42 U.S.C. § 1983

Qualified immunity bars Section 1983 damages for a campaign of petty harassment when the law did not clearly establish that the conduct was unconstitutional.

Nowak v. Szwedo · filed 1989-01-11

Given the uncertain state of the law, Defendants had no such notice, and therefore are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to liability on a “campaign of harassment” theory.

State officers sued individually under § 1983 for retaining child support payments have qualified immunity only if they show reasonable doubt, when they acted, about the state’s entitlement to the funds.

Bennett v. White · filed 1989-01-13

In the context of this case, such immunity would be available only upon a showing by the defendants that there was a reasonable doubt, at the time they acted, as to the DPW’s entitlement to the retained funds.

Qualified immunity does not shield a defendant from an official-capacity action under Section 1983.

Barts v. Joyner · filed 1989-01-27

Harlow’s qualified immunity is no defense to an action brought against someone in his official capacity.

Municipalities cannot invoke qualified immunity as a defense to liability under § 1983.

Carapellucci v. Town of Winchester · filed 1989-02-03

The Town of Winchester has also moved for summary judgment on this added ground, contending that it too is entitled to a qualified immunity. ... It does not shield municipalities for conduct that violates constitutional standards. ... I have determined above that the Town of Winchester is entitled to summary judgment on other grounds, but this added defense of qualified immunity is not available as additional support for that conclusion.

Section 1983 defendants sued individually for retaining support funds can claim qualified immunity only by showing reasonable doubt, when they acted, about the agency’s entitlement to the funds.

Bennett v. White · filed 1989-02-10

In the context of this case, such immunity would be available only upon a showing by the defendants that there was a reasonable doubt, at the time they acted, as to the DPW's entitlement to the retained funds.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 procedural due process claim when unsettled law would not have alerted the official that a pretermination hearing was required.

Merrell v. Bay County Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 1989-02-15

Defendant Stoner, therefore, could not be expected to appreciate the importance of affording Merrell a pretermination hearing before firing him. Under the circumstances, the Court finds as a matter of law that Defendant Stoner is entitled to qualified immunity concerning the procedural due process claim.

A public official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim if a reasonable official in the same position could have believed the challenged act complied with federal law.

Dartland v. Metropolitan Dade County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Sergio Pereira · filed 1989-02-27

Therefore, Pereira is immune from suit if a reasonable person in his position could have believed that his act complied with federal law.

Qualified immunity does not bar a Section 1983 claim against a government official in the official capacity.

Barts v. Joyner · filed 1989-03-01

Harlow 's qualified immunity is no defense to an action brought against someone in his official capacity.

A defendant in a § 1983 action may have qualified immunity for reasonably relying on a court order authorizing the challenged conduct.

Smart v. Christian Simonson, David Edelson and Meryln Niedens · filed 1989-03-09

Defendants were entitled to rely upon the terms of that order and, as long as that reliance was reasonable, they are shielded from liability.

A defendant in a section 1983 suit may receive qualified immunity against a claim premised on 11 U.S.C. § 525(a), even when the court leaves open whether a violation of that provision is actionable under section 1983.

Mary Jean MANGAN, Appellant, v. Donald CULLEN, Appellee · filed 1989-03-22

We affirm the district court’s ruling in this case, but on different grounds. With respect to Mangan’s claim that Cullen violated her rights under section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code, we hold that Cullen is protected by qualified immunity. We thus express no opinion in this case as to whether a section 525 violation can be redressed through a section 1983 action.

Officials sued under § 1983 may rely on a facially valid warrant of execution that was properly issued under state law.

Anderson v. Smith · filed 1989-04-27

The district court correctly held in favor of all the defendants for the reasons stated in the magistrate's reports and the district court's orders. The crux of the case is whether the state court clerk properly issued the warrant of execution. Under Tennessee law, the execution was proper; the officials from the various sheriff's departments were entitled to rely upon the facially valid warrant.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action in Arizona state court may seek review of an adverse immunity ruling before final judgment.

Henke v. Superior Court · filed 1989-05-10

Therefore, we conclude that a defendant in a section 1983 action should not be required to await final judgment in order to challenge a trial court’s adverse ruling on the issue of immunity from suit.

Qualified immunity applies to section 1983 excessive force claims based on substantive due process as well as the Fourth Amendment.

Hamm v. Powell · filed 1989-06-06

Qualified immunity applies to the excessive force claim based on substantive due process as well as to the claim based on the Fourth Amendment.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of their actions would not have been apparent to a reasonable official.

Yerardi's Moody Street Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. v. Board Of Selectmen Of The Town Of Randolph · filed 1989-06-22

Since defendants' actions were not such that their unlawfulness would have been apparent to a reasonable selectman, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged constitutional violation was not apparent under preexisting law.

Jones v. Morris · filed 1989-06-29

Certainly it could not be said that such a “violation” was apparent in light of preexisting law, and therefore the Chief Engineers would be entitled to qualified immunity in all events.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages on a substantive due process claim if they had no reason to know that the evidence supporting their decision was faulty, even if the decision later proves arbitrary.

Newman v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Appeal of Diana Burgin · filed 1989-08-28

Even if it ultimately can be shown that the decision to censure her was arbitrary—if, for example, it turns out that the “expert” who found plagiarism lacked any knowledge of Serbo-Croatian literature—defendants are entitled to immunity from damages so long as they had no reason to know that the evidence on which they relied was faulty.

Officers who have probable cause to seek a warrant satisfy the reasonable conduct standard for qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Jones v. Gilmore · filed 1989-08-28

Since the officers had probable cause to seek a warrant, they clearly met the reasonable conduct standard of Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), and its progeny.

Governmental bodies cannot claim qualified immunity from damages actions under § 1983.

Theresa J. HEDGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF TIPPECANOE, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1989-11-17

We disagree with the court’s ruling because the Supreme Court had authoritatively determined prior to that date that governmental bodies do not enjoy qualified immunity from damages actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendants in a Section 1983 damages action have qualified immunity unless they knew or should have known their actions would violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Lyons v. Powell · filed 1989-12-28

Defendants are entitled to a qualified immunity from damages under Section 1983. ... They are liable for damages only if they knew or should have known that their actions would violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 defendants retain qualified immunity from a claim for denying access to records when FERPA gives the plaintiff no right to that access.

Tarka v. Franklin · filed 1989-12-29

Because we reject Tarka’s right of access to the recommendation letters founded on FERPA, it follows that the defendants have not shed their qualified immunity from suit for denying that access.

