42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits recovery for a violation of state law only when the same conduct also violates a federal constitutional or statutory right.

Wilson v. City of Chicago · filed 1989-02-24

Unless the actions alleged to violate state law also abridge a federal constitutional or statutory right, a person cannot recover for violations of state law under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights secured by federal law, but not for violations of rights secured solely by state law.

Harris v. Paul Davis, Warden, Baltimore City Jail Charles Fredericks, Records Supervisor, City Jail · filed 1989-03-02

Section 1983 of Title 42, U.S.C., provides a remedy for violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States; the statute does not provide redress for the deprivation of rights secured solely under state law.

A violation of state law alone is not actionable under § 1983.

MYERS v. SCOTT COUNTY · filed 1989-03-03

As the District Court carefully explained, the theory of substantive due process is properly reserved for truly egregious and extraordinary cases, and violations of state law, in and of themselves, are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

Queen Anne Courts v. City of Lakeville · filed 1989-06-08

However, “the theory of substantive due process is properly reserved for truly egregious and extraordinary cases, and violations of state law, in and of themselves, are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Myers v. Morris, 868 F.2d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir.1989); see also Weimer, 870 F.2d at 1406 (something more than violation of state law must be claimed to establish substantive due process violation).

State tort claims legislation cannot immunize a defendant from § 1983 liability for violations of federally protected rights.

Pruticka v. Posner · filed 1989-06-09

To the extent that § 1983 and the New Jersey Tort Claims Act conflict, the latter must obviously yield to the former under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const, art. VI.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff alleging a due process deprivation in federal court to comply with Nevada’s medical malpractice screening statute.

Gordon v. Higgs · filed 1989-06-16

Accordingly, the Court holds that NRS § 41A.016 is inapplicable in a § 1983 action brought in a federal court to redress a deprivation of due process.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for due process violations, so a state rule requiring retroactive application of amendments to state statutory remedies does not govern that remedy.

Johnson v. The Southwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center · filed 1989-08-03

Although the property interest in public employment is created by state law, neither the right to due process nor the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remedy for violation of that right is a creature of state law; therefore, the principle of Mississippi law that amendments to statutory remedies must be applied retroactively is simply inapposite in this case.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim based on a violation of a state Double Jeopardy Clause.

Robeson Defense Committee v. Britt · filed 1989-09-29

Plaintiffs even alleged that the prosecution violated the state Double Jeopardy Clause, which cannot be asserted in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for violations of state law alone.

Boyd v. Angarone · filed 1990-01-09

And violations of state law do not give rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State agencies are absolutely immune from liability under Section 1983.

Donaldson v. Illinois State Board of Education · filed 1990-02-15

The Illinois State Board of Education is an agency of the state and is therefore absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on violation of a state regulation.

Smith v. Maloney · filed 1990-04-23

The reach of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 with respect to claims based solely upon violation of statutes and regulations extends only to the violation of federal enactments, not state regulations.

State agencies are absolutely immune from suits for damages under Section 1983.

Deans v. Kent County Jail · filed 1990-05-09

Generally, state agencies are absolutely immune from suit for damages under Sec. 1983.

State-law immunity for child-abuse reports does not bar a Section 1983 claim, even when the claim is brought in state court.

Cudlin v. Cudlin · filed 1990-06-11

The immunity provided by the child abuse reporting statute does not control Cudlin's section 1983 claim, even though the federal cause of action of is asserted in a state court.

Section 1983 does not turn a state law tort claim into a federal rights claim merely because public officials are involved.

Giannini v. Manuel L. Real A. Wallace Tashima · filed 1990-08-16

However, merely because public officials are involved, Giannini’s state law tort claims are not transmuted into claims of deprivation of federal constitutional rights.

Section 1983 liability for failure to protect from harm requires a violation of federal constitutional or statutory law; a state-law duty alone is insufficient.

P.C. · filed 1990-09-06

Obligations imposed by Vermont law are not relevant because liability for failure to protect from harm under Sec. 1983 must be based on a violation of federal constitutional or statutory law, not state law.

A state is immune from a § 1983 suit seeking monetary damages in connection with its criminal prosecution.

Gallagher v. State of Ohio · filed 1990-10-03

The district court concluded, in a well-reasoned decision, that the State of Ohio was immune from suit in this context and that Gallagher had not suffered a constitutionally cognizable deprivation. We agree.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim that state administrative regulations were improperly promulgated or are inconsistent with state law.

Sanders v. Perry M. Johnson, Robert Brown, Jr., Marjorie Van Ochten · filed 1990-11-26

The question of whether the administrative regulations challenged by Sanders are consistent with and properly promulgated under Michigan law is a state, rather than a federal question and is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A plaintiff may not recover under both § 1983 and state tort law when both claims are based on the same facts.

Rodriguez v. City of New York · filed 1990-12-06

In the instant case, even were Rodriguez to have met the Monell requirement for bringing the Federal civil rights claim, he is nevertheless barred from recovering on this claim because a plaintiff may not recover under both 42 USC § 1983 and State tort law, if both claims are based on the same facts.

Section 1983 provides a claim for violations of the federal Constitution or federal statutes by officials acting under color of state law, but does not provide a claim for violations of state statutes alone.

Carey Ex Rel. Carey v. Maine School Administrative District 17 · filed 1990-12-18

Section 1983 claims are valid only against officials who, acting under color of state law, violate either the United States Constitution or a federal statute.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of a state statute alone.

