42 U.S.C. § 1983

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they could not have known their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Singer v. State of Maine, John Lafaver · filed 1995-04-13

We cannot conclude that defendants knew or should have known that their actions violated Singer’s clearly-established Fifth Amendment rights. Indeed, it could be reasonably argued that under the applicable law, there was no Fifth Amendment violation at all. Accordingly, we hold that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to the § 1983 Fifth Amendment claim.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a Section 1983 claim and does not remove federal subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.

Mayronne v. Vaught · filed 1995-04-13

Contrary to plaintiffs assertions, qualified immunity does not remove the adjudication of Section 1983 claims from the federal courts, but rather provides an affirmative defense.

Municipal entities are not entitled to qualified immunity from claims brought under Section 1983.

Stanziale v. County of Monmouth · filed 1995-04-19

As a threshold matter, the court notes that qualified immunity for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 clearly does not extend to municipal entities.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, an officer may have qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable to believe probable cause existed, even when probable cause was absent.

Naccarato v. Oliver · filed 1995-04-19

It can be objectively reasonable for an officer to believe that probable cause existed for the arrest, even in the absence of a finding that probable cause in fact existed.

Qualified immunity is a defense to a Section 1983 claim, but it does not protect officials whose actions violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Wilson v. Meeks · filed 1995-04-20

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense against section 1983 claims. ... However, qualified immunity is not a defense when officials' actions violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim does not require an officer responding to a threat to know the suspect’s intentions.

Wilson v. Meeks · filed 1995-04-20

Qualified immunity does not require that the po-' lice officer know what is in the heart or mind of his assailant.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their challenged conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Thomas v. Lawrence Whalen and Edward Ammann, City of Cincinnati · filed 1995-04-21

It follows that the two individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from suit and that the complaint against them should likewise have been dismissed.

Section 1983 claims against police officers are subject to qualified immunity when the officer did not violate clearly established law.

Romero v. Sanchez · filed 1995-04-24

Therefore Officer Sanchez is entitled to qualified immunity because there is no proof that he violated clearly established law, and he should not be made to stand trial on the § 1983 claims.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim when the officer leads a search team into the wrong home without reasonable efforts to verify that it is the place named in the warrant.

Hartsfield v. Lemacks · filed 1995-04-24

Because Newton did nothing to make sure that he was leading the other officers to the correct residence, we conclude that the district court erred in holding that he was protected by qualified immunity.

An individual-capacity § 1983 claim against a government official is subject to dismissal when the complaint does not allege that the official violated clearly established rights.

Canon v. Clark · filed 1995-04-25

The Second Amended Complaint does not allege that Mr. Clark violated Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... The Court thus finds that the Complaint as to Mr. -Clark in his individual capacity should be dismissed.

Section 1983 officers receive qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed their conduct was constitutional under clearly established law.

Lester v. Brown · filed 1995-04-26

As plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that no reasonable police officer could have believed that handcuffing Lester and placing him in the police car was constitutional, qualified immunity should apply.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officers for failing to prevent another officer’s reasonable conduct; those officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Bills v. Aseltine · filed 1995-04-26

We hold that Aseltine's culpability is necessary to any liability of the other officers. Aseltine actively performed (invited Meisling to the search) what they merely failed to prevent, and he actually knew what they might only suspect. The officers' alleged violations were, in essence, "lesser included offenses" of Aseltine's, so that the jury's finding that Aseltine acted reasonably must mean that there can be no liability for failing to prevent "reasonable" actions. Thus, we find that Bills is collaterally estopped from going to a jury on the reasonableness of the attending officers' conduct. Since the officers did not act unreasonably, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Court reporters have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when a reasonable reporter could believe that alleged transcript alterations would not prejudice the criminal defendant’s appeal.

Curro v. Watson · filed 1995-04-28

The Court is of the opinion that the defense of qualified immunity insulates each of the present defendants from suit, because a reasonable court reporter could have believed that the alleged alterations to the transcript would not prejudice Curro’s appeal.

Officers have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for injuries caused by a fleeing suspect when their potential liability was not clearly established at the time of the chase.

Trigalet v. Young · filed 1995-05-02

We have found no opinion decided between 1986 and 1990 holding that an officer could be held hable under section 1983 to a third party injured as a result of pohce chasing a fleeing felon. Although we recognize that the very conduct need not have previously been held unlawful, the Trigalets have cited no case, nor have we found one, that is sufficiently analogous to the facts here to persuade us that the law became clearly established before Medina was decided in 1992. Accordingly, we conclude that the Trigalets have not satisfied their burden with respect to defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity, and we reverse the district court’s determination to the contrary.

Section 1983 affords a police officer qualified immunity from a claim based on seeking an arrest warrant when there was arguable probable cause.

Moran v. Marker · filed 1995-05-02

Upon this basis and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the non-movant, the court concludes that there was arguable probable cause. As a result, defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 lack qualified immunity when they unreasonably ignore a later custody decree that defeats their asserted grounds for arrest and seizure.

Henderson v. Mohave County · filed 1995-05-03

The officers are entitled to immunity if they “reasonably but mistakenly” believed that they had probable cause to arrest Kathy and to take Korinne into custody. ... Deaf as they acted to the explanation offered by Kathy, blind as they appeared to the later decree, the sheriffs did not act reasonably.

Qualified immunity protects an official from § 1983 damages when existing law gave the official a reasonable basis to believe the challenged conduct was lawful.

Gregorich v. Lund · filed 1995-05-09

We hold only that, at the time he acted, Justice Lund had a reasonable basis for his conclusion and therefore could invoke the protection of qualified immunity.

A public school official sued under § 1983 may assert qualified immunity.

Doe ex rel. Doe v. Petaluma City School District · filed 1995-05-12

Homrighouse, as a public school official, is eligible to assert a qualified immunity defense.

Municipal corporations cannot invoke qualified immunity as a defense to liability under § 1983, even when individual officials receive qualified immunity.

Term Auto Sales, Inc. v. The City of Cleveland · filed 1995-05-18

It is well settled that while qualified immunity protects officials, "the doctrine of qualified immunity is no defense to municipal corporations which may otherwise be liable for federal constitutional violations under [42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983]." ... Therefore, the district court's determination that, since we had afforded qualified immunity to the individual defendants on appeal, no liability remained as to the City was erroneous.

Section 1983 claims against prison officials are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Atkins v. Latanzio · filed 1995-05-18

For these reasons, I find that it was not clearly established as of January 20, 1988 that plaintiff had an enforceable liberty interest in remaining free from handcuff restraints when exiting his SHU cell, whether or not the order authorizing such restraint had expired. Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity against such a claim.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from a prisoner retaliation claim when reasonable officials could believe a transfer was lawful because it advanced legitimate penological goals through narrowly tailored means.

