42 U.S.C. § 1983

A correctional officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that the officer violated a clearly established right.

Watts v. James · filed 1992-02-03

Therefore, given Watts' failure to demonstrate a clearly established right to be present when correspondence to or from a public agency is opened, Officer James was entitled to invoke qualified immunity and the district court did not err by granting summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1983 preserves common-law immunities rather than abolishing them wholesale, so a damages claim against a prison warden requires proof of bad faith or sufficiently serious neglect or malice to overcome official immunity.

Carl B. Hoitt, Jr. v. Joseph C. Vitek, Etc. · filed 1974-05-16

... Questions of both pleading and proof must be approached within the context of the qualified immunity available to prison authorities. As Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), makes clear, § 1983 does not “abolish wholesale all common law immunities”. A prison warden, charged with controlling an unwilling population, aided by perhaps an inadequate number of guards, faces the most demanding and delicate decisions as to the nature and extent of the sanctions he should impose and the timing and effect of their removal. Thus, as we said recently in Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.2d 978, 980 (1st Cir. 1974), before there can be recovery there must be proof of “bad faith or at least such a degree of neglect or malice . . . as to deprive defendants of official immunity for merely erroneous action.”

Section 1983 damages suits against prison officials are subject to qualified immunity rather than absolute immunity.

Procunier v. Navarette · filed 1978-02-22

We agree with petitioners that as prison officials and officers, they were not absolutely immune from liability in this § 1983 damages suit and could rely only on the qualified immunity described in Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra , and Wood v. Strickland, supra.

Section 1983 damages claims against prison officials are barred by qualified immunity when the officials did not know and could not have known that their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights and did not act with malicious intent.

Lock v. Jenkins · filed 1978-12-27

The qualified immunity from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be availing to all of the named defendants because the constitutional rights allegedly infringed by them were not clearly established at the time of their challenged conduct. They did not know or could not have known of those rights and they did not know or could not have known that their conduct violated the constitutional norm. Defendants did not act with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury. At all times in their dealings with pre-trial detainees at the prison, defendants acted in good faith.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against prison officials for failing to protect inmates when serious procedural deficiencies amount to gross negligence and defeat a good-faith immunity defense.

Doe v. Lally · filed 1979-03-05

any serious deficiencies in actual prison procedures which allowed frequent commingling between diagnostic and population inmates and the ensuing sexual assaults border on gross negligence, thereby negating any good faith immunity defense under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... With both the constitutional rights and standards now clearly delineated, there can be no excuse for continued deprivations of the kind alleged in this case. The defendants are on notice that this Court stands ready to consider meritorious claims for money damages by inmates filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where prison and correctional authorities are alleged to have failed to provide the requisite physical safeguards. Such cases must obviously be treated on an individual basis; however, with the duties now clearly spelled out, the likelihood of a good faith or immunity defense prevailing has substantially diminished.

Section 1983 does not impose monetary-damages liability on prison officials who neither violate a clearly established constitutional right nor act maliciously.

Raffone v. Robinson · filed 1979-10-18

Thus, because the defendants neither violated a clearly established constitutional right nor acted maliciously, they are immune from liability for monetary damages under § 1983, and we affirm.

Section 1983 damages claims against state prison officials acting within the scope of their official responsibilities are subject to qualified good-faith immunity.

Hayes v. Thompson · filed 1980-12-18

The Supreme Court has recognized a qualified good-faith immunity for state prison officials acting within the scope of their official responsibilities when damages are sought for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... It is this two-pronged test which we apply here.

Section 1983 damages claims against prison officials are subject to qualified, rather than absolute, immunity.

Lock v. Jenkins · filed 1981-02-19

Prison officials receive qualified, not absolute, immunity from liability in a section 1983 damages suit.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to recover damages from prison officials only when they acted in bad faith or knew or should have known their actions violated the prisoner's constitutional rights.

Green v. White · filed 1981-08-10

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity in actions brought by prisoners. ... A plaintiff may recover damages only if he or she can show that the official acted in bad faith or that the prison officials took action that they knew or should have known violated the prisoner’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against correctional officers who knowingly fail to remedy unconstitutional conditions of confinement, subject to a good-faith qualified-immunity defense.

Villanueva v. George · filed 1981-09-16

Appellees Almond and Buttice were correctional officers whose duties included the day to day supervision of Villanueva. These officers had knowledge of the appellant's conditions of confinement and nevertheless took no steps to remedy the situation. It is true that these officers may assert a defense of good faith and qualified immunity, if they were following the orders of their superiors. Nevertheless, it is also true that " 'if they knew or should have known that their (failure to act was) violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights, * * * (they may not) hide behind the cloak of institutional loyalty.' " Putman v. Gerloff, supra, 639 F.2d at 423 (quoting Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1217 (3d Cir. 1979). It was up to the jury to determine whether these officers knowingly failed to remedy unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

Prison officials receive qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability for non-disciplinary administrative confinement used for continuing medical evaluation when they could not have known it violated clearly established rights.

Adams v. Brierton · filed 1985-02-04

Under the particular facts of this case, the prison officials could not have known that they were violating “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights” of the inmate.

Section 1983 defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity for a 1981 prison-visitor strip search unsupported by objective grounds because the Fourth Amendment prohibition was clearly established.

Smothers v. Gibson · filed 1985-11-27

We reject the prison's argument. The fourth amendment rights prohibiting this search were "clearly established" in 1981, and thus the search was unreasonable.

Prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because they could not reasonably be expected to know a three-month-old out-of-circuit rule governing intrusive employee searches.

Adrow v. Johnson · filed 1985-12-12

It is not reasonable to require prison officials to be familiar with such a recent decision of another Circuit.

To defeat qualified immunity in a § 1983 action, the asserted constitutional right must be sufficiently particularized to put officials on notice that their conduct probably is unlawful.

Qaid Rafeeq Azeez and Abdullah Muhammad v. James W. Fairman, Warden, John E. Wright, Asst. Warden, and A. Dodge, 120 (c. · filed 1986-06-30

The right must be sufficiently particularized to put potential defendants on notice that their conduct probably is unlawful.

Good faith immunity can preclude prison officials’ liability under § 1983 for an alleged due process violation.

Gutierrez v. Coughlin · filed 1988-03-10

In addition, it is clear that appellees’ defense of good faith immunity would preclude any finding of liability on their part.

Qualified immunity shields prison officials from § 1983 damages for transferring a prisoner to another state under a voluntary parole agreement when the claimed right to a pre-transfer hearing was not clearly established at the time.

Brown v. Ponte · filed 1988-03-14

Even assuming that the Connecticut authorities requested Brown's presence pursuant to the Detainer Agreement, we find that appellants are immune from this § 1983 damages action. ... Thus we conclude that the “contours of the right” Brown alleges appellants violated in 1982 were not sufficiently clear that appellants reasonably could have understood that what they were doing violated that right.

Qualified immunity does not protect prison medical personnel who casually and without justification disclose an inmate’s confidential medical information to other staff and inmates, because that conduct falls outside their discretionary functions.

Woods v. White · filed 1988-07-27

Casual, unjustified dissemination of confidential medical information to non-medical staff and other prisoners can scarcely be said to belong to the sphere of defendants’ discretionary functions. Therefore, the defense of qualified immunity is not available to defendants.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment in a § 1983 action when evidence could show that a prison search policy served punitive purposes unrelated to security and that a reasonable official would have known the searches violated clearly established rights.

