42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

Beley v. City of Chicago · filed 2018-08-23

But they cannot assert a claim for a state-law violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

Garner v. Lebbeus Brown · filed 2018-11-02

But, even if Garner were correct about how to interpret the Department of Corrections’ regulations, that violation of state law would not give rise to a cognizable constitutional claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not turn a state official’s error of state law into a federal constitutional violation.

Hoffman v. Wilks · filed 2019-01-16

This is a suit under §1983, which does not enforce state law by deeming a state official’s error of state law to be a violation of the federal Constitution.

A violation of state law alone does not give rise to a claim under § 1983.

Hestekin v. Belay · filed 2019-03-21

Moreover, a finding of a state law violation does not give rise to a constitutional claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violating a state law detention limit.

Rayfield v. City of Grand Rapids · filed 2019-04-15

First, to the extent that Rayfield bases his § 1983 wrongful-detention claim against Hornbacher, Glowney, and the John Doe City defendants on their violation of the 24-hour detention limit under Michigan law, such an allegation is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a violation of state law.

Bartley v. Jenny Stewart Medical Center · filed 2019-06-20

Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law alone.

Oesterlin v. Cook County Sheriff's Departme · filed 2019-07-19

But § 1983 and the Due Process Clause do not provide a remedy for violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

Benson v. Piper · filed 2019-08-06

Plaintiff cannot state a claim under § 1983 based on an alleged violation of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law.

Banda v. Doe · filed 2019-08-19

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law or prison policy alone.

Colvin 192744 v. Horton · filed 2019-08-20

Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state law.

HENRY v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2019-09-06

With respect to Count VIII, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim based on violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

Buchanan v. Stanton · filed 2019-09-18

Plaintiff alleges only violations of state statutes, which state no claim under § 1983 because “a violation of state law alone does not give rise to a federal cause of action under § 1983.” Malek v. Haun, 26 F.3d 1013, 1016 (10th Cir. 1994).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of the Kentucky Open Records Act because it is a state law.

Herbig v. LMDC · filed 2019-09-18

The Kentucky Open Records Act is a state law, and a violation of that statute does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights under color of state law, but does not cover conduct that violates only state law.

Neinast v. Bd Trustees Columbus · filed 2003-10-10

Section 1983, upon which Neinast bases his claim, authorizes courts to redress violations of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws” that occur under color of state law.

Section 1983 remedies violations of federal law; failure to follow state prison policy alone does not create a claim.

Chomos 287880 v. Brown · filed 2019-10-01

Section 1983 is addressed to remedying violations of federal law, not state law.

A violation of a state statute or prison regulation alone does not state a claim under Section 1983.

Champ v. Simmon · filed 2019-10-04

a statutory or administrative code violation does not translate into a constitutional violation upon which a civil rights claim may rest.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law or procedure alone.

Soldan 358345 v. Washington · filed 2019-10-17

To the extent Plaintiff relies solely on a violation of state law or procedure, he does not state a cognizable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a claim only when the alleged conduct violates a federal statute or the Constitution; violating state prison regulations alone is insufficient.

Powell v. Banales · filed 2019-10-30

Only if the events complained of rise to the level of a federal statutory or constitutional violation do they give rise to a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federally protected right; a state law violation alone does not state a claim.

Adamczyk v. Annucci · filed 2019-11-19

Even if this were true, a violation of state law does not, in and of itself, state a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations, not violations of state law.

Sanders, Jr. v. Wolff · filed 2019-11-21

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations, not violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide redress for violations of state law alone.

Adams v. Parker · filed 2019-11-27

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendants liable under § 1983 because the policy violates other state policies or regulations, such allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983, which does not provide redress for violations of a state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

Vetere v. City of New York · filed 2019-12-05

But a violation of state law, without more, does not give rise to a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law alone.

Glenn 609012 v. Greenleaf · filed 2019-12-17

Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state sentencing guidelines.

Stone v. Van Wormer · filed 2019-12-26

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s assertion that the lifetime revocation of his driver’s license does not comport with Oregon Sentencing Guidelines is not properly brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for violations of a state constitution alone.

Unknown Party v. Arizona Board of Regents · filed 2019-12-27

Additionally, Doe cannot seek damages under § 1983 based on an alleged violation of the Arizona Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state law alone.

Jones v. Hakins · filed 2020-01-31

Violations of state law, however, are not cognizable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for an alleged violation of state licensing law.

Ballard v. Jabbar · filed 2020-02-12

Moreover, any failure on the part of the City relating to licensing would be a state law violation which is not actionable under § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state law alone.

Flessner 703698 v. People of the State of Michigan · filed 2020-02-14

Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants violated state law therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state law alone.

