42 U.S.C. § 1983

Discovery on § 1983 claims against other defendants may be stayed when it would undermine an individual defendant’s qualified immunity defense.

Woodson v. Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc. · filed 2020-07-17

However, there is no question that allowing limited discovery to proceed as to the official capacity claims against Defendant Elder, or as to the § 1983 claims against the other Defendants, would effectively rob Defendant Elder of his qualified immunity defense.

Section 1983 defendants asserting qualified immunity are protected from the burdens of discovery while that defense is pending.

Davis v. Core Civic, Inc. · filed 2020-08-19

“The protection of qualified immunity gives officials a right, not merely to avoid standing trial, but also to avoid the burdens of such pretrial matters as discovery.” ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for service of subpoena duces tecum on the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (Dkt. No. 300) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

In a Section 1983 suit, asserting qualified immunity does not bar discovery limited to facts needed to resolve that defense.

Welsh v. Collier · filed 2020-10-27

The Court therefore grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel against defendants Pollard-Fortsan, ... Nowlin, and Rediskez to the extent that the information he seeks would clarify their entitlement to qualified immunity, should they choose to re-plead that affirmative defense.

Discovery against defendants asserting qualified immunity in a § 1983 action may be stayed while their motion to dismiss is pending.

Skinner v. Gautreaux · filed 2020-11-30

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that a temporary stay of discovery against the Sheriff Defendants in this action is warranted in light of their asserted qualified immunity defense.

A court may stay discovery in a § 1983 damages suit while it resolves a government official’s qualified immunity defense.

Harris v. McConnell · filed 2020-12-12

Therefore, considering the String Cheese Incident factors together, as well as the strong interest of resolving immunity questions before subjecting government officials to the vicissitudes of litigation, a stay of discovery is appropriate in this case.

Qualified immunity bars personal liability under § 1983 for a police officer who reasonably believed a challenged seizure was lawful under clearly established law.

Parise v. Murray, No. Cv90-297284s (Oct. 14, 1994) · filed 1994-10-14

The court finds that each of the items claimed to have been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was either an item authorized to be seized or an item whose seizure does not give rise to liability because of the doctrine of qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a clearly established constitutional right would have made the violation apparent to a reasonable officer in his position.

Pinder v. Johnson · filed 1994-10-14

Immunity may thus be established either on the basis that the right allegedly violated was not at the time one "clearly established," or that, though "clearly established," it was one that a "reasonable" person in the officer's position could have failed to appreciate would be violated by his conduct. ... The facts alleged suggest that a reasonable person in Officer Johnson's position would have known that he was violating this clearly established right when he assured Carol Pinder, with full knowledge of Pittman's violent threats and Pinder's reliance upon his words, that Pittman would remain in custody, and then charged Pittman with minor offenses for which he was unlikely to be kept in custody. Accordingly, we find that Officer Johnson is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 excessive force claim when a reasonable officer would have known that the alleged force violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Farrington v. Robert L. Whitesell, Sergeant · filed 1994-10-14

The defense of qualified immunity is available to law enforcement officers in lawsuits alleging excessive use of force. Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 216 (4th Cir.1991). This immunity protects an officer for conduct which does not "violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). ... Under the facts alleged by Farrington, a reasonable officer in Whitesell's position would have known that the amount of force alleged to have been used was excessive. The motion was properly denied.

Private police officers given the same powers as state and municipal police officers may invoke qualified immunity against § 1983 claims when the reasons for protecting public police officers also apply.

Raby v. Baptist Medical Center · filed 1998-09-09

In summary, because the policy concerns which have prompted courts to apply qualified immunity to municipal police officers also apply to Baptist Medical Center police officers, the court finds that the unique factual circumstances presented by this case require the application of qualified immunity to these private defendants to whom the state has given the same powers as those given to state and municipal police officers.

Section 1983 affords a police officer acting as a complaining witness before a grand jury only qualified immunity from a malicious prosecution claim based on allegedly perjured testimony.

Palma v. Atlantic County · filed 1999-06-15

Where, however, the police officer is acting as a complaining witness before the grand jury, he .or she is only entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability on a claim for malicious prosecution arising out of any alleged perjured testimony.

A probation officer's absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim does not extend to imposing a jail sentence.

Clover v. Joliff, Unpublished Decision (9-27-2002) · filed 2002-09-27

While we continue to recognize the importance of immunity for public officials, that immunity does not extend to a probation officer imposing a jail sentence.

Section 1983 permits a city to be liable for a policy or custom that deprives people of their constitutional rights even when the officer who carried out the deprivation has qualified immunity.

Szabla v. City Of Brooklyn Park · filed 2005-12-01

A city operating under a policy or custom that deprives people of their constitutional rights can be liable even though the officer who carried out the deprivation is entitled to qualified immunity. Kuha, 365 F.3d at 603. Thus, Brooklyn Park can be liable even though Baker is not.

Section 1983 does not immunize municipal police officers from liability merely because they are police officers.

Donovan v. Earl Reinbold and Harley Askew, Michael Arthur Donovan v. Earl Reinbold and Harley Askew · filed 1970-11-27

Askew’s and Reinbold’s contention that their position as police officers rendered them immune from liability under section 1983 is frivolous.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for unconstitutional police force, subject to qualified immunity.

Estate of Jaquez v. City of New York · filed 2015-05-08

The dispositive legal point is that a grant of qualified immunity as to the use of force — even lethal force — in the course of an event does not necessarily extend to all use of such force throughout the, incident. While it may have been reasonable for Sgt. Flores to use lethal force earlier in the altercation when Mr. Jaquez threatened the officers with a knife, such authority does not extend indefinitely.

In a § 1983 claim requiring proof of improper motive, a defendant’s possible proper motive alone does not establish qualified immunity at summary judgment; the plaintiff must identify specific evidence of improper motive.

Walter v. Morton · filed 1994-08-30

But a prima facie showing that a defendant may have proper reasons for the challenged conduct does not alone invoke qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage. The focus remains on whether the plaintiff has produced facts properly evidencing improper intent. To survive a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff must point to specific evidence showing the official's actions were improperly motivated.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with an improper motive.

Roberts v. Williams · filed 1971-04-01

We therefore reaffirm our holding in Whirl v. Kern, that improper motive is not a prerequisite to suit under section 1983.

A private entity required by state law to exercise discretion may assert qualified immunity against § 1983 damages liability.

Carman v. City of Eden Prairie · filed 1985-11-27

Moreover, to deny a private party like Fairview good faith immunity would be unjust when it is required by state statute to exercise discretion. ... The court finds, therefore, that Fairview may assert a qualified immunity defense.

Private parties sued under Section 1983 for allegedly conspiring with state actors do not receive public officials' immediate-appeal privilege for denials of qualified immunity.

Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Ulery · filed 1986-04-02

This rationale has no application in the instant case, where the defendants, appellants here, are not public officials but private parties suable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 only because they allegedly conspired with other persons acting under color of state law.

Private contractors, including corporations, may claim qualified immunity in § 1983 damages suits when they perform governmental functions under duties imposed by a government contract.

DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co. · filed 1988-04-07

Similarly, we have just held generally that when private parties act pursuant to contractual duties and perform governmental functions, they can claim qualified immunity. That a private party defendant is a corporation should not change this result.

