42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to have a federally protected right under the provision it seeks to enforce; the plaintiff must be an intended beneficiary of that provision.

CAMCO CABLE SERVICES, INC. v. City of Lauderhill · filed 1998-07-23

Because Cameo was not an intended beneficiary of § 25.104, the Court finds that § 25.104 does not create a federally protected right for Cameo. Accordingly, Cameo does not have standing under § 1983, and the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted.

A person who files an attorney disciplinary complaint lacks standing to sue disciplinary officials under § 1983 for allegedly mishandling it when its disposition causes the complainant no legally cognizable injury.

Cotton v. Steele · filed 1999-01-08

We therefore conclude that Cotton did not have standing to assert a claim against Steele and Carlson based upon their alleged mishandling of his disciplinary complaint and, accordingly, that the district court did not err in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on threatened or imminent injury.

Miller v. Ririe Joint School District No. 252 · filed 1999-02-16

Threatened or imminent injury is sufficient to make a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not let family members sue solely for a violation of a relative’s civil rights.

Rodriguez-Oquendo v. Toledo-Davila · filed 1999-02-23

Since family members cannot rest a section 1983 claim on the violation of a kin’s civil rights, we dismiss those claims for lack of standing.

Section 1983 allows a victim or the victim’s estate representative to pursue a claim, but does not allow family members to recover for their own indirect injuries.

Claybrook v. Birchwell · filed 2000-01-11

Accordingly, only the purported victim, or his estate’s representative(s), may prosecute a section 1983 claim; conversely, no cause of action may lie under section 1983 for emotional distress, loss of a loved one, or any other consequent collateral injuries allegedly suffered personally by the victim’s family members.

Section 1983 does not give a spouse standing to recover for indirect injuries caused by a constitutional tort suffered by the other spouse.

Claybrook v. Birchwell · filed 2000-01-11

For the reasons developed above, Royal Claybrook Jr. lacks standing under section 1983 to claim compensation for any indirect injuries allegedly caused to him by reason of any constitutional tort suffered by his spouse Quintana Claybrook, irrespective of the potential merits of Quintana's personal claims.

Standing to bring a § 1983 wrongful death claim is determined by the applicable state wrongful death statute through § 1988.

Aguillard v. McGowen · filed 2000-03-15

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, we must look to the state wrongful death statute to determine who has standing to bring a wrongful death claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not allow a plaintiff to recover damages for the violation of someone else’s federal rights, except under survivor or representative theories.

Hunt v. Elkhart County Sheriff · filed 2000-04-03

Except under survivor and representative theories, a plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot recover damages on the ground that someone else’s federal statutory or constitutional right was violated.

Section 1983 permits organizations with representational standing to sue to vindicate their members’ federal rights.

Environmental Tech v. State of SC · filed 2000-06-02

It is well established that organizations satisfying the requirements for representational standing may bring actions to vindicate the fed- eral rights of their members under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not itself confer standing; a plaintiff must establish standing on another basis.

Tarsney v. O'Keefe · filed 2000-09-11

Standing must be established on another basis before a section 1983 claim can proceed.

Section 1983 does not itself confer standing; a plaintiff must establish standing on another basis before a claim can proceed.

Tarsney v. O'keefe · filed 2000-09-11

It is well established that the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), cannot confer standing.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to sue for violations of children’s rights when he cannot show that his own federal rights were deprived.

Dillabaugh v. County of Thurston · filed 2001-06-21

Dillabaugh’s allegations regarding the denial of constitutional rights to children fail to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he lacks standing, as he is unable to show that he suffered any deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to have suffered a personal deprivation of federal rights; injury to another person does not give the plaintiff standing to sue.

Serrano v. Sanchez-Bermudez · filed 2001-11-26

Therefore, the Court holds that Cruz-Serrano lacks standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to warrant an assertion of his individual First Amendment rights because he has suffered no personal injury.

Section 1983 does not let a plaintiff sue solely for violations of family members’ rights.

Idemudia v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 2002-06-14

First, although many of Idemudia’s allegations concern the alleged illegal convictions of various family members, she lacks standing to bring a civil rights action for violations allegedly committed against her family members. Generally, a plaintiff must assert her own rights and not solely those of a third party.

A power of attorney does not give a person standing to bring a § 1983 claim based on another person’s constitutional rights.

Wayne v. Johnson · filed 2002-10-11

A power of attorney does not confer standing to assert another party’s constitutional claims or authority to represent another party in court.

A plaintiff must personally suffer a constitutional injury to have standing to assert a claim under § 1983.

Prestopnik v. Whelan · filed 2003-03-26

Because plaintiff did not, and is not likely to, personally suffer any constitutional injury, she does not have standing to assert claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a claimant to allege a personal injury; an alleged violation of another person’s rights does not give the claimant standing to sue.

Schachter v. United States Life Insurance · filed 2003-10-02

Here, Mr. Schachter’s allegations of a deprivation of his own rights depends entirely upon the alleged violation of the rights of his unnamed home attendant. Thus, Mr. Schachter has not alleged the sort of personal injury necessary to confer standing to pursue a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not dispense with Article III standing to challenge an administrative appeals process.

Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Clearwater · filed 2003-11-28

We note that while 42 U.S.C. § 1983 forms the statutory jurisdictional basis for Granite State’s claim, § 1983 is not a substitute for the constitutional standing requirements.

Section 1983 claims depend on the plaintiff’s standing to invoke the substantive rights they seek to enforce.

