42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious damages liability on local officials for another officer’s act without an alleged government practice, policy, or custom.

Conrad Slay, Jr. v. State of Alabama · filed 1981-02-12

The appellant alleges only that Sgt. McConico confiscated his writings, yet this individual has not been named as a defendant, nor has appellant alleged that Sgt. McConico’s act was pursuant to an established County practice, policy or custom. ... The appellees can not be held liable for damages on this basis and the District Court’s decision on this count is correct.

Section 1983 does not make a public official vicariously liable for another person's wrongdoing.

Riley v. Johnson · filed 1981-11-27

Under § 1983 a public official (here a prison guard) cannot be held vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of others, Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1977).

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a school district for a teacher’s constitutional violation.

C.F. v. Capistrano Unified School District · filed 2009-05-01

Nor can the District be held vicariously liable for Corbett’s statement regarding Peloza under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely for another person’s actions without a basis for holding the defendant responsible for them.

Castle v. Marquardt · filed 2009-07-02

As defendants correctly note, vicarious liability, alone, cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim. ... Because plaintiff has not presented any evidence or argument that provides a basis for holding defendants liable for the actions of plaintiffs teachers or classmates, the court will not consider any of plaintiffs allegations that require such a connection.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability for the acts of others.

Buras v. Strain · filed 2009-07-27

The named defendants cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 holds a state actor liable only for its own unconstitutional conduct, not vicariously for another party’s conduct.

Little v. Tall · filed 2002-03-25

Finally, because the cross-claim of Penob-scot County and its employees seeks in ... demnification for liabilities incurred by cross-claimants as a result of ARCH’s conduct, it can pertain only to plaintiffs negligence claim, and not to his constitutional claim, against the County and its employees. ... (emphasizing that a state actor is only hable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for its own unconstitutional conduct and that “[r]espondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983”) ... I therefore decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this cross-claim, which should be pressed in the same proceeding as the negligence claim.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability for another person’s decision.

Allen v. Heinzl · filed 2009-11-12

There is no vicarious liability under §1983.

Section 1983 permits liability against an organization for its board and officers' authorized actions.

Brown v. Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico · filed 2010-07-23

The vicarious liability objection, at least as briefed by Colegio, is hopeless; Colegio is responsible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the authorized action of its board and officers in maintaining the insurance program.

Section 1983 does not allow vicarious liability or respondeat superior liability.

Shelby v. Enlers · filed 2011-06-20

Shelby cannot succeed on any claim of vicarious liability or respondeat superior because under § 1983, there is no liability under these theories.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability or liability under respondeat superior.

Wilson v. Buster · filed 2011-07-15

Wilson likewise cannot succeed on any claim of vicarious liability or respondent superior, because under § 1983, there is no liability under these theories.

Section 1983 does not make a corporate medical provider liable for an employee’s acts unless those acts reflect the provider’s own policy.

Olive v. Wexford Corporation · filed 2012-10-30

Section 1983 does not create vicarious liability, however, see Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), so Wexford is not liable for Carter’s acts unless they represent Wexford’s own policy.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against supervisors or municipalities based solely on vicarious liability for a subordinate’s acts.

N.S. v. City of Alexandria · filed 2013-01-24

Under § 1983, supervisory officials and municipalities cannot be held liable on any theory of vicarious liability for the actions of subordinates. ... Therefore, Plaintiff cannot assert any claims against Coutee or the City for vicarious liability based on alleged acts or omissions under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make an organization vicariously liable for its employee’s conduct.

Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2013-02-07

Section 1983 does not create vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability for another officer’s acts.

Richie v. Wharton County Sheriff Department Star Team · filed 2013-02-19

Also, no liability exists under § 1983 under the theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Grant v. Winik · filed 2013-06-11

Under § 1983, there is no respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not make a corporate defendant vicariously liable for its employees’ acts.

Conley v. McKune · filed 2013-07-17

Apart from whether CCS is a state actor, vicarious liability is not a basis for a § 1983 claim against a corporate defendant.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim based on vicarious liability.

Monroe v. Burl Cain, Warden · filed 2015-02-18

To the extent that Monroe sought to hold Dr. ... Roundtree vicariously liable, his claim is not cognizable.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private company when its policy or custom causes a deprivation of federal rights, but not solely because it employs the person who committed the act.

Hendrick v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2015-09-29

Such companies are liable under § 1983 “only when an' official policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights.”

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

La Tidtus Jones v. Moore · filed 2017-01-26

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private prison medical provider for injuries caused by its employees.

Rascon v. Douglas · filed 2017-11-20

But “vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. The district court properly dismissed this claim.

Section 1983 does not make a governmental entity vicariously liable for its employees’ conduct.

Smith v. Kilgore · filed 2017-11-27

A governmental entity cannot be found liable under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability in a §1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not allow defendants to be held liable solely for another person’s conduct.

Dyer v. City of Boston · filed 2018-03-27

As explained, Defendants cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable solely because it employs the person who allegedly violated a constitutional right.

Bowens v. Zhang · filed 2018-08-03

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff sues Wexford based solely on the fact that it is Dr. Zhang’s employer (see Dkt. 214 at 9] 27-28), such claim is dismissed as improper under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability for government entities or individuals.

Peeler v. Reali · filed 2019-01-23

To the extent that Peeler’s claims against defendants are based on a theory of respondeat superior, Peeler failed to state a claim because neither government ... entities nor individuals can be held vicariously liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on prison officials for the conduct of others.

Giles v. Godinez · filed 2019-01-29

Section 1983 does not create a system of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 cannot impose vicarious liability on a private corporation without an underlying constitutional violation by someone whose conduct is imputed to it.

Gaston v. Ghosh · filed 2019-04-03

Vicarious liability makes a person responsible for someone else's wrong but does not change the proof required to show that a legal wrong has occurred. So even if we were to overrule Iskander, Gaston would need to show that someone whose acts are imputed to Wexford violated the Eighth Amendment, as understood in Gamble, Farmer, and Petties.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation vicariously liable for its employees’ actions.

Haggard v. Jackson · filed 2019-06-21

However, Wexford is not vicariously liable for the actions of its employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor or employer solely because an employee violated someone’s rights.

Phelps v. Carter · filed 2019-06-26

Furthermore, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and these individuals cannot be held liable simply because they oversee operations at the prison or supervises other correctional officers.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal involvement in the deprivation of rights and does not permit vicarious liability for another person's conduct.