Private parties acting under color of state law are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Conner v. City Of Santa Ana · filed 1990-03-01

Defendant California Towing's grant of qualified immunity must also be reversed as private parties acting under color of state law are not entitled to the qualified immunity defense.

Private defendants alleged to have voluntarily pursued their own interests through malicious prosecution cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit on these facts.

Lydia Felix De Santana, Etc. v. Jose Eligio Velez and Elba Zayas · filed 1992-02-06

The appellants are alleged to have voluntarily engaged in illegal activities in the advancement of their own self-interests. ... Based on the facts of this case, we see no reason to extend the right to claim qualified immunity to these defendants.

Private social workers under government contract to perform duties required of the state may raise qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit because they are the functional equivalent of public officials.

Frazier v. Bailey · filed 1992-02-24

We hold, therefore, that individuals like Stevens and Flinker, under contract with the government, are entitled to raise a qualified immunity defense because they are the functional equivalent of public officials.

A private defendant sued under § 1983 for using a state attachment process later found unconstitutional may assert the same qualified immunity available to public officials.

Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel · filed 1992-03-27

Accordingly, the court concludes that in a suit for utilizing an existing state attachment process later found to be constitutionally deficient, a private § 1983 defendant may assert the same type of qualified immunity afforded to public officials under Harlow.

A private § 1983 defendant who uses an existing state attachment process later held unconstitutional may assert qualified immunity of the type available to public officials.

Jordan v. Berman · filed 1992-05-01

Accordingly, the court concludes that in a suit for utilizing an existing state attachment process later found to be constitutionally deficient, a private § 1983 defendant may assert the same type of qualified immunity afforded to public officials under Harlow.

Private parties sued under § 1983 for invoking state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statutes are not entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

Wyatt v. Cole · filed 1992-05-18

The precise issue encompassed in this question, and the only issue decided by the lower courts, is whether qualified immunity. as enunciated in Harlow, is available for private defendants faced with § 1983 liability for invoking a state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statute. That answer is no.

Private defendants alleged to have conspired with public officials to deprive another person of constitutional rights cannot claim qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit.

Burrell v. Board of Trustees · filed 1992-09-02

Private defendants who allegedly conspired with public officials to deprive another of her constitutional rights therefore are not entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983.

Private parties are not entitled to qualified immunity in actions brought under § 1983.

Penman v. Korper · filed 1992-10-08

In particular, the law is settled that private parties are not entitled to qualified immunity in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Private defendants alleged to have conspired with public officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit.

Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Georgia Military College · filed 1992-10-29

Private defendants who allegedly conspired with public officials to deprive another of her constitutional rights therefore are not entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983.

A private hospital carrying out a court order to detain and treat a mental health patient may raise qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim for its discretionary medical treatment.

Sherman v. Four County Counseling Center, Douglas Cox, Cass Superior Court Judge, and Gary Boyles, Officer · filed 1993-02-19

For these reasons, we hold that Four County may raise a qualified immunity defense for administering anti-psychotic medication to Sherman.

Section 1983 allows a prison physician employed by a state contractor to assert qualified immunity when providing medical services the state is constitutionally obligated to provide.

Williams v. Michael O'leary, Clyde E. Nash, Leroy Banks · filed 1995-05-25

The instant case clearly falls within the class of cases in which qualified immunity may be raised by a private defendant. Brewer, through his employer Correctional Medical Systems, was under a government contract to provide services to inmates which the State was obligated to provide under the Constitution.

A private individual performing a government function at a state official’s request may claim qualified immunity from § 1983 liability if the official would have had that immunity when performing the function.

Rebecca Warner and Pamela Ann Laxton v. Grand County, Ron Richmond, James B. Nyland and Robin A. Parker · filed 1995-06-13

We hold that a private individual who performs a government function pursuant to a state order or request is entitled to qualified immunity if a state official would have been entitled to such immunity had he performed the function himself.

Private parties assisting police under officers’ direction may receive qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when they act objectively reasonably.

Beal v. Bahan · filed 1996-05-31

Mindful of the chilling effect that declining to extend gualified immunity to NYNEX might have on private parties in a position to cooperate with the police, see Rodrigues, 950 F.2d at 815, the court finds that NYNEX is entitled to gualified immunity against the plaintiff's federal claims.

A private corporation that contracts with a local government to perform a public function cannot assert qualified immunity against a Section 1983 claim.

Blumel v. Mylander · filed 1997-01-23

Therefore, this Court holds that a private corporation which contracts with a local government to perform a public function is not entitled to raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in a Section 1983 case.

Private individuals assisting state officials at their request may receive qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability when their actions are objectively reasonable.

Bradley v. Medical Board · filed 1997-07-15

We are persuaded by the reasoning of Rodriques and Warner, and hold that Dr. Horowitz, Vitali and Giles are entitled to qualified immunity as their actions were objectively reasonable. As discussed, Raley and Brandenburg are entitled to immunity from liability for their part in the undercover investigation of Dr. Bradley; it would be anomalous not to extend the same protection to the private defendants who had no ax to grind with Dr. Bradley but were merely assisting the Board at its request.

Private defendants sued under § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity.

Sallie v. Tax Sale Investors, Inc. · filed 1998-03-19

In any event, in Richardson v. McKnight, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 2108, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997), and Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992), the Supreme Court has made it clear that qualified immunity is not available to private defendants sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private defendant to allege that the defendant conspired with a state actor to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Johnson v. City of Meridian · filed 1998-07-23

In order to state a claim under § 1983 against a private defendant, the plaintiff must allege that the individual conspired with a state actor to violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Private building inspectors performing municipal inspections without government supervision lack qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when no historical or policy basis warrants it.

Daniel S. Malinowski, Maureen S. Malinowski and Mathew T. Malinowski v. James Deluca and Donald Villaincourt · filed 1999-04-30

We disagree with the defendants’ contentions and hold that DeLuca and Villaincourt have failed to establish, as under Richardson, anything “special enough about the job or about its organizational structure that would warrant” an extension of governmental immunity.

Privately employed special police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the government only sets policy and exercises limited direct supervision.

Payton v. RUSH-PRESBYTERIAN-ST. LUKE'S MED. CENTER · filed 2000-01-27

Because the government only sets policy and has limited direct supervision in this case, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Privately employed special police are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when history and policy do not support immunity.

Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center · filed 2000-01-27

The presumption is against immunity for private actors unless tradition and strong policy reasons dictate conferring immunity. ... Therefore, we find that these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Private nonprofit foster care providers closely supervised by a state agency may assert qualified immunity against § 1983 claims.

Bartell v. Lohiser · filed 2000-06-07

Accordingly, because of the closely monitored, non-profit interrelationship between FIA and LSS, we hold that the LSS defendants may assert qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows a private person enlisted to assist an arrest to claim qualified immunity only if the person acted at a known officer’s request, provided no patently abusive assistance, and did not materially depart from the officer’s directions.

Mejia v. City of New York · filed 2000-10-05

On the basis of these competing considerations and the standards for qualified immunity announced in Harlow, Malley, and Anderson, it follows that in order to be entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 for false arrest, a private person enlisted by a law enforcement official to assist in making an arrest must show that: (1) he acted at the request of one whom he knew to be, and who in fact was, a law enforcement official; (2) the assistance requested by the law enforcement official and provided by the private citizen was not patently abusive; and (3) his actions did not materially deviate from those that the law enforcement official directed him to take.

