42 U.S.C. § 1983

Municipalities cannot claim qualified immunity against § 1983 claims.

Green v. City of Bessemer, Alabama · filed 2002-05-17

Nor do municipalities enjoy even qualified immunity with regard to either § 1983 claims, Heggs v. Grant, 73 F.3d 317, 320 n. 5 (11th Cir.1996), or § 1981 claims, Garner v. Giarrusso, 571 F.2d 1330, 1341 (5th Cir.1978).

A municipality cannot use Connecticut’s governmental immunity statute to avoid suit under Section 1983.

Gupta v. City of Norwalk · filed 2002-08-15

Thus, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-557n does not provide the City with immunity from suit under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Title VII.

A municipality cannot assert governmental immunity as a defense to a § 1983 claim.

Clayton v. Branson · filed 2002-10-15

As defendants have no defense of governmental immunity against the § 1983 claim, we affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment as to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim on the grounds of governmental immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit a local government to claim judicial or quasi-judicial immunity through its officials.

Miller v. City of Red Lodge · filed 2003-03-13

However, to the extent that we afforded the local government units immunity from § 1983 liability pursuant to the doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, Reisdorff is hereby overruled.

A municipality is not entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 action and may be liable for a constitutional violation even if its officer has qualified immunity.

Margaret Cowan, Administratrix of the Estate of Victoria Cooper v. Michael Breen, Town of North Branford, Consolidated-D · filed 2003-12-18

Moreover, because a municipality is not entitled to qualified immunity in § 1983 actions, ... even if Breen was entitled to qualified immunity, if Cooper’s constitutional rights were violated, the Town could still be liable.

Municipalities have no immunity from liability under § 1983.

Owen v. The City of Independence · filed 1980-07-01

The Supreme Court granted certiorari upon this latter issue and reversed, holding that municipalities enjoy no immunity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... In light of the Supreme Court's holding, we must reverse the judgment of the district court dismissing Owen's action.

Municipalities have no immunity from liability under § 1983.

Owen v. City of Independence · filed 1980-07-01

The Supreme Court granted certiorari upon this latter issue and reversed, holding that municipalities enjoy no immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In light of the Supreme Court’s holding, we must reverse the judgment of the district court dismissing Owen’s action.

Municipal corporations sued under § 1983 have neither absolute nor good-faith qualified immunity.

Huemmer v. Mayor of Ocean City · filed 1980-10-09

There it was held that municipal corporations sued, as here, in their official capacities, have no immunity, either absolute immunity or good-faith qualified immunity.... Reversal and remand, therefore, are mandated insofar as the Mayor and City Council of Ocean City are concerned, so that damages may be assessed and awarded.

Municipalities sued under § 1983 cannot claim immunity based on their officials' good faith.

Key v. Rutherford · filed 1981-05-22

The Supreme Court decision in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), established that local governmental units are subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As a consequence of these subsequent changes, the trial court's jury instruction that Stroud would be immune if its city officials acted in good faith is erroneous under the current state of the law.

Municipalities have no immunity in § 1983 actions, and good faith is not a defense to liability.

Joseph Wheeler, Cross v. City of Pleasant Grove, a Municipal Corp., Cross · filed 1981-12-18

It specifically stated that municipalities have no immunity in § 1983 actions, and that good faith does not serve as a defense to liability. ... We therefore reverse the district court’s conclusion of law on this issue and remand for a determination of damages sustained by the plaintiffs.

Municipalities cannot assert qualified immunity against § 1983 claims.

Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock · filed 2004-04-29

It is well established that municipalities cannot avail themselves of the qualified immunity doctrine.

Municipalities cannot claim official immunity from suit under § 1983.

King v. Jefferies · filed 2005-11-25

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the existence of an official policy to support a § 1983 claim. Further, the Town is not entitled to official immunity.

Governmental immunity is not a defense to a Section 1983 claim.

Davis v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1994-11-10

Unlike a claim brought under a negligence theory, under Section 1983, governmental immunity is not a defense.

Local government entities cannot claim official immunity from § 1983 suits based on their own policies.

Hernandez v. Michael F. Sheahan, Sheriff of Cook County, and City of Chicago · filed 2006-07-26

First, units of government are not entitled to immunity in suits under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide municipalities with good faith immunity from liability.

Cleamtee Garner v. Memphis Police Department · filed 1983-06-16

In light of our finding of a constitutional violation, we must reach this question; in doing so, we hold that there is no good faith immunity for municipalities under § 1983.

A municipality has no immunity from § 1983 liability based on its officers’ good faith, even when those officers are immune.

Bill Wilkinson and James Farrands v. Lester Forst, Donald Long, Austin McGuigan and the City of Meriden · filed 1987-11-09

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980), holds that a municipality has no immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) based upon the good faith of its officers, even though those officers would themselves be accorded such immunity.

