42 U.S.C. § 1983

Public officials sued under § 1983 are immune when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Esmeralda v. Partin · filed 1994-07-07

Public officials are immune under § 1983 for alleged constitutional torts “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when a reasonable officer with the same information could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful.

Przyborowski v. Howard · filed 1994-07-07

A reasonable officer in Detective Howard’s shoes could have believed that his actions in returning the letter to Washington, Georgia, law enforcement authorities without a prior hearing, was lawful in light of the information he possessed.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable officer would have known.

Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. Baer · filed 1994-07-08

We hold that the conduct of the officers did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable officer would have known, and the officers therefore are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for disclosing student records when a reasonable official would have recognized that the disclosure violated clearly established FERPA rights.

Brown v. City of Oneonta, NY · filed 1994-07-18

Thus, the court stands by its original determination that qualified immunity does not apply to defendants Wilson and Hunt in regard to their alleged FERPA violation.

Officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless home search.

O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids William Hegarty Daniel Ostapowicz · filed 1994-07-18

Qualified immunity would protect Hegarty and Ostapowicz from suit if it were objectively reasonable for the officers to conclude, given the information they had, that immediate action to conduct the probes without first obtaining a warrant was necessary — that is, that exigent circumstances existed to excuse their failure to obtain a warrant before entering O’Brien’s residence. ... Consequently, Hegarty and Ostapowicz were entitled to qualified immunity and the district court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law against them.

Section 1983 permits damages against individual defendants for unconstitutional terminations, subject to qualified immunity.

Aldrich v. Knab · filed 1994-07-19

The Court holds that the individual defendants shall be liable for any damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and 1985 only as to the termination of Alexis Edwards, and are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the other terminations.

Officials sued under § 1983 for retaining records of unsubstantiated child abuse have qualified immunity when existing law did not make the conduct’s unlawfulness apparent.

Hodge v. Jones · filed 1994-07-19

On the facts of this case and in light of preexisting law, we cannot say that the purported unlawfulness of retaining records of unsubstantiated child abuse charges should have been apparent to Defendants. ... Because qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law," Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), that defense was improvidently denied below.

In a § 1983 action, state officials are entitled to qualified immunity for retaining confidential reports of unsubstantiated child abuse when their conduct violates no clearly established federal right.

Hodge ex rel. Hodge v. Jones · filed 1994-07-19

We reverse, holding that, because Defendants’ actions violated no clearly established federal constitutional or statutory right, the district court erroneously found for Plaintiffs on the issue of liability and denied Defendants the benefit of qualified immunity, 812 F.Supp. 593.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for an officer who could reasonably have believed his conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Feldman v. Davis · filed 1994-07-20

In determining whether an officer is protected by qualified immunity, the district court must find, in light of clearly established principles governing the conduct in question, whether the officer could reasonably have believed that his conduct was lawful. ... Therefore, the district court did not err when it granted Davis' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can bar a § 1983 excessive force claim against a police officer.

District of Columbia v. Evans · filed 1994-07-21

Without question, then, qualified immunity can provide a valid defense to a § 1983 claim for excessive use of force.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from damages when controlling law did not clearly establish that relying on tainted evidence at a prison disciplinary hearing violated due process.

Walsh v. Finn · filed 1994-07-22

Although this Court’s determination that the evidence relied upon by Defendant did not constitute “some evidence” was premised on the evidence in question being tainted evidence rather than on the fact that the evidence was just an unsworn misbehavior report, the Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity since neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has held that tainted evidence does not meet the “some evidence” standard.

A prison official is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

J.R. Wilkerson v. Charles D. Marshall, Warden · filed 1994-07-26

Accordingly, because the law on the constitutionality of prisoner pen pal solicitations was not clearly established at the time Marshall imposed the ban, Marshall was immune from suit.

Government officials may receive qualified immunity from damages in a Section 1983 action when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Stack v. Killian · filed 1994-07-26

We have carefully reviewed the plaintiffs' various challenges to the district judge's ruling and conclude, as he did, that defendants Frank and Donch are entitled to qualified immunity under Harlow.

Individual police officers are qualifiedly immune from liability under § 1983 when the asserted constitutional rights were not clearly established under the circumstances.

Smith v. City of Elyria · filed 1994-07-28

Because plaintiffs’ substantive due process and equal protection rights were not clearly established under these circumstances, the Court finds that the individual police officers are qualifiedly immune from individual liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when no objectively reasonable officer could believe their conduct complied with the Fourth Amendment.

Hummel-Jones v. Strope · filed 1994-07-28

We believe that no objectively reasonable law enforcement officers could have believed that this search comported with the Fourth Amendment's basic requirement of reasonableness. The appellees are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Municipal defendants in Section 1983 actions cannot invoke qualified immunity.

Chipman v. City of Florence · filed 1994-08-02

The municipalities, however, may not invoke the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Defendants are qualifiedly immune from a Section 1983 claim when their conduct does not violate clearly established principles of which a reasonable person should have known.

Malmin v. Board of Com'rs of Idaho State Bar · filed 1994-08-02

We accept the district court's reasoning that the defendants were immune from the Sec. 1985(3) conspiracy claims and the Sec. 1983 due process and equal protection claims because their decision to issue the letter did not violate clearly established principles of which a reasonable person should have known.

In a Section 1983 action, raising qualified immunity shifts to the plaintiff the burden to show facts and law establishing that the defendant is not entitled to immunity.

Palllottino v. City Of Rio Rancho · filed 1994-08-04

Once a defendant to a Sec. 1983 action raises a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show both facts and law to establish that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Once a defendant raises qualified immunity in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must show facts and law establishing that the defendant is not entitled to it.

Pallottino v. City of Rio Rancho · filed 1994-08-04

Once a defendant to a § 1983 action raises a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show both facts and law to establish that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A public official sued under § 1983 lacks qualified immunity for retaliating against an employee who disclosed possible misconduct by a public official when the unlawfulness was clear to a reasonable official.

Schultea v. Wood · filed 1994-08-08

No reasonable public official in 1992 could have assumed that he could retaliate against an employee because that employee disclosed instances of misconduct by a public official.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a Section 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when no reasonable officer could believe the arrest was lawful.