When a § 1983 plaintiff does not specify the capacity in which state prison officials are sued, those officials are immune from monetary damages.

Jasman v. Schmidt · filed 2001-02-06

First, the district court properly held that because Jasman failed to allege the capacity in which he sued the defendants, they were immune from monetary damages.

Private defendants who conspire with public officials to violate constitutional rights in a replevin action cannot claim qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit.

Audio Odyssey, Ltd. v. Brenton First National Bank · filed 2001-04-06

Qualified immunity does not extend to private defendants who conspire with public officials to violate constitutional rights--at least in the replevin context.

A private defendant accused of conspiring with state officials to violate federal rights is not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Toussie v. Powell · filed 2003-03-20

Accordingly, we today hold that a private defendant faced with § 1983 liability for conspiring with state officials to violate federal rights is not protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 cannot be used against a private university to enforce federal statutes.

Slovinec, Joseph v. DePaul University · filed 2003-06-18

DePaul is a private university, so Slovinec cannot use 42 U.S.C. §1983, and the approach of Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), to enforce these federal statutes.

Private emergency medical oversight contractors and their medical director cannot claim qualified immunity from § 1983 suits when neither historical immunity nor the purposes of the doctrine support it.

Weigand v. Spadt · filed 2004-05-12

On the record presented, the court finds that EMS and Dr. Rounsborg cannot claim qualified immunity, but that Chief Spadt is entitled to qualified immunity on all claims alleged against him in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not give a private individual who acts in concert with state officials qualified immunity from damages.

Downs v. Sawtelle · filed 1978-03-30

Nor can it be said that a private individual shown to have acted in concert with state officials may rely upon any type of qualified immunity, whether derivatively or otherwise.

A private nonprofit defendant facing sufficient competitive pressure from possible replacement cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit based on concern about unwarranted timidity.

Rosewood Services, Inc. v. Sunflower Diversified Services, Inc. · filed 2005-06-29

Because the competitive pressures associated with the threat of being replaced exist in this case, we hold that the policy considerations concerning unwarranted timidity do not favor extending qualified immunity to these Defendants.

Privately employed prison medical providers are not entitled to qualified immunity against § 1983 claims.

Cook v. Martin · filed 2005-07-27

Our examination of the history and purposes of qualified immunity does not reveal anything sufficiently special about the work of private prison medical providers that would warrant providing such providers with governmental immunity. Accordingly we agree with the district court that Mason is not protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Officials of a nonprofit athletic association whose regulatory activity is state action may claim qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association · filed 2006-03-17

The initial question here is whether the qualified immunity defense is even available to Carter, an employee of a non-profit corporation that has been found to be a state actor when engaging in regulatory activity. ... We find that qualified immunity is available to officials such as Carter.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to nurses employed by a private company contracted to provide jail medical care under these circumstances.

Harrison v. Ash · filed 2008-08-28

In sum, the history and purpose of qualified immunity, as well as the case law interpreting the scope of the doctrine, are clear that Defendant nurses, as employees of CMS, are not eligible for qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit.

Nurses employed by a private company contracted to provide jail medical care are not eligible for qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit under the circumstances addressed by the court.

Harrison v. Kirk · filed 2008-08-28

We find, however, that as employees of a private medical provider, rather than Macomb County itself, Defendant nurses may not assert a defense of qualified immunity and thus we lack jurisdiction to hear their appeal.

A private casino and its security supervisor were not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability where the doctrine’s policy justifications and historical basis did not support it.

Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc. · filed 2009-07-30

First, addressing Imperial Palace’s and Espensen’s arguments on cross-appeal that reversal is warranted because they are entitled to qualified immunity for any § 1983 liability, on the disputed facts and for policy reasons, we conclude that qualified immunity does not apply to protect Imperial Palace and Espensen from liability in this matter.

Section 1983 claims against private defendants require joint action with a state actor.

Mitchell v. Akal Security, Inc. · filed 2009-12-14

The district court properly dismissed the section 1983 claims because Mitchell alleged these claims against private defendants, but did not allege joint action with a state actor.

The narrow qualified immunity exception for private actors under § 1983 does not cover a citizen who makes a false complaint at a police officer’s request.

Pritchard v. Hamilton Township Board of Trustees · filed 2011-05-25

Gail Gilbert’s actions—placing a false noise complaint at the behest of her police-officer husband—do not fit within our Court’s narrow category of private actors entitled to qualified immunity.

Private complaining witnesses who use government processes to pursue their own interests cannot invoke qualified immunity against § 1983 claims under the circumstances alleged here.

Sampson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield · filed 2014-02-18

As explained below, this Court concludes that the BCBS Defendants are not entitled to seek the protection of qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims under the circumstances presented in this case.

Private forensic experts performing criminal investigative functions for the state may assert qualified immunity against § 1983 claims.

Levon Brooks v. Hayne · filed 2017-06-27

We are persuaded that Defendants, as consulting forensic experts, were engaged in the criminal investigative functions of the state protected at common law and are here entitled to assert qualified immunity.

Private contractors acting under color of state law are not automatically eligible for qualified immunity from § 1983 claims; eligibility depends on historical immunity and whether the defense serves the statute's purposes.

Cahoo v. Sas Inst. Inc. · filed 2018-03-02

CSG has not pointed to any cases supporting "firmly rooted history" of conferring qualified immunity upon private government contractors, who compete in the marketplace for outsourced business. ... CSG is not entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense.

Privately employed psychiatrists working in a state facility may assert qualified immunity against § 1983 claims when the history and purposes of immunity support it.

Dominick Perniciaro, III v. Hampton Lea · filed 2018-08-16

In sum, considering the history and purposes of immunity in conjunction with the facts of this case, we hold that Drs. Thompson and Nicholl may raise the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants may be dismissed when the complaint makes no allegations against them or they are immune from suit.

Short v. Sisolak · filed 2020-07-13

She separately found that each Defendant should be dismissed because Short fails to make allegations against some Defendants—Sisolak and Ford—while others are immune from suit—Potter and Walker. ... Having reviewed the Complaint, the Court agrees with Judge Baldwin’s recommendations and will adopt the R&R in full.

A private prison contractor carrying out essential work under official corrections policy may invoke qualified immunity against a Section 1983 claim.

THOMPSON v. FERGUSON · filed 2020-12-31

Therefore, the Court finds that qualified immunity should apply equally to Smart Communications because it was contracted to assist the DOC in carrying out its essential work pursuant to official DOC policy.

In Colorado, denial of a motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim for failure to state a claim is not immediately appealable when the motion raises no immunity question.

Awad v. Breeze · filed 2005-06-30

However, contrary to defendants’ contention, the exception to the requirement of finality created in Furlong, Brace, and the federal cases upon which they relied, only applies to the denial of a motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim where a qualified immunity defense is raised. Accordingly, because defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim does not implicate any questions of immunity, the trial court’s ruling denying defendants’ motion is not subject to interlocutory appeal.

An order denying a Section 1983 defendant’s claim of qualified immunity from suit is immediately appealable because immunity from suit would be effectively lost if review were postponed until after trial.