Municipalities cannot use qualified immunity to avoid liability under § 1983.

Palmer v. City of Monticello · filed 1990-03-05

Unlike Defendant Adair, Defendant City of Monticello cannot employ the doctrine of qualified immunity to escape civil liability under section 1983.

A state official lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the official knew or should have known that the challenged conduct would violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Coleman v. McHenry · filed 1990-04-24

However, qualified immunity is not available where the official knew or should have known that his actions would violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. ... Thus the defense of qualified immunity, is not available to Defendant on the claims presented here, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground of qualified immunity must be denied.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects individual officials from damages when no decision gave them specific notice that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Swank v. Smart · filed 1990-04-27

Current immunity doctrine requires clear notice to public officials that their conduct violates the Constitution. The notice can of course be given by decisions interpreting the Constitution, but the interpretations must be specific, not general. No decisions placed these defendants on specific notice that their conduct of the hearing denied Swank his constitutional rights. This conclusion requires the dismissal of so much of the case against the individual defendants as concerns Tina’s statement, but leaves Carthage’s liability unaffected.

Individual officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim when the alleged conduct, if proved, could not reasonably have been thought lawful.

Thompson v. City of Starkville, Mississippi, David Lindley, Larry Sisk, and Jimmy Raines, Individually and in · filed 1990-05-03

Thus, we — like the district court — conclude that if Thompson’s allegations relating to the behavior of the individual defendants prove true, such retaliatory behavior is not of a nature that any reasonable official could possibly have thought legitimate. ... Therefore, we find that the district court properly denied summary judgment on the issue of the individual defendants’ qualified immunity in relation to Thompson’s first amendment claim.

A county cannot invoke qualified immunity as a defense to a Section 1983 claim.

Ross v. Neff · filed 1990-06-04

Regardless of the state of the law at the time the arrest took place, however, the qualified immunity defense is not available to the county.

In a Section 1983 damages action, officials have qualified immunity when reasonable officials in the same circumstances could have acted for a rational, lawful purpose, regardless of their disputed actual motives.

Baptist v. O'LEARY · filed 1990-07-11

Regardless of what invidious factors may possibly have motivated defendants, if this Court finds that reasonable officials acting under the same circumstances could have been motivated by another noninvidious and rational purpose, defendants are entitled to immunity.

Section 1983 actions brought in Minnesota courts are subject to the federal standard of qualified immunity for government officials.

McIntire v. State · filed 1990-08-07

The federal standard of qualified immunity applies in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought in Minnesota courts.

Section 1983 permits officers to invoke qualified immunity against damages claims arising from searches, even if the searches violated constitutional rights, upon the required showing.

Moresi v. State, Dept. of Wildlife & Fisheries · filed 1990-09-06

In this civil rights action, even if the search of the ice chests and compartment violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights the officers may upon proper showing invoke qualified good faith immunity as a defense.

Qualified immunity that shields officials from liability for alleged EAHCA violations also shields them from liability under Section 1983 for claims alleging those same violations.

Christopher P. ex rel. Norma P. v. Marcus · filed 1990-09-27

Plaintiffs’ due process and section 1983 claims allege the very same violations of the EAHCA that are the subject of their claims under the Act itself. Accordingly, defendants' qualified immunity in connection with the EAHCA claims also shields them from liability for these alleged violations.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects officers when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated constitutional rights.

Elder v. Holloway · filed 1990-11-21

There is no way that any individual officer, under the circumstances of this case, could have known that he was violating another’s clearly established constitutional rights when those rights were not yet clearly established.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action protects against liability and, when established before trial, against having to stand trial; defendants who fail to seek a timely pretrial ruling must stand trial unless the district court later grants immunity.

Ernest Edwards and Sarah Edwards v. Cass County, Texas, Paul Boone and Gary Pixley · filed 1990-11-30

The concept of qualified immunity has two elements: the substantive immunity itself and freedom from standing trial where that substantive immunity has been found to exist. Having failed to take the appropriate measures to test the legal issue of immunity prior to trial, these defendants must stand trial, unless on remand the district court should elect to consider their motion for summary judgment and should determine that qualified immunity is present.

In section 1983 actions, advice of counsel is one factor in the objective qualified immunity inquiry, not a complete defense to liability.

Buford v. Holladay · filed 1990-12-18

Thus, it is clear that advice of counsel, even where pleaded as a separate defense, does not constitute a true and complete defense to a section 1983 claim, but rather is merely one of several factual circumstances that may be considered under the objective “good faith” standard for determining whether qualified immunity exists.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on a substantive due process malicious prosecution claim when the law at the time only generally suggested such a claim and did not clearly establish the asserted right.

Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer District · filed 1990-12-27

This type of authority cannot provide a "clearly established" right as contemplated by the Supreme Court in Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's determination that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff's substantive due process claim.

Government officials may raise qualified immunity as a defense to a § 1983 claim.

Campbell v. Ernest Mercer, as Mayor of Elmore City, and as an Individual · filed 1991-02-26

The affirmative defense of qualified immunity is available to government officials in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Officials are not entitled to good faith qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on intentional discrimination.

Mody v. City of Hoboken · filed 1991-03-06

Yet, because plaintiff’s section 1983 claim is based on a theory of intentional discrimination, defendants are not entitled to “good faith” immunity.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action does not require a prior decision holding the exact challenged conduct unlawful.

Butler v. Seiter · filed 1991-03-07

The decision in Anderson does not mean that there must have been a previous decision which ruled that the very action in question be held unlawful.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when reasonable officers could have believed deadly force was necessary under the circumstances, even under the plaintiff’s account of the facts.

Fitzgerald v. Patrick · filed 1991-03-08

We find that in this case, under either version of the facts, reasonable officers would have been justified in using deadly force because they could have reasonably believed that it was necessary under the circumstances.

Qualified immunity does not shield a public official from a § 1983 claim for arbitrary discrimination based on prejudice against homosexuals and lacking any rational basis.

Jantz v. Muci · filed 1991-03-29

Accepting as true the evidence offered by the plaintiff, as the court must under the relevant standards of review, the defendant acted arbitrarily, without any rational purpose, based upon personal prejudices against homosexuals. Under these circumstances, the defendant is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

A § 1983 plaintiff facing qualified immunity must plead the factual basis of the claim in detail; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Copsey v. Swearingen · filed 1991-04-23

Because the doctrine of qualified immunity is intended to shield officers from the disruptions accompanying a lawsuit, a section 1983 plaintiff must comply with heightened pleading requirements and state with factual detail and particularity the basis of his claim.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action who raises qualified immunity is judged under the law as it stood when the defendant acted and need not anticipate later changes in the law.

