42 U.S.C. § 1983

A police officer has a complete qualified-immunity defense to § 1983 liability when the officer reasonably believed in good faith that the challenged conduct was constitutional.

Bowling Ex Rel. Nadvornik v. City of Westland · filed 1985-01-17

A police officer has a complete defense to liability under § 1983 if he reasonably believed in good faith that his actions were constitutional.

Qualified immunity in Section 1983 cases is evaluated objectively, without considering an officer's subjective good faith.

Robert N. Creamer, Cross-Appellee v. Officer Lewis Porter, Officer J.L. Sampson and Officer R. Johnson, Cross-Appellants · filed 1985-03-15

The defense of qualified immunity is no longer to be evaluated with reference to any subjective consideration of an officer’s good faith in carrying out certain discretionary functions.

Police officers may assert qualified immunity from liability in Section 1983 suits.

Schlothauer v. Robinson · filed 1985-03-14

Police officers, however, are afforded qualified immunity from liability in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Police officers have qualified rather than absolute immunity from § 1983 damages and remain liable when they violate clearly established rights they knew or should have known.

Howard J. Brierley, and V-1 Oil Company v. F.J. Schoenfeld, Jr. · filed 1986-01-15

Individual police officers have no absolute immunity from civil rights suits such as that accorded judges and prosecutors. However, they have been held to be entitled to a qualified or good faith immunity under § 1983 unless they violate a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which they knew or should have known at the time of the alleged acts.

Qualified immunity is available as a defense in Section 1983 cases alleging unlawful arrest or excessive force.

Hamblen v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1986-10-23

This argument, if it is indeed what Yagman claims, cannot survive in the face of clear authority that the qualified immunity defense is available in cases of unlawful arrest, ... and excessive force, ... F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir.1984).

Police officers sued under Section 1983 are protected by qualified immunity when unsettled law would not have alerted a reasonable officer that the conduct violated an established right.

Edward A. Slavin, Jr. v. City of Oak Ridge, Tennessee Howard F. Lee Alan R. Massengill Scott E. Ball and J.W. Dunn · filed 1986-11-04

Since the Supreme Court decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967), there is no doubt that the defense of good faith immunity is available to police officers in a § 1983 action. There is also no doubt that where the law is unsettled police officers will be "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate established constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

A police officer does not lose qualified immunity from Section 1983 merely by violating a departmental regulation when the asserted constitutional duty was not clearly established.

Donald Gagne, Etc. v. City of Galveston, and Mike Putnal · filed 1986-12-09

Accordingly, the violation of such a departmental regulation could not by itself deprive Putnal of the protection of qualified immunity.

Police officers have qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Schultz v. Thomas · filed 1986-12-08

Good-faith immunity, otherwise known as qualified immunity, is available to police officers as a shield from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 deadly-force claim when undisputed facts show they reasonably used force to protect others from a suspect actively shooting people.

Trejo v. Wattles · filed 1987-02-25

In the present case, the material facts are not in dispute. Decedent was in the act of shooting at others when defendant detectives drew their weapons and opened fire on him. ... Accordingly, I find that Wattles' and Carter's use of force was justified and reasonable. They are entitled to qualified immunity, thereby relieving them of any liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

A police officer remains protected from § 1983 damages by qualified immunity unless the violated right was clearly established when the officer acted and the officer reasonably should have known the conduct was illegal.

Tarantino v. Baker · filed 1987-08-10

Even when a court concludes after the fact that a police officer violated a constitutional right, the officer remains shielded from civil liability under Sec. 1983 unless the right was "clearly established" at the time he acted and he reasonably should have known that his actions were illegal.

A state executive officer performing discretionary functions has qualified immunity from § 1983 damages unless the conduct violates clearly established law a reasonable person would know.

de Maldonado v. Rivera · filed 1987-08-17

In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defense of qualified immunity from liability for damages is available to state executive officers performing discretionary functions, “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

A state executive officer performing discretionary functions has qualified immunity from § 1983 damages unless the conduct violates clearly established law a reasonable person would know.

De La Cruz Andreu v. Inclan · filed 1987-08-17

In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defense of qualified immunity from liability for damages is available to state executive officers performing discretionary functions, “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Once a defendant raises qualified immunity in a § 1983 case, the plaintiff must present facts that, if true, establish a violation of law that was clearly established when the defendant acted.

Dominque v. James A. Telb, Sheriff, Jimmy G. Putnam, Assistant Deputy Director · filed 1987-10-23

Once the issue of qualified immunity is properly injected in the case either by a motion to dismiss, an affirmative defense, or a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff is obliged to present facts which if true would constitute a violation of clearly established law.

An officer has qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest lawful under clearly established law.

McIntosh v. White · filed 1987-11-03

Any reasonable officer could have believed the arrest of Plaintiff to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and information arresting officers possessed. Their arrest of Plaintiff was objectively legally reasonable. The test is not what a court would believe while in the comfort and seclusion of its chambers.

In a § 1983 action, police officers cannot claim a good faith defense when the rights at issue were clearly established.

Holt v. Artis · filed 1988-05-17

In addition, because this case involved clearly established constitutional rights, the trial court should have determined well before trial that the good faith defense was not available to the defendants as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for an officer whose actions a reasonable officer could have believed lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the officer possessed.

Martin v. City of Eastlake · filed 1988-05-18

Qualified immunity, in its simplest terms, is given to an officer who may have violated a constitutional right of a person, if the officer’s actions are such that a reasonable officer could have believed that the actions were lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the officer possessed.

In a Section 1983 action, qualified immunity does not justify summary judgment for an officer who made an emergency mental-health hold when the evidence could show that a reasonable officer would not have believed the hold lawful.

Kennedy v. LeFebvre · filed 1988-05-25

In these circumstances, we believe that a jury could find that a reasonable officer would not have believed the emergency hold to be lawful, but rather the product of a domestic dispute.

Section 1983 damages claims against police officers are subject to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed the challenged force was lawful under clearly established law.

Nelson v. City of Elmhurst · filed 1988-06-30

Because of the policy concerns underlying the doctrine of qualified immunity, the doctrine shields a defendant from civil damages liability as long as his actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights he allegedly violated.

Public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliatory-discharge claim when a reasonable official would have known the discharge violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Brawner v. City of Richardson, Texas, L.F. Eudy, Richardson Police Department Director, and Kenneth Yarbrough, Ch · filed 1988-08-18

Thus, a reasonably objective public official would have known that termination of an employee for his speech concerning misconduct by public officials would violate a clearly established constitutional right. Therefore, defendants here are not entitled to summary judgment on their claim of qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 damages action, a jury may decide qualified immunity when whether an officer reasonably believed his conduct was lawful presents a factual issue.

Patricia Thorsted Stephanie Thorsted v. Kelly · filed 1988-10-03

In this case, the question of whether a reasonable officer placed in the circumstances faced by Kelly could reasonably believe that his conduct was legal is a fact-specific one, and was appropriately given to the jury.

In a § 1983 wrongful arrest claim, an officer has a good faith defense if the officer reasonably believed the arrest was lawful.

Butts v. Carey · filed 1988-10-11

The court has found that Carey believed in good faith that he had probable cause to arrest Gordon Butts. In light of the present state of Connecticut law regarding Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53a-167a and Conn.Gen. Stat. § 53a-181, that belief was surely reasonable. Accordingly, Carey has met his burden of showing the defense of “good faith.”