Anderson v. City of Hopkins · filed 1986-09-19

In summary, we conclude that the order is appealable. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the legal issue of whether defendants are immune from suit.

Qualified immunity does not itself make an order denying protection from discovery immediately appealable when the defendant did not raise immunity in, or appeal from, a dismissal or summary-judgment motion.

Graham v. Gray · filed 1987-09-01

We see no basis for permitting interlocutory appeal from the order denying protection from discovery in the instant case. The appeal therefore is dismissed.

An interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action postpones trial for the appealing defendants unless the district court finds the appeal frivolous or the right to appeal forfeited.

Apostol v. Mark Gallion, John Auriemma v. Fred Rice, and City of Chicago · filed 1989-03-28

If we conclude that the appeal invokes our power and presents a genuine issue, the trial must be postponed until the appeal is resolved. In the absence of the district court's reasoned finding of frivolousness or forfeiture, however, the trial is automatically put off; it should not be necessary for the defendants to come to this court, hat in hand, seeking relief that is theirs by virtue of Forsyth, which authorizes pre-trial appeals.

A defendant does not waive qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim by declining to appeal immediately from the denial of summary judgment.

Hamm v. Powell · filed 1989-06-06

The defense of qualified immunity is not waived if an official chooses not to take an immediate appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment.

A defendant in a § 1983 action waives qualified immunity by failing to raise it in the district court or on appeal.

Merritt v. G. Michael Broglin, Superintendent · filed 1989-12-08

Where a liberty interest has been violated, a state official may sometimes be entitled to avoid liability through the doctrine of qualified immunity. The defendant here never raised that defense, however, either below or on appeal, and ... therefore the possibility of qualified immunity as a defense has been waived.

In a § 1983 suit, a denial of summary judgment may be reviewed on interlocutory appeal when the motion is combined with a qualified-immunity defense.

Rogers v. Fair · filed 1990-04-30

In the context of § 1983 suits, we have made an exception when the defense of qualified immunity (an interlocutory appeal that we must entertain) is combined with the motion for summary judgment.

In a § 1983 Fourth Amendment case, an interlocutory appeal from denial of qualified immunity is frivolous when undisputed officer conduct was unreasonable under clearly established law or disputed conduct bears on the reasonableness of the officers’ actions.

Dickerson v. McClellan · filed 1994-02-17

It is only if there is no dispute about the actions of the officers and these actions were unreasonable under the established law, or if there is a dispute about the actions of the officers and these disputes go the reasonableness of the actions, that the appeal should be deemed frivolous in a § 1983 ease based on Fourth Amendment violations.

On appeal, qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action must be reviewed in light of all relevant precedents, including those not cited to or found by the district court.

Elder v. Holloway · filed 1994-02-23

We hold that appellate review of qualified immunity dispositions is to be conducted in light of all relevant precedents, not simply those cited to, or discovered by, the district court.

In a damages action under § 1983, a nonfrivolous appeal from denial of qualified immunity ordinarily stays merits discovery until the appellate court resolves immunity.

Hegarty v. Somerset County · filed 1994-05-31

But in light of the Court’s later determination that a denial of qualified immunity is entitled to immediate appellate review, see Mitchell v. Forsyth, supra, we believe that the stay of discovery, of necessity, ordinarily must carry over through the appellate court’s resolution of that question, so long as the appeal is non-frivolous.

A public official may assert Harlow qualified immunity in a § 1983 action in Maryland court and immediately appeal a denial of that immunity on motion.

Artis v. Cyphers · filed 1994-06-08

There are instances when a defendant will raise in a Maryland court the public official immunity stated in Harlow; that is the test to be applied in actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If that immunity is rejected on motion, an immediate appeal will lie. To that extent, we follow Mitchell.

In a state-court section 1983 suit, qualified immunity does not entitle an officer to an interlocutory appeal when the only issue is whether the evidence shows that the officer committed the alleged acts.

Carter v. Cole · filed 1995-03-14

An interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion for summary judgment on the factual merits of the suit does not implicate any substantive rights guaranteed by federal qualified immunity law.

In Wisconsin § 1983 actions, an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a state official’s qualified immunity must be granted after summary judgment when the order turns on a question of law; after a motion to dismiss, review is discretionary.

Powell v. Cooper · filed 2001-02-16

Finally, the decision of the court of appeals presents an opportunity for this court to clarify the circumstances under which the court of appeals is required to grant a petition for interlocutory appeal from a circuit court order denying a state official's claim of qualified immunity in a § 1983 action. ... For the reasons set forth in Arneson I, we continue to conclude, pursuant to the this court's superintending power over lower state courts in article VI, section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, that the court of appeals should grant these petitions when they arise from a summary judgment order that turns on an issue of law and denies a claim of qualified immunity. However, when the interlocutory appeal arises on motion to dismiss, the court of appeals should exercise its sound discretion in determining whether or not to grant the petition.

Section 1983 damages claims against court reporters acting in their official capacity may be defeated by qualified immunity when the reporter acts within lawful authority and in good faith under court rules.

Woods v. Dugan · filed 1981-08-03

On May 11, 1981, plaintiff filed this pro se complaint alleging various violations of his civil rights, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Specifically, plaintiff is suing the court reporter of Division 11 of the St. Louis County Circuit Court, Jack Dugan, in his official capacity as official court reporter. Such personnel, when acting within their official capacity, are immune from civil liability in any action allegedly arising out of the pursuit of his lawful duties. Although such immunity is qualified, and not absolute, when a court reporter "can show that he was acting pursuant to his lawful authority and following in good faith the instructions and rules of the Court and was not in derogation of those instructions or rules..." McLallen v. Henderson, 492 F.2d 1298, 1300 (8th Cir. 1974), he is immune from a damage action arising out of alleged wrongful conduct. ... The factual pattern unfolding in this case shows that this defendant is entitled to a qualified immunity, and therefore defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a court reporter who has qualified immunity for harm caused while acting under the court's authority and following its rules and instructions.

Woods v. Dugan · filed 1982-11-10

However, the issue is not only whether the eleven month delay constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but is also whether defendant maintains a qualified immunity for any purported harm engendered by the delay. On this issue, the Court believes no material issue of fact exists. Defendant's affidavit establishes that defendant was working on court business throughout the eleven month period. Defendant's affidavit also shows that the delays were twice sanctioned or at least excused by the Missouri Supreme Court. In short, defendant's affidavit demonstrates that he was acting according to the court's rules and instructions and with the court's approval. On the other hand, plaintiff's affidavit fails to controvert any of the elements of defendant's qualified immunity defense. Plaintiff has not shown how or in what instances defendant deviated from the rules and instructions of the court in the preparation of the Woods' transcript.

A court reporter who follows court orders and does not knowingly violate established constitutional rights is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages.

Formanek v. Arment · filed 1990-06-14

There is nothing in the record which would lead the Court to conclude that defendant Riekeberg knowingly acted in contravention of plaintiff’s established constitutional rights. ... Accordingly, she is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs claim for money damages.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to a court reporter for acts within the scope of a judge’s instructions.