SCHROEDER v. McDONALD · filed 1995-05-19

Accordingly, we conclude that defendants were advancing legitimate penological goals and their means were narrowly tailored to meet those goals; thus, defendants could have believed the transfer of Schroeder from the minimum security facility back to the medium security facility was lawful. See Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532. Consequently, we conclude that defendants are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity with regard to the retaliation claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could believe their conduct was lawful, even if other reasonable officers could disagree.

Cooper v. Palmieri · filed 1995-05-19

If a reasonable officer could believe that the Defendants' conduct was lawful, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity even if other reasonable officers could disagree about the lawfulness of the Defendants' conduct.

Section 1983 gives a medical examiner absolute immunity for trial testimony, but not for knowingly withholding material evidence during an investigation.

Walker v. Tyler County Commission · filed 1995-05-22

Although it is correct that Sopher is absolutely immune for any claims of perjury which occurred while testifying as a witness in the underlying criminal trials, he may still be held liable for his alleged refusal to furnish the defense with records from Sherwood’s autopsy unless he can invoke the doctrine of qualified immunity. ... Sopher is in a position similar to a police officer; accordingly, under Goodwin, he is not immune from claims that he knowingly withheld material evidence from the defense in order to convict Walker.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer from liability for failing to protect a person from private violence when no constitutional duty to provide that protection was clearly established at the time.

Pinder v. Johnson · filed 1995-05-30

We hold that no such due process right to protection was clearly established, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), and that Officer Johnson is thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability unless they violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable person would have known.

Pinder v. Johnson · filed 1995-05-30

Qualified immunity under § 1983 shields officials from civil liability unless their actions violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

State caseworkers have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when it was not clearly established that they could be liable for a child harmed by one natural parent while in the physical custody of the other.

Nos. 93-9158, 93-9324 · filed 1995-05-31

It was not clearly established law then or now that these caseworkers could expect to be liable when a child, in their legal, but not their physical custody, is harmed by a natural parent while in the physical custody of the other natural parent.

Section 1983 does not shield prison officers with qualified immunity when their duty to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates was clearly established.

Solesbee v. Witkowski · filed 1995-05-31

The COs' claim of qualified immunity fails as well. The general duty of prison officials to protect inmates committed to their care had been clearly established for years prior to the attack on Solesbee.

Qualified immunity shields an official from a § 1983 damages claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Soliday v. Miami County, Ohio · filed 1995-06-02

The key issue in analyzing a claim of qualified immunity is whether the defendant's alleged conduct violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." ... The events here occurred before Brotherton I was decided. The District Court held that Meeker was protected by qualified immunity. This decision is correct, and we therefore affirm it.

Officials sued for damages under Section 1983 may have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Soliday v. Miami County · filed 1995-06-02

Government officials may be entitled to qualified immunity from civil suits for damages arising out of their performance of their official duties. ... The events here occurred before Brotherton I was decided. The District Court held that Meeker was protected by qualified immunity. This decision is correct, and we therefore affirm it.

Section 1983 individual-capacity claims against government officials are barred by qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of clearly established law.

May v. Fulton County, Ga. · filed 1995-06-07

In addition, this court finds that plaintiffs have not shown that defendants violated clearly established law at any time relevant herein. Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity bars plaintiffs’ claims against defendants Davis, Boyd, Fra-ley, and Fuller in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity can bar an individual-capacity § 1983 claim against an officer for actions in effecting an arrest.

Chamblin v. Soltani · filed 1995-06-08

As part of the May 8, 1995, order, the court found and ruled "that defendant[] Soltani [is] entitled to qualified immunity with regard to [his] actions in effecting the arrest of plaintiff." Order of May 8, 1995, at 35. ... In accordance with said finding, the court herewith grants summary judgment on behalf of defendant Soltani, in his individual capacity, with respect to plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

Deputies executing a court order under an untested state statute are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when no clearly established right prohibited their conduct.

Salzer v. Dellinger · filed 1995-06-08

Under these facts, we conclude that the deputy sheriffs did not violate any clearly established right, so they were entitled to qualified immunity under Sec. 1983.

Qualified immunity shields a defendant from personal damages liability under § 1983 when the conduct did not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Kaluczky v. City Of White Plains · filed 1995-06-08

In a Sec. 1983 action, it is well-settled that qualified immunity shields a defendant from personal liability for damages so long as his conduct did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

A government official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable official would not have known that the challenged conduct violated a clearly established right.

Olivo v. David K. Mapp, Jr., Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of the City of Norfolk, and City · filed 1995-06-08

Because Olivo failed to establish that his speech addressed a matter of public concern, a reasonable sheriff would not have known that Mapp's actions with respect to Olivo would violate Olivo's First Amendment rights. Accordingly, Mapp is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the scope of their asserted constitutional duty was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Hamrick v. Robert Carson Packard Joseph Talley, Sherrye Elizabeth Elliot, and Town of Boiling Springs · filed 1995-06-09

Because the scope of the officers' responsibility had not been clearly established at the time of the events at issue here, Packard and Talley reasonably could have believed--indeed had no reason not to believe--that their actions did not violate clearly established law, and thus they are entitled to qualified immunity.

A municipality cannot claim qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit.

Moore v. City of Wynnewood · filed 1995-06-13

In contrast, the City is not entitled to qualified immunity, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1409, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980), and cannot invoke the collateral order doctrine to justify appeal of an otherwise nonappealable decision, Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 1207-08, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995).

A public official sued individually under § 1983 has qualified immunity for following affirmative action goals or a plan when a reasonable official would not have understood that doing so violated clearly established law.

Ball v. Cook County School District · filed 1995-06-13

As both a matter of law and common sense, the court finds that a public official — whether faced with a defined set of affirmative action goals or mere policy suggestions — would not have believed he was violating the law by acting pursuant thereto. ... Accordingly, the court finds that DEFENDANT LEICHNER IS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY.

Qualified immunity does not support § 1983 summary judgment when the defendant has not shown that the governing statutory or constitutional law was unclear at the time of the challenged conduct.

Carr v. Alford · filed 1987-02-04

On summary judgment, the judge is to determine if the law asserted to have been violated was clearly established at the time the defendant official acted. If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. ... Here, Alford failed to show that the law was not clearly established concerning many of the conditions challenged by Carr. Accordingly, summary judgment was not appropriate on that ground, either.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity is a question of law for the court to decide.

Alvarado v. Ronald D. Picur, Special Administrator of the Estate of Robert Curry, 1 · filed 1988-10-27

The question of qualified immunity is a question of law for the court, not for the jury.

Officers sued under Section 1983 may receive summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Collinson v. Gott · filed 1990-02-13

The grants of summary judgment by reason of qualified immunity to officers Bowen and Nutter, respectively, are affirmed.