Brown v. Grabowski · filed 1990-12-31

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state statutes, and, as the district court observed, a state statute cannot, in and of itself, create a constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state rules alone.

Jackson v. Hanlon · filed 1991-01-14

That the procedures may have violated state law is irrelevant; Sec. 1983 is not a vehicle for enforcing state rules.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of state law alone; the claim must rest on a federal statutory or constitutional right.

Brown v. Grabowski · filed 1991-01-29

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state statutes, and, as the district court observed, a state statute cannot, in and of itself, create a constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not allow a school district to assert a state-law sovereign immunity defense when it is subject to suit in state court and the defense would be unavailable in federal court.

Doohan v. Bigfork School District No. 38 · filed 1991-02-05

Moreover, a state law defense of sovereign immunity under § 2-9-111, MCA, is not available in a § 1983 suit where a defendant school board is otherwise subject to suit in a state court and where such a defense would not be available had the action been brought in a federal forum.

Section 1983 does not subject a state or its agency to suit unless the state waives its immunity or Congress expressly overrides it.

Weaver v. University of Cincinnati · filed 1991-03-05

Unless a state waives its immunity or Congress explicitly overrides such immunity, a state or one of its agencies or departments is not subject to an action brought pursuant to Section 1983.

State statutory immunity does not shield individuals from liability under § 1983.

J & a REALTY v. City of Asbury Park · filed 1991-04-18

State statutory immunity does not immunize individuals from liability in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state immunity defense cannot bar a § 1983 action in state court if that defense would be unavailable in federal court.

S.M. v. R.B. · filed 1991-05-23

We note that Howlett v. Rose (1990),_U.S._, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332, is a case in which the United States Supreme Court concluded that a state immunity defense was not available in a § 1983 action brought in a state court, when such a defense would not be available if the action were brought in a federal court. Howlett precludes any implication on our part that the District Court properly dismissed § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action solely for a violation of state law or breach of a common-law duty.

Losinski v. County of Trempealeau · filed 1991-10-24

Even if state or common law creates such a duty, plaintiffs’ argument that this gives rise to a section 1983 cause of action is mistaken.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of state statutory schemes unless the violation is constitutional.

Cowger v. State · filed 1991-10-28

The violation of statutory schemes argument has been addressed above and even if there were a violation it would not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action unless the violation were constitutional.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action solely for violations of state law.

Losinski v. County Of Trempealeau · filed 1992-01-09

Even if state or common law creates such a duty, plaintiffs' argument that this gives rise to a section 1983 cause of action is mistaken. An en banc opinion of this circuit, Archie v. Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065, 109 S.Ct. 1338, 103 L.Ed.2d 809 (1989), foreclosed section 1983 claims for violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violating a state statute that imposes purely discretionary duties.

Ward v. Thomas Minick Erwin Henes · filed 1992-02-13

Violations of state law do not give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the state statute demands purely discretionary duties.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for violations of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, not state constitutions or statutes.

Mason v. Will Tom Wathen · filed 1992-03-12

Moreover, the alleged violations of Kentucky's Constitution and statutes are not cognizable under § 1983, which creates a cause of action only for violations of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

Buchanan v. Jack R. Duckworth, Warden and John Doe · filed 1992-03-19

A violation of state law (even if Reformatory "rules" could legitimately be described in this manner) does not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide an action to compel a state to comply with its own laws.

Lake v. State Bd. of Elections of North Carolina · filed 1992-03-31

Laying aside the point that “irregularity” in this context inevitably implies “illegality,” it is settled that a § 1983 action does not lie to force a state to comply with its own laws.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for violations of state law alone.

Burke v. Sheboygan County Human Services · filed 1992-04-20

However, it is not the role of this federal court under § 1983 to remedy violations of state law, cf Davis, 493 F.Supp. at 120 n. 5 (even the fact that the defendants could be shown to have violated state law, without more, would not give rise to liability under § 1983).

Section 1983 does not override Eleventh Amendment immunity for a state or a state official sued in an official capacity.

Bruner v. Rasmussen · filed 1992-06-11

Further, the United States Supreme Court has held that 42 U.S.C. section 1983 does not provide a congressional override to the Eleventh Amendment and therefore, a state or an official of the state acting in his official capacity is not subject to suit under Section 1983.

A violation of state law alone does not give rise to a cause of action under § 1983.

Fann v. Brailey · filed 1992-07-02

We are convinced, however, that, while the violation of state law might establish a state cause of action, it does not give rise to a federal cause of action under § 1983.

State agencies, including state correctional centers, are immune from suit under § 1983 as appendages of the State.

Meadows v. Huttonsville Correctional Center · filed 1992-07-07

The same principle applies to suits brought against “appendages” of the State, such as state agencies.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for an alleged violation of state law alone.

Elkin v. William H. Fauver, E. Calvin Neubert, Donald Mee, Jr. · filed 1992-08-07

An alleged violation of state law, however, does not state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not create a cause of action from a false arrest or imprisonment merely because it violates state law; the claim must rest on a federal constitutional violation.

Cramblit v. Fikse · filed 1992-10-23

While it is true that a false arrest or imprisonment may be the basis for a claim under § 1983 for violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the fact that there has been such a state law violation does not, ipso facto, create such a cause of action under § 1983.

State tort immunity cannot bar a § 1983 claim because federal law controls.