Zeller v. Wexford Health Sources Inc. · filed 2019-08-12

There is no respondeat superior or vicarious liability under § 1983. ... Where Zeller has not alleged such personal conduct by Wexford, as opposed to individual dentists, his claims necessarily fail.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on a private prison medical contractor for its employees’ conduct.

Jones v. Wexford Medical Services · filed 2019-09-19

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow vicarious liability; a plaintiff must show that each defendant is individually liable for a violation.

Jackson v. Mussion · filed 2019-09-25

because § 1983 suits do not support vicarious liability, plaintiffs must demonstrate defendants are individually liable for violations.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation vicariously liable for its employees’ actions.

Collins v. Wexford Health of Pittsburgh · filed 2019-12-02

However, the Wexford defendants are not vicariously liable for the actions of their employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor or employer for an employee’s conduct.

Strickland v. Health Care Authority of Cullman County · filed 2020-01-09

But, there is no vicarious liability, including respondeat superior liability, in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for the actions of their subordinates.

Skinner v. Ard · filed 2020-02-11

Thus, the Sheriff’s motion is granted, and to the extent that Plaintiff intended to assert a claim of vicarious liability under § 1983 against Sheriff Ard, such a claim is dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not make a defendant vicariously liable for another person’s constitutional violation.

Brown v. Arndt · filed 2020-03-13

And under § 1983, Ginkowski cannot be deemed vicariously liable for any constitutional violation committed by Arndt.

Section 1983 does not make a private contractor vicariously liable for its employees’ constitutional torts.

Tolbert v. Gusman · filed 2020-04-16

CCS cannot be vicariously liable for the constitutional torts of its employees.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable solely for its employees’ actions.

Lucas v. Wexford Medical Corp · filed 2020-05-08

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because Lucas’s allegations against Wexford appear to be based only on the poor decisions that its staff made in connection with his care, he cannot proceed against Wexford.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on a defendant’s employment of someone who allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Figueroa v. Portage County Sheriff's Department · filed 2020-06-01

But respondeat superior irrefutably does not provide a basis of liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a governor vicariously liable for the conduct of officials he appointed.

Foster v. Commissioner of Correction (No. 2) · filed 2020-06-02

Moreover, the Governor cannot be found liable based on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, that is, on the theory that he is legally responsible for the conduct of those he appointed to government service or to the agencies they lead.

Section 1983 does not make an employer vicariously liable for its employees’ constitutional violations.

Phoenix v. Lafourche Parish Government · filed 2020-06-17

Insofar as the plaintiff attempts to hold CHL vicariously liable for its employees’ alleged constitutional violations, as alleged as part of Count 3 of the complaint, any such claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not make municipalities or supervisors vicariously liable for the actions of employees or subordinates.

Elliott v. County of Tehama · filed 2020-08-04

As alleged, however, Plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action against Defendants because municipalities and supervisors cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of their employees or subordinates under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a person is responsible for another person's actions or omissions.

Saddozai v. Bolanos · filed 2020-08-05

First of all, under no circumstances is there liability under § 1983 solely because one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability for civil rights violations.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, Inc. · filed 2020-08-06

There is no vicarious liability for RICO violations, violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or violation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on an employer or supervisor for employees’ violations of civil rights.

Goff v. Beacon Health · filed 2020-08-10

Neither an employer nor a supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for its subordinates’ or employees’ deprivations of others’ civil rights.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability; a claim against these officials requires allegations that they personally knew of the danger and failed to act.

Pevie v. Snyder · filed 2020-08-18

Because vicarious liability is unavailable for § 1983 claims, Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004), the question is whether Pevie has alleged sufficient facts to support a finding that Snyder and Gang were personally aware of the danger but failed to act.

Section 1983 does not allow a sheriff to be held vicariously liable for the acts of his guards.

Cassity v. Counts · filed 2020-09-16

To the extent Mr. Cassity is seeking to hold Sheriff Counts liable for the acts of others (“his guards”), vicarious liability is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private medical contractor liable solely for its employees’ conduct under respondeat superior; liability requires a policy or custom causing the deprivation.

Anderson v. Southern Health Partners, Inc. · filed 2020-10-28

As such, Plaintiffs claim is predicated on a theory of ... respondeat superior and is insufficient to state a plausible claim against SHP. The Court will grant the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's seventh claim for relief against SHP.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on private corporations or prison supervisors for an employee’s constitutional violations.

Gabaldon v. The GEO Group Facility · filed 2020-11-16

Private corporations and prison supervisors cannot be held vicariously liable for an employee’s alleged constitutional violations under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability; a defendant must be directly involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

Cordova v. Louisiana State University Health Science Center · filed 2020-12-17

As this court noted in ruling on the LSU defendants’ second Motion to Dismiss, vicarious liability cannot support a claim under § 1983. ... There is no allegation of any direct action or omission by the Lafayette General defendants with regards to Cordova’s non-renewal. Accordingly, even if he could show that they were state actors or conspired with state actors and that they played a role in the RFAA process, he has asserted no basis for their liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability for an employee’s alleged violation.

Sharp v. Aramark Food Service Corporation · filed 2021-01-05

Moreover, the Defendant cannot be held vicariously liable on a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability for the acts of a defendant’s personnel.

Weddington v. Prime Care Medical · filed 2021-01-14

Vicarious liability, or respondeat superior, does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make an employer or supervisor liable solely for its employees’ actions.

Smith v. Deel-Hout · filed 2021-01-26

Plaintiff names Wexford, Wexford Inc., and the Illinois Department of Corrections as defendants, alleging they are responsible for the actions of their employees. However, there is no respondent superior or “supervisor liability” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (2001). Accordingly, they will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a police officer who acts in good faith but negligently seeks a search warrant, where applicable state common-law privilege bars liability.

Madison v. Manter · filed 1971-04-28

Plaintiff concedes that under a section 1983 action he remains bound by Massachusetts common law as to privilege, Pierson v. Ray, 1967, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, at least unless Massachusetts law is substantially out of line with common law immunity elsewhere. It is not. ... We decline to place upon policemen acting in good faith the risk of personal liability if that official makes a negligent mistake.

Section 1983 damages claims against law-enforcement officers are subject to a defense when the officer acted in good faith with a reasonable belief that the conduct was constitutional.