Hidahl v. Gilpin County Department of Social Services · filed 1991-07-16

A defendant in a Sec. 1983 action is not required to anticipate changes in the law, and the reasonableness of his conduct is to be judged by the state of the law at the time of his conduct.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the law at the time did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful.

Elliott v. William Thomas, Barbara Propst v. Morton W. Weir · filed 1991-09-04

The state of the law on mixed-motive transfers was in 1987 — and remains — sufficiently ambiguous that the three administrators are entitled to immunity.

Qualified immunity is unavailable to government officials sued in their official capacities under § 1983.

Rivas v. Freeman · filed 1991-09-09

This is an official-capacities-lawsuit; thus, we hold that a qualified immunity defense is not available in this lawsuit.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for discrimination based on pregnancy by artificial insemination and unwed motherhood when a reasonable official would have known the conduct violated established rights.

Cameron v. Bd. of Educ. of Hillsboro, Ohio Sch. D. · filed 1991-09-12

Therefore, this Court holds that a reasonable official would have known that discriminating against a woman based upon her pregnancy by artificial insemination and her status as an unwed mother violated the woman’s rights.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim arising from protective detention when they had probable cause to take the person into custody and acted in reasonable good faith.

Maag v. Richard Wessler Mike Boyer Michael Sukut City of Glasgow, Montana Valley County, Montana · filed 1991-09-23

Thus we find that the officers had probable cause to take Maag into protective custody, based on the Montana statute, the information from family members and friends, the officers’ own observations, and Dr. Bell’s recommendation that Maag be brought to the hospital. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the officers acted with less than reasonable good faith. Therefore, they are immune.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action is assessed under an objective test.

Ballenger v. Don Neal, Investigator, Phillip McLeod Captain · filed 1991-09-24

Although the district court relied on a subjective text of qualified immunity, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1978), the test for qualified immunity is properly an objective one. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982). Nonetheless, defendants prevail under Harlow, too.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when it was unsettled whether their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Holley v. Bishop Robinson, Mason Waters, Mr. Herndon · filed 1991-10-01

It is not yet settled whether exposure to ETS can create a health hazard that violates an inmate's constitutional rights. ... Therefore, the defendants' conduct has not violated any clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Qualified immunity and summary judgment are appropriate since there is a legitimate question as to whether the official's action constitutes the violation of a constitutional right.

Qualified immunity bars damages under § 1983 when existing law did not make the alleged violation apparent to a reasonable official.

Johnson v. Robert Moore, Superintendent, Clallam Bay Corrections Center · filed 1991-10-09

Because we cannot say “that in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness” of denying access to softcover books from other parties is “apparent”, defendants are entitled to prevail on their defense of qualified immunity.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when federal law unambiguously requires them to use a prescribed formula and they fail to do so.

Jackson v. Rapps · filed 1991-10-17

The federal statute and regulations unambiguously require the directors to utilize the prescribed formula in setting the state debt, and the directors are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can shield defendants from liability on a § 1983 claim.

Kilroy v. Prince Charles · filed 1991-11-15

The findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to the issue of qualified immunity are set forth in the district court opinion with great clarity and we adopt both in our decision. Because we find the district court determination on summary judgment was proper and that all defendants are insulated from any liability to Mr. Kilroy on immunity grounds, we affirm.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 may assert qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known the conduct violated clearly-established rights.

McGovern v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1992-01-21

The individual officers argue they are entitled to qualified immunity against respondents’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We agree. ... Whether qualified immunity exists turns on whether the officials violated clearly-established statutory or constitutional rights, the existence of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Based on the record, we hold that qualified immunity exists as a matter of law.

When a defendant raises qualified immunity against a Section 1983 claim, the court must require the plaintiff to plead particular facts supporting recovery and overcoming immunity.

Thibodeaux v. City of Port Arthur · filed 1992-01-24

However, once a claim raises the issue of qualified immunity, this court must on its own motion require of the plaintiff a detailed complaint alleging with particularity all material facts on which he contends he will establish his right to recovery, including detailed facts supporting the contention that the plea of immunity cannot be sustained.

Qualified immunity can bar damages against prison officials in a § 1983 action even when the prisoner states a claim for injunctive relief.

McKinney v. Pat Anderson, Carol Ployer, H.L. Whitley, George W. Sumner, John Nye · filed 1992-03-27

Although we held that McKinney had stated a cause of action for injunc-tive relief, we found that he was not entitled to damages on that cause of action because the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot overcome qualified immunity with conclusory, nonspecific assertions that the defendant violated a constitutional right.

Kirby v. Largo · filed 1992-03-31

I conclude that Kirby’s conclusory and nonspecific assertions are insufficient to overcome the defendant’s qualified immunity defense.

Officers are immune from a Section 1983 claim for taking a person into protective custody when they had probable cause to do so.

Maag v. Richard Wessler Mike Boyer Michael Sukut City of Glasgow, Montana Valley County, Montana · filed 1992-04-01

We hold that the officers are immune because there was probable cause to take Maag into custody.

A deputy sheriff has no qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim for striking a person twice in the face with a flashlight while that person is securely under the deputy’s control.

Moore v. Morton · filed 1992-04-02

It is clear, however, that no officer could reasonably believe that it was objectively reasonable for him to strike the Appellant twice in the face with a flashlight while the Appellant was securely under the Appellee's control.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff offers no evidence to substantiate allegations of an unconstitutional motive.

San Diego House of Hope Mamie Y. Thomas Richard Thomas Fred Thomas v. San Diego Department of Social Services, and Oksan · filed 1992-04-03

In sum, Smith is entitled to a grant of qualified immunity in this case due to the dearth of evidence substantiating House of Hope's charges of Smith's alleged unconstitutional motive.

In a § 1983 action, a public official claiming qualified immunity must plead and prove that he acted within his authority and in good faith.