Anderson v. Village of Forest Park · filed 1992-10-28

We hold that the Tort Immunity Act does not apply to plaintiff’s section 1983 claims because of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 claims against state employees are not barred by state law defenses governing state law claims against those employees.

Johnson v. Wilkinson · filed 1992-12-23

However, appellant’s Section 1983 claims are not subject to state law defenses.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a state official’s violation of state law alone; it addresses violations of federal law.

Sanders v. D.F. Kelly · filed 1993-02-23

Whether state officials violated state law does not present an actionable claim under section 1983, which addresses violations of federal law.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law alone.

Swoboda v. Dubach · filed 1993-05-04

Similarly, Swoboda's claim that defendants violated various state laws during his incarceration at Doniphan County jail does not present a claim of constitutional dimension such that it supports a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law alone; it redresses violations of federal law committed under color of state law.

Hellebust v. Brownback · filed 1993-05-07

The Defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims that the method of election violates the Kansas state constitution is granted because this court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether the Board’s method of election violates state law. ... Therefore, the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 1983 claim for violation of state law is granted.

Section 1983 does not provide federal relief for state officials’ errors in interpreting state law.

Burgess v. Ryan · filed 1993-06-14

Yet it is not appropriate for a federal court, hearing a case under § 1983, to upbraid state officials for a supposed error of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a state official’s mere error in interpreting state law.

Burgess v. Ryan · filed 1993-07-14

Yet it is not appropriate for a federal court, hearing a case under § 1983, to upbraid state officials for a supposed error of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for governmental conduct that violates only state law.

Hill v. City of Harvey · filed 1993-07-16

We agree with the district court that Hill has not stated a claim cognizable under § 1983. As we have previously held, § 1983 does not provide a remedy for all governmental abuses of power; it protects only against violations of federal constitutional rights.

Immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act does not shield public entities or law enforcement personnel from liability under § 1983.

Tice v. Cramer · filed 1993-07-28

We emphasize only that whatever the immunity conferred by the Act, public entities and law enforcement personnel should understand that federal liability under section 1983 may exist, even if inconsistent with the Act, and if it does, the Act provides no immunity from the federal claim.

State-law sovereign immunity does not bar claims under § 1983 against public school teachers or a municipal school board.

BMH BY CB v. School Bd. · filed 1993-09-23

Therefore, the Court finds no support for the assertion that the Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are barred by any state-based sovereign immunity that might apply under these circumstances. The Defendants' motion, on that basis, is thus DENIED.

Immunity from § 1983 liability is governed by federal law, so state-law sovereign immunity does not bar claims against public-school teachers or municipal school boards.

B.M.H. v. School Board of Chesapeake · filed 1993-09-23

Therefore, the Court finds no support for the assertion that the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are barred by any state-based sovereign immunity that might apply under these circumstances. The Defendants’ motion, on that basis, is thus DENIED.

State law immunity under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act does not immunize defendants from § 1983 liability.

Edwin C. Tiemann and Maudie Joyce Tiemann v. Tul-Center, Inc., Downtown Tulsa Unlimited, James G. Norton, and City of Tu · filed 1994-03-03

We hold that the district court erred in concluding that the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act immunizes defendants from § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights, but violations of state law alone do not suffice.

Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Authority · filed 1994-03-14

Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the constitution and laws of the United States, not for violations arising solely out of state or common-law principles.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law; violations of state law or policy alone are not cognizable.

Abdul-Mateen v. Robert Moton, Case Manager at State Prison of Southern Michigan Brian Watson, Assistant Deputy · filed 1994-03-22

We also affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the alleged violation of Abdul-Mateen's rights under Michigan law and policy because these claims are not cognizable under Sec. 1983. To state a viable Sec. 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

A state department of corrections is immune from a § 1983 suit seeking monetary damages.

Sexton v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation/correction · filed 1994-03-29

The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction is immune from liability.

Section 1983 claims for deprivation of a constitutional liberty interest cannot be limited by a state defamation-law privilege.

Palmer v. City of Monticello and Kent Adair, Individually and as Chief of Police · filed 1994-06-30

We are persuaded that the trial judge was correct in holding that a state libel and slander law privilege may not limit a cause of action for deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a mere violation of state law; the plaintiff must show deprivation of a federal right.

Conley v. K.F. Williams · filed 1994-07-05

While the states are, of course, free to enact laws that are more protective of individual rights than the United States Constitution, a mere violation of such a state law will not establish a proper claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages suits against a state or a judge for judicial acts performed in sentencing.

Johnnie Cooper, Jr., AKA Bobby Smith v. State of Washington Daniel Kershner · filed 1994-07-06

Neither the State of Washington nor Judge Kershner, the named defendants, may be sued under Sec. 1983 for damages because the state is not a person liable to suit under Sec. 1983, and the judge's actions in sentencing Cooper are within the scope of his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state or municipal law alone.

Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1994-08-25

Violations of state law, standing alone, are not actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federal right; violation of a state law that provides greater protection than federal law alone does not support a claim.

Torrey v. City of Tukwila · filed 1994-09-19

Accordingly, Torrey and Dewberry’s claim is based on a claimed violation of a state law which exceeds federal protection, and cannot serve as the basis for a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a violation of federal law; a violation of state law alone does not support a claim.

Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan · filed 1994-10-14

In a suit under § 1983, the plaintiff must show a violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, not just a violation of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim based solely on a violation of state law, and violating a statutory or administrative provision alone does not defeat qualified immunity for an official sued for a constitutional violation.

Brown v. Crispus C. Nix John Henry John Emmet Paul Hedgepath Charles Harper Paul Grossheim Hal Farrier · filed 1994-10-18

Brown may not base his section 1983 claim on a violation of the state statute and officials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a state-law violation only when that violation deprives someone of a federal constitutional right.

Manse Sullivan Carney Sherron v. Steve Cambra Jack R. Reagan Sharon McLeod Pat Galvez J. Roberts E. Shepeard and H.C. Lo · filed 1994-12-27

Here, even if we assume that there has been a violation of state law, we have previously determined that Sullivan and Sherron do not have a constitutional right to their prison jobs. Hence, under these circumstances the alleged state law violations could not have deprived either Sullivan or Sherron of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state law, even when a state constitution incorporates a federal constitutional provision.

April Love v. Robert G. Pepersack, Sr. Merrill A. Messick, Jr. Ernest Eldon Pletcher Elmer Hunt Tippett, Jr. State of Ma · filed 1995-02-03

It may well "apply" to Maryland in this manner, but, if it does, it is only as a matter of state law, and violations of state law are not cognizable under § 1983.

Immunity under the Kansas Tort Claims Act does not shield defendants from liability under § 1983.

Reidenbach v. U.S.D. 437 · filed 1995-02-10

The law is clear that immunity provided by the Kansas Tort Claims Act does not insulate the defendants from liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a constitutional claim based solely on a state official’s violation of state law.

Hipes v. Braxton · filed 1995-03-07

Violations of state law by state officials do not provide basis for constitutional claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law by state actors.

Vincent v. West Texas State University · filed 1995-03-14

The only references to constitutional infringement concerned article 1, §§ 3a and 8 of the Texas Constitution, and a § 1983 suit cannot be founded upon violation of state law by state actors.

State statutory immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against a municipality because federal law controls the available defenses.

Jaeger v. Dubuque County · filed 1995-03-18

The court concludes that, although the decisions above generally involved state common-low immunities, Iowa’s statutory immunity can fare no better, because federal law, not state law whether statutory or common, is controlling as to federal claims brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a violation of state law alone actionable.

Weir v. Nix · filed 1995-05-25

In any event, a violation of state law, without more, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a right created and recognized only under state law.

Harrill v. Blount County · filed 1995-05-31

The violation of a right created and recognized only under state law is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability only for violations of federal rights; an alleged violation of state law alone does not support a claim.

Willie D. White, Jr. v. Rick Olig, James M. Gilmore, and Fond Du Lac County, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1995-06-06

It is therefore a truism, reiterated many times by this court, that mere allegations of state law infraction are insufficient to support a Section 1983 claim.

A § 1983 action naming only a state corrections department and state prison is barred by state immunity.

Lucas v. Department of Corrections California Men's Colony-West · filed 1995-09-20

Appellees correctly note on appeal that Lucas failed to name individual defendants in his complaint, and that his action, as currently written, is barred by state immunity.

State law cannot immunize a defendant from liability under § 1983.

Purisch v. Tennessee Technological University · filed 1996-03-01

First, state law cannot immunize Volpe from section 1983 liability.

A violation of state law alone will not support a § 1983 claim; the plaintiff must allege facts showing a violation of federal law.

Cotner v. Fugate · filed 1996-07-29

Assuming without deciding that the seizure of some of the property was unlawful under Oklahoma law, we conclude this violation of state law alone will not support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not remedy claims based on a state constitution or state-law assault.

Bookman v. Shubzda · filed 1996-11-21

... Bookman’s claim based on the Texas Constitution is not remediable pursuant to § 1983. Assuming arguendo that Bookman alleges a state-law assault claim, this too is a pendent claim within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction, but is not remediable through a § 1983 action.

State tort claims immunity does not shield a county or its employees from liability under § 1983.

Sage v. Williams · filed 1997-03-07

Federal civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not subject to the state law limitations of the Kansas Tort Claims Act, and thus the immunity granted by K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 75-6104(f) is not available to the County and its employees.

Section 1983 does not redress state-law claims of constructive fraud or breach of an implied contract.

Faust v. Al C. Parke · filed 1997-05-22

Faust's state law claims of constructive fraud and breach of an "implied contract by parol evidence" are not redressable under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims are not limited or barred by a state immunity statute.

Lestrange v. Kontout, No. Cv94 04 69 29s (Nov. 4, 1997) · filed 1997-11-04

Also, the immunity claim does not apply to the § 1983 action set forth in the fifth count. A state immunity statute does not limit or preclude the operation or reach of the federal civil rights statute.

Delaware’s Municipal Tort Claims Act does not shield municipal defendants from liability on § 1983 claims.

Dale v. Town of Elsmere · filed 1997-11-21

Initially, we note that the Municipal Tort Claims Act does not shield the Town Defendants from liability for claims brought under § 1983.

A state statute immunizing discretionary acts does not shield political subdivisions from § 1983 claims alleging federal constitutional deprivations.

DeBari v. TOWN OF MIDDLETON, NY · filed 1998-05-22

Section 25(5) provides immunity to political subdivisions for discretionary actions. The present § 1983 action, however, alleges a deprivation of rights secured by the federal Constitution. Fidelity to the Constitution is not a discretionary action; it is mandatory. ... As such, § 25(5) provides no immunity to defendants in the case sub judice.