In a § 1983 Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim, a finding of wanton conduct precludes qualified immunity, so a separate qualified-immunity jury instruction is unnecessary.

Valdez v. Farmon · filed 1991-06-11

Because the court concludes that the standard that plaintiff has to meet in an Eighth Amendment case includes an element of willfulness (i.e., wantonness), there is no possibility that the jury could rule in plaintiff’s favor, yet also rule that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, a jury may decide whether officers reasonably believed their use of force was lawful for qualified immunity purposes.

Posr v. Doherty · filed 1991-09-10

Whether the officers reasonably believed that their use of force was not excessive was properly a jury issue. By its verdict, the jury found against the defendants on this prong of the qualified immunity defense and we find no basis for disturbing this finding.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit cannot be resolved as a matter of law when disputed facts determine whether officers are protected.

Richardson v. City of Dayton · filed 1991-11-21

Because of factual disputes in this case, it is inappropriate for us to rule as a matter of law that qualified immunity shields the officers from liability. The applicability of qualified immunity to a given set of facts is a question of law for a court to decide. Garvie v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 647, 649 (6th Cir.1988). In this case, however, a jury should be the final arbiter of the qualified immunity issue since the resolution of the qualified immunity issue turns upon which view of the facts the jury accepts. See Brandenburg v. Cureton, 882 F.2d 211, 215-16 (1989) (factual issues precluded the court from holding that qualified immunity barred new trial).

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 due process claim when the evidence raises a genuine factual dispute over whether their conduct denied the plaintiff an unbiased tribunal.

Patrick v. Miller · filed 1992-01-27

To the contrary, we find Patrick’s evidence sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants’ conduct denied Patrick an unbiased tribunal. Thus, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Patrick’s due process claim.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when undisputed facts establish that issuing a citation did not amount to an arrest.

Devine v. M.T. Pickering, James Eure, Coleman Davis, and Ted Denny · filed 1992-04-08

Because we find, on the basis of undisputed facts, that Sergeant Denny and Officer Pickering did not arrest Devine when ordering and writing the citation, these defendants were entitled to judgment on their claims of qualified immunity with respect to Devine's illegal arrest claim.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim should normally be decided on summary judgment after adequate development of the factual record.

Lester v. City of Tavares · filed 1992-07-10

Because qualified immunity is a defense to a section 1983 claim, the question whether it precludes liability should normally be raised by motion for summary judgment, determined by the trial court after an adequate development of the factual record.

In a Section 1983 excessive-force suit, disputed material facts bearing on officers’ qualified immunity preclude summary judgment on that defense.

Washington v. L. Newsom R. Phillips J. Thomas the City of Southfield and the Southfield Police Department · filed 1992-12-21

The defense of qualified immunity in this case is dependent upon the resolution of these factual issues, and in particular on the facts relative to Ellington’s flight from the car in the presence of a number of police officers. The district court found, and we agree, that the facts surrounding those inquiries are not undisputed.

In a § 1983 action, a genuine factual dispute about an official's conduct can preclude summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Tucker v. Resha · filed 1992-12-30

Having carefully reviewed Resha's amended complaint, as well as Tucker's answer, affidavit, and motion for summary judgment, and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to Respondent as the non-moving party, we find a genuine factual issue exists regarding Tucker's conduct, so as to preclude a grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 excessive-force claim, disputed facts about the force used can leave the officers’ qualified-immunity defense for the jury.

Mazurkiewicz v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1993-01-19

It is proper to leave the question of qualified immunity on this count of excessive force to the jury.

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity from damages for failing to prevent inmate intimidation without actual injury when no clearly established right prohibits that conduct.

Allen v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 1993-01-27

Because the Court has been unable to find any authority alluding to the right of an inmate to be free of intimidation by other inmates where the intimidation does not result in any actual injury, the Court is compelled to find that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing a violation of “a clearly established right.” As a consequence, State Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action cannot be resolved on summary judgment when material factual disputes prevent determining whether the defendants reasonably believed their conduct was lawful.

Fain v. Jack Kerns R. Prigge · filed 1993-03-01

Applying this three-part analysis, we find genuine issues of material fact preclude a determination of whether Prigge and Murray are entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts prevent a finding that the challenged conduct was objectively reasonable.

Tveraas v. Coffey · filed 1993-03-05

As a matter of law, then, it is not at all clear that the defendant’s finding of probable cause was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity is inappropriate at this time.

In a § 1983 excessive-force suit, disputed facts bearing on whether a reasonable officer could believe his use of force was lawful may be submitted to the jury in resolving qualified immunity.

Miller v. James R. Nida, Individually and in His Official Capacity, and Chief of Fairfax County Police Departm · filed 1993-03-09

The district court denied Nida's motion, properly recognizing that there were disputed facts surrounding Nida's use of force against Miller that presented issues for the jury's resolution. The question whether a reasonable officer in the circumstances faced by Officer Nida could have believed his use of force was legal was a fact-specific question, appropriately reserved for the jury's resolution.

A police officer sued under § 1983 for signing a probable cause affidavit may be denied qualified immunity when material facts bear on whether a reasonably competent officer would have signed it with the information she possessed.

Meyer v. Lana J. Robinson, Individually and as a Police Officer of the City of Lawrence · filed 1993-05-06

Thus, we hold that material issues of fact remain in dispute regarding whether Meyer’s arrest of Kielblock involved excessive force and whether a reasonably competent officer would have signed the probable cause affidavit in light of the information she possessed.

A defendant who raises qualified immunity in a Section 1983 case is entitled to a ruling on that defense when the district court decides a summary judgment motion.

Beck v. Charles Schwartz, Industries Supervisor I · filed 1993-05-12

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, appellant raised the issue of qualified immunity. Although entitled to a ruling on this issue, the district court overruled appellant’s motion for summary judgment without reference to this defense. This was error.

Qualified immunity does not justify a directed verdict on a § 1983 excessive force claim when disputed facts must be resolved before the officers’ conduct can be judged reasonable.

Trigo v. Moore · filed 1993-06-07

The district court erred in granting a directed verdict based on qualified immunity. This case is more closely analogous to Rainey than Gooden, which the court used because the central issue is the amount of force used. Further, as this case was already in the trial phase, the goal of qualified immunity to spare the defendants the burden and uncertainty of trial would not be served by granting a directed verdict. See Gooden, 954 F.2d at 965. Because there were critical issues of fact that needed to be determined before the officers' actions could be labeled as reasonable or unreasonable, the directed verdict was not properly granted.

In a Section 1983 suit, qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment when material facts remain disputed about whether an official committed acts violating a clearly established right.

Barbara Walton, Individually and as Next Friend of Courtney Walton and Kamara Walton v. City of Southfield, Keith Birber · filed 1993-06-10

However, if genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the defendants actually did commit acts that would violate a clearly established right, then summary judgment on qualified immunity is improper.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when the evidence, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, creates a genuine factual issue whether a reasonably competent police officer would have considered the force lawful.