Municipalities sued under § 1983 have neither absolute immunity nor good-faith qualified immunity.

Tammy Lane HUEMMER v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF OCEAN CITY · filed 1980-10-09

Those grounds, however, dissolved as a consequence of the closely divided decision in Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). ... There it was held that municipal corporations sued, as here, in their official capacities, have no immunity, either absolute immunity or good-faith qualified immunity.

Municipalities have no immunity from damages awarded under § 1983.

Kindem v. City of Alameda · filed 1980-11-11

While plaintiff’s request was pending before this court, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980), in which it held municipalities enjoyed no immunity from damages awarded pursuant to section 1983. Owen provides a definitive answer to the questions presented by plaintiff’s request in the instant action. Inasmuch as the court has previously established that the proper amount of any backpay award in this case would be $9,433.90, that sum shall be paid to plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not give a municipality immunity from damages based on its officials’ good faith.

Key v. Rutherford · filed 1981-04-10

As a consequence of these subsequent changes, the trial court’s jury instruction that Stroud would be immune if its city officials acted in good faith is erroneous under the current state of the law.

Section 1983 does not give a municipality legislative immunity from damages for constitutional violations caused by its zoning regulations.

Hernandez v. City of Lafayette · filed 1981-05-01

We consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Owen and its caveat in Lake Country Estates to be dispositive of the city’s argument and hold that the City of Lafayette is not entitled to a legislative immunity from damages under § 1983 in connection with its zoning regulations.

Section 1983 does not give municipalities immunity from damages claims, even when the official involved has absolute immunity.

Quarterman v. City of Springfield · filed 2009-09-28

Even if the offending official is entitled to immunity, the entity is not. As a municipal government, the City of Springfield has no immunity against suits for damages brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or 1983.

Municipalities are not immune from damages liability under § 1983 merely because they enforced a state law.

RHJ Medical Center, Inc. v. City of DuBois · filed 2010-12-07

For three decades, the Supreme Court has held that municipalities do not have immunity for suits stemming from 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a municipality to assert its officers’ good faith as a defense to damages liability.

Roe v. City of San Diego · filed 2013-03-05

Similarly, a “municipality may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability under § 1983,” because “municipalities have no immunity from damages liability flowing from their constitutional violations.”

Pennsylvania’s tort-claims immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against a school district.

Viney v. Jenkintown School District · filed 2014-09-10

However, the same reasoning does not apply to Plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This is because the Pennsylvania Torts Claims Act does not immunize municipalities against federal causes of action.

A governmental entity sued under Section 1983 cannot assert its officer’s judicial immunity.

Rodriguez v. Providence Community Corrections, Inc. · filed 2016-06-09

Neither does the County confront the well-established tenet of Section 1983 litigation that a governmental entity may never assert the judicial immunity asserted by its officer.

Municipalities do not have absolute immunity from suits under Section 1983.

Sample v. City of Woodbury · filed 2016-09-06

Unlike government officials, municipalities do not enjoy absolute immunity from suit under section 1983.

Municipalities cannot claim absolute or qualified immunity from suits under § 1983.

Leon v. Summit County · filed 2018-11-28

But the argument is contrary to settled law. As the Supreme Court has stated, “unlike various government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit—either absolute or qualified—under § 1983.”

Municipalities sued under § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity.

E. D. v. Sharkey · filed 2019-07-01

Unlike the individual Defendants, Berks County cannot assert a qualified immunity defense, and the denial of summary judgment to Berks County therefore does not trigger collateral order doctrine review. See Owner v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980) (under § 1983, a municipality is not entitled to qualified immunity from liability for violations of constitutional rights).

Section 1983 does not treat a municipal corporation such as the Port Authority as a “person” subject to suit under the statute.

Skyers v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NY & NJ · filed 1976-12-28

Thus plaintiff’s § 1983 claim as against the Port Authority must fail.

Section 1983 treats a municipality as a “person” subject to suit for alleged constitutional violations.

Carolina Action v. Pickard · filed 1979-02-12

Further, the court has jurisdiction over the City of Charlotte as a “person” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats municipalities as persons subject to damages liability for constitutional violations flowing from legislative activities and reaches private persons acting in concert with government officials.

Chertkof v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore · filed 1980-09-19

The court also concludes that plaintiff has stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both the City and the corporate defendant. Municipalities are “persons” within the meaning of the statute, ... and may be held liable for damages for constitutional violations flowing from their legislative activities, even in the absence of bad faith. ... Additionally, it is settled that private persons acting in concert with government officials subject themselves to section 1983’s reach.

A municipal corporation can be a “person” eligible to sue under § 1983, but it must assert a protected right to state a claim.