Turner v. Lawson State Community College · filed 1992-04-03

In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a public official whose position might entitle him to qualified immunity, the defendant must plead and prove as a defense that he had acted within his authority and in good faith.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the record does not show that a reasonable official would have known the challenged search violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Groves v. State of Ohio Larry Peck Brad Copeland Scott Doty · filed 1992-04-09

In the face of the Ranger's testimony that he was invited onto the premises by someone apparently exercising authority and control, plaintiff's absence of evidence proves fatal. No court could conclude, on this record, that a reasonable official would have known the search to have been violative of plaintiff's rights.

Officials sued under Section 1983 receive qualified immunity when the law did not clearly put them on notice that their conduct was unlawful.

Floberg v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections Larry R. Meachum Larry A. Fields Denise Robinson Deborah Robison · filed 1992-04-14

Our review of the record in this case, and the applicable law, has failed to convince us that the law regarding this type of employment practice was so clear at the time of Plaintiff's termination as to have placed the Defendants on notice that they were violating it. See Lutz v. Weld County Sch. Dist. No. 6, 784 F.2d 340, 342-44 (10th Cir.1986). Thus, we affirm the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Defendants.

Section 1983 does not afford a bail bondsman qualified immunity for violating a person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures while apprehending a fugitive.

Bailey v. Kenney · filed 1992-04-16

With respect to bail bondsmen, the court finds none of the compelling policy reasons that traditionally justify the availability of qualified immunity to state actors performing discretionary functions. ... The court concludes that qualified immunity is unavailable to Kenney for any actions undertaken in violation of plaintiff’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

A prison warden lacks qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when a reasonable warden could not have believed that valid penological interests justified a total ban on religious prayer oil.

Munir v. Scott · filed 1992-04-27

Furthermore, plaintiffs have come forth with evidence indicating that a reasonable warden, with the information available to defendant Scott, could not have believed that valid penological interests necessitated the total ban on prayer oil, while defendant has come forth with no evidence whatsoever to justify the total ban. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can bar individual-capacity damages claims under § 1983 against correctional officers even when a constitutional violation is assumed.

Riddick v. Sutton · filed 1992-05-08

Magistrate Judge McCotter’s recommendation, which concluded that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted, made four findings: ... (4) that even if a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights were to be found the damages claims against the defendants in their individual capacities should be dismissed under the doctrine of qualified immunity. ... Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons Magistrate Judge McCotter’s recommendations are hereby adopted by the court, and the action is dismissed.

In a § 1983 warrantless-search claim, qualified immunity requires that an officer could reasonably believe both probable cause and exigent circumstances existed.

Leydens v. City of Des Moines · filed 1992-05-13

The problem in the present case is that the court failed to require a showing that an officer could reasonably conclude he had both probable cause and exigent circumstances so as to excuse the lack of a warrant.

A defendant officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless a reasonable officer would have known the challenged conduct was unlawful.

Scott v. Glumac · filed 1992-05-19

Scott’s last hope is to pierce Officer Glumac’s qualified immunity shield. He may breach that armor only by showing that a reasonable officer would have known that seizing the automobile under paragraph 36-1 was unlawful.

A plaintiff who states no deprivation of a constitutional right cannot overcome a government official’s qualified immunity defense to a Section 1983 damages claim.

Mitchell v. Clayton · filed 1992-06-03

Because the plaintiffs do not state the deprivation of any constitutional right, they cannot overcome the defendants' qualified immunity defense.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability even when individual officers avoid liability through qualified immunity, a defense unavailable to municipalities.

Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1992-06-04

If the officers avoid liability by mounting a defense of qualified immunity — arguing that they committed the constitutional violations in good faith — the municipalities may still be liable. This is true because the qualified immunity defense is available to individuals but not to government bodies.

An officer who obtains and relies on a warrant supported by an affidavit lacking facts establishing probable cause is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Montes v. Gallegos · filed 1992-06-05

I conclude that the warrant and supporting affidavit are facially invalid and that as a matter of law, officer Pacheco is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

A Section 1983 claim against prison officials cannot be dismissed on qualified-immunity grounds when whether they reasonably believed the challenged conduct lawful remains a question for the trier of fact.

Kennebrew v. Peterson · filed 1992-06-19

Moreover, the issue of whether the prison officials reasonably believed that the search and the search policy were lawful is an issue for the trier of fact. ... Accordingly, it was error for the district court to dismiss Kennebrew's action for failure to state a claim on qualified immunity grounds.

A plaintiff must show a violation of a constitutional right to overcome qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action.

Marcilis v. R. Bouck, Counselor, in His Individual Capacity Pete Vidor, Deputy, in His Individual Capacity · filed 1992-06-22

Under a qualified immunity analysis, Marcilis has not shown the threshold determination that he has asserted a violation of any constitutional right at all.

A supervisor sued under § 1983 may reasonably rely on a competent subordinate’s investigation unless there is some indication that it was inadequate or incompetent.

Cecere v. City of New York · filed 1992-06-26

Absent some indication to a supervisor that an investigation was inadequate or incompetent, supervisors are not obliged either to undertake de novo investigations or to cross examine subordinates reasonably believed to be competent as to whether their investigations were negligent.

An officer seeking an arrest warrant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the officer reasonably believes the warrant affidavit establishes probable cause.

Thompson v. Reuting · filed 1992-07-07

The issue is not whether the affidavit actually establishes probable cause, but rather whether the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that it established probable cause. ... We therefore affirm the District Court's dismissal of Thompson's complaint on the ground that Reuting was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields an arresting officer from an unlawful arrest claim when arguable probable cause existed for the arrest.

Moore v. Gwinnett County, and Xyz Company, and John Doe, Jointly and Severally, J.O. Meadows · filed 1992-08-06

Instead, we need only state what is virtually obvious from the facts: Officer Meadows had arguable probable cause to effect the arrest such that he is entitled to qualified immunity against Moore’s unlawful arrest claim.

In a § 1983 wrongful-arrest suit, officers may be denied qualified immunity when evidence supports a finding that a reasonable officer could not have believed there was probable cause to arrest.

Alvin Coates Stephanie Benefield v. Timothy Daugherty Chester L. Toney, and Lisa A. Janiszewki · filed 1992-08-18

While we do not find this case free from doubt, we are persuaded that there were facts upon which the jury could properly have found that qualified immunity should not apply.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when reasonably competent officers could disagree about whether their conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Manley v. Dwelle · filed 1992-08-20

Nor did the district court err in granting defendants Dwelle and Russell qualified immunity. The allegations of Manley's misconduct, the investigation into the allegations, and the public pretermination hearing strongly support the conclusion that "officers of reasonable competence could disagree" on whether their conduct violated Manley's rights.