Edwards v. Cabrera · filed 1994-08-10

By arresting Walter Edwards without probable cause, defendants Cabrera and Redmond may have been merely incompetent, or they may have known of the illegality of the arrest. Either way, they are not entitled to qualified immunity, because no reasonable officer, knowing what defendants knew, could have believed that arresting Walter Edwards was lawful under those circumstances.

State officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they had an objectively reasonable basis for their conduct and the plaintiff fails to prove violation of a clearly established right.

Frank J. Matylinsky, Jr. v. Angelone · filed 1994-08-10

As Zimmerlee provided defendants with an objectively reasonable basis for relying on the confidential informant's testimony and Matylinsky has failed to prove the violation of a clearly established right, the district court properly held the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they violated no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Jack Cummings, Ralph Best, Billy Rodgers, Bruce Henry and Terry M. Walters v. Dekalb County, James Pierce, Cliff Pruett · filed 1994-08-11

Because we have determined that the individual defendants, Conley, Pruett and Pierce, violated no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of the plaintiffs, these individual defendants are entitled to federal qualified immunity from suit.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right that a reasonable officer would have known.

Sellers v. Baer · filed 1994-08-16

We hold that the conduct of the officers did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable officer would have known, and the officers therefore are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against prison officials when the evidence does not show they knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.

Haavisto v. Perpich · filed 1994-08-19

The record does not contain evidence to support the conclusion that Pung and Erickson knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals in holding that the defense of qualified immunity bars, as a matter of law, Haavisto’s 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 claims against Pung and Erickson.

Officials sued individually under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the protected right or applicable exception was unclear at the time, or when they could reasonably believe their conduct was lawful.

Oliver Schools, Inc. v. Foley · filed 1994-08-24

Government officials sued in their individual capacities are immune from suit where (1) it was unclear at the time the official acted that the plaintiffs interests were protected by a federal statute or the Constitution; (2) it was unclear at the time of the acts that an exception did not permit the acts; or (3) that it was objectively reasonable for the official to believe that he was not violating the plaintiffs protected rights.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to a police officer whose conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right under the circumstances known to the officer.

Alto v. City of Chicago · filed 1994-08-25

Therefore, given the potential for dangerous conflict and the failure of plaintiff to demonstrate that a “clearly established” right was violated, Bradley is entitled to qualified immunity for the drawing of his weapon when entering Alto’s home.

Public officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless specific allegations show that they violated clearly established constitutional law.

Joseph M. Schultea, Sr. v. David Robert Wood, David Robert Wood, Homer Ford, W.F. "Slim" Plagens, and Warren K. Driver · filed 1994-08-26

As public officials, the Defendants “are entitled to qualified immunity from suit under section 1983 unless it is shown by specific allegations that [they] violated clearly established constitutional law.”

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity from civil damages to an officer when the law underlying the claimed violation was not clearly established at the time.

Dahood v. Racicot · filed 1994-08-26

If the law that forms the basis of the suit was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, a defendant officer is protected from liability for civil damages.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known his affirmative conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right to protection from danger he created or increased.

Pinder v. Johnson · filed 1994-08-29

The facts alleged suggest that a reasonable person in Officer Johnson’s position would have known that he was violating this clearly established right when he assured Carol Pin-der, with full knowledge of Pittman’s violent threats and Pinder’s reliance upon his words, that Pittman would remain in custody, and then charged Pittman with minor offenses for which he was unlikely to be kept in custody. Accordingly, we find that Officer Johnson is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Individual defendants sued under § 1983 in their individual capacity are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violated clearly-established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person knew or should have known.

Garza v. Galena Park Independent School District · filed 1994-09-01

Individual defendants sued in their individual capacity are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violated clearly-established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person knew or should have known at the time of the incident in question. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). As discussed above, no constitutional right was involved in this case and the individual defendants are protected by qualified immunity.

Officers sued individually under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when existing case law did not clearly establish that materially similar suicide-prevention measures were constitutionally inadequate.

Belcher v. City of Foley · filed 1994-09-02

After reviewing the case law at the time of Mr. Belcher's death, we conclude that it did not clearly establish that measures materially similar to those taken by Corporal McKinley, Officer Roberson, and Officer Riebeling, to prevent Mr. Belcher from committing suicide, were so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference. Therefore, these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities.

Officials sued under § 1983 in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct constituted deliberate indifference.

Belcher v. City of Foley · filed 1994-09-02

Because we conclude that, at the time of Mr. Belcher’s suicide, the law did not clearly establish that the conduct of the individual defendants in this case constituted deliberate indifference toward Mr. Belcher, we reverse the denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

An officer cannot claim qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit for a warrantless home arrest that violates clearly established Fourth Amendment law, even if state law authorizes the arrest.

Howard v. Jan Dickerson, and Charles Milton, Keith Purdue · filed 1994-09-07

Any New Mexico law which might have condoned Officer Dickerson’s actions will not protect him from the consequences of his clearly illegal conduct. The district court, therefore, properly denied Officer Dickerson’s claim of qualified immunity and rejected his motions for summary judgment and dismissal on the Fourth Amendment claim.

Section 1983 damages claims against prison officials are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established by Supreme Court or circuit precedent.

Russell v. Selsky · filed 1994-09-07

We conclude that in the absence of Supreme Court or Second Circuit precedents prescribing a right to have separate review and hearing officers in a state prison disciplinary hearing, there is no such clearly established right that would deprive McGinnis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to an officer who reasonably could have believed there was probable cause to seek an arrest warrant.

Maltby v. Winston · filed 1994-09-14

Thus, we believe that a reasonable officer in Inspector Winston's position, looking to our case-law on probable cause generally, could have concluded that Mr. Maltby committed the crime. Consequently, Inspector Winston is entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 false arrest suit, an officer has qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to arrest.

Maltby v. Winston · filed 1994-09-14

Nevertheless, we believe that, even in the face of these circumstances, a reasonable officer could have believed he had probable cause. ... Consequently, Inspector Winston is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established enough for a reasonable person in their position to know the conduct violated it.

Littek v. Virginia Parole Board John Greco Augusta County Jail Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Vi · filed 1994-09-15

Rather, we find that the right is not so clearly established that a reasonable person acting in the Defendants' positions would have known that their conduct violated any liberty interest. The Defendants, therefore, are protected by qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the law at the time did not clearly establish that their alleged conduct was unlawful.