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when no reasonable officer could believe their conduct was lawful under clearly established constitutional standards.

Vaughan v. Ricketts · filed 1988-10-14

No reasonable officer could believe that such searches were conducted in a reasonable manner, and so Ricketts was not entitled to qualified immunity on Vaughan’s fourth amendment claim.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action may obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to plead facts describing a violation of a clearly established right.

Walton v. Richard M. Rogers J.R. Dickey, Officer 1-50, Wright Sheffield, Officer Richard B. McQuade Jr., Ju · filed 1988-10-19

Furthermore, we find no error in the district court's granting of summary judgment to defendant Sheffield on the basis of qualified immunity. Plaintiff did not respond to the motion by pleading facts describing a violation of a clearly established right.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on police officers for violating legal rules that were not clearly established when they acted.

McClellan v. Coale · filed 1988-11-02

Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), police officers are not required to anticipate new rules of law.

A police officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest claim when a reasonably competent officer could have relied on an ordinance whose constitutionality was unsettled at the time of the arrest.

Richardson v. Sergeant Curtis Bonds · filed 1988-11-29

The constitutionality of the ordinance requiring a police officer to identify himself on demand was not settled at the time of the arrest; a reasonably competent police officer could rely on the ordinance in making a warrantless arrest. Bonds is therefore entitled to qualified immunity based on the undisputed facts in the record, and the District Court’s grant of summary judgment was proper.

Police officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when a reasonable officer could have believed the prosecution was proper.

Costopoulos v. Gibboney · filed 1988-12-02

Applying the test to the instant case, it seems fairly clear that a reasonable police officer could have thought the prosecution proper. ... Defendants’ motion is granted to the Civil Rights Act action, 42 U.S.C. §1983, on the basis of qualified official immunity.

Police officers lose qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim over a facially neutral domestic violence policy applied discriminatorily only if a reasonable officer would know its discriminatory impact on women, that bias against women motivated its adoption, and that it serves no important public interest.

Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Department · filed 1988-12-23

Applying Harlow and Anderson to the situation before us, and in light of the particularized right discussed above, we conclude that a police officer loses a qualified immunity to a claim that a facially neutral policy is executed in a discriminatory manner only if a reasonable police officer would know that the policy has a discriminatory impact on women, that bias against women was a motivating factor behind the adoption of the policy, and that there is no important public interest served by the adoption of the policy.

A police officer sued under § 1983 may claim qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the officer possessed.

Estate of Kenneth Daniels, by Tina Daniels, Etc. v. City of Cleveland · filed 1989-01-11

This instruction incorporated the objective standard of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), and posed the "relevant question" described in Anderson v. Creighton, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987), as the "objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [Thomas's firing his revolver] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information [he] possessed." 107 S.Ct. at 3040. The instructions correctly submitted the issue of qualified immunity.

Police officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability for enforcing a zoning ordinance when its alleged unconstitutionality was not sufficiently obvious to overcome that immunity.

Johnson v. City of Willoughby Hills · filed 1989-02-03

Although this Court is not prepared to rule at this time on the constitutionality of Willoughby Hills’ zoning ordinances, it is apparent from the briefing that the alleged violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights was not of such a sufficiently obvious nature so as to warrant a waiver of the Defendant officers’ qualified immunity. Therefore, summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of Defendant police officers Jack Berwold, Robert D. Owens, and Lyn Swetel on Count One of the Complaint.

Qualified immunity shields officials from a Section 1983 damages claim when a reasonable officer could believe the challenged conduct was lawful under the clearly established law at the time.

Edwards v. Gilbert · filed 1989-02-28

Because no court had ever held that acts materially similar to what these defendants did--leave a seemingly sleeping juvenile inmate, who had never threatened or attempted suicide and who had never been considered a suicide risk, in a secure cell for forty-five minutes with another sleeping juvenile--constituted deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety from self harm, we believe that a reasonable officer in each of defendants' positions could have believed that he was acting consistently with the Constitution. We therefore conclude that these individual defendants are entitled to immunity.

A corrections officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when a reasonable officer could believe his use of force to prevent an escape was lawful in light of clearly established law and the facts known to him.

Henry v. Perry · filed 1989-04-13

The question in determining the existence of qualified immunity is whether a reasonable person could have believed the defendant’s action to be lawful in light of clearly established law and the information he possessed. ... We conclude that on this record the district court should have held that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity and should have entered summary judgment for the defendant.

Qualified immunity applies to a § 1983 excessive force claim when a reasonable officer could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful under the circumstances.

Brown v. Noe · filed 1989-04-17

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must decide whether a reasonable officer could have believed his actions to be lawful. ... Accepting plaintiffs version of the facts as true, the court still finds that defendant Noe’s pushing plaintiff was reasonable in the context of the arrest.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when undisputed facts establish that their attempted stop, arrest, and use of force did not expose them to liability.

Jaroma v. James J. Massey, Etc. · filed 1989-04-28

This statement of facts, treated as uncontroverted, is plainly adequate to establish that defendants are protected from liability by a defense of qualified immunity and therefore are entitled to summary judgment.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages against government officials when their conduct did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Shields v. David Burge, Individually, and as Superintendent With the Illinois State Police · filed 1989-05-15

Qualified immunity insulates government officials from civil damages liability when the officials’ actions do not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

A parole officer who relies on a facially valid release form is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for an arrest based on that form.

Moiser v. Coreen M. Blum, Dick D. Moore, Bill E. Duncan, Cranston J. Mitchell, Wilbur C. Kirchner, Victoria C. · filed 1989-05-24

The Parole Board’s release form is facially valid. We conclude that Blum is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Police officers have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit when they do not violate the plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights.

Beaudoin v. City of Dearborn Heights Greg Gondek Timothy Adams · filed 1989-06-13

The district court held that Gondek and Adams were entitled to qualified immunity from suit under section 1983 because they did not violate Beaudoin's clearly established constitutional rights. ... We agree with the district court that under this standard no genuine fact issues exist in this case. ... Therefore, the officers' use of deadly force to prevent Beaudoin's escape was constitutionally permissible.

An officer’s qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim must be decided by a properly instructed jury when disputed facts bear on whether the officer could reasonably believe the force was lawful.

Calamia v. City Of New York · filed 1989-06-22

Thus, the question here was whether it was objectively reasonable for Sutton to believe that his treatment of Calamia did not violate that right. This was a matter as to which the facts were not undisputed, and hence it was a question to be answered by a properly instructed jury. Accordingly, Sutton was not entitled to judgment n.o.v. on the ground of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim depends on objective reasonableness, not an officer’s subjective good faith.

Calamia v. City of New York · filed 1989-06-22

The proper standard for proof of such immunity, as discussed above, is not good faith but rather objective reasonableness.

Section 1983 does not give a police officer qualified immunity when a reasonable officer should have understood that his conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right to personal security.

Wood v. Steven C. Ostrander Neil Maloney · filed 1989-06-27

If Ostrander acted as Wood claims he did, Ostrander is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

A police officer cannot claim qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when he could not reasonably believe that his use of force was authorized.

Pastre v. Weber · filed 1989-07-28

The foregoing reasoning eliminates any claim of qualified immunity under Anderson v. Creighton (1987), 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523. Weber could not have been under the impression that any New York statute entitled him to address a citizen as a “fucking asshole” and proceed to clobber him.

A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 claim for excessive force during an arrest must plead facts sufficient to overcome a potential qualified immunity defense.