State-law immunity cannot shield a state actor from liability under Section 1983.

Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos · filed 1998-06-29

A state-conferred immunity cannot shield a state actor from liability under section 1983.

State officers may face liability under § 1983 despite claims of absolute immunity.

Scheuer v. Rhodes · filed 1974-04-17

It can hardly be argued, at this late date, that under no circumstances can the officers of state government be subject to liability under this statute.

A state agency is immune from a § 1983 suit unless the state consents to the suit.

Daley v. Hoyt · filed 1998-10-20

Since Plaintiffs have not pleaded that the State has consented to suit—and Defendant asserts that it has not—DPS must be DISMISSED from this action, as that agency enjoys sovereign immunity from suit and any action against it is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 claims against a state agency and officials in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity absent a valid waiver; officials sued individually may have qualified immunity.

Shearer v. Leuenberger · filed 1999-04-02

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Shearer’s § 1983 action is completely barred by the sovereign immunity of DSS and the appellees in their official capacities and the qualified immunity of the appellees in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a land use dispute that alleges only a violation of state zoning law.

Corder v. City of Sherwood · filed 1984-02-22

The claims in the present case are classic assertions under Arkansas land use and zoning law, and the Court cannot say that the complaint, viewed realistically, states a claim for relief under § 1983.

State-law immunity cannot shield defendants from liability under Section 1983 for violating federal rights.

Hedges Ex Rel. C.D. v. Musco · filed 2000-02-22

The District Court, therefore, erred in holding that the school officials were immunized from plaintiffs' federal claims by the New Jersey statute.

Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Section 1983 suits against state agencies.

Eddins v. Excelsior Independent School Dist. · filed 2000-03-15

Upon conducting a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s report and plaintiffs’ objections, the court concludes that the magistrate judge correctly determined that Eleventh Amendment immunity absolutely bars suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state agency, Texas Education Agency.

Section 1983 does not apply to a claim seeking state officials’ compliance with state law when references to constitutional rights describe only the consequences of noncompliance.

McGehee v. Nix · filed 1984-03-07

The laws that create the cause of action in this case are two Louisiana state laws: R.S. 17:1997 and R.S. 23:981 et seq. References to constitutional amendments do not create federal jurisdiction in this case. ... The court now concludes that this is not a case arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make every state-law tort actionable merely because a state actor committed it.

Bisignano v. Harrison Central School District · filed 2000-09-11

Not every state law tort becomes an actionable constitutional tort under section 1983 simply because it was committed by a state actor.

Section 1983 claims against a state are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Rudolph v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc. · filed 2001-07-31

Plaintiffs Rule 14(a) Complaint alleges that Tropicana’s state-mandated EE-BOP caused the alleged violations of Plaintiffs rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I), § 1983 (Count II), the NJLAD (Count III), and the New Jersey Constitution (Count TV). ... I shall grant the State Defendants’ unopposed motion to dismiss all claims against the State of New Jersey on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Kansas Tort Claims Act damages caps do not limit recovery in a § 1983 action.

Beach v. City of Olathe, Kan. · filed 2002-02-01

More importantly, judges of the District of Kansas have already expressly rejected the use of the Kansas Tort Claims Act to limit damages in a section 1983 action. ... Accordingly, the court denies summary judgment to defendants on their request to apply the Kansas Tort Claims Act damages caps to plaintiffs claims.

Section 1983 allows claims against state officers in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief and in their individual capacities for money damages.

Mercer v. Brunt · filed 2002-03-28

Therefore, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the state officers in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief, and against the state officers in their individual capacities for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state corrections department is immune from a § 1983 suit absent the state's consent.

Miller v. New York State Department of Corrections · filed 2002-05-01

At the same time, under the PLRA, Defendants are entitled to dismissal with prejudice with respect to DOCS because DOCS is immune from suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2). “[I]n the absence of consent, any claims against the State or one of its agencies or departments ... are proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment [to the United States Constitution].”

Section 1983 suits against state agencies in federal court are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Nelson v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare · filed 2002-12-09

Plaintiff cannot sue the DPW for a § 1983 violation because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits such suit.

Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim.

Holloway v. Brechtse · filed 2003-08-18

As for Plaintiffs claim on the use of excessive force, this is brought under federal statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant’s immunity under the Tort Claims Act, while effective against unintentional state law tort claims, has no force when applied to federal claims.

Acting under color of state law does not determine whether a state agency is immune from a § 1983 suit; all state agencies act under color of state law.

Sampson v. USA · filed 2003-08-12

Sampson argues only that UTMB acted under color of state law and, accordingly, is subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The question whether a state agency acted under color of state law is not pertinent to ... the question whether that agency is immune from suit as all state agencies act under color of state law.

State law immunity rules cannot shield defendants from a § 1983 suit alleging ongoing violations of federal law.

Dubuc v. Michigan Board of Law Examiners, George Googasian, State Bar of Michigan, and John Berry · filed 2003-09-03

While this provision may immunize the individual defendants from state law claims, no state law or rule can immunize anyone from liability for violating the United States Constitution. ... Therefore, the RCSBM do not immunize any defendant from this § 1983 lawsuit alleging ongoing violations of federal law.

Section 1983 permits recovery for a constitutional violation even when the defendant acted contrary to state law.