Kernats v. O'Sullivan · filed 1994-09-16

Because the case law had not clearly established the unlawfulness of O’Sullivan’s alleged actions as of the time he acted, O’Sullivan was entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer facing an unlawful arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest was lawful under clearly established law.

Babb v. Dorman · filed 1994-09-19

We further hold that, in light of the facts alleged and the established law, a reasonable officer could have believed that he was justified in holding the appellant for public intoxication.

An official sued under § 1983 cannot obtain qualified immunity for violating clearly established law merely because that law is complex.

Garcia v. Reeves County, Tex. · filed 1994-09-19

However, he is not immune from the consequences of violating complex laws, if they are clearly established, as this one has been since at least 1981.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable official in their position should have known their conduct violated a clearly established right.

Roberts v. City of Newport News Ed Maroney, City Manager Caroline Hurt, Director of Personnel L. L. Orie, Fire Chi · filed 1994-09-23

Therefore, we find that a reasonable person in the Appellants' position should have known that their conduct infringed on a clearly established right. Thus, the district court properly found that the qualified immunity defense was inapplicable under these circumstances.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 retaliation claim when reasonable officials could disagree whether withholding a discretionary benefit from a nonemployee for exercising First Amendment rights violates clearly established law.

Wimer v. Holzapfel · filed 1994-09-27

Given proper supporting evidence, it may be possible that a plaintiff in Wimer’s situation could bring a colorable § 1983 action for improper retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights. ... Since reasonable public officials could disagree, qualified immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claim that he was removed from the rotational list for exercise of his First Amendment rights.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity only if their conduct did not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable official would have known.

Tindal v. Montgomery County Commission · filed 1994-09-27

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions, but only to the extent that those officials' actions do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

A defendant asserting qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action bears the burden of establishing that his conduct was reasonable, even if it may have violated a constitutional standard.

Sandschulte v. City of Black Diamond · filed 1994-09-27

The burden, however, is on Olson to establish that his conduct was reasonable even though it might have violated constitutional standard.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer could have believed the challenged conduct lawful in light of clearly established law at the time.

Imperiale v. Pierce County, a Municipal Corporation, Under the Laws of the State of Washington · filed 1994-09-28

Although appellant has asserted a broad range of claims against all four defendants in this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action, his case stands or falls on his Fourth Amendment challenge to Deputy Sheriff Thrash's initial warrantless entry. We hold that the district court did not err in granting Thrash qualified immunity, because a reasonable officer could have believed this entry into Imperiale's house to be lawful in light of clearly established law as of August 1989.

A municipality cannot assert qualified immunity as a defense to a Section 1983 claim, even when individual defendants are entitled to that defense.

Tenenbaum Ex Rel. Tenenbaum v. Williams · filed 1994-09-30

However, those defendants who were sued individually with respect to the medical examination are entitled, as a matter of law, to qualified immunity. That defense is not available to the defendant City of New York.

A state official whose conduct is objectively reasonable is protected by qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim unless the plaintiff shows a clearly established right the official should have known.

Bonds v. Missouri Department of Mental Health · filed 1994-10-04

Since Count III asserts a violation of rights by Dr. Bowers only, we need only consider whether Bonds states a claim for damages under § 1983 against Dr. Bowers. ... Dr. Bowers’ conduct satisfied the standard of “objective reasonableness.” In order to overcome the defense of qualified immunity, it is incumbent on Bonds to show “the existence of a clear, factually-defined, well-recognized right of which a reasonable [person] should have known.”

Qualified immunity can defeat a § 1983 claim against prison officials.

Turner-Bey v. Joseph Wilson, Assistant Warden James v. Peguese, Captain Howard Grant, Lieutenant · filed 1994-10-05

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) complaint. ... Our affirmance is based on the district court's qualified immunity analysis.

A defendant in a § 1983 action cannot claim qualified immunity based on ignorance of the law governing his conduct when the plaintiff had a clearly established constitutional right.

Landrum v. Al Gomez · filed 1994-10-05

Landrum had a clearly established constitutional right to marry, see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-96 (1987), and he had a means of exercising that right without infringing upon any legitimate penological concerns regarding security, see Cal. Family Code Sec. 502. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's conclusion that Gomez's lack of knowledge did not entitle him to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim if, on the plaintiff’s supported facts, it was objectively reasonable to believe the challenged conduct lawful under clearly established law and the information then available.

Osipova v. Dinkins · filed 1994-10-06

Thus, Martinez is only entitled to qualified immunity if, assuming the facts as set forth by the plaintiff, it was objectively reasonable for Martinez to believe, in light of clearly established law and the information he possessed at the time, that his warrantless entry into Osipova’s apartment was lawful. ... Accordingly, Martinez is entitled to qualified immunity.

An official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity if the law was not clearly established or, although clearly established, the official did not violate it.

Shaw v. Oconee County, Ga. · filed 1994-10-11

Under this analysis, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if either (1) the law was not clearly established, or (2) the law was clearly established but the defendant did not violate the law.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional rights they allegedly violated were not clearly established.

Chipman v. City of Florence · filed 1994-10-12

As the constitutional rights which the defendant law enforcement officers allegedly violated in this ease are not clearly established, those defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 retaliation claim, a plaintiff opposing qualified immunity must put forward specific, non-conclusory factual allegations establishing retaliatory intent.

Blue v. Koren · filed 1994-10-13

We hold that to overcome Defendant’s qualified immunity defense, Plaintiff must put forward specific, non-conclusory factual allegations that establish retaliatory intent.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for a warrantless home arrest when the right was clearly established and a reasonable officer would know the arrest was unreasonable, particularly where the offense is minor, a warrant is available, and exigent circumstances are slight or absent.

Kuklane v. Whittington · filed 1994-10-17

Based on the law, and the testimony, the right at issue here was clearly established and a reasonable officer would have known that breaking into a home to arrest a person for violating the noise ordinance was unreasonable, particularly when a warrant could be obtained and the exigent circumstances were minor or non-existent. Hence, the jury properly found that Whitting ton was not entitled to qualified immunity for his role in the warrantless arrest of Kuklane.

An arresting officer may assert qualified immunity against a § 1983 damages claim for arrest without probable cause if a reasonable officer could believe probable cause existed or reasonable officers could disagree about it.