Brown v. Deputy Constable John Glossip · filed 1989-08-04

Henceforth, a plaintiff who files a lawsuit predicated on the use of excessive police force contrary to the fourth amendment must comply with these authorities and state facts sufficient to overcome a potential qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment in a Section 1983 action when the alleged conduct would violate clearly established rights and material facts bearing on the defense remain disputed.

Manhattan Beach Police Officers Association, Inc. v. City of Manhattan Beach David J. Thompson Harry L. Kuhlmeyer, Jr. · filed 1989-08-08

The only issue before us, however, in reviewing the denial of defendants’ claim of qualified immunity, is whether the plaintiffs have alleged the violation of norms that were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions. ... If their allegations are proven, then clearly established first amendment rights were violated. ... However, these facts are not yet before us; the facts as to the nature of the “administrátive sergeant” position, and the defendants’ motivations, are still in dispute. The district court therefore properly denied the motion for summary judgment.

Qualified immunity protects an official from a Section 1983 claim when the law was not so clearly established that a reasonable official would have known the conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Dominque v. James A. Telb, Sheriff, J.G. Putnam, Assistant Deputy Director · filed 1989-08-29

In any event, the law was not so clearly established at the time that a reasonable official in Putnam's shoes would have known that his acts violated clearly established rights.

Qualified immunity does not protect officers who use unreasonable force during an arrest when that force violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Carter v. Dixon · filed 1989-09-07

Thus, at the time of Daniel Carter’s arrest, defendants should have known that the use of unreasonable force in effecting an arrest violates the Constitution. For this reason, if plaintiffs can prove their allegations that defendants used unreasonable force, then defendants cannot properly invoke the doctrine of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 claim, reliance on advice from a city attorney or judge does not automatically give an officer qualified immunity; the advice bears on whether the officer acted reasonably.

Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kirksey · filed 1989-09-19

While it may be true that the officers relied on the erroneous opinions of the City Attorney and a local judge, following such advice does not automatically cloak one with qualified immunity, but rather, is used to show the reasonableness of the action taken.

Government officials performing discretionary functions are generally immune from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights a reasonable person would have known.

Nevels v. Timothy Smith, Deputy Sheriff Judith Perry, Deputy Sheriff Clinton County Sheriff's Department Patrick · filed 1989-09-28

Government officials, performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Material factual disputes about the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 action.

Zuchel v. Spinharney · filed 1989-11-27

Viewed through this evidentiary prism, we conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding a judicial determination of whether Officer Spinharney's conduct was objectively reasonable.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their conduct complied with clearly established due process law.

Gittens v. Superintendent Eugene S. Lefevre, Review Officer Lt. Kavanaugh, Correction Officer J. Gillen, Sergeant · filed 1989-11-29

Thus, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity only if it was “objectively reasonable” for them to believe that a disciplinary hearing within seven days complied with the Helms standard. We believe it was.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when no clearly established authority would have informed a reasonable officer that the challenged conduct was unconstitutional.

Watson v. Norris · filed 1989-12-07

Although this Court has found that the arrangement at Turney Center is insufficient, it notes that there was no body of authority such that any reasonable officer should have known in advance that it was unconstitutional. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, and the defendants should be granted partial summary judgment as to that issue.

Qualified immunity protects a police officer from a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Navratil v. Parker · filed 1989-12-12

If there is some other constitutional right of privacy that might prohibit police from shining flashlights into or on cars, it is not clearly established and thus Parker is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Police officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that they violated clearly established law or acted in an objectively unreasonable manner.

Reuter v. City of New Hope · filed 1990-01-02

Officers Erickson and Campbell are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law against the Reuters’ section 1983 claims. The Reuters failed to present evidence that the officers violated a clearly established law or acted in an objectively unreasonable manner.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for an officer when a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have believed the force used was lawful.

Stevens v. Stover · filed 1990-01-05

Considering the force plaintiff exercised in resisting her arrest, the Court finds that a reasonable officer in Officer Stover’s shoes would have believed that the force that he used against plaintiff was lawful. Accordingly, Officer Stover is entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s section 1983 claim.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability for an arrest if their conduct was objectively reasonable.

John Junior Dayse v. George Schuldt, Chief of Police · filed 1990-02-15

The officers were entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability if their conduct in arresting Dayse was objectively reasonable.

Police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would know that disparaging a suspect’s lawyer and coercing cooperation in the lawyer’s absence violates the suspect’s constitutional rights.

Cinelli v. Michael Cutillo and Robert Nunez · filed 1990-02-23

Appellants, as Revere Police Officers, knew or should have known that the statements made by them during Cinelli’s interrogation relative to the inability of a lawyer to help him and the threat of a life sentence for refusal to cooperate violated Cinelli’s constitutional rights. We hold that, on this issue, the detectives were not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

An officer is qualifiedly immune from § 1983 liability when the plaintiff cannot show that the challenged conduct violated a clearly established right.

Clark v. Tinnin · filed 1990-03-01

I conclude that no case law supports the plaintiffs assertions that the defendant Tinnin’s actions violated “clearly established” constitutional or statutory rights. No instance has been cited where a female defendant has been held liable under § 1983 in any case that possesses “some factual correspondence” to the alleged actions of the defendant Tinnin. I thus conclude that the defendant Tinnin is qualifiedly immune from liability and that the defendants’ summary judgment motion on this issue is granted.

Police officers may be entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the undisputed facts establish the defense.

Mack Quarrels, Jr. v. Jeffery D. Huslak Two Unknown Named Agents, of Tri County Metro Narcotics in Their Individual Capa · filed 1990-03-12

Mack Quarrels, Jr., appeals the summary judgment for defendants in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Upon consideration, we conclude that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under the undisputed facts of this case.

Section 1983 allows a police officer qualified immunity when the law allegedly violated was not clearly established.

Johnson v. Morris · filed 1990-03-23

Simply stated, if the law the officer allegedly violated was “clearly established” there would exist no immunity, but, if not, qualified immunity would be available.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit against police officers cannot be resolved on summary judgment when disputed facts affect whether a reasonable officer could have believed the search lawful.

Lancie v. Giles · filed 1990-03-23

Based on these facts and allegations, we cannot conclude that the trial judge erred in deciding that there were facts at issue which affect the question of whether a reasonable officer could have believed that all elements of this search were lawful.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from Section 1983 liability for an unlawful seizure if a reasonable officer in the same position could have believed the seizure lawful.

Willie Bigford, Jr. v. Joe Max Taylor, Individually and as Sheriff of Galveston County, Texas · filed 1990-03-23

Applying these principles to the seizure of Bigford’s truck, we conclude that a reasonable officer in Spoor’s position could have believed the seizure of Bigford’s truck to be lawful. ... Deputy Spoor is entitled to immunity from civil liability for the unlawful seizure of Bigford’s truck.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to officials when the constitutional rights allegedly violated were not clearly established.

Toledo Police Patrolman's Association v. City of Toledo · filed 1990-06-01

Even if a violation did occur, and it was of constitutional dimensions, these constitutional rights were not so "clearly established" as to deprive Navarro and Stiles of qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

Police officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 suits unless their conduct violates clearly established rights that a reasonable officer would know.