Tribble v. Gardner · filed 1988-10-25

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Tribble has produced sufficient evidence to show that the searches are conducted for punitive purposes unrelated to security concerns and that a reasonable person would have known that searches based on such motives violated Tribble's clearly established rights. ... Therefore, we hold that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the district court was correct in denying defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

In Mississippi state court, a prisoner’s § 1983 claim against prison officials survived dismissal only to the extent it alleged intentional or constructively intentional misconduct or acts substantially outside their authority.

McFadden v. State · filed 1989-02-01

On the other hand, the Circuit Court erred when it dismissed the complaint against the defendants Thigpen, Cabana, Newton, Cabanero and Cox; provided, however, that the complaint against these defendants remains viable under state or federal law [42 U.S.C. § 1983] only insofar as it charges each of these defendants with having acted intentionally and wilfully toward plaintiff or with such wanton and gross neglect toward plaintiff so that their acts or omissions should be characterized as constructively wilful or intentional, or acted greatly or substantially outside their authority.

Prison officials cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 access-to-courts claim by arguing that the right was unclear when Bounds had established its contours.

Baker v. Seiter · filed 1989-04-04

The defendants argue that the district court should have granted them qualified immunity because the contours of the general right of access to the courts were not sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violated that right. ... The district court held that Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), established those contours, and we agree. ... However, they did not provide any evidence concerning the plaintiff's actual access to the library. Therefore, they did not meet their burden on the access issue. The district court properly denied the motion for summary judgment.

A prison warden is entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 when reviewing disciplinary decisions.

Earnest McEwen v. Billy McWherter Warden Lucky Lawhorn · filed 1989-06-23

The warden is entitled to qualified immunity in reviewing disciplinary decisions, Turney v. Scroggy, 831 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1987), and plaintiff did not establish the existence of any constitutional right to a delayed appeal from prison disciplinary decisions.

Qualified immunity does not shield jail officials from a § 1983 strip-search claim when clearly established law barred searching a detainee charged only with a traffic violation or nonviolent minor offense without reasonable grounds to suspect weapons or other contraband.

Masters v. Crouch · filed 1989-07-14

It was equally clearly established that a person charged only with a traffic violation or nonviolent minor offense may not be subjected to a strip search unless there are reasonable grounds for believing that the particular person might be carrying or concealing weapons or other contraband. ... Thus, the defendants are not entitled to prevail at this stage of the case on their claim of qualified immunity.

In § 1983 damages suits, qualified immunity does not protect prison officials who bar pretrial detainees from receiving hardcover books sent directly from publishers when existing precedent clearly established the ban was unconstitutional.

Jackson v. Elrod · filed 1989-08-07

Wolfish and Kincaid between them strongly signal that defendants here were on notice under clearly-established case law that their hard-cover book prohibition was unconstitutional.

Section 1983 defendants have a valid qualified immunity defense to a retaliatory-transfer claim when their asserted reason for the transfer is the inmate’s medical needs.

Wynn v. Jones · filed 1989-09-29

In contrast to the facts in Haymes, however, here the defendants alleged that they transferred Wynn because he suffers from seizures and the regional correctional facility provides better medical care than the work camp. These allegations provide the basis for a valid qualified immunity defense.

A prison official lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 due process claim for punishing an inmate whose conduct violated no rule when the right to fair notice was clearly established.

Coffman v. Trickey · filed 1989-10-12

In the present case, Trickey was not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Coffman’s due process claim. The contours of the right not to be punished for committing a lawful act have been sufficiently established so that Trickey, in charge of a thousand-man high-medium prison, should have known that she was proscribed from punishing Coffman unless his conduct constituted an offense.

Jail officials who take reasonable steps to protect an inmate from suicide are entitled to immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau County, Mo. · filed 1989-10-25

This Court now concludes as a matter of law that reasonable steps were taken in this case to prevent England from taking his life and defendants are thereby entitled to immunity.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 claims unless they knew or should have known that their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Brown v. Frey · filed 1989-11-07

However, prison officials are immune from suit on the basis of qualified good faith immunity unless (1) their conduct violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff-prisoner that was clearly established prior to the time of the alleged acts of the prison officials; (2) they knew or should have known of the clearly established right at the time of the violation; and (3) they knew or should have known that their conduct violated that right.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action when the particular constitutional right allegedly violated was not clearly established.

Brown v. Frey · filed 1989-12-13

Although a prison official is not always immune from liability merely because there is no case establishing a constitutional right in identical circumstances, if there is a legitimate question as to whether the more particularized constitutional right exists under the facts of the case, it cannot be said that the prison official's action violated clearly established law.

Prison officials may be protected from personal liability under Section 1983 by qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Fox v. Coughlin, III · filed 1990-01-04

Prison officials may be protected from personal liability under Sec. 1983 when their "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Prison officials have qualified immunity from personal liability under § 1983 when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Fox v. Coughlin · filed 1990-01-04

Prison officials may be protected from personal liability under § 1983 when their “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 permits liability despite qualified immunity when prison officials clearly defy established limits on their discretion by failing to file a required misbehavior report during keeplock confinement.

Scott v. Coughlin · filed 1990-01-05

While the defendants’ may have reasonably believed that confinement for six to eight days without a disciplinary hearing did not violate due process, I find their failure to file a misbehavior report at any point during plaintiff’s 14 days in keep-lock clearly defied well-delineated boundaries of official discretion so as to subject them to liability under § 1983.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 failure-to-protect claim when they verbally intervene in an inmate fight and have no clearly established duty to risk physical intervention.

Arnold v. Patrick Jones C/o Blythe C/o Creeden C/o Scheers C/o Edwards C/o Whitson Lt. Olson · filed 1990-01-19

Because defendants verbally intervened and there is no allegation of any additional steps the officials should or could have taken short of physical intervention, we hold that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

A prison official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for ordering a digital body cavity search when the inmate had a clear right against that search absent a legitimate penological need.

Hill v. Koon · filed 1990-02-21

Mr. Koon is not entitled to qualified immunity on account of his conduct. Plaintiff Hill had the clear right at the time of the digital body cavity search on April 9, 1987, not to be subjected to a digital body cavity search where there was no legitimate peno-logical need for the search under the circumstances.

Prison officials and corrections officers may have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when their conduct is objectively reasonable and does not violate clearly established rights.

Moore v. Dowd · filed 1990-02-28

The Court also concludes that defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs eighth amendment claim because they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to that claim. In some instances, prison officials and corrections officers enjoy qualified immunity against § 1983 claims for money damages.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for prison officials whose 1986 urine testing did not violate a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.

Molinelli v. Tucker · filed 1990-04-09

The question on appeal of this civil rights action is whether, at the time of a 1986 urinalysis of a state prison guard, the law “clearly established” that urine testing was a search under the fourth amendment, making the defense of qualified immunity unavailable to the prison officials administering such tests unreasonably. We hold that the law in 1986 was not “clearly established” and that the defense is available.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 due process claim based on the absence of chain-of-custody proof for a disciplinary urinalysis when due process does not require that proof.

Adkins v. Robert D. Johnson, Lt. Dillard Davidson, Lt. · filed 1990-04-11

As a result the district court erred in determining that defendants were not entitled to the defense of good faith qualified immunity and denying their motion for summary judgment.