Flor v. Franklin, No. Cv 92 0058957 (Oct. 18, 1994) · filed 1994-10-18

"An arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a suit for damages on a claim for arrest without probable cause if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met."

Section 1983 defendants are qualifiedly immune from a Fourth Amendment arrest claim when an objectively reasonable officer in their position would have found probable cause to arrest.

McIntyre v. City of Newport Beach · filed 1994-10-21

Appellant argues in his reply brief the that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. We disagree. As the district court found, based on the undisputed facts, an objectively reasonable officer, similarly situated, would have found probable cause to arrest plaintiff.

A public official has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when no clearly established constitutional right forbade the challenged conduct.

Harrison v. Humphreys · filed 1994-10-24

Because there is no clearly established right that Humphreys should have known he was violating, we must REVERSE the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Humphreys.

Officers are not immune from a Section 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when their belief that the arrest was lawful was not objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Langevine v. District of Columbia · filed 1994-10-24

Accepting, as we must, the appellant's testimony that she did no more than calmly (albeit repeatedly) ask the officers for an explanation of why she had been stopped, we hold that even if the officers believed in good faith that the appellant was engaging in or about to engage in disorderly conduct, that belief was not objectively reasonable in light of the applicable law. ... Consequently, we reject the officers' claim of immunity to the constitutional and common law tort claims. See Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S.Ct. 534, 537 (1991) (for immunity from Sec. 1983 suit, officer must establish that, in light of clearly established law, it was objectively reasonable to believe that arrest was lawful); Etheredge v. District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 908, 918 (for immunity from common law false imprisonment and false arrest suit officer must establish both objectively reasonable and good faith belief that arrest was lawful).

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Griffith v. Truette · filed 1994-10-24

Rather, it is a civil action in which defendants are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity unless they violated one of the Griffith’s clearly established constitutional rights. Since even now reasonable lawyers and judges can disagree as to the applicability of Whitehead’s holding here, it follows that defendants cannot be held to have known the scope of its dictate on January 11, 1990.

In a § 1983 false arrest suit, an officer may receive qualified immunity for reasonably relying on another officer’s report of an outstanding arrest warrant unless circumstances cast doubt on that report.

Hardiman v. Charles Ford and Bernard Richter · filed 1994-10-25

Thus, absent unusual circumstances that would indicate to the defendants that Officer Fitzsimmons' information could not be trusted, the defendants could presume there was in fact an outstanding warrant for Hardiman's arrest and therefore be accorded immunity for their good faith reliance.

Public officials are immune from § 1983 suits when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Weaver v. Brenner · filed 1994-10-26

The balance struck under the doctrine of qualified immunity has been formulated as a rule: public officials are immune from Sec. 1983 civil rights suits brought by an aggrieved citizen when their "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Qualified immunity may shield an official from a § 1983 claim despite a clearly established right if the official reasonably believed the challenged conduct was lawful.

Weaver v. Brenner · filed 1994-10-26

The defendants are still entitled to qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their actions were lawful.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from monetary liability under § 1983 when his conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Dean v. Earle · filed 1994-10-28

Thus, Officer Ward did not violate Dean’s clearly established constitutional rights and is immune from monetary liability under § 1983.

A prison official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when a reasonable official would have known that allowing law library access did not justify denying an inmate regular outdoor exercise.

Allen v. City & County Of Honolulu · filed 1994-10-28

Since a reasonable prison official should have known that he could not deprive Allen of one simply because he permitted Allen to exercise the other, Salgado is not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.

Government administrators are entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 retaliation suit when the plaintiff fails to present specific, nonconclusory facts that they acted to punish protected speech.

Barbara Propst and Franklin M. Propst v. Donald L. Bitzer, Morton W. Weir, Judith S. Liebman, and Robert M. Berdahl · filed 1994-11-01

The administrators are therefore entitled to qualified immunity from his suit, just as they were from Barbara’s.

Section 1983 does not afford prison officials qualified immunity for a body cavity search of a visitor when a reasonable officer could not have believed the available facts justified searching her body cavities.

Spear v. Sowders · filed 1994-11-08

Given the information available, a reasonable person could not have concluded that there was a reasonable probability that contraband would be found in her body cavities, so qualified immunity does not apply.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot defeat qualified immunity by alleging only a broad, clearly established constitutional right; the right must be sufficiently particularized.

Bakalis v. Jenni Golembeski Mark R. Stephens Merrill Becker James Durkin · filed 1994-11-08

However, a plaintiff may not escape the doctrine of qualified immunity by alleging violation of a clearly established, but very broad, constitutional right.

A supervisor who takes no action after receiving complaints of unlawful workplace harassment is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim on that basis.

BATOR v. STATE OF HAWAII · filed 1994-11-08

Even if the contours of a supervisor's responsibility are uncertain, complete inaction in the face of claimed harassment cannot be objectively reasonable conduct entitling a supervisor to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 claim against an officer asserting qualified immunity, the plaintiff must plead particular facts establishing a right to recovery and negating the immunity defense.

Guidry v. Jefferson County Detention Center · filed 1994-11-14

When a government official claims immunity, plaintiff must satisfy a heightened pleading standard. Plaintiff must allege with sufficient particularity all material facts establishing his right to recovery, including facts which negate the official’s immunity defense.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from a public employee’s speech claim when the speech’s protection was not clearly established at the time of termination.

Norton v. Napper · filed 1994-11-14

Hence it was not "clearly established" at the time of Norton's termination that his workplace speech was protected by the First Amendment.

A public official sued under § 1983 has qualified immunity from damages when the official could not reasonably have known that the conduct violated the claimant’s rights.

Amato v. Office of Com'r of Securities · filed 1994-11-15

We hold that Stansbury could not reasonably be expected to know that his action violated Amato's rights. Therefore, his action is shielded by qualified immunity. ... Amato alleged in his Amended Petition "(t)hat said acts of defendants also constitute deprivation of petitioner's civil rights in violation of state and federal constitutional and statutory rights ...," and he argues in brief that he "is entitled to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of his civil rights." Moresi is applicable.

Officials may be entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim even if they violated the plaintiffs’ rights.