Gasparre v. City of St. Paul · filed 1993-06-22

Our analysis of the Graham factors indicates that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether a reasonably competent police officer would have concluded that Sohm’s actions were legal. ... The trial court properly denied appellants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified and official immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when their determination of probable cause may be found objectively unreasonable.

Maxwell v. The City of Indianapolis, Sergeant Harry Gurnell, Officer Dennis Rahn, and Officer George Diehl · filed 1993-06-29

Because we have already established that the conclusion by the three officers concerning the existence of probable cause may be found to be objectively unreasonable, they are not entitled to qualified immunity at this juncture.

Summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 action requires application of the standard specific to qualified immunity.

Jack Ruggles, Jr. v. State of Nevada, Gary Whipple, David Sowder, David Hefner, Janet Garrietty, T.J. Cappaccio, Lou Gre · filed 1993-07-01

The district court's order denying summary judgment recites the ordinary summary judgment standard without acknowledging the overriding importance of the unique standard appropriate in the context of qualified immunity.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established, even if a factual dispute remains over whether the right was infringed.

Camarillo v. Daniel J. McCarthy Director · filed 1993-07-01

Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages, unless the official’s conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... The district court should have ordered summary judgment for the defendants. Once it was determined that no clearly established constitutional right was violated, the factual dispute became immaterial.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim against a prison supervisor when disputed facts determine whether the supervisor knowingly failed to prevent repeated guard assaults in breach of a clearly established duty.

Burgo v. Shimoda · filed 1993-08-18

Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that Burgo's right not to be subjected to excessive force by prison personnel was clearly established, as was the responsibility of supervisory prison personnel not to act with deliberate indifference to that right. ... Because these issues of fact must be resolved in order to determine whether Shimoda "knowingly violated the law" by failing to take steps to prevent Kauhane from repeating his physical attacks on inmates, the district court did not err in denying summary judgment.

Summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 action is improper when genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether officials committed acts violating a clearly established right.

Black v. Al C. Parke, Kenneth Case, Walt Chapleau, and Tom Campbell · filed 1993-09-09

However, if genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the defendants actually did commit acts that would violate a clearly established right, then summary judgment on qualified immunity is improper.

In a Section 1983 action, disputed facts underlying a claim of qualified immunity must be determined by the fact finder.

J. Manuel Morales, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. City of San Rafael Daniel Hulett, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Ap · filed 1993-09-28

Similarly, where the facts underlying a claim of qualified immunity are in dispute, those facts are to be determined by the fact finder--in this case, the jury.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity supports summary judgment for prison officials if a reasonable official could have believed the challenged actions were lawful.

Mines v. Gardner · filed 1993-09-29

If a reasonable prison official could have believed that his actions were lawful, summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is appropriate. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Hemphill, 987 F.2d at 591, 594. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim turns on uncertainty in the law and does not shield officials merely because disputed facts concern whether an employment contract created a clearly established property interest.

Lassiter v. Alabama · filed 1993-10-07

Qualified immunity turns on ambiguity in the law, not ambiguity in the contract. If the law is clear, but there are issues of fact concerning the contract, then a defendant is not immune from having a jury resolve the factual issues concerning the contract.

An officer is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity from a Section 1983 shooting claim when, on the plaintiff's asserted facts, no reasonable officer could have believed the shooting lawful.

Lowery v. Redd · filed 1993-12-21

The district court denied Stovall's motion because, if Lowery's assertions of fact were true, no reasonable officer could have believed that the shooting was lawful. ... We have considered the briefs and arguments of the parties, and we affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons stated in its memorandum opinion.

Officers sued under Section 1983 cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when a jury could find their observations utterly inconsistent with witness descriptions and their conduct unjustified by exigent or dangerous circumstances.

James E. Taylor, Administrator for the Estate of Brenda K. Taylor v. David Farmer Thomas P. Leonard · filed 1993-12-27

Here, summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not available to the officers because a jury could reasonably believe that the officers’ personal observations of a detained suspect were utterly inconsistent with descriptions provided them by witnesses, and that the officers’ conduct could not be justified by exigent or dangerous circumstances.

Section 1983 damages claims against prison officials may be resolved by summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Easterling v. Charles Creecy Randall Lee Director's Classification Committee · filed 1994-01-06

To the extent that Easterling seeks damages, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 officials may obtain qualified immunity on summary judgment only when no genuine factual dispute bears on whether their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

David K. Nelson, Jr. v. Allan Streeter, Dorothy Tillman, and Bobby L. Rush · filed 1994-02-01

An official is entitled to immunity only if the uncontested or uncontestable facts reveal that his acts did not invade the plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights. At least this is so where, as in this case, the defense is raised by motion for summary judgment. The motion can be granted only if there is no genuine issue of material fact bearing on the entitlement to immunity.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when the evidence cannot support a finding that the officer acted objectively unreasonably.

Gamble v. Moran · filed 1994-02-08

If, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could not find facts sufficient to support the legal conclusion that the officer's conduct was objectively unreasonable, it follows that summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity is appropriate.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment in a § 1983 action when material factual disputes bear on whether the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable.

Guffey v. Eldridge Wyatt, Officer · filed 1994-03-09

As defendant’s claim of qualified immunity remains inextricably bound to disputed factual issues, we affirm the Magistrate Judge’s order denying summary judgment.

A police officer sued for false arrest under § 1983 has qualified immunity, but factual disputes about probable cause can prevent summary judgment on that defense.

Gordon v. Villegas, No. Cv90 270839s (Mar. 10, 1994) · filed 1994-03-10

For example, a police officer sued for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , has only a qualified immunity. ... As discussed above, there are factual disputes about what occurred at the premises that make it inappropriate for the court to determine whether the officers, including Domkowski, had probable cause and therefore are protected by the qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action is a question of law for the court.

Hebron v. Catherine Touhy and Albert Parks · filed 1994-03-28

But qualified immunity presents a question of law for the court.

Section 1983 defendants must submit a qualified immunity defense to a fact finder when material facts bearing on that defense remain disputed.

Johnson v. Louisiana Dept. of Agriculture · filed 1994-04-12

Thus defendants must present their qualified immunity defenses to a fact finder for resolution of material issues of fact.

A public official is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity in a Section 1983 retaliation suit when clearly established law made the alleged conduct unlawful to a reasonable official.