Ellis v. Zieger · filed 1978-04-06

Thus, it is a defense to an action for damages under § 1983 “for a law enforcement officer to prove that he acted in good faith with a reasonable belief in the constitutionality of his conduct.”

Police officers may defeat a § 1983 damages claim by showing that they acted in reasonable good faith.

Huotari v. Vanderport · filed 1974-08-14

There remains, however, the defense of good faith which is available to police officers in suits for damages under § 1983. ... The Court finds that defendant officers have made an adequate showing of good faith to preclude plaintiff’s claim for damages.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal district court to enjoin ongoing state contempt proceedings when the plaintiff had an opportunity to raise constitutional claims in the state courts.

Juidice v. Vail · filed 1977-03-22

We must decide whether, with the existence of an available forum for raising constitutional issues in a state judicial proceeding, the United States District Court could properly entertain appellees’ § 1983 action in light of our decisions in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975). We hold that it could not.

A federal court may abstain from deciding a § 1983 claim when resolving unsettled state-law questions could avoid constitutional issues.

Lowe v. Smith · filed 1973-09-20

Moreover, even assuming plaintiff’s claims are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court is of the opinion that abstention would be the appropriate course in this case.

Section 1983 actions may be dismissed under abstention principles when unresolved state-law issues could eliminate the need to decide the federal constitutional question.

University Day Care Center, Inc. v. Temple University · filed 1971-04-30

Of particular relevance is the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 91 S.Ct. 856, 28 L.Ed.2d 196 (1971), which reaffirmed the appropriateness of abstention in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where "state law claims * * * if sustained * * * will obviate the necessity of determining the Fourteenth Amendment question." At 478, 91 S.Ct. at 858. There is, moreover, the salutary policy that "[i]n all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has possession of the subject must decide it." Smith v. McIver, 22 U.S. 532, 535, 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824). There is no need for the federal court to retain jurisdiction, since it is not alleged that complete relief will be unavailable in the Court of Common Pleas. The order of the district court dismissing the complaint will be affirmed.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against police officers for conduct the jury could find willful and malicious; personal animosity between the parties is not required.

Donald T. Gill and Marie Gill v. Deputy Sheriff Charles Manuel · filed 1973-11-09

An instruction on punitive damages is appropriate when the facts are such that the jury could find the action and conduct of police officers to be willful and malicious apart from any showing of personal animosity between the parties. ... The questions in regard to the credibility of the witnesses and the determination of whether the facts presented were sufficient for an award of punitive damages are issues reserved for determination by the trier of fact. See Lee, supra.

A § 1983 claim arising from the same cause of action adjudicated in state court is barred by res judicata when the plaintiff fully submitted the federal claims there without reserving them for later federal adjudication.

Kaufman v. Somers Board of Education · filed 1973-11-19

Under this standard I hold that plaintiff’s action in this Court is barred as res judicata by the judgment of the court of common pleas. ... Plaintiff fully argued his federal claims in his brief to the court of common pleas, not merely as a background to the state issues tendered to the court, but as an independent and indeed the principal ground for reversal of defendant’s decision to terminate plaintiff’s contract. No effort was made explicitly or even implicitly to reserve plaintiff’s federal claims for subsequent consideration by this Court. Even were I to apply the more favorable standard of England, I would have to hold that plaintiff freely and fully submitted his federal claims for decision to the state court.

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to relitigate in federal court a constitutional claim that could have been raised in a prior state-court action between the same parties arising from the same operative facts.

Lovely v. Laliberte · filed 1974-06-24

Res judicata, when the suit is between the same parties and concerns the same operative nucleus of fact, is of broader scope and bars issues even if unlitigated. This familiar role is not diminished because Lovely’s federal case alleges a violation of constitutional rights; state courts, too, are guardians of the federal constitution.

An action under § 1983 is not categorically exempt from the federal abstention doctrine.

Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission · filed 1975-01-13

Plaintiffs argue that abstention is inappropriate in this case because they have brought this action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court does not agree. ... In short, there is no per se exception to the abstention doctrine for civil rights cases.

Section 1983 actions are subject to the Younger abstention doctrine.

Anonymous J. v. The Bar Association Of Erie County · filed 1975-04-03

However, it is equally clear that section 1983 is not exempted from the Younger abstention doctrine.

Section 1983 actions do not require the district judge personally to conduct the evidentiary hearing; a magistrate may conduct it under Rule 53 subject to the district judge’s review.

Fred A. Cruz, Etc. v. W. B. (Bill) Hauck · filed 1975-06-30

The magistrate in the instant case did not make a judicial order, but submitted his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district judge. After receiving the objections of the litigants to the magistrate’s report, the judge made appropriate changes in the findings of fact, amended the jail’s rules, and issued the final judicial order. We are unaware of any statute that requires a judge personally to conduct an eviden-tiary hearing in section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 authorizes federal civil-rights actions for damages against police officers for unlawful arrest and unreasonable force, and permits such an action for malicious prosecution where there is malice or no probable cause.

Wyland v. James · filed 1977-01-24

As to Plaintiff’s allegation of false arrest, we do recognize, of course, that damages are recoverable under § 1983 for violations of a citizen’s 4th Amendment protections against an unlawful arrest, ... This Court finds, therefore, that the arrest was proper and lawful. ... As to Plaintiff’s second claim, it has long been recognized that a Federal civil rights action will lie against police officers for use of unnecessary or unreasonable force in effecting an arrest, ... We find, therefore, that Defendants used only that degree of force they reasonably believed to be necessary to prevent Plaintiff from leaving the scene and to protect their persons. ... Finally, as to the malicious prosecution allegation, it is again recognized that a Federal civil rights action will lie where there is malice or absence of probable cause, ... We believe, therefore, that the prosecution of Plaintiff was carried out in good faith based upon a reasonable belief that he had violated a Texas statute.

Section 1983 cannot be used to relitigate issues already decided in a state-court proceeding when collateral estoppel applies.

Hazo v. Geltz · filed 1977-11-02

Hazo has sought through the vehicle of a § 1985 action (amended complaint ¶ 30) which we assume was meant to be § 1983, for damages and injunctive relief, to have a lower federal court engage in what essentially constitutes relitigation of issues already decided by the state court. Having been content to forego her appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, the plaintiff is now barred by the principle of collateral estoppel from obtaining a review of the state court proceedings in the lower federal court.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by res judicata when they could have been, but were not, raised in a prior state suit.

