42 U.S.C. § 1983

When a § 1983 qualified-immunity issue proceeds to trial, the jury may consider both an official's subjective good-faith belief and the objective reasonableness of that belief.

Vizbaras v. Prieber · filed 1985-05-14

Our reading of the instructions at issue in this case leads us to conclude, as we did in McElveen, that “[t]he good-faith standard employed by the district judge ... included both the subjective element of good faith 'belief,' and the objective element of 'reasonableness' for that belief.”

A § 1983 plaintiff whose claim requires proof of improper motive must point to specific evidence of that motive to overcome an official’s qualified-immunity summary-judgment motion supported by objectively reasonable conduct.

Medicare&medicaid Gu 37,414 Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc., and Oliver P. Pacheco v. Joseph E. Losavio, Jr. · filed 1988-05-24

Where the defendant’s subjective intent is an element of the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant has moved for summary judgment based on a showing of the objective reasonableness of his actions, the plaintiff may avoid summary judgment only by pointing to specific evidence that the official’s actions were improperly motivated.

In a Section 1983 action over alleged unconstitutional searches, officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment when the record does not establish an objectively reasonable basis for the searches.

Compton v. Deskins · filed 1988-05-26

Defendants, law enforcement officers, appeal the judgment of a United States Magistrate that denied their claim of qualified immunity in this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. ... Accordingly, we agree with the magistrate that defendants have not shown that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to any of the three search incidents.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim is not defeated by allegations of malice when the defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner.

Doe v. Hennepin County · filed 1988-11-21

This claim is barred by qualified immunity unless evidence of malice or improper motives on the part of defendants is proved. ... Allegations of malice are not sufficient to defeat immunity if the defendant acted in an "objectively reasonable manner."

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim turns on the officers’ objective reasonableness; allegations of malice do not defeat the defense.

Michael Schertz and Beverly Schertz v. Waupaca County · filed 1989-04-21

Allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome the immunity defense; the question is whether the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity may be submitted to the jury with an instruction requiring defendants to prove an objectively reasonable belief that their conduct was lawful.

James Cuthrell, Sr. v. Don Truelove, Don Tripp, Ned Thorpe, Lindy Pendergrass · filed 1989-05-08

This case is controlled by our decisions in Vizbaras v. Preiber, 761 F.2d 1013 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1101 (1986), and Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d 963 (4th Cir.1984). In Vizbaras and Bailey we approved submission to the jury of the question whether defendants reasonably should have known, in light of existing law and the circumstances confronting them, that their conduct violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. We also approved language essentially identical to that used by the court here in instructing on qualified immunity, i.e., that the defendants must prove that they acted in good faith with an objective reasonable belief in the lawfulness of their actions.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct is objectively reasonable, regardless of their subjective motive.

Russell v. Bill Hardin, and Major McPherson · filed 1989-07-18

We hold, accordingly, that as a matter of law appellants here are entitled to qualified immunity even if their course of conduct involved benevolent cooperation with the IRS.

Social workers performing discretionary functions are protected by qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when their conduct is objectively reasonable.

Navis v. Fond Du Lac County · filed 1989-08-30

In this circuit it is clearly established that social workers performing discretionary functions are protected, against suits for damages on the ground of qualified immunity. ... The court must find that Tryon acted in an objectively reasonable manner and the plaintiffs have failed to show that there is any issue of fact requiring a trial.

Officers sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity when their actions were objectively reasonable, but the defense fails if they were told by a superior that the conduct was unlawful.

E-Z Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kirksey · filed 1989-09-19

If Sutherland’s report that he informed the officers of the legality of Texas Select is accurate, then the defense of qualified immunity must fail. A reasonable officer would have analyzed the statute governing the situation and relied on the interpretation and recommendation of his superior officer. If, however, the court determines that Lieutenant Sutherland did not communicate his beliefs to the officers, then we conclude that the actions of the officers were indeed objectively reasonable in light of the confusing variation in terms between the statute and the label coupled with the opinions of the City Attorney and the local judge.

State officials performing discretionary functions within their authority have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct was objectively reasonable under the law at the time.

Brennan v. Hendrigan · filed 1989-10-27

State actors are entitled to qualified immunity from damages under section 1983 if they have performed discretionary functions falling within the scope of their authority and have done so in an objectively reasonable manner, measured by the state of the law at the time the conduct occurred.

Section 1983 qualified immunity cannot be resolved for officials accused of malicious prosecution when a genuine factual dispute remains over the objective reasonableness of continuing the prosecution.

Weg v. MacChiarola · filed 1990-01-24

In the case before the Court, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the continuation of the prosecution after the receipt of Malamy’s memorandum was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, the Court cannot find at this time that qualified immunity attaches for the purposes of the malicious prosecution claim.

For a § 1983 equal protection claim requiring proof of discriminatory intent, an official seeking summary judgment on qualified immunity must make a prima facie showing that the challenged conduct was objectively reasonable.

Lewis v. City of Ft. Collins · filed 1990-05-14

For Lewis to succeed with any of her statutory claims of age, race and sex discrimination and with her constitutional equal protection claim brought under § 1983, she must ultimately prove the essential element of intentional discrimination. ... Where a defendant’s subjective intent is an element of plaintiff’s claim and the defendant moves for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of the “objective reasonableness” of the challenged conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on officers for a mistaken emergency psychiatric detention when their conduct was objectively reasonable and protected by qualified immunity.

Gooden v. Howard County · filed 1992-01-23

The fact that a mistake was made, however, cannot be dis-positive of the issue of qualified immunity in this lawsuit. ... If every mistaken seizure were to subject police officers to personal liability under § 1983, those same officers would come to realize that the safe and cautious course was always to take no action.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when the defendant gives no legal or factual basis to undermine the district court’s fact-specific assessment of objective reasonableness.

Thompson v. Mahre · filed 1992-04-02

The district court did engage in the kind of fact-specific analysis required by Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 in assessing whether Sargent Steen's conduct was objectively reasonable. Appellant has not set forth any legal or factual basis to undermine the district court's ruling that Steen was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the information they possessed made it objectively reasonable to believe their warrantless entry was lawful.

Washington Square Post No. 1212 v. City of New York · filed 1992-08-31

The Court finds that, for reasons similar to those articulated by the Second Circuit with respect to the individual federal defendants, the individual City defendants are qualifiedly immune from suit on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for alleged violations of their 4th Amendment rights; based upon the information possessed by the individual City defendants, it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their warrantless entry into the Post was lawful.

Police officers sued under § 1983 for an arrest have qualified immunity if they had objectively reasonable grounds to believe probable cause existed.