South Macomb Disposal Authority v. Township of Washington · filed 1986-05-13

We are of the opinion that in light of Monell, it would be a strained analysis to hold, as a matter of statutory construction, that a municipal corporation was a “person” within one clause of section 1983, but not a “person” within another clause of the same statute.

Section 1983 permits suits against local school corporations classified as municipal corporations because they are persons under the statute.

Fortenberry v. Board of School Trustees · filed 2000-11-28

Classification as a municipal corporation has the double effect of making local school corporations amenable to suit as persons under Section 1983, and of removing them from the protection of the Eleventh Amendment.

A municipality is a proper defendant in an action under § 1983.

Gray's Disposal Co. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville · filed 2002-12-31

A municipality is a proper party in actions brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 protects corporations as persons that may assert claims for violations of their rights.

Northeast Georgia Radiological Associates v. Tidwell · filed 1982-03-15

Accordingly, corporations are "persons" whose rights are protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a school city that is a subdivision of the state.

Mejia v. School City of Gary · filed 1976-07-09

While this action will not lie against the defendant School City of Gary under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it is a subdivision of the State of Indiana, it is still a .suit for deprivation of constitutional rights and the same rationale would apply even though jurisdiction is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Indiana public school corporations are local governmental units and therefore persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Parker v. Franklin County Community School Corp. · filed 2012-01-31

We believe that under Will, as local governmental units, the school corporations are clearly “persons” within the ambit of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a complainant alleging a constitutional tort to plead deliberate indifference to the prisoner's continued health and well-being.

Bowring v. Godwin · filed 1977-03-18

For a constitutional tort to arise and for a cause of action to be stated under § 1983, the complainant must allege deliberate indifference to his continued health and well-being.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when a state actor, under color of law, deprives a person of constitutional rights; denying necessary medical attention to an incarcerated person despite circumstances indicating serious injury can constitute such a deprivation.

Robert Fitzke and Joy Fitzke v. Barry Shappell, Deputy Sheriff, and Elwin Smith, Sheriff, of Eaton County, Michigan, Joi · filed 1972-10-03

Accordingly, the complaint states a cause of action cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct causing insufficient or improper medical treatment to be so harmful that it can properly be characterized as a barbarous act that shocks the conscience.

Campbell v. Patterson · filed 1974-05-06

To constitute a claim under section 1983 based upon insufficient or improper medical treatment, the conduct must “be so harmful that it can properly be characterized as a ‘barbarous act’ that ‘shocks the conscience.’ ”

A person under state control has a constitutional right to adequate medical care, and intentional deprivation of that care is actionable under § 1983.

Baldi v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1985-05-08

Once the duty attaches, the individual under state control has a constitutional right to adequate medical care, the intentional deprivation of which is actionable through section 1983.

A systemwide failure to answer prisoners' dental-care requests or provide ordered follow-up treatment constitutes deliberate indifference to serious dental needs actionable under § 1983.

Dean v. Coughlin · filed 1985-12-03

Their failure to respond to requests for emergency treatment and routine care, and to perform follow-up appointments denies the defendants access to the dentist for treatment and diagnosis, and thus constitutes deliberate indifference on an institutional scale.

Section 1983 medical-care claims require allegations showing that inadequate care amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.

Colbeth v. Civiletti · filed 1980-07-01

A § 1983 claim for denial of adequate medical care will be dismissed if it does not allege such denial as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to bring a federal civil-rights claim alleging religious persecution, which the federal court should entertain.

Pierce v. La Vallee · filed 1961-07-31

In these three actions, plaintiffs seek relief under the Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for religious persecution alleged to have been practiced upon them while they were inmates of Clinton State Prison at Dannemora, New York. ... So we feel constrained to hold, notwithstanding the cited adverse rulings, that the present complaints, with their charges of religious persecution, state a claim under the Civil Rights Act which the district court should entertain.

Section 1983 does not permit a state prisoner to sue for perjury committed in a state prosecution unless the prisoner has first prevailed in habeas corpus.

Davis v. Hudson · filed 1977-08-18

Claims of perjury in state prosecutions are now commonplace, but a state prisoner cannot sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for perjury unless he has earlier prevailed in a petition for habeas corpus, which Davis does not show he has done.

Section 1983 provides a legal remedy for a prisoner’s claim that prison officials violated his constitutional right to freedom of religion.

Maute v. Frank · filed 1996-01-22

Because, at the very least, his action is cognizable in a § 1983 action, there is an adequate remedy at law and his mandamus action must fail.

A state prisoner’s civil rights claims arise under § 1983 rather than Bivens.

Royster v. Sutton · filed 2003-11-10

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error, although we note that in light of Royster’s status as a state prisoner, his civil rights claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), rather than Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 288 (1971).

A police officer’s investigatory conduct during a prosecution is not protected by the prosecutor’s absolute immunity from § 1983 liability.