Baker v. Cawley · filed 1978-10-31

It is clearly the law in this Circuit that res judicata does not apply in § 1983 suits with respect to claims that could have been but were not raised in a prior state suit.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by collateral estoppel when a prior guilty plea establishes facts inconsistent with the alleged civil-rights deprivation.

Mayberry v. Somner · filed 1979-11-28

The guilty plea is inconsistent with the contention he now raises that he acted in self-defense, and the plea establishes that the force Mayberry used was not legally justified. ... In short, simply by examining the elements of the crimes to which Mayberry has pleaded guilty it becomes clear that his plea works an estoppel against him in this suit. ... This extensive inquiry by the court into the factual basis for Mayberry’s plea removes all possible doubt that the plea constituted an admission by him that he instigated the incident in which defendant Somner was injured. Accordingly, I conclude that May-berry is collaterally estopped from raising claims alleging a deprivation of his civil rights on the basis of the events that transpired on January 21, 1974.

Section 1983 permits a damages action for a constitutional failure to protect an involuntarily confined resident, subject to a substantial-necessity justification.

Romeo v. Youngberg · filed 1980-11-24

However, analysis of this particular claim for constitutional purposes would proceed as follows: because this is a fundamental interest — which conflates plaintiffs right to personal security with defendants’ duty to protect — if the defendants failed to provide for Romeo’s personal security, such failure can be justified, in a § 1983 case, only by substantial necessity.

Section 1983 does not categorically bar abstention in land-use civil-rights suits, but courts must assess abstention case by case because blanket abstention would undermine the statute's purpose.

Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township · filed 1980-12-19

Abstention is not precluded here merely because the plaintiffs bring this suit as a civil rights action. ... We note, however, that in regard to civil rights cases, a court must exercise extreme care, and proceed on a case by case basis, when ruling on a motion to dismiss on grounds of abstention. ... Blanket application of the doctrine of abstention in land use cases would foreclose the option of pursuing land-use related federal constitutional claims in federal court. Such a policy would subvert the purpose of civil rights statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and erode the guarantees of the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim to proceed without exhaustion of state remedies, but a federal court may defer or stay it while a related state criminal proceeding is pending.

Parkhurst v. Wyoming · filed 1981-05-11

If the habeas claim happens to fail for lack of exhaustion, a claim properly brought under § 1983 may nevertheless proceed while exhaustion runs its course in state proceedings. ... As a matter of comity, therefore, the district court correctly refused to consider appellant’s money damages claim during the pendancy of appellant’s direct criminal appeal.

Section 1983 actions are subject to collateral estoppel when the underlying factual issues were fully and fairly litigated and resolved in a prior state administrative proceeding.

Gear v. City of Des Moines · filed 1981-05-22

There is, in the Court’s view, no valid rationale for distinguishing sections 1981, 1983 and 1985 for purposes of employing the foregoing analysis to permit collateral estoppel to serve as a barrier in federal court to relitigation of administratively determined issues of fact.

Section 1983 does not generally require plaintiffs to exhaust state-law remedies, but a federal court may abstain under Pullman when the plaintiff invokes an unsettled state statute that could provide significant relief.

Manney v. Cabell · filed 1981-08-27

In a petition for rehearing, the plaintiffs raise the concern that our holding on Pullman abstention implies an incorrect conclusion on the question of whether there is an exhaustion of remedies requirement applicable to suits brought under section 1983. We do not hold that, as a general matter, plaintiffs bringing suit under section 1983 must always exhaust the possible bases of relief provided by state law. Instead, we rely upon the Supreme Court's application of the Pullman abstention doctrine in Boehning v. Indiana State Employees Association, Inc., 423 U.S. 6, 96 S.Ct. 168, 46 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975) (per curiam). That decision illustrates that abstention may be proper, not only when a state statute is itself attacked, but also when a state action is attacked on constitutional grounds The plaintiffs expressly base their challenge to state action on two grounds: constitutional violations and state law violations. Where the plaintiff identifies state law as a source of his remedy, and where the state statute provides a significant opportunity for relief which has not yet been defined by the state courts, abstention is appropriate.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to litigate a Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure claim despite a state-court guilty plea when that issue was not actually litigated.

Proside v. Haring · filed 1981-12-30

The question is so likely to be one incapable of fair and expeditious resolution in the run of § 1983 actions that we believe a general rule of non-preclusion should obtain with respect to search and seizure issues in guilty plea cases.

Section 1983 claims are subject to res judicata when the same constitutional claims were fully litigated and decided in prior state-court proceedings.

Friarton Estates Corp. v. City of New York · filed 1982-06-07

It is immaterial that the questions were constitutional in character, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), or that they are now asserted in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96-105, 101 S.Ct. 411, 416, 420, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414, 425 (2 Cir. 1978).

Section 1983 civil-rights actions may be barred by collateral estoppel when the same issue was fully and fairly litigated in a prior state criminal proceeding.

Paul Searing and Joann Searing v. Hayes · filed 1982-07-30

The appellants, Paul and JoAnn Searing, brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 for damages against Officer Edward B. Hayes. ... In this case the federal district court determined that the validity of the search and seizure is the primary issue in the civil rights action. We agree that the plaintiffs’ claim under this civil rights complaint involves the same issue of legality as in the suppression hearing during the state court criminal proceedings. Thus collateral es-toppel may preclude the relitigation of that issue in federal court.

Section 1983 claims involving unresolved factual issues may be stayed while the plaintiff exhausts state remedies and state courts review the constitutionality of the conviction.

Flaherty v. Nadjari · filed 1982-10-05

Insofar as there are material factual issues to be resolved in the § 1983 claim, that claim will be stayed, pending plaintiff’s exhaustion of state remedies and the outcome of the New York courts’ review of the constitutionality of the plaintiff’s state conviction.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim for every violation of state law or procedural administrative rules absent interference with a constitutionally protected interest.

Rhodus Ex Rel. Rhodus v. Dumiller · filed 1982-12-15

Thus, the Court must determine whether the defendant’s failure to follow a school regulation constitutes a constitutional violation which would give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the federal Constitution. It is well settled that not every infraction of state law constitutes interference with a constitutionally protected interest. ... Procedural rules created by a state administrative body do not, of themselves, serve as a basis for a protected liberty nor does every deviation of these rules constitute a federal constitutional violation.

