collision and significant injury, if proven, could be found against the backdrop of the totality of the circumstances to constitute unreasonable force in the attempt to apprehend this plaintiff.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant intentionally caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Keaton v. Goeglein · filed 2014-09-17

There was no designated evidence presented to the trial court to establish an intentional deprivation of Keaton’s right to be free from arrest without probable cause.

Section 1983 requires no particular state of mind for liability, although the plaintiff must show action under color of state law and deprivation of a federally protected right.

Haygood v. Younger · filed 1981-11-30

I conclude that the statute requires no particular state of mind on the defendants' part in order for liability to be imposed.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a person who, under color of state law, causes a constitutional deprivation through an affirmative act or a legally required omission, including by setting in motion acts the person knows or reasonably should know will cause the injury.

Johnson v. Duffy · filed 1978-12-27

A person "subjects" another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made. (Sims v. Adams (5th Cir. 1976) 537 F.2d 829.) Moreover, personal participation is not the only predicate for section 1983 liability. Anyone who "causes" any citizen to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation is also liable. The requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. (Cf. Beverly v. Morris (5th Cir. 1972)470 F.2d 1356.)

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional torts only when the defendant’s violation is intentional, malicious, or reckless, rather than merely negligent.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. City of Evanston · filed 1980-09-30

Our research indicates that, in cases of this type under section 1983, the mere proof of a violation of one party’s constitutional due process rights by another party does not automatically entitle the former to a remedy as against the latter. ... Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant has violated his rights in a malicious or reckless manner. This is true when the defendant is a municipal corporation as well as in any other case. ... We therefore hold that Krishna has failed to meet its burden of proof under a section 1983 action in failing to prove any intentional, malicious, or reckless conduct by Evanston when it circumvented Krishna’s procedural due process rights.

Section 1983 requires proof of an intent or purpose to discriminate for impermissible reasons; disparate impact alone is insufficient.

Jeanne McGlory WALLACE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants · filed 1981-08-31

Once again, it must be pointed out that the Title VII standard of disparate impact will not satisfy the necessity under Section 1983 of proving an intent or purpose to discriminate for impermissible reasons.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s constitutional deprivation.

Sadiqq v. Bramlett · filed 1983-03-04

It is also necessary, however, that a defendant’s actions be a cause of the plaintiff’s constitutional deprivation.

A civil § 1983 claim does not require specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Kidd v. Robert O'Neil Mike Lomonaco Fairfax County Police Dept. · filed 1985-09-23

This state-of-mind requirement ... has long since been rejected by the Supreme Court as being inapplicable to civil actions under § 1983.

Alleging gross negligence is insufficient for § 1983; the pleaded facts must show outrageous conduct or an arbitrary use of government power.

Jones v. Sherrill · filed 1987-09-02

The facts alleged in support of the legal conclusion of gross negligence must be sufficient to charge the government officials with outrageous conduct or arbitrary use of government power.

Section 1983 requires proof that each defendant personally caused the deprivation through intentional conduct; a defendant’s knowledge or constructive knowledge of another’s discriminatory motive does not suffice.

Bruce Wilson D/B/A the Rink II v. Ken Cross, Eddie Hightower, Donnie Smith, Jim Tanner, Robert McClaim Bobby Foiles, and · filed 1988-04-20

It is now axiomatic that vicarious liability has no place in § 1983 lawsuits. Only the person who caused the deprivation can be held liable. ... Further, the constitutional tortfeasor must have acted intentionally because negligence is not actionable under § 1983. ... Individualized motives are critical, not irrelevant. Wilson’s “knew or should have known” approach amounts to nothing more than a negligence standard. The instruction was a correct statement of the law.

Section 1983 requires an intentional act but does not require a specific intent to deprive someone of a federal right.

Donald v. Wilson · filed 1988-05-16

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), it has been clear that section 1983 does not require a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right: ... The magistrate and the defendants confused the requirement of Wilson v. Beebe that there be an intentional act with a requirement that there be a specific intent to deprive one of a federally protected right. The two concepts are completely different.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim for intentional psychiatric commitment even if the alleged due process violation resulted from negligence; the commitment itself need only have been intentional.

Demarco v. Sadiker · filed 1995-05-22

From this analysis, it follows that where, as here, a plaintiff alleges that he was intentionally committed to a mental hospital without the requisite finding of dangerousness and/or without his actually being dangerous, he has sufficiently plead the mens rea requirement of a § 1983 cause of action based upon a due process violation, even if the alleged due process violation could be construed as having occurred as the result of mere negligence.