Randle v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1986-10-16

To say that a police officer performing the acts alleged in the present case is functionally equivalent to a prosecutor, however, would extend immunity to an official who does not occupy the public trust of the prosecutor’s office and is neither authorized to make the discretionary decisions involved in presenting the state’s case in court nor under any duty as an officer of the court.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on police officers merely for investigating an accident, serving a ticket, testifying in the resulting prosecution, or allegedly giving a false account of the accident.

Edward Joseph Hurlburt, an Infant Over the Age of 14 Years, by Dorothy E. Hurlburt, His Next Friend v. Graham · filed 1963-10-21

The police officers did not become liable under the Civil Rights Act merely because they investigated the accident, served a ticket on the plaintiff which required him to appear before the justice and testified in the case. The officers were not responsible for what subsequently took place in the trial of the case. Cuiksa v. City of Mansfield, supra. Nor do we think that giving a false version of the accident (which plaintiff claims the officers and other defendants did) would bring the case under the Civil Rights Act. If the rule were otherwise, any disgruntled litigant who lost his case in the state court could get a retrial in the federal court by alleging that his opponent gave a false account of the controversy.

A § 1983 claim that police knowingly caused an indictment through perjured grand-jury testimony cannot reach a jury when the evidence would make a finding that they framed the plaintiff merely speculative.

Willis v. Bert W. Cool, Sylvester Young, Sr., and James F. Campbell · filed 1983-08-19

In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff claims that three Kansas City, Missouri police officers deprived him of federally protected rights by knowingly causing him to be indicted for murder on the basis of perjured testimony before a grand jury. ... We agree with the District Court, for the reasons given in its able opinion, that the evidence presented by the plaintiff will not support the conclusion that defendants knowingly attempted to frame an innocent man for murder. A jury verdict for plaintiff on this record would have been speculative only.

Police officers' forcible extraction of a confession is actionable under § 1983.

Hunt v. Jaglowski · filed 1987-07-21

Count III alleges that the police defendants forcibly extracted a confession from Hunt. This circuit has held at least twice that such conduct is actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an incarcerated California state prisoner to bring a federal civil-rights action despite state-law provisions concerning the prisoner’s capacity to sue.

Weller v. Fred H. Dickson, Andrew Emmitte Pope v. Richard A. McGee · filed 1963-03-29

We agree with this conclusion and invite the reader’s attention to McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F.Supp. 112, 116-117 (N.D.Calif.1955), wherein the court considered the effect of Sec. 2600 of the California Penal Code and Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure upon the right of an inmate of a California State Prison to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relating to civil rights. The court held that the prisoner had the capacity to bring the action.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to sue despite a state civil death statute.

Pierson v. Grant · filed 1973-04-25

Accordingly, the court is of the view that plaintiff does not lack the capacity to sue under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a due-process claim for a temporary transfer outside a teacher’s license when the plaintiff has not alleged deprivation of a protected property interest.

Gordon v. Anker · filed 1977-11-04

Nor has plaintiff stated a claim under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment for violations of her rights under the due process clause.

Section 1983 authorizes recovery when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of a state-law-protected right or benefit without due process.

Bell v. Gayle · filed 1974-11-18

This court finds and concludes that the defendants in this case acting under color of law by virtue of their offices on the city council and as mayor of Denver City, Texas, deprived the plaintiffs of their right to due notice and an opportunity to present defenses. ... Therefore, the plaintiffs had proved to the satisfaction of this court by a preponderance of the evidence that they were deprived of a right or benefit conferred by state law without due process of law and are entitled to a recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy when state officials deprive a public employee of a constitutionally protected interest in procedural safeguards, including a predischarge hearing required by applicable employment rules.

Jorge J. Oppenheimer Mendez v. Acevedo · filed 1975-04-01

The district court ruling that the activities of the appellants abridged appellee’s civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) turns on its determination that there was a legitimate expectancy that procedural safeguards would be required prior to dismissal for just cause and that therefore appellee had a constitutionally protected interest in the faithful execution of these procedures. ... It is clear that at the time of his dismissal appellee was entitled to a predischarge hearing. The district court’s order requiring reinstatement and provision of that hearing is appropriate.

Section 1983 reaches a state-law employment decision when it deprives a public employee of a Fourteenth Amendment-protected property right and procedural due process.

Morse v. Wozniak · filed 1975-05-06

In summary, this Court may view plaintiff’s claim under the Teacher Tenure Act as a purely state claim, one which is pendent to a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and proceed to rule on it. ... This argument expands the State claim into a federal civil rights claim. ... Before any such decision could be made, however, it would be necessary to decide that plaintiff had acquired tenure, or had a claim of entitlement — some property right — protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Since this has been decided by the foregoing portion of this opinion, it follows that plaintiff has been denied constitutional rights as well as any rights which arise under the Teachers Tenure Act.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to obtain relief when state actors deprive the employee of protected property or liberty interests without due process.