Section 1983 claims alleging civil rights violations are not categorically exempt from abstention.

C-Y Development Co. v. City of Redlands · filed 1983-03-08

We conclude, however, that there is no per se civil rights exception to the abstention doctrine.

Section 1983 civil-rights actions presenting substantial federal rights are among the least likely candidates for abstention.

Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson · filed 1983-08-12

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to abstain. ... As a final note on this issue, we observe that while the 1981 Legislative Assembly’s actions were noteworthy, they form no basis for granting the State’s motion for abstention. Cases involving questions of civil rights are the least likely candidates for abstention.

Patsy's rule barring a blanket exhaustion-of-state-remedies requirement for Section 1983 suits does not preclude a federal court from applying Pullman abstention to obtain a state-court resolution of an antecedent, unsettled state-law question in a Section 1983 case.

NISSAN MOTOR CORPORATION IN v. HARDING · filed 1984-08-23

Application of the Pullman abstention doctrine in a Sec. 1983 suit is not affected by Patsy. Abstention is not as crude a mechanism as exhaustion. It is a means of postponing federal jurisdiction to obtain a definitive state resolution of ambiguous state law issues only when to do so will not destroy the rights of the parties and will avoid the possibility of unnecessarily deciding a federal constitutional question. It is not a blanket prerequisite to the institution of a Sec. 1983 suit in federal court.

When abstention defers a § 1983 damages claim to a state proceeding unable to award constitutional damages and attorney fees, the federal court should retain jurisdiction and stay rather than dismiss the action.

Crane v. Fauver · filed 1985-05-28

We find in this case the same circumstances that called for retention of jurisdiction in Red Bank. ... Thus, under Red Bank, the district court should have retained jurisdiction.

A federal court may abstain from hearing a § 1983 claim intertwined with an ongoing complex state administrative proceeding.

Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Baltimore County · filed 1985-09-27

We affirm the district court's decision to abstain.

The presence of § 1983 and other federal civil-rights claims does not absolutely bar Colorado River abstention when a parallel state action will resolve the underlying state-law dispute.

Lumen Construction, Inc. v. Brant Construction Company, Inc. · filed 1986-01-07

Similarly, in this case, the presence of federal claims under sections 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 2000d is an important factor to be weighed in the balance, but it does not pose an absolute bar.

A federal court may stay a Section 1983 due-process claim under Pullman when unsettled state law may establish the claimed property interest and avoid or alter the constitutional question.

Weiser v. Koch · filed 1986-04-15

However, the court abstains from adjudicating the federal due process claim under ... . Accordingly, rather than dismiss the action, the court will “stay its hand” on the federal due process claim against the City until the New York Appellate Division, First Department, decides ... , which was argued on September 5, 1985.

A federal court may abstain from a § 1983 land-use action under both Burford and Pullman when it implicates a complex local regulatory scheme and unsettled state law that may avoid the constitutional issue.

Meredith v. Talbot County · filed 1987-09-08

The district court’s application of both of these abstention doctrines is appropriate here.

A federal court may not abstain from a direct constitutional challenge to an unambiguous state statute when no parallel state proceeding or complex state appellate regulatory process is pending.

Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode Island v. Mark A. Pfeiffer, Etc. · filed 1987-11-02

We thus hold that a direct challenge to the constitutionality of an unambiguous state statute is not subject to the abstention doctrine, at least when there are no pending or ongoing concurrent state proceedings nor potential for disruption of state appellate procedures intimately related to a complex state regulatory process.

A federal court may abstain from a § 1983 constitutional challenge involving a complex state regulatory scheme, parallel state cases, active legislative revision, and no clear facial conflict with federal law.

Bath Memorial Hospital v. Maine Health Care Finance Commission · filed 1987-11-09

The Court is unwilling to become enmeshed in a regulatory web that the Maine Legislature and courts are so actively attempting to untangle themselves. Maine’s hospital cost control system is a complex and specialized matter of substantial public concern. The Court’s intervention at this juncture would simply disrupt state efforts to craft a coherent state policy, and is therefore inappropriate.

Although § 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies, Younger abstention applies when a federal plaintiff seeks relief from a pending state proceeding involving important state interests and can raise federal issues there.

Delahunty v. State of Hawaii · filed 1987-12-30

A federal district court is required to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a federal lawsuit in which (1) a party to a presently pending state proceeding (2) seeks relief from that proceeding in federal court (3) in spite of the fact that important state issues are involved and where (4) the party has an adequate opportunity to raise federal issues in the state proceeding.

Even when Younger abstention applies, a federal court must stay rather than dismiss § 1983 damages and fee claims that cannot be resolved in the pending state proceeding.

Deakins v. Monaghan · filed 1988-01-12

We need not decide the extent to which the ... doctrine applies to a federal action seeking only monetary relief, however, because even if the ... doctrine requires abstention here, the District Court has no discretion to dismiss rather than to stay claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the state proceeding.

Section 1983 permits an action to enforce proper standards under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act despite their remedial schemes and federal oversight of state disability determinations.

Laird v. Stilwill · filed 1997-10-25

The court concludes that, even in light of Blessing, Titles II and XVI of the SSA do not — on the basis of their remedial schemes, federal oversight of state agency determinations, or both — preclude an action pursuant to § 1983 to enforce proper standards under the SSA.

Section 1983 damages claims are not subject to abstention merely because they arise from a custody dispute.

Wright v. McCaslin · filed 1986-11-04

Accordingly, the abstention doctrine was improperly relied upon by the District Court as a basis for declining to address plaintiff's claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes actions for redress of constitutional rights deprivations caused under color of state law, including equitable relief in federal court.

Septum, Inc., a Georgia Corporation v. Robert E. Keller, Individually and as District Attorney for Clayton County, State · filed 1980-03-24

This plaintiff’s choice of a federal forum involves no more interference with Georgia’s orderly administration of its own affairs than is attendant upon any § 1983 challenge to state laws. ... The proposition that federal courts should impose such a limitation as a matter of law based on the vague notion of comity finds no support in previous Younger-type cases, and would run directly contrary to the policies the Supreme Court has identified underlying § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right under color of state law, but a state law violation alone is insufficient.