Waste Conversion, Inc. v. Sims · filed 1994-11-15

Even if defendants did violate plaintiffs rights, we would find that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers retain qualified immunity from a § 1983 warrant challenge when correcting alleged false statements and omissions would still leave probable cause.

Mary Velardi and Frances Velardi v. Cornelius R. Walsh, Jr. And Robert L. Boek · filed 1994-11-15

Disputed issues are not material if, after crossing out any allegedly false information and supplying any omitted facts, the “corrected affidavit” would have supported a finding of probable cause.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 action if their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Song v. Bob Miller · filed 1994-11-18

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity in a Sec. 1983 action if their conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

In a Section 1983 action, a public official receives qualified immunity if the official objectively could have believed the conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Lauranzano v. D. Umfleet, S. Hubbard, and D.L. Arcamone · filed 1994-11-22

When a public official 2 asserts qualified immunity from liability in a Section 1983 action, the district court must determine whether, in light of clearly established principles governing the conduct in question, the official objectively could have believed that his conduct was lawful.

Section 1983 does not shield an official through qualified immunity when the official’s conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Kelly v. Foti · filed 1994-11-23

In light of the strong precedent limiting the legality of strip searches and the uncon-troverted evidence regarding Ms. Kelly’s demeanor, the court concludes that it was not objectively reasonable to subject her to a strip search. Thus, the court will deny the Sheriffs motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not give prison officers qualified immunity from a prisoner’s deprivation-of-clothing claim when that claim is intertwined with alleged excessive force and the evidence raises a question whether their conduct was malicious and sadistic.

Wilkins v. Moore · filed 1994-11-25

Because the "excessive force" and "conditions-of-confinement" claims in this case are so analytically and factually intertwined, the plaintiff's charges require consideration of the evidence relating to both claims as a continuous course of conduct. 40 Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity on the claim asserted in count 2.

In § 1983 excessive-force claims, an officer has qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed the alleged force objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Otha Rowland, Jr. v. B.M. Perry · filed 1994-11-29

The inquiry on qualified immunity is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the use of force alleged was objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for prison officials who reasonably believed a prisoner transfer serving legitimate penological goals was lawful.

SCHROEDER v. McDONALD · filed 1994-11-29

Accordingly, we conclude that defendants were advancing legitimate penological goals and their means were narrowly tailored to meet those goals; thus, defendants could have believed the transfer of Schroeder from the minimum correctional facility back to the medium correctional facility was lawful. See Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532. Consequently, we conclude that defendants are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity with regard to the retaliation claim.

An officer who seeks a search warrant lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonably well-trained officer would have known the affidavit failed to establish probable cause and would not have applied for the warrant.

Greenstreet v. County Of San Bernardino · filed 1994-12-02

The lack of probable cause notwithstanding, Deputy Hebden is entitled to immunity from suit for his seeking the issuance of the search warrant unless "a reasonably well-trained officer in [Deputy Hebden's] position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant." ... Deputy Hebden is thus not entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' Sec. 1983 action.

An officer who applies for a search warrant is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer in that position would have known the affidavit failed to establish probable cause and would not have sought the warrant.

Greenstreet v. County of San Bernardino · filed 1994-12-02

We therefore conclude that a reasonable officer in Deputy Hebden’s position would not have sought the issuance of a search warrant for the Greenstreets’ address. Deputy Hebden is thus not entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ § 1983 action.

Officials sued under § 1983 for failing to protect an involuntarily committed patient have qualified immunity unless settled law made their specific failure to supervise an apparent violation of the patient’s right to reasonably safe conditions.

Rodgers v. Horsley · filed 1994-12-05

Defendants are entitled to immunity unless plaintiff demonstrates that it was in May 1991 a settled question of law that the failure to supervise Rodgers for fifteen minutes under the circumstances of this case was such a substantial departure from professional standards as to violate her constitutional right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on an officer for violating a right that was not clearly established.

Eagleston v. Guido · filed 1994-12-07

When the rights of an aggrieved party are not clearly established, there can be no Sec. 1983 liability.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when no reasonably competent officer would have believed a warrant should not issue under the circumstances.

Clark v. Stacy Bruce, Detective/crimes Against Children Unit John Balliet, Assistant Commonwealth Attorney · filed 1994-12-07

At the very least, Bruce was entitled to qualified immunity in this case as no officer of reasonable competence would have believed that a warrant should not issue under the circumstances of this case.

Section 1983 claims against jail officials may be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds when no clearly established right requires screening a detainee for suicidal tendencies at intake.

Dawson ex rel. Young v. Campbell County · filed 1994-12-09

In the alternative, the court concludes that the defendants sheriff and deputy are entitled to qualified immunity in this case as a matter of law, for the reasons discussed above, and that the plaintiffs claims against these defendants are subject to dismissal for this reason, too.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials are subject to qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Thomas William Sinclair Richey v. James Blodgett, Superintendent · filed 1994-12-12

When qualified immunity applies, the shield from section 1983 liability for damages will be lifted only if the party's conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Law enforcement officers sued personally under Section 1983 may invoke qualified immunity, which turns on objective reasonableness.

Amato v. City of Richmond · filed 1994-12-15

The availability of qualified immunity is determined against a standard of objective reasonableness.

Section 1983 affords child welfare workers qualified immunity when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their actions did not violate parents’ constitutional rights.

Gottlieb v. County of Orange · filed 1994-12-15

In determining that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the test is whether it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their acts did not violate the parents’ constitutional rights.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff offers evidence that they violated clearly established federal rights and could not reasonably believe their conduct was lawful.

Abdul-Matiyn v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 1994-12-15

In short, a plaintiffs claims will withstand summary judgment only if he presents some evidence upon which a reasonable fact finder could find (i) that defendants violated well-established federal rights and (ii) that it was not objectively reasonable for defendants to believe that their conduct did not violate those rights.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect an officer whose conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Payne v. Breuer · filed 1994-12-19

Thus, we hold that Breuer’s actions were not objectively reasonable under clearly established law. Therefore, Breuer is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A public official is immune from § 1983 damages when the official had no reason to believe the challenged conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Trust & Investment Advisers, Inc. v. Hogsett · filed 1994-12-19

As a government official performing discretionary functions that she had no reason to believe violated TIA’s clearly established constitutional rights, Dant is immune from this suit for damages.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim is judged by objective reasonableness, without regard to the official’s good faith.