Ricci v. Captain Michael Urso · filed 1992-08-31

Defendants are not required to show that they had “probable cause” to arrest the plaintiff. Rather, they must show only that they had “objectively reasonable” grounds for obtaining an arrest warrant — that a reasonably competent police officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Ricci.

An officer cannot receive a qualified immunity instruction on a Section 1983 claim when the facts preclude an objectively reasonable belief that the officer’s conduct was constitutional.

Morgan v. Bill Woessner, and Clay Searle Los Angeles City, (Two Cases) · filed 1992-09-15

We find that the facts of this case and our analysis regarding reasonable suspicion preclude a finding that Searle could have objectively believed that his conduct was constitutional. Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in refusing to give a qualified immunity instruction.

Public officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their objectively reasonable conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Ray Landes Darlene Landes Ronald J. Foster Corey Foster v. K.W. Reed W.M. Fulton · filed 1992-11-09

Public officials are free from liability for monetary damages in a § 1983 action if they can prove that their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable persons would have known. ... A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if his actions were objectively reasonable in light of the information available to him. ... Reed and Fulton were protected by qualified immunity as to the § 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim turns on whether an objectively reasonable officer could have believed the conduct lawful, and a subjective desire to put the plaintiff out of business does not defeat that immunity.

John Hamilton and Jo-Bet, Inc., a Michigan Corporation D/B/A Henry the Viii South v. Lawrence Lokuta, Individually · filed 1993-11-09

The presumed desire to put Mr. Hamilton out of business may or may not have been justified, but we do not believe that it could suffice to defeat Lt. Lokuta's qualified immunity defense. The test is objective, not subjective, and we think an objectively reasonable officer could well have believed that a search conducted as this one was would be lawful. Our disposition of the qualified immunity issue makes it unnecessary to rule on the reasonableness of the search in a constitutional sense.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim uses an objective standard, making an official’s subjective intent irrelevant if a reasonable person in the official’s position could have acted the same way.

Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 1993-11-09

Qualified immunity invokes an objective standard; that is, if a reasonable person in the defendant’s place could have acted the same way, the defendant’s subjective intent is irrelevant.

In a § 1983 damages action, qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that the defendant bears the burden of pleading in the answer.

O'HAGAN v. Soto · filed 1983-05-02

At the first trial before this court, the plaintiff, Brian O’Hagan, sought damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980) for violations of his sixth amendment right to counsel allegedly caused by the defendant, Hector Soto, a member of the Haverstraw, New York police department, during custodial interrogation in connection with a local burglary. ... “Qualified” or “good-faith” immunity is an affirmative defense. ... Thus, the defendant has the burden of pleading it in his answer.

In a Section 1983 damages action, the defendant official bears the burden of proving the affirmative defense of qualified good-faith immunity.

Bilbrey v. Brown · filed 1984-08-02

Such intrusive handling of the minors required justification. The burden of establishing that affirmative defense lay on the appellees.

A defendant asserting qualified (good faith) immunity in a section 1983 damages action bears the burden of showing his conduct was justified by an objectively reasonable belief that it was lawful.

Bilbrey ex rel. Bilbrey v. Brown · filed 1984-08-02

Thus, neither Taylor nor Robinson satisfied their burden to show affirmatively that their conduct “was justified by an objectively reasonable belief that it was lawful.”

A defendant asserting qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim bears the burden of proving it.

Marley v. City of Allentown · filed 1991-09-23

The defendant bears the burden of proof on the issue of immunity. ... Therefore, he is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not require a court to decide a Section 1983 dismissal motion before ruling on disclosure of grand jury materials when that ruling imposes no discovery burden on government defendants.

Stump v. Gates · filed 1991-10-08

Defendants’ argument that this court cannot rule on the instant motions until deciding their motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds is unavailing. While it is true that under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), immunity issues should be decided before government defendants become subject to "the burdens of broad reaching discovery,” no discovery burden would be imposed on the defendants by an ... order releasing or prohibiting release of the grand jury report.

In a § 1983 action alleging an unreasonable seizure, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving the Fourth Amendment violation.

Keiko Larez, and v. William Holcomb, and Cross-Appellee · filed 1994-02-22

Second, the court failed to make clear in the instruction that, because Larez’s action was a § 1983 civil action, Larez at all times had the ultimate burden of proving to the jury that she had been seized unreasonably in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

A prima facie religious discrimination claim under § 1983 shifts the burden to the employer to articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Wexley v. Michigan State University Richard Lewis David Scott John Dibiaggio Delores Cook and Dean Pridgeon · filed 1994-05-23

When a plaintiff presents a prima facie case of religious discrimination under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.

For a § 1983 retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show protected conduct that substantially motivated discipline; the defendants then must prove they would have imposed the same discipline without that conduct.

Graham v. Henderson · filed 1996-07-11

The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the conduct at issue was constitutionally protected and that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the prison officials' decision to discipline the plaintiff. Id. If the plaintiff carries that burden, the defendants must show by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have disciplined the plaintiff "even in the absence of the protected conduct." Id.

A § 1983 plaintiff alleging rape as a civil rights violation bears the burden of proving every element of the alleged violation, including lack of consent.

Lyons v. Williams · filed 1996-08-02

A fortiori, where the alleged rape was the centerpiece of a claimed violation of civil rights, it was the burden of the plaintiff to prove every element of the alleged violation.

A plaintiff bears the burden of proof for claims under § 1983.

Lopez v. City of San Diego · filed 1997-01-23

Lopez has the burden of proof for his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim bears the burden of proving its elements by a preponderance of the evidence, including a particularized injury caused by the defendant’s conduct.

McNamara v. City of Chicago · filed 1997-03-18

It is plaintiffs’ burden to establish all elements of their claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a preponderance of the evidence. ... This includes the necessity of showing that plaintiffs have actually suffered a particularized and specific injury as a result of the city’s conduct.

In a § 1983 claim over an unreasonable search, a plainly erroneous warrant and search shift the burden of going forward to the defendants to establish that the search was reasonable.

Holland v. O'Bryant · filed 1997-03-27

This Court questions whether any such burden rests with the Plaintiffs at this time. The warrant and subsequent search of Plaintiffs residence on February 16, 1996 was so clearly in error that the burden of going forward has now been shifted to the Defendants.

In a Section 1983 challenge to a vehicle search justified by consent, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that consent was involuntary.

Valance v. Gaylon Wisel, Mike Reneau, Ed Pearce · filed 1997-04-07

We see no reason for altering the plaintiffs traditional burden in an automobile search case when the officers rely not on probable cause but on consent in searching the vehicle. We therefore agree with the officers that Valance ultimately must bear the burden of proving that his oral and written consents were involuntary.