Bogart v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 298 of Lincoln Cty. · filed 1977-05-17

The first determination to be made in this § 1983 action is whether plaintiff had such a legally cognizable property or liberty interest as to have standing to complain of the manner of its deprivation. ... The Board’s dismissal of plaintiff is invalid purely upon due process grounds. ... Plaintiff is entitled to and must receive reinstatement and restoration to his position as a teacher in the high school of defendant School District from which he was wrongfully dismissed, at the same classification in rank as a teacher and pay scale applicable thereto to which he would presently be entitled had he continued without interruption as a teacher in such district.

Section 1983 allows federal review of state employee discipline for federal due-process violations, but a claim fails when the employee receives constitutionally sufficient notice and a meaningful hearing concerning conduct not itself constitutionally protected.

Janet Shawgo and Stanley Whisenhunt v. Lee Spradlin, Chief of Police, City of Amarillo, Texas · filed 1983-03-28

Emphasizing that the underlying conduct — cohabitation or romantic involvement between a subordinate and superior officer — was within the scope of state personnel regulation and not independently protected by the Constitution (as is, for example, first amendment speech), we find that — in the context of a § 1983 action brought in federal court to review personnel disciplinary actions by state governmental agencies — the notice provided by the state civil service regulations, however vague it may have been that the conduct for Whisenhunt which was disciplined was subject to sanction, did not nevertheless offend the minimum requirements of federal due process with regard to the state’s discipline of its employees for conduct that is not in itself constitutionally protected and that was reasonably within the scope of the regulations’ prohibitions.

Section 1983 does not authorize de novo federal review of a public-employment fact-finding board’s evidentiary determinations; federal intervention requires a deprivation of constitutional dimension.

Payne v. Ballard · filed 1984-10-11

To the extent that a plaintiff challenges administrative actions taken against him, the district court should not provide a ... review under § 1983 of a fact finding board’s determinations. ... Federal courts do not review disciplinary actions for sufficiency of evidence. It is only when a party suffers deprivations of constitutional dimension that a federal court may become involved.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for termination of public employment when the employee receives the notice and opportunity to be heard required by due process.

House v. University of Central Arkansas ex rel. Board of Trustees of the University of Central Arkansas · filed 1988-04-12

Termination after notice and hearing is not a deprivation cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for “only deprivations without due process are actionable.”

Section 1983 supports a federal due process claim when a tenured borough police officer is discharged without an opportunity to contest whether his disability is permanent.

Tressler v. Borough of Red Lion · filed 1988-06-01

Count I sets forth a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based upon defendants’ violation of plaintiff’s due process rights in connection with the determination of his disability status as a police officer with the Borough. ... Defendants admit they discharged plaintiff without giving him an opportunity to show his disability was only temporary and they defend upon the erroneous belief that such an opportunity was not required. Accordingly, they have no meritorious defense to the due process claim in Count I of the complaint and default will not be set aside on that count.

Section 1983 permits vicarious liability under respondeat superior, allowing an employer to be liable for an agent’s constitutional deprivation.

Hill v. Toll · filed 1970-12-09

Accordingly, we now decide, consistent with the traditional injunction that remedial statutes are to receive a liberal construction, that respondeat superior is impliedly a part of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on higher city officials for lower officials' acts when applicable state law imposes no such liability.

Mary I. Boettger, Administratrix of the Estate of Clarence Stensrude, Jr., Deceased v. Moore · filed 1973-07-31

We have held that when a state, by statute, has imposed upon a sheriff liability for the misconduct of his appointees, the sheriff can be sued under §§ 1983 and 1988. Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1971). ... Thus, assuming that Hesselgesser requires the district court to look to state law, the district court correctly found no liability. Montana has not imposed vicarious liability upon its city officials in this type of case. Boettger v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., supra. See also Cockrum v. Whitney, 479 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1973).

Section 1983 may be enforced in state courts, but it does not impose vicarious liability on an official solely because of the official's position.

Dudley v. Genesee County Sheriff · filed 1973-11-29

The trial court held that exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims under 42 USCA 1983 is vested in the Federal courts. We find this conclusion to be erroneous. Unless it appears that Congress intended to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal courts, state and Federal courts usually have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce rights under Federal statutes. ... We see no reason for any holding other than that a state court has jurisdiction. ... The Federal act does not provide for vicarious liability simply because a person holds a certain position.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Hopkins v. Hall · filed 1974-01-18

The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss will be sustained as to Defendant Hall.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private entity for the acts of an officer it employs, because the entity lacks the requisite official state-action character.