State employees sued in their personal capacities under § 1983 may be protected by qualified immunity.

Becerril v. Clayton Kidd Eunice v. Martin William B. Sutton, Victor Becerril v. Clayton Kidd Officer Vaughn Offic · filed 1992-08-27

Even if Becerril sued the ADOC employees in their personal capacities, the district court concluded, and we agree, that Ruiz, Rouse, Cardenas, and Jacobs are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim challenging an arrest when a prior Franks hearing established probable cause for the arrest warrants.

Mulligan v. Rioux, No. Cv 87 0336554 (Sep. 17, 1992) · filed 1992-09-17

However, in light of Cartier and the fact that a Franks hearing was held after which probable cause was found, we conclude that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

A police officer sued under Section 1983 for obtaining a search warrant has qualified immunity when the warrant application gives a reasonable officer grounds to believe probable cause exists.

Woods v. Lemonds · filed 1992-09-28

Thus, it is the opinion of this Court, that the warrant application sworn out by defendant Lemonds was not so lacking in indicia' of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable and defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff does not show that he was plainly incompetent or knowingly violated the law.

Pettigrew v. Bass · filed 1992-09-29

Because it was not shown that Bass was plainly incompetent or that he knowingly violated the law, he is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when a reasonable officer in his position would not have believed the person arrested had committed a crime.

Mahoney v. Kesery · filed 1992-09-30

But if a reasonable officer would not have believed the person had committed a crime, then the officer, whatever he did or did not believe, is acting contrary to clearly established law and therefore has no immunity.

A police officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if a reasonably competent officer would not have known the conduct violated clearly established law.

King v. Jason Chide and Mark Gonzales · filed 1992-10-13

Qualified immunity cloaks a police officer from liability if a reasonably competent law enforcement agent would not have known that his actions violated clearly established law.

Officials cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 action merely because they did not know the nature of the public employee speech for which they fired the employee.

Churchill v. Waters · filed 1992-10-15

We believe it is immaterial that the defendants were allegedly unaware of whether Churchill’s speech was in regard to a matter of public concern — for while we decline to impose a due process requirement that public officials investigate the precise content of an employee’s alleged complaint, we hold that ignorance of the nature of the employee’s speech (in particular in light of the record before us) is inadequate to insulate officials from a § 1983 action.

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Burnley v. Suthard · filed 1992-10-16

Because no clearly established right is involved, Defendants here are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the environmental tobacco smoke issue.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Stith v. Paul K. Delo Don Roper · filed 1992-10-19

Even assuming that defendants did force Stith to appear at the classification hearing partially dressed with women present, they did not violate a clearly established constitutional right and are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 damages action, once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff must allege particular facts showing a violation of clearly established law.

Pilon v. Maynard · filed 1992-10-22

Once the defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must, with sufficient particularity, "come forward with facts or allegations sufficient to show both that the defendant's alleged conduct violated the law and that the law was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred." Losavio, 847 F.2d at 646.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from § 1983 damages when the alleged violation falls in an unsettled area of law and the right was not clearly established to a reasonable person.

Laws v. Terry · filed 1992-10-28

Governmental officials sued for damages attributable to alleged constitutional violations are entitled to the defense of qualified “good faith” immunity if their challenged conduct does not violate a clearly established right in a manner that a reasonable person would have known. ... Even in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the two alleged violations occur in “gray areas” of the law. For this reason, the Defendant should be allowed a qualified immunity defense from damages.

Section 1983 officers have qualified immunity from damages claims when the alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established.

Franklin v. City of Boise · filed 1992-11-06

The Court notes further that for all of the federal constitutional claims, the officers enjoyed good-faith immunity. Public officials have a qualified immunity when they engage in an unconstitutional act where the alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established.

Section 1983 does not afford a police officer qualified immunity from an unlawful-arrest claim when the officer alleges no facts supporting even arguable probable cause.

Rivera v. Murphy · filed 1992-11-10

Officer Murphy should not have been granted qualified immunity by the court below because there are no facts alleged in Murphy’s affidavit showing, or tending to show, that he had probable cause to arrest Rivera.

A prison official is not entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit when the official knew or should have known of inmates' clearly established right to protection from sexual attacks by other inmates.

Butler v. Dowd · filed 1992-11-11

In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court held that defendants will be protected by qualified immunity in § 1983 suits only if their actions did not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. This court has clearly held that prisoners have a constitutional right to be free of sexual attacks by other inmates and that a prison official is liable if they are deliberately indifferent or act with reckless disregard of that right. Vosburg, 845 F.2d at 765-66; Martin, 742 F.2d at 474. Because this is a clearly established constitutional right about which Dowd either knew or should have known, Dowd was not entitled to qualified immunity in this case.

Section 1983 damages claims against public officials in their individual capacities may be barred by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Mujahid v. Sumner · filed 1992-11-12

Defendants correctly contend that they are protected from liability in their individual capacities by qualified immunity. ... The prison officials in the instant case did not violate the clearly established rights of the plaintiff.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages claims against public officials when the challenged conduct did not violate a right clearly established at the time.

Arrington v. County of Dallas, Jack Richardson, Timothy Hammond v. County of Dallas, Jack Richardson and Rick R · filed 1992-11-12

It follows that the district court is obligated to grant summary judgment if the law at the time of the actions giving rise to the complaint did not clearly establish a cause of action for the violation of statutory or constitutional rights, which the official should have known then existed.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim against a public official must allege and prove that the official violated clearly established constitutional law to overcome qualified immunity.

Raju v. Rhodes · filed 1992-11-20

In a § 1983 action against a public official, the plaintiff bears the burden of alleging and proving that the defendant’s conduct violated “clearly established” constitutional law.

Government officials sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Rooks v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Corp. Commission · filed 1992-11-24

There is a presumption of qualified immunity unless it is shown that the official’s conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Parker v. Sheriff Gary Toelke · filed 1992-11-25

Although courts were beginning to address claims concerning inmates' free-exercise and privacy rights at the time Parker filed suit, we conclude that, at the time of these incidents, Parker did not have clearly established free-exercise or Fourteenth Amendment rights in not being seen nude by female prison guards, female inmates, or female police officers while showering or using the toilet. Toelke was, thus, entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer who knowingly violates the law is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Fowler v. Valencourt · filed 1992-12-01

If true, defendant Valencourt certainly “knowingly violate[d] the law” and is not entitled to immunity.