Neville v. Dearie · filed 1990-08-17

In Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir.1983), the Second Circuit held that a court reporter acting at the direction of a judge is immunized from liability under section 1983 by the defense of qualified immunity for actions carried out within the scope of those instructions. ... Since Charuka is immune from the claims asserted against him by plaintiff, Neville’s complaint against Charuka must be dismissed.

Official court reporters have qualified immunity under § 1983 when they act within their lawful authority and follow court instructions or rules in good faith.

Woodall v. State of Texas · filed 2003-10-23

Official court reporters are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they acted pursuant to their lawful authority and following in good faith the instructions or rules of the Court.

Qualified immunity can bar a § 1983 damages claim against a court reporter accused of altering a trial transcript.

Jackson v. Fick · filed 2008-11-17

Reviewing the record de novo and viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in a light most favorable to Jackson, see Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 2006), we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted on the basis of qualified immunity, see Holt v. Dunn, 741 F.2d 169, 170 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“qualified immunity protects court reporters who act pursuant to their lawful authority and follow in good faith the instructions or rules of the court”); see also Smith v. Tandy, 897 F.2d 355, 355-56 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (upholding district court’s grant of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity in suit against, inter alia, court reporter for omissions in trial transcript).

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 property-deprivation action turns on whether the defendants knew or reasonably should have known that their conduct violated the plaintiff’s due-process rights.

Charles T. Coleman, Sr. v. Turpen · filed 1987-08-24

... the question is whether or not defendants knew or should reasonably have known that Coleman was being deprived of his constitutional right to due process.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity damages against a public official who violates procedural due process when qualified immunity does not bar the claim.

Collins v. Marina-Martinez · filed 1990-01-24

Defendant did not accord him that right and, because qualified immunity is not a bar on these facts, defendant, in his individual capacity, may be held answerable in money damages.

A § 1983 claim against a state official may proceed when a protected property interest gives rise to due process rights and qualified immunity remains unresolved.

Abell v. Dewey · filed 1993-03-16

We hold that the recognition of due process rights entitles Abell to maintain the 42 U.S.C § 1983 claim against Dewey and that summary judgment was improperly granted. It now becomes a question of fact whether this right was clearly established concerning probationary employees or whether the meeting held between Abell and Dewey prior to her termination was sufficient to satisfy the due process requirement.

Under § 1983, licensing officials lack qualified immunity for actions violating clearly established constitutional rights of which they knew or reasonably should have known.

Leland v. Mississippi State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers & Land Surveyors · filed 1993-11-09

The court concludes that their motion in this regard is not well taken. These defendants enjoy no qualified immunity for actions which violated clearly established constitutional rights of which defendants knew or reasonably should have known.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects a building inspector from damages for omitting pre-eviction process when a reasonable inspector could find an immediate threat to occupants.

J.C. Flatford v. City Of Monroe · filed 1994-02-22

Even if in hindsight we conclude that Bosanac's decision to evacuate was erroneous, the Flatfords' evidence fails to prove that a reasonable building inspector could not conclude that the condition of the wooden-framed structure posed an immediate threat to the safety of its occupants. We, therefore, hold that Bosanac is entitled to qualified immunity for any failure to provide predeprivation process.

Local officials have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when state and local law did not clearly establish the asserted property interest at the time they acted.

Acierno v. Cloutier · filed 1994-07-07

Therefore, we hold that under the vested rights doctrine as recognized in Delaware, Acierno's property interest, if any in fact existed, was not so clearly established as to defeat the former members of the County Council and Mitchell of their claims to qualified immunity for their actions leading to the enactment of Ordinance 91-190.

Section 1983 claims against local officials for administrative employment decisions are subject to qualified, good-faith immunity rather than absolute legislative immunity.

Detz v. Hoover · filed 1982-05-20

Municipal decisionmakers, passing on administrative questions, possess qualified, good faith, not absolute immunity.

Qualified immunity bars Section 1983 damages against a state personnel director for a protected interpretation and application of state pay law.

Alabama State Personnel Board v. Hubbard · filed 1987-05-15

That counterclaim was brought under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. ... We are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Ballard on the ... ground that she was entitled to a qualified immunity.

Officials receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 patronage-dismissal claim when precedent did not clearly establish protection for the particular public office.

Hawkins v. Steingut · filed 1987-09-18

We therefore conclude that in July 1982, federal law was far from "clearly established" with respect to whether the prohibition against patronage dismissals extended to administrative law judge positions such as the one held by Hawkins.

Officials seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 political-discharge claim must show that political affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the employee’s position.

Maldonado v. Lausell · filed 1988-01-22

Although defendants have laid claim to qualified immunity, on this first amendment claim, they have presented no evidence as to Maldonado’s position or position description. The burden of proof on defendants at this point was to demonstrate a permissible patronage firing. They have failed to present any evidence in this regard and qualified immunity as to the first amendment claim must be DENIED.

In a § 1983 action, officials are not entitled to qualified immunity for adverse action substantially motivated by a public employee’s protected attendance at a legislative hearing.

Johnston v. Richard Koppes Robert Tousignant · filed 1988-06-30

The defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate any clearly established constitutional norm. ... It is apparent that if this fact was “a substantial” or “motivating” factor for the transfer, see Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), then a fundamental constitutional norm was violated. Government cannot punish its employees for exercising rights guaranteed them by the Federal Constitution.

A public official has good faith immunity from § 1983 liability for a political dismissal when he reasonably believes the dismissal is lawful; seeking legal counsel strengthens that immunity.

Lowe v. Padgett · filed 1989-03-06

However, if this finding is incorrect, Mr. Padgett would certainly have been acting reasonably in believing he could hire someone else to fill that position without committing a constitutional tort. His entitlement to good faith immunity on this issue is strengthened by the fact that he sought the counsel of Knox County Law Director Dale Workman before issuing any termination notices.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a § 1983 employment due process claim merely because determining whether an implied contract gave the employee a property interest requires a factual inquiry.

Derstein v. Benson · filed 1989-05-22

While that determination would depend upon the factual circumstances of that case, the court cannot agree that the defendants can be absolved from liability for their decision simply because they were required to make some minimal evaluation of plaintiff’s individual circumstance. Accordingly, the court concludes that the Kansas law recognizing implied employment contracts was clearly established in 1981, and defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity in this case.

Qualified immunity shields a public official from damages under § 1983 for a patronage dismissal when the law at the time did not clearly establish that political affiliation was impermissible for the position.

Mariani-Giron v. Heriberto Acevedo-Ruiz, Etc. · filed 1989-06-23

We consequently hold that the district court erred in not granting Acevedo Ruiz’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that he was entitled to qualified immunity from damages in Mariani Giron’s section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not give officials qualified immunity for retaliating against a public employee’s testimony on a matter of significant public concern when there is no evidence of workplace disruption and no reasonable basis to believe the retaliation was lawful.

Piesco v. The City of New York, Dept. Of Personnel, Juan Ortiz and Nicholas Laporte, Jr. · filed 1991-06-03

We further hold that the court erred in concluding that Ortiz and LaPorte were immune from suit. Since Dr. Piesco’s testimony was of significant public concern and there was no evidence of disruption at DOP as a result of her comments, it was not reasonable for Ortiz and LaPorte to believe that their actions were lawful.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from a First Amendment retaliation claim when the law did not clearly establish that firing an employee who was both a whistleblower and persistently insubordinate violated the Constitution.

