42 U.S.C. § 1983

A police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when no reasonable, competent officer could have believed the challenged use of deadly force was justified.

Baker v. Chaplin · filed 1993-05-11

We conclude that no reasonable, competent police officer could have believed that deadly force was justified in this situation. ... Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied Chaplin’s summary judgment motion asserting qualified immunity as a matter of federal law.

Qualified immunity does not foreclose inquiry into an official’s actual motive when motive is an element of a First Amendment retaliatory termination claim under § 1983.

Gonsalves v. Gallegos · filed 1993-05-14

Claims of retaliatory termination under the First Amendment, unlike issues of probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, necessarily implicate the motives of the employer. The qualified immunity test "does not rule out the need to inquire into the actual reasons behind an official's conduct when the official's state of mind is a necessary component of the constitutional violation he allegedly committed." Feliciano-Angulo v. Rivera-Cruz, 858 F.2d 40, 45 (1st Cir.1988); see also Burgess, 918 F.2d at 107; Gutierrez v. Mun. Court of Southeast Judicial District, 838 F.2d 1031, 1051 (9th Cir.1988) (qualified immunity unavailable because "where the lawfulness of a challenged act is dependent upon the actor's motive or intent, the purpose for which the act was undertaken must be analyzed"). Burgess remains the law we must follow in this case.

Qualified immunity bars damages under § 1983 when the defendant did not violate a right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Leeks v. Lowell K. Cunningham, Mr. Carson P. Bass Joseph A. Kemper M. Press · filed 1993-05-18

Therefore, appellant is entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity.

A defendant sued under § 1983 may assert a defense of qualified immunity.

Bryant v. William R. Muth Gregg Robbins · filed 1993-05-24

A defendant sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may assert a defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields an officer from damages for a warrantless entry when the entry’s unlawfulness was not clearly established at the time.

Baker v. Clover · filed 1993-05-25

While we, too,- might make a similar determination regarding Deputy Clover’s warrant-less entry into Baker’s open garage on May 20,1988, we need not do so in order to decide whether his entry was protected by qualified immunity. We hold that it was so protected. As the foregoing discussion reflects, the issue of whether his entry was lawful or unlawful was not “clearly established” by preexisting statutory or decisional law at the time.

Officials sued personally under Section 1983 have qualified immunity unless they violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable person would have known.

Elenor Joyce Whittaker Gay v. William F. Turner, Lawrence Bax, Liz Hamlin, Ted Haslag, Carolyn Bax · filed 1993-05-27

We further conclude that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Count IV. Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity when sued personally unless they have violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 workplace safety claim when the inmate shows only negligence.

Warren v. State of Missouri Dick Moore Bill Armontrout Leonard Rutledge Richard A. Anderson Richard K. Bowers Kei · filed 1993-05-28

Thus, Warren is left with only his claim that defendants negligently provided him an unsafe work place. Because mere negligence is not a constitutional deprivation, ... defendants are clearly entitled to qualified immunity on that claim.

A general allegation of conduct violating § 1983 does not overcome a public official’s qualified immunity; the plaintiff must allege violation of a specific, clearly established right.

Slade v. Vernon · filed 1993-06-01

A general allegation of conduct in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not sufficient to abrogate qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects officers from damages when they reasonably believe their arrest procedure is lawful under the governing standards.

Topp v. Thomas J. Wolkowski and Thomas J. Lombardi · filed 1993-06-03

It cannot have been clear to them, in light of established practice and the supportive case law, that the procedure of using one officer to spot violators and others to effect the actual arrests, with confirmation that the correct vehicle was stopped, was inconsistent with the statute. Thus, even assuming that § 1983 requires officers to comply with the requirements of a state statute defining probable cause more narrowly than the federal Constitution requires, the standard is met because the officers were not clearly wrong in believing that they were acting properly.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for an officer whose conduct a reasonable officer could have believed lawful under clearly established law and the information available at the time.

Green v. City of Welch · filed 1993-06-03

Police officers are entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity in civil rights cases if they can establish that reasonable officers could have believed that their actions were lawful in light of both clearly established law and information the officers possessed at the time of the acts in question.

Public officials have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on a prosecution when they reasonably rely on statutory language and no clearly established law excludes the charged conduct.

Weg v. MacChiarola · filed 1993-06-04

Public officials do not lose a qualified immunity when their conduct is reasonably based upon the language of a statute even though some attorneys, trial courts, or even intermediate appellate courts have ruled otherwise.

An official defending a Section 1983 claim has qualified immunity when the law governing the claimed constitutional violation was unsettled at the time of the challenged conduct.

Cheathon v. Brinkley · filed 1993-06-04

Therefore, in light of the unsettled state of the law existing at the time of plaintiffs suspension, defendant is entitled to qualified immunity with regard to plaintiffs due process claim.

A sheriff is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for firing deputies over allegations of public corruption when a reasonable sheriff could not believe departmental morale and discipline outweighed the value of their speech.

Paul Hatfield, Fred McCoy v. Charles "Fuzzy" Keesee · filed 1993-06-08

We are not prepared to say in this case that a reasonable sheriff could believe that the value of the plaintiffs' speech was outweighed by considerations of departmental morale and discipline. As we have seen, the public interest is at its zenith when speech includes accusations of corruption involving a public official.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against prison officials who reasonably rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations without violating a known right.