A probation officer who allegedly prepares a perjured probation revocation petition cannot obtain dismissal of a § 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds when a reasonable officer would have known the conduct violated the probationer’s due process rights.

Park County v. Cooney · filed 1992-12-02

We hold that a reasonable probation officer would have known that the perjury allegedly committed here implicated the probationer’s right to substantive due process under the United States and Wyoming Constitutions. We affirm the trial court’s holding that appellant Mayor is not entitled to dismissal of Cooneys’ claims against him on the basis of qualified immunity, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials are barred by qualified immunity when the officials could reasonably believe their conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo · filed 1992-12-02

Although appellants' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot, their claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a result of the minority program's past operation remain viable. ... Accordingly, Harrison and United Fences' damage claims against the named state officials are barred by qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 judicial-deception claim based on falsehoods in an official report, a plaintiff must make a substantial showing of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for truth to overcome qualified immunity.

Jones v. Thomas · filed 1992-12-04

We have held, in Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 698 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1622 (1991), for a theory of judicial deception, which must be grounded upon the incorporation of falsehoods into official reports, to overcome the defense of qualified immunity, "a plaintiff must make a substantial showing of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for truth, such that would be needed to challenge the presumed validity of an affidavit supporting a search warrant under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154." In this case, not only has plaintiff failed to show Dr. Thomas acted with a deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth, he also failed to establish the report submitted by the defendant was false in any way.

Once a defendant raises qualified immunity in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must show both a violation of law and that the law was clearly established when the defendant acted.

Mahler v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections · filed 1992-12-08

Once the defense of qualified immunity has been raised, the plaintiff must come forward with facts sufficient to show both that the defendants' conduct violated the law and that the law alleged to have been violated was "clearly established" at the time of the defendants' actions. Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645-46 (10th Cir.1988). Mr. Mahler has not met either prong of this burden.

Qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 is available to officials sued in their individual capacities, but not to a county department.

Fitzpatrick v. Meyer · filed 1992-12-09

Because qualified immunity is available only to a defendant named in their individual capacity, Littlejohn, 768 F.2d at 772, this Court declines to accorded qualified immunity to BCDHS which is not and cannot be so named.

Public officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that a claimed right was clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Parker v. Board of Regents of the Tulsa Junior College · filed 1992-12-17

We conclude that plaintiff did not prove that the law was clearly established such that she had a right to a hearing before deciding whether to resign or face termination proceedings. Accordingly, we hold that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

State officials are qualifiedly immune from damages under Section 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Honkanen v. Doyle · filed 1992-12-22

State officials have qualified immunity from money damages under § 1983 "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

In a § 1983 claim against an official asserting qualified immunity, the plaintiff must identify a clearly established right and show that a reasonable officer in the defendant's position should have known the conduct violated that right.

Adams v. Robert Silva and Dean Sanderson · filed 1992-12-22

To hold an official protected by qualified immunity personally liable, the plaintiff must: (1) identify a clearly established right alleged to have been violated; and (2) establish that a reasonable police officer in the defendant's position should have known that the conduct at issue was undertaken in violation of that right.

Officers who withhold exculpatory evidence can be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their belief in probable cause is objectively unreasonable.

Asbury Leaphart, and Esther Leaphart v. Janet Hudson Sandy Laney Tim Taylor, Defendants · filed 1992-12-23

The jury also could have found that, since it was not objectively reasonable for the Defendants to believe they had probable cause when they withheld exculpatory evidence, they were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Individual defendants have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless they knew or should have known their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Nelson v. Payne · filed 1992-12-29

Liability can only be imposed on the individual defendants if it is shown that they knew or should have known that their conduct violated a person’s clearly established constitutional rights.

For qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit, prior cases need some, but not precise, factual correspondence to establish that the law was clearly established.

Calhoun v. Bob D. Gaines and Kenneth Walker · filed 1992-12-30

The standard adopted by this Court requires that there be some, but not necessarily precise, factual correspondence between previous cases and the case at bar.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials are subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Zaczek v. Murray · filed 1992-12-31

Consequently, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Zaczek's claim for damages because the law in this area is ambiguous and their actions did not violate a clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known.

A government attorney sued under § 1983 has qualified immunity when the challenged acts could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights allegedly violated.

Nkop v. Aleeta M. Van Runkle and City and County of San Francisco, Asuquo Nkop v. Aleeta M. Van Runkle and City a · filed 1992-12-31

We agree with the district court that since all of the alleged actions by Van Runkle could have reasonably been thought consistent with the rights allegedly violated--denial of due process and equal protection--Van Runkle is immune under federal law.

Prison officials cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit for disobeying a final, nonappealable release order, even if counsel advised them that the order was unlawful.

Slone v. Herman · filed 1993-01-04

Counsel’s advice that Judge Ely’s order was not lawful does not immunize defendants Herman and Mitchell from liability for disobeying that order once the order became final and they did not file an appeal. A reasonably competent official should know that it is not lawful to disobey a final and nonappealable court order.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 lack qualified immunity for conduct that violates clearly established rights a reasonable official would know.

Rivera-Ruiz v. Leonardo Gonzalez-Rivera, Etc. · filed 1993-01-05

However, government officials are not entitled to this defense if they violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable government official would have known. ... Thus, appellees are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to those actions.

A public official has qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 if the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable.

Buckner v. Hollins · filed 1993-01-06

A public official accused of violating the constitutional rights of others enjoys qualified immunity from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the official’s conduct satisfies the standard of “objective reasonableness.” ... We agree and affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.

Individual defendants have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability for entering a home when they violate no clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Wildauer v. Frederick County · filed 1993-01-12

The individual defendants are also protected by qualified immunity for their entry into Wildauer's home, since they did"not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Section 1983 does not protect an officer with qualified immunity when clearly established law made the unlawfulness of his force during an arrest apparent to a reasonable officer.

Kane v. P.K. Hargis, Senior Trooper, Gloria Anne Kane v. P.K. Hargis, Senior Trooper · filed 1993-01-14

It would have been “apparent” to a reasonable officer in Hargis’ position that, after he had pinned to the ground a woman half his size and the woman did not pose a threat to him, it was unreasonable to push her face into the pavement with such force that her teeth cracked. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Officer Hargis’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity for the excessive force claim.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from Section 1983 liability when a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have acted similarly, even if the conduct violated a constitutional right.