Steven C. Draeger, by and Through Norman A. Draeger, Guardian Ad Litem v. Grand Central, Inc., and David Park · filed 1974-10-16

In our view, there is less reason for imposing vicarious liability here since the entire thrust of § 1983 requires, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, official state action. ... We are of the opinion then that the appellant department store cannot be held liable solely as a master or principal. If the store were an active participant it could still not be state action. Therefore, the aggrieved person must look to common law actions for relief.

Section 1983 does not impose monetary-damages liability on an employer under respondeat superior for constitutional wrongs committed by its employees.

Weiss v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 1976-05-21

It is well-established that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to actions for monetary damages brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a state or municipal official for the acts of lower officials absent a state law imposing such liability.

Mosher v. H. C. Saalfeld and Wesley J. Robinson · filed 1979-01-26

This court has held that in a § 1983 action vicarious liability may not be imposed on a state or municipal official for the acts of lower officials in the absence of a state law imposing such liability.

Section 1983 permits a sheriff to be held vicariously liable for a deputy's acts when applicable state law provides for that liability, subject to state-law limits.

Gary Baskin and Beulah Baskin v. Eugene Parker and Curtis L. Smith · filed 1979-02-01

In this circuit, “the question of a sheriff’s vicarious liability under Section 1983 for acts of his deputy is controlled by state law.” ... Therefore, the district court should have looked to the law of Louisiana to determine whether the Sheriff was liable. ... Thus, applying Louisiana law, Sheriff Parker is liable for the search conducted by Deputy Smith and by the search party Smith directed, although only to the extent of Deputy Smith’s bond or the limits of the liability insurance that covered Smith. The district court, therefore, improperly dismissed the Section 1983 cause of action against Sheriff Parker.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a state or municipal official for acts of lower officials unless state law imposes that liability.

Fayle v. Stapley · filed 1979-11-05

We have held that in a Section 1983 action, vicarious liability may not be imposed on a state or municipal official for acts of lower officials in the absence of a state law imposing such liability.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for negligent acts committed by local jail employees.

Dillon ex rel. Dillon v. Director, Department of Corrections · filed 1982-12-09

For the reasons stated in the Director’s motion to dismiss, this court is of the opinion that the Director must be dismissed from this action. ... The Director, moreover, cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts, if any, committed by employees of the Roanoke City Jail.

A constitutional-injury claim based only on vicarious liability is not actionable under Section 1983.

Watts v. Morgan · filed 1983-08-30

A claim of constitutional injury based on a theory of vicarious liability is not actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery against a municipality on a respondeat superior theory.

Quaschnick v. Minnesota · filed 1985-07-18

Respondeat superior is not permitted as a basis for recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A city is liable under § 1983 only when its rule or procedure was the moving force behind the constitutional violation, not on respondeat superior grounds.

Sisler v. City of Centerville · filed 1985-07-31

In order to recover from the city, plaintiffs would have to prove the city had a forbidden rule or procedure which was “the moving force of the constitutional violation....” ... The city could not be held liable merely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat-superior liability.

Ouzts v. Sgt. D. Cummins E. Campbell, Co-I Warden W.H. Sargent, Arkansas Dept. Of Correction · filed 1987-08-13

Respondeat superior is not applicable to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 liability cannot be based on respondeat superior.

Rodriguez v. Handy · filed 1989-05-26

Section 1983 liability with its concurrent § 1988 attorney’s fees liability cannot be predicated on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private corporate employer for its employees’ constitutional torts.

Temple v. Albert · filed 1989-09-18

Thus, a private corporate employer may not be vicariously liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior or vicarious liability for a deprivation of federal rights committed under color of state law.

Montgomery v. County of Clinton, Mich. · filed 1990-07-30

Respondeat superior or vicarious liability does not attach under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of a federally protected civil right under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not recognize vicarious liability for a constitutional deprivation.

Jacobs v. Dujmovic · filed 1990-12-11

Vicarious liability is not recognized in section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on school board officials for a hearing officer’s conduct without their personal involvement.

Collins v. School Board of Dade County, Florida · filed 1993-01-26

Even if the DOAH hearing officer were viewed as an agent of the Dade County School Board, defendants would not be subject to vicarious liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on defendants, including school districts, for wrongs they did not perform, authorize, or ratify.

Schanou v. Lancaster County School District No. 160 · filed 1994-08-31

Simply put, there is no vicarious liability under section 1983. Since there is no evidence that any of the defendants, including the school district as an entity, performed, authorized, or ratified the alleged wrong, the defendants can have no liability for the distribution to Jace.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Fairbairn v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF S. CENT. SCHOOL · filed 1995-01-13

Moreover, the court notes, liability may not be based on the respondeat superior or vicarious liability doctrines.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior or vicarious liability on a county or sheriff for deputies’ conduct.

