42 U.S.C. § 1983

In a § 1983 suit, a court may deny a request for a reply to a qualified immunity defense when the complaint already alleges sufficient facts to address that defense.

Nickson v. Polk County · filed 2019-09-06

At this stage of the proceedings, plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that defendant Cole was deliberately indifferent to Antwaun Bogany’s serious medical needs when she treated a brain hemorrhage with two Tylenol tablets, and that the medical care was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. As a result, defendant Cole’s Schultea motion should be denied.

In a Section 1983 action, an officer waives qualified immunity at summary judgment by raising the defense for the first time in a reply brief.

Fondren v. Van Lanen · filed 2020-03-10

Therefore, the Court finds that Van Lanen has waived the immunity defense for this stage of the proceedings.

Section 1983 grants a state officer immunity for failing to perform a discretionary act, as opposed to a ministerial duty.

Roberts v. Williams · filed 1969-07-30

It is unnecessary for us to align ourselves with that view since by the weight of federal authority, § 1983 immunity is granted to a state officer for his failure to perform a discretionary act as opposed to a mere ministerial duty.

Section 1983 permits damages liability for state officials who violate constitutional rights, but provides immunity protections: ministerial court clerks are not absolutely immune as quasi-judicial officials, while officials acting in good faith and without malice may receive qualified immunity.

Allen v. Dorsey · filed 1978-09-18

We hold, therefore, that the defendants in this case cannot be characterized as “quasi-judicial” officials and, thus, are not entitled to absolute “quasi-judicial” immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the allegedly improper performance of their ministerial duties. ... However, qualified immunity from liability for damages in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be available for a government official acting in good faith pursuant to the lawful authority vested in him by the state. ... In conclusion, having found that the defendants did not know or reasonably could not have known that Allen’s petitions for habeas corpus were mailed to the Clerk of the Court for filing pursuant to the PCHA, and having found that the subsequent transmittal of the petitions to the Prothonotary was in good faith and without malicious intention, we hold that the defendants in this case are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of constitutional or federal statutory rights, while courts may recognize qualified immunity for discretionary public officials.

Scherer v. Davis · filed 1982-06-07

The language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is absolute and unqualified: “Every person who, under color of any statute . . . [or] custom . . ., of any State . . ., subjects . . . any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . .. ” Although the statute itself embodies no immunities, courts have created a qualified immunity for public officials whose positions require the exercise of discretion in the performance of their duties.

Government officials have qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages liability for discretionary acts performed in good faith.

Osgood v. District of Columbia · filed 1983-07-05

It is well established that governmental officials have qualified immunity from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for discretionary acts performed in good faith.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 does not protect an official's ministerial act where the official had no discretion to withhold the legally required action.

Breault v. CHAIRMAN OF BD, FIRE COMMR. OF SPRINGFIELD · filed 1987-10-13

Because the defendant enjoyed no statutory discretionary authority to withhold reinstatement, he acted in a ministerial capacity. Immunity was properly denied.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 does not protect an official's ministerial act where the official had no discretion to withhold the legally required action.

Breault v. Chairman of the Board of Fire Commissioners · filed 1987-10-13

Because the defendant enjoyed no statutory discretionary authority to withhold reinstatement, he acted in a ministerial capacity. Immunity was properly denied.

Public officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity in § 1983 actions when their conduct could reasonably have been thought consistent with the allegedly violated rights.

Lauer v. Dahlberg · filed 1989-07-31

Public officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity in § 1983 actions if their conduct “could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects officers who in objective good faith perform a definite statutory duty within the scope of their authority, even when the duty is ministerial.

Heleba v. Allbee · filed 1992-01-17

We hold that officers who, in objective good faith, obey a simple and definite legal command established by statute while acting, or reasonably believing they are acting, within the scope of their employment and authority, are qualifiedly immune from a suit that is grounded upon conduct prescribed by that statute.

Officials sued under Section 1983 for discretionary acts have qualified immunity when reasonable officers with the same information would have believed their conduct lawful under clearly established law.

Jackson v. Champion · filed 1993-02-22

Officials performing discretionary functions will have qualified immunity from suit as long as reasonable officers in the defendants' position would have believed the disputed conduct was lawful in light of the clearly established law and the circumstances and information they possessed at the time the decision was made.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to officials performing discretionary duties when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable official would have known.

B Street Commons, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1993-05-27

In short, because the commissioners’ actions did not violate clearly-established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known, defendants in their personal capacities are protected by qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit.

Government officials performing discretionary functions are protected from damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Raju v. Rhodes · filed 1993-11-24

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages liability if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects officials from liability for discretionary conduct that did not violate rights clearly established when the conduct occurred.

Jones v. Dr. Mary Flannigan and Dr. Vallabhaneni · filed 1994-01-20

Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for discretionary conduct if they did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" at "the time [the] action occurred."

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against officials for discretionary acts absent facts supporting a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

T.T. the Bear's Place, Inc. v. Rodriguez · filed 1994-02-17

Inasmuch as plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting its claim that the defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right, plaintiff has failed to state either a Civil Rights Act claim or a §1983 claim, and cannot claim against the individual defendants on the basis of their discretionary acts.

Qualified immunity protects government officials sued individually under § 1983 for discretionary acts unless they violate clearly established law that a reasonable person would know.

Conde v. Colorado State Department of Personnel · filed 1994-03-10

In § 1983 actions, the doctrine of qualified immunity protects governmental officials sued in their individual capacity from personal liability in the performance of discretionary functions unless their actions violate clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known.