Evans v. Morgan · filed 2004-02-24

Generally, a plaintiff suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not need to show that the defendants were acting in accordance with state law. In other words, a plaintiff may recover for the violation of his constitutional rights even when the defendants were acting contrary to state law.

Section 1983 personal-capacity suits against state officials remain subject to traditional common law immunities.

Suster v. Jefferson-Moore · filed 2004-11-30

That holding has no application to this case because the district court did not rely on the Eleventh Amendment to find the defendants immune. The court relied on traditional common law immunities, and the Hafer Court actually reaffirmed the existence of those immunities.

State agencies are presumptively immune from § 1983 damages actions unless Congress abrogates their immunity or the state expressly waives it.

Justice v. State of Oklahoma Department of Human Services Child Welfare · filed 2004-12-15

A state agency is presumptively immune from § 1983 damages actions unless Congress abrogates, or the State expressly waives, immunity.

State-law immunity does not shield defendants from § 1983 claims alleging violations of federal civil rights.

Posthumus v. Board of Education of the Mona Shores Public Schools · filed 2005-01-27

Defendants’ argument based upon state law immunity fails because Posthumus' claims are based solely upon federal law. Many courts have recognized that immunity granted under state law does not apply to claims alleging violations of federal civil rights.

The State Bar of Texas is a state agency protected by the Eleventh Amendment from damages claims under § 1983.

Bishop v. State Bar of Texas · filed 1986-06-11

This Court, however, has noted that the State Bar of Texas is a state agency such that an action for damages is barred by the eleventh amendment.

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for recovery for a violation of state law alone.

Arredondo v. Locklear · filed 2005-05-06

Indeed, a violation of state law alone cannot provide the basis for recovery under § 1983.

State law cannot preempt a § 1983 claim or immunize conduct that violates § 1983.

Gronowski v. John D. Spencer, Mayor of the City of Yonkers, Sued in His Individual Capacity, and City of Yonkers, D · filed 2005-09-20

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution guarantees that state law will not preempt or otherwise erode § 1983 causes of action and state law may not be used to immunize conduct violative of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state because the state is immune under this section.

Mierzwa v. City of Garfield · filed 2005-10-19

Finally, the Mierzwas’ § 1983 claims against the State were properly dismissed as the State is immune from liability under this section.

Section 1983 permits a claim for violation of constitutional rights even when the same conduct may support a claim under Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act.

Jones v. City of Allen Park · filed 2006-01-03

Defendants point to no authority that would permit us, in light of the Supremacy Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2, and in the absence of any indication that Congress intended state laws such as the Michigan WPA to supersede the right to bring a § 1983 action for violation of constitutional rights, to construe the WPA in the way defendants suggest. ... The district court correctly held that the WPA is not Jones’s exclusive remedy.

Section 1983 does not recognize immunities arising from state law.

Branham v. May · filed 2006-04-17

While there may be other categories of claims for which governmental and official immunity could apply, Plaintiff brings this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not recognize immunities arising from state law.

Section 1983 does not make rights conferred by state law enforceable in federal court; Section 1988 permits borrowing state-law remedies, not rights.

Coe v. County of Cook · filed 1998-12-04

Remedies, not rights. ... Otherwise section 1988 would undo the limits that the courts have placed on the federalization under section 1983 of rights conferred by state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal forum for claims against a state or an arm of the state when the state has not waived its immunity.

Lewis v. Kansas Department of Revenue · filed 2006-05-23

Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State [or arms of the State] for alleged ... deprivations of civil liberties.[ 2 ] The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has waived its immunity.

Section 1983 does not preempt New York laws allowing the state to assess and recover treatment charges from indigent patients.

Mental Disability Law Clinic, Touro Law Center v. Carpinello · filed 2006-05-31

Finally, we affirm, for substantially the reasons stated by the district court, the district court’s conclusions that (1) the applicable state laws are not preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (2) the same laws are not preempted by the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally 111 Individuals Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10801 et seq.

Section 1983 does not preempt New York Correction Law § 24’s bar on personal-capacity damages suits against correctional employees for acts within the scope of their duties.

Haywood v. Drown · filed 2006-12-22

We further reject plaintiffs contention that Correction Law § 24 is preempted by federal law, particularly the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and 42 USC § 1983, and that the court therefore erred in dismissing plaintiffs federal civil rights claims in the first action and his federal civil rights cause ... of action in the second action (see Woodward, 23 AD3d at 853-855; Cepeda v Coughlin, 128 AD2d 995, 997 [1987], lv denied 70 NY2d 602 [1987]; see also Martinez v California, 444 US 277, 284 n 7 [1980], reh denied 445 US 920 [1980]; cf. Howlett v Rose, 496 US 356, 372-375 [1990]).

State executive officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 claims, so an immunity defense alone does not warrant dismissal at the pleading stage.

Greenlow v. California Department of Benefit Payments · filed 1976-01-16

Scheuer also belies any notion that this Court may predicate a motion to dismiss upon the alleged immunity of the individual defendants. Scheuer held that immunity of members of the executive branch, unlike that of the judicial branch, is not absolute, but qualified.

Section 1983 suits against state agencies are treated as suits against the state and cannot be maintained.

Segaline v. Department of Labor & Industries · filed 2008-04-29

Because L&I is a state agency, Segaline’s § 1983 suit is in legal effect a suit against the state and cannot, therefore, be maintained.