Section 1983 plaintiffs must prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

Rodrigues v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 1997-05-29

The jury found for defendant officers on the § 1983 claims, where plaintiffs had the burden to prove their case by only a preponderance of the evidence. Because the state law claims involved essentially the same conduct, an instruction that the burden of proof was the preponderance of the evidence for the state law claims would not have altered the result, and any error was therefore harmless.

Section 1983 racial discrimination claims may be analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting framework.

Stewart v. Rutgers · filed 1997-07-25

Our application of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework is applicable to Stewart's allegation of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 3 and 1983.

In a § 1983 false-arrest suit, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that officers lacked probable cause; when the legality of the plaintiff’s conduct was uncertain, the plaintiff must show it was clearly established.

Sorenson v. Ferrie · filed 1998-02-11

That is because Sorenson, as the plaintiff in a false arrest suit arising under § 1983, bears the burden of proving that the officers lacked probable cause, which in this ease means she must show that the legality of her conduct was clearly established.

A § 1983 plaintiff must prove the facts needed to establish liability by a preponderance of the evidence.

Soto v. Johansen · filed 1998-03-03

If that, were the case, Soto would have been held to a higher standard of proof than the appropriate one, which is a preponderance of the evidence.

In a § 1983 racial discrimination action, evidence establishing a prima facie case shifts the burden of coming forward with evidence to the defendant.

Thompson v. School District of Omaha · filed 1980-05-21

She has not won her case by this proof, but has simply transferred the burden of coming forward with evidence to the school district. We feel that transfer is appropriate, particularly in light of the school district’s superior access to proof of its intent in dismissing Thompson.

Section 1983 does not impose a clear-and-convincing evidence burden on plaintiffs proving an official’s improper motive at summary judgment or trial.

Crawford-El v. Britton · filed 1998-05-04

Neither the text of § 1983 or any other federal statute, nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provide any support for imposing the clear and convincing burden of proof on plaintiffs either at the summary judgment stage or in the trial itself.

Section 1983 equal protection claims alleging intentional workplace race discrimination use the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting framework.

Merriweather v. Alabama Department of Public Safety · filed 1998-09-14

Consequently, the framework traditionally applied to claims of intentional discrimination under Title VII (the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework set out above) also applies to Merriweather’s § 1983 claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

A Section 1983 defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving qualified immunity.

Melvin Alexander, on Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly Situated v. Lamar Alexander, Governor · filed 1983-05-03

While the plaintiff in a Section 1983 action bears the burden of pleading and proving that the defendant deprived him of a federal right while acting under color of state or territorial law, an assertion of qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved by the defendant official.

In a § 1983 action, a defendant asserting qualified immunity retains the burden of persuasion on summary judgment.

Deary v. Evans · filed 1983-06-06

This Court finds that a motion for summary judgment filed by the party asserting the defense should not alter the burden of persuasion. We, therefore, hold that the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant in a summary judgment motion.

A plaintiff challenging qualified immunity in a § 1983 action bears the burden of establishing the alleged constitutional violation.

Nicholas C. Omdahl, Roger C. Omdahl, and Linda Omdahl v. David E. Lindholm and Michael G. Stoffel · filed 1999-03-15

The qualified immunity defense places the burden of establishing the existence of the alleged constitutional violation on the Omdahls.

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.

Martel v. Great Bend Borough · filed 1999-03-26

The McDonnell Douglas shifting burden analysis applies to § 1983 eases as well as matters involving ADEA and PHRA matters.

A Section 1983 retaliation claim is subject to the preponderance of the evidence standard absent a legislatively imposed higher standard.

Phillips v. Bowen · filed 2000-03-27

In any event, a clear and convincing standard is required only if the legislature creates it for this type of claim; otherwise, civil cases adhere to the preponderance of the evidence standard.

Section 1983 places the initial burden of establishing the elements of a claim on the plaintiff.

Otto v. Pennsylvania State Education Ass'n—NEA · filed 2000-07-03

We agree with Magistrate Judge Smyser’s recommendation that the Plaintiffs have the prima facie burden of establishing the elements of a § 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 plaintiff challenging a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment bears the burden of showing that the magistrate’s probable cause determination was unreasonable under deferential review.

Meloche v. City of West Branch · filed 2001-03-02

Likewise, in a § 1983 action in which the plaintiff claims a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the magistrate’s probable cause determination was unreasonable in light of the deferential standard of review.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence both deprivation of a federal right and action under color of state law.

Robbins v. Chronister · filed 2001-03-16

A civil rights plaintiff proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must allege and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) he was deprived of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) “the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state law.”

Section 1983 plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that an officer’s conduct was unreasonable.

Mendoza v. Gates · filed 2001-08-30

Fifth, the Mendozas argue that the district judge abused his discretion in formulating his instruction as to who had the burden of proof on the issue of the reasonableness of Olsen’s conduct. It is more probable than not that any error in the instruction was harmless because the reading of the instruction most negative to the Mendozas was that they had the burden of proof, and this reading is an accurate reflection of the predicament of § 1983 plaintiffs.

Section 1983 intentional discrimination claims are not bound by Title VII’s formal disparate treatment burden shifting framework.

Lily Keyser Maria Sofia Robledo Richard M. Cisneros v. Sacramento City Unified School District, a Public Entity and and · filed 2001-09-12

Although courts in the Ninth Circuit are not bound by the formal Title VII disparate treatment burden shifting framework when trying § 1983 claims, id. at 471-72, because both disparate treatment and § 1983 claims require a showing of intentional discrimination, it is unsurprising that summary judgment decisions with regard to § 1983 claims are remarkably similar to their Title VII counterparts.

The McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis does not apply to a § 1983 First Amendment political affiliation claim.

Deheve v. Price · filed 2002-02-28

DeHeve urges the Court to use the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis in this case. That analysis is not appropriate for a § 1983 First Amendment Eldon/Branti/Rutan claim.

In a § 1983 claim challenging an officer’s entry into a home, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving each element, including lack of consent.

Harolyn Pavao, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Jon Webster Pavao v. John Pagay County of Hawaii · filed 2002-09-30

In a civil case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of establishing each element of his or her claim, including lack of consent.

Section 1983 race discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Cuenca v. University of Kansas · filed 2003-05-09

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) provides the framework for analyzing circumstantial evidence under Title VII, as well as § 1981 claims and § 1983 claims based on allegations of racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A § 1983 plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense must show that the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established.