LAMAR ADVERTISING OF PENN, LLC v. Pitman · filed 2008-08-06

Such claims are properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”), which provides a civil remedy to any person deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by anyone acting under color of state law. A violation of state law that does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation cannot support a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits federal courts to protect people from unconstitutional action under color of state law while remedial state administrative proceedings are pending.

Joubert-Vazquez v. Alvarez-Rubio · filed 2011-08-01

To satisfy the first prong of this analysis, in the context of administrative proceedings vis-a-vis federal suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First Circuit has unequivocally established that the pending administrative proceeding must be coercive in nature — i.e., state initiated enforcement proceedings in which participation is compulsory. ... These considerations, however, are absent when an aggrieved, not the state, initiates the administrative proceeding. This type of proceedings, which are remedial in nature, yield to the Congressional intent behind § 1983 of interposing “the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights — to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.” ... For these reasons, it is well settled that Younger is inapplicable in connection with remedial administrative proceedings. ... Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs’ complaint is immune to Younger, and the Court is compelled to entertain their case.

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege sufficient unconstitutional conduct to overcome a state official’s sovereign-immunity defense.

Wiley v. Lloyd · filed 1985-07-09

We conclude that such allegations are insufficient, as a matter of law, to overcome the bar of sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 supports declaratory and equitable relief for federal-rights violations notwithstanding a state-law tort-immunity provision.

National Ass'n of Theatre Owners of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Motion Picture Commission · filed 1971-06-02

Section 895.43(3), Wis.Stats., which deals with tort actions against political subdivisions, provides no immunity to defendants in this action which seeks declaratory and equitable relief for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on judges acting within their jurisdiction, and a defense attorney is not acting under color of state law merely by representing a criminal defendant.

Griffin v. Nangle · filed 1974-10-08

The doctrine applies in this case, because Judge Satz was acting within his jurisdiction. Therefore, he is immune from such a suit as this. ... Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Nangle fails to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the reason that counsel’s actions were not taken under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide federal relief for a state official's violation of a state statute alone.

Lee v. Baroski · filed 1975-11-21

It has been consistently held that federal relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be premised solely on a violation by state officials of state statutes benefiting a plaintiff.

Section 1983 is governed by federal standards rather than controlling state-law privileges, but it does not require a damages action whenever state law permits deadly force; states retain leeway where the privilege is unsettled.

Flozell Jones, Administrator of the Estate of Dennis Jones v. Marshall · filed 1975-11-24

A state rule of immunity or privilege which allows a state officer to escape liability for a deprivation of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States” is simply not controlling under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... But this trend is not so momentous or compelling as to require us to recognize a § 1983 action to lie in the situation of this case.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of state-law rules or requirements absent a violation of federal rights.

Porter v. Bainbridge · filed 1975-12-18

Allegations of a violation of rules or requirements of state law are insufficient to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S. C., Section 1983.

A claim based only on a state-law violation without a constitutional deprivation is not cognizable under § 1983.

Scott v. Plante · filed 1976-03-29

the court does not conceive this as a matter cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 actions are not subject to California's 100-day claim-filing requirement, and state indemnification provisions remain applicable.

Williams v. Horvath · filed 1976-05-04

Accordingly, we hold that the claim provision of section 911.2 is inoperative in an action brought under section 1983. ... Accordingly,-we conclude that the indemnification provisions remain applicable whether the action is grounded on the Tort Claims Act or on section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action based solely on state officials' failure to follow state-law procedural requirements.

Oliver Martin, Jr. And Joseph White, Etc. v. Frank Blackburn, Etc. · filed 1978-09-27

The claim that state officials have failed to follow the procedural provisions of state law, without more, does not aver a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against states that retain sovereign immunity.

Chai v. Michigan Technological University · filed 1980-06-11

These recent pronouncements by the Court ... convince me that states are immune from suits under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose personal damages liability on state officials for acts performed in good faith within the scope of their official duties, and it does not authorize damages against officials in their representative capacities when the suit is effectively against the State.

Westberry v. Fisher · filed 1980-10-25

Section 1983 makes liable "every person" who under color of state law deprives another person of his civil rights. ... Being satisfied that the acts of which plaintiffs complain were done by defendants “in good faith in performance of their official duty as they understood it,” the Court holds that under the circumstances of this case defendants are not personally liable for damages under Section 1983. ... In the first place, suits under Section 1983 may be maintained only against a "person" who under color of state law deprives another of his civil rights. ... The Court holds that insofar as plaintiffs seek to recover damages of defendants in their representative capacities as officers of the State of Maine, their suit must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, both because it does not come within the purview of Section 1983 and because it falls within the inhibition of the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 requires the constitutional-tort inquiry to be independent of state-law authorization, while a state statute may matter to a defendant’s good-faith immunity from damages.

Ayler v. Hopper · filed 1981-04-29

As to the first, section 1983 cause of action, it has long been established that in interpreting the scope of section 1983, courts are ... not bound by the state law of torts or the defenses of privilege that law provides. ... The question for decision in a section 1983 action is “whether [the defendant’s] conduct — independent of its lawfulness or unlawfulness at state law — was sufficiently egregious as to be ‘constitutionally’ tortious.” ... The existence of a state statute, regulation or policy purporting to authorize allegedly constitutionally tortious conduct is not relevant to the determination of whether such conduct is in fact constitutionally tortious. Such a state statute, etc., becomes relevant in a section 1983 action only insofar as, a constitutional deprivation having been established, the statute tends to support or undercut a defense of good faith immunity. ... Thus, even if a state statute is unconstitutional, a defendant relying on the statute in ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ good faith is entitled to immunity from liability for damages under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Hilliard v. New Jersey Army National Guard · filed 1981-05-12

As to waiver, section 1983 does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the states, nor does it have a history which focuses directly on the question of state liability or shows that Congress considered and firmly decided to abrogate the eleventh amendment of the states.

Section 1983 does not override a state's preserved traditional sovereign immunity, which bars a damages action against the state in its own courts unless the state has waived that immunity.

Kapil v. Association of Pennsylvania State College · filed 1982-08-10

Rather, a state’s “traditional” sovereign immunity, to the extent that the state has preserved it, would also bar a Section 1983 damage action in the state’s own courts.

Section 1983 actions are governed by state statutes of limitation rather than the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act's notice deadline.

Mucci v. Falcon School District 49, El Paso County · filed 1982-08-12

While the District correctly asserts that § 1983 actions are governed by state statutes of limitation, ... the applicable state statute of limitations is § 13-80-106, C.R.S. 1973, ... and not the time limit found in the GIA.