Kurtz v. Denniston · filed 1994-12-19

Good faith is not an element of the defense, nor relevant to the qualified immunity inquiry, because “the standard is one of ‘objective reasonableness.’ ”

Defendants in a § 1983 suit alleging disclosure of personal information are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted confidentiality privacy right was not clearly established.

Taliaferro v. DiFrancesco · filed 1994-12-22

The defendants have moved for summary judgment on the alternative grounds of qualified immunity. Under Shields, they would be entitled to such a defense.

Qualified immunity can bar an individual-capacity claim brought under Section 1983.

Miles v. Pendell · filed 1994-12-27

The district court properly dismissed the claims against Appellee in his individual capacity as barred by qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 action where defendants plead qualified immunity, the court may consider the merits of the constitutional claim even when defendants do not defend the challenged conduct.

Leroy v. Illinois Racing Board · filed 1994-12-28

Although defendants have not sought to defend Rule 25.19, the merits of the constitutional claim are an antecedent issue whenever the defendants plead immunity, one we may consider without regard to the Utigants’ tactical decisions.

A § 1983 plaintiff suing an official who raises qualified immunity must plead facts sufficient to overcome the defense before limited discovery may proceed.

Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Services · filed 1995-01-05

Rather, we hold simply that if the pleadings fail to state facts sufficient to overcome the defense of qualified immunity, then limited discovery is improper and dismissal, as qualified above, is in order.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show that the asserted constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

McGRATH v. GILLIS · filed 1995-01-06

Accordingly, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 affords arresting officers qualified immunity when a reasonably competent officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Voudry v. Brackett · filed 1995-01-10

The defendants do not have to show that there was probable cause for the arrests, but only that "objectively reasonable grounds" existed such that "a reasonably competent police officer could have believed probable cause existed."...The local officers are entitled to gualified immunity.

In a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing a clearly established liberty interest; officials then bear the burden of showing that their conduct was reasonable.

Browning v. Richard A. Vernon, Director Ron McKinsey · filed 1995-01-10

The inmates bear the burden of proving the existence of a “clearly established” liberty interest at the time of Vernon’s and McKinsey’s allegedly impermissible conduct. ... If the inmates meet this burden, then Vernon and McKinsey bear the burden of establishing that their actions are reasonable, even if they violate the inmates constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from § 1983 damages claims when their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

In Re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation · filed 1995-01-11

Importantly, the defense is not effective when plaintiffs can demonstrate that an official’s conduct violated a plaintiffs clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity from an excessive force claim when a reasonable officer could have believed the force lawful under clearly established law.

Shawn Michael Jones, a Minor by His Father and Next Friend, Terry D. Jones, and Terry D. Jones v. Charles Webb, Individu · filed 1995-01-11

We agree that in these circumstances, a reasonable police officer certainly could have believed that the limited force applied was proper and was not unconstitutionally excessive in light of clearly established law. ... Webb is therefore qualifiedly immune from Jones’ claim that he used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

State officials have qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability unless they violate a constitutional right that was clearly established when they acted.

Blackburn v. Marshall City Of · filed 1995-01-12

State officials are shielded from liability under qualified immunity unless they violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Officials sued individually under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Rodgers v. John Jabe, Jerry Hofbauer, and Robin Pratt, in Their Individual and Official Capacities · filed 1995-01-12

We hold that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the amount of exercise to which prisoners had a right was not clearly established at the time of the defendants’ actions.

Officers who execute a civil protection order under a presumptively constitutional statute are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when their conduct violates no clearly established law.

Kelm v. Hyatt · filed 1995-01-18

Here, however, when the officers executed the CPO, § 3113.31 was constitutional and its procedures were presumed adequate. Thus, there was no “clearly estabHshed” law with which the officers failed to comply. Instead, the officers rightfully executed a CPO pursuant to a presumably constitutional statute. The officers, therefore, are entitled to qualified immunity and Kelm’s damages claim against them must fail.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they could reasonably believe their conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Fredericks v. Gary Wright George Burke City of Forest Grove and John Doe, a Fictitious Person · filed 1995-01-20

Moreover, the officers could have reasonably believed that their actions were lawful, and thus the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Schaefers v. Gary Wright George Burke City of Forest Grove, an Oregon Municipal Corporation · filed 1995-01-20

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's determination that the right which Schaefers claims was violated was not clearly established and that the officers were entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim if a reasonable officer could have believed the suspect threatened others when the officer used force.

White v. Leonhardt · filed 1995-01-25

Officer Leonhardt is entitled to immunity from liability for his use of force if a reasonable officer could have believed that White posed a threat of harm to others when Leonhardt fired.

Qualified immunity does not support dismissal of a § 1983 complaint that alleges violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Weaver v. Clarke · filed 1995-01-30

Because Weaver has alleged the violation of a clearly-established constitutional right, the defendant prison officials are not entitled to dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 money damages when their conduct violates no clearly established right that a reasonable official would have known.

Long v. Nix · filed 1995-01-31

Defendants did not violate any of Long’s clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable prison official would have known. They are entitled to qualified immunity on Long’s claims for money damages.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from § 1983 damages when the officer did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Hartman v. Bachert · filed 1995-01-31

Although we have already granted summary judgment on other grounds, we find in the alternative that Bachert would be entitled qualified immunity. State officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established Constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the law was not clearly established and the defendant reasonably believed the conduct was lawful.

Elder v. Holloway · filed 1995-01-31

Thus, in reconsidering the qualified immunity issue herein in light of Alr-Azzawy and all other relevant authority, this court finds that Defendant Holloway is entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established and because Holloway reasonably believed that his conduct in arresting Elder was lawful.

An official sued under Section 1983 may claim qualified immunity unless the alleged conduct violated a right clearly established when the conduct occurred.

DiMeglio v. Haines · filed 1995-02-02

When a plaintiff seeks to hold an official personally liable for his exercise of a discretionary function, the court must, in addressing the qualified immunity defense, consider whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of law that was clearly established at the time the challenged actions were taken.

Qualified immunity shields an official from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Burns v. Rick Reed · filed 1995-02-06

In sum, it certainly cannot be said that such a right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. For this reason, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the finding that defendant possessed qualified immunity from suit.