O'Connor v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 1991-11-13

This is particularly the case where the employee has engaged in consistent insubordination and routinely failed to perform his job duties. Therefore, the Court holds that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the first amendment claim.

A state official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when it was not sufficiently clear that the plaintiff’s speech was protected and a reasonable official could believe terminating the plaintiff’s license did not violate the First Amendment.

Copsey v. Swearingen · filed 1992-03-05

Finally, as noted at trial, the court finds that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity in any event. Under the circumstances, it would not have been sufficiently clear that plaintiff's speech was protected under the First Amendment. Consequently, a reasonable state official would have been justified in believing that he did not violate plaintiffs constitutional rights in terminating his license.

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when existing law did not clearly establish that their politically motivated employment decision was unlawful.

Pounds v. David Griepenstroh, Hugh Barclay, and Louis Lubbehusen · filed 1992-08-06

We disagree with the trial court’s finding and reverse, holding that the defendant commissioners are entitled to qualified immunity.

Public officials cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for firing an employee over potentially protected speech merely by remaining ignorant of the speech’s content.

Churchill v. Waters · filed 1992-12-09

We believe it is immaterial that the defendants were allegedly unaware of whether Churchill's speech was in regard to a matter of public concern--for while we decline to impose a due process requirement that public officials investigate the precise content of an employee's alleged complaint, we hold that ignorance of the nature of the employee's speech (in particular in light of the record before us) is inadequate to insulate officials from a § 1983 action.

Officials have qualified immunity from Section 1983 civil damages for politically motivated personnel actions taken before the First Amendment prohibition on those actions was clearly established.

Rodriguez-Pinto v. Tirado-Delgado · filed 1993-01-05

Here, all the complained of adverse personnel actions took place prior to our decision in Agosto-de-Feliciano and the Supreme Court’s decision in Rutan. As a result, the district court’s ruling that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff’s claim for civil damages was plainly correct.

Fiscal court magistrates are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim over an employee’s termination when they lack legal authority to remove the employee.

Mineer v. Call · filed 1993-05-04

Applying the law to the undisputed facts of this case, the members of the fiscal court did not have the legal capacity to deprive Mineer of constitutional rights in connection with his termination. ... We, therefore, conclude that the magistrates' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity should have been granted with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim as well as with respect to the First Amendment claim.

Individual defendants have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when it is unclear whether the claimed employment benefits are constitutionally protected property.

Portman v. County of Santa Clara Bob Diridon · filed 1993-06-09

Since it is not clear whether the entitlement to these types of benefits is a constitutionally protected property right, the individual defendants who were involved in the decision not to give them to Portman are immune from suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for a sheriff who reasonably dismisses a volunteer deputy as an at-will employee when no clearly established property interest in continued employment exists.

Deswart v. Tillamook County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Oregon, and David Wilson, Sheriff of Tillamook · filed 1993-06-18

Thus, DeSwart did not have a clearly established property interest in his position under Oregon or under Constitutional law, see Brady, 859 F.2d at 1547-48, and Sheriff Wilson acted reasonably by terminating DeSwart on the assumption that DeSwart could be fired at-will, see Hunter, 112 S.Ct. at 537; Floyd, 929 F.2d at 1393.

Municipal employees are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 when prior precedent does not clearly establish that a revised cable-franchising scheme violates the First Amendment.

Preferred Communications, Inc. Clinton Galloway Carl Galloway Perry Jr. Parks v. Susan Herman Edward J. Perez City of Lo · filed 1993-08-30

The franchising scheme at issue here differed from the one invalidated in Preferred I because it no longer contained the unconstitutional one operator/one area policy. Therefore, the scheme's repugnance to the First Amendment was not "clearly established." Herman and Perez are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim is unavailable to a police chief who retaliates against an employee’s protected speech in violation of clearly established First Amendment law.

Schnabel v. Tyler · filed 1993-08-31

Thus, the law is clearly established that when government officials respond to an employee’s exercise of free speech in a retaliatory manner it violates the employee’s free speech rights under the first amendment. The trial court was correct in its conclusion that the qualified immunity defense was not available to the plaintiff.

Under § 1983, a district judge is entitled to qualified immunity for terminating his predecessor's secretary when a reasonable judge would not have known that the termination violated her due process rights.

Munroe v. Kautz · filed 1993-09-27

The Court holds that a reasonable district judge would not have known that discharging the secretary of the judge who preceded him would violate her due process rights. ... The defendant is thus entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

County legislators are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for terminating an employee over premature disclosure of audit information when their conduct violates no clearly established constitutional rule.

Barnard v. Jackson County · filed 1993-10-12

It may be noted that all individual defendants other than perhaps defendants Tindall, Coe and Waits would in any event be entitled to prevail on a qualified immunity defense. If,their vote to terminate plaintiff was based in whole or in part on his violation of the restriction on premature release of audit information, and even if this could be ruled constitutionally invalid, no controlling precedent for such a novel ruling has been cited or found. At least four of the defendants were not violating a clearly established rule of constitutional law.

Government supervisors have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for requiring a medical diagnosis to justify sick leave because an employee's constitutional right to refuse that disclosure was not clearly established in 1985.

Henson v. John Florez, Robert Kinoshita, and Joe Cuccia · filed 1993-11-01

We hold that qualified immunity bars suit against the officials for the alleged constitutional violations. ... Henson cites no authority, nor have we found any, that suggests that in 1985 the constitutional right of privacy included an employee's right to refuse to provide a medical diagnosis to justify a request for sick leave. The district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim.

City council members performing executive functions lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for discharging an employee in violation of clearly established free-speech rights.

Casey v. City of Cabool · filed 1993-12-28

This immunity, however, is available only if defendant’s “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Since the rights infringed in this ease were clearly established, the judgment of the district court with respect to defendants Gentry and Roberts was proper.

An official lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 First Amendment claim when clearly established law protects the employee’s speech and the official’s adverse action is unreasonable.

Farnworth v. Femling · filed 1994-03-02

Farnworth asserts that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment on his federal civil rights claim against Fem-ling under the First Amendment on the basis of qualified immunity. We agree. ... Therefore, on the basis of the record now before us, employing the Pickering factors, we conclude that this speech was protected by the First Amendment, and it was not reasonable for Fending to take adverse action against Farnworth based on these statements.

Officials sued personally for damages under § 1983 generally receive qualified immunity in public-employee speech cases requiring Pickering balancing when no clearly established right governs.

Feldman v. Art Bahn · filed 1994-03-09

This suggests the lack of any clear constitutional right. As we have held repeatedly, the complexity of Pickering’s balancing approach makes damages too crude an instrument. As a result, “qualified immunity typically casts a wide net to protect government officials from damage liability whenever balancing is required.”

A district attorney sued under § 1983 is not entitled to state immunity for administrative decisions implementing a county diversion program.

Del Campo v. Kennedy · filed 2006-12-05

Based on the facts alleged and an examination of the state laws and legislative history of diversion programs, the Court finds that the District Attorney was not acting as a prosecutor but as a county policymaker in implementing certain aspects of the diversion program. As such, he is not entitled to absolute immunity for acting in his prosecutorial capacity as a state actor.