Tucker 132271 v. Corizon Correctional Healthcare, Inc. · filed 2020-02-20

Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law alone.

Daugherty 200709 v. Washington · filed 2020-02-28

Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state prison policy alone.

Triggs 214324 v. Barnhardt · filed 2020-03-10

Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of jail policy or state law alone.

Sibley v. Dart · filed 2020-03-18

First, alleged policy violations are not, ipso facto, civil rights violations. See Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 7.04; Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that § 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state statutes or regulations) (citing Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a failure to follow state laws or regulations.

(PC) Blackwell v. Jenkins · filed 2020-03-25

Additionally, plaintiff cannot state a claim under § 1983 based on defendants’ failure to comply with state laws or state regulations.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state or municipal law alone.

Vodicka v. Ermatinger · filed 2020-03-26

Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs attempt to bring a § 1983 premised upon violations of state or municipal law, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of state law or prison policy.

Lawrence Redmond as special representative of the estate of Michael Everett v. Pfister · filed 2020-04-07

Moreover, Everett’s argument that Warden Pfister’s failure to follow these guidelines supports his Eighth Amendment claim is misplaced because a violation of local or state policies does not amount to a constitutional deprivation. Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006) (“42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”) (citation omitted).

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a violation of state prison rules unless the conduct also violates federal law.

Torres v. Kernan · filed 2020-04-13

Thus, although Mr. Torres may be able to bring a state law claim against defendants for violating the CDCR FIM, the allegations of the complaint do not state a cognizable claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a violation of state law alone.

Simons v. Washington · filed 2020-04-14

Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for violations of state law alone.

Bermudez v. Allison · filed 2020-04-17

Section 1983 does not impose liability for violations of state law, including title 15 of the California Code of Regulations.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of New York State FOIL alone.

Jackson v. Wilcox · filed 2020-04-17

First, to the extent that Plaintiff's claims are premised on a violation of New York State FOIL, it is well settled that such a claim, standing alone, is insufficient to support a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not remedy a violation of state law alone; it requires a violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

(PC) Billy Lee Eakins v. Diaz · filed 2020-04-23

Thus, plaintiff’s claim is not cognizable under § 1983 because it merely asserts a violation of state law. Section 1983 only remedies a violation of the Constitution, law or treaties of the United States.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law alone.

(PC) Sekona v. Perez · filed 2020-05-13

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

Madison v. Crowley · filed 2020-05-19

Moreover, violation of state law is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state statutes.

OCASIO v. EADY · filed 2020-05-26

Asan initial matter, Plaintiff cannot assert a state statute as a basis for recovery under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law.

Ferguson 506189 v. Alger Correctional Facility · filed 2020-05-27

Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law.

A violation of a state statute or regulation alone does not establish a claim under § 1983.

Oliver v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government · filed 2020-06-02

However, it is a “long-established principle ‘that the violation of a state statute or regulation is insufficient alone to make a claim cognizable under § 1983.’” West v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 425 F. Supp. 3d 793, 809 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (quoting Stanley v. Vining, 602 F.3d 767, 769 (6th Cir. 2010)).

Section 1983 provides no remedy for violations of state laws or regulations without a deprivation of federal rights.

Farmer v. Phillips · filed 2020-06-03

Section 1983 therefore does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations.

Potter v. Phillips · filed 2020-06-04

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for violations of state law.

Brown v. Taylor · filed 2020-06-05

However, Brown has never responded to defendants’ dispositive argument that Texas Health & Safety Code § 841.081 lacks a private right of action for damages. Section 1983 creates no such remedy for violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide redress for violations of state law or prison policy alone.

Kelly 792018 v. Labelle · filed 2020-06-18

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983 based on Defendants’ failures to follow MDOC policy providing Plaintiff certain state procedural rights under state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law, including a state constitution.

Nalepka v. Livingston County Sheriff · filed 2020-06-24

Section 1983 does not provide redress for violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state law or corrections department policy alone.

COLEMAN v. BENSHIEMER · filed 2020-06-25

Ms. Coleman argued at her deposition that her arrest violated IDOC policy, but violations of state law or IDOC policy do not support a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law alone.

(PC) Sekona v. Lucas · filed 2020-06-29

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of state law or departmental regulations.

Kosakoski v. Duprey · filed 2020-07-08

Allegations that an official violated state law or departmental regulations or practices do not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of state laws or regulations alone.

Bounds v. Paul · filed 2020-07-23

A violation of state laws or regulations is not a basis for a federal civil rights case.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for an alleged violation of state law alone.

(PC) Chubbuck v. Brown · filed 2020-08-19

Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim is not cognizable under § 1983 because it only asserts a violation of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a state law violation only when that violation deprives the plaintiff of a right protected by the United States Constitution.