Peoples v. Kimmey · filed 2003-05-19

Once a defendant asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s actions violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established.

Section 1983 age and gender discrimination claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.

Allen v. City Of Pocahontas · filed 2003-09-17

Allen's claims of age and gender discrimination, whether sounding under the ADEA, Title VII, or § 1983, 4 all require the Court to engage in the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis.

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test.

Hoechstetter v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 2003-11-03

The District Court correctly recognized that both Appellants’ Title VII and § 1983 claims are evaluated under the familiar burden-shifting test set forth by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its progeny.

Section 1983 race-discrimination claims may be evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Coleman v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2003-11-10

The caselaw, however, supports the District Court’s application of the McDonnell Douglas mechanism to Coleman’s claims under §§ 1983 and 1981.

Section 1983 retaliation claims use the Title VII burden-shifting analysis, but require a different prima facie showing.

Smith v. Parish of Washington · filed 2004-03-26

The burden-shifting analysis employed under Title VII is also applied under § 1983. However, the prima facie showing under § 1983 is different from Title VII.

An official claiming immunity from a § 1983 damages suit bears the burden of proving entitlement to it.

Haislah v. Albert Walton and City of Cleveland and Cleveland Police Department · filed 1982-04-21

More important, the instruction incorrectly placed the burden of proof on the question of defendant Walton’s immunity squarely on plaintiff.

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Salguero v. City of Clovis · filed 2004-05-06

We evaluate the merits of both the §§ 1981 and 1983 claims pursuant to the stepwise allocation of burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

In a § 1983 action challenging an arrest, the defendant bears the burden of going forward with evidence establishing probable cause.

Karr v. Uniform Patrolman Smith and Officer L.N.U. (Mark Lemon), Kansas City, Kansas, Police Department · filed 1985-10-11

The burden of going forward with evidence establishing the existence of probable cause is on the defendant in a 1983 action.

Section 1983 employment-related equal protection claims alleging race discrimination use the Title VII burden-shifting framework.

Foxworth v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2005-11-29

However, subsequent caselaw has established that this same burden-shifting approach used in Title VII claims is also applied when analyzing employment discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and racially based employment-related equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 excessive force claims against police personnel must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence in Wisconsin state courts.

Shaw v. Leatherberry · filed 2005-12-06

In sum, we conclude that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires Wisconsin courts to apply the lowest burden of proof— preponderance of the evidence — in civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive use of force by police personnel.

A defendant who raises qualified immunity in good faith against a Section 1983 claim need not submit evidence to support the defense at summary judgment.

Leo v. Trevino · filed 2006-06-08

We conclude that the School District Employees properly raised a good faith plea of entitlement to qualified immunity under section 1983, and that, pursuant to federal substantive law, they were not required to put forth evidence in support of that claim.

In a § 1983 warrantless arrest claim, the plaintiff need only present a prima facie case of illegal arrest to meet the initial burden of proof.

Delone Martin v. Duffie · filed 1972-07-28

The trial court having ruled that the plaintiff had failed to prove lack of probable cause for the arrest, the crucial issue here is whether a plaintiff in a § 1983 case who has been arrested without a warrant must, in order to satisfy his burden of proof, negative every possible justification for the arrest without a warrant. We hold that he need only present a prima facie case of illegal arrest in order to sustain his burden.

In a § 1983 action alleging arrest without probable cause, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that probable cause was lacking at the time of arrest.

Smith v. Swoope · filed 1972-11-13

With regard to the question of burden of proof, it has been held that in actions maintained under § 1983, the burden is upon the plaintiff, who is alleging the deprivation of constitutional rights, to establish the lack of probable cause at the time of his arrest.

Section 1983 equal protection employment discrimination claims require the same evidentiary showing as Title VII claims.

Watson v. City of Cleveland · filed 2006-09-08

Proving intentional discrimination for an equal protection claim brought under § 1983 requires the plaintiff to make the same showing required to prove a violation of Title VII.

The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof in a § 1983 action.

Jordan v. Herrera · filed 2007-03-13

In the Ninth Circuit, the burden of proof in § 1983 cases remains always with the plaintiff.

A § 1983 plaintiff bears the burden of proving every element of the alleged due process claim.

Brody v. Village of Port Chester · filed 2007-07-18

Defendants argue that Brody bears the burden, in a § 1983 action, to prove every element of the due process claims he alleges. ... Defendants are correct.

In a § 1983 action, once a public official raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting it.

Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Texas · filed 2007-09-13

Once a public official raises the defense of qualified immunity, the burden rests on the plaintiff to rebut it.

In a § 1983 suit, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that an officer who asserts qualified immunity is not entitled to it.

Hathaway v. Bazany · filed 2007-11-01

Here, then, the evidentiary burden is on the Hathaways to show that Bazany is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A § 1983 plaintiff asserting a procedural due process claim bears the burden of proving that the defendant violated that right.

Eaton v. Charter Township of Emmett · filed 2008-03-21

But appellants bore the burden of proof on their procedural due process claim. ... Jones concerned neither procedural due process, nor § 1983 litigation. ... The district court properly instructed the jury that appellants bore the burden of establishing that the defendant violated their procedural due process rights.

In a § 1983 action, once an official raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of defeating it.

Jewett v. Anders · filed 2008-04-11

However, once the defense is raised, it becomes the plaintiffs burden to defeat it.

Section 1983 discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free School District · filed 2008-09-30

Plaintiffs claims of discrimination, be they under Title VII, Section 1983, the ADA, the ADEA, or state law, are all analyzed under the now familiar burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Section 1983 plaintiffs bringing free speech claims bear the burden of showing that they engaged in constitutionally protected conduct.

Black v. Brewer · filed 2008-12-02

Moreover, § 1983 plaintiffs have the burden to show that they engaged in constitutionally-protected conduct.

In a public employee’s § 1983 free speech claim, the employee must show protected conduct that substantially motivated the employment decision; the employer may then show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision anyway.

Alderman v. Pocahontas County Board of Education · filed 2009-01-30

Thus, as previously discussed in Orr in regard to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we now specifically hold that the burden is properly placed on the public employee to show that conduct is constitutionally protected and, further, that this conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the employment decision. Once the public employee carries that burden, however, the public employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to the public employee’s employment even in the absence of the protected conduct.

A plaintiff alleging excessive force under Section 1983 must prove that the officer caused the claimed injury.

Clark v. Parker · filed 2009-02-04

The trial court was unable to determine whether or not Ms. Robbie Clark was forced to the ground by Trooper Parker or whether she intentionally sat on the ground after he began his defensive maneuver on her. Accordingly, Ms. Robbie Clark failed to meet her burden of proof under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or La.Civ. Code art. 2315, and thus the trial court erred in finding that Trooper Parker was liable for her injuries.