State prison officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Tyler v. Tom Barton and Frank O. Gunter · filed 1990-04-26

At a minimum, a legitimate question may exist whether Tyler possessed a right to be free from visual observation while furnishing a urine sample. Thus, we conclude that Barton and Gunter did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. Accordingly, the doctrine of qualified immunity applies to Barton and Gunter.

A prison official who excludes an inmate’s catalog without examining it is not entitled to qualified immunity when the catalog poses no threat to institutional security.

Allen v. Higgins · filed 1990-05-04

Based on the trial court’s finding that the catalog ordered by Allen, “clearly posed no threat to the security of the institution,” the trial court concluded that Groose was not entitled to qualified immunity. We agree.

Prison officials are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages suit when a jury could find they reassigned an inmate’s job in retaliation for exercising constitutional rights.

Baker v. Zlochowon · filed 1990-06-29

Defendants contention that they have qualified immunity from suit for damages does not warrant granting their summary judgment motion. ... The Second Circuit has held that at least with respect to transfers in retaliation for exercise of constitutional rights, “a reasonable jury could find that a reasonable commissioner of corrections would be aware of [the illegality of his actions],” and thus might not be able to establish the defense of qualified immunity. ... We believe that the same can be said with respect to retaliatory job reassignments.

Section 1983 does not give prison officials qualified immunity when they could not reasonably believe that ten days of confinement without notice or an opportunity to be heard satisfied clearly established due process requirements.

Russell v. Coughlin · filed 1990-08-02

Further, defendants could not have reasonably believed that releasing Russell on his tenth day of confinement without providing any notice or opportunity to be heard complied with the requirements of federal due process. The district court properly rejected the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants on a prison disciplinary committee are entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated due process.

Harrison v. John Dahm, Etc. · filed 1990-08-23

We agree with the district court that the members of the disciplinary committee were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that the actions taken by the committee involving the use of the test, the record of the test and the evidence log violated Harrison’s right to due process.

A prison guard lacks qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when a reasonable guard would have known that the force violated clearly established law.

Williams v. Landen · filed 1990-12-17

Appellant is entitled to qualified immunity unless a reasonable prison guard would have believed that the force applied by the appellant, under the facts of this case, was excessive under clearly established rules of law. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). ... Under the facts before the district court, we hold that the appellant was not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Jailers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability for an inmate suicide when their preventive measures do not demonstrate deliberate indifference to a known suicide risk.

Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau County, Missouri · filed 1991-02-04

Because the measures taken by the defendants to prevent the suicide of England did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs as a suicide risk, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for the alleged deprivation of England's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on prison officials for inmate injuries caused by overcrowding when the relevant constitutional right was not clearly established at the time.

Brogsdale v. Marion S. Barry, Jr., Donyell A. Marsh v. Marion S. Barry, Jr. · filed 1991-03-12

We need not pause long over our misgivings, however, because we conclude that liability is foreclosed in any event by the defendants’ qualified immunity.

Correctional officials are shielded from damages under Section 1983 by qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show they violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Dotson v. Maschner · filed 1991-04-15

Having reviewed the entire record in this matter, the court finds no basis for the declaratory relief sought by plaintiff and further concludes plaintiff has failed to show the corrections officials named as defendants in this action acted in violation of any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Accordingly, these defendants are shielded from liability for damages by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment for a prison pharmacist sued under § 1983 when a genuine factual dispute exists over whether a reasonable pharmacist could believe withholding prescribed medication was lawful.

Johnson v. Hay · filed 1991-04-15

We believe that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether a prison pharmacist reasonably could have believed that he was not violating Johnson’s constitutional rights by refusing to fill the prescriptions.

Section 1983 defendants lack qualified immunity for a warrantless search of a jail visitor after her visit ends and the risk of smuggling contraband has passed.

Marriott ex rel. Marriott v. Smith · filed 1991-05-01

While officers are certainly not required to anticipate new developments in the law, in this case the law has not changed, and is not changed by this opinion. Defendants simply rely on a grievous misreading of existing case law. ... The district court correctly ruled that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

A prison official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 inmate assault claim when the right to protection was sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that failing to act violated it.

Stafford v. Rick Hallock · filed 1991-05-17

Upon review, we affirm the district court's judgment because a prisoner's right to be protected from assault at the hands of another inmate was sufficiently clear at the time this claim arose such that a reasonable official would have understood that his action (or in this case, inaction) violated that right.

Hearing examiners and prison guards have qualified rather than absolute immunity from § 1983 damages, but that immunity does not protect violations of clearly established due process rights.

Griffin v. Spratt · filed 1991-06-04

Hearing examiners, as well as prison guards, are protected by qualified, not absolute, immunity. ... In the circumstances, there is no immunity, qualified or otherwise.

Section 1983 defendants cannot claim qualified immunity for a warrantless search of a jail visitor after the visit ends when established law makes the prison visitor exception inapplicable.

Marriott v. Smith · filed 1991-06-17

Nothing in the Hunter or Smothers cases suggests that prison visitors' fourth amendment rights not to be searched without a warrant are abridged after their visit and after the danger of smuggling has passed. The mere fact that this case and Hunter involved people who had gone to visit prisoners is a superficial similarity. That similarity does not justify an officer in relying on Hunter when the purpose for the Hunter rule does not exist. The district court correctly ruled that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim against a jail nurse for allegedly failing to carry out prescribed dressing changes and pain medication, because carrying out that treatment is a ministerial duty.

Boretti v. Beverly A. Wiscomb, R.N., Wanda M. Baldwin, R.N. · filed 1991-07-09

Because daily dressing changes and pain medication were prescribed for two weeks, the nurse allegedly had a duty to administer the prescription. Complying with a doctor’s prescription or treatment plan is a ministerial function, not a discretionary one. ... For this reason, we don’t believe defendant Wiscomb’s motion for summary judgment should be granted on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against prison officials are subject to qualified immunity when, given the law and information known to the official, a reasonable official could have believed the challenged conduct lawful.

Foster v. Basham · filed 1991-07-16

Although subjective motive (or intent) is not relevant to the qualified-immunity analysis, the knowledge possessed by the defendant at the time the challenged action occurred is, along with the clearly established law as of that time, the focus of the inquiry. ... Applying those principles to this case, we conclude that Basham should have qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect a prison official against a § 1983 claim for authorizing a prison visitor’s visual body cavity search without reasonable suspicion when that requirement was clearly established.

Daugherty v. Donal Campbell, Alton R. Hesson, Robert W. Starbuck, Funderburk, Rita A. Starbuck, Kevin W. Daniels, · filed 1991-08-27

Bearing the aforementioned principles in mind, we conclude that the district court properly denied Campbell’s claim of qualified immunity because in January 1988 the search of prison visitors without at least reasonable suspicion violated clearly established law.

Officials sued under Section 1983 retain qualified immunity despite violating a prison policy when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Bell Bey v. Evans · filed 1991-09-12

This policy directive, however, does not affect the defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity because "[o]fficials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision." Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984) (footnote omitted).