Canadian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York · filed 1983-11-04

It follows that they also lack standing to assert the alternative claims for relief set forth in the complaints. The claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are dependent upon plaintiffs’ standing to invoke the substantive rights afforded by the Nonintercourse Act.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish a legal entitlement to the interest allegedly deprived in order to have standing to challenge the deprivation.

Appelmans v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1987-08-12

We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The plaintiffs have failed to allege or provide evidentiary support for their legal entitlement to the funds at issue giving them standing to object to the transfer.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue for violations of her own constitutional rights, not another person’s rights.

Barrett v. United States · filed 1985-10-08

It also is now a firmly established principle of law that a plaintiff may not assert the constitutional rights of another but can only rely upon his own constitutional rights in bringing a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 allows a person to recover damages for a deprivation of that person's own federal rights, but does not allow a spouse or conjugal partnership to recover for another person's injury.

Leon v. Mujica-Cotto · filed 2004-11-17

The case law is clear that only Ramirez, and not co-plaintiffs Rivera-Pagán and the Conjugal Partnership of Ramírez and Rivera-Pagán, may recover damages for a § 1983 violation. Therefore, the causes of action under § 1983 of co-plaintiffs Rivera-Pagán and the Conjugal Partnership of Ramírez and Rivera-Pagán must be and are DISMISSED, with prejudice.

Section 1983 permits only the person whose civil rights were violated to bring the claim, and a shareholder cannot sue under it for damages suffered by a corporation.

Ramirez v. Arlequín · filed 2005-02-23

The First Circuit case law is crystal clear to the effect that only the party whose civil rights have been violated may bring a claim pursuant to that Section.

Section 1983 allows only the person whose civil rights were violated to bring a claim.

Figueroa-Garay v. Municipality of Rio Grande · filed 2005-03-08

The First Circuit case law is crystal clear to the effect that only the party whose civil rights have been violated may bring a claim pursuant to that Section. ... Therefore, Defendants’ request for dismissal of Co-plaintiffs Fuentes-Lopez’s and the Fuentes-Figueroa conjugal partnership’s Section 1983 claims is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Co-plaintiffs Fuentes-Lopez’s and the Fuentes-Figueroa conjugal partnership’s Section 1983 claims will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

A corporation may seek damages under § 1983 on its own behalf for alleged violations of its constitutional rights.

Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. The Township of Hampton, the Township of Hampton Council and the Commonwealth of Pennsylv · filed 2005-06-14

We note further that ASI has standing to seek damages on its own behalf under § 1983.

A decedent’s personal representative may bring a Section 1983 wrongful death claim for the surviving spouse and next of kin when state law authorizes the representative to sue.

Thomas Ex Rel. Smith v. Cook County Sheriff · filed 2005-11-16

Because Illinois law gives standing to a decedent’s personal representative to sue for wrongful death on behalf of the decedent’s surviving spouse and next of kin, Thomas may also bring a wrongful death claim under Section 1983 for the benefit of her deceased son’s surviving spouse and children.

A homeowner who did not pay school impact fees and cannot show a legally protected injury lacks standing to seek a refund under § 1983.

Gray v. Owens · filed 2006-02-08

Unlike their claims based on improper zoning, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a § 1983 claim for a refund of improperly assessed school impact fees.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to be a direct victim of the alleged constitutional violation; injury traceable to a violation of someone else’s rights is insufficient.

Barber v. Overton · filed 2007-08-02

Although she can trace her injury to the government’s release of her husband’s information, this does not render her a direct victim for purposes of bringing a § 1983 claim. Because Melissa Barber’s information was not released by the state, the state did not violate her constitutional rights, and she therefore cannot proceed under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give a person standing to sue for a violation of her First Amendment rights based solely on the prosecution of her father in retaliation for her political activity.

Dal Molin v. County of Napa Conservation, Development & Planning Department · filed 2008-02-06

William Dal Molin and Chris Malan (Appellants) appeal the dismissal of their suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Malan contends that the prosecution of her father as retaliation for her political activity confers standing on her to sue for a violation of her First Amendment rights. Her argument is squarely foreclosed by Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989, 992-93 (9th Cir.1999).

Section 1983 does not provide standing to maintain an action alleging violation of a consent decree when the decree contains no provision for an individual suit for damages or injunctive relief.

Williams v. Ward · filed 1982-08-11

Thus, Williams does not have standing to maintain the instant § 1983 action for alleged violation of his rights under the consent decree.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of their own federal rights; a spouse’s distress over an injury directed at the other spouse does not suffice.

Gomez v. Feliciano · filed 1988-10-27

Accordingly, a section 1983 plaintiff, like any person who claims a deprivation of constitutional or federally protected rights, must allege some violation of his or her personal rights.

A Medicaid provider directly affected by reimbursement decisions has standing to bring a § 1983 claim alleging a Boren Amendment violation.

Saint Joseph's Hospital v. Department of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania (In Re Saint Joseph's Hospital) · filed 1989-08-21

We also conclude that the Debtor could succeed only on its claims set forth in Counts IV and V of its Complaint, asserting violations of Title XIX of the Social Security Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We also reject the Defendants’ contention that the Debtor lacks standing to prosecute any aspects of its claims.

Section 1983 does not allow a corporation to bring a racial discrimination claim on its own behalf when the corporation has no racial identity.