Qualified immunity shields officials from damages under § 1983 for discretionary acts that do not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Mario A. Mora, Angel Marcias, and Roberto Ponce v. John L. Nunn, Charles Adkins, William Hartley, H. Vales, Capt. Dick C · filed 1994-04-06

We need not determine whether the defendants infringed upon the plaintiffs' state-created liberty interests because, even if they did, under the doctrine of qualified immunity they cannot be held liable. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for damages for discretionary acts that do not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for officials performing discretionary investigative duties when no clearly established law would have warned them that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

James T. Giovanetti, D.D.S. And Patricia Ann Giovanetti v. Nicholas J. Tomasi, D.D.S. Wally McLaughlin Robert L. Schroed · filed 1994-05-19

In any event, there was no "clearly established law" that would have put defendants on notice that plaintiffs had a constitutional right to be free from entrapment in a civil administrative action, or that their conduct was so outrageous as to violate due process principles. Defendants, who were performing a discretionary function of the Board by investigating whether Dr. Giovanetti was practicing dentistry without a license, are thus qualifiedly immune from suit for their actions.

Officials who fail to show that they acted within the scope of their discretionary authority are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Tribell v. David G. Mills, Warden Norma Jean Eggers Gordon R. Miler, Counselor, Jim Morrow, Counselor Donley · filed 1994-06-01

Because the appellants failed to establish that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority when they segregated Tribell from the general prison population for more than twenty days without a hearing (in violation of rights clearly established by Hewitt ), the appellants are not immune from Tribell's 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from damages unless their conduct violates clearly established federal rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Roy George, Shirley George and Sherrod Fitts v. City of St. Louis, Robert Scheetz, Albert Upchurch and Brian Gilmore · filed 1994-06-06

Government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established [federal] statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 defendants acting within their discretionary authority are entitled to qualified immunity if the law was not clearly established or they did not violate it.

Smith v. Upson County, Ga. · filed 1994-08-08

Under this analysis, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if either (1) the law was not clearly established, or (2) the law was clearly established but the defendant did not violate the law.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields officials performing discretionary acts when the law was not clearly established or when they reasonably believed their acts lawful under clearly established law.

Schnabel v. Tyler · filed 1994-08-09

In sum, federal qualified immunity shields a public official performing discretionary acts from liability if the law was not clearly established at the time of the performance of his or her conduct, or, in the case of clearly established law, if it was objectively reasonable for the public official to believe that his or her acts were lawful in light of the clearly established law.

Officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from personal liability under § 1983 unless they violate clearly established law that a reasonable person would have known.

JARVIS BY AND THROUGH JARVIS v. Deyoe · filed 1994-08-11

Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from personal liability unless their actions violate clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known.

Government officials sued under Section 1983 for discretionary acts are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable person would have known.

Patterson v. G.H. Baldwin Frank Hall M. Tangney P. Anderson D.R. Irwin · filed 1994-10-31

Given these circumstances, Patterson has failed to show that the officials' conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable official would have known. See Camarillo, 998 F.2d at 639. Accordingly, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable person would have known.

Patterson v. G.H. Baldwin · filed 1994-10-31

Accordingly, because Patterson failed to show that the defendants violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known, the district court did not err by dismissing Patterson's photocopying claim.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from section 1983 liability when reasonable officials in their position would not have clearly understood that their conduct violated established rights.

Parsons v. Wright · filed 1994-11-10

Because reasonable officials in the Wrights’ position would not have clearly understood that they were violating Parsons’s rights, the Wrights are immune from section 1983 liability.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim requires the defendant to be a government official exercising a discretionary function.

Ramirez v. Oklahoma Department of Mental Health · filed 1994-11-28

As to defendant Clute, however, we see no basis for his satisfying the condition of being a government official exercising a discretionary function. Accordingly the dismissal as to Clute on the ground of qualified immunity was error and must be reversed.

Government officers performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would be aware.

Heggestad v. District of Columbia · filed 1995-01-12

In actions for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, government officers performing discretionary functions enjoy qualified immunity insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which reasonable persons would have been aware.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity from civil damages to government officials performing discretionary functions when their actions do not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Johnson v. Bunch · filed 1995-02-02

We conclude that the actions of the appellants in this case did not violate any of Robert Johnson's clearly established constitutional rights. It follows that, as government officials performing discretionary functions, they are entitled to immunity from civil damages, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), as a matter of law.

State actors are immune from damages under § 1983 for discretionary acts within their authority when their conduct was objectively reasonable under the law at the time.

Rosario v. Brooks · filed 1995-02-21

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity state actors are immune from damages under § 1983 “if they have performed discretionary functions falling within the scope of their authority and have done so in an objectively reasonable manner, measured by the state of law at the time the conduct occurred. ... Defendant has not shown that a reasonable officer in his position could have reasonably believed that he had probable cause at the time of plaintiffs arrest, if disputed evidence about what precise circumstances existed at that time should be resolved by a factfinder in plaintiffs favor.

Section 1983 protects government officials performing discretionary functions through qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Goetz v. Noble · filed 1995-03-29

Qualified immunity affords government officials performing discretionary functions protection from liability under section 1983 where their conduct does not violate what reasonable people would recognize as a clearly established constitutional right.

Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their conduct does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Jarvis v. Billy Wellman John T. Wigginton Al C. Parke and Steve Smith · filed 1995-04-24

Disclosure of plaintiffs medical records does not rise to the level of a breach of a right recognized as “fundamental” under the Constitution. Because disclosure of plaintiffs medical records did not violate a constitutional right, it follows that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that plaintiff was unable to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Public officials performing discretionary functions may have qualified immunity from civil liability under § 1983 when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Matthews v. Rakiey · filed 1995-05-05

Where public officials are performing a discretionary function, they may be shielded from civil liability in a § 1983 action by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

An official who acts outside the scope of her discretionary authority is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Lenz v. Winburn · filed 1995-05-12

Because Paskewitz acted outside the scope of her authority, she is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A § 1983 defendant seeking qualified immunity must show that the challenged actions fell within her discretionary authority.

Lenz v. Winburn · filed 1995-05-12

However, we need not reach the question whether any Fourth Amendment right was clearly established because we conclude that Paskewitz failed to show that she was acting within her discretionary authority. Paskewitz is thus not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim can protect a government employee’s ministerial actions when they fall within the employee’s duties and authority.

C. C. a minor, etal v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed. · filed 2008-11-10

A government employee, however, may enjoy the benefit of qualified immunity even for ministerial actions so long as his or her actions meet the two-prong test.

Absolute immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim for injunctive relief against a prosecutor or court clerk.

Cole v. Rich · filed 2015-08-14

Cole’s complaint, however, does not seek money damages but instead seeks injunctive relief in the form of dismissal of the pending, new criminal charge and release from custody on that charge. The immunity defense relied on by the district court does not apply to Cole’s particular claims for injunctive relief.

Qualified immunity, which shields officials from damages liability under section 1983, does not extend to bar claims against state officials for injunctive relief.

Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi · filed 1984-08-30

We therefore hold that state officials are not protected by principles of immunity from actions seeking injunctions limiting the exercise of authority under a state statute that is allegedly unconstitutional.

Qualified immunity protects an official only from individual-capacity damages and does not justify dismissing official-capacity claims, claims against a governmental entity, or requests for reinstatement.

Littlejohn v. Rose · filed 1985-07-16

Regardless of the standard applied, the qualified immunity defense only protects the superintendent in his individual capacity from money damages, not from other forms of relief sought such as reinstatement. ... Accordingly, the availability of qualified immunity that would enable an individual defendant to escape individual liability for money damages would not warrant the dismissal of claims against that defendant in his official capacity or against a governmental entity.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim seeking only equitable relief against a state official in his personal capacity.

Mowbray v. Kozlowski · filed 1989-10-25

The state defendant's motion to dismiss the suit against him in his personal capacity on the basis of qualified immunity must, therefore, be dismissed since qualified immunity is not available where only equitable relief is sought.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action does not bar claims for declaratory or injunctive relief.

Selkirk v. Boyle · filed 1990-05-23

Qualified immunity does not bar actions for declaratory or injunctive relief.

Section 1983 defendants cannot assert qualified immunity against a claim for injunctive relief based on a reasonable belief that their conduct was lawful.

Newman v. Burgin · filed 1991-04-22

When a civil-rights plaintiff asks for an injunction, however, the defendants cannot assert this “qualified immunity” defense — that they reasonably did not know their conduct was unlawful.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 action against a state official seeking only equitable relief.

American Fire v. Gillespie · filed 1991-05-08

Based on this reasoning, we held in Hoohuli that a state official cannot invoke the protection of qualified immunity in a section 1983 action seeking only equitable relief. Gillespie and Tomashoff are subject to the same rule.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 action seeking only declaratory or injunctive relief; it applies to claims for damages.

American Fire, Theft & Collision Managers, Inc. v. Gillespie · filed 1991-05-08

Because the defense of qualified immunity is available only in actions for damages, and American Fire is not seeking damages, we reverse.

Qualified immunity does not bar injunctive relief in a § 1983 action against prison officials.

Fortner v. Thomas · filed 1993-02-18

Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in dismissing the appellants' claims for injunctive relief based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officials from damages in § 1983 actions but does not bar injunctive relief.

Gilbert v. Booth Gardner, Governor, and Ernest W. Packebush, Superintendent, Eastern Washington Pre-Release · filed 1993-03-05

Qualified immunity protects officials from actions for damages, but does not extend to actions for injunctive relief.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim for equitable relief against a state officer in an official capacity.

Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado · filed 1993-04-14

Consequently, when a plaintiff seeks equitable relief from a defendant in his capacity as an officer of the state, qualified immunity is not a viable defense.

Under § 1983, qualified immunity shields governmental officials from damages unless they violate clearly established rights a reasonable person would have known, but does not bar injunctive or declaratory relief.

Passon v. F.D. Lockhart R. Sweitzer, Lt. Greg Dehart B. Brand Mark Stephenson · filed 1993-10-04

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields governmental officials from personal liability unless their actions violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The immunity protects the official only from damages and not injunctive or declaratory relief. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 734-37 (1980). ... Thus, to the extent plaintiff sought damages against the defendants, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit does not bar reinstatement and is premature as a defense to a complaint alleging punishment for protected speech without a legitimate reason.

Eberhardt v. O'Malley · filed 1994-03-01

The defendants offer a backstop defense: qualified immunity. It is premature, as well as irrelevant to the plaintiffs request for an order that he be reinstated. If the complaint is taken at face value, as we must do in light of the absence of any other source of facts, the defendants punished the plaintiff for writing a novel, without having any legitimate reason for such punishment.

Qualified immunity does not bar injunctive relief in a § 1983 action.