Ken Mouille, Leroy Liberda v. The City of Live Oak, Texas, Mark E. Jackley, Douglas Faesler, and Timothy Britt · filed 1993-01-15

Therefore, even if we conclude, with the benefit of hindsight, that Britt did violate Liberda’s constitutional rights, but we also conclude that a reasonable officer placed in Britt’s shoes would have acted similarly—then Britt is entitled to the protective shroud of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects defendants in a § 1983 involuntary commitment claim when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe the person was dangerous based on the information available at the time.

Glass v. Mayas · filed 1993-01-15

Thus, the availability of qualified immunity turns on whether it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe, at the time they examined Glass and in light of the information that they possessed, that Glass was dangerous.

A prison official sued under § 1983 has qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not understand that the challenged security measure violated the Eighth Amendment.

Harrington v. Grayson · filed 1993-01-22

In the present case, this Court believes that a reasonable person would not understand that a security measure which followed the posting of a notice relating to dress code and required all prisoners to use state issued shoes as a prerequisite for their entry into a hospital, would violate the Eighth Amendment. ... Therefore, the Court concludes that Gray-son is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Bartholomew v. James Rowland B.J. Bunnell · filed 1993-01-22

Dr. DeRomanette and Dr. Johnson, as prison officials, have qualified immunity. ... They are protected from suit "as long as 'their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Lum, 876 F.2d at 1386 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817).

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages suit applies an objective reasonableness test to whether an officer should have recognized that the conduct constituted a seizure or arrest, as well as whether the restraint was justified.

Ungerer v. Moody · filed 1993-01-28

This raises the question whether the test of objective reasonableness applies not only to the existence of justification for any restraint on freedom, but also to the determination of whether the police officer’s actions constitute a seizure or arrest. We conclude that it does.

An official sued under Section 1983 has qualified immunity when the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable under the law clearly established at the time.

Edwards v. Robert James Miller Dennis Gunsch James Votypka John Doe · filed 1993-02-01

The question of whether an official is protected by qualified immunity turns on the "objective legal reasonableness" of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were "clearly established" at the time the action was taken.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Herman v. Kurt Peterson, Superintendent Stanley Lee Bob Deans John Doe Galvin, Custody Unit Supervisor, Pine Hall · filed 1993-02-01

Therefore, the defendant prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity for their failure to award Herman with presentence good conduct credit and the district court properly granted summary judgment.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim protects officials against monetary damages, so the defense is moot when the plaintiff seeks none.

Versarge v. The Township of Clinton New Jersey Annandale Hose Company No. 1, a New Jersey Corporation William Faust · filed 1993-02-02

Because plaintiff seeks no monetary damages, Faust’s qualified immunity defense is moot.

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not defined clearly enough at the time of their conduct to give them fair notice that it was unlawful.

Benitez v. D. Wolff, J. Kihl · filed 1993-02-03

Though the present case presents a close question, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. ... Though, as discussed above, we think that is the fair implication of Wolff v. McDonnell, and we have clarified the existence of the 24-hour retention requirement today, we cannot say that in March 1988 an inmate’s right to retain the notice for 24 hours had been defined with sufficient specificity to deny defendants qualified’ immunity for the acts complained of here.

Section 1983 defendants cannot claim qualified immunity for disobeying a final, nonappealable release order merely because counsel advised that the order was unlawful.

Slone v. Herman · filed 1993-02-05

Counsel's advice that Judge Ely's order was not lawful does not immunize defendants Herman and Mitchell from liability for disobeying that order once the order became final and they did not file an appeal.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity for alleged property deprivations resulting from established prison policies and procedures.

Mowatt v. Miller · filed 1993-02-05

Furthermore, we note that the defendants were protected by qualified immunity insofar as the alleged deprivations resulted from established policies and procedures.

A state officer may claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when a reasonable officer could believe the conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Barney v. Gillespie · filed 1993-02-11

Under the circumstance Whittaker may validly claim qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a § 1983 retaliation suit, a court must accurately characterize the defendants’ actions before applying the objective test for qualified immunity.

Robert O’CONNOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Walter H. Clark, Robert E. Paaswell, Et Al., Defenda · filed 1993-02-12

In essence, the district court failed to accurately define or characterize the defendants’ actions. Such characterization is a prerequisite to application of the objective test for qualified immunity.

A public official has qualified immunity from § 1983 damages only when the official’s conduct is objectively reasonable.

Buckner v. Veltrop · filed 1993-02-15

A public official accused of violating the constitutional rights of others enjoys qualified immunity from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the official's conduct satisfies the standard of "objective reasonableness." ... The district court stated, as a conclusion of law, that "it was simply not reasonable for Veltrop to conclude that it would be proper to stand by and watch a cuffed and naked inmate be beaten on FRDC premises." We agree and affirm the district court's denial of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against police officers based on a right to local, intrastate travel that was not clearly established when they acted.

Klock v. Cain · filed 1993-02-17

The court holds that, even today, the right to local, intrastate travel is not a clearly established constitutional right.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Coker on Behalf of Coker v. Henry · filed 1993-02-18

Reasonable state officers in the positions of defendants cannot be held to have understood that the complained of conduct was unconstitutional. Defendants are thus entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff’s substantive due process claims against all three defendants must be dismissed.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when existing law did not clearly prohibit their conduct under the circumstances.

Jones v. City of Upper Arlington, Paul Schaumburg, and Michael Nagode · filed 1993-02-19

We find that the law regarding the proper use of force under the circumstances of this case did not clearly proscribe the officers' conduct. For this reason, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for the officers on the basis of qualified immunity.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity if the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful when they acted.

Marshall v. Wilbert Allen, Richard Anderson, and Anthony J. Fusco, Jr. · filed 1993-02-25

If it were not clearly established that their conduct violated the law at the time the officials allegedly acted, then they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages are unavailable against a prison warden who has qualified immunity because an inmate had no clearly established right to cross-dress in prison.

Star v. Gramley · filed 1993-02-26

Finally, even assuming (without finding) that the defendant did violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from damages. The plaintiff has no “clearly established” right to cross-dress.

Public officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have understood that the alleged conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Vieira v. Presley · filed 1993-03-17

A reasonable official in the place of these defendants would not have understood that his alleged actions violated a protected right to freedom of association, and the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987), and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the law governing the challenged conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Pelerin v. Carlton County · filed 1993-03-23

The law in this area was thus not “clearly established” when Pelerin was fired. ... We hold that Twomey is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect a sheriff from a § 1983 claim for a blanket strip-search policy applied to minor-offense detainees without individualized reasonable suspicion when clearly established law made the policy unlawful.