Duran v. City Of Douglas · filed 1990-06-04

It is well settled that police officers and other state officials are entitled to qualified immunity from section 1983 suits. ... The only remaining issue, then, is whether the rights here in question were so clearly established that officer Aguilar should have known he was acting illegally when he initiated the traffic stop. We believe they were.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known that the conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Lenn v. Gentry · filed 1990-06-13

In light of the state of the applicable law and given this Court’s determination that there was no seizure of Mr. Lenn, this Court finds that it would not have been apparent to Officers Gentry and Bailey that their behavior violated Mr. Lenn’s Fourth Amendment rights. Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct and this action should not proceed.

Qualified immunity shields a police officer from Section 1983 damages when a reasonable officer could believe the challenged conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Simpson v. Hines · filed 1990-06-19

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields a police officer from liability for civil damages when a reasonable officer could have believed that the challenged conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity protects a state officer from § 1983 damages for objectively reasonable conduct that does not violate clearly established rights.

Cox v. Sapp · filed 1990-07-27

Although the case is close, we conclude that under the standard of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), Sapp's decision to stop the vehicle was objectively reasonable and protected by qualified immunity.

Section 1983 police-officer defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages unless pre-existing law made the unlawfulness of their conduct sufficiently clear that they should have known it was unlawful.

Jack L. Losee, Jr. v. David R. Dearinger, Dmpd, and William Trimble, Dmpd · filed 1990-08-03

We agree with the District Court that under the facts of this case, appellees were entitled to qualified immunity. Appellees are liable for damages only if the contours of the Fourth Amendment were sufficiently clear, in the light of pre-existing law, that appellees should have known their actions were unlawful.

Qualified immunity shields a police officer from damages under § 1983 when the officer reasonably believed the challenged conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law.

Darnell v. H.A. Phillips, Individually and as a Deputy Sheriff of the Roanoke County, Virginia Sheriff's Depar · filed 1990-09-19

Accordingly, because Sergeant Phillips' actions were objectively reasonable in light of any legal rules that may have been clearly established at the time of the arrest, he is protected from an award of civil damages on the unlawful seizure claim by qualified immunity.

An officer defending a § 1983 excessive-force claim has qualified immunity if the conduct violated no clearly established right or the officer reasonably believed the conduct lawful.

Finnegan v. Fountain · filed 1990-10-01

By comparison, to establish the qualified immunity defense, a police officer must satisfy one of two tests: either that his conduct did not violate “clearly established rights” of which a reasonable person would have known, or that it was “objectively reasonable” to believe that his acts did not violate these clearly established rights.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known that his threats against protected speech violated clearly established First Amendment rights.

Bennett v. Village of Oak Park · filed 1990-10-25

In summary, the court believes that a reasonable police officer in 1986 would have concluded that a person of ordinary firmness would feel substantially threatened by the statements and circumstances present here, thereby violating the First Amendment rights of that person. Therefore, the court rejects defendant Slowiak’s claim of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can shield an officer from a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Jhonathon D. White v. Smith · filed 1990-11-02

To the extent that White asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for malicious prosecution, the cloak of qualified immunity protects Smith from this claim as well.

Police officers cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit when supported, uncontroverted allegations that they framed the plaintiff, if true, would defeat good faith.

Young v. Neil B. Biggers, Jr., J.W. Collins · filed 1990-11-06

The district court improperly assumed that the officers acted reasonably and in good faith when they arrested Young, took his property, and testified in court against him. If Young’s allegations that they conspired to frame him for the robbery are true, then it is evident that they could not have acted in good faith. Unlike the allegations made with respect to his other claims, these allegations are not conclusory. Young offers sufficient operative facts, detailed earlier in this opinion, coupled with a failure to controvert them by countering affidavits, to support his legal claims. Summary judgment therefore was improper.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action does not shield officials merely because no court has construed a familiar term when a reasonable official would understand that the conduct violated clearly established rights.

Andreu v. Glen E. Sapp, Individually and as Sheriff of Charlotte County, and William E. Reilly · filed 1990-12-18

While qualified immunity protects a defendant from liability when the legal concepts that make up the plaintiff’s claim are not clear, the defense cannot be manipulated by arguing that the common sense meaning of a familiar term is unclear merely because a court has yet to construe the term.

Section 1983 affords a sheriff qualified immunity in his personal capacity when he directs an arrest within his discretionary authority and the officers do not violate clearly established law.

Floyd B. Hutton, Anna v. Hutton v. Sheriff Thomas Strickland, Individually and as Sheriff of Holmes County, Florida · filed 1990-12-27

We conclude that the officers, acting at Sheriff Strickland's direction, were performing duties within the scope of their discretionary authority when they arrested the Huttons for trespass and inventoried the contents of their truck. The Huttons have not shown that the arresting officers' conduct violated clearly established law or that genuine issues of fact exist regarding the officers' actions in violation of clearly established law. ... We hold that Sheriff Strickland is entitled to qualified immunity in his personal capacity.

A police officer who retaliates against the exercise of a clearly established constitutional right is not entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit.

Deloach v. Bevers · filed 1990-12-31

The unlawful intent inherent in such a retaliatory action places it beyond the scope of a police officer’s qualified immunity if the right retaliated against was clearly established.

An officer’s qualified immunity from individual liability under § 1983 does not bar recovery against other defendants who lack that defense.

Ken Mouille, Laurie Rollins v. City of Live Oak · filed 1991-01-08

Thus, a plaintiff whose civil rights were in fact violated may be able to recover from defendants who do not invoke qualified immunity even though the plaintiff may not recover from an individual officer who successfully invokes it.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a defamation claim connected to an alleged unconstitutional arrest when that basis for liability was clearly established.

Cooper v. Dupnik · filed 1991-02-06

We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the Tucson Police Department appellants on Count Five, since the alleged defamation was in connection with an alleged unconstitutional arrest.

A defendant in a § 1983 action cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when a factual dispute over the defendant’s conduct remains.

Engler v. The Township of Spring Valley, Stanley C. Vint, Sgt., Individually and as Officer and Agent of the · filed 1991-02-07

The determination of the trial judge that a factual dispute precludes the grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, is in all events well taken. This is not to say that defendant Vint must as a matter of law be found after trial to have been altogether without a qualified immunity. We only hold, as did the trial judge, that such a determination is not available to relieve him of his obligation to stand trial upon the matters alleged and well pleaded in the plaintiff's complaint.

Police officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when they do not violate clearly established rights or when it was objectively reasonable to believe their acts did not violate those rights.

Hurlman v. Rice · filed 1991-03-04

The qualified immunity enjoyed by police officers protects them against a suit for damages " 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,' " Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 920 (2d Cir.1987) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)), or, where the rights were clearly established, insofar as it was objectively reasonable to believe that their acts did not violate those rights, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1097, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d at 921.

In a § 1983 damages action, qualified immunity protects an officer who reasonably believed a search was lawful in light of the law and information available at the time.

Bratton v. Toboz · filed 1991-03-15

Therefore, based on the state of the law at the time, and the information available to Toboz, Toboz’s actions were reasonable, and Toboz is entitled to qualified immunity from damages.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, a finding that the force was unreasonable under all the circumstances also resolves the officer’s qualified immunity defense.

Street v. Terry Parham, Ken Snider, and Mike Hill, Sheriff of Sedgwick County, Kansas · filed 1991-03-25

Once the jury concluded that, even under all the circumstances, excessive force had been used, the inquiry was over. This is one of the rare instances where the determination of liability and the availability of qualified immunity depend on the same findings. The qualified immunity question was answered as part of the jury’s consideration of the excessive force claim.