In a § 1983 action, an official claiming immunity bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence.

Dr. Joseph T. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College · filed 1976-05-13

We therefore hold that in § 1983 actions the burden is on the defendant official claiming official immunity to come forward and to convince the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that, under the standards of Wood v. Strickland, official immunity should attach.

In a § 1983 action, defendants bear the burden of proving qualified immunity by a preponderance of the evidence.

Dehorty v. New Castle County Council · filed 1983-04-14

The defendants, therefore, bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the qualified immunity defense set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. at 2738.

A plaintiff suing under § 1983 bears the burden of proving each element of the alleged constitutional violation.

Bowden v. City of Electra · filed 2005-10-17

In contrast, a plaintiff in a suit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has the burden of ... proving each element of the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 claims require proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Shaw v. Nevada · filed 2009-06-05

The district court correctly determined that issue preclusion does not bar Shaw’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action because the hearing officer based his decision on a finding of substantial evidence, and § 1983 claims require a different standard of proof — preponderance of the evidence.

In a § 1983 false-arrest claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the absence of probable cause.

McBride v. Grice · filed 2009-08-11

In this circuit the allocation of the burden of persuasion in a § 1983 case claiming a Fourth Amendment violation is clear: a plaintiff claiming that he was arrested without probable cause carries the burden of establishing the absence of probable cause.

When a § 1983 employment discrimination claim mirrors a Title VII claim, the same elements and burden-shifting framework apply to both.

Spadaro v. McKeon · filed 2010-03-15

Where a plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which, as in the instant case, mirrors a claim brought under Title VII, the elements of the claims are the same, and the same burden-shifting framework applies to each.

In a § 1983 unlawful-search action, placing the burden of proving lack of consent on the plaintiff is not plain error when precedent does not clearly assign that burden to defendants.

Tirreno v. Mott · filed 2010-04-30

On plain error review, it is enough to conclude that plaintiffs cannot show that clearly established precedent imposed the burden of proving consent on the defendants.

In a § 1983 due process case, the plaintiff must prove that a constitutional violation proximately caused the injuries; the defendant may then prove that the same actions would have occurred with due process.

Burns v. PA Department of Corrections · filed 2011-04-20

Under Carey, the plaintiff in a § 1983 case must prove that a constitutional violation has occurred, and that it was the proximate cause of his or her injuries. Once the plaintiff clears both hurdles, the burden shifts to the defendant, who then has an opportunity to prove that the same actions would have occurred even if due process had been provided.

Section 1983 places the ultimate burden of proving a civil Fourth Amendment violation on the plaintiff after the defendant produces evidence of a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

Bogan v. City of Chicago · filed 2011-07-06

We generally agree with Ruggiero’s formulation of the proper allocation of the parties’ burdens in a section 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment violation. ... The district court’s instruction on burden of proof correctly and clearly stated the law, and, consequently, we find no error on this basis.

A plaintiff bears the burden of proving each element of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, and the jury determines probable cause from the trial evidence.

Grider v. City of Auburn, Al · filed 2011-10-21

Grider had the burden of proof on each element of his malicious prosecution claims, and the district court correctly instructed the jury to determine the existence of probable cause based on the trial evidence, which included the magistrate judge’s dismissal order as well as testimony of all the witnesses to the alleged bribery.

In a § 1983 action challenging a warrantless home entry, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that the entry was unreasonable, including the absence of consent or an emergency, once the defendant produces evidence of an exception to the warrant requirement.

Der v. Connolly · filed 2012-01-25

Here, as in Bogan, the district court's jury instruction on the burden of proof "correctly and clearly stated the law," id., by instructing the jury that the Ders bore the burden of proving that Sandra "did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to Connolly's entrance into the home" and that "it was objectively unreasonable for Connolly to believe that an emergency requiring his attention existed within the home." ... Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in instructing the jury on who bore the burden of proof.

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies to employment discrimination claims brought under § 1983.

Perez-Dickson v. City of Bridgeport · filed 2012-05-01

The McDonnell Douglas Corp. burden-shifting analysis is applicable to claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.

Section 1983 gender discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Keene v. Pine · filed 2012-05-15

We now consider whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Prine and the County on the employees’ claims for gender discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, retaliation under Title VII, and age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).2 Each of these claims is based on circumstantial evidence, so we apply the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973).

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test at summary judgment.

Sotomayor v. City of New York · filed 2012-05-24

To survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff claiming discrimination under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and § 1983 must satisfy the tripartite burden-shifting test enumerated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim bears the ultimate burden of proving each element of the claim.

Mueller v. City of Boise · filed 2012-09-10

Because the Muellers’ claims arise under section 1983 the jury instructions properly placed the burden on the Muellers.

Gender-discrimination claims under § 1983 are analyzed using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Brown v. Holladay · filed 2013-01-14

This Court analyzes discrimination claims asserted pursuant to § 1983 under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas.

Section 1983 claims alleging racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Giles v. City of Dallas · filed 2013-09-09

In adjudicating Title VII claims of racial discrimination, we apply the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). We also apply the same framework in adjudicating claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 alleging racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

A plaintiff must prove the elements of a § 1983 claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Ware v. Riley · filed 2014-03-12

Plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the elements of a § 1983 claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

A plaintiff must prove a civil rights violation under § 1983 by a preponderance of the evidence.

Williams v. Dohm · filed 2014-10-14

The plaintiff has the burden of proving a civil rights violation under § 1983 by a preponderance of the evidence.

An excessive force claim under § 1983 is proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

Dasho v. City of Federal Way · filed 2015-04-27

In an excessive force case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, which requires the plaintiff to prove his or her claims on a more-probable-than-not basis.

In a § 1983 claim challenging consent to a search, the defendant must produce evidence of consent, and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving it invalid.

Wall v. Stanek · filed 2015-07-21

The county has provided undisputed evidence showing Wall consented to the blood draw after she was unable to produce a urine sample. See Der v. Connolly, 666 F.3d 1120, 1128 (8th Cir. 2012) (explaining the defendant only has the burden of producing evidence of consent in § 1983 actions). Because Wall challenges the validity of this consent, she bears the burden of proving her “will [was] overborne and h[er] capacity for self-determination critically impaired.”

Section 1983 Equal Protection employment discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Lucas v. Office of the Colorado State Public Defender · filed 2017-08-04

The McDonnell Douglas framework applies as well to § 1983 claims based on allegations of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.