States and their corrections departments are immune from § 1983 suits in federal court; a partial waiver for claims in state court does not waive that immunity.

Buerger v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections State of Ohio · filed 1985-03-18

The plaintiff brought this action against the State of Ohio and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Both of these entitles are immune from suits brought in federal courts. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). Although the State of Ohio has partially waived its immunity as to actions filed in the Ohio Court of Claims, that waiver does not affect actions brought in federal courts.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights and permits state law principles to supply suitable remedies when needed.

Balas v. Taylor · filed 2008-07-29

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has properly pled a section 1983 retaliation claim that incorporates Delaware tort law principles, including those encompassed in a wrongful death action. Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff bringing a section 1983 claim to specify whether it is incorporating state tort law principles, or if it is, which principles it relies on.

State statutory immunity does not shield defendants from federal claims brought under § 1983.

Stanley v. Muzio · filed 2008-09-26

State statutory immunity in general, and section 4-165 in particular, do not apply to claims for violation of federal law.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state agency because the agency is immune under the Eleventh Amendment, regardless of the relief sought.

Gleason v. Board of Education of City of Chicago · filed 1986-06-02

The State Board, an Illinois state agency, is therefore absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A state agency is immune from liability under § 1983, regardless of the relief sought.

Gleason v. Board of Education of Chicago · filed 1986-06-02

The State Board, an Illinois state agency, is therefore absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is not a general remedy for common law torts.

Miller v. Hawver · filed 1979-08-08

Suffice it to say here that § 1983 is not a general or common law tort claims statute.

A state immunity statute does not control a § 1983 claim, even when the claim is brought in state court.

Martinez v. California · filed 1980-03-03

We turn then to appellants’ § 1983 claim that appellees, by their action in releasing Thomas, subjected appellants’ decedent to a deprivation of her life without due process of law. ... It is clear that the California immunity statute does not control this claim even though the federal cause of action is being asserted in the state courts.

A state and its department of corrections are immune from a § 1983 suit in federal court unless the state consents to suit.

Burr v. Duckworth · filed 1982-09-24

However, and notwithstanding the inroads made on the Eleventh Amendment by Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), and its progeny, a direct action against a state and its department of corrections in a federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, absent consent to suit on the part of the state.

State rules cannot immunize defendants from § 1983 suits alleging ongoing violations of federal law.

Dubuc v. Googasian · filed 2003-09-03

Therefore, the RCSBM do not immunize any defendant from this § 1983 lawsuit alleging ongoing violations of federal law.

Alabama Constitution Article I, § 14 immunity does not apply to federal claims brought under § 1983.

Bedsole v. Clark · filed 2009-09-18

Section 14 immunity has no applicability to federal-law claims.

A state statute granting immunity cannot shield a defendant from liability under § 1983.

Bates v. Paul Kimball Hospital · filed 2009-09-24

As already explained, neither the Medical Facilities, nor any other Appellee, is entitled to absolute immunity from suit under § 1983 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4— 27.7.

A state immunity statute cannot bar a Section 1983 claim when doing so would eliminate the federal remedy.

Roe Ex Rel. Callahan v. Gustine Unified School District · filed 2009-12-22

In this case, the application of § 35330(d) completely eliminates any potential remedy for Plaintiff under § 1983 and Title IX. Barring recovery is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and the legislative intent that protection of federal civil rights be encouraged.

State statutes cannot immunize state actors from § 1983 claims.

Grosz v. Lassen Community College District · filed 2009-12-28

Nor can a California statute immunize a state actor against § 1983 claims.

State law immunity does not bar a claim under § 1983; federal law governs immunity from that claim.

I.K. Ex Rel. E.K. v. Sylvan Union School District · filed 2010-01-20

It is axiomatic that “[c]onduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985(3) cannot be immunized by state law.”

Section 1983 immunity is governed by federal law; state law immunity for child abuse reporters cannot shield defendants from federal civil rights claims.

Buckheit v. Dennis · filed 2010-05-18

The Court declines to do because it is bound by the law of the Ninth Circuit, which is clear that “[i]mmunity under § 1983 is governed by federal law; state law cannot provide immunity from suit for federal civil rights violations.”

California Government Code § 945.3 does not prevent a federal court from hearing a § 1983 action.

Evans v. Atwater Police Department · filed 2010-08-02

In opposition to summary judgment, Evans contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear his § 1983 action because of California Government Code § 945.3. The district court properly concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider Evans’s action. See Harding v. Galceran, 889 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1989) (California Government Code § 945.3 does not prohibit a § 1983 action).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to enforce a state-law least restrictive environment standard.

Endsley v. Luna · filed 2010-08-05

Thus, courts have rejected § 1983 claims seeking to enforce a state-law “least restrictive environment” standard. ... Following these decisions, the Court rejects this claim.

Section 1983 does not preempt a generally applicable state procedure for paying federal fee judgments merely because it delays payment, absent an indication that the procedure frustrates Section 1983 plaintiffs or reduces the deterrent effect of judgments.

El-Tabech v. Clarke · filed 2010-08-13

The compensatory purposes of § 1983 do not justify preempting a statute of general applicability within an area of traditional state power when there is no indication the statute “was intended to frustrate § 1983 inmate plaintiffs, or to reduce the deterrent effect of § 1983 judgments.”

Section 1983 claims cannot be defeated by immunity granted under state law.