Section 1983 permits claims based on negligent or intentional acts, but a public official has qualified immunity unless the plaintiff alleges and proves bad faith.

Angelina Casualty Co. v. Pattonville-Bridgeton Terrace Fire Protection District · filed 1986-01-21

An action for deprivation of civil rights under § 1983 can be based upon either negligent or intentional acts. ... Where, however, the defendant is a public official such as the directors here, there exists a qualified immunity under § 1983. A plaintiff in a § 1983 case against such an official must allege and prove that the official acted in bad faith.

Public defenders are absolutely immune from liability under Section 1983 for acts performed in their quasi-judicial function as public defenders.

Robinson v. Bergstrom · filed 1978-06-13

Policy considerations raised herein and by the Miller and Minns courts support a holding that a public defender should be absolutely immune from liability from suits brought under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act for acts done in the performance of his quasi-judicial function as a public defender.

Public defenders acting within the scope of their professional duties are immune from liability under § 1983.

Ellison v. Olivia Smith · filed 2019-10-03

We have previously made clear that “public defenders and court-appointed counsel acting within the scope of their professional duties are absolutely immune from civil liability under § 1983.” ... The District Court correctly dismissed Ellison’s § 1983 complaint.

State child-welfare officials who acted in good faith are immune from compensatory damages under Section 1983 for temporarily removing children from their parents.

Tammie Rowe Dorsey and Randy Dorsey, Etc., Cross v. Hilmar G. Moore, Raul Jimenez, Cross-Appellants · filed 1983-11-21

Accordingly, the plaintiffs are not entitled to compensatory damages from these defendants on their § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 allows child protective service workers qualified immunity, but not absolute immunity, for removing children from their home without a prior court order.

John Hodorowski and Jeraldine Hodorowski v. Ann Ray, Mary Ellen Burns and Texas Department of Human Resources, Defendant · filed 1988-06-14

The question presented by this appeal is whether and to what extent Texas child protective service workers are immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their decision to remove children from the home of their parents without a prior court order. The district court held that the workers could claim neither absolute nor qualified immunity. We reverse, holding that the workers may claim qualified, but not absolute, immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 claim alleging deceptive statements at an emergency child removal hearing absent evidence of malice or improper motives.

Doe v. Hennepin County · filed 1988-10-06

This claim is barred by qualified immunity unless evidence of malice or improper motives on the part of defendants is proved.

Qualified immunity does not shield child welfare workers from § 1983 damages when they knowingly place a child with a dangerous or unfit foster parent without justification based on resources or professional judgment.

Murphy v. Morgan · filed 1990-09-24

Only if without justification based either on financial constraints or on considerations of professional judgment they place the child in hands they know to be dangerous or otherwise unfit do they expose themselves to liability in damages. This right we regard as clearly established, but the distinct right not to be shifted among foster homes "too frequently" remains more problematic and its existence and dimensions remain to be explored in proceedings suitable to the elaboration of constitutional rights.

Government officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for temporarily removing children from their home when their actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Oldfield v. Benavidez · filed 1994-01-12

In these circumstances, we think Defendants’ actions in temporarily removing the Oldfield children from the home were objectively reasonable, and as a matter of law violated no particular right to familial integrity. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity should have been granted.

Section 1983 defendants who conduct or assist a child abuse investigation may invoke qualified immunity against a family integrity claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Mayronne v. Vaught · filed 1994-02-23

Similarly here, Mr. Mayronne’s claim for violation of the right to family integrity cannot stand. The OCS defendants, and those persons retained by the OCS to aid in the abuse investigation are immune on the theory of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 gives child protective caseworkers qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, for investigative actions that are objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Cornejo v. Bell · filed 2010-01-04

For the reasons stated, therefore, while we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that the caseworker defendants were entitled to absolute immunity on plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we find that they were nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity on those claims and that the rest of the district court’s conclusions were correct.

A plaintiff cannot defeat qualified immunity by stating a constitutional right at a high level of generality; the right must be sufficiently particularized to notify officials that their conduct probably is unlawful.

Grove School v. Guardianship & Advocacy Commission · filed 1986-09-02

The right must be sufficiently particularized to put potential defendants on notice that their conduct probably is unlawful. ... Plaintiffs have failed utterly to identify any “clearly established” standard that holds (or even suggests) that the pursuit of an investigation by a state body having that duty amounts to a First Amendment violation, simply because the effect (or even the purpose) of that investigation is to discredit the teaching method that has occasioned complaints and thus triggered the investigation.

In a § 1983 damages action, school-board members are qualifiedly immune unless they knew or reasonably should have known their action would violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights or acted with malicious intent to cause a constitutional deprivation or other injury.

McGhee v. Daniel D. Draper, Superintendent, Daniel D. Draper, Leroy Chamberlain, Dale Brown, Edward Billups, J. W. · filed 1977-10-03

The board member is not immune if he knew or reasonably should have known that his action would violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff, or if he acted with the malicious intent to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.

Section 1983 provides no qualified-immunity defense to a suit against school officials seeking injunctive relief.

Carmen V. RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF EASTCHESTER UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 1980-05-02

This immunity, however, has never been thought to extend to suits for injunctive relief.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity is a defense that the defendant must plead.

Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Independent School District · filed 1981-04-16

In the context of a section 1983 action, qualified immunity is a defense and the burden of pleading it rests with the defendant.

Section 1983 damages claims against individual public officials are subject to qualified immunity when they neither knew nor reasonably should have known their action would violate constitutional rights and did not act with malicious intent.

Gay Activists Alliance v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma · filed 1981-12-22

a school board member is not immune from liability for damages under [section] 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student. ... There is no evidence indicating that the Regents acted with malice to deprive the GAA members of constitutional rights or to cause “other injury.” ... This immunity bars the defendants’ personal liability not only as to the actual damages sought by the plaintiffs but also as to the punitive damages sought by the plaintiffs.

School officials cannot claim qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit for failing to investigate and protect students from a teacher’s known sexual abuse when reasonable officials would have known of that duty.

Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District · filed 1988-09-12

Since, as we noted above, sexual abuse is at least as traumatic as physical abuse, it is implausible that by 1979 reasonable school officials would not have known that there was a duty to take some affirmative action to investigate and protect students from a teacher's sexual abuse of which they were made aware, and to take steps to eliminate rather than condone an atmosphere in which teachers could sexually harass students with impunity.

School officials cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim on the ground that they lacked notice of a duty to investigate and take reasonable steps to protect students from known sexual abuse by a teacher.

Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District · filed 1988-09-12

We therefore hold that Stoneking had a constitutionally protected right to be free from sexual abuse by her school teachers that was clearly established by 1979, when defendants were put on notice of Wright’s alleged abuse of a female student.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of an individual-capacity § 1983 claim when the defense does not appear on the face of the complaint; the issue may be resolved on summary judgment.

Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 21 · filed 1989-05-12

The defendants’ qualified immunity defense does not appear on the face of the complaint. Moreover, qualified immunity determinations are more appropriately made in the summary judgment context.

A school board, as a local government body, has no qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit, but the plaintiff must still establish the board’s substantive liability.