Frank Donahue Jackson Killough, AKA Chris Killough, an Individual v. William Casey, an Individual, and Greg Winters, an · filed 1994-04-25

Given all of this and given the established jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and this circuit, we cannot see how Winters can hope to claim that he reasonably believed that his conduct was lawful, unless he somehow reasonably believed that Donahue's statement to the OCC was false--so false that it fell outside of the protective mantle of the First Amendment. On this record, we do not see how Winters could possibly have entertained that belief, though perhaps a more complete development of the facts will someday show that he could have. At any rate, he certainly was not entitled to summary judgment on his qualified immunity claim.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 excessive-force claim requires objectively reasonable conduct; an officer is not immune merely because the plaintiff suffered no significant injury.

Harper v. Harris County, Tex. · filed 1994-04-28

Qualified immunity only shields officers who engage in objectively reasonable conduct, not officers who engage in objectively unreasonable conduct but do not cause a significant injury.

In a § 1983 suit against police officers, a jury must resolve disputed facts bearing on whether the officers reasonably believed their conduct was lawful for purposes of qualified immunity.

Oliveira v. Mayer · filed 1994-04-28

These disputes bear directly upon whether it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that they were acting lawfully. ... The District Court should have let the jury (a) resolve these factual disputes and (b) based on its findings, decide whether it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe that they were acting within the bounds of the law when they detained the plaintiffs.

Qualified immunity supports summary judgment for officers on a § 1983 arrest claim when the evidence cannot support an inference that they knowingly or recklessly misled the judge who issued the warrant.

Beard v. City of Northglenn · filed 1994-05-11

Given, in Harlow’s parlance, appellant’s inability to sustain an inference that the officers acted knowingly or recklessly to mislead the warrant-issuing judge, we hold summary judgment in favor of appellees on his § 1983 claim appropriate.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action must be resolved by a fact finder when material facts bearing on the defense remain disputed.

Johnson v. Louisiana Department of Agriculture, Bob Odom · filed 1994-05-20

Thus defendants must present their qualified immunity defenses to a fact finder for resolution of material issues of fact.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when facts material to that immunity are genuinely disputed.

Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss. · filed 1994-06-10

If disputed factual issues material to qualified immunity exist summary judgment is not appropriate.

In a § 1983 suit, material factual disputes bearing on an individual defendant’s qualified immunity preclude summary judgment.

Hare ex rel. Hare v. City of Corinth · filed 1994-06-10

If disputed factual issues material to qualified immunity exist summary judgment is not appropriate.

In a § 1983 action, a finding that officials did not violate the plaintiff’s rights supports ordinary summary judgment rather than summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Megenity v. Stenger · filed 1994-06-23

Next, rather than looking to see if a reasonable public official would have been aware of this legal right, the magistrate judge went on to conclude that there were no disputed facts precluding him from finding that the conduct of defendants did not violate plaintiff's rights. Although we agree with this conclusion, it is actually a conclusion that supports a general summary judgment, not a summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim cannot be resolved as a question of law at summary judgment when material facts about the arrest are disputed.

Gloria Jean Harper, Individually and as Mother and Next Friend of Jordan Harper a Minor and Jordan Harper v. Coun · filed 1994-06-28

While it is correct that the reasonableness of the arresting officer’s conduct under the circumstances is a question of law for the court to decide, such is not the case where there exist material factual disputes as in the case before us.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 arrest claim cannot be resolved as a matter of law while material facts about the existence of probable cause remain disputed.

Mulligan v. Rioux · filed 1994-06-28

Rather, Cartier requires that in a civil proceeding, before taking the issue of qualified immunity away from the jury as a matter of law on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must first determine that there are no material issues of fact relevant to the existence of probable cause.

Qualified immunity does not justify summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when genuine disputes of material fact must be resolved to determine whether the officer acted reasonably under clearly established law.

Baker v. Chaplin · filed 1994-06-30

Although qualified immunity is “in part an entitlement not to be forced to litigate,” when the law is clearly established, immunity from trial is appropriate only when the plaintiff has not demonstrated any genuine issues of material fact which must be resolved to determine whether the defendant’s actions were reasonable under clearly established law.

Disputed facts about an official’s conduct can prevent summary judgment on qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action.

Longoria v. Robert G. Borg, Warden, and Bernie Aispuro, Warden · filed 1994-07-13

The court correctly found that disputed issues of fact prevented a determination of qualified immunity at summary judgment.

A police officer is immune from a § 1983 action when his use of deadly force is objectively reasonable in response to a threat of serious bodily injury.

Reynolds v. County of San Diego · filed 1994-07-14

The Court finds that Jackson acted reasonably when confronted with the threat of serious bodily injury and therefore is entitled to immunity. Defendant Jackson’s motion for summary judgment is therefore granted as to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

A § 1983 plaintiff alleging intentional discrimination must offer more than conclusory assertions of discriminatory intent to overcome qualified immunity at summary judgment.

Lindsey v. Donald L. "Pat" Shalmy, Clark County Manager, and Cliff Rives · filed 1994-07-14

Mere conclu-sory assertions of discriminatory intent, embodied in affidavits or deposition testimony, cannot be sufficient to avert summary judgment.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action cannot be granted on summary judgment while a material factual dispute remains over whether officials violated a clearly established right.

MacKey v. Dennis Dyke, Assistant Deputy Director of the Bureau of Correctional Facilities, Michigan Depart · filed 1994-07-21

Because the question of whether bed space for Mackey was available in the general prison population is material and is as yet unanswered, the district court erred in finding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity when it ruled on the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

A plaintiff opposing qualified-immunity summary judgment in a § 1983 suit may use circumstantial evidence to prove a public official’s unconstitutional motive.

Tompkins v. Vickers · filed 1994-07-25

We agree with those Circuits that have rejected the argument that a plaintiff must produce direct evidence in a case such as this. Circumstantial evidence is equally as probative as direct evidence in proving illegitimate intent.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment in a Section 1983 suit when supported allegations of conduct violating clearly established rights turn on disputed facts.

Adams v. Metiva · filed 1994-08-01

Because defendant’s alleged conduct would violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would know, and plaintiffs version of events is supported by sufficient evidence, the district court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when whether the defendant acted with deliberate indifference remains a question of fact.

Wilson v. Cedarcrest Regional Hospital, No. Cv 90 0373901s (Sep. 12, 1994) · filed 1994-09-12

Whether the failure of the doctor to implement the former policy rather than the latter policy does or does not constitute deliberate indifference is a question of fact for the trier of fact. This reason for summary judgment, qualified immunity on the bases alleged, is rejected by the Court.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim based on omitted warrant information that an investigatory grand jury had already considered in finding probable cause, because the asserted right was not clearly established.

Brown v. D'Amico · filed 1994-09-12

In essence, Brown is asserting the right to be free from an arrest under circumstances where (a) probable cause is furnished; (b) probable cause would arguably have been negated if information in the applicant’s possession had been disclosed to the issuing magistrate, and (e) the undisclosed information had previously been disclosed to an investigatory grand jury that had made a finding of probable cause. We hold that D’Amico is entitled to qualified immunity because this right was not clearly established in December 1986 when he applied for an arrest warrant (nor indeed is it clearly established even now).