A prison official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when a reasonable official at the time could not have known that her response to an inmate’s threats violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Rita F. Marsh, Cross-Appellee v. Dorothy Arn, Delores Furrow, Cross-Appellant · filed 1991-09-23

We conclude that a reasonable person in 1985, and perhaps even today, would have had trouble determining whether Furrow’s conduct violated the eighth amendment. ... We find that defendant Furrow was entitled to qualified immunity and therefore JNOV.

Prison officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when they reasonably, even if mistakenly, believe an emergency permits an opposite-sex guard to view a visual body cavity search.

Cookish v. Commissioner Ronald Powell · filed 1991-09-26

We believe that determination applies no less to an official’s reasonable, although mistaken, conclusion regarding the existence of an emergency permitting a visual body cavity search although conducted within the visual range of a prison guard of the opposite sex. We conclude, therefore, that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in this case.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for imposing seven days of keeplock without Wolff procedures when the right to those procedures was not clearly established at the time.

Jermosen v. Smith · filed 1991-10-01

Accordingly, we conclude that none of the defendants violated established rights of which a reasonable officer would have known. They are thus entitled to assert qualified immunity from suit.

State prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Cooper v. Rogers · filed 1991-10-30

While these measures, of course, could not retroactively insulate defendants from liability for damages arising from pre-existing unconstitutional conduct, defendants are clearly entitled to qualified immunity against any such liability.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison officials from § 1983 damages liability for violating inmates’ clearly established right to adequate heat and shelter.

Henderson v. DeRobertis · filed 1991-11-01

The district judge's post-verdict finding of a lack of any clearly established constitutional right under the facts of this case was erroneous, as was his resulting grant of the protection of qualified immunity to the defendants.

Qualified immunity does not shield a prison guard from a § 1983 retaliation claim when a reasonable official would know that retaliation for exercising a constitutional right is unlawful.

Scher v. Engelke · filed 1991-11-01

The law making retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right actionable under § 1983 has been established for some time and an objectively reasonable official could not fail to know of it.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when a material factual dispute remains over whether prison officials provided a religiously acceptable alternative diet.

Bass v. Coughlin · filed 1991-12-11

There is a material question of fact as to whether Plaintiff was given an adequate alternative diet in the prison food service. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the defense of qualified immunity is denied.

In a § 1983 suit, town officials applying an ordinance are eligible for qualified immunity rather than absolute legislative immunity for that conduct.

Maybee v. Town of Newfield · filed 1992-04-06

Given this language, the court concludes that plaintiffs’ claims against the Town Supervisor and the Town Council members pertain to defendants’ application of the MHP Law to plaintiffs, not to their enactment of the ordinance. Accordingly, they are entitled only to qualified immunity.

A prisoner’s § 1983 excessive-force pleading alleging malicious, unprovoked force can be sufficient to negate a prison official’s immunity claim before further factual development.

Thomas v. Holder · filed 1992-08-31

Appellant’s pleading, without more development of the factual basis, is sufficient to negate an immunity claim by the Appellee.

Prison officials are immune from § 1983 liability arising directly from a search and seizure conducted by state police.

Richard L. Massey, Jr. v. Richard Singleton Bishop L. Robinson · filed 1992-11-09

We also find that prison officials are immune from any liability accruing as a direct result of the search and seizure, see Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 775 (4th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1010 (1989), and that prison officials are not appropriate parties to Massey's action to regain possession of his typewriter.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability for restricting correspondence with specific news media members when the right is not clearly established and the officials reasonably believe their conduct is lawful.

Mujahid v. Sumner · filed 1993-06-28

Our review of the record indicates that it was reasonable for the defendants to believe that their conduct was lawful, and that Mujahid did not have a clearly established right to correspond with specific members of the news media. See Romero, 931 F.2d at 627. Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting the defendants summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

A prison disciplinary appeals officer is not entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims where the review lacks adequate procedural safeguards and independence from prison administration.

Moye v. Selsky · filed 1993-07-02

These shortcomings were not cured by the administrative appeal to Selsky, who relied upon the same evidence (and, in the case of Dunbar, lack of evidence) considered by Cote. ... The simple fact that Selsky serves at the pleasure of superiors within DOCS creates a dependence upon the goodwill of these officials, who may, on occasion, place institutional interests above the rights of inmates. ... Accordingly, this Court finds Selsky is not entitled to absolute immunity.

Prison officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity for nine- to fifteen-day delays in providing an administrative-segregation hearing when those delays were not clearly established as unreasonable, but not for a thirty-day delay whose unreasonableness should have been clear.

Jones v. Coonce · filed 1993-10-14

On the record before us, however, it should have been clear that thirty days was not a reasonable time for detention of Payne, Moore and McGee without an informal non-adversary hearing. We thus hold that the officials are entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claims of Craig Jones, Macy Jones, Madison and Phillips, but not on the claims of Payne, Moore and McGee.

Qualified immunity does not protect prison officials from a § 1983 claim alleging deliberate indifference to a prisoner's need for feeding assistance as part of treatment for a serious medical condition, because that right was clearly established.

Santiago v. Leik · filed 1993-10-28

A prison doctor and a prison administrator should have known in 1987 that Estelle condemns deliberate indifference to a prisoner's need for treatment for a serious medical condition. We conclude that neither Dr. Lloren nor Leik are immune from Santiago's suit.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct conforms to existing precedent and does not violate clearly established rights.

Marcussen v. Brandstat · filed 1993-11-01

Even if defendants were not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on all of Marcussen’s claims, they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the basis of qualified immunity. ... The record and cases cited above demonstrate that defendants’ behavior was in line with standards stated in existing precedent, and therefore could not have violated the clear contours of any of Marcussen’s rights. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in this case.

Officials have qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability for involuntarily medicating prisoners before 1990 under procedures requiring physician and warden approval to prevent harm, because the required procedural safeguards were not clearly established.

Sullivan v. Mary Flannigan, Superintendent, and Sam Parwatikar, Psychiatrist · filed 1993-11-01

In sum, Illinois' pre-1990 procedures for involuntary medication of prisoners ensured that Sullivan would not be drugged unless a competent physician and the warden decided that he needed medication to prevent harm to himself or others. This policy did not violate clearly established constitutional rights, and thus defendants have qualified immunity for their treatment of Sullivan before 1990.

A prison director is entitled to qualified immunity from section 1983 damages for revoking Act 814 work-release status in 1988 without a Morrissey-type hearing because the right to that hearing was not then clearly established.

Billy Darlene Jackson, Also Known as Billy Darlene Kimbrough v. A. L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correct · filed 1993-11-02

Because the Act 814 participant’s constitutional right to the due process protections of a Morrissey-type hearing was not clearly established at the time Jackson’s 814 status was revoked, Lockhart is entitled to qualified immunity.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from section 1983 claims for enforcing a hair-length rule against religious objections when their conduct was objectively reasonable under then-existing law.

Wellmaker v. Dahill · filed 1993-11-05

The Court must agree with Defendants that, given the state of the law at the time, their conduct was not objectively unreasonable. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ are entitled to qualified immunity, and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment must be granted for this reason.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for transferring an inmate without a hearing when the transfer violates no clearly established due process right.

Harrison v. Raney · filed 1993-11-05

Finally, as plaintiff had no liberty interest in remaining at Fort Pillow, or in receiving a hearing before his transfer, the defendants did not violate his clearly established rights to due process by transferring him. The defendants are thus protected by qualified immunity for their decision to transfer him.