Hudson Valley Freedom Theatre, Inc. v. Heimbach · filed 1981-05-05

Defendants assert, and the Court agrees, that because plaintiff HVFT, as a corporation, has no racial identity, it cannot have been the target of any racial discrimination, and therefore has no standing to maintain its claims under the Civil Rights laws and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. ... For these reasons, plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and 2000d are dismissed for lack of standing.

A person with an enforceable ownership interest in a car can sue under Section 1983 over its allegedly wrongful towing even if the car is titled in someone else’s name.

Petty v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1996-06-07

Based on the uneontroverted evidence, the court concludes that the plaintiff has a sufficient interest in the Car to provide her with standing to sue for violations of her constitutional rights under section 1983 arising from the allegedly wrongful towing of the Car.

A private citizen lacks standing to bring a § 1983 claim for damages against police officers for declining to prosecute someone else.

Garcia v. Miami Beach Police Dept. · filed 2009-06-04

We first conclude that Garcia lacks standing to bring a § 1983 claim for failure to prosecute.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights, but a plaintiff must have standing to sue.

Casella v. Borders · filed 2009-09-02

Accordingly, Casella lacks standing to sue under § 1983 for a Fourth Amendment violation. Counts II and III of the Amended Complaint will be dismissed.

Section 1983 looks to state law to determine who may bring a claim arising from conduct toward a deceased person.

Golla v. City of Bossier City · filed 2009-12-15

To the extent plaintiffs seek to pursue a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from the conduct of the defendants towards McDaniel, plaintiffs lack the standing to do so. A court must look to state law to determine the proper parties under section 1983.

A plaintiff’s personal § 1983 claim does not depend on standing to bring claims on behalf of a decedent’s estate.

Feliz Ex Rel. Estate of Clevenger v. County of Orange · filed 2014-01-10

Here, the district court committed manifest legal error by entering judgment on the entire § 1983 claim. L.P.F.’s personal Fourteenth Amendment claim does not depend on whether L.P.F. has standing to assert claims on behalf of the estate.

A Section 1983 retaliation claim does not require an adverse employment action; a plaintiff must personally suffer from a violation of civil rights to have standing.

Fedele v. Harris · filed 2014-05-09

There is no required “adverse employment action” element for a claim of retaliation under Section 1983. Rather, to have standing to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that [he or she] personally suffer[ed] from a violation of their civil rights.”

A person may pursue a Section 1983 claim arising from a search despite being absent from the scene if she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the property searched.

Natal-Falcón v. Beauchamp-Rodriguez · filed 2014-08-18

Given the allegations, the relevant question for purposes of Section 1983 is not whether Febus-Marcano was present at the scene. Rather, it is whether she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle and purse searched. That expectation, which defendants have not challenged, triggers the constitutional protection. For the same reason, absence from the scene does not deprive Febus-Marca-no of standing to pursue her claim. On this basis, defendants’ request to dismiss Febus-Marcano’s claim for lack of standing is denied.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to assert a third party’s constitutional rights.

Settle v. Slager · filed 2016-01-15

Moreover, as the district court held, Settle has no standing to assert the constitutional rights of a third party, see Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 497 (10th Cir. 1990), and his state claim is likewise meritless.

Section 1983 does not provide standing for a loss-of-familial-relations claim when the child's biological parents have already vindicated identical rights against the same defendant.

Piper v. Cabillo · filed 2016-11-03

Although we today assume without deciding that a non-biological non-adoptive “parent” could, under some circumstances, recover under § 1983 for loss of familial relations with a child, we cannot find such standing in a case in which the biological parents have already vindicated identical rights against the same defendant.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim on behalf of another must have standing under the applicable state wrongful death or survival statute.

Spells v. New Orleans City · filed 2017-07-13

Thus, in order to have standing to bring a § 1983 claim on behalf of another, the plaintiff “must have standing under the state wrongful death or survival statutes.” Id.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim on another person’s behalf must have standing under the applicable state wrongful death or survival statute; without it, the plaintiff lacks a cause of action.

Spells v. New Orleans City · filed 2017-08-11

Applying these principles, the succession administrator does not have standing to bring this § 1983 suit and thus lacks a cause of action. Under Louisiana law, a succession administrator lacks standing to bring a wrongful death action.

For a § 1983 claim arising from a death in Minnesota, the plaintiff must have standing under Minnesota’s wrongful death statute; appointment as a special administrator is insufficient.

Estate of Guled Ex Rel. Abdi v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2017-08-29

Regardless of any damages limitation that may apply were the party to pursue a state law claim under § 573.02, only a person who has standing to bring a claim under § 573.02 has standing to bring a § 1983 action in these circumstances.

Section 1983 permits a court-appointed wrongful death trustee to bring a claim arising from a decedent’s death; state survival law determines who may sue.

Anderson v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2018-03-30

Here, Plaintiff was appointed trustee for Anderson’s next-of-kin by a judge in Hennepin County, and thus this Court holds that he has standing to bring the § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to bring claims on behalf of another person.

Lang v. Vangorder · filed 2019-12-23

To the extent that these allegations might be construed as an attempt to raise claims on behalf of his mother, Lang lacks standing to bring such claims.

When a constitutional violation causes a person’s death, only the decedent’s personal representative may bring a § 1983 claim under Florida law.

Moss v. Leesburg Regional Medical Center · filed 2020-02-07

That is to say, the decedent’s personal representative is the only person with standing to pursue a § 1983 action regarding any constitutional violation that caused the death of the decedent.

The estate administrator may assert the decedent’s § 1983 claims; the heir and administrator in her individual capacity lack standing to assert them.