Shepherd v. Boysen · filed 1994-04-20

Since qualified immunity is not applicable to injunctive relief, however, the other issues would still have to be treated.

Qualified immunity does not bar § 1983 claims seeking injunctive or prospective declaratory relief.

O'KEEFE v. Murphy · filed 1994-08-08

However, claims for injunctive and prospective declaratory relief are unaffected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not bar a claim for injunctive relief under § 1983.

Williams v. Paul Delo Bill Hartley Raphael Coad Greg Dunn Unknown Wells, Officer Norma Lavrrar Paul Stuart, Offic · filed 1995-03-07

Qualified immunity, however, is not a complete defense to Williams’s claims because it cannot serve as a defense to an equitable claim such as the claim for injunctive relief in this case.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action applies to monetary relief, but does not bar injunctive or declaratory relief.

D'Aguanno v. Gallagher · filed 1995-03-29

And, because qualified immunity is a defense only to claims for monetary relief, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from equitable relief in a § 1983 action.

Bradford v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2002-09-17

We note that qualified immunity does not shield officials from equitable relief.

Absolute immunity does not bar a claim for equitable relief under Section 1983.

West v. Keeshan · filed 2003-02-05

Although the doctrine of absolute immunity does not bar claims for equitable remedies, see Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 525 (5th Cir. 1985), West is not entitled to such relief because he has not shown that he is likely to face the same wrong in the future.

Qualified immunity may shield an official from damages under § 1983, but it does not bar injunctive relief.

Petzak v. Nevada Ex Rel. Department of Corrections · filed 2008-09-23

Put simply, Dobel can only claim qualified immunity in an action for damages; qualified immunity does not bar injunctive relief.

Section 1983 claims for equitable relief are not barred by qualified immunity or Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

Joyner-El-Qawi-Bey v. Russi · filed 2011-09-15

Qualified immunity and sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment do not bar such claims for equitable relief.

Individual-capacity defendants in a Section 1983 action cannot obtain dismissal on qualified immunity when the pleadings do not establish that they gave constitutionally adequate notice of the charges.

Pack v. Newsome · filed 1988-12-12

Upon our review of the pleadings, we cannot hold that Pack was provided adequate notice or that he was sufficiently notified of the Board's charges as required by due process. This is an issue which must be determined by the district court pursuant to the proof presented by the parties. Accordingly, the district court's ruling on the motion to dismiss the defendants in their individual capacities under qualified immunity is AFFIRMED.

A state official sued personally under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity at dismissal when his knowing administration of a system lacking notice of an available hearing presents an unresolved merits question.

Orozco Ex. Rel Arroyo v. Sobol · filed 1989-01-19

The Commissioner’s administration of a system which he knows does not provide that kind of notice at the local level presents a question going to the merits of this case. Consequently, his motion to be dismissed in his personal capacity on the basis of qualified immunity must be denied.

A § 1983 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint, even if its allegations are true, does not state a constitutional violation.

Samaad v. City of Dallas · filed 1991-08-23

We, however, disagree with that conclusion; in fact, we find that plaintiff did not allege a constitutional violation at all, "clearly established" or not, for the complaint does not state facts that, even if true, would constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 prison conditions claim at the pleading stage when clearly established law would alert officials that deliberately denying a basic necessity violates the Eighth Amendment.

Matthews v. Peters · filed 1993-04-06

On that score the definitive teaching in Wilson v. Seiter, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)—decided in the earliest days of Matthews’ time in segregation, fully six months before he was compelled to bring this suit — blocks defendants’ entitlement to a qualified immunity dismissal.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of an individual-capacity § 1983 claim when the complaint alleges that officers selectively enforced the law in retaliation for access to the courts.

Carmen's East, Inc. v. Huggins · filed 1993-05-21

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's ruling that the defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the claim due to qualified immunity.

A state official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the complaint alleges a nonemergency bank seizure that violated clearly established due process rights.

Kenworthy v. Hargrove · filed 1993-07-16

Therefore, assuming Hargrove took such actions, she violated clearly established due process rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Accordingly, she is not entitled to ... qualified immunity under the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when state mental health officials allegedly disregard a voluntarily committed patient’s known suicide risk while he is in their custody.

ESTATE OF CASSARA BY CASSARA v. State of Ill. · filed 1994-05-19

It is reasonably foreseeable that patients under the state’s care may commit suicide if the state officials are deliberately indifferent to their known suicidal conditions while housed at the state’s custodial mental health center. Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity under the facts as pleaded in the complaint.

A § 1983 plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense must plead specific, nonconclusory facts sufficient to show that the defense can be overcome.

McKinney v. Kentucky State Bd. of Examiners and Registration of Architects · filed 1996-08-07

Nevertheless, we think dismissal of this claim was appropriate because plaintiff fails to satisfy the heightened pleading standard required when a qualified immunity defense is raised. See Veney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d 917 (6th Cir.1995) (holding that original or amended complaint must allege specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact that will enable the district court to determine that those facts, if proved, will overcome qualified immunity defense).

A § 1983 plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense must plead the claim with factual detail and particularity.

Sloan v. Sharp · filed 1998-11-02

The record cites that Sloan refers to do not show that Wiley’s qualified immunity defense was denied, and thus he has not waived his defense. Therefore, under Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995), Sloan has not pled her claim with factual detail and particularity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim when the defense is not established on the face of the complaint.

Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa · filed 1999-12-06

No such immunity is established on the face of Mercer’s complaint, not least because the defendants’ assertion of Byrne’s qualified immunity rests on a mischarac-terization of Mercer’s § 1983 claims.