A prison official is entitled to qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 for banning religious oils when legitimate security concerns make the decision reasonable under settled law.

Munir v. Elton I. Scott, Robert Brown · filed 1993-11-10

Defendant has articulated a sufficient number of legitimate security considerations concerning the use of religious oils to bring his decision within the ambit of reasonableness. Our inquiry ends there.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 protects prison officials from liability for nine-, thirteen-, and fifteen-day delays in administrative-segregation hearings where their unlawfulness was not clearly established, but not for a clearly unreasonable thirty-day delay.

Jones v. Coonce · filed 1993-11-15

Since the inmates point to no developments clarifying the definition of "reasonable time" between 1986 and the time of the events in this case, Swenson requires that we hold the officials' detention of Macy and Craig Jones for nine days, Madison for thirteen days, and Phillips for fifteen days did not violate the inmates' clearly established constitutional rights. On the record before us, however, it should have been clear that thirty days was not a reasonable time for detention of Payne, Moore and McGee without an informal non-adversary hearing. We thus hold that the officials are entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claims of Craig Jones, Macy Jones, Madison and Phillips, but not on the claims of Payne, Moore and McGee.

Qualified immunity shields officials from damages under § 1983 for conduct that did not violate clearly established rights, but does not affect the availability of injunctive relief.

Johnson v. Laham · filed 1993-11-15

As the district court noted, the Defendants are shielded by qualified immunity for monetary damages since their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald,457 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1982). At the time the Defendants acted, there was no clearly established liability for exposing prisoners to environmental tobacco smoke. See McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1509 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 60 U.S.L.W. 3291 (U.S. 1991). We therefore affirm that portion of the district court's order. Qualified immunity, however, does not affect the availability of injunctive relief. Id.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to a private corporation or its employees operating a state prison under contract.

Manis v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 1994-08-01

There is, thus, no basis for concluding that private parties, such as these defendants, who would not have been entitled to immunity at common law, should be afforded immunity under Section 1983 today.

Section 1983 applies a two-part qualified immunity standard to correctional administrators, considering both their good faith and whether they reasonably should have known their conduct violated constitutional rights.

Knell v. Bensinger · filed 1975-09-26

While the Court’s formulation in Wood v. Strickland was expressly limited to “the specific context of school discipline,” we conclude that the two-pronged standard therein articulated applies equally to challenges to the official conduct of correctional administrators.

Prison adjustment committee members have qualified, rather than absolute, immunity from damages liability under Section 1983.

Redding v. Fairman · filed 1984-02-21

Adjustment Committee members enjoy only qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, from damages liability.

Prison disciplinary officials are not absolutely immune from § 1983 claims for procedural due process violations, though they may have qualified immunity.

Reid v. Brodeur, et al. · filed 2000-01-24

Defendants also argue that they are absolutely immune from liability for any procedural due process violations arising from the prison disciplinary process. This claim has no merit.

Qualified immunity does not protect foster care officials from § 1983 claims when they deliberately disregard a clearly established duty to protect children in state custody.

Roes ex rel. Bazerman v. Florida Department of Children & Family Services · filed 2001-09-24

Defendants McCarthy, Reale, Andrews, and Williams failed to protect the Roes from the abuse they suffered at the hands of the Lynches to the degree of rising to the level of deliberate indifference. Therefore, they are not protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits a suit against prison officials who deprive an inmate of a constitutional right; their positions do not give them blanket immunity.

Roberts v. Pepersack · filed 1966-06-29

Since it is the court’s belief in the instant case that defendants may be sued, if they have deprived Roberts of a right protected by the Constitution, it becomes necessary to determine whether plaintiff has stated a claim under the second aspect of section 1983, “deprivation * * * of a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Roberts v. Trapnell, supra, 213 F.Supp. at 50-51.

Town selectmen have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims, but allegations that they knowingly and willfully acted to injure, harass, and discriminate can state a claim.

Gaffney v. Silk · filed 1973-12-27

When allegations that defendants knowingly and willfully acted in derogation of state law to injure, harass and discriminate against plaintiffs are added, we think that, notwithstanding defendants’ qualified immunity, a sufficient claim under § 1983 has been stated.

Section 1983 does not immunize these prison officials from suit for alleged procedural due process violations.

United States Ex Rel. Myers v. Sielaff · filed 1974-09-11

Under contemporary ease law it seems clear that defendants are not immune from suit under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 lets a person sue a state official for violating a constitutional right under color of state law.

Gullatte v. Potts · filed 1981-08-31

In Bogard, we clearly enunciated the standard of proof for a prima facie case and the scope of the qualified immunity that would be available to state prison officials sued in their individual capacity under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when the officials lacked fair notice that their conduct violated clearly established rights.

Bash v. Patrick · filed 2009-04-09

Officials sued pursuant to § 1983 thus have a right to fair notice.

Section 1983 qualified immunity can shield prison officials from damages when they act without improper motivation and reasonably interpret their duty to protect inmates.

Withers v. Levine · filed 1978-04-21

These criteria are applicable to prison officials. ... There is no indication under the facts of this case that defendants acted with improper motivation. While the inmates’ right to protection is clearly established, officials should not be unduly burdened with failure to correctly interpret the requirements of that duty in every situation. ... In light of the above principles, an award of damages is not appropriate under the facts of this case.

A warden has absolute immunity from damages under Section 1983 for a prisoner’s incarceration pursuant to a facially valid order of confinement.

Wilson v. Poulos · filed 2010-03-02

In sum, Defendant Poulos is entitled to absolute immunity. Therefore the Court GRANTS his motion to dismiss and DISMISS this matter WITH PREJUDICE. However, to make clear, this holding is limited in the same fashion as Patterson’s. Specifically, a warden is only entitled to absolute immunity against “damages flowing from the fact of a prisoner’s incarceration, when that incarceration occurs pursuant to a facially valid order of confinement.” Patterson, 999 F.2d at 1241 (emphasis added).

Section 1983 permits damages claims against government officials subject to qualified immunity when the violated right was not clearly established.

C.F. Ex Rel Farnan v. Capistrano Unified School District · filed 2011-08-19

In evaluating a grant of qualified immunity, we ask two questions: (1) whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the government official’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.

Prison officials charged with executing facially valid court orders have absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for conduct those orders prescribe.

Engebretson v. Mahoney · filed 2013-05-30

We now join our sister circuits and hold that prison officials charged with executing facially valid court orders enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for conduct prescribed by those orders.

Section 1983 provides absolute immunity to prison officials for conduct prescribed by facially valid court orders they are charged with executing.

Engebretson v. Mahoney · filed 2013-06-28

We now join our sister circuits and hold that prison officials charged with executing facially valid court orders enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for conduct prescribed by those orders.

Section 1983 permits a surviving spouse to sue for her own injuries arising from the deprivation of the decedent’s constitutional rights when state wrongful death law gives the spouse that right.

Estate of Kahng v. City of Houston · filed 2007-04-24

Therefore, as the decedent’s spouse, Clara Kahng, has standing to sue under § 1983 for her own injuries as a result of the deprivation of the decedent’s constitutional rights.

Corporations are persons under § 1983, but indirect effects on a corporation do not give it standing to sue.