Chapman v. Nichols · filed 1993-03-23

The legal issue is whether, as Sheriff Nichols contends, an official could have reasonably believed that a strip search policy applied to minor offense detainees without particularized reasonable suspicion was lawful if conducted in private. In light of the five cases set out above that expressly hold such a private strip search unconstitutional and the lack of any authority to the contrary, we conclude as a matter of law that such a belief is not objectively reasonable. Two of the five cases held, as we do here, that the qualified immunity defense must fail in light of clearly established law.

Qualified immunity does not shield a sheriff from personal liability under § 1983 for a blanket policy of strip searching minor offense detainees without reasonable suspicion when clearly established law made the policy unconstitutional.

Chapman v. Nichols · filed 1993-03-23

We hold as a matter of law that Sheriff Nichols’ belief that his policy was constitutional was not objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Section 1983 affords police officers qualified immunity when omitted facts would not have changed the probable cause determination and their omission did not violate clearly established law.

Jennings v. Hinkle · filed 1993-03-26

We hold that Hinkle’s omissions from the affidavits and from his grand jury testimony were not material to the probable cause determination in the sense required by Harlow and Franks in that they would not have changed that determination. Thus, the omissions did not violate clearly established law, and both Hinkle and Tucker were qualifiedly immune from Section 1983 liability.

State officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show they violated a clearly established right.

Ransom v. Davies · filed 1993-03-30

Because plaintiff fails to show defendants violated any clearly established right, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity against plaintiffs claim for damages.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known at the time that the challenged conduct violated a clearly established right.

Brewer v. Seiter · filed 1993-03-31

A government official enjoys qualified immunity if his or her challenged conduct does not violate clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... We conclude that a reasonable government official would not have known in 1986 of a requirement promulgated in 1988. Therefore, the Defendants are protected under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

An officer who does not violate clearly established rights in obtaining a search warrant is immune from damages in a § 1983 action.

Fairchild v. W.T. Flanagan, Deputy, Detective Sgt. Badge No. M-9, Mohave County Sheriff's Office · filed 1993-04-05

Flanagan is immune for civil damages for his part in obtaining a search warrant of Fairchild's residence.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when they reasonably could not know that enforcing binding regulations would violate clearly established rights.

Evans v. Evans · filed 1993-04-08

Although this Court has held that the process is illegal because it conflicts with IDEA, the Court must find that based on these facts these individual Defendants are shielded from liability for civil damages because they reasonably could have not known that in executing these illegal regulations they would violate an individual’s clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Section 1983 defendants performing investigative duties may receive qualified immunity when their conduct is objectively reasonable and does not violate clearly established rights.

Trust & Investment Advisors, Inc. v. Hogsett · filed 1993-04-08

TIA has failed to allege facts which, if proven, would demonstrate that Dant’s actions were objectively unreasonable or violated TIA’s clearly established rights. Dant is thus entitled to qualified immunity.

A detective is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim over a compelled blood sample when the evidence shows probable cause for the search warrant.

Will H. Woods v. Detective A.T. Lemonds City of Cape Girardeau, Missouri · filed 1993-04-09

Because the evidence showed Lemonds had probable cause for the search warrant, we agree with the district court that Lemonds is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued for damages in their personal capacities under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted federal right was not clearly established; decisions of a Washington district court did not clearly establish the claimed right.

Ronald Cree, Jr. Dalton Cree Jack Haggerty Tiin-Ma Logging Co. v. State of Washington David W. Waterbury Keith Qunell · filed 1993-04-14

The Yakima County District Court decisions dismissing the earlier citations are insufficient to clearly establish the federal right the plaintiffs assert under the Treaty. ... We conclude that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' claims for damages against them in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Government officials lack qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct is not objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Foulks v. Cole County, Missouri · filed 1993-04-14

The defendants have failed to show that their actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law. The law was clearly established at the time of Cornelious' injury that if a reasonable official would have known that observation and treatment was necessary, the refusal to provide access to the treatment would constitute deliberate indifference to Cornelious' constitutional rights. Because Foulks has alleged a sufficient claim of deliberate indifference to withstand the defendants' motion for qualified immunity, we affirm the district court.

Section 1983 claims against state officers may be dismissed on qualified-immunity grounds.

White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson · filed 1993-04-21

For the reasons below, we conclude that plaintiffs' First Amendment claims and certain of their due process claims lacked merit and that defendants were entitled to dismissal of the remaining due process claims on the ground of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects a prison official from § 1983 damages when the official reasonably believed his conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Oswald v. Graves · filed 1993-04-26

In addition, this Court concludes that, even had there been a violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights, defendant would have been reasonably justified in his belief that the law did not proscribe his actions, and that his actions did not violate plaintiffs statutory or constitutional rights. Therefore, plaintiffs claim for damages can be properly terminated by a summary judgment based on the Court’s finding that defendant is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

A police officer who retaliates against a person for exercising the constitutional right to plead not guilty and demand a hearing is not entitled to qualified immunity from damages under § 1983.

Ruscavage v. Zuratt · filed 1993-04-30

The right to be free from bad faith prosecution in retaliation for exercise of one’s constitutional rights is likewise clearly established. Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity from damages because he acted in bad faith to retaliate against Plaintiff.

A prison officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the alleged conduct violated an Eighth Amendment right that was clearly established at the time.

Hill v. Shelander · filed 1993-04-30

Accordingly, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Hill, Shelander did not act in the shadow of legal uncertainty, and he is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity is unavailable in a § 1983 claim when prison officials violate clearly established due process rights at a disciplinary hearing.

Hyson v. Neubert · filed 1993-05-03

It appears that the due process rights for disciplinary hearings articulated by the Third Circuit in Helms v. Hewitt should be well known to a prison official such that qualified immunity would not be available.

Qualified immunity does not protect § 1983 defendants from a political-discharge claim if the plaintiff proves a violation of a First Amendment right that was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred.

Melancon v. Ascension Parish · filed 1993-05-10

Although the Court cannot determine whether the dismissal was politically motivated because of material issues of fact in dispute, the Court does find that if plaintiff does establish such a violation at the trial, this right was clearly established at the time the alleged violation occurred.... Therefore, the defendants would be prohibited from relying on the defense of qualified immunity.