When a § 1983 complaint lacks specific facts about each individual defendant’s conduct, a defendant asserting qualified immunity is entitled to a Rule 7 reply identifying that conduct.

Henrise v. Horvath · filed 2000-04-21

Since Plaintiffs Complaint is lacking in specificity, Defendants are entitled to an order requiring Plaintiff to file a reply pursuant to Rule 7, Fed.R.Civ.P., enumerating the specific conduct of each Defendant on which Plaintiff predicates his claims for which each Defendant should be held personally liable.

In a § 1983 suit against an individual officer, a plaintiff’s responses to a motion to dismiss can satisfy the opportunity to reply to a qualified immunity defense.

Toliver v. Conner · filed 1996-08-06

In these circumstances, the district court satisfied the Schultea requirements.

When a defendant raises qualified immunity in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must plead facts supporting the claim; the court cannot supply missing facts through judicial notice.

Armengau v. Cline · filed 2001-03-01

Once Defendants here raised qualified immunity as a defense to Armengau’s section 1983 action, the district court erred by taking judicial notice of facts enabling Plaintiff’s complaint to survive a motion to dismiss rather than dismissing the complaint without prejudice to afford Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to satisfy Veney’s heightened pleading requirement.

A plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense in a § 1983 suit against individual officials must plead specific, nonconclusory facts that, if proved, would overcome the defense.

Sollitto v. Mitchell · filed 2001-12-14

That is, once a defendant claims qualified immunity, a plaintiff must plead “specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact that will enable the district court to determine that those facts, if proved, will overcome the defense of qualified immunity.” Id. at 922. ... Under Monks and the heightened pleading standard articulated in Veney, Sollitto’s Supplemental Amended Complaint fails to support his claim that defendants sought to hinder his union office campaign.

A Section 1983 complaint faces no heightened pleading requirement merely because the defendant raises qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss.

Eaton v. Meneley · filed 2002-01-09

This Court will take the Tenth Circuit’s statement in Currier at face value: “[a] heightened pleading requirement finds no support in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and constitutes a deviation from the notice-pleading standards of Rule 8.”

A Section 1983 complaint should not be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds unless the plaintiff could prove no facts sufficient to defeat the defense.

Russell v. Lazar · filed 2004-01-27

Thus, a complaint should not be dismissed based on qualified immunity unless it is clear that the plaintiff could prove no facts sufficient to defeat the defense. ... Taking plaintiffs allegations and the inferences therefrom in his favor, I conclude that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, subject to doctrines such as qualified immunity.

Gionorio v. Gomez · filed 2004-06-04

Defendants’ argue that plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims should be dismissed because they fail to adequately state a claim under this circuit’s heightened pleading standard for such actions. ... Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs have complied with the notice pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) and their claims survive defendants motion to dismiss.

Qualified immunity dismissal of a Section 1983 claim is premature when the allegations, taken as true, could state a claim and the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to develop the facts through discovery.

Grose v. Caruso · filed 2008-07-01

Where, as here, the standard for a 12(b)(6) motion is whether the allegations, if taken as true, could state a claim upon which relief may be granted, dismissal of Appellants on the basis of qualified immunity is premature.

A Section 1983 claim should not be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at the pleading stage when the defense depends on facts that have not yet been developed.

Ray-Cluney v. Palmer · filed 2018-10-09

Given this backdrop, the district court acted prematurely in deciding Palmer’s entitlement to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage.

A state official’s violation of state regulations supports § 1983 damages liability only if the official also violated a then-clearly-established federal constitutional or statutory right.

Deane v. Dunbar · filed 1985-11-26

An official who violates state regulations may be held liable in damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 only if he also violates federal constitutional or statutory rights clearly established at the time of his actions.

Officials do not lose qualified immunity from § 1983 liability merely because their conduct violated a state statute or administrative rule.

Whitcomb v. Jefferson County Department of Social Services · filed 1987-09-08

However, officials sued for constitutional violations “do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates some [state’s] statutory or administrative provision.”

A defendant in a § 1983 suit does not lose qualified immunity merely because the conduct violated a state statute or regulation.

Popham v. City of Talladega · filed 1989-06-01

However, even assuming arguendo that defendants were in violation of § 14-6-105, their own departmental policy, and were subject to, and in violation of, the above-quoted provision of the Alabama County Jail Standards, “officials sued for constitutional violations lose no immunity simply because their conduct violates some state statute or regulation.”

A government official does not lose qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim by violating a state statute or regulation unless it is the source of the constitutional right asserted.

City of McGregor v. Janett · filed 1991-11-26

In violating a state statute or regulation, an official does not deprive himself or herself of qualified immunity unless the statute or regulation is the source of the constitutional right the plaintiffs have sued to vindicate.

A state official retains qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim if the federal constitutional right was not clearly established, even if the conduct clearly violated state law.

Bertram v. Deukmejian · filed 1993-11-04

That the right was clearly established under California law prior to 1987 is irrelevant for qualified immunity purposes. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193-94 (1984) (state official retains qualified immunity if the federal constitutional right was not clearly established, even if the conduct clearly violated state statute or regulation).

A violation of state law defeats qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action only if that state law embodies the federal right underlying the claim.

No. 94-5284 · filed 1995-05-31

A violation of a clearly established state law can only surmount qualified immunity if it embodies the federal right that is the basis of the Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides redress for violations of federal law and federally protected liberty interests, but not for violations of state procedures alone.