An officer’s objectively reasonable reliance on a state forfeiture statute can establish qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Mills v. Graves · filed 1991-04-11

The Millses have failed to present any evidence controverting the apparent reasonableness of Robertson’s reliance upon the forfeiture statute. There is no genuine issue of fact regarding Robertson’s qualified immunity defense from liability under section 1983. Thus, on this ground too, the district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing Robertson was correct.

A § 1983 plaintiff can overcome a qualified immunity defense at the pleading stage by alleging sufficient facts in the complaint.

Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Texas · filed 1991-04-30

The district court’s qualified immunity analysis was at best premature. Cooper satisfied his obligation to allege sufficient facts in his complaint to overcome the presumption of immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted treaty right was not clearly established and a reasonable officer could have believed the challenged arrest lawful.

Romero v. Kitsap County · filed 1991-05-01

Because we find the law not clearly established as to the nature and scope of the Indians' right to gather shellfish in areas off the reservation, a reasonable fisheries patrol officer would not have known that he or she may have been violating treaty rights by citing or arresting Indians for gathering shellfish. Because the law is unclear, a reasonable officer could have believed it appropriate to arrest the plaintiff/appellees. Consequently, under Harlow, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against officers for an unannounced, forced entry when a reasonable officer could have believed the entry lawful under then clearly established law.

Arvil Hall v. Jon Shipley, Don Boles, Phillip Nall, and Sgt. Jack Mansfield · filed 1991-05-08

In light of our authority and the information the searching officers possessed, an objectively reasonable officer confronted with these circumstances could have believed that an unannounced, forced entry was necessary and consistent with Hall’s fourth amendment rights. The right asserted by Hall was not so clearly established in this circuit as to defeat the officers’ claim of qualified immunity. The appellant officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the claim regarding the unannounced entry.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 excessive-force claim at summary judgment when, under the plaintiffs’ version of the facts, no reasonable officer could believe the force was necessary.

Willie Dixon, Hyon Dixon v. Deputy Sheriff Donald Richer, Deputy Sheriff David Yarbrough · filed 1991-05-10

Since we have already held that, under the Dix-ons’ version of the facts, a reasonable police officer would not have believed that the force used was necessary under the circumstances, the qualified immunity question has already been answered on the state of the record before us. We hold that the district court was correct in denying summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.

A police officer sued under section 1983 has qualified immunity for relying on a state forfeiture statute when that reliance was objectively reasonable.

Mills v. Graves · filed 1991-06-04

Whether or not the state forfeiture statute was valid, Officer Robertson's immunity depends upon whether his reliance upon the statute was objectively reasonable. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218-19, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (police excused from section 1983 liability for acting pursuant to statute reasonably believed to be valid).

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when they act objectively reasonably in sharing information with another police agency.

DaVee v. Mathis · filed 1991-06-11

As such, members of the Johnson County, Kansas Sheriffs Department acted in an objectively reasonable manner in providing information to the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department and are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified-immunity summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed evidence could show that he knowingly arrested the wrong person to coerce information about the intended arrestee.

Sanders v. City of Flatwoods, Ky. · filed 1991-06-11

Applying these principles to the case at bar, we conclude that Officer Leonhart was not entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. If it is true, as the plaintiff alleges, that the arrest was made to coerce her into divulging the location of the person for whom the officer knew the warrant was actually intended, the unlawfulness of his actions should have been "apparent" to him. No reasonable police officer could have thought it lawful to arrest an innocent woman under a warrant intended for another, hoping thereby to learn the other person's whereabouts.

A police officer facing a § 1983 excessive force claim is entitled to qualified immunity when the officer violates no clearly established federal right.

Merzon v. County of Suffolk · filed 1991-06-17

Accordingly, under these circumstances, Officer Emanuele is entitled to the protection of the defense of qualified immunity.

An officer may have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when he reasonably relies on a superior’s assurance that assisting with an unfamiliar body attachment is proper.

Whiting v. Kirk · filed 1991-06-21

When confronted with a document that he did not recognize and a situation he had never dealt with, he called in his superior. His superior, Officer Choquette, then assured him it was proper for them to assist Constable Kirk. Although in a situation more familiar to a police officer, I would not accept a defense based on authorization from a superior, I feel that, in this case, Officer Petrarca acted reasonably. ... Defendant Petrarca is entitled to qualified immunity and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is hereby entered in his favor.

An officer may plead qualified immunity as a special defense to a § 1983 claim by alleging that his discretionary conduct was objectively reasonable and violated no clearly established right.

Jackson v. Borysevicz Town of Manchester, No. 382561 (Jul. 9, 1991) · filed 1991-07-09

The second special defense sufficiently pleads the defense of qualified immunity, and the motion to strike as to that defense is denied.

Qualified immunity is available to a police officer defending a Section 1983 claim alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Slattery v. Rizzo · filed 1991-07-25

We agree with the majority of these courts and hold that qualified immunity can be applied in claims alleging excessive use of force in violation of the fourth amendment.

Qualified immunity does not protect an official from a Section 1983 claim if the official caused an arrest for a reason the official could not reasonably believe was consistent with the arrestee’s constitutional rights.

Brown v. Ed Bowling · filed 1991-08-08

If the Plaintiff can prove that the Defendant had him arrested only because of anger over Plaintiff's refusal to use Defendant's funeral home, there would be no qualified immunity because Defendant could not fairly be said under these circumstances to believe that arrest for such a reason is consistent with Plaintiff's right to be free from unconstitutional seizures.

Qualified immunity shields police officers from civil liability under § 1983 when a reasonable officer would not have understood that the conduct violated clearly established rights.

Spratlin v. Montgomery County, Maryland, Barbara Kunkle, Robert Angelino, and Robert Garrison, John & Jane Doe, Sta · filed 1991-08-19

Accordingly, qualified immunity applies to Officers Angelino and Kunkle and protects them from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A police officer whose arrest was reasonable under the circumstances is immune from damages on a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Meyer v. City of Cincinnati · filed 1991-08-27

Because Leugers' conduct in arresting plaintiff was reasonable under the circumstances, he is immune from liability for damages allegedly resulting from plaintiff's prosecution on the disorderly conduct charge.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against police investigators based only on a witness’s lack of credibility when they present the witness to the prosecutor and grand jury without knowingly submitting false evidence.

Williams v. City Of Albany · filed 1991-08-28

We hold that evidence as to the incredibility of a witness presented to the prosecuting attorney, which witness is then presented to a grand jury, is insufficient to support a claim against a qualified immunity defense.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer when Supreme Court and circuit law had not clearly established that the challenged conduct was unconstitutional at the time.

Courson v. Quinn A. McMillian Individually and as Sheriff of Walton County, a Political Subdivision of the State · filed 1991-08-30

Under qualified immunity analysis in this circuit, Roy is entitled to qualified immunity because a law enforcement officer cannot be held to a standard of conduct which is unsettled by the Supreme Court or this circuit at the time of his actions which are questioned.

Qualified immunity does not protect officers from § 1983 damages when reasonable officers would have known they were violating clearly established constitutional rights.

Barlow v. Officer George Ground, I.D. 9129 · filed 1991-09-05

The doctrine of qualified immunity does not apply if reasonable officers would have known they were violating clearly established Constitutional rights.

Police officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when a complaint alleges disclosure of intimate material obtained under a pledge of confidentiality without a legitimate police purpose, because the constitutional privacy right was clearly established.