Howard v. Carter · filed 2020-08-20

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a violation of state law may form the basis for an action but only when that violation causes the deprivation of a right protected by the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law alone.

(PC) Price v. Sutton · filed 2020-08-21

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a violation of a state statute or regulation alone; the plaintiff must show a violation of a federal right.

West v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm'n · filed 2020-08-28

Also, “[i]t has long been established that the violation of a state statute or regulation is insufficient alone to make a claim cognizable under § 1983.” ... The Wests thus have not shown a protected liberty interest.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of state law or prison policy alone.

Gibson v. Payne · filed 2020-09-01

In any event, the violation of prison policy or other state law doesn’t give rise to a federal constitutional claim. ... Mr. Gibson’s allegations don’t state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide redress for violations of state law or prison policy alone.

McNeal 302062 v. Hargett · filed 2020-09-01

Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law or policy.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a violation of state prison policy alone.

Perry 427193 v. Knapp · filed 2020-09-03

Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants violated MDOC policy therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for failure to enforce state regulations unless a federal right is implicated.

O'Neal v. Albertson · filed 2020-09-10

O’Neal’s assertion that the Nevada DMV failed to enforce its own regulations governing insurance coverage is similarly not actionable under § 1983 because O’Neal fails to show that those regulations implicate a federal right.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a violation of state law alone.

Franklin v. DeVoe · filed 2020-09-11

A violation of state law alone does not infringe a constitutional right and is not remediable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

(PC) Johnson v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation · filed 2020-09-11

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is not cognizable under § 1983 because it only asserts a violation of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law alone.

Board 766060 v. Radtke · filed 2020-09-23

Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants violated state law therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a violation of state law alone actionable without a federal constitutional violation.

Woodard v. Gaylord · filed 2020-09-25

Even if Nurse Gaylord violated a provision of the Florida Administrative Code by disclosing the nature of Plaintiff’s conviction, such conduct, standing alone, is not a constitutional violation and thus is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law alone.

Torgensen v. Gill · filed 2020-09-29

Section 1983 claims cannot be based on state law violations.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state law alone.

Fusco v. County of Nassau · filed 2020-09-30

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is dismissed to the extent it is premised on violations of state law because state law claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law; it requires the deprivation of a federal right.

(PC) Diggs v. Doe · filed 2020-10-02

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law.

Section 1983 provides relief for violations of federal rights, but a state law violation alone does not state a claim.

(PC) Davis v. Pickett · filed 2020-10-05

Section 1983 remedies violations of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a violation of state law alone.

Solton (ID 120065) v. Miller · filed 2020-10-05

Violations of state law are not sufficient grounds for relief in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations without a deprivation of federal rights.

Frye v. Bonner · filed 2020-10-07

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights, not violations of state law alone.

STOKES v. PRICE · filed 2020-10-20

“[Section] 1983 merely provides a mechanism for enforcing individual rights ‘secured’ elsewhere, i.e., rights independently ‘secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” ... In the absence of another source of federal jurisdiction, i.e. a federal question or diversity of the parties, the Court cannot adjudicate Plaintiff’s claim that the police violated a New Jersey state statute.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law alone.

(PC) Ramirez v. CDCR - California Corrections · filed 2020-10-21

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide redress for violations of state law alone.

Gurley 290528 v. Hatton · filed 2020-11-04

Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants violated state law therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law.

(PC) Popovich v. Igbinosa · filed 2020-11-05

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights, not state law.

Montanez v. Town of Highland · filed 2020-11-13

Section 1983 is a method for vindicating violations of the United States Constitution and federal statutes, not state laws.

Section 1983 remedies violations of federal law, so failure to follow a state prison policy alone does not support a claim.

Horacek 218347 v. Lebo · filed 2020-11-13

Section 1983 is addressed to remedying violations of federal law, not state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of prison policies alone.

Hardy v. Lott · filed 2020-11-20

However, policy violations do not amount to constitutional violations. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”). Therefore, Mr. Hardy has not stated a claim by alleging that the defendants failed to follow their own policies.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state laws or departmental regulations alone.

Perkins v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-12-15

However, to the extent Plaintiff bases his claim in part on violations of state laws or departmental regulations, he fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of state administrative regulations.

Fuqua v. Harmon · filed 2020-12-17

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiffs contend that the overcrowding at WCRJ violates Kentucky state administrative regulations, they fail to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 remedies violations of federal law; a failure to follow state prison policy alone does not state a claim.

Martin 724371 v. Tanner · filed 2020-12-17

Section 1983 is addressed to remedying violations of federal law, not state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law alone.