Reimann v. Murphy · filed 1995-07-31

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides redress for violations of federal law and federally protected liberty interests, not violations of state procedures.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone without a deprivation of federal rights.

Pyles v. Robert S. Raisor, Ray L. Sabbatine · filed 1995-08-01

Plainly, Raisor cannot be liable under § 1983 unless he violated one of Pyles’ federal constitutional rights. Pyles’ rights under Kentucky law, including her right as an alleged misdemeanant to be arrested only when the misdemeanor is committed in the presence of the arresting officer, are not grounded in the federal Constitution and will not support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits claims for violations of federal law or the federal Constitution, but does not cover violations of state law alone.

May v. Baldwin · filed 1995-08-07

It is well settled, however, that “only violations of the federal constitution or federal law are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not state law violations.”

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a violation of state law alone.

Payne v. Fontenot · filed 1995-08-16

It is also clear that a violation of state law is not ground for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on a municipality’s failure to comply with a state bail statute.

Roberts v. City of Forest Acres · filed 1995-08-21

The court cannot agree that the City’s failure to comply with section 17-15-10 supports a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of state law alone.

Ringuette v. City of Fall River · filed 1995-11-09

The “clearly established right” must be a federal constitutional or statutory right. A violation of a state statute, in itself, does not give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make standalone violations of state law or prison regulations actionable.

Abdul-Akbar v. Department of Corrections · filed 1995-12-19

In addition, he claims that prison officials failed to follow Delaware law and regulations in many different ways. ... As nonconstitutional claims, they are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a violation of a state-law standard of care actionable unless it implicates a constitutional concern.

Larry D. Raver, Darryl E. Adkins Daniel George Karnes Walter C. Evans Carl T. Zelinsky, Jr. Deric Mott, Sr. v. Reginald · filed 1996-02-15

Finally, plaintiff's contention that defendants violated a standard of care owed him under state law simply does not implicate constitutional concerns cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law alone.

Gragg v. McKune · filed 1996-04-09

To the extent that plaintiff is seeking relief for alleged violations of Kansas Administrative Regulations, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983.

A violation of a state prison regulation does not by itself establish a constitutional violation actionable under § 1983.

Carter v. O'SULLIVAN · filed 1996-04-19

Furthermore, even assuming that the phone list rule was a breach of 525.150, a violation of a state prison regulation does not necessarily amount to a constitutional violation actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a state official for violating state law.

Williams v. Van Buren Township · filed 1996-05-10

Obviously, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a state official for a violation of state law.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a state-created interest beyond the rights protected by federal law.

Lovell v. Poway Unified School District · filed 1996-07-18

To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a prison official’s failure to file policies with a state official when the failure concerns only state law.

Sandefur v. Lewis · filed 1996-08-14

Moreover, Defendant Lewis’ failure to file affects a matter that only concerns state law and, therefore, is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A violation of state law alone does not give rise to a § 1983 claim unless it also implicates a federal constitutional right.

Van Loo v. Braun · filed 1996-09-05

Even if a violation of state law occurred, this does not give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the Constitution of the United States is implicated.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state laws or regulations alone.

Billado v. Appel · filed 1996-10-11

Violations of state laws or regulations do not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 liability does not arise solely from an officer’s technical deviation from state seizure reporting procedures when the officer promptly reports the seizure through departmental channels.

Putman v. Unknown Smith · filed 1996-10-28

Despite the fact that this reporting procedure deviates slightly from the technical directives of the CAFA,5 section 1983 liability must rest on something more than the mere fact that the officer promptly reported the seizure to the proper authority through an indirect means.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a claimed violation of state law alone.

Boling v. Romer · filed 1996-12-02

That argument, however, addresses only state law concerns and, therefore, does not support plaintiff’s claims for relief under the federal civil rights statutes.

Section 1983 does not make a failure to follow state procedures actionable without deprivation of a federally protected right.

Watson v. State of Utah · filed 1996-12-09

Insofar as Ms. Watson is claiming that defendants failed to follow state procedures in effecting the termination, these claims are not cognizable in § 1983 proceedings.

A violation of state law does not automatically support a claim under Section 1983.

Lyle v. Magnolia State Ent · filed 1996-12-17

Even assuming that Lyle made this argument below and that the behavior in question does violate state law, a violation of state law does not automatically give rise to a claim of constitutional significance under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a claim that officials violated state law without violating federal law.

Boling v. Romer · filed 1997-01-17

Although not asserted as a separate claim for relief, plaintiff argues that the policies adopted by the DOC are inconsistent with the language of Colo.Rev.Stat. § 17-2-201(5)(g). That argument, however, addresses only state law concerns and, therefore, does not support plaintiff's claims for relief under the federal civil rights statutes.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce rights derived solely from a state child protection statute.

White v. Chambliss · filed 1997-04-30

White next argues that the South Carolina Child Protection Act forms the basis of a clearly established right to protection while in foster care which is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We disagree. ... Because the South Carolina Child Protection Act does not create a clearly established substantive federal right, the immunity claims of the DSS defendants do not rise or fall on questions of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law.

Williams v. Scott · filed 1997-06-05

But § 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on a violation of state law.

Weir v. Crispus Nix · filed 1997-06-11

While we are skeptical that the statute provides him with such a right, it is immaterial in this case because a violation of state law, without more, is insufficient to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for an ordinary violation of state entrapment law; the violation must rise to the level of a due process violation.