Walker v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2020-05-13

The proposed Second Amended Complaint asserts § 1983 claims on behalf of both plaintiffs, see Doc. 133-1 at 23–37 (Count I–IV), but only the Estate can assert the § 1983 claims.

A prisoner suing under § 1983 in his individual capacity cannot assert the constitutional rights of other inmates.

Muse v. Wilson · filed 2020-10-21

First, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief under § 1983 on behalf of other inmates in the “G-pod,” he has no standing to do so.

Under Missouri’s survival statute, plaintiffs lack standing to pursue a § 1983 claim on a decedent’s behalf for injuries that resulted in the decedent’s death.

Deloach v. Stevens · filed 2020-11-12

As to the §1983 claims, Plaintiffs do not have standing under the Missouri survival statute to pursue a § 1983 claim for injuries caused by the Defendants to Decedent.

Section 1983 allows service providers to challenge a state’s refusal to pay copayments required by the Medicaid Act’s QMB provisions.

Rehabilitation Ass'n of Virginia, Inc. v. Kozlowski · filed 1994-12-05

Second, Virginia again asserts that the Medicaid and Medicare Acts do not provide standing to the rehabilitation providers to bring this suit under § 1983. ... Where the state refuses to pay what the providers insist is the proper amount of the copayment for QMBs required under the Medicaid Act, the providers have standing to challenge the state’s interpretation of the relevant provisions.

Rehabilitation service providers have standing under § 1983 to challenge a state’s refusal to pay the QMB copayment amount allegedly required by the Medicaid Act.

Rehabilitation Association of Virginia, Incorporated v. Kozlowski · filed 1994-12-05

Second, Virginia again asserts that the Medicaid and Medicare Acts do not provide standing to the rehabilitation providers to bring this suit under Sec. 1983. ... The analysis set out in those opinions as to the Boren Amendment is equally applicable in this instance to the related QMB provisions of 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1396a(a)(10)(E), 1396d(a), 1396d(p). Where the state refuses to pay what the providers insist is the proper amount of the copayment for QMBs required under the Medicaid Act, the providers have standing to challenge the state's interpretation of the relevant provisions.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid providers to enforce the Medicaid Act’s equal access provision in court.

American Society of Consultant Pharmacists v. Garner · filed 2001-08-08

We begin with plaintiffs right to maintain this action, which the Seventh Circuit scarcely could have stated in more explicit language: “[w]e therefore follow Arkansas Medical Society and hold that providers of medical care have a private right of action, derived through § 1983, to enforce § 1396a(a)(30).” ... We decline the defendant’s invitation to disregard the clear holding of Methodist Hospitals, and we thus conclude that plaintiffs have a right to pursue this claim under Section 30(A).

A complaint filed under § 1983 against a federal employee is construed as a Bivens action.

Franco v. Santamas · filed 2002-08-05

Initially, we note that although the complaint was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because Franco sued a federal employee, the complaint is construed as being filed under Bivens.

A civil rights claim against federal court employees for their conduct as federal employees is classified as a Bivens action rather than a Section 1983 claim.

Wilson v. Helen · filed 1991-01-09

Because the defendants in this case are federal employees, this case is properly classified as a Bivens action. ... Wilson labels his complaint as one arising under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. However, pro se petitions should not be dismissed solely because the petitioner seeks relief under the wrong statute.

Section 1983 does not apply to claims against federal officers.

Howard v. Warden, Petersburg Reformatory · filed 1972-10-03

The Court concludes that the defendant’s contention that the Court is without jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S. C. § 1983 is well taken, since that section is not applicable to Federal officers.

Section 1983 does not apply to actions taken by the Federal Government.

United States ex rel. Gallagher v. Daggett · filed 1971-03-05

It is quite obvious to the court that the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not apply to actions on the part of the Federal Government and thus such statute forms no grounds for relief.

Section 1983 does not apply to official action by agents of the federal government.

Brown v. Schlesinger · filed 1973-10-30

Plaintiff also urges 42 U.S.C. § 1983 coupled with 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) as a jurisdictional basis. Sections 1983 and 1343 do not apply, however, with respect to official action by agents of the federal government.

Section 1983 does not apply to complaints by federal prisoners against federal officers or agents.

Ricketts v. Ciccone · filed 1974-02-05

Section 1983, Title 42, United States Code, is not applicable to complaints by federal prisoners of actions by federal officers or agents.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations under color of state law and does not apply to federal officers or private individuals absent state action.

Raether v. Phillips · filed 1975-07-21

Plaintiffs have asserted that this action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which creates a remedy to redress a deprivation, under color of state law, and is directed to state wrongdoing only, but does not apply to federal officers nor private individuals, unless they are acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not apply when the challenged action is exclusively federal rather than state action.

Mitchell v. Carlson · filed 1975-12-09

Second, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the related civil rights statutes are inapplicable in this instance because only federal, riot state, action is being challenged.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of civil rights under color of state law and does not apply to federal officers acting pursuant to federal law.

V. Stevens Kite v. Clarence M. Kelley, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1976-11-29

Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from them for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which proscribes deprivation of civil rights under color of state law. Section 1983 has no application to federal officers acting pursuant to federal law.

Section 1983 does not apply to actions of the federal government.

Rodriguez v. Ritchey · filed 1977-08-03

Section 1983, however, does not apply to the actions of the federal government.

Section 1983 is not a jurisdictional grant and does not provide an applicable jurisdictional basis for actions against federal officers.