Wilcox 223862 v. Mnuchin · filed 2021-01-04

Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of a state law or regulation alone.

Quartman v. Eppers · filed 2021-01-08

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated DOC regulations is not, on its own, legally cognizable under Section 1983 and may not proceed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law or policy alone.

(PC) Ruiz v. Lucas · filed 2021-01-11

Violations of state law or policy do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, and thus, fail to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not remedy a violation of state law unless it causes the deprivation of a federal right.

Miller v. Carter · filed 2021-01-26

42 U.S.C. § 1983 limits the federal court’s analysis to the deprivation of rights secured by the federal “Constitution and laws.” A violation of state law may form the basis for a Section 1983 action but only if that violation causes the deprivation of a right protected by the United States Constitution.

Qualified immunity protects law enforcement officers from liability under § 1983 when they reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause exists.

Howard v. Little Rock Police Dept. · filed 1993-09-15

We also agree with the district court that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. See Gorra v. Hanson, 880 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir. 1989) (qualified immunity protects law enforcement officers when they reasonably but mistakenly conclude probable cause is present).

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from damages under Section 1983 when they reasonably believe they are executing a valid search warrant and leave the mistakenly entered apartment upon discovering their error.

Samuels v. Smith · filed 1993-12-21

Here, there can be no doubt that the officers reasonably believed that their conduct was fully consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The record demonstrates that the officers reasonably believed they were properly executing a narcotics-related search and seizure warrant and that they terminated, their activities and departed the plaintiffs apartment once they realized their mistake. ... Accordingly, the court holds that, under the circumstances presented here, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. They are therefore immune from civil damages liability.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when they could reasonably mistake an inmate’s Arabic speech for conversation rather than protected prayer.

Smith v. Elkins · filed 1994-03-02

He misses the point. Mere knowledge that Smith was a practicing Muslim does not mean that prison officials were able to understand Arabic. We agree with the district court's reasoning and affirm on the issue of qualified immunity.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 mistaken-identity arrest claim when a reasonable officer could believe there was reasonable cause to think the arrestee was the person named in the warrant.

Blackwell v. Barton · filed 1994-09-20

Because a reasonable officer in Barton's position could have believed that there was reasonable cause to believe Blackwell was Melinda Allen, Barton is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects officers who reasonably but mistakenly believe they have probable cause to arrest a person or take a child into custody.

Henderson v. Mohave County · filed 1995-06-06

The officers are entitled to immunity if they "reasonably but mistakenly" believed that they had probable cause to arrest Kathy and to take Korinne into custody.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action is a legal question for the trial court rather than the jury.

Warren v. City of Lincoln, Nebraska James Breen Sandra L. Myers and David M. Beggs · filed 1987-04-17

Because we agree with the en banc decision of the Seventh Circuit, we hold that it is for the trial court in this case to determine whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action is a question of law for the court rather than the jury.

Alfred Garionis, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Harriet Newton and Keith Barr, Appellees/cross-Appellants · filed 1987-08-21

At the outset, we note that qualified immunity is a question of law. ... The District Court submitted the immunity issue to the jury, and this was error.

In a § 1983 suit, a jury should decide whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity when facts material to that defense remain disputed at trial.

Brisk v. City of Miami Beach, Fla. · filed 1989-12-15

In summary, the Court finds that if facts material to the determination of a qualified immunity defense remain in dispute at trial, the court should send to the jury the question of whether a reasonable person could have believed the defendant’s conduct to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the defendant.

A defense of qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action should not be submitted to the jury.

Winter v. Cerro Gordo County Conservation Board · filed 1991-01-09

The trial court erroneously submitted Van Gundy's defense of qualified immunity to the jury.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action is a legal question for the court rather than the jury.

Buffkins v. City of Omaha, Douglas County, Nebraska, a Municipal Corporation Alvin Grigsby And, John Friend · filed 1991-02-15

The district court also erred in submitting the legal question of qualified immunity to the jury.

In a Section 1983 action, disputed facts bearing on qualified immunity may be submitted to a jury.

Anthony v. Baker · filed 1992-12-10

Although a claim of qualified immunity presents a question of law that ordinarily should be resolved by the court, it also contains within it potential issues of fact that may, in appropriate circumstances, be submitted to a jury.

In a § 1983 action seeking only monetary relief, the court decides qualified immunity as a matter of law after the jury resolves disputed facts through special interrogatories.

Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Housing Authority · filed 1993-09-09

We adopt a third alternative, one used by the Second Circuit. The court should submit special interrogatories as to the factual dispute to the jury and then make its qualified immunity decision based upon the answers to the interrogatories. ... At the same time, we limit our holding to cases where monetary relief is the only remedy sought. ... Thus, in light of the above authority, we conclude that the district court erred in allowing the jury to decide the legal component of the qualified immunity test.