Celeste James, Barry James v. City of Douglas, Ga., Clyde Purvis, John Doe--Clifford Thomas · filed 1991-09-18

We conclude that James’s complaint alleges a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. We affirm the district court’s denial of the motion for summary judgment.

Section 1983 generally affords qualified immunity to an officer who follows an administrative rule unless a reasonable officer should have known the rule was unconstitutional.

Gonzalez v. Tilmer · filed 1991-09-30

An officer who is following a statute or administrative rule should generally be accorded qualified immunity for his actions unless a reasonable officer should have known that the law or rule in question was unconstitutional.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when preexisting law did not make the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct apparent.

Altshuler v. City of Seattle · filed 1991-11-18

We cannot say that it was "readily apparent" in light of preexisting law that Officer Haynes' warrantless entry into Altshuler's garage was unlawful under the circumstances. Consequently, the trial court did not err in determining that Officer Haynes was entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim if the conduct did not violate constitutional rights clearly established at the time and known to a reasonable person.

Perreault v. Thornton · filed 1991-12-06

Though police officers are responsible for the natural consequences of their actions, they are entitled to qualified immunity from financial liability if their actions are not violative of constitutional rights which were clearly established at the time and about which a reasonable person would have known.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known the conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Draper v. Walsh · filed 1991-12-17

The Court therefore concludes that summary judgment cannot be granted on Walsh’s qualified immunity defense, which “is available to police officers sued in their individual capacity when they could not reasonably have known that their actions violated the law.”

In a § 1983 claim, disputed facts about whether an officer reasonably believed his conduct was lawful prevent a directed verdict based on qualified immunity.

White v. Hezikiah Walker, X Bonding Company, and Town of Verona, Mississippi · filed 1991-12-30

But if there are triable issues of fact about whether an officer could reasonably believe that his conduct was legal, then a jury should evaluate the question.

A parole officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for conduct that did not violate the parolee’s constitutional rights.

Yost v. Charles Solano Kathy Hall Officer Marti Lieutenant Roberts Sergeant Siefkes E.J. Slip James E. McKenzie Ma · filed 1992-01-28

We hold that Hohnstein did not violate Yost’s constitutional rights by recommending that a probable cause hearing be held on whether he had violated his parole conditions, and therefore is entitled to qualified immunity, for her relevant conduct.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 medical-care claim when promptly summoning paramedics for a detainee found hanging did not violate a clearly established right.

Rich v. City of Mayfield Heights · filed 1992-02-04

No case has been brought to this Court's attention which recognizes a constitutional duty on the part of jail officials to immediately cut down a prisoner found hanging in his or her cell. ... For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the district court erred in denying summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity to the individual police officers with respect to plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from damages under Section 1983 when their discretionary conduct was reasonable in light of the information they had at the time.

Corker v. Michael A. Jones John C. Picchi · filed 1992-02-21

Pursuant to these authorities, police officers are entitled to immunity from damages when their discretionary conduct is believed to be reasonable at the time, given the information in their possession. ... These facts render the Defendants' decision to issue a summons for Corker's violation of section 18.2-204.1(B) eminently reasonable. They are entitled to qualified immunity.

A state officer sued under § 1983 has qualified immunity for a discretionary arrest that does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Dailey v. Lyles · filed 1992-02-28

Lyles, a state Conservation agent, is shielded from liability in this case by qualified immunity so long as he did not violate one of Dailey’s clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for handcuffing an arrestee when the asserted right not to be handcuffed was not clearly established under preexisting law.

Soares v. State of Connecticut · filed 1993-11-02

Given the absence of any preexisting caselaw recognizing plaintiff's alleged right not to be handcuffed and in light of the presently existing conflict of views, it is plain that Firmin and Luty did not violate plaintiff's "clearly established" rights during his arrest. Consequently, the officers enjoy qualified immunity and are entitled to have the suit against them dismissed.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from § 1983 liability for a warrantless arrest unless it was clear at the time of arrest that probable cause was absent.

Floyd v. Richard J. Farrell, Jr., Individually and in His Capacity as a Trooper for the New Hampshire State P · filed 1985-06-19

Despite a finding of no probable cause at a later hearing, a police officer should not be found liable under § 1983 for a warrantless arrest because the presence of probable cause was merely questionable at the time of the arrest. His qualified immunity is pierced only if there clearly was no probable cause at the time the arrest was made.

Officers are not qualifiedly immune from a warrantless home arrest for a minor offense when established law made the absence of exigent circumstances or consent clear.

Patzner v. Joyce Burkett A/K/A Joyce McLaughlin Deborah Myerchin and Stutsman County, North Dakota, a Political S · filed 1985-12-26

We conclude that the illegality of Patzner’s arrest was not seriously open to question at the time it occurred. We hold, therefore, that the deputies are not immune from suit with respect to Patzner’s claims of illegal arrest.

An officer who obtained an arrest warrant is protected by qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability when probable cause was at least arguable and was not clearly absent.

Kaltner v. Pebbles · filed 1986-01-29

The plaintiff not having shown that the defendant clearly had no probable cause to seek an arrest warrant against him, this court finds that it was at least arguable that probable cause existed. Thus the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable, and he is shielded from § 1983 liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

A police officer who causes an unconstitutional arrest by requesting a warrant receives qualified, not absolute, immunity and loses it when the application is so deficient that belief in probable cause is unreasonable.

Malley v. Briggs · filed 1986-03-05

Accordingly, we hold that the same standard of objective reasonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing in ... defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest. ... Only where the warrant ... application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable, ... will the shield of immunity be lost.

Section 1983 does not impose civil liability for an incorrect warrant address caused only by police negligence rather than reckless disregard for truth or gross neglect.

Schulte v. CITY OF DODGE CITY, KAN. · filed 1986-03-18

The court does not read the standards of ... to require suppression ... or, through ... to permit civil liability for a search warrant which, through the simple negligence of the officers preparing the affidavit, contain incorrect information. The reckless disregard of the truth or gross neglect required by ... and ... is not present in this case.

Qualified immunity bars Section 1983 liability for a warrantless driveway arrest when the officer’s conduct did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment law.

Krause v. D.R. Penny, Edward M. Rooney, the County of Saratoga and the Sheriff's Department of the County of Sar · filed 1988-01-26

Viewing Penny’s conduct objectively, as we are required to do, we are satisfied that it did not violate Krause’s rights under clearly established law and that this entitled Penny to avoid liability on the basis of qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 for obtaining an arrest warrant without probable cause has qualified immunity unless the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that belief in its existence would be unreasonable.

Clarke v. The Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, Richard S. Simpson, Investigator, and Wayne M. Huggins · filed 1988-05-03

In cases alleging that a warrant was issued without probable cause, the law enforcement officer who requested the warrant loses immunity from suit "[o]nly where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986). ... The qualified immunity doctrine therefore protects Simpson from Clarke's claim of an unconstitutional arrest.

Section 1983 does not immunize a police officer who seeks an arrest warrant when the officer reasonably should have known probable cause was lacking, even if a prosecutor applies for the warrant and a judge approves it.

Drake v. Lawrence · filed 1988-06-13

The United States Supreme Court has held that police officers are only qualifiedly immune when they seek such warrants and that the officer is not immune where he reasonably should have known that he lacked probable cause to request the warrant. Malley v. Briggs (1986), 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271. This remains true regardless of whether the prosecution actually applies for the warrant and the judge approves it. Id. Because the jury reasonably could have concluded that Drake lacked probable cause in seeking the arrest warrant, he was not immune from suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officers who seek an arrest warrant when their applications have enough indicia of probable cause to make their conduct objectively reasonable under the law then in effect.