Section 1983 permits claims against public employees for federal-rights violations even when state law would otherwise immunize them from suit.

Hoch v. Forgey · filed 1982-11-08

Plaintiffs’ first three causes of action present 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) claims against defendants. Since § 2 cannot operate to immunize a public employee from liability under § 1983, Forgey, Simmons and Ring must remain as defendants as to those claims.

Section 1983 prevents state-law immunity provisions from shielding state actors who violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Buskirk v. Seiple · filed 1983-02-16

Pennsylvania’s legislation cannot, however, immunize state actors who abrogate federal constitutional or statutory rights; § 1983 specifically protects such rights.

State common-law immunities do not govern Section 1983 immunity; the inquiry is whether Congress intended the asserted immunity to apply.

Riley v. Smith · filed 1983-08-26

It follows that the Michigan common law immunities do not govern section 1983 immunity analysis. Where a section 1983 defendant asserts an immunity, the judicial inquiry must focus on whether the section 1983 drafters intended this immunity to apply.

Deprivation of a state-created right alone is not a constitutional deprivation within § 1983.

Firestone v. Fritz · filed 1983-11-15

An alleged deprivation of a State-created right does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutional right within the meaning of section 1983.

A governmental authority's local sovereign-immunity law cannot bar a federal constitutional-rights claim where doing so would conflict with federal supremacy.

Maruyama & Associates, Ltd. v. Mariana Islands Housing Authority · filed 1984-05-24

Therefore, the claim set forth in Count XI for constitutional violations is not prohibited by the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, so a state agency is immune from a Section 1983 suit.

Grove School v. Guardianship & Advocacy Commission · filed 1984-10-24

Because ... have laid to rest the notion that Section 1983 abrogates the Eleventh Amendment, ... the appropriate inquiry is whether Commission, a state agency, is protected under standard sovereign immunity analysis. ... Commission is therefore immune from suit on both the Section 1983 and pendent claims.

A violation of state law that does not itself create a Section 1983 cause of action cannot defeat a defendant's qualified immunity.

Hicks v. Feeney · filed 1984-11-08

Mere violation of a state statute that does not create a cause of action under 1983 cannot be used to overcome qualified immunity.

A violation of state law is not cognizable under § 1983 and does not defeat an official's qualified immunity absent violation of a clearly established federal constitutional or statutory right.

Pollnow v. Glennon · filed 1985-03-12

Clearly, a violation of state law is not cognizable under Sec. 1983. ... Furthermore, such a violation, even if there were one, would not deprive a state official of qualified immunity from damages.

A state cannot confer immunity from § 1983 liability on a municipality.

Meding v. Hurd · filed 1985-04-19

A state lacks authority to confer on a municipality immunity from liability under § 1983.

State governmental immunity cannot defeat a Section 1983 claim because a state may not immunize entities or individuals alleged to have violated federal law.

Wade v. City of Pittsburgh, Victor Muto and William Burke · filed 1985-07-26

This governmental immunity statute, although effective against a state tort claim, has no force when applied to suits under the Civil Rights Acts. The supremacy clause of the Constitution prevents a state from immunizing entities or individuals alleged to have violated federal law.

A state-created grant of immunity cannot shield a defendant from liability under § 1983 for violating federal constitutional rights.

Truhe v. Rupell · filed 1985-11-20

A defendant cannot avoid liability for violation of a plaintiffs federal constitutional rights by relying on a state-created grant of immunity. Section 1983 specifically protects those rights.

Errors in interpreting or applying state law do not, without more, create a cause of action under § 1983.

Schwindling v. Melba Smith, Records Supervisor, Cummins Unit Steve Clark, Attorney General, State of Arkansas · filed 1985-11-21

The first two of these arguments are simply questions as to whether the Department of Correction has properly interpreted state law; errors of state law (if there were any) do not, without more, give rise to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State-law sovereign immunity for government employees does not protect them from liability under Section 1983 or other federal civil-rights statutes.

In Re Request for Opinion of the Supreme Court Relative to Constitutionality of SDLC · filed 1985-12-18

This immunity, however, does not protect individuals from liability for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or other federal statutes that protect federally guaranteed rights.

A plaintiff who invokes Ohio's limited waiver of sovereign immunity by suing the state in the Court of Claims waives a same-act Section 1983 claim against individual state employees.

Ferrari v. Woodside Receiving Hospital · filed 1985-12-18

For this reason, this court must conclude that the plaintiff voluntarily waived any right to bring an action against the individual physicians for alleged constitutional violations, given the circumstance that plaintiff elected to sue the State of Ohio under the limitations and conditions imposed by the state legislature in its limited waiver of sovereign immunity and consent to be sued in the Court of Claims.

Failure to satisfy a state tort-claim notice requirement cannot bar a Section 1983 action alleging federal constitutional violations.

Craig v. Witucki · filed 1986-01-13

Failure to file notice as required by the Indiana Tort Claims Act cannot bar an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state and its agencies are immune from Section 1983 actions in federal and state court unless Congress unequivocally abrogates that immunity or the state legislature waives it.

Skoblow v. Ameri-Manage, Inc. · filed 1986-02-18

Absent an unequivocal expression of intent by either the United States Congress to overturn a state's eleventh amendment immunity, or a state legislature to waive the state's sovereign immunity, a state and its agencies are immune from civil rights actions brought against them pursuant to section 1983 in both federal and state courts.

The Eleventh Amendment bars a Section 1983 suit that is effectively against the state and seeks payment from the state treasury.

Mohler v. State of Mississippi · filed 1986-02-18

The instant action is both in form and in substance a suit against the state. It seeks equitable relief requiring the state to pay money from its treasury to its teachers.

State-law immunity defenses cannot shield conduct that is wrongful under Section 1983.

Wilson v. Jackson · filed 1986-03-12

The appellants’ § 1983 claim against Jackson presents a wholly different standard because State immunity defenses may not be asserted in response to federal civil rights claims.

State workers’ compensation exclusivity cannot bar or immunize conduct that is actionable under Section 1983.

Mcclary v. O'hare · filed 1986-03-17

Numerous cases have upheld the constitutionality of the exclusivity provisions of state compensation laws, ... but this does not mean that a state statute's exclusivity provision may bar a federal civil rights action. ... Conduct that is wrongful under section 1983 cannot be immunized by state law.