In a § 1983 action, a court may decline requested jury interrogatories on qualified immunity when the verdict and jury findings already answer them or their answers are irrelevant to immunity.

Johnson v. Breeden · filed 2002-01-28

In summary, given the jury’s verdict, when read in light of the instructions, and its findings in response to the submitted interrogatories, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to submit the defendants’ requested special interrogatories. The reason is that the answer to each requested special interrogatory was either covered by the verdict and jury findings, or it was irrelevant to the qualified immunity issue in light of the verdict and jury findings.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 excessive force claim is ultimately a question of law for the court to decide.

District of Columbia v. Jackson · filed 2002-11-14

We agree, particularly in light of Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), decided after the trial of this case, that qualified immunity in an excessive force case — as in any other — is ultimately an issue of law for the court to decide.

In a § 1983 suit, the jury resolves disputed historical facts, but the court decides the ultimate question of qualified immunity.

Littrell v. Franklin · filed 2004-11-02

In short, where questions of historical fact exist, the jury must resolve those questions so that the court may make the ultimate legal determination of whether officers’ actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.

In a § 1983 claim, the jury may resolve disputed facts underlying qualified immunity, but the court must decide the ultimate immunity question.

Patricia Littrell, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Daniel Jake Franklin, in His Official and Individual Capacities, Appellee · filed 2004-11-02

Carefully drafted interrogatories allow jurors to decide factual issues and preserve the ultimate legal determination for the court. It is error, however, to submit the ultimate question of qualified immunity to the jury.

In a § 1983 action, an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity when the facts reasonably found by the jury show a violation of clearly established rights.

A. D. v. State of Calif. Highway Patrol · filed 2013-04-03

The district court correctly concluded that, on the facts as the jury found them, Markgraf violated clearly established law. Like the district court, we also are bound by the jury’s findings.

Public officials facing § 1983 damages claims have qualified immunity when they reasonably rely on legal advice, but an official whose conduct was apparently unlawful under preexisting law is not immune.

Village of Lake Barrington v. Hogan · filed 1995-05-02

Applying these standards, we find that a reasonable village president would have relied on the advice of the village attorney that the course of conduct the Village was pursuing was proper and legal, and thus we find immunity applies to Smith. However, we find that in light of the preexisting law the immunity does not extend to attorney Bateman.

An officer may rely on a facially valid arrest warrant against individual liability under § 1983 unless the officer knowingly made false statements or omissions to the issuing judge.

Hansel v. Bisard · filed 1998-12-07

Even assuming that Judge Falahee erred in finding probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction, a judicial error of this type would not subject Deputy Bisard to individual liability under section 1983. Pursuant to the clear standard set forth in Yancey, supra, Deputy Bisard is entitled to rely on a facially valid warrant absent a finding that he knowingly made false statements and omissions to the judge.

An officer who did not obtain a search warrant may rely on its indicia of probable cause when asserting qualified immunity from a § 1983 illegal-search claim.

Sinick v. County of Summit · filed 2003-09-24

The search warrant at issue set forth specific information collected from a confidential informant. The informant was said to have provided information in the past and was described as reliable. These are indicia of probable cause that an officer who did not secure the search warrant is entitled to rely upon.

In a Section 1983 suit, an officer cannot claim qualified immunity based on reliance on counsel when counsel drafted an affidavit from the officer’s report but gave no legal advice.

Melessa v. Randall · filed 2005-02-01

Mr. Shaum simply prepared the affidavit based on Deputy Randall’s own investigative report. Deputy Randall does not allege that Mr. Shaum advised her as to what information to include in the report; nor does she allege any facts from which we could construe Mr. Shaum’s actions as constituting legal advice. Therefore, the “extraordinary circumstances” exception based upon the advice of counsel is simply inapplicable to this case.

An officer cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim by relying on an ordinance whose unconstitutionality the officer should have recognized.

Lawrence v. City of Rawlins, WY · filed 2005-05-06

This is a sufficiently obvious constitutional violation that Mr. Reed should have known about. Mr. Reed, therefore, was not entitled to rely on the ordinance, and qualified immunity is inappropriate.

In a § 1983 claim, officers may receive qualified immunity for relying on a search warrant unless it is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that reliance is unreasonable.

KRL v. Estate of Moore · filed 2008-01-16

We now hold that Moore, Irey and Hall are entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that they relied on the January 11 warrant, which was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to an officer who reasonably relies on another officer’s representations to conclude that probable cause exists for an arrest.

Dull v. West Manchester Township Police Department · filed 2009-03-31

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably rely on the representations of other officers to conclude that probable cause existed for an arrest.