Section 1983 retaliation claims are evaluated under the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.

Holcomb v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Fredonia · filed 2017-10-10

Retaliation claims under Title VII, as well as under Title IX, Section 1983, and the NYSHRL, are evaluated under the three-step burden-shifting analysis from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).

A § 1983 plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving the claim.

Clukey v. Town of Camden · filed 2018-06-25

Clukey bore the ultimate burden at trial to prove his § 1983 claim against Camden.

In a § 1983 suit, state actors are presumed to have properly performed their duties, and the plaintiff must present clear evidence to overcome that presumption.

Holsapple v. Cunningham · filed 2020-06-02

Furthermore, in a § 1983 suit, “there is a strong presumption that ... the state actors have properly discharged their official duties, and to overcome that presumption the plaintiff must present clear evidence to the contrary; the standard is a demanding one.”

In a § 1983 claim, once an officer invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that immunity is inappropriate.

Lazcano v. Morrow · filed 2020-08-17

“Once a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden to show that qualified immunity is inappropriate.”

Section 1983 claims are governed by the preponderance of the evidence standard, including when the plaintiff seeks to overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity.

Campbell v. Pennsylvania School Boards · filed 2020-08-27

Accordingly, we have repeatedly held preponderance of the evidence to be the proper standard for § 1983 claims.

A plaintiff bringing First Amendment or Equal Protection employment claims under § 1983 must show that the defendant based the challenged decision on unlawful considerations.

TOBIA v. LAKEWOOD BOARD OF EDUCATION (LBOE) · filed 2020-12-14

To advance a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show as part of her initial burden of proof that it is more likely than not that a defendant based its conduct, such as the adverse employment decision here, on unlawful considerations.

A § 1983 plaintiff must prove the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Cannady v. Woodall · filed 2021-01-21

This burden is quite different from the preponderance of the evidence standard required for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim in this case.

Although unconstitutional motive may be an element of a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must produce evidence creating a genuine factual dispute over that motive to overcome qualified immunity at summary judgment.

Wright v. South Arkansas Regional Health Center, Inc. · filed 1986-09-02

Plaintiff argues that Harlow's elimination of the subjective good faith immunity inquiry does not mean that an allegation of bad faith is to be ignored when it is part of a substantive claim under Section 1983. We recognize that motivation is frequently an issue going to the heart of some lawsuits against public officials, such as civil-rights or First Amendment actions, and that many cases will present factual questions of motivation incapable of resolution on summary judgment. This is not such a case. Here, the record simply does not create a genuine issue of material fact.

Qualified immunity cannot be resolved on summary judgment in a § 1983 suit when genuine issues of material fact remain as to the officials’ entitlement to the defense.

Cooper v. Petray · filed 1988-08-16

Giving Cooper the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), we believe that, the district court correctly concluded that genuine issues of material fact do exist as to Petray and Armstrong's entitlement to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when a genuine factual dispute bears on whether a reasonable official would have believed an emergency justified the challenged conduct.

Walters v. Western State Hospital, Ft. Supply, Oklahoma, and Patrick W. Dudley, M.D., and E.B. Lasmarias, M.D. · filed 1988-12-29

Based on the record on appeal and Walters’ representations of statements contained in various depositions not in the appellate record, but which the defendants do not dispute, we hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether a reasonable person, exercising professional judgment and possessing the information before the defendants, would have believed that an emergency existed.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when a genuine factual dispute remains over what they reasonably should have known about a constitutional violation.

Willoughby v. Luster · filed 1989-05-02

Despite the lack of evidence presented by Willoughby, this Court finds that the two committee members who did not participate in the investigation are not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. This Court finds that a “genuine issue of material fact” exists as to what these two committee members “reasonably should have known.”

A § 1983 claim may proceed to trial when material factual disputes prevent summary judgment on officers’ qualified immunity defense.

Turner v. Dammon · filed 1990-03-05

The second issue is whether Dammon and Edwards were entitled to qualified immunity or whether their conduct was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. This question was extensively addressed by this court in Turner. Guided by that discussion, we conclude that there still remains a triable issue regarding the appellees' motivations and justifications for the allegedly excessive bar checks.

In a § 1983 claim requiring proof of purposeful discrimination, a genuine fact dispute over officials’ motive precludes summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Madyum v. Campbell · filed 1990-09-13

In such a case, therefore, summary judgment on a qualified immunity defense is not appropriate if there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning the officials' motivation.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action cannot be resolved on summary judgment when material factual disputes bear on whether officers acted objectively reasonably.

Hurlman v. Rice · filed 1991-03-04

In sum, on the present record, when reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiffs as the non-moving parties, there are plainly factual questions as to what actually occurred, what information the officers had, and whether the facts were sufficient to permit an objectively reasonable belief that harm to Jillian was imminent. Since there are questions of fact to be answered in order to determine whether appellants are entitled, on any of their theories, to a defense of qualified immunity, the district court’s order denying their motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not appealable.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action cannot be resolved on summary judgment when disputed facts determine whether officials reasonably believed their conduct was lawful.

Kaminsky v. Rosenblum · filed 1991-04-09

We also believe the resolution of the objective reasonableness of defendants' actions turns on disputed questions of fact that preclude the granting of summary judgment.

A § 1983 plaintiff can overcome qualified immunity at summary judgment by presenting sufficient evidence of a factual dispute over whether officials acted with an improper motive.

Stewart v. O'Donoghue Rehabilitation Institute · filed 1991-04-22

"If material factual disputes exist with regard to the actions of the official, summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is not possible." Campbell v. Mercer, 926 F.2d 990, 992 (10th Cir.1991) (citing DeVargas, 844 F.2d at 718-20). We hold that plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to set forth an issue of fact as to whether defendants' actions were improperly motivated.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when factual disputes relevant to the immunity claim remain.

Allan F. Archer, Jr. v. Sanchez · filed 1991-07-01

Mr. Archer has met his burden of showing factual disputes relevant to the claim of immunity precludes summary judgment.

Qualified immunity is available to officers facing a § 1983 excessive force claim arising from discretionary handcuffing, but summary judgment requires entitlement to the defense on the plaintiff’s version of disputed facts.

Ospina v. Department of Corrections · filed 1991-08-14

Therefore, while we have held that qualified immunity is theoretically available to officers who are alleged to have applied excessive force during a handcuffing, we cannot conclude, after viewing the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Ospina, that Durnan has met his burden of showing that he is entitled to summary judgment with regard to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment for a § 1983 defendant when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether the defendant could reasonably have believed the conduct lawful.