In a § 1983 suit, an officer cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when genuine factual disputes determine whether the officer violated a clearly established right.

Buckner v. Kilgore · filed 1994-10-03

As there are genuine issues of fact regarding which version of the facts occurred, summary judgment based on qualified immunity would be inappropriate.

In a § 1983 suit, factual disputes material to an individual defendant’s qualified immunity preclude summary judgment.

Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss. · filed 1994-10-13

If disputed factual issues material to qualified immunity exist summary judgment is not appropriate.

In a § 1983 claim against officials in their individual capacities, disputed facts material to qualified immunity preclude summary judgment on that defense.

Hare v. City of Corinth, MS · filed 1994-10-13

If disputed factual issues material to qualified immunity exist, summary judgment is not appropriate.

In a Section 1983 suit, an officer asserting qualified immunity at summary judgment requires the plaintiff to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, after which the officer must prove that the conduct was objectively reasonable.

Gahn v. Fujino · filed 1994-10-21

Where, as here, the defendant officers have affirmatively raised the defense of qualified immunity at summary judgment, the plaintiff must allege a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Once the plaintiff makes this showing, then the officers must prove that their conduct was objectively reasonable.

A § 1983 defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when the record leaves unresolved whether officials unjustifiably denied a prisoner’s clearly established right to call a witness at a disciplinary hearing.

ALTIZER Jr. v. MURRAY · filed 1994-10-25

The record reflects no response by the Defendants to these allegations, as is required by Ponte. ... Therefore, on this record, we find that Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the qualified immunity question.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when a factual dispute exists over whether an officer engaged in clearly unlawful conduct.

Mastromatteo v. Simock · filed 1994-10-27

Because Mr. Mastromatteo has raised an issue of fact concerning Officer Simock’s unlawful conduct, Officer Simock cannot be granted an award of summary judgment on the grounds that he is immune from the lawsuit.

Police officers sued under § 1983 cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts determine whether their conduct was reasonable.

Davis v. Town of Southern Pines · filed 1994-11-01

Because this creates an issue of material fact as to whether defendants’ actions were reasonable under the circumstances, the trial court properly reserved this issue for trial. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant officers’ motion for summary judgment based upon the qualified immunity defense.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when circumstantial evidence creates a jury question whether they fired an employee for protected speech.

BISBEE v. BEY · filed 1994-11-03

In evaluating defendants' qualified immunity claims, we must first determine whether plaintiff's allegations, if true, state a claim for a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established when defendant acted. ... Plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence to create a circumstantial case that he was fired in violation of his First Amendment rights. Questions concerning whom to believe in this matter are reserved for the jury. We affirm the trial court's denial of the individual defendants' motion for summary judgment on the section 1983 claim.

In a § 1983 action in Florida court, a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory review to the extent the order turns on a legal issue.

Tucker v. Resha · filed 1994-11-10

The two counts at issue in this case involve claims of deprivation of Resha's civil rights based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Thus, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold that an order denying summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory review to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law.

Officials sued under § 1983 for disciplining an employee’s expression are not entitled to qualified immunity when material facts remain disputed about its effect on workplace discipline or relations.

Dunn v. Carroll · filed 1994-11-15

Here, we conclude that there is an issue of fact as to whether Dunn's failure to comply with the uniform requirement affected District discipline or workplace relations. Therefore, the District and its officials are not entitled to qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 suit, allegations that officials violated clearly established constitutional rights defeat qualified immunity at summary judgment if the alleged conduct is true.

Allen v. Sakai · filed 1994-11-15

We agree with the district court that Smith's allegations are adequate to defeat summary judgment: he has alleged conduct on the part of defendants that, if true, violates clearly established constitutional rights, defeating defendants' claims to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the plaintiff alleges a violation of clearly established constitutional law.

Allen v. Sakai · filed 1994-11-15

Because Smith has alleged a violation of clearly established law, we affirm the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Smith’s Eighth Amendment claim.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment for prison officials in a § 1983 suit when the asserted right was clearly established and the officials have not shown that their conduct complied with it.

Gee v. Ruettgers · filed 1994-11-15

Therefore, because the law was clearly established at the time defendants censored the April 29, 1991 letter and because defendants have not shown that Ch. XXX, § 2, ¶ 27, as applied to censor plaintiff’s outgoing mail, did not violate that clearly established law, the court must deny defendants’ Motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity involving the censorship of the April 29, 1991, letter to his brother.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when genuine factual disputes determine whether the defendant violated a clearly established right.

Buckner v. Kilgore, II · filed 1994-11-21

As there are genuine issues of fact regarding which version of the facts occurred, summary judgment based on qualified immunity would be inappropriate.

A police officer sued under § 1983 cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts prevent a determination of whether a reasonable officer could have believed the use of deadly force was lawful.

Brooks v. Sneed · filed 1994-12-05

The district court properly refused Sneed's motion for summary judgment because material factual disputes remain as to whether a reasonable officer would have had probable cause to believe that Jacques Brooks presented a serious threat of personal harm to Sneed when Sneed shot Brooks.

In a Section 1983 suit, disputed material facts bearing on qualified immunity preclude summary judgment for the defendant officials.

Hare v. City of Corinth, Ms. · filed 1994-12-08

If disputed factual issues material to qualified immunity exist, summary judgment is not appropriate.

In a § 1983 gender discrimination claim, circumstantial or direct evidence of an individual defendant’s discriminatory intent can defeat summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Verney v. Dodaro · filed 1995-01-05

In the present action, the Plaintiff can defeat the motion for summary judgment by introducing evidence, either circumstantial or direct, of an individual Defendant’s subjective intent to act against her on the basis of gender.

In a § 1983 action, an officer cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when genuine factual disputes determine whether the officer committed acts that violated a clearly established right.

Ciak v. City of Louisville, James H. Lasch · filed 1995-01-09

However, Walton also recognizes that "if genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the defendants actually did commit acts that would violate a clearly established right, then summary judgment on qualified immunity is improper." Id. Thus Officer Lasch's arguments fail.

Qualified immunity cannot be resolved on summary judgment in a § 1983 claim when disputed facts about the officer’s conduct prevent deciding whether it violated clearly established law.

Gonzalez v. City of Laredo · filed 1995-01-10

In evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, the Court must determine whether the officer’s conduct violated “clearly established” law. In this, case, questions of fact surround Orozco’s conduct during the search. Did Orozco touch the Plaintiffs buttocks? If so, what was the nature of this contact? Without more evidence on these factual issues, the Court cannot determine whether Orozco’s conduct violated clearly established law.