Smith v. Rick J. Lang · filed 1997-06-16

Because § 1983 does not provide for relief for ordinary violations of state law, a cause of action exists only where the state law violation is so extreme that it rises to the level of a due process violation, such as when the state law violation "create[s] a serious risk of convicting an innocent person." See Eaglin v. Welborn, 57 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 421 (1995) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991)).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state law or a state constitution alone.

Griswold v. New Madrid County Group Practice, Inc. · filed 1997-06-19

Violations of state laws or a state constitution cannot by themselves constitute a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a right of action for violations of state law.

Webber v. Hammack · filed 1997-07-31

It is axiomatic that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a right of action for violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not enforce state procedural requirements that exceed what the Due Process Clause requires.

Carroll v. Town of University Park · filed 1997-08-11

Second, any procedural requirements contained in the General Orders Manual beyond those required by the Due Process Clause are not enforceable through a § 1983 action.

A violation of state law alone is not actionable under § 1983 when it does not violate the Constitution.

Duggan v. CITY OF LEAGUE CITY, TX · filed 1997-08-25

Although Plaintiffs point to the Texas Family Code for the proper procedures for detaining children, any violations of the Texas Family Code are a matter of state law. Any such violations that may have occurred do not rise to the level of a violation of the United States Constitution. Therefore, these violations are not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on an alleged violation of state law.

Smith v. Tana Wood Al Scamahorn Tom Rolfs Steve Rawlings Chase Riveland · filed 1997-08-29

We affirm the district court's dismissal of Smith's state law claim because an allegation of a state law infraction is not sufficient to state a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on police officers’ failure to follow state law.

Paolello v. Richard Marco and Mitchell Vandenbos · filed 1997-10-23

Other portions of his brief-assert that the police did not follow state law, which in an action under § 1983 is neither here nor there.

Section 1983 does not permit an action based solely on a state official’s failure to follow state law.

Clanton v. Jody Cooper · filed 1997-11-17

However, an action may not be maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a state official’s failure to adhere to state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on prison officials’ failure to follow prison regulations, directives, or policies.

Lopez v. Reynolds · filed 1997-12-02

A prison inmate does not have a viable § 1983 claim based solely on prison ■officials’ failure to adhere to the requirements of prison-regulations, directives or policy statements.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a state law violation only when that violation also violates the Constitution or federal law.

Gabbert v. David Conn Carol Najera Leslie Zoeller Elliot Oppenheim · filed 1997-12-08

State law cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim unless the violation of that law also results in a constitutional or federal law violation.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of a state statute.

Cronin v. West Whiteland Township · filed 1998-02-19

Further, the violation of a state statute does not in and of itself give rise to a § 1983 violation.

Section 1983 claims must rest on a violation of the Constitution or federal law; a violation of state law alone cannot support a claim.

Wheeler v. Gilmore · filed 1998-03-30

Because plaintiff pursues this claim under § 1983, only a violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States can serve as a basis for the claim.

A violation of state law generally does not create liability under § 1983.

Campbell v. Paul Burt, and John Doe (3), Police Officers · filed 1998-04-06

As a general rule, a violation of state law does not lead to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 vindicates federal rights; a violation of state law alone does not support a claim.

Peterson Ex Rel. Peterson v. Independent School District No. 811 · filed 1998-04-09

In addition, violations of state law do not by themselves give rise to a claim under § 1983, which vindicates only federal rights. Plaintiff, therefore, may not base his § 1983 claim on a violation of the Dismissal Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law.

Watson v. Patricia Maxwell Las Vegas Valley Water District Clark County Commissioners, in Individual and Official Ca · filed 1998-04-28

Finally, § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for alleged violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because an officer exceeded territorial authority under state law; the arrest must also violate the Constitution.

Madsen v. Park City · filed 1998-04-29

But even if, under state law, Leding had lacked authority to stop plaintiff and issue a citation in Waukegan, that by itself would be an insufficient basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The arrest would only violate the Constitution if it was without probable cause or defendant violated some other constitutional prohibition.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights, not for conduct that violates only state law.

Bartell v. Lohiser · filed 1998-07-01

Section 1983 only authorizes courts to redress violations of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and [federal] laws”, and does not cover conduct that violates only state laws.

A violation of state law alone does not state a claim under § 1983.

Collins v. Bellinghausen · filed 1998-09-30

Whatever the requirements of Iowa law, they are irrelevant to the issues in this case, for "a violation of state law, without more, does not state a claim under the federal Constitution or 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Bagley v. Rogerson, 5 F.3d 325, 328 (8th Cir.1993).

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a violation of state procedural law alone.

Young v. County of Fulton · filed 1998-11-16

Without more, the fact that defendants violated New York procedural requirements does not support liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a jail’s failure to follow its staffing policy without a violation of federal rights.

Lewis v. Sheahan · filed 1999-02-02

Finally, the Jail’s failure to follow its own policy of staffing five paramedics in Division 9 does not state a cause of action under § 1983. Violations of state law or procedures in and of themselves are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a policy’s failure to comply with state laws or administrative procedures alone.

Boswell v. Robert Mayer and Melinda Cieslinski · filed 1999-04-14

Below and on appeal, Boswell repeatedly argues that the promulgation of the Van Octhen policy failed to comport with a host of state laws and administrative procedures. Such alleged noncompliance does not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of rights guaranteed solely by state law or a state constitution.

Bellevue Fire Fighters Local 1604 v. City of Bellevue · filed 1984-01-12

The violation of rights guaranteed solely by the state constitution and state law is not actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a State authority’s failure to comply with State regulations alone.