Griffin v. George A. Lombardi Dick D. Moore Jim M. Jones Nikki Nicks Terry Barnes James A. Gammon · filed 1991-11-25

The conflicting affidavits before the district court raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the officials could have reasonably believed that they were not violating Griffin’s first amendment rights. ... Accordingly, the district court properly denied the officials’ motion for summary judgment on the officials’ claim of qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 suit, qualified immunity may be resolved on summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute that officers reasonably perceived the circumstances leading to an emergency psychiatric seizure.

Gooden v. Howard County, Maryland · filed 1992-01-23

We are aware of no evidence, however, that the officers' mistaken perception--if in fact it was mistaken--was unreasonable. In the absence of a genuine dispute as to the reasonableness of the officers' perceptions, the issue of qualified immunity is ripe for summary judgment.

Section 1983 officers are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts about their use of force determine whether their conduct was objectively reasonable.

Senk v. Village of Northfield · filed 1992-04-22

If the Senks' version of the facts is correct, however, the officers who are accused of using excessive force would clearly not be entitled to qualified immunity. In this case, as in Brandenburg, 882 F.2d at 216, "the legal question of qualified immunity is completely dependent upon which view of the facts is accepted by the jury." Summary judgment based on qualified immunity is therefore inappropriate.

Qualified immunity does not require a § 1983 excessive-force plaintiff to cite a prior decision holding the officer’s precise conduct unlawful; factual disputes over the amount and reasonableness of force can preclude summary judgment.

Rice v. Burks · filed 1992-05-28

Again, defendants are asking the court to require citation to authority that the very action in question had previously been held unlawful; a specificity not required for plaintiff Samson’s excessive force claim to survive this motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The same sort of factual questions that remain with respect to plaintiff Rice’s claim of excessive force remain with respect to plaintiff Samson’s claim of excessive force; i.e., questions of how much force was used and whether that amount of force was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

Qualified immunity cannot be decided on summary judgment in a § 1983 excessive-force suit when the officer’s entitlement depends on a disputed credibility determination about the force used.

Rainey v. Conerly · filed 1992-08-19

Even in light of this highly deferential standard, we find that the district court properly denied Conerly's motions for the invocation of qualified immunity. Resolution of this case depends entirely on a credibility determination between Rainey and Conerly as to the level of force used by Conerly in removing Rainey from the vestibule, and as such, the issue is inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment.

Qualified immunity cannot be granted on summary judgment or directed verdict in a § 1983 excessive force claim when disputed facts about the force used require a credibility determination.

Rainey v. Conerly · filed 1992-08-19

The determination of what actually happened depends exclusively on an assessment of the credibility of the respective witnesses. This assessment is a disputed issue of fact and, therefore, cannot be resolved on summary judgment or directed verdict.

In a § 1983 action, a defendant cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when material facts bearing on immunity are genuinely disputed.

Burger v. Rattigan · filed 1992-08-25

However, Richardson and other Seventh Circuit cases on qualified immunity make it clear that the plaintiff's version of material facts is relevant; indeed, a defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity based upon facts about which there is a genuine dispute.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit cannot be resolved on summary judgment when disputed facts prevent determining whether the defendant could reasonably have believed the conduct was lawful.

Dewitt v. Francisco Silva, Officer · filed 1992-09-01

Although ordinarily we should resolve qualified immunity before trial, see Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536-37 (1991), here the underlying facts are in dispute, and thus, the issue of qualified immunity cannot be resolved on summary judgment.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment in a § 1983 claim when a factual dispute prevents deciding whether an official violated clearly established rights.

Taylor v. Foltz · filed 1992-10-07

“Summary judgment would not be appropriate if there is a factual dispute involving an issue in which the question of immunity turns, such that it cannot be determined before trial whether defendant did acts that violate' clearly established rights.” ... Accordingly, the court agrees with the magistrate judge’s recommendation that Foltz’s motion for summary judgment be denied on the issue of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim turns on whether an objectively reasonable officer would believe the conduct lawful; summary judgment is inappropriate when disputed facts determine that question.

Roxbury v. Paul · filed 1992-10-07

Count I of the complaint is premised on a violation of Title 42 United States Code Section 1983. ... When the legal question of qualified immunity is completely dependent upon which view of the facts is accepted by the jury, summary judgment is inappropriate.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when a material factual dispute over their motives remains.

Decore v. City of Parma, Ronald Mottl, Jr., Mark Daniels, Michael Ries · filed 1992-10-07

Thus, the Appellants' motivations remain unresolved. Under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not err in refusing to enter a summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when a genuine factual dispute material to whether they violated clearly established law remains.

Gainor v. Scott Rogers City of Moorhead, a Minnesota Municipality and John Doe · filed 1992-10-09

Once a genuine issue of material fact is found to exist, the defense of qualified immunity shielding the defendant from trial must be denied.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 excessive-force action cannot be resolved on summary judgment when genuine disputes of material fact concern the officer's perceptions before using deadly force.

Haddaway v. Ellerbusch · filed 1993-06-30

When qualified immunity is asserted at the summary judgment stage, as here, the court must first determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the officer's perceptions. ... The record before the court, even taking into account the reasons for the qualified immunity defense, raises genuine issues of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. We hold that the trial judge properly denied Officer Ruff's motion for summary judgment.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts prevent determining whether their conduct was objectively reasonable.

Bascomb v. City of Seattle · filed 1993-10-28

Thus, whether Officer Lisoski is entitled to qualified immunity because he objectively reasonably believed that deadly force was appropriate cannot be determined without further evidentiary proceedings.

In a § 1983 retaliation action, unresolved factual questions about officials’ motives preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity when a jury could reasonably find that their actions were retaliatory.

Lundgren v. Curiale · filed 1993-11-10

The defendants here cannot make that showing. As discussed in Section II, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendants’ actions against Lundgren were retaliatory. Since there are open fact questions with regard to the defendants’ motives in acting against Lundgren and the evidence must be seen in the light most favorable to Lundgren, the defendants’ claim that it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their actions did not violate Lundgren’s rights must be rejected.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 excessive force claim when material facts are disputed about whether officers violated a clearly established right.

Kuehne v. Hugan · filed 1995-10-16

While the "reasonableness" standard in excessive force cases is an objective one, "if genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the defendants actually did commit acts that would violate a clearly established right, then summary judgment on qualified immunity is improper." Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1336 (6th Cir.1993).

In a § 1983 suit, disputed historical facts material to qualified immunity must be resolved before a court can decide whether an officer is immune.

Curley v. Klem · filed 2002-08-02

We find that this and the other disputed facts discussed above should have prevented Klem from prevailing as a matter of law at this stage of the case. A jury must resolve these issues before a court can determine whether it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that Klem's conduct was unlawful.