In a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim, factual disputes about an officer’s good faith and reasonable reliance on a prosecutor’s legal advice can prevent qualified immunity at summary judgment.

Kelly v. BOROUGH OF CARLISLE · filed 2011-09-07

Applying the newly adopted standard for evaluating police officer reliance on legal advice, this Court must conclude that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings. Factual disputes bearing on Defendant’s good faith and reasonableness in relying on ADA Birbeck’s legal advice remain outstanding in this matter.

In a § 1983 claim challenging a search authorized by a warrant, qualified immunity turns on whether the officer unreasonably relied on the warrant.

Charlot v. City of Houston · filed 2018-12-10

When a plaintiff challenges a search authorized by warrant, our qualified immunity analysis hinges on whether the defendant unreasonably relied on the warrant. ... Charlot has not demonstrated that the search was so clearly unconstitutional that the defendants were prohibited from relying on the warrant.

Officers sued under § 1983 are shielded from liability for a search when the evidence supports a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate.

Cruse v. Blackburn · filed 2019-06-03

Certainly, as found by the Magistrate Judge, this evidence is sufficient to provide Defendants the “shield of immunity” conferred by the warrant that was issued by a neutral State magistrate.

Qualified good-faith immunity in a Section 1983 action is an affirmative defense that the official must plead.

Satchell v. Dilworth · filed 1984-10-04

Unquestionably, a police officer is protected by a qualified good faith immunity under Sec. 1983. ... However, this immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pled by the official who claims it.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that defendants must specifically plead in a Section 1983 action.

Prescott v. Pritchett · filed 1986-03-12

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which must be specifically asserted by the defendants in a section 1983 action.

A § 1983 plaintiff need not plead facts defeating qualified immunity in the complaint because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense.

Detro v. Roemer · filed 1990-03-21

Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss plaintiffs complaint because it fails to allege facts which would defeat the qualified immunity of defendants. This argument is without merit. Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded, the plaintiff need not anticipate the defense in his complaint.

A defendant in a § 1983 action must timely plead qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, even though it is an immunity from suit.

Jones v. Wells · filed 1993-03-08

The fact that qualified immunity if proved is an "immunity from suit," Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), does not render unnecessary timely pleading.

A defendant in a § 1983 action may raise qualified immunity after answering even if the defense was omitted from a pre-answer motion to dismiss.

English v. Dennis Dyke Terry Pitcher Pamela Withrow and Linda Flanagan · filed 1994-05-13

We conclude, therefore, that defendants’ qüalified immunity defense may still be raised post-answer and' the District Court’s order to the contrary is erroneous.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that a defendant official must plead in a Section 1983 action.

Reeve v. Steven A. Oliver City of Des Moines, Ia William Moulder · filed 1994-11-29

The parties’ references to qualified immunity are not relevant at this point in the litigation. "Qualified or 'good faith’ immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official."

In a § 1983 action, discovery may be suspended while defendants brief and seek summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Ethnic Awareness Organization v. Gagnon · filed 1983-08-16

This is an appropriate case in which to suspend discovery, pending resolution of the immunity issue. ... Therefore, the defendants’ motion to suspend discovery for a period adequate to brief , the issue of their alleged immunity is granted.

In a § 1983 action, discovery before resolution of a fact-dependent qualified immunity defense must be limited to facts needed to decide that defense.

Maxey v. Fulton · filed 1989-11-29

Given this uncertainty in the record and the policy interest in deferring discovery on the merits until after the question of qualified immunity is resolved, we hold that the district court's order did not adequately limit permissible discovery to the question of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects government officers sued under Section 1983 from the expense and delay of discovery.

Fitzgerald v. Patrick · filed 1991-03-08

The purpose in moving for summary judgment, under the privilege of qualified immunity, is to avoid having government officers subjected to the expense and delay of discovery.

In a Section 1983 suit, discovery against officials asserting qualified immunity must be limited to facts needed to resolve that defense.

Gaines v. James H. Davis, Mike Steinhauser, Movant-Appellant · filed 1991-05-15

In this case, the district court’s October 15 Order allowing Plaintiffs to take the depositions of Davis and Steinhauser is overly broad because it failed to limit the scope of the depositions to the issue of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim may be premature to decide at the pleading stage when facts bearing on the challenged search require discovery.

McKenna v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1991-08-20

It is thus premature to determine at this stage whether or not defendants are entitled to qualified immunity regarding McKenna’s full body cavity search.

In a § 1983 suit, a qualified immunity defense severely limits discovery, and the plaintiff must make a specific showing tied to that defense before discovery may proceed.