In a Section 1983 suit, limited discovery may proceed on qualified immunity when the plaintiff alleges a violation of clearly established law and the parties dispute what the officials did.

Lovelace v. Delo · filed 1995-02-08

However, if the plaintiffs' allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law and the parties disagree as to what actions the law enforcement officers took, discovery may be appropriate for the limited purpose of addressing the issue of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants sued for damages in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Keen A. Umbehr v. Joe McClure Glen Heiser, and George Spencer · filed 1995-02-10

We agree that Defendants should be qualifiedly immune from Mr. Umbehr’s claim for damages against them in their individual capacities, given the uncertainty in this area of law.

An official sued for damages in an individual capacity under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when unresolved legal questions prevent the asserted right from being clearly established.

Hawk v. Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 1995-02-14

There are at least three unanswered questions of law that prevent the law from being clearly established and thus require that qualified immunity be granted.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant from a § 1983 suit when the alleged conduct violates no constitutional right.

Joseph Walton, as Next Friend of Christopher Walton, a Minor v. Alma Alexander, Alma Alexander · filed 1995-02-17

Consequently, because Alexander’s alleged failure to protect Walton did not violate the Due Process Clause, we hold that she is entitled to qualified immunity from this suit.

An official is protected from a § 1983 claim by qualified immunity unless the plaintiff establishes a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Walton v. Alexander · filed 1995-02-17

Alexander has interlocutorily appealed the denial of qualified immunity. This doctrine insulates her from being forced to litigate the consequences of her official conduct, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), unless the plaintiff establishes that she violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged incident.

Individual officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when plaintiffs fail to show that their actions were objectively unreasonable, even if the claims involve clearly established constitutional rights.

Scott v. City of Dallas · filed 1995-02-20

As for the other claims, the Court agrees that they involve clearly established constitutional rights, but holds that the Plaintiffs have failed to show that these officers’ actions were not objectively reasonable.

School officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability for good faith, nonmalicious actions taken to fulfill their official duties.

Byrd v. Sullivan · filed 1995-02-24

School officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability for good faith, nonmalicious actions taken to fulfill their official duties.

Section 1983 monetary damages claims against state officials can be barred by qualified immunity.

Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Shinn · filed 1995-02-28

Plaintiffs claim for monetary damages is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could find probable cause to use deadly force against a threat of death.

Estate of Chlopek Ex Rel. Fahrforth v. Jarmusz · filed 1995-02-28

The doctrine of qualified immunity is applicable in this case and governs the federal constitutional claims arising from 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988. ... The court finds that a reasonable officer in the same situation would have found probable cause to use deadly force to protect himself from the threat of death. ... Accordingly, the doctrine of qualified immunity applies, and Jarmusz is not liable under any of the federal claims in Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint.

Section 1983 does not shield state officials with qualified immunity when reasonable officials would have known that retaliating against protected speech or access to the courts violated clearly established First Amendment rights.

Warmus v. Hank · filed 1995-02-28

Given the state of the law in 1988 and 1989, when defendants began their allegedly retaliatory acts, we find that reasonable persons in defendants' positions would have known that actions taken with an intent to retaliate against plaintiffs for the exercise of their First Amendment rights could give rise to liability. Our case law was clear that an individual may not be punished for seeking access to the courts or for publicly criticizing the government. Thus, we conclude that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this issue.

Police officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless they violate a clearly established right that a reasonable officer would have known.

Simmons v. Poe · filed 1995-03-01

Because the law is clear that police officers are entitled to immunity unless they have violated a "clearly established" constitutional right, we reverse the District Court's denial of the Appellees' claim of entitlement to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on prison officials who place an inmate in administrative segregation when the asserted liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population was not clearly established.

England v. Farley · filed 1995-03-01

Whether an Indiana inmate has a liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population is not clearly established, therefore, the defendants cannot be held liable for placing an inmate in administrative segregation.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when their actions violate no clearly established constitutional right.

In Re: City Phila Litigation · filed 1995-03-06

Judge Scirica and I conclude that all the individual defendants are immune because their actions on May 13, 1985, did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights of plaintiff Ramona Africa and decedents Frank James and Vincent Lopez Leaphart. Accordingly, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment to defendants Wilson Goode, the mayor of the city, and police officers Frank Powell and William Klein, and will reverse the denial of summary judgment on the section 1983 claims to defendants Brooks, Sambor, and Richmond.

Officials are immune from § 1983 liability when their actions do not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Africa v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1995-03-06

Judge Seirica and I conclude that all the individual defendants are immune because their actions on May 13,1985, did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights of plaintiff Ramona Africa and decedents Frank James and Vincent Lopez Leaphart.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from § 1983 liability when their alleged conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Ford v. Davis · filed 1995-03-09

Since both parts of the Seventh Circuit’s analysis exist, the court finds that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not shield either Defendant from liability.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their actions are objectively reasonable under the circumstances they faced.

Huffman v. Grinnell · filed 1995-03-09

Thus, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim because they acted reasonably given the circumstances they were faced with.

In § 1983 suits against public officials who plead qualified immunity, a district court may require a detailed reply addressing that defense.

Schultea v. Wood · filed 1995-03-13

When a public official pleads the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in his answer, the district court may, on the official's motion or on its own, require the plaintiff to reply to that defense in detail.

Qualified immunity bars damages under § 1983 against officials who did not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory law at the time of their conduct.

WERNER v. McCOTTER · filed 1995-03-14

Qualified immunity shields the Defendants from pecuniary liability unless they violated "clearly established" constitutional or statutory norms.

In a § 1983 damages suit, qualified immunity does not shield officers whose conduct a reasonable officer would have known violated clearly established law.

Dawkins v. Graham · filed 1995-03-14

Qualified immunity does not shield the officers from a lawsuit for damages if a reasonable officer would have known the officers' actions violated clearly established law. ... We conclude the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a due process damages claim for forced antipsychotic medication when the relevant procedural rights were not clearly established at the time.

Dwayne Walker v. Dr. Ghoudy, Ronald Shansky, Robert Newkirk · filed 1995-03-14

Because a prisoner's rights to due process regarding the forced injection of antipsychotic drugs were not clearly established by May 30, 1988, we hold that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for Walker's due process claim.

An official sued under section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that the official’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional right.