Vine v. County of Ingham · filed 1995-02-03

Yet, respondeat superior or vicarious liability does not attach under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability; a defendant is liable only if its own conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Donaggio v. Arlington County, Va. · filed 1995-03-28

There is no vicarious liability under § 1983. ... In other words, a party is not liable under § 1983 unless that party’s conduct violated the plaintiffs rights in some manner.

Section 1983 does not make a jail physician vicariously liable for the actions of other infirmary personnel.

Burton v. Cameron County, Tex. · filed 1995-04-24

Essentially, Plaintiff asks that Dr. Stern be held vicariously liable for this conduct. Dr. Stern is not liable under § 1983 for the actions of other infirmary personnel.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a defendant, including liability under respondeat superior.

Randle v. NFN Foster · filed 1995-10-18

A defendant cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of vicarious liability, including respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors or municipalities for constitutional injuries inflicted by subordinate employees.

McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors · filed 1996-01-09

It cannot be done on any theory of vicarious liability; principles of respondeat superior do not apply in imposing liability under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on defendants who have no connection to the alleged deprivation.

Johnson v. Phelan · filed 1996-01-29

Most of the defendants have no relation to the events of which Johnson complains and were properly dismissed because § 1983 does not establish vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not permit holding a private corporation liable for its employees’ conduct solely under respondeat superior.

Palmer v. Smith · filed 1996-08-20

Given that the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be employed to hold a private corporation liable under section 1983, plaintiff's argument plainly fails.

Section 1983 does not make a defendant vicariously liable for another person’s statements.

Oren Gamble, Sr. v. Kemna · filed 1997-02-05

Kemna cannot be held vicariously liable for his statements.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability for a claim based on a policy, custom, or practice.

Robinson v. City of San Bernardino Police Department · filed 1998-01-26

A Section 1983 claim premised upon liability stemming from a policy, custom or practice cannot be established through the doctrine of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Doe v. ISD · filed 1998-06-11

The law is well-settled that liability under § 1983 cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not recognize claims based on negligence or vicarious liability.

Black v. Scott · filed 1998-08-21

Because Black’s claims of negligence and vicarious liability are not cognizable in a § 1983 cause of action, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that his claims were frivolous.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability for constitutional violations committed by others.

Payne v. Churchich · filed 1998-11-06

To the extent that the rambling language of this count might be construed to allege vicarious liability for federal constitutional violations committed by others, it fails because, as we have already noted, § 1983 does not permit vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability for another person’s constitutional violation.

Payne v. Churchich · filed 1999-01-12

To the extent that the rambling language of this count might be construed to allege vicarious liability for federal constitutional violations committed by others, it fails because, as we have already noted, § 1983 does not permit vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on physicians for nurses’ omissions.

Stewart v. Murphy · filed 1999-04-27

However, Appellants did not sue the nurses; and, of course, the doctors may not be held liable for § 1983 violations under a theory of respondent superior or vicarious liability, based upon claimed omissions by the nurses.

Section 1983 does not make doctors vicariously liable for nurses’ alleged omissions.

Stewart v. Murphy · filed 1999-05-14

However, Appellants did not sue the nurses; and, of course, the doctors may not be held liable for § 1983 violations under a theory of respondent superior or vicarious liability, based upon claimed omissions by the nurses.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on vicarious liability.

Donlan v. Ridge · filed 1999-07-27

Liability under § 1983 cannot be based on vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not allow a municipality to be held liable on a respondeat superior theory.

Jordan v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1999-09-14

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a re-spondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery based on vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Sanders v. Phillips · filed 2001-02-23

Sanders may not recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on theories of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on a defendant’s employment relationship with the person who committed the violation.

Rhyce v. Martin · filed 2001-04-09

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES all vicarious liability claims against the individual defendants and all § 1983 vicarious liability claims.

Section 1983 does not allow state-law vicarious liability for a deputy’s acts.

Henley v. Edlemon · filed 2002-07-24

Thus, the Henleys cannot rely on this state law doctrine in their § 1983 suit because it is inconsistent with federal law.

Section 1983 does not make officers vicariously liable for physicians’ later decisions to authorize a civil commitment.

Bielenberg v. Griffiths · filed 2003-03-14

The physicians who authorized the Bielenbergs’ civil commitment are not among the defendants, and the officers who took them to the hospital cannot be held vicariously liable for the physicians’ later decisions.

Section 1983 does not make a governmental entity liable for its employees’ acts solely on a theory of vicarious liability.

Woulard v. Food Service · filed 2003-03-27

The issue in regard to State Defendant Food Service is whether for § 1983 purposes, the actions taken by Food Service employees can be attributed to Food Service itself. Food Service cannot be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability for prison officials based solely on their subordinates’ errors.

Adames v. Perez · filed 2003-06-04

We have made clear that vicarious liability is an untenable theory of recovery in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an organization based solely on its employees’ actions.