Savage v. City of Pontiac · filed 2010-09-30

However, that statute cannot protect Leeb from a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a direct suit against an arm of a state that has not consented to suit, regardless of the relief sought.

Weaks v. North Carolina Department of Transportation · filed 2011-01-25

Defendants are therefore immune from a direct action under section 1983 in this court regardless of the relief sought.

A state corrections department is immune from suit under Section 1983.

Jim Harris, Jr. v. McSwain · filed 2011-05-09

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of defendant MDOC because it is immune from suit.

State immunity rules do not bar claims brought under § 1983.

Collins v. Board of Education of North Chicago Community Unit School District 187 · filed 2011-05-31

state immunity rules do not apply to actions brought under § 1983.

State law immunity cannot limit recovery under Section 1983.

Wilson v. Jara · filed 2011-10-17

The Supremacy Clause and Supreme Court precedent therefore preclude the New Mexico Family Violence Protection Act from limiting any civil recovery that might be available to Wilson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and officials performing functions analogous to judges have absolute immunity when sued individually.

Curt Wilson v. Ayers · filed 2012-03-05

The district court properly dismissed Wilson’s claims against defendant Richins, a Nevada Department of Administration Appeals Officer, in her official and individual capacities. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against state officials in their official capacity); Romano, 169 F.3d at 1186 (absolute immunity extends to state officials, including those sued in their individual capacity, “when they preside over hearings . . . or otherwise perform functions analogous to judges”).

States and state agencies are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983 and are immune from such suits under the Eleventh Amendment.

Sivak v. Dept of Corrections · filed 2012-06-21

As to the claim against the IDOC, it is well settled in Idaho that the State is not a “person” for purposes of section 1983 and the State and its agencies are immune from a section 1983 civil rights suit pursuant to the immunity granted by the Eleventh Amendment.

State statutory immunity for child abuse investigations ordinarily cannot be asserted as a defense to a Section 1983 claim.

Arce v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles · filed 2012-12-17

Under these preemption principles, state statutory immunities for child abuse investigations may not ordinarily be asserted as a defense to a section 1983 claim.

California’s mandated reporter immunity cannot be asserted as an affirmative defense to a Section 1983 claim.

Dwight R. v. Christy B. · filed 2013-01-07

The result here is that Christy’s absolute immunity as a mandated reporter under Penal Code section 11172 cannot be asserted as an affirmative defense to Dwight’s and the girls’ section 1983 claims.

State law cannot immunize conduct that is wrongful under § 1983.

Wilson v. Jara · filed 2013-03-12

Also, the court appropriately declined to give the investigation instructions. “Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . cannot be immunized by state law.

State immunity under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act does not bar a § 1983 claim against individual defendants.

Duckett v. Oklahoma ex rel. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma · filed 2013-11-14

Instead, they argue that § 1983 claims “are actions sounding in tort” and “subject to the limitations set forth in the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act.” ... This argument is plainly wrong.

A state immunity statute cannot shield a county from liability under Section 1983.

Petkus v. Richland County, Wisconsin · filed 2014-08-19

As the Supreme Court held in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988), the statute can’t immunize the County from liability for violating federal law.

Pennsylvania’s Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act does not provide immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Mariano v. Borough of Dickson City · filed 2014-08-22

But as the court already addressed at that earlier stage in this litigation, it is well-established that immunity under the PPSTCA applies only to state law tort claims, and not federal civil rights suits under § 1983. ... The court thus repeats its earlier decision that immunity under the PPSTCA cannot apply to the due process clause claims that remain in this case.

Section 1983 does not abrogate state immunity from federal damages suits.

Gromek v. Maenza · filed 2015-05-22

Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity through the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Quern v. Jordan, ... 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979), and New Jersey has not waived its immunity in federal court, see Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. Port Auth., 819 F.2d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994).

State-law immunity defenses do not apply to federal claims brought under § 1983.

Morgan v. Pallito · filed 2015-09-04

However, the immunity doctrine on which the State relies applies only to state claims against defendants in their individual capacity. See id. at 248 (explaining that sovereign immunity is the doctrine that applies to claims against the State); Sec. 1983 Litig. Claims & Defenses § 9.01(b)[2] (explaining that “state law immunity defenses and privileges do not apply” to federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

State-law immunities do not apply to federal constitutional claims brought under Section 1983.

Jones v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2015-09-21

State-law immunities do not apply to federal constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State high public official immunity cannot shield defendants from liability under § 1983.

Judge v. Shikellamy School District · filed 2015-09-28

Importantly, it is clear to this Court that Defendants cannot utilize a state immunity such as the one at issue to insulate themselves from the application of a federal law under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims fail when defendants are immune from such claims or did not act under color of state law.

Steg v. Johnson · filed 2016-10-03

The district court properly dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) claim on the grounds that the defendants were immune from such claims, ... or were not acting under color of state law.

State law cannot provide immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

Brown v. Taylor · filed 2017-01-31

More fundamentally, state law cannot provide immunity from a section 1983 claim.

State law sovereign immunity does not bar a Section 1983 claim in federal court.

Eiras v. Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco · filed 2017-03-07

Both of these contentions miss the mark because state law sovereign immunity “has no application to claims, in federal court, under Section 1983.” Hufford v. Rodgers, 912 F.2d 1338, 1341, n 1 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Connor v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 135 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1223 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (rejecting a state agent’s assertion of immunity under section 768.28(9)(a) in response to a Section 1983 claim).