McCoy v. Webster · filed 1995-03-14

Because the law was not clearly established that Brown's conduct, based on the information he possessed, violated McCoy's Eighth Amendment right, Brown is entitled to qualified immunity.

Government officials lack qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when their conduct violates clearly established rights of which a reasonable person should have known.

Blue Ridge Mountain Fisheries, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources · filed 1995-03-16

1. The court erred in ruling that under federal law (42 USC § 1983) defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. ... In making a decision to prosecute plaintiffs for a criminal violation of the Georgia Game and Fish Code, based on a definition of “exotic fish” different than its generally accepted definition and not codified or set forth in any promulgated regulation, the DNR officials violated clearly established due process rights of which a reasonable person should have known and were acting outside their discretionary authority. Thus, they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Police officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably rely on a school official’s representation of parental consent to remove a child from school, absent unusual circumstances calling for further inquiry.

Gardiner v. Incorporated Village Of Endicott · filed 1995-03-17

As such, we hold that it is objectively reasonable for police officers to rely on the representations of a school official that a parent has consented to the removal of a child from school without conducting an independent inquiry, absent unusual circumstances that would warrant such inquiry.

Probation officers performing official duties have qualified immunity from damages under Section 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Murray Eugene Fields, II v. McCannally · filed 1995-03-20

Therefore, even if we were to recognize such a right, McCannally is protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity from personal liability because no such right was "clearly established" at the time of the alleged misconduct.

Individual defendants are not personally liable under § 1983 when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Johnson v. El Paso Cty Sheriff · filed 1995-03-20

In other words, even if it is decided that El Paso, pursuant to its policies and practices, violated Johnson's constitutional rights by rejecting incoming mail in a manner that is not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, the individual defendants could not be held personally liable under § 1983 unless Johnson's constitutional rights were "clearly established" at the time these events took place.

Officers sued under § 1983 lose qualified immunity for searches or seizures after they knew or reasonably should have known they were in the wrong residence.

Pray v. City of Sandusky · filed 1995-03-21

Conversely, any search or seizure that took place after the officers knew or reasonably should have known that they were in the wrong residence would no longer be protected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects a government officer from damages under § 1983 when the officer’s conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Boyd v. Parker, Correctional Officer, Oregon State Penitentiary, Individually in His Official Capacity · filed 1995-03-27

Thus, Parker is entitled to qualified immunity on the "snitch" claim because his conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Officials enforcing a state statute that had never been held unconstitutional were entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages for a due process violation when their actions complied with the statute and served public safety objectives.

Kutschbach v. Davies · filed 1995-03-31

In the present case, the Court concludes that Defendants Davies and Thompson are immune from liability for damages for the violation of Plaintiff Kutschbach’s due process rights. The case for qualified immunity is particularly strong in this instance for two reasons: (1) Defendants were acting in accordance with their responsibilities under an Ohio statute that had never been held unconstitutional by the Ohio Supreme Court or any federal court and (2) Defendants were justified by legitimate public safety objectives in taking custody of Plaintiff Kutschbach’s vehicle when her husband was arrested for driving without a license.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 excessive force claim when the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable and does not violate a constitutional right.

Edwards v. Brian Giles Timothy Woolman Mike Bassett, of the Lincoln Police Department, Lincoln, Ne · filed 1995-03-31

Anyway, Woolman’s conduct in drawing his gun and pointing it at Edwards, without any indication Woolman intended or attempted to fire the gun, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. ... Furthermore, Woolman’s actions were objectively reasonable in the circumstances. ... Woolman is entitled to qualified immunity on Edwards’s claim.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law did not make their conduct unlawful.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit · filed 1995-04-03

I conclude that there was no clearly established law as of May 13, 1985, which would have required the officials to choose an alternative approach to execute the warrants. Thus, as Judge Scirica joins in this section of the opinion the city defendants, meaning the individual defendants, are entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law at the time.

Jacobs v. Charlie Young · filed 1995-04-05

Third, the district court incorrectly relied on qualified immunity to dismiss Jacobs's claim. The question of whether an official is protected by qualified immunity turns on the objective reasonableness of his or her actions, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time they were taken. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). Jacobs alleged that the defendants housed him with "an aggressive smoker" as recently as March 1993. This incident postdates the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hunt. Thus, Jacobs's right to live in a smoke-free cell had been clearly established by March 1993 when Jacobs was last housed with a smoker.

Qualified immunity shields a government official from a § 1983 damages claim when the law was not clearly established, even if the official said he knew he was violating the plaintiff’s civil rights.

Furnace v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission · filed 1995-04-06

Once the magistrate judge determined that the law was not clearly established, Johnson was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Accordingly, we hold that the magistrate judge erred in denying Johnson's motion for summary judgment on the basis of his statement that he knew he was violating Furnace's civil rights. The statement was irrelevant to the efficacy of Johnson's qualified immunity defense.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show that they violated a clearly established right.

Wooten v. Campbell · filed 1995-04-06

We note, however, that assuming arguendo there is a violation of a constitutional right, the defendants are clearly entitled to qualified immunity.

When a defendant raises qualified immunity in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff initially must show that the defendant violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Albright v. Rodriguez · filed 1995-04-07

However, under settled authority the court should have placed the initial burden on Plaintiff to demonstrate that Defendant violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.

A § 1983 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to show either a violation of a constitutional or statutory right or that the right was clearly established at the time.

Albright v. Rodriguez · filed 1995-04-07

First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s actions violated a constitutional or statutory right. ... Second, the plaintiff must show that the constitutional or statutory rights the defendant allegedly violated were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. ... If the plaintiff fails to carry either part of his two-part burden, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer cannot claim qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit for an unauthorized arrest when a reasonable officer would have understood that the arrest violated clearly established law.

Thomas J. Simpson, Sr. v. David White, City of Loretto, Tennessee John T. Odem Johnny F. Cheatwood County of Lawrence, T · filed 1995-04-11

At the time of plaintiff's arrest, it was clearly established in Tennessee that a person could not be arrested for contempt of court for violating a restraining order without an order of the court. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure ("Tenn.R.Civ.P.") 65.06. It was also clearly established that this unauthorized arrest violates the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. ... Therefore, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity on the basis that a reasonable police officer would have misunderstood the law.