Colon Rodriguez v. Bonilla · filed 2004-11-04

It is well established that corporations are “persons” within the meaning of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses and Section 1983. ... The indirect effects, if any, of Defendants’ actions on the corporate Plaintiffs does not give them Article III standing.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for redress against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Murphy v. Bitsoih · filed 2004-06-01

It is a well-settled principle that standing to assert a Section 1983 claim requires a plaintiff to assert a violation of a constitutional right personal to the plaintiff and not the right of someone else.

An unincorporated association is a person entitled to seek relief under § 1983.

Lippoldt v. City of Wichita, Kansas · filed 2003-05-28

Plaintiff OSA is a “person” entitled to seek relief under § 1983, and the court therefore denies the defendants’ summary judgment motion in part.

A vehicle passenger may bring a § 1983 claim based on an illegal traffic stop that violates her Fourth Amendment rights.

Laplace v. Demarco, No. Cv 01-0095009 S (Oct. 16, 2002) · filed 2002-10-16

A passenger may invoke her Fourth Amendment rights in a § 1983 action premised on an illegal traffic stop.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to assert an equal protection claim for personal injury caused by racial discrimination directed at the plaintiff because of an association with members of a protected class.

Rk Ventures, Inc. v. City Of Seattle · filed 2002-10-07

Here, appellants were the direct targets of the City's alleged racial discrimination due to their association with their African-American patrons. The City's efforts were aimed at forcing appellants to discriminate against members of the protected class. We hold, therefore, that appellants have standing under § 1983 to assert their own equal protection claims.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue only defendants who directly injured that plaintiff.

Brown v. Fettke · filed 2001-03-09

However, § 1983 may only be used to sue defendants who have directly injured the plaintiff.

A plaintiff no longer subject to a challenged state tax lacks standing to seek prospective relief under § 1983 on behalf of current residents.

Schwartz v. State Department of Revenue Administration · filed 1992-04-24

This brings us to the defendant’s second argument, with which we agree, that the plaintiff has no standing to assert a claim for prospective relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Schwartz has moved to Washington, D.C., and, as he is no longer a resident of New Hampshire, he is no longer subject to the interest and dividend tax to which he objects; thus he is no longer “impaired or prejudiced” by the tax.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to challenge school-district corporal-punishment policies when the plaintiffs cannot show direct impairment of their own constitutional rights.

Butts v. Southworth · filed 1975-05-07

We have no reason to take issue with plaintiffs’ position that where, as here, school authorities have prior notice of a parent’s opposition to the administration of corporal punishment to her child, the subsequent imposition of such punishment may constitute a trespass cognizable under § 1983. ... Under these circumstances we find that plaintiffs are without standing to contest any constitutional issues arising out of the imposition of corporal punishment. It does not appear that plaintiffs have shown direct impairment of their own constitutional rights as a result of School District policies on these matters.

Section 1983 does not allow an organization to sue for violations of its members’ rights.

Aguayo v. Richardson · filed 1973-01-18

Neither this language nor the history recently reviewed in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972), suggests that an organization may sue under the Civil Rights Act for the violation of rights of members.

Section 1983's zone of protected interests does not include a board member's asserted right to have other boards comply with a state questionnaire.

Nance v. Jackson · filed 1972-08-28

Neither is it clear that the right sought to be protected by plaintiff board members—namely, the right to have members of other boards comply with the questionnaires promulgated by the Supreme Court of Alabama—is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question—whether the relevant statute be considered to be the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States Code, Amendment 91 of the Alabama Constitution, or Title 17, Section 32(1) of the Code of Alabama. Clearly, the interest of the plaintiff board members does not come within the zone of interests to be protected by the federal constitution and statute.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking class relief for a claimed constitutional or civil-rights violation to show an injury directly associated with the wrong, rather than a vague or indefinite injury.

Smiley v. City of Montgomery · filed 1972-10-27

The allegations of the treatment of the Smileys cannot be lightly treated. They state clear and precise instances of alleged mistreatment of citizens under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, not every person who has his eye blacked by an irate policeman may bring a class action against the municipality by alleging that his race is in the minority at City Hall and, therefore, members thereof are not receiving equal protection. ... The damage or injury of the plaintiff must be directly, rather than vaguely, associated with the claimed wrong. Otherwise, spurious or arguably vexatious litigation could be extended immeasurably by allowing suits by persons seeking to right various wrongs for which they claim some vague or indefinite injury. ... Accordingly, Dr. and Mrs. Smiley will be dismissed as Plaintiffs in their suit for equal employment opportunity for other persons.

Section 1983 does not give an organization standing to sue for violations of its members’ constitutional rights.

Glover v. McMurray · filed 1973-05-24

In Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), the Court ruled that the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not confer standing on organizations to sue for violations of the constitutional rights of their members. ... With regard to the claims of their members, they have standing to raise only the statutory claims.

Section 1983 provides a remedy to the party injured, so a plaintiff must show actual or threatened injury sufficient to satisfy Article III standing.

O'Shea v. Littleton · filed 1974-01-15

Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in particular, provides for liability to the “party injured” in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. Perforce, the constitutional requirement of an actual case or controversy remains. Respondents still must show actual or threatened injury of some ldnd to establish standing in the constitutional sense.

Section 1983 does not provide a judicially cognizable due process claim when the alleged state inaction has no direct relationship to the plaintiff’s injury and state-law remedies remain available.

Paturzo v. Home Life Insurance · filed 1974-09-30

Standing requirements are also unsatisfied in this case. Neither Paturzo nor anyone similarly situated can plausibly claim to have been deprived of property without due process of law since Paturzo as well as any disgruntled policyholder can institute a breach of contract suit in a court of the State of Maryland and have his respective assertions of violation of contract rights determined therein either in individual or class suits as permitted by Maryland’s statute and rules of procedure. Accordingly, Paturzo cannot show that the alleged derelictions by the State Insurance Commissioner deprived Paturzo of property without due process of law. Accordingly, also, there is no direct relationship between any such alleged derelictions and Paturzo’s alleged injury. ... Herein, the record establishes facts which, for the reasons set forth above, disclose that, as to defendant Hatem, the plaintiff lacks standing to permit a judicially cognizable 1983 claim.

Section 1983 allows an expectant mother to sue to enforce her direct statutory right to AFDC benefits for an unborn child.

Parks v. Harden · filed 1974-12-02

If AFDC payments must be made with respect to unborn as well as post-partum children, then, the expectant mother herself has a right to receive them and standing to assert that right under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a litigant to sue for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

Coxson v. Godwin · filed 1975-11-10

It is, of course, an undisputed proposition that a litigant cannot sue for deprivation of another’s civil rights.

Section 1983 does not give public-housing tenants a right to increase the number of lower-income fellow tenants at the expense of slightly more affluent tenants who also qualify.

Taylor v. Kerr · filed 1977-03-02

The defendants contend that the Tenants Steering Committee has failed to allege sufficient injury to entitle it to standing in this case. It is difficult to rationally interpret the provisions of § 1983 to guarantee as a right that a low-income tenant in a public housing project have a larger number of still lower income citizens as fellow tenants. Even for the current members of the tenants committee who fall in the lowest income group, § 1983 does not offer them a means to increase the number of their sub-group within the total number of tenants, at the expense of others who are slightly more affluent but who still qualify as low-income persons eligible for housing.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff asserting an Establishment Clause claim to show a real and immediate injury to establish standing.