Dr. Walter A. Cervoni v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare · filed 1978-06-27

First, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a jurisdictional grant. Second, neither § 1983 nor its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), constitutes an applicable basis for jurisdiction since they do not concern actions against federal officers.

Section 1983 does not apply to defendants acting under color of federal law.

Hubbert v. United States Parole Commission · filed 1978-10-31

Plaintiff alleges jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but that statute does not apply when the defendants are acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not encompass actions against federal officers or agents acting under color of federal law.

Porter v. Windham · filed 1981-06-04

Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that the named defendants, or any of them, were acting pursuant to state law, and it does not appear that any such allegation could be made in the circumstances. The statutes under which plaintiff has asserted his claim for relief herein do not encompass actions against federal officersor agents acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not authorize redress against federal agencies or officials acting under federal law.

Little Earth of United Tribes, Inc. v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1983-08-15

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting under “color of state or territorial law”; it does not authorize redress against federal agencies or officials who were acting under federal law as were defendants here.

Federal officers may be liable under Section 1983 when they act under color of state law to deprive a person of federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Krohn v. United States · filed 1983-10-04

Federal officers may be subject to liability under § 1983 where they act under color of state law to deprive a person of rights secured under the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires that the defendant have acted under color of state law, and a private employer's compliance with IRS instructions issued under federal Treasury Regulations is not action under color of state law.

Jenkins v. Rockwell International Corp. · filed 1984-08-08

§ 1983 provides redress only for action under color of state law. The action taken by a private party pursuant to the directions of the IRS in accordance with federal law (Treasury Regulations) does not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not create a cause of action for federal officials' violations committed under color of federal rather than state law.

Unification Church v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 1985-06-04

It did violate the appellants’ rights under color of federal law, but that creates no cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officers acting under color of federal law.

People of Colorado v. Heckler · filed 1985-08-09

Section 1983 “does not apply to federal officers acting under color of federal law.”

Federal officials may be liable under § 1983 when they conspire with state officers or employees.

Martinez v. Winner · filed 1985-08-22

Federal officials ordinarily are not suable under Sec. 1983, which requires action under color of state law, but they may be liable under Sec. 1983 where, as here, they are charged with conspiring with state officers or employees.

Federal officials do not violate § 1983 by acting under color of federal law.

Hall v. United States of America · filed 1985-09-25

Federal officials do not violate section 1983 by acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 reaches only deprivations accomplished under color of state law and therefore does not provide a cause of action against federal officials acting under federal authority.

Hewitt v. Grabicki · filed 1986-07-18

Section 1983 is based upon the Fourteenth Amendment and concerns only deprivations of rights that are accomplished under the color of state law, ... and Dr. Hewitt has failed to allege a racially or class-based animus necessary to establish a civil rights conspiracy under section 1985(2) and (3), ... .

Section 1983 does not supply jurisdiction over federal officials and private parties carrying out federal policy because their conduct is not state action.

Kostyu v. Ford Motor Company R.F. Hanna J. Haine T. Egan Taisha Turner Bruce Settel and R.S. Barmore · filed 1986-07-28

We observe initially the lack of state action which would provide jurisdiction for this action under Sec. 1983. The defendants are federal officials and private parties carrying out federal income tax policies.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations under color of state law and does not apply to the United States or defendants acting under color of federal law.

Harper v. City of Birmingham · filed 1986-07-29

“Section 1343 places original jurisdiction in the district courts when there is a substantive claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. However, we agree with the district court’s ruling that these statutes provide a remedy for deprivation of rights under color of State law and do not apply when the defendants are acting under color of federal law.”

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not reach a federal agency acting under federal law or a private party absent state action.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Project Development Corp. · filed 1987-05-27

As a federal agency, moreover, FDIC could not be a state actor acting “under color of state law.” ... Project Development is a private party. The state action or “under color of state law” requirement is therefore absent. Appellants therefore utterly failed to state a claim under section 1983.

Federal officers generally fall outside § 1983, but they may be liable when their acts are done under color of state law.

Behre v. Thomas · filed 1987-07-17

It is well established that the above-quoted language requiring action under color of state law to establish a section 1983 claim means that actions of federal officers are at least facially exempt from its proscriptions. ... There are certain limited circumstances wherein federal officers may be subject to section 1983 liability for actions done under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches conduct under color of state law and does not authorize suit against a federal agency for a federal employee's actions.

Carver v. Casey · filed 1987-08-21

Section 1983 specifically redresses violations of rights "under color of state law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, a former federal employee, is complaining of the actions of a federal agency, which is not subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 and § 1343(a)(3) do not authorize an action against federal officials.

Brown v. Smith · filed 1987-09-18

does not confer jurisdiction upon the district court to adjudicate a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action against federal officials.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages action against officials acting under color of federal rather than state law; such a claim must proceed under Bivens.

Del Raine v. Norman Carlson, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Director of the Federal Bureau of Priso · filed 1987-10-21

But — and this is the fifth departure from our paradigm of the state prisoner’s dual suit — this part of the complaint could not be based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants were acting under color of federal rather than state law.

Section 1983 provides no relief against federal officers.

In Re Impounded Case (Law Firm) · filed 1988-03-25

The defendants in this action were federal officers, and thus no relief is available under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officers acting under color of federal law.

Vu v. Meese · filed 1991-01-08

The Civil Rights Act of § 1983 does not apply to federal officers acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not provide a cause of action against federal officers.

Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons · filed 1991-06-24

An action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 cannot lie against federal officers.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not permit a claim against federal officers.

Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons · filed 1991-06-24

An action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot lie against federal officers.

Section 1983 does not waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity and permits damages actions only against persons acting under color of state law.

In Re: Michael Haggert · filed 1992-12-22

The government enjoys sovereign immunity against Haggert's claim, since § 1983 does not provide for any waiver of that immunity. See Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251-52 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983). Also, section 1983 permits damages actions against persons acting under color of state law, and not against persons acting under federal law. Chatman v. Hernandez, 805 F.2d 453, 455 (1st Cir. 1986); Zernial v. United States, 714 F.2d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1983). The IRS, of course, acts under federal, not state law.

Section 1983 claims by a federal immigration detainee against a federal detention center contractor and its employees are construed as Bivens claims.

Nwabueze C. Clement v. R. Crawford, Lt. Esmor Inc. L. Fauria, Lt. · filed 1993-04-15

Although Clement brought this action in the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court correctly construed it as a Bivens claim.

Section 1983 applies to actions under color of state law and does not cover actions of the federal government or its officers.

Murray v. United States Department of Justice · filed 1993-05-11

As defendants correctly point out, plaintiffs reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is misplaced, for that statute “applies only to actions taken under the color of state law that violate constitutional or federal statutory rights,” Yalkut v. Gemignani, 873 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added), and on its face does not apply to actions of the federal government or its officers.

A § 1983 complaint against a federal correctional institution medical officer is properly construed as a Bivens action.

Long v. Thomas E. Gable, Doctor, Federal Correctional Institution Medical Officer · filed 1994-10-25

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) complaint, which the court properly construed as a Bivens action.

Section 1983 does not provide the cause of action for a constitutional claim against federal marshals; that claim is treated as a Bivens action.

Thacker v. Morgan · filed 1994-11-29

First, while the action was styled as one under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the district court properly deemed it a Bivens action.

Section 1983 does not apply to actions of the federal government or its officers.

Ye Wen Hong v. United States · filed 1996-02-29

By its express terms, however, § 1983 does not apply to actions of the federal government or its officers.

Section 1983 does not provide the claim against a federal agent; that claim must be considered under Bivens.

Quinn v. Stokes · filed 1996-12-03

Quinn’s complaint, although brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, names a federal agent rather than a state officer. His claim must be considered under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.

Section 1983 does not authorize claims against federal officers.

Parsons v. Pond · filed 2000-10-24

“An action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot lie against federal officers.” ... As such, the court will interpret Parsons’s federal constitutional claims against the defendants to be alleged under Bivens only.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officers; it applies to state officers acting under color of state law.

Rich v. United States · filed 2001-07-13

First, Section 1983 applies only to state officers acting under color of state law, and not to federal officers.

A complaint against federal officers labeled under § 1983 may be construed as a Bivens action.

Johnson v. Flannery · filed 2003-02-13

Wayne Johnson appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint, which the court properly construed as an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not apply to federal agencies or officers acting pursuant to federal law.

Collins v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs · filed 2003-05-29

Section 1983 is not applicable to federal agencies and officers, such as Defendants in this case, acting in the normal course of events pursuant to federal law.

Section 1983 does not support claims against federal officers acting under federal law.

Russo v. Glasser · filed 2003-08-05

Plaintiff does not contest that the individual Defendants were acting under federal law, and accordingly all § 1983 claims against them are dismissed.

A claim against an officer treated as a federal employee should be brought under Bivens rather than § 1983.

Tyson v. Willauer · filed 2003-10-23

Since Defendant Willhauer is being treated as a federal employee for purposes of this case, the § 1983 claim against him should have been asserted as a Bivens claims. Therefore, although he is not named in Count Ten, both sides have treated this Count as having been asserted against him in his capacity as a member of the Federal Task Force.

Section 1983 does not apply to employment discrimination claims against a federal agency.

Davis v. Potter · filed 2004-02-05

Similarly, Davis seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but that statute does not apply to claims of employment discrimination against a federal agency.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law and does not apply to claims against federal officers.

Flick v. R. A. Larue John Nevins · filed 1987-06-23

Plaintiff here was at all times and is a federal prisoner and therefore the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, are not applicable.

Section 1983 does not provide relief to a federal prisoner suing a federal officer.

Dixon v. Vanderbilt · filed 2004-11-17

Dixon is a federal prisoner suing a federal officer, and thus, Dixon is not entitled to seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against federal officers acting under federal authority.

Smith v. Department of Education · filed 2005-12-13

The district court properly dismissed Smith’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Linda Howard-Kent and David Christensen because federal officers, acting under federal authority, are immune from suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 covers deprivations under color of state law, not actions of the federal government or its officers under color of federal law.

Nicholson v. Johanns · filed 2007-02-15

With respect to § 1983, the statute has no application to the actions of the federal government or its officers acting under color of federal law, but is instead confined to deprivations under color of state law.

A complaint against federal officers is construed as a Bivens action even when filed on a form used for § 1983 claims.

Rolle v. US Marshals Office · filed 2007-06-15

In drafting his complaint, Rolle used the “Civil Rights Complaint Form” employed by prisoners in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But because the Marshals are federal officers, we construe Rolle’s complaint as an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

Section 1983 does not apply to claims against federal agencies and federal employees.

Amadi v. FCI Fort Dix Health Services · filed 2007-11-30

The District Court also was correct that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, cited by Amadi, had no applicability to claims against a federal agency and federal employees.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officers acting under color of law.