Puffer v. Raynolds · filed 1990-06-26

As a local government body, the school board does not enjoy a qualified immunity from suit. ... Nevertheless, Lynne C. must still demonstrate the Board’s substantive liability to recover under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims alleging the same violations of the Education of the Handicapped Act are barred when qualified immunity shields the defendants from liability for those alleged violations under the Act.

Christoper P. v. Marcus · filed 1990-09-27

Plaintiffs' due process and section 1983 claims allege the very same violations of the EAHCA that are the subject of their claims under the Act itself. Accordingly, defendants' qualified immunity in connection with the EAHCA claims also shields them from liability for these alleged violations.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a § 1983 claim that defendants must raise and establish; its possible success does not justify denying leave to amend.

Oliver Schools, Inc. v. Foley · filed 1991-04-12

As to the qualified immunity hurdle, it may be that, as defendants contend, Oliver will ultimately be unable to prevail because of that defense. That possibility is not a valid basis for denying leave to amend the complaint, however, for such immunity is an affirmative defense that the defendants have the burden of raising in their answer and establishing at trial or on a motion for summary judgment.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when alleged intentional obstruction of the IEP process violates a clearly established IDEA right to a free appropriate public education.

Taylor v. Bill Honig, Superintendent of Education, and Thomas Uram Bernard Rappaport Gary Ruelas William G. Loomis · filed 1992-10-22

If the Mental Health defendants intentionally sabotaged IEP meetings and "warehoused" Todd, Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988), they violated Todd's clearly established statutory right to a free appropriate public education of which a reasonable person would have known. Thus, the Taylors have alleged conduct that violated the clearly established right to a free public education, 1 and the Mental Health defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity under Harlow.

Section 1983 allows official-capacity claims for injunctive relief to proceed even when qualified immunity has defeated individual-capacity damages claims.

Longmire v. Alabama State University · filed 1992-12-18

The damage claim against the trustees in their individual capacities has been dismissed. They still remain as defendants in their official capacities for purposes of injunctive relief. Under well-settled law, the defense of qualified immunity is “totally immaterial” to claims for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 defendants are protected by qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Alanis v. University of Texas Health Science Center · filed 1992-12-23

In order to overcome this defense, Mr. Alanis must show that the appellees’ conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Thus, we find, as a matter of law, that the actions of the University officials did not violate the clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of Mr. Alanis. Therefore, the actions of all the appellees are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when disputed facts about the official’s conduct determine whether immunity applies.

Jaffe v. Cleveland Heights-University Heights City Board of Education, and Irving Moscowitz · filed 1993-01-07

Therefore, resolution of this case by summary judgment is inappropriate because a factual dispute exists regarding the conduct upon which the issue of qualified immunity turns.

Public school officials performing discretionary functions generally have qualified good faith immunity from Section 1983 damages unless they knew or reasonably should have known their actions would violate a constitutional right.

Mazurek v. Wolcott Board of Education · filed 1993-01-12

Public school officials performing discretionary functions generally are protected by a qualified good faith immunity from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This protection does not extend to officials who knew or reasonably should have known that their official actions would violate a constitutional right.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against a school official when the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Durso v. Taylor · filed 1993-01-29

Even if Durso had violated Taylor’s right to due process, we hold that he had qualified immunity for his actions. The availability of the doctrine of qualified immunity depends upon the objective legal reasonableness of his conduct.

Section 1983 damages claims against school officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Alabama v. Trustees of the Big Sandy Independent School District · filed 1993-03-12

Accordingly, the school officials, in their individual capacities, are immune from plaintiffs’ claim for monetary damages resulting from the due process violation.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable official would have known.

Pauli v. Farmington Cent. Com. School Dist. 265 · filed 1994-01-12

For the reasons set forth above, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent that this Court finds Defendants entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims.

A supervisory school official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for a subordinate’s sexual abuse of students when the evidence does not show deliberate indifference to that abuse.

Hagan v. Houston Independent School District · filed 1995-04-27

After a careful review of the summary judgment evidence, we conclude that there is no genuine dispute of material fact over whether Orum was deliberately indifferent to Reaux's abuse of these students. As a matter of law, Orum is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

School officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights or they reasonably believed their conduct was lawful.

Mazza v. Hendrick Hudson Central School District · filed 1996-10-08

A school official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 action insofar as his conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or even where the rights were clearly established, if it was objectively reasonable to believe that his acts did not violate those rights.

University officials involved in student disciplinary proceedings may raise qualified immunity, but not absolute immunity, against a § 1983 claim.

Brown v. Western Connecticut State University · filed 2002-05-08

Accordingly, the Court concludes that defendants are entitled to raise only the defense of qualified immunity.

School officials acting in good faith and without malice while performing their duties are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Ex Parte Turner · filed 2002-06-21

Turner's affidavit provides uncontroverted sworn statements that sufficiently establish qualified immunity from the § 1983 action. No evidence was presented indicating that Turner acted in bad faith or maliciously in handling the incident. Nothing before us indicates that Turner deprived Ware of her rights under the United States Constitution. The trial court erred in denying Turner's motion for a summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity from the § 1983 action.

School officials may receive qualified immunity from § 1983 liability for good-faith, nonmalicious actions taken in their official duties.

Ware ex rel. Ware v. Turner · filed 2002-06-21

Turner’s affidavit provides uncon-troverted sworn statements that sufficiently establish qualified immunity from the § 1983 action. No evidence was presented indicating that Turner acted in bad faith or maliciously in handling the incident. Nothing before us indicates that Turner deprived Ware of her rights under the United States Constitution. The trial court erred in denying Turner’s motion for a summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity from the § 1983 action.

Section 1983 applies the Wood standard for school officials’ immunity from damages to actions affecting part-time school district employees.

Pence v. Rosenquist · filed 1978-02-02

In this state of the record, it cannot be said as a matter of law that defendants were immune from liability for damages. ... We see no reason why the Wood standard of liability should not cover action taken against part-time school district employees such as bus drivers.

A government official waives qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim by asserting it in the answer but failing to raise it in a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

Leibson v. Ohio Department of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities · filed 1992-12-30

In this case, Schumacher asserted qualified immunity as a defense in his answer; however, he failed to assert it in his motion to dismiss and failed to file a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, it was effectively waived.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting liability under a viable federal legal theory, and officials may be immune from civil damages under qualified immunity.

Love v. County of Los Angeles CA2/2 · filed 2016-05-11

Respondents’ demurrer to appellant’s first and third causes of action for violation of title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. section 2000d; fourth cause of action for violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; sixth cause of action for violation of the commerce clause, article IV and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; seventh cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. sections 1982 and 1983; and eighth cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1986, was sustained without leave to amend for failure to state a claim. ... Because the arresting officers had sufficient probable cause for the arrest, appellant was not wrongfully deprived of any right. Appellant failed to plead any viable federal causes of action against respondents, as he failed to state facts supporting liability under the legal theories which he attempted to allege. In addition, the respondents were immune from liability as to appellant’s Fourth Amendment claims. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable public official should have been aware.

Public officials’ qualified-immunity defense in a § 1983 action uses both subjective good faith and objective reasonableness.

Alice Foster and William Allen v. J. Zeeko and Guy Dibello · filed 1976-09-16

There would appear to be little or no question that the double pronged standard is now applicable in gauging a defense against a Section 1983 action by public officials having a qualified immunity.