Brashich v. Port Auth. of New York · filed 1979-12-20

In order to acquire standing under the Establishment Clause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as for any other claim of “a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws”, the plaintiff must meet the test of constitutional standing which requires a “real and immediate injury” to the plaintiff.

Section 1983 allows a property-owning cooperative whose ownership rights are allegedly harmed by a municipal ordinance to challenge the ordinance in court.

Hometown Co-Operative Apartments v. City of Hometown · filed 1980-05-19

The municipal ordinance is directed at two parties: owners of property who are sellers/lessors, and buyers/lessees of that property. The cooperative is the proper party to represent its own interests as well as the interests of the buyers or lessees of its residential units. The co-operative, as the owner of the property, is duty bound by the ordinance to comply with its provisions. It is the co-operative which must pay the fine for failure to comply with the ordinance. Moreover, it is the co-operative’s ownership rights that are being harmed if the ordinance is unduly burdensome. ... In summary, the Court finds plaintiff has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Hometown ordinance under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not address standing, so state law governs the resolution of standing issues.

James Cunningham, Tony Williams v. Governor Robert D. Ray · filed 1981-05-18

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) is silent on the question of standing, state law governs the resolution of this issue.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show an injury caused by the challenged conduct, and a plaintiff lacks standing when the challenged conduct did not cause the injury.

Howard v. New Jersey Department of Civil Service · filed 1981-12-04

To have standing, then, plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) they suffered an injury; and (2) defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct caused their injuries. ... We conclude that plaintiffs have suffered no injury caused by the conduct they challenged as discriminatory. Plaintiffs are therefore without standing to challenge defendants’ use of the physical agility test under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging allegedly discriminatory conduct to show an injury caused by that challenged conduct, and a plaintiff lacks standing when the challenged conduct did not cause the injury.

Howard, Frank, Jr., Rubin J. Battle, Floyd Bostic, Jr., Lynette Crawford, Charles E. Harris, and Olivia C.… · filed 1981-12-30

The required causal connection will be satisfied only if there is a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress the injury. ... Defendants' use of the challenged physical agility test did not cause plaintiffs' loss of job opportunity. Thus, plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge defendants' use of the physical agility test.

Section 1983 does not allow a person to sue to vindicate the constitutional rights of third-party property owners.

Sterngass v. Bowman · filed 1983-04-19

The Sterngasses’ personal rights thus have not been affected, and they may not sue under section 1983 to vindicate the rights of third-party property owners not present in this suit.

An indirect economic interest in a potential back-pay award does not give a nondiscriminated spouse or conjugal community property partnership standing under Section 1983.

Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Almodovar · filed 1986-03-04

This interest under Puerto Rico law cannot alone serve as a basis for standing under section 1983.

Individuals who personally suffer racial discrimination from unequal and segregative public higher education have standing to seek relief under § 1983 for violation of equal protection.

United States v. Alabama · filed 1987-10-06

The Knight intervenors are plainly entitled to bring a § 1983 action charging that they suffered discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause due to unequal and segregative public higher education in the Montgomery area.

Section 1983 does not let a parent sue on his own behalf for the deprivation of his children's civil rights.

Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources Marvin Hood Sandy Allnutt Marian McKinney · filed 1988-10-18

We agree with the conclusion of the district court on the standing issue. Meador has no right to sue on his own behalf for the deprivation of the civil rights of his children.

Section 1983 requires a claimant to show deprivation of the claimant’s own federally secured right; a claimant cannot assert an equal protection claim based on the rights of others.

South-Suburban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors · filed 1989-04-27

In order to establish a violation of Section 1983 counterplaintiffs must also establish that the challenged conduct deprived counterplaintiffs of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Counterplaintiffs clearly have no standing to assert this claim.

A plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim based solely on injuries to other people without alleging an injury to himself.

Corbett v. Gardner · filed 1989-05-31

The district court dismissed this case sua sponte because Corbett did not allege any injury to himself and lacked standing to raise the injury to the other inmates. Therefore, Corbett did not state a claim under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). We conclude that the district court's reasoning is correct, and we will affirm the district court's dismissal.

Section 1983 permits a nonminority plaintiff injured by racial discrimination because of its commercial relationship with minority patrons to sue.

Yesteryears, Inc. v. Waldorf Restaurant, Inc. · filed 1989-12-11

Thus, the lesson from all these cases is clear: a non-minority plaintiff, be it a corporation or an individual, has standing to bring suit under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts when racially discriminatory actions have injured plaintiff due to plaintiffs relationship with minority citizens.

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege a personal stake in the claimed deprivation; allegations concerning other inmates alone do not establish standing.

Reynoldson v. Shillinger · filed 1990-06-28

We agree with the district court’s ruling that, to the extent a complaint concerns “inmates” rather than the plaintiff himself, it is dismissable for failure to allege the plaintiff’s standing to proceed.

A prisoner bringing a Section 1983 action lacks standing to assert another inmate’s due process or First Amendment rights.

James M. Jourdan, Jr. v. Robert E. Lecureux, Thomas Doty, Roger Dobbs · filed 1991-08-14

Jourdan does not have standing to raise a due process or first amendment claim on behalf of another inmate.

Section 1983 claims are personal, so a family member cannot sue solely through another person’s injury.

Buenrostro v. Collazo · filed 1991-10-24

To the degree that the claim alleged would have been merely a vicarious suit by the family “through” their father’s claim, defendants are correct that there is no standing, since section 1983 actions are personal and do not inure to any person other than the person injured.

Section 1983 ordinarily does not allow a person to sue for the deprivation of someone else’s civil rights.

Brown v. Teitelbaum · filed 1991-11-07

Ordinarily, one cannot sue for relief over the deprivation of another’s civil rights.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations, but a claimant invoking the Fourteenth Amendment must possess an underlying constitutional right to sue.

Housing Authority of the Kaw Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. City of Ponca City, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1991-12-19

To have standing to sue under section 1983, therefore, the Authority must possess some right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, section 1983 does not provide any substantive rights at all but only creates a remedy for the violation of substantive rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging jail conditions to show that the conditions personally affected him; he cannot pursue claims based only on harm to other inmates.

Swoboda v. Dubach · filed 1992-03-30

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he was personally impacted by many of the challenged conditions. For instance, plaintiff complains of the medical care withheld from inmates in drug withdrawal, but makes no claim that he needed and was denied such medical care. Plaintiff is not entitled to proceed on such claims.

A resident who alleges that police wrongfully entered her home has standing to bring a Section 1983 claim for the intrusion on her own rights.

Gora v. John Costa and Thomas Ginoza · filed 1992-08-07

In alleging that the police officers wrongfully entered her home, Amelia Gora alleged a personal intrusion into her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. ... For these reasons, we cannot affirm on the grounds that Amelia Gora is an improper plaintiff or that she failed, as a matter of law, to state or prove a claim for relief under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff asserting a First Amendment claim to have independent or third party standing to assert the right at issue.

Moody v. Jefferson Parish School Board · filed 1992-10-05

Since plaintiff has no independent standing, nor any third party standing, to assert a claim based on alleged violations of the First Amendment, no genuine issue for trial exists with regard to § 1983.

Prisoners suing under § 1983 must allege personal losses and cannot bring claims on behalf of other prisoners.