Ali v. D.C. Court Services · filed 2008-03-13

Mr. Ali’s claim does not fall under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because that statute does not apply to federal officers, such as Defendants here, acting under color of law.

Section 1983 does not provide relief against federal officers acting under federal law.

Morales-Garza v. Lorenzo-Giguere · filed 2008-05-06

Second, § 1983, even if used to assert any potential right under HAVA, does not apply to federal officers, such as Lorenzo-Giguere, who act under federal law, and thus relief is not available under this statute.

Section 1983 does not govern a civil rights claim against a federal officer arising from a federal misdemeanor conviction; the claim proceeds under Bivens.

Gilbert v. Isham · filed 2008-06-30

Although the action was addressed below as one pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), because the Defendant is a federal officer and the complaint of conduct involved a federal misdemeanor conviction, the action is one under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not apply to official-capacity claims treated as claims against a federal agency.

Johnson v. Williams · filed 2010-03-30

Because the suit against the defendants in their official capacities is treated as if it were brought against CSOSA directly, and because CSOSA is a federal government agency, § 1983 does not apply and cannot be a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not apply to officers of the federal government.

Taitz v. Obama · filed 2010-04-14

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he is a federal officer, and section 1983 does not apply to officers of the federal government.

Section 1983 does not cover claims against federal officers acting as federal officers; those claims may instead arise under Bivens.

Adekoya v. Holder · filed 2010-11-12

Although Adekoya purports to bring this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (''§ 1983”) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Defendants were federal rather than state officers. Consequently, the Court will construe these claims as arising under Bivens and the Fifth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a federal officer for actions taken as a federal officer.

Williams v. Young · filed 2011-02-25

Although plaintiff also seeks to assert causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the only remaining defendant is a federal officer who is not liable under that statute.

Section 1983 does not apply to a federal officer who was not acting as a state actor.

PANAGACOS v. Towery · filed 2011-03-01

S/A Colvin was a civilian working for CGIS, a federal agency. He was not a state actor. Federal Officers are exempt from the proscription of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state actors; a claim against a federal officer may be construed under Bivens.

Day v. Ibison · filed 2013-07-17

The District Court dismissed Day‘s § 1983 claims solely on the basis that Ibison is not a state actor, and, therefore, the claims against him are not cognizable. However, given our obligation to construe a pro se litigant‘s pleadings liberally, see, e.g., Higgs v. Att‘y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011), we will construe Day‘s complaint against Ibison as brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not cover a claim against a federal officer acting under federal authority; that claim is cognizable under Bivens.

McClamma v. Remon · filed 2014-03-28

Although Mr. McClamma purportedly brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his complaint against Officer Remon, a federal officer, is cognizable under Bivens.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against federal agencies or federal officers acting under federal law.

Willis v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2014-08-06

Therefore, Plaintiffs attempt at suing three federal agencies and four federal officers acting in their official capacities under federal law pursuant to Section 1983 is clearly improper.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officers acting in their official capacity.

AL Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen · filed 2018-08-20

As Defendants recognize (ECF No. 145 at 9-10), Section 1983's plain terms do not provide a cause of action against federal officers acting in their official capacity.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state officers; a claim against a federal officer is treated as a Bivens claim.

Robinson v. Tyler · filed 2019-11-04

Although Robinson presented his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the magistrate judge treated it properly as a Bivens claim.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal agencies or officers acting under federal law.

CASSELL v. HOMELAND SECURITY · filed 2020-01-29

Civil rights laws at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not apply to federal agencies and officers as they act under federal law.

Section 1983 applies to state officers acting under color of state law, not federal officers.

Edokobi v. Grimm · filed 2020-03-04

“Section 1983 applies only to state officers acting under color of state law, and not to federal officers.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal officers.

Diaz v. Mercurio · filed 2020-03-05

Defendant is alleged to be a federal officer—specifically, a DEA agent. “[A]n action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot lie against federal officers.” Davis v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 1800, 2004 WL 324880, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2004) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is DISMISSED.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law and a deprivation of federal rights; the court dismissed the claims against the federal agents.

Gonzalez v. Doe 1 · filed 2020-03-16

To establish a claim under section 1983, two criteria must be met. First, the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under of color of state law. Second, the conduct must deprive the complainant of rights secured under the Constitution or federal law. ... The portions of the complaint dealing with a violation of section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment will be dismissed as to the Federal Defendants.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on federal agencies or officers acting under federal law rather than state law.

Alicea v. Veteran's Affairs Adm. · filed 2020-03-31

Defendant correctly asserts that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is equally inapplicable. ... “Because section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal law by persons acting pursuant to state law, federal agencies and officers are facially exempt from section 1983 liability inasmuch as in the normal course of events they act pursuant to federal law.”

A claim pleaded under § 1983 against a federal officer is construed as a Bivens claim.

Smith v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Julianna Boor · filed 2020-04-03

Additionally, although Smith’s complaint purports to bring a cause of action under § 1983, because Smith is suing a federal officer, it is construed as a claim brought pursuant to Bivens.

A claim pleaded under § 1983 against federal officers for conduct in federal custody may be construed as a Bivens claim.

Geritano v. AUSA Office for The E.D.N.Y. · filed 2020-05-05

Because Plaintiff alleges that he was denied medical care at the MCC, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officers and agents because it requires state action.

Spencer v. United States Bureau of Prisons · filed 2020-09-16

But § 1983 does not apply to federal officers and agents.

School districts do not have governmental immunity from suits under Section 1983.