In a § 1983 suit, a defendant’s qualified-immunity defense at summary judgment shifts the burden to the plaintiff to show a violation of a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time.

Hill v. Fleming · filed 2006-04-04

We apply the burdens of the parties differently on claims of qualified immunity. See Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1311 (10th Cir. 2002). “When a § 1983 defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity on summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that 1) the official violated a constitutional or statutory right; and 2) the constitutional or statutory right was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred.”

In a Section 1983 qualified immunity case, the usual summary judgment rules apply: the court cannot resolve disputed facts or assess witness credibility.

Easley v. City of Riverside · filed 2019-04-03

Although a qualified immunity “defense should be resolved as early as possible,” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998), the general rules concerning “a ‘judge’s function’ at summary judgment” continue to apply, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).

An officer is qualifiedly immune from Section 1983 damages for shooting an unarmed fleeing felon when, at the time of the shooting, constitutional law had not clearly established that the force was unlawful.

Brown v. City of Clewiston · filed 1986-09-22

After reviewing the effective law in 1979, we find that constitutional principles regarding the use of deadly force to apprehend fleeing felons were not clearly established. As a matter of law, a reasonable person would not have known that shooting an unarmed fleeing felon would violate the Constitution. Accordingly, PEREZ is entitled to prevail on his defense of qualified immunity in the absence of any showing of bad faith or malice.

Section 1983 claims against police officers may be subject to a qualified-immunity defense, but that defense does not defeat the claim at the pleading stage.

Morrow v. Igleburger · filed 1974-10-25

Regarding suits under § 1983 against police officers there exists a “qualified immunity.” Qualified immunity differs from immunity doctrines in a strict sense. The qualified immunity is in actuality a defense that may be asserted by a police officer and it does not cause an action to fail at the outset for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 affords police officers qualified immunity from monetary liability when they act with a good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful and that belief is objectively reasonable.

Norton v. Turner · filed 1977-01-26

The immunity afforded a police officer at common law and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was articulated by the Supreme Court in terms of “good faith and probable cause.” ... In order to successfully assert the immunity defense, an officer must show (1) he acted in a good faith belief that his conduct was lawful; and (2) his belief was reasonable. ... Moreover, there is no distinction in this regard between an action brought against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or one brought against a federal agent under a Bivens-type claim.

The qualified-immunity rule under Section 1983 for public officials acting in good faith applies to damages actions, but does not insulate officials from injunctive or declaratory relief.

The Stanford Daily v. James Zurcher, Individually and as Chief of Police of the City of Palo Alto, County of Santa Clara · filed 1977-03-28

The appellants rely on the rule that gives public officials a qualified immunity in damage actions under Section 1983 if the officials acted in good faith. Extension of this rule to suits like the present one, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, has been rejected by the courts.

Section 1983 requires jailers seeking qualified immunity from false-imprisonment liability to present objective facts supporting a good-faith, reasonable belief that they had legal authority to continue confinement.

Douthit v. Clarence Jones, Sheriff, Dallas County, Texas, and W. H. McCallum · filed 1980-06-20

We hold that to be entitled to qualified immunity from liability for false imprisonment under § 1983, Sheriff Jones and Deputy McCallum must present evidence of objective facts upon which they could have based a good faith, reasonable belief that they had the legal authority to continue to ... hold Douthit once he had satisfied the sentence imposed upon him in case number 73-5457.

Section 1983 does not protect a police officer from liability for an arrest when the officer lacked an objectively reasonable belief that the arrest was valid, even if the officer acted in subjective good faith.

Hartnett v. Schmit · filed 1980-11-12

The test, thus, under § 1983 is not whether the arrest was constitutional or unconstitutional or whether it was made with or without probable cause, but whether the officer believed in good faith that the arrest was made with probable cause and whether that arrest was reasonable.

In a § 1983 action, a police officer may assert qualified official immunity, but the officer must plead and establish that the conduct was within official discretionary authority, after which the plaintiff may overcome the immunity by showing a lack of good faith.

Barker v. Ben Norman and Jack Ballas · filed 1981-07-30

Qualified immunity from section 1983 liability is an affirmative defense in the sense that it must be pleaded... Once the official has shown that he was acting in his official capacity and within the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to breach the official’s immunity by showing that the official lacked “good faith.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on police officers for damages suffered after a district attorney files charges when the officers did not act maliciously or with reckless disregard and the presumption of the prosecutor's independent judgment is not rebutted.

Smiddy v. Varney · filed 1981-08-07

Thus, we hold that where police officers do not act maliciously or with reckless disregard for the rights of an arrested person, they are not liable for damages suffered by the arrested person after a district attorney files charges unless the presumption of independent judgment by the district attorney is rebutted. This result is just because the other actors who decided to continue to hold Smiddy, the district attorney and the municipal court judge, are absolutely immune from liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a police officer to receive qualified immunity from damages when the officer reasonably and in good faith believes the conduct was lawful.

Street v. P. G. County Police Detective Cherba P. G. County Police Detective Robert Derfler, Sex Squad · filed 1981-10-01

The argument is unpersuasive, for it is well-established that a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from an assessment of damages against him if he acted with a reasonable and good faith belief that he had acted lawfully.

Section 1983 shields a police officer from liability when the officer pleads qualified immunity and reasonably believes the challenged actions are lawful, unless the plaintiff shows the officer lacked good faith.

Rheaume v. The Texas Department of Public Safety · filed 1982-02-01

We have recently had occasion to discuss the concept of the qualified immunity available to police officers when charged with constitutional violations. ... An officer who reasonably believes that his actions are lawful is entitled to immunity from liability if he pleads such immunity unless it can be shown by the plaintiff that the officer lacked good faith.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against police officers subject to a good-faith immunity defense.

Truss v. Collier · filed 1983-04-08

It has long been established that police officers are entitled to assert a defense of good faith immunity in actions brought for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Police officials performing discretionary functions under color of state law are entitled to qualified immunity in § 1983 actions.

Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg · filed 1983-06-24

Police officials acting under the color of state law are government officials who perform discretionary functions and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is immune from Section 1983 liability unless his conduct violated clearly established law defining the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Jones v. Waters · filed 1983-09-13

Officer Waters is entitled to immunity for his actions under § 1983 unless his conduct violated “clearly established law” defining Jones’ constitutional rights.

A police officer may assert qualified immunity as a defense in a § 1983 damages action.

Clark v. T v. Beville · filed 1984-04-23

As a policeman, Beville is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity in this section 1983 action.