Tyler v. Ashcroft · filed 1993-07-20

Further, the inmates must allege personal losses-they cannot bring claims on behalf of other prisoners. See id. We conclude that the inmates' complaint fails on both accounts and the district court properly dismissed it.

A plaintiff seeking relief under Section 1983 must allege a deprivation of the plaintiff's own protected rights and cannot sue or recover damages for the deprivation of another person's rights.

Bullock v. Howard A. Peters, III · filed 1993-08-19

Bullock may not sue or recover damages for the deprivation of another person's rights. ... Since Bullock has failed to allege that he has personally been deprived of a protected right, his Count II claims are not cognizable under Sec. 1983.

The zone of interests analysis under Section 1983 is limited to determining whether the underlying constitutional or statutory provision confers rights intended by the legislature to be enforceable under that section.

Church Of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc. v. City Of Clearwater · filed 1993-09-30

Whatever the nature of the inquiry in the absence of congressional legislation, the Court's precedents show that the zone of interests analysis under Sec. 1983 is limited to ascertaining whether the substantive constitutional or statutory provision confers rights intended by the legislature to be enforceable under the remedial statute.

A corporation has standing under § 1983 to sue for violations of constitutionally protected rights other than privileges and immunities.

L.S.T. Inc. v. Crow · filed 1993-10-05

Although a corporate entity lacks standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding violations of privileges and immunities, a corporation does possess standing under the statute for violations of other constitutionally protected rights.

Section 1983 does not permit an inmate to bring a denial-of-access claim for another inmate who can bring that claim personally.

Hamm v. Groose · filed 1994-01-28

Our cases are clear that an inmate cannot bring a denial-of-access claim on behalf of another inmate who is able to bring such a claim in his or her own name.

Section 1983 does not allow an inmate to bring another inmate’s denial-of-access claim when that inmate can bring the claim in his or her own name.

Hamm v. Groose · filed 1994-03-22

Our cases are clear that an inmate cannot bring a denial-of-access claim on behalf of another inmate who is able to bring such a claim in his or her own name.

A Section 1983 plaintiff cannot assert another prisoner’s right of access to the courts based on the denial of a request to provide that prisoner legal assistance.

Robbins v. Lewis · filed 1994-04-21

As the district court found, however, Robbins does not have standing to challenge the denial of his request to continue providing legal assistance to Apodaca on the ground that the denial violates Apodaca's right of access to the courts.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a personal injury; a prisoner cannot bring a claim on behalf of other prisoners.

Langton v. Secretary of Public Safety · filed 1994-07-11

Under the Federal Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff must show that he has a “personal stake in the outcome,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), and that “he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). “A prisoner cannot bring claims on behalf of other prisoners.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). We agree with the motion judge that the plaintiff lacks standing.

Section 1983 gives a white plaintiff standing to sue for retaliation for assisting a Black person when he asserts his own right and a personal injury.

Maynard v. City of San Jose · filed 1994-10-13

Maynard has standing under Section 1983. ... He asserts his own right to be free from retaliation, alleges injuries that are personal to him, and is the only effective plaintiff who can bring this suit.

Section 1983 allows a white plaintiff to sue for retaliation against himself for assisting a Black person when he asserts his own right and personal injuries.

Maynard v. City of San Jose · filed 1994-11-22

Maynard has standing under Section 1983. Unlike the plaintiff in Halet, Maynard is not suing on behalf of anyone else. He asserts his own right to be free from retaliation, alleges injuries that are personal to him, and is the only effective plaintiff who can bring this suit.

A retirement fund acting as a retirement fund lacks standing to invoke the protection of Section 1983.

Policemen’s Retirement Fund of the City of Louisville v. City of Louisville · filed 1995-01-12

With respect to the City withholding appropriations from the Fund, no authority suggests that a retirement fund qua retirement fund has standing to invoke the protection of a civil rights law such as 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim on behalf of other children without standing to sue for them.

Rebecca Mercer, Also Known as Rebecca Mercer Hensley v. Fayette Circuit Court · filed 1995-04-13

Mercer also does not have standing to sue on behalf of other children whose mothers are incarcerated.

A § 1983 plaintiff may not assert denial-of-access claims on behalf of other prisoners.

Davis v. T.J. Powell, Also Known as Sonny Powell · filed 1995-05-11

Davis may not assert denial-of-access claims on behalf of other prisoners.

A prisoner challenging prison conditions under § 1983 has standing when the complaint connects those conditions to the prisoner’s own experience or injury.

Bauer v. Dantis · filed 1996-02-21

In Swoboda, we held a state prisoner lacked standing to raise claims on behalf of others and that "general observations" about prison conditions are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In our view, the complaint alleged a sufficient nexus between the condition of the cell doors and his own individual situation at the Bernalillo County Detention Center. It was therefore error for the district court to conclude he lacked standing under Swoboda.

Section 1983 allows parents to sue for deprivation of their own constitutional rights, but not for deprivation of their children’s rights.

Divergilio v. Skiba · filed 1996-03-11

The Court holds that plaintiff parents lack standing to bring a § 1983 claim for deprivation of their children’s constitutional rights. While plaintiff parents do have standing to sue for deprivation of their own liberty interest in creation and maintenance of the parent-child relationship, the allegations made in the complaint and the facts asserted in opposition to defendant Skiba’s motion fail to support a claim for such deprivation.

Section 1983 permits a frequent visitor with a legitimate expectation of privacy in a residence to sue to vindicate her own Fourth Amendment rights during a search.

Bonner v. Anderson · filed 1996-04-17

Anderson contends that Bonner lacks standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We believe that Bonner's activities--visiting a neighbor and assisting the elderly--establish an expectation of privacy that is "recognized and permitted by society." ... We conclude that Bonner should be afforded the opportunity to vindicate the constitutional guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner to allege a personal loss and seek to vindicate his own constitutional rights rather than those of other prisoners.

Darryl Corn v. Sparkman · filed 1996-04-17

A prisoner must allege a personal loss and seek to vindicate a deprivation of his own constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not give parents standing to bring individual claims based on a deprivation of their child’s constitutional rights.

Burrow Ex Rel. Burrow v. Postville Community School District · filed 1996-06-17

As a preliminary matter, the court finds that Lisa’s Parents lack standing to bring individual claims under § 1983 based upon a deprivation of Lisa’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of their own constitutional rights, not the rights of a third party.

Sidari v. Orleans County · filed 1996-08-26

Furthermore, plaintiff can not maintain such constitutional claims under the other civil rights statutes asserted in the Amended Complaint. To have standing to assert such claims, the plaintiff must allege “a violation of his or her own, not a third party’s, rights.”

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for violations of their own rights, but family members cannot sue solely because another family member’s constitutional rights were violated.

Pierzynowski v. Police Dept. City of Detroit · filed 1996-09-23

If the constitutional rights of one family member are violated, this does not confer standing on other family members to assert a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 allows a nonminority landlord to sue over allegedly discriminatory official treatment based on his association with Black tenants.

Puglisi v. Underhill Park Taxpayer Assoc. · filed 1996-11-12

These cases show that plaintiff, in the present case, has standing to bring the § 1983 claim. Although plaintiff, here, is not a corporation, plaintiff is alleging that he was singled out for disadvantageous treatment by the Village defendants’ who, acting under the color and authority of law, selectively enforced its laws and codes because they believed plaintiff was in a rental contract with or otherwise associated with his African American tenants.