Zuniga v. University Health System · filed 2003-12-05

Zuniga’s claims against University Health Systems for the actions of its employees and his claims against Dr. Schenck and Dr. Sparks for negligence and malpractice are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability or liability based on respondeat superior.

Coleman v. Martin · filed 2005-03-29

The law is clear that liability under § 1983 cannot be imposed based on theories of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 claims against defendants based on vicarious liability may be dismissed.

Wilson v. Johnson · filed 2005-04-27

To the extent that Wilson attempted to recover from certain defendants under a theory of vicarious liability, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing these claims.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on a theory of vicarious liability.

Lyon v. Buentello · filed 2005-06-21

Lyon’s complaint and his more definite statement in the district court reveal that he is suing these defendants under a ... theory of vicarious liability, which is not a basis for 28 U.S.C. § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a county or supervising officials for a deputy’s misconduct.

Reinhardt v. Dennis · filed 2005-08-31

However, Ionia County, Sheriff Dennis and Undersheriff Miller cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for injuries caused by Balis.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on private defendants solely for their employees’ acts.

Smedley v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2005-12-20

While it is quite clear that Monell itself applied to municipal governments and not private entities acting under color of state law, it is now well settled that Monell also extends to private defendants sued under § 1983.

A private prison medical provider cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for its employees’ acts.

Green v. FIRST CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL · filed 2006-05-10

Here, Green did not name any individual prison officials or FCM employees as defendants, and, under the Eighth Amendment, FCM cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees actions.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability, including respondeat superior, on a defendant.

James v. Gonzales · filed 1999-04-20

James’ allegations against Dr. Gonzales also do not demonstrate a constitutional violation under § 1983. See Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (5th Cir. 1979)(defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of vicarious liability, including respondeat superior).

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability against a sheriff for deputies’ conduct.

Turner v. Sheriff of Marion County · filed 2000-03-01

The plaintiffs conceded in their summary judgment response that the Sheriff of Marion County cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 and summary judgment was accordingly granted on those claims.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a physician for another medical provider’s violations.

Gobert v. Caldwell · filed 2006-08-29

Caldwell cannot be held liable for § 1983 violations under the theory of respondiat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on a vicarious liability theory.

Hendrickson v. McCreanor · filed 2006-10-05

The appellants’ claim that Brady was vicariously liable for the actions of prison officials was also flawed because she did not supervise the DCC officers and employees, and she could not be held liable in a § 1983 suit based on vicarious liability theory, in any event.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable for its employees’ actions solely under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Bevan v. Lee County SO · filed 2007-01-05

The district court properly granted summary judgment on these claims because an employer cannot be held liable under § 1983 for its employees’ actions under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 imposes no vicarious liability on a city or police chief without an underlying constitutional violation.

Schneider v. Merritt · filed 2007-06-26

Without an underlying constitutional violation, the City of Pacifica and its Chief of Police have no vicarious liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability for another officer’s conduct; an officer must have participated in or been aware of the conduct to be held accountable for it.

Brown v. Fortner · filed 2008-03-04

A claim pursuant to § 1983 cannot be based upon vicarious liability, however, so Fortner must have made — or at least been aware of— the taunting comments to be held accountable for them.

Section 1983 does not permit a state vicarious liability statute to impose liability on a sheriff for deputies’ actions when the sheriff did not personally violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Marks v. Lyon County Board of County Commissioners · filed 1984-08-10

In summary, this Court is unpersuaded by the reasoning of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and holds that K.S.A. 19-805 may not be used to impose liability under § 1983 upon a sheriff for the actions of his deputies when the sheriff has not acted personally to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior or vicarious liability for another person's constitutional violations.

Kinslow v. Pullara · filed 2008-08-14

His theory under the Compact relies on agency principles of respon-deat superior and vicarious liability, but neither one applies to claims based on § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability for another person's acts.

Coon v. Ledbetter · filed 1986-01-16

It follows that neither Sheriff Ledbetter nor his insurer, U.S.F. & G., can be held liable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief based solely on vicarious liability.

Shabazz v. White · filed 2008-11-25

Moreover, Shabazz failed to state a cause of action based on anything other than vicarious liability for which relief is unavailable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability under respondeat superior.

Clark v. Maryland Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services · filed 2009-03-13

As previously noted, principles of respondeat superior have no application to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not make officials liable for their predecessors’ acts when the applicable state law excludes that liability.

Sperl v. Deukmejian · filed 1980-01-09

While the Civil Rights Act does not specifically provide a basis for vicarious liability,, the Ninth Circuit has held that state laws pertaining to vicarious liability are applicable. ... Thus, the Complaint also fails because neither defendant was in office at the time of the conviction now attacked by plaintiff.