Coen v. Runner · filed 1988-08-16

These officers' decision to seek a warrant was objectively reasonable if their warrant applications were not totally lacking in indicia of probable cause under the law as it existed at the time. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. The affidavits that Runner and Lassiter presented were not so lacking. Thus, Runner and Lassiter cannot be held liable.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer could have believed their warrantless arrest was lawful under clearly established law.

Fenstermaker v. City of Dayton, Ohio · filed 1988-08-17

As a matter of law, objectively and without any reference to the Defendant police officers’ subjective beliefs, a reasonable officer could have believed the warrantless arrest of the Plaintiff to be lawful. ... Qualified immunity is, accordingly, available to these officers as an absolute defense on the Plaintiff’s federal claim.

A police officer sued under § 1983 has qualified immunity when reasonably competent officers could disagree whether probable cause supported seeking an arrest warrant.

Henegar v. City of Morristown, Tennessee, Mike Finley · filed 1988-09-01

However, assuming for purposes of argument that absolute immunity does not apply, we are of the opinion that a verdict should have been directed for Officer Finley on the ground of qualified immunity. ... At the very least, officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether there was probable cause.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim for procuring an arrest warrant when no reasonably competent officer with the known facts would think the warrant should issue.

Tillman v. Coley · filed 1989-01-18

In summary, this court determines that no reasonably competent officer, knowing all that Sheriff Coley knew, would have concluded that the arrest warrant in question should have been applied for or issued. Thus, the defense of qualified or good faith immunity is not available to Sheriff Coley in this case.

In a Section 1983 damages suit, a police officer has qualified immunity if an objectively reasonable officer could have believed an arrest warrant was supported by probable cause, even if probable cause did not actually exist.

Hicks v. Oscar W. Butler, Jr. · filed 1989-02-14

Although the existence of probable cause is an issue central to the proof of the plaintiff's case, the defendant may establish that he is protected by qualified immunity regardless of whether probable cause is found to exist.

An officer who reasonably relies on a police bulletin stating that an arrest warrant exists is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest.

CAPONE, Umberto v. MARINELLI · filed 1989-02-23

Because we find that the Appellants reasonably relied upon a bulletin establishing the existence of a warrant for arrest, they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer who reasonably relies on a police bulletin stating that an arrest warrant exists, and extends to the officer’s supervisor in this case.

Capone v. Marinelli · filed 1989-02-23

Therefore, as a matter of law, the protection of qualified immunity from both § 1983 and state law tort claims... extends to O’Neill, as well as to his direct supervisor, police chief Bambi, who had knowledge of Capone’s arrest.

An officer seeking an arrest warrant lacks qualified immunity under § 1983 when a reasonably trained officer would know the supporting affidavit fails to establish probable cause.

Garmon v. Lumpkin County · filed 1989-08-04

Under this standard, conduct that violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known," Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738, will support liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... We conclude that appellee Seabolt did not have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that his investigator's affidavit established probable cause to arrest Mrs. Garmon.

Section 1983 affords an officer qualified immunity from damages when enough facts remain in a warrant affidavit to establish probable cause after alleged false or reckless material is removed.

Forster v. County Of Santa Barbara · filed 1990-02-07

This presumption can be overcome if the party challenging the affidavit makes allegations of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations are accompanied by an offer of proof. Id. If these requirements are met, the allegedly false or reckless material must be set aside. Id. If there remains sufficient content in the affidavit to support probable cause, the officer is qualifiedly immune.

An officer sued under § 1983 for an allegedly unlawful arrest or search is qualifiedly immune unless a reasonably trained officer would have known that the warrant affidavit lacked probable cause.

Forster v. County of Santa Barbara · filed 1990-02-07

A police officer is qualifiedly immune from a suit for damages arising from an allegedly illegal arrest or search unless “a reasonably well-trained officer in [his] position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant.”

In a § 1983 suit, a police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity based solely on a judge issuing a warrant when material facts about the information supplied for the warrant are disputed.

Hoosier v. Harden · filed 1990-03-13

Harden is not protected here by the fact that a state judge issued a search warrant, because a vital component of the information furnished the issuing magistrate was an alleged--and seriously contested--oral communication between the charging officer and the accused.

Section 1983 qualified immunity for officers executing a search warrant turns on whether their conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Gurski v. State Police Dept. · filed 1990-06-04

Thus, the trial court was required to determine on the summary judgment motion whether the State Police Officers and Superintendent Pagano executed the search warrant in an objectively reasonable manner.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment in a § 1983 action when a material factual dispute remains over whether an officer recklessly omitted critical information from an arrest warrant affidavit.

Stewart v. Donges · filed 1990-09-17

We AFFIRM the district court’s ruling denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity because there was a factual dispute material to a determination of whether the defendant recklessly omitted a critical fact from the affidavit he submitted in seeking a warrant for the arrest of plaintiff.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim arising from a warrant application if the affidavit, corrected for material misstatements or omissions, supports a reasonable belief that probable cause existed.

Magnotti v. Walter J. Kuntz, Individually and in His Official Capacity as an Officer in the Police Department of N · filed 1990-11-08

But, well-established principles instruct that qualified immunity is appropriate if the affidavit accompanying the warrant is sufficient, after correcting for material misstatements or omissions, to support a reasonable officer’s belief that probable cause existed.

In a Section 1983 damages action, a police officer making a discretionary warrantless arrest has qualified immunity unless there clearly was no probable cause when the arrest was made.

McKenney v. Labbe · filed 1991-04-01

In actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the test for entitlement to immunity from damages “eliminates from consideration allegations about the official’s subjective state of mind, such as bad faith or malicious intention, concentrating the inquiry upon the ‘objective reasonableness’ of the official conduct,” so that the immunity of a police officer performing the discretionary function of a warrantless arrest is “pierced only if there clearly was no probable cause at the time the arrest was made.”

A plaintiff cannot defeat an officer’s qualified immunity under Section 1983 merely by alleging that information in a search-warrant affidavit was incorrect.

Reed v. Marker · filed 1991-04-24

A fortiori, a plaintiff in a civil suit cannot, merely by alleging that information in the affidavit is incorrect, strip an affiant of his qualified immunity.

Officers who reasonably credit a firsthand account of crime can be protected from personal liability under § 1983 when seeking a search warrant.

Bellamy v. Unicoi County, Tennessee, Mike Hensley, and Sheriff Bob Whitson · filed 1991-05-08

Under such circumstances, we believe the police officers should not be subject to personal liability. Whether the rationale underpinning this conclusion is a finding of probable cause as a matter of law or the qualified immunity analysis of "objectively reasonable conduct," the result is the same.

An officer sued under § 1983 for an arrest is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause supported the arrest warrant.

Ferguson v. Taylor · filed 1991-05-21

If a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to get the arrest warrant, then Taylor is entitled to qualified immunity. We conclude that he is.

Qualified immunity warrants a directed verdict for an officer sued under § 1983 only if the trial evidence compels a finding that the officer reasonably could have believed his challenged conduct lawful under clearly established law and the information he possessed.