Morgan v. Frank Morgan, and Jessica Brewer · filed 1991-12-31

When qualified immunity is asserted as a defense, discovery is severely limited. For discovery to proceed under these circumstances, Mr. Morgan would have to make a specific showing tied to defendants' claim of qualified immunity. This he failed to do.

In a § 1983 suit, a qualified-immunity defense does not require a stay of all discovery when disputed facts about officials’ conduct must be developed to decide immunity.

Williams v. County of Sullivan · filed 1994-07-26

A stay of all discovery under such circumstances is inconsistent with expeditious adjudication of the issue of qualified immunity pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 1.

In a § 1983 suit, a court may condition a discovery stay on officials reimbursing expenses caused by their untimely qualified-immunity motion.

Cole v. Ruidoso Municipal Schools · filed 1994-12-29

Here, because the defendants' last-minute filing of their motions on qualified immunity caused the plaintiff to incur unnecessary expenses (including the cost of an unrefundable plane ticket), the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in requiring reimbursement of some of these expenses as a condition of granting the stay of discovery.

A § 1983 plaintiff facing qualified immunity must plead particular facts that, if true, show a violation of clearly established rights before discovery may proceed.

George WICKS, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MISSISSIPPI STATE EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Et Al., Defendants, Hazel Cook, Defenda · filed 1995-01-06

Discovery under Lion Boulos, however, must not proceed until the district court first finds that the plaintiffs pleadings assert facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity generally stays discovery until immunity is resolved, but necessary discovery may be allowed if tailored to the immunity question.

McIntosh v. Denver, City And Co · filed 1996-02-29

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the district court should stay discovery until the immunity issue is resolved. Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332, 336 (10th Cir. 1992). In some instances, however, “discovery may be necessary before a motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds can be resolved.” Id. If discovery is allowed, it should be “tailored specifically to the immunity question.” Id. Here, discovery was necessary to decide Mr. McIntosh’s equal protection claim.

In a § 1983 damages suit, qualified immunity protects officials from further discovery when the existing record entitles them to summary judgment.

Doe v. Leach · filed 1999-07-15

We hold that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity and that the same qualified immunity protected them from any further discovery.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action protects officials from discovery when summary judgment in their favor is appropriate.

Hardiman v. Fields · filed 1999-11-08

This court has observed that the defense of “qualified immunity [in a § 1983 action] entails a right to have suits dismissed at ‘the earliest possible stage of the litigation,’ sparing officials not only from liability but also from discovery and trial.” ... Because summary judgment against Hardiman was appropriate in this case, we conclude that Hardiman was not entitled to discovery, and that no error flowed from the district court’s failure to consider Hardiman’s discovery request.

A court must address a qualified immunity defense raised before discovery in a § 1983 action before allowing discovery to proceed.

Skousen v. Brighton High School, Paul Rambo, a Michigan State Trooper · filed 2002-09-26

We now conclude that the district court erred in denying the motion, both because the defense of qualified immunity is a threshold question, which, if properly raised prior to discovery, the district court has a duty to address prior to discovery, and because on the undisputed facts of this case defendant Rambo is clearly entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 action, a court may stay discovery while it decides qualified immunity on summary judgment.

Ford v. Fletes · filed 2003-01-22

The district court did not abuse its discretion in staying discovery pending a determination of qualified immunity on summary judgment.

In a § 1983 suit, a court may stay discovery while it resolves a qualified immunity motion when the plaintiff has not justified discovery.

Zamora v. City of Belen · filed 2005-04-04

Zamora has not adequately explained why the Court should not follow the Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit’s instructions to limit or stay discovery until it rules on assertions of qualified immunity. Accordingly, Valdez is entitled by law to a stay of proceedings until the Court resolves the immunity issues.

Discovery in a § 1983 suit may be stayed while qualified immunity is determined.

Reeves v. Wood · filed 2006-11-17

Further, the discovery stay was authorized pending determination related to qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 suit, a court may deny discovery on remand in view of the defendants’ qualified immunity defense.

Kittelson v. Nafrawi · filed 2007-07-06

Finally, the district court did not abuse its sound discretion in denying Kittelson’s motions for discovery on remand in view of the defendants’ assertion of the defense of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, discovery on qualified immunity cannot proceed until the district court finds that the complaint alleges facts which, if true, would overcome the defense.

Winstead v. Box · filed 2011-03-21

Therefore, we have held that discovery “must not proceed until the district court first finds that the plaintiff’s pleadings assert facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity.” ... The district court did not make this threshold finding.

In a § 1983 suit, a qualified immunity defense can support denying a motion to compel discovery.