Concourse Rehabilitation & Nursing Center Inc. v. DeBuono · filed 1999-06-03

As we repeatedly have explained, the failure of a State authority to comply with State regulations cannot alone give rise to a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a mere violation of state law.

Doughty v. City of Vermillion · filed 1999-06-08

The Court disagrees. It is clear that “a mere violation of ... a state law will not establish a proper claim under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of state law.

Brown v. Stickle, Unpublished Decision (12-29-1999) · filed 1999-12-29

Based on our decision in Manogg, supra, we conclude the trial court properly granted summary judgment as appellants can not maintain a Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code claim based on a statutory violation.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law alone.

Tyler v. Harper · filed 1984-02-28

Violations of state law alone do not give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for every violation of state law or unlawful municipal promotion procedure.

Broadnax v. City of New Haven, No. 412193 (May 16, 2000) · filed 2000-05-16

It is not every violation of state law, nor every illegal municipal promotional procedure, that gives rise to cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability based on a violation of state law only when that violation is cognizable under federal law; internal policy manuals do not themselves create a constitutional duty.

Devereaux v. Perez · filed 2000-07-12

With respect to the internal policy manual’s interviewing techniques, such manuals do not constitute decisional law giving rise to a constitutional duty under § 1983. Even where the interview techniques were not followed, state law may serve as a basis for § 1983 liability only where such violation is cognizable under federal law.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for failure to meet state law requirements.

Estate of Shannon Novack, Deceased, by Its Personal Representative, Susan Turbin, and Susan Turbin v. County of Wood, a · filed 2000-08-07

Section 1983 provides no remedy for failure to meet state law requirements.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on violations of state prison directives.

Graham v. Perez · filed 2000-11-06

To the extent that the plaintiff is alleging a cause of action under Section 1983 based on these state violations, the claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for an arrest that violates only a state-law requirement and no federal right.

Soltesz v. City of Sandusky · filed 2001-03-23

The vitality of plaintiffs § 1983 action depends on whether Officer Gautschi had probable cause under the Fourth Amendment to make an arrest; it does not depend on whether the offense was committed in Officer Gautschi’s presence.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

Jackson v. Welborn · filed 2001-06-13

To the extent that Jackson is arguing that Welborn’s actions violated state law by failing to adhere to the state procedural classifications of these types of actions, his claim of a state- law violation is not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a parole board’s violation of state law alone.

Seavolt v. Escamilla · filed 2001-07-19

To the extent he also argues that the parole board’s decision violated state law, the claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

Erikson v. Pawnee County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2001-08-23

We agree with the conclusion of the magistrate judge that, without more, any such violation of state law is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on improper child-witness interviews or violations of state regulations.

Devereaux v. Abbey · filed 2001-09-05

Consequently, mere allegations that Defendants used interviewing techniques that were in some sense improper, or that violated state regulations, without more, cannot serve as the basis for a claim under §§ 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

Scott v. Fiesta Auto Center · filed 2001-09-07

A violation of state law is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on noncompliance with state laws or administrative procedures.

Porter v. Soice · filed 2001-11-30

However, such alleged noncompliance fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for interference with prison grievances when the allegations show only a violation of state law.

Thompson v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2002-01-02

The claims that defendants had interfered with his filing of grievances alleged only a violation of state law which did not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of state law or institutional policies alone.

Nicolaison v. Milczark · filed 2002-01-08

Further, we agree with the District Court that (1) Nicolaison cannot seek relief in federal court under section 1983 based on alleged violations of Minnesota laws or Moose Lake policies, ... Accordingly, we affirm.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law alone.

Love v. McKune · filed 2002-02-01

We agree with the district court that § 1983 provides no basis for redressing these alleged violations of state law.

Section 1983 provides relief for violations of federal rights, not rights arising solely under state law.

Hinds v. Dallas Independent School District · filed 2002-02-22

By its plain language, § 1983 provides a cause of action and remedies for violations or deprivations secured or guaranteed by the United States Constitution and federal statutes.

A violation of state law alone does not establish a § 1983 violation; the plaintiff must show a violation of a federal right.

Coliseum Enterprises, Inc. v. Campbell · filed 2002-02-25

In other words, the contention that the commissioners violated § 236 does not by itself give rise to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation. Rather, the violation giving rise to the cause of action is the alleged deprivation of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the violation of 7 V.S.A. § 236.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of state law alone.

Box v. Ferrell · filed 2002-03-13

Contrary to Box’s assertions, the record reflects that (1) a prompt probable-cause hearing was held after his arrest, see County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (stating that probable- cause determination within forty-eight hours of warrantless arrest generally satisfies Fourth Amendment), (2) there was no violation of the state statutory provisions he cites (and in any event, he cannot base a § 1983 action on a violation of state law per se, see Doe v. Gooden, 214 F.3d 952, 955 (8th Cir. 2000)), and (3) the allegations in his complaint do not state a due process claim, see Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 2000) (rejecting attempt to bring Fourth Amendment warrantless arrest claims under Due Process Clause).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for official conduct that violates only state law.

Boyd v. Village of Lexington, Unpublished Decision (3-14-2002) · filed 2002-03-14

Section 1983 does not cover official conduct that violates only state law.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for claims based solely on violations of state law.

Neinast v. Board of Trustees of the Columbus Metropolitan Library · filed 2002-03-27

But this is a question of state law, and mere allegations of state law are not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983.