White v. Hezikiah Walker, and Town of Verona, Ms · filed 1991-06-11

A directed verdict in favor of Officer Walker on the ground of qualified immunity was therefore appropriate only if the evidence introduced at trial would compel a reasonable jury to find that Officer Walker reasonably could have believed that his stop of Mark’s vehicle and his seizure of Mark’s person were lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information Officer Walker possessed at the time.

A state official sued individually under § 1983 lacks qualified immunity when it is objectively unreasonable for her to submit a materially false affidavit to obtain an arrest warrant.

Burk v. Linda L. Beene, Doctor, in Her Individual and Official Capacity as Director of the Arkansas State Board of · filed 1991-11-07

In sum, we conclude that, as a matter of law, it was not objectively reasonable for Beene to submit the affidavit containing materially false statements that supported the warrant ultimately issued for Burk’s arrest. Therefore, Beene in her individual capacity does not enjoy immunity from Burk’s section 1983 suit or liability thereon.

A private physician assisting police with a search under an objectively reasonable, facially valid warrant may invoke qualified immunity without independently investigating probable cause.

Rodriques v. Furtado · filed 1991-12-05

That the warrant was facially valid and reasonable entitles Dr. Falkoff to the defense of qualified immunity. We will not require a private physician to look behind an objectively reasonable and facially valid warrant to determine whether it is based upon probable cause.

In a § 1983 suit over a warrant that led officers to search the wrong home, an officer’s qualified immunity is assessed under an objective reasonableness standard when the claim concerns the warrant’s description of the place to be searched.

Jose G. Navarro Esperanza C. Navarro v. F.K. Barthel, and Thomas McCleary · filed 1991-12-27

We believe the district court correctly characterized this case as involving the Na-varros’ Fourth Amendment right to a warrant describing with sufficient particularity the location to be searched, not as a case involving whether the warrant was validly issued with probable cause. We conclude, therefore, that the district court properly judged McCleary’s conduct under an objectively reasonable standard.

When a § 1983 claim challenges false information used to obtain a search warrant, qualified immunity cannot be resolved on appeal without factual findings on falsity and the officer’s knowledge.

Ernestine W. Cannaday and Donald Cannaday v. Gibas · filed 1992-01-08

The merit of Gibas' defense is not apparent from this record. The district court did not make any factual findings whether the information relied upon for the warrant was false or, if so, whether Gibas knew it was false. Thus, we cannot decide this issue.

Qualified immunity shields officers from § 1983 damages for objectively reasonable detention while they verify whether an arrest warrant has been withdrawn.

Duckett v. City of Cedar Park · filed 1992-01-10

We now turn to the issue of defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity, which shields certain public officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage liability if “their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” ... We find that the defendants’ actions — in not releasing Duckett prior to the teletyped confirmation indicating that Duckett’s arrest warrant had been withdrawn — were objectively reasonable.

In a § 1983 false arrest action, an officer has qualified immunity when reasonable officers could disagree about probable cause after correcting the warrant affidavits for misstatements and omissions.

Tara Cartier Donald Coates v. Paul D. Lussier, Individually and in His Official Capacity · filed 1992-02-05

We think sufficient evidence remains, after correcting the affidavits, to constitute probable cause; reasonable troopers, at the very least, could well disagree whether or not it existed. Such is sufficient to establish the qualified immunity defense as a matter of law in defendant’s favor.

An officer who executes a facially valid arrest warrant knowing it lacks probable cause is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim.

Juriss v. Paul McGowan and Russell Stanfield, Jointly and Severally · filed 1992-02-24

In sum, a reasonable officer would have known in December 1987 that the fourth amendment forbade the execution of a facially valid arrest if the officer knew that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. McGowan is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity for Juriss’ false arrest count.

Officers who act objectively reasonably in making an arrest under a facially valid writ are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim even if the writ was improperly issued.

Whiting v. George I. Kirk, Jr., Robert S. Choquette, Steven Whiting v. George I. Kirk, Jr. · filed 1992-04-06

Because we hold that the writ of execution was facially valid, and because Constable Kirk and Lieutenant Choquette acted objectively reasonably in executing an arrest pursuant to that writ, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Police officers sued under § 1983 for obtaining an arrest warrant have qualified immunity unless the warrant is so lacking in probable cause that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded it should issue.

Hutsell v. Sayre · filed 1993-09-29

Police officers are entitled qualified immunity however, unless the warrant is so utterly lacking in probable cause that no officer of reasonable competence would have concluded that a warrant should issue. ... In light of our conclusion that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment issue, the proposed amendment would be futile.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against prison disciplinary officials whose conduct did not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable official would have known.

Young v. Grady B. Lynch Sgt. Benthall H.R. Daughtry Officer Newell G.T. Cousins John Doe, Correctional Officer, · filed 1988-05-20

Roger Young, an inmate at the Caledonia Correctional Institution, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that members of the prison disciplinary committee violated his fundamental due process rights at a disciplinary hearing. ... In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court held that government officials performing discretionary functions are not liable for damages when their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” We conclude that the evidence satisfies this objective test for qualified immunity and hold the committee members are entitled to immunity from monetary damages.

A prison disciplinary officer sued for damages under § 1983 has qualified immunity when the due process requirements were not clearly established such that a reasonable officer would have recognized the violation.

Hudson v. Edmonson · filed 1988-05-24

In this prisoner civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defendant Lt. Harlan Edmonson appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky denying his motion for summary judgment. ... Assuming for the purpose of this appeal that the acts complained of violated Hudson’s constitutional right to due process under the fourteenth amendment, we hold that the status of the law at the time was nevertheless not so clearly established that, on an objective basis, any officer in the position of Lt. Edmonson would have reasonably known that his attempts to afford Hudson with due process were insufficient.

Section 1983 defendants seeking qualified immunity on summary judgment must meet an objective standard; affidavits asserting subjective good faith do not suffice.

Brockmiller v. Officer Walter, Officer Hart, and Warden Yarborough · filed 1989-06-16

Their motion was made before the plaintiff had an opportunity to complete discovery, and the affidavits which they filed did not comport with the objective tests required for the interposition of a "good faith" immunity claim under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

Qualified immunity does not shield a prison hearing officer from a Section 1983 claim that he prejudged an inmate’s guilt when the right to an unprejudged hearing was clearly established.

Francis v. Coughlin, III · filed 1989-12-04

Appellant Greiner is thus charged with knowledge of Crooks v. Warne, and, accordingly, is not entitled to qualified immunity against Francis's allegation of prejudgment on the ground that the right of an inmate to be heard by a hearing officer who had not prejudged his guilt was not clearly established.

In a § 1983 suit against public officials asserting qualified immunity, courts first determine whether the plaintiff established a constitutional violation; if the plaintiff has not, factual disputes cannot preclude summary judgment.

William C. Bennett, AKA John A. Richardson v. Garrison A. Parker, Warden, Robert M. Jackson, Officer, Daniel W. Cooper, · filed 1990-04-25

When faced with a motion for summary judgment based on a defense of qualified immunity, the district courts should first focus on whether the plaintiff has established a constitutional violation before determining whether material issues of fact are present. No material issues can be in dispute where the plaintiff’s evidence fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not shield prison guards with qualified immunity when the prisoner shows they violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would have known.

Felix v. Daniel J. McCarthy Director of the Department of Corrections P.J. Morris J. Campoy Daniel Vasquez · filed 1991-07-10

Because we conclude that Felix has made a sufficient showing that the appellant-guards violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would have known, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.