Urias v. Hudson · filed 2011-06-21

The court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Urias’s motion, given that the defendants had raised a qualified immunity defense.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity heightens the showing needed to obtain discovery before summary judgment, though limited discovery may still be allowed.

Gomez v. Martin · filed 2014-11-17

This burden is somewhat elevated in qualified immunity cases because officials have “a right, not merely to avoid standing trial, but also to avoid the burdens of such pretrial matters as discovery.” Medina v. ... Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1127 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). Although an assertion of qualified immunity heightens the Rule 56(d) burden, “limited discovery may sometimes be necessary before the district court can resolve a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593 n.14 (1998).

When a defendant raises qualified immunity to a § 1983 claim, the court may stay discovery throughout the case if discovery on overlapping claims would defeat that protection.

Martin v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2015-11-09

Ordinarily, once a defendant files a motion for summary judgment that raises qualified immunity, the Court should stay discovery. ... If the Court stayed only the § 1983 claim, the stay would not mean much, if anything. ... Unless the Court stays the entire case, Padilla will not get the stay that qualified immunity law entitles him to.

In a Section 1983 action, the court may stay discovery while it resolves an asserted qualified immunity defense.

Maday v. Dooley · filed 2018-03-23

All discovery in this case except as addressed below is stayed until after resolution of defendants’ qualified immunity defense.

A defendant’s qualified immunity claim in a Section 1983 suit may be resolved before discovery, and a plaintiff opposing a supported summary judgment motion must identify evidence that could defeat it.

Johnson v. Moody · filed 2018-09-10

Plaintiffs’ argument ignores a critical procedural fact -- Defendants’ summary judgment motion included a claim that the individual Police Department Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 damage claims in Counts I and II. ... The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying this request, consistent with the teaching of Crawford-El v. Britton and other Supreme Court and circuit court precedents.

A court may stay discovery in a § 1983 damages suit against an official while resolving a qualified immunity defense.

Thomas v. Rogers · filed 2019-10-10

Therefore, considering the String Cheese factors together, as well as the strong interest of resolving immunity questions before subjecting government officials to the vicissitudes of litigation, a stay of discovery is appropriate in this case.

In a Section 1983 suit, a court may stay discovery while it resolves a defendant’s qualified immunity motion when discovery is unnecessary to respond to the motion.

Lunsford v. Davidson County Sheriffs Office · filed 2019-11-14

The defendants’ motion to stay discovery will be granted. Although the court may allow discovery if it is needed to resolve the issue of qualified immunity, see, e.g., English v. Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086, 1091 (6th Cir. 1994), Lunsford has not alleged that he requires discovery to respond to Ramsey and Jones’s motion to dismiss; in fact, he has already responded to that motion in the absence of discovery.

In a § 1983 suit, discovery may be limited to facts needed to decide a defendant’s qualified immunity defense.

Hill v. Davis · filed 2020-01-31

Therefore, the undersigned will order limited discovery relevant to the issue of Director Davis’s qualified immunity defense.

A court may stay discovery in a Section 1983 suit while it considers a qualified immunity defense.

East v. Dooley · filed 2020-02-03

Indeed, the qualified immunity doctrine has as its “driving force” “a desire to ensure that ‘insubstantial claims’ against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery.” ... ORDERED that the State Defendants’ motions for protective order against discovery prior to this Court ruling on qualified immunity, Doc. 33, and for leave to file brief exceeding page/word limit,.Doc. 38, both are granted.

Discovery in a Section 1983 action may be stayed while defendants appeal the denial of qualified immunity, including when the appeal affects the entire case.

Mitchell v. Duval County Jail/Doc. PDF · filed 2020-02-14

Typically, courts stay discovery in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions during an interlocutory appeal based on qualified immunity. ... Here, Defendants accurately describe this case as one in which “the entire case” should be stayed pending the outcome of the interlocutory appeal, Response at 1, and this Court agrees.

Discovery on § 1983 claims is stayed while the court resolves a defendant’s qualified immunity defense.

Skinner v. Ard · filed 2020-05-07

A stay is mandated as to the federal claims to which qualified immunity applies.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim does not shield officials from discovery as nonparty fact witnesses about separate claims against other defendants.

Waid v. Earley · filed 2020-06-02

But ordering Snyder and Dillon to comply with discovery requests as non-party fact witnesses to events regarding wholly separate claims against different defendants does not, in the abstract, interfere with their immunity.

Qualified immunity permits limited discovery in a § 1983 action while an appeal of its denial is pending, so long as the discovery does not disrupt the appealing defendants.

Walker v. Stroman · filed 2020-06-30

This Court reiterates the Supreme Court’s emphasis on “disruptive discovery” to stress that, in the process of resolving qualified immunity, limited discovery can be allowed.