Ogletree v. Glen Rose Independent School District · filed 2007-05-02

The District was not immune from suit under Section 1983.

A municipality sued under section 1983 cannot assert a good faith or qualified immunity defense to liability, unlike individual officials.

Kathriner v. City of Overland, Mo. · filed 1984-09-04

Accordingly, because the City of Overland cannot assert the defense of good faith immunity, Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980), plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict against the City of Overland was granted.

A municipal hospital system is immune from punitive damages under § 1983.

Davis v. West Community Hospital · filed 1985-03-21

The hospital system is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 2762, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). Accordingly, the judgment should be modified to exclude the hospital from the punitive damages awarded under the remaining claim against it--the violation of procedural due process.

A municipal hospital system is immune from punitive damages under § 1983.

Davis v. West Community Hospital · filed 1985-03-21

The hospital system is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Municipalities and counties have no immunity from § 1983 suits.

Leese v. Baltimore County · filed 1985-09-09

Out of this litigation, two hard and fast rules have emerged. First, municipalities and counties are not immune from suit. ... Appellee Baltimore County, therefore, has no immunity from Leese’s § 1983 claims.

Municipal sovereign immunity is not an absolute bar to a § 1983 suit for constitutional injury caused by governmental custom, policy, ordinance, regulation, or decision.

Spencer v. City of Seagoville · filed 1985-11-18

The doctrine of sovereign immunity is not an absolute bar to a section 1983 suit against the City.

Municipal corporations have no qualified immunity from damages liability under § 1983 for their constitutional violations.

Hynson v. City of Chester · filed 1987-10-01

Since the Prison Board is a municipal corporation, it is not entitled to assert the qualified immunity defense.

Municipal officials performing legislative functions have absolute immunity from damages under § 1983, while those performing discretionary executive or administrative functions have only qualified immunity.

Point Properties, Inc. v. Anderson · filed 1991-06-14

Although absolute immunity from § 1983 actions is available to government officials performing legislative functions at the municipal level, generally only qualified or "good faith" immunity has been extended to government officials performing discretionary functions that are characteristically executive or administrative.

Section 1983 does not give municipalities qualified or absolute immunity from liability, including for legislative acts.

Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill · filed 1992-08-10

Agreeing with these authorities, we hold that there is no immunity defense, either qualified or absolute, available to a municipality sought to be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Municipal defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from claims under § 1983.

Harris v. Coweta County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Georgia, Larry T. Hammett, Sheriff of Coweta · filed 1993-10-27

Municipal defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as to section 1983 claims.

Under § 1983, qualified immunity applies to officials sued in their individual capacities but does not protect municipalities.

Triomphe Investors v. City of Northwood · filed 1993-10-29

First, qualified immunity does not apply to a municipality, ... and thus, the City of Northwood is not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. Second, qualified immunity only attaches to the individual defendants when they are sued in their individual capacity.

Municipalities have no immunity from § 1983 claims, even when the official responsible for the alleged violation would have individual immunity.

Ashton v. Brown · filed 1995-06-30

Local government entities, including municipalities like the City of Frederick, are not entitled to immunity under § 1983, even if the local government official responsible for the alleged constitutional violation would be immune from an individual capacity suit.

A municipality has no immunity from section 1983 liability for the enactments and actions of its local legislature.

Berkley v. Common Council of City of Charleston · filed 1995-08-11

We now join our sister circuits and hold that a municipality is not immune from liability under section 1983 for the enactments and actions of the local legislative body.

Cities are not protected by qualified immunity against claims under § 1983.

Horne v. Crozier · filed 1997-06-04

Contrary to the circuit court’s ruling, however, cities are not protected by qualified immunity under § 1983.

Municipalities cannot claim immunity from § 1983 damages even when the officials whose conduct caused the injury are immune from personal liability.

Schlosser v. Louise Renne City and County of San Francisco · filed 1997-06-23

We agree that the district court was mistaken. The Supreme Court has held that municipalities cannot claim immunity from damages, even where the officials whose conduct caused the injury are immune from personal liability. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980). Sovereign immunity does not render Schlosser's complaint futile.

Municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

McManus v. Grippen · filed 1997-11-06

Although we have recently stated that municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit under 42 USC § 1983 (see, Matter of Kaczmarek v Conroy, 218 AD2d 97, 101), the County urges us to adopt the contrary position espoused by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Baker v Mayor & City Council (894 F2d 679, cert denied 498 US 815). We decline to do so since the Fourth Circuit has overruled its decision in Baker (see, Berkley v Common Council, 63 F3d 295, 303, cert denied 516 US 1073).

Municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity against § 1983 claims.

Casper v. Lago Vista, City of · filed 1999-03-18

Because municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity against claims under federal law, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993), we have no jurisdiction over the City's appeal on the § 1983 claim.

Municipal defendants in a Section 1983 action cannot invoke the absolute judicial immunity available to individual officials.

Discovery House, Inc. v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis · filed 1999-04-01

Because judicial immunity is a defense available to individuals only, the present lawsuit will not be dismissed on the ground of judicial immunity.

Section 1983 does not afford municipal entities qualified immunity.

Carlino v. Gloucester City High School · filed 1999-08-02

The Gloucester City Board of Education, as a municipal entity, however, is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Municipalities have neither qualified nor absolute immunity from suits under § 1983.

Morris v. Lindau · filed 1999-10-21

In other words, municipalities have no immunity defense, either qualified or absolute, in a suit under § 1983.