Mere misuse or disregard of state law by state officials does not create a Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim when state procedures can adequately correct the alleged defects.

Henry Malachowski and Julia Malachowski v. City of Keene · filed 1986-03-28

Mere alleged misuse or disregard of state law by state officials does not constitute a deprivation of property without constitutional due process of law. ... Such deficiencies, if they exist, are readily and adequately correctable under state law in state court.

Section 1983 does not abrogate a state agency’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.

U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. Carlson · filed 1986-04-28

Section 1983, does not contain language which effectively abrogates the immunity from suit in federal court.

Florida’s statutory waiver of sovereign immunity does not encompass section 1983 actions against the state or its agencies.

Spooner v. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS · filed 1986-05-19

Gamble and Shinholster hold that Florida's waiver of sovereign immunity does not encompass Section 1983 actions, while Meeker, now overruled by Gamble, reached a contrary view. We agree with the Gamble and Shinholster decisions' construction of the pertinent statutes and adopt as our own the reasoning and analysis of the opinion in Gamble.

Section 1983 cannot be used to compel a state agency to accelerate reforms required only by state law when no federal constitutional violation by that agency has been identified.

Bush v. Viterna · filed 1986-08-04

Section 1983, however, cannot be used as a lash for whipping state governments into faster action on reform programs that, however desirable, are not required by federal law.

A violation of a municipal ordinance is actionable under § 1983 only when the challenged conduct also violates federal constitutional standards.

Kompare v. Stein · filed 1986-09-04

Although conduct which violates an ordinance may be actionable under Sec. 1983, such action is allowed only when the conduct violates federal constitutional standards. Therefore, the Kompares' claim fails, in part, because the conduct about which the Kompares complain (i.e., the investigation of Jody's death and disclosure of the fibromatosis) does not violate federal standards.

Section 1983 does not abrogate a state's common-law sovereign immunity in its own courts, and Florida has not waived that immunity for federal civil-rights actions.

Hill v. Dept. of Corrections · filed 1987-09-24

Thus, we hold that the common law immunity of the state of Florida and its agencies has not been abrogated by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state governmental-immunity notice requirement does not apply to federal civil-rights claims under § 1983.

Martinez v. County of El Paso · filed 1987-11-24

The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to claims based on federal civil rights violations.

A violation of state or local law is cognizable under § 1983 only when it also infringes a federally protected right.

Toledo Police Patrolman's Ass'n v. City of Toledo · filed 1988-02-04

Violations of state law are only cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the violation of state law results in an infringement of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal cause of action for a state-law wrong merely because it was committed under color of state law.

Bennett v. Judge James Thorburn · filed 1988-03-31

Section 1983 does not create a federal cause of action for every wrong committed under color of state law.

A violation of state law alone does not create liability under § 1983.

Martin v. Sheriff Richard Tyson · filed 1988-05-09

He argues that the Commissioners were statutorily required to comply with certain policies. This is irrelevant, since a violation of state law does not create liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a public employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim against state officials to proceed when the asserted right was clearly established and the officials lack immunity.

William R. Schwartzman, M.D. v. Fred Valenzuela Bamford Frankland, David Swoap · filed 1988-05-17

William Schwartzman brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) against various state officials, contending that they fired him in retaliation for exercising his right of free speech. ... The district court correctly held that the doctrine of qualified immunity did not preclude the claim and correctly rejected the appellants’ assertion that they were absolutely immune to suit. We affirm.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to immunity under the Kansas Tort Claims Act; federal law governs immunity in those claims.

Riddle v. City of Ottawa · filed 1988-05-20

The present action was brought as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of federal civil rights. ... The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Kansas Tort Claims Act to the present case.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal constitutional claim solely because prison disciplinary rules were improperly promulgated under state law.

Jackson-Bey v. Wilmer Osborne Dale E. Lammers Robert Atherton Michael D. Adams · filed 1988-05-23

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). Plaintiff contends that defendants subjected him to disciplinary proceedings for violations of prison rules which were not properly promulgated according to state law. ... We likewise conclude that no federal constitutional question is presented by the alleged failure to properly promulgate prison disciplinary rules under state law.

A violation of state law alone does not establish a claim under Section 1983.

Long Grove Country Club Estates, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove · filed 1988-07-01

And, assuming arguendo that defendants violated Section 9-2-40, a mere violation of state law does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state law privilege cannot shield an officer from § 1983 liability for depriving a person of federal constitutional rights.

Davis v. David Little, Individually and in His Capacity as an Officer in the Police Department of Waterbury, C · filed 1988-07-12

As we said in Jones v. Marshall, “[a] state rule of immunity or privilege which allows a state officer to escape liability for a deprivation of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States’ is simply not controlling under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 528 F.2d at 137.

Section 1983 permits a procedural due process claim against a prison disciplinary officer despite state law immunity from tort liability.

Soto v. Lord · filed 1988-08-09

State law immunizing government conduct otherwise subject to suit under section 1983 is preempted, “because the application of the state immunity law would thwart the congressional remedy, which of course already provides certain immunities for state officials.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal law committed under color of state law, but not for violations of state law alone.

No. 87-2167 · filed 1988-08-12

Section 1983 does not, however, provide a basis for redressing violations of state law, but only for those violations of federal law done under color of state law.

Section 1983 redresses violations of federal law committed under color of state law, but does not provide a remedy for violations of state law alone.

Jones v. City & County of Denver · filed 1988-08-12

Section 1983 does not, however, provide a basis for redressing violations of state law, but only for those violations of federal law done under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a violation of state law alone.

Willie Williams, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Michael P. Lane, Director of the Illinois Dep · filed 1988-08-29

A violation of state law would not create liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 excessive-force claims are not barred by state tort privileges or a state fleeing-felon rule when the officer uses excessive force.

Mitchell v. City Of Sapulpa · filed 1988-09-20

We agree that the Oklahoma fleeing felon rule would not provide an absolute defense had the officer in this case used excessive force. "[I]n interpreting the scope of Sec. 1983 we are not bound by the state law of torts or the defenses of privilege that law provides."

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a city’s violation of a state water-rate statute without a federal constitutional right.

Jung v. City of Phoenix · filed 1989-01-12

If the city has violated a state statute in its charges for water provided to nonresidents, the plaintiffs’ remedy is under state law, not under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.