An officer cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit when a factual dispute remains over whether he planted the only evidence supporting the arrest.

Hampton v. William D. White, Individually as a Policeman With the City of Ridgeland Police Department · filed 1995-01-25

And, because no reasonable officer could believe that they had probable cause to arrest if the only evidence against the accused was fabricated, an officer is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity only if there is no factual dispute regarding whether he planted the evidence.

In a section 1983 suit, an officer cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts determine whether the officer violated clearly established rights.

Heuton v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court · filed 1995-01-26

With respect to matters involving qualified immunity, summary judgment is not appropriate where there is a factual dispute involving an issue on which the question of immunity turns, such that it can not be determined before trial whether the defendants committed acts that violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when factual disputes prevent a determination that the officers did not violate clearly established rights or acted objectively reasonably.

Dellamore v. Stenros · filed 1995-02-16

Given the existence of the serious factual disputes discussed above, I cannot find as a matter of law that defendants’ conduct did not violate Dellamore’s constitutional rights or was objectively reasonable.

An officer sued under § 1983 for excessive force cannot obtain qualified immunity on summary judgment when the plaintiff’s version of the facts would show excessive force.

Hill v. Miller · filed 1995-02-23

Miller is still entitled to qualified immunity if he can demonstrate that even under the worst case scenario (i.e., Hill’s version of events), the force he used was not excessive. ... However, he can not make that showing.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the alleged conduct, if true, violates clearly established constitutional rights.

Allen v. Sakai · filed 1995-03-01

We agree with the district court that Smith's showing is adequate to defeat summary judgment: he has alleged conduct on the part of defendants that, if true, violates clearly established constitutional rights, defeating defendants' claims to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity cannot be resolved as a matter of law when disputed material facts determine whether an official reasonably believed the challenged conduct was lawful.

Engle v. Townsley · filed 1995-03-07

If the factual circumstances are material to the qualified immunity analysis and remain disputed after initial discovery, see id. at 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. at 3042 n. 6, the issue cannot be resolved as a matter of law.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit cannot always be resolved on summary judgment when material facts bearing on immunity are disputed.

Engle v. Townsley · filed 1995-03-07

Not every immunity question can be decided on summary judgment, however, for there may be disputed issues of material fact which prevent it.

In a § 1983 claim over a warrant affidavit, the materiality of an alleged misstatement or omission is a question of law for the court as part of qualified immunity.

Smith v. Reddy · filed 1995-04-06

In a Franks civil case, the question of materiality of any omissions or misstatements is a sub-part of the qualified immunity inquiry, which is, by its very nature, a threshold one under Anderson. ... Materiality, in this context, is ultimately a question of law as well.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff’s evidence, if proved, could show a violation of clearly established rights and no objectively reasonable basis for the officials to believe their conduct lawful.

Wilkinson v. Balsam · filed 1995-04-17

For the reasons set forth below, I am satisfied that the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs, if proved, is sufficient to support a finding that Russell and Adams violated the clearly established constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and that they did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that their conduct did not violate such rights.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim against state hospital attendants when the relevant constitutional standards were clearly established at the time.

Clark v. Donahue · filed 1995-04-27

Therefore, the relevant constitutional standards were established at the time in question and Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim when the plaintiff alleges sufficient facts that officials forced him from a school board for protected speech on matters of public concern.

Carlson v. Midway 1 School District · filed 1995-04-28

We therefore agree with the district court that Carlson made a colorable claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim when allegations of protected speech and retaliatory removal from a school board support a colorable claim.

Carlson v. Midway R-1 School District · filed 1995-04-28

We therefore agree with the district court that Carlson made a colorable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

A Section 1983 plaintiff may use circumstantial and inferential evidence to defeat a qualified immunity summary judgment motion.

Cox v. Kentucky Department of Transportation · filed 1995-05-02

The present rule in the Sixth Circuit dictates that a party may rely upon circumstantial and inferential evidence to defeat a qualified immunity summary judgment motion.

Qualified immunity cannot resolve a § 1983 excessive-force claim as a matter of law when a genuine factual dispute about the officer’s conduct prevents deciding whether a reasonable officer would have believed that conduct constitutional.

Ahonen v. Varela · filed 1995-05-03

If a genuine issue of fact exists surrounding the conduct that took place, then this question cannot be answered as a matter of law and the case must proceed to trial.

An officer sued under § 1983 for deadly force is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when evidence materially disputes the officer’s account of the threat.

Cynthia Bunch, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Aaron Matthew Bravard v. Village of New Lebanon · filed 1995-05-31

Ables' version of the facts, if unrefuted, entitles him to immunity; however, plaintiff has produced evidence that conflicts with Ables' rendition.

In a § 1983 excessive-force suit, factual disputes about the amount and necessity of force can preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Jett v. McCarter · filed 1995-06-05

In this case, however, a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the amount of force McCarter used, and the necessity of that force. Because the nature of McCarter's actions are disputed, the reasonableness of his actions cannot be determined on motion for summary judgment. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err by denying McCarter qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, discovery before a ruling on summary judgment based on qualified immunity must be limited to facts related to that defense.

Furlong v. Gardner · filed 1998-03-23

Here, however, the trial court erred when it entered a general, non-circumscribed order allowing discovery to continue, as opposed to entering an order limiting discovery to facts related to Furlong and Marr’s assertion of qualified immunity. Only the latter, narrowly tailored order is permissible prior to ruling on the summary judgment motion.

Section 1983 claims against officials may be defeated at summary judgment on official-immunity grounds when the plaintiff lacks evidence supporting the challenged allegations.

Butler v. San Diego District Attorney's Office · filed 2004-06-04

We hold that a district court is not required (or even allowed) to assume that challenged factual allegations in a plaintiffs complaint are true, irrespective of any evidentiary support, if a defendant makes a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on official immunity that would, on a motion for summary judgment in any other civil case, require plaintiff to produce evidence in opposition.

A defendant waives a § 1983 qualified-immunity defense by failing to file timely objections to a magistrate's recommendation denying the defense.

Ivey v. George Wilson, Ron Hanley, Lt. Barnes, Robert Hendricks, Dewey Sowders, Capt. Barnett, Phil Parker, A · filed 1987-11-04

Without expressing any view on the merits of the magistrate's conclusions, we hold that the failure to file timely objections resulted in a waiver of the qualified immunity defense.

A defendant waives qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim by failing to raise the defense and obtain a ruling on it in the trial court.

Unpublished Disposition John Perotti, Cross-Appellant v. Richard Seiter, Gary Brown, Cross-Appellee · filed 1989-02-16

But even if it were not, we would decline to resolve Brown's appeal on his qualified immunity argument, because he has waived the defense by failing to raise it and obtain a ruling upon it below.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action waives qualified immunity by failing to preserve the defense before raising it in a motion after trial and judgment.

Maul v. Dr. Evan Constan, Anthony Metzcus, and Richard Gore · filed 1991-04-01

There is no reason the defendants could not have raised their qualified immunity defense earlier in the proceedings. We hold that the defendants waived their qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim can be waived by failing to preserve its legal and factual grounds.

Martin v. Thomas · filed 1992-09-29

Whether the defendants had the protection of qualified immunity in the present case is moot because any claim of qualified immunity has been waived. ... Thus, they waived a claim of assured qualified immunity as a matter of law, although factual issues remained since the summary judgment motion involved only the question of law. ... The remaining factual questions implicated by the immunity defense were later waived. ... We conclude that there was full waiver of qualified immunity.

A defendant waives qualified immunity from a § 1983 strip-search claim when he raises it only generally before trial and does not pursue it at trial or on appeal.

Kraushaar v. Earl K. Flanigan, Fred Winterroth, Robin Davis, and Tazewell County · filed 1995-01-13

Similarly, we are unable to find that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. First, although the issue was raised generally in the final pre-trial order before the district court, Flanigan did not argue the point with respect to this strip search during the trial. He also did not raise the issue on appeal. Thus, the argument has been waived.

A defendant may waive qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for the pretrial stage by failing to raise the defense diligently after discovery.

Guzmn-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz · filed 1996-10-28

In order to reduce the potential for abuse by defendants, we believe that the defense of qualified immunity may be deemed to have been waived if it is not raised in a diligent manner during the post-discovery, pre-trial phase.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit does not waive qualified immunity by failing to raise it in a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

White v. Bibb County, Georgia · filed 1998-12-07

Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant Godbee did not waive his right to raise the defense of qualified immunity by failing to invoke it in a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment.

A defendant waives a Heck defense to a § 1983 claim by failing to plead it in time.

Carr v. Michael O'Leary and Michael P. Lane · filed 1999-02-04

The failure to plead the Heck defense in timely fashion was a waiver; the question is whether there was some ground for relieving the defendants from the consequences of their waiver.

A § 1983 defendant may preserve a qualified immunity defense by raising it in a written motion for a directed verdict.

Howes v. Hitchcock · filed 1999-09-09

Applying these standards to the instant case, the Court concludes that the officers have not-waived their qualified immunity defense because they raised it in their written motion for a directed verdict (Docket No. 59).

A section 1983 defendant may waive qualified immunity by mentioning it only cursorily in an answer and failing to press it through dispositive motions and trial before raising it on remand.

Sales v. Grant · filed 2000-08-16

Under these circumstances, we have no trouble concluding that the defendants waived their right to press seriously their claim of qualified immunity for the first time after remand.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action may waive qualified immunity by mentioning it only cursorily in an answer and failing to pursue it through motions and trial before seeking to raise it on remand.

Inez Sales v. Grant · filed 2000-08-16

Rather, we hold only that where, as here, a defendant only cursorily references qualified immunity in his answer to a section 1983 complaint, and thereafter fails to mention, let alone seriously press, his assertion of that affirmative defense, despite filing several dispositive motions in the district court and despite participating in a trial on the merits of the section 1983 claim, that defendant may not actively pursue his claim of qualified immunity for the first time on remand after appeal.

A defendant does not necessarily waive qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action by first raising it at summary judgment; the court must consider the defendant’s diligence and any prejudice to the plaintiff.

Eddy v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority · filed 2001-07-10

We agree with the conclusions of the First and Sixth Circuits that the defense of qualified immunity is not necessarily waived by a defendant who fails to raise it until the summary judgment stage. Instead, the District Court must exercise its discretion and deter mine whether there was a reasonable modicum of diligence in raising the defense. The District Court must also consider whether the plaintiff has been prejudiced by the delay.

Defendants who waive the right to seek summary judgment based on qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit may still assert the defense at trial.

Gordon v. City of Pleasanton · filed 2002-07-02

In affirming the district court’s ruling that defendants Ortiz, Douglas, Paez, Sanchez, Rutherford, and Westfall waived their right to move for qualified immunity, we do not completely bar them from asserting the defense; they may still assert it as an affirmative defense at trial.

A defendant who fails to properly raise qualified immunity before the district court may lose appellate consideration of that defense, even if it appeared in a responsive pleading.

Cleveland Brown v. Crowley · filed 2003-01-28

The Seventh Circuit has explained that, even if a defendant hás “raised” the affirmative defense in a responsive pleading, “the defense of qualified immunity may be deemed as waived if not properly and timely presented before the district court.” ... We find this reasoning persuasive. ... We will not, therefore, address the defendants’ argument that they have qualified immunity from Brown’s claim.

A defendant waives qualified immunity as a ground for a Section 1983 Rule 50 motion by failing to raise it when making the motion.

Isom Ex Rel. Estate of Isom v. Town of Warren · filed 2004-02-25

But the defendants did not raise immunity as an issue at the time of their Rule 50 motion, and so they have waived that defense as a grounds for the motion.

State public entities and their officials waive immunity from § 1983 damages when they fail to plead it as an affirmative defense.

Sommer v. State, Department of Transportation & Development · filed 2000-03-29

In the present case the State, through its public entities and their employees, waived the right to immunity because the defendants did not plead immunity from liability as an affirmative defense.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Hayes Williams and Arthur Mitchell v. David C. Treen, Governor of the State of Louisiana · filed 1982-03-31

Applying this formula to the instant case, we find that the District Court erred in dismissing Hayes Williams’ and Arthur Mitchell’s § 1983 damage claims on the grounds of qualified immunity. First, the District Court should not have dismissed these claims when the factual record had not yet been sufficiently developed to support a finding of qualified immunity. Specifically, the defendants failed to show that they each held positions which entailed the exercise of official discretion and that they each acted within the scope of that discretion. Second, insofar as these officials are alleged to have acted in violation of law which was clearly established at the times here in question, the defendants are not entitled to the protections afforded by a qualified immunity.

An officer does not waive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim or the right to appeal its denial by failing to seek dismissal on immunity grounds before the first trial.

Spann v. Rainey · filed 1993-03-22

Likewise, we do not consider the defense -- or the concomitant right to an interlocutory appeal from its denial -- ... waived by Rainey's failure to seek dismissal based on it prior to the 1991 trial.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity to shield state officials from personal liability and allows the defense to be raised at summary judgment after discovery.

Lopez-Erquicia v. Weyne-Roig · filed 2015-05-26

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense against personal liability which may be raised by state officials. ... It “provides a safe harbor for public officials acting under the color of state law who would otherwise be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for infringing the constitutional rights of private parties.” ... As contemplated in Guzmán-Rivera, the defense of qualified immunity can be raised for the first time at the pre-trial stage via motion for summary judgment after discovery had concluded even if it had not been asserted before.