Haavisto v. Perpich · filed 1993-06-09

The commissioner and warden were entitled to rely on prison medical personnel for clinical determinations; their reliance was reasonable and did not violate any known right. Accordingly, qualified immunity applies to bar Haavisto’s section 1983 claim against them.

In a Section 1983 claim, qualified immunity does not preclude consideration of an official’s intent when intent is an essential component of the alleged constitutional violation.

Broderick v. Francis Roache, Arthur Morgan, Jr. · filed 1993-06-18

Accordingly, we reject Morgan’s argument that the district court erred in taking into consideration his intent while conducting its qualified immunity analysis.

Prison officials lack qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when they withhold treatment for a serious medical need to compel payment in violation of clearly established law.

Benter v. Peck · filed 1993-06-25

Applying these principles to the ease at hand, the court finds Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. At the time Defendants withheld Benter’s glasses beginning in December 1991, Benter had a clearly established constitutional right to be free from deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. ... The law in this circuit’ was clearly established in 1991: The withholding of treatment for a serious medical need in order to compel payment constitutes deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when their reasonable conduct violates no clearly established right.

Murray v. District of Columbia · filed 1993-06-25

The naming of defendants in their individual capacities does not save plaintiffs § 1983 claim, because the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. As explained above, plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of Article 111(a) of the IAD. Even assuming that there was such a violation, however, there was no violation of a “clearly established” right of which a reasonable government actor would have known.

A prison official lacks qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for a digital anal cavity search when the reasonable-cause requirement was clearly established and the official could not reasonably have believed that reasonable cause existed.

Chandler v. Steve Koon, Captain Scott Jackson Sgt. Benzler Harol Whitley C/o Baca Darrel Butler · filed 1993-06-29

By 1984, the law on digital anal cavity searches was clearly established; an inmate's anal cavity could be searched only with reasonable cause and in a reasonable manner. Vaughan, 950 F.2d at 1468-69. An independent review of the record reveals that, as a matter of law, Koon could not reasonably have believed that he had reasonable cause and was, therefore, not entitled to qualified immunity.

State officials have qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 when the boundaries of the asserted right are not sufficiently clear for a reasonable official to understand that the challenged conduct violates it.

Severino v. Negron · filed 1993-06-29

Although it has been clear since Tracy that a liberty interest exists in a work release program, we cannot say that the boundaries of that interest are drawn with such clarity that the officials here knew precisely what was required to remove an inmate from the program. ... Therefore, we hold that whether or not the appellee state officials violated Severino's due process rights, they are immune from suit for money damages. We affirm on that basis.

Officials retain qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims for politically motivated transfers that complied with then-binding circuit law, even when that law is later rejected.

Akers v. Caperton · filed 1993-06-29

Therefore, despite Rutan 's ultimate rejection of Delong, the defendants retain their qualified immunity unless the transfers were tantamount to a dismissal. ... Because the defendants' actions did not violate "clearly established" law at the time of the transfers--and did, in fact, comply with this Circuit's established law--the district court's qualified immunity ruling must be reversed.

Once defendants assert qualified immunity in a § 1983 action, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the alleged conduct violated the law and that the law was clearly established when the violation occurred.

Jason Stege, Justin Stege v. C. Joseph Girard, Mitchell B. Trimmer · filed 1993-06-29

Once defendants asserted qualified immunity, plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing both that defendants' alleged conduct violated the law and that the law was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred. See Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir.1992). Because plaintiffs failed to establish that defendants' alleged conduct violated law clearly established at the time of this incident, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

In a section 1983 action, assertion of qualified immunity shifts the burden to the plaintiff to establish that the defendant violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Thomas v. Collins · filed 1993-07-01

Once a defendant asserts the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut it. ... To meet this burden, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s conduct “violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... We hold that appellant’s petition adequately stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that Collins did not establish his immunity from suit as a matter of law.

Qualified immunity protects officials from damages under § 1983 when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Salaam v. Collins · filed 1993-07-12

And, of course, the legal question decided in ... was certainly not one concerning which, prior to that decision, there was sufficient certainty so as to deny to defendants herein their asserted qualified immunity protection from damage claims relating to the Founder's Day issue, under the objective standards of ... and its progeny.

Qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 turns on whether an official’s conduct was clearly unconstitutional, not whether courts had specifically approved that conduct.

Knox v. Kenneth L. McGinnis and Thomas Roth · filed 1993-07-20

Knox misunderstands the .qualified immunity doctrine. The question is not whether the conduct is clearly constitutional, but whether it is clearly unconstitutional.

A prison official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when an inmate’s letters would alert a reasonable official that further action is necessary to protect the inmate from assault under clearly established Eighth Amendment law.

Nelson v. Overberg · filed 1993-07-20

Having wrestled with the different ways of framing the question, we conclude that it really makes no difference how one frames it — either way, Nelson’s letters would have alerted a reasonable prison official that more action needed to be taken than was taken by Overberg to protect "Nelson’s Eighth Amendment rights. Therefore, qualified immunity is not appropriate in this case.

Municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983.

La Societe Generale Immobiliere v. Minneapolis Community Development Agency · filed 1993-07-21

The defendants neither pleaded nor argued qualified immunity prior to trial. However, in light of ... the Court notes that qualified immunity has not been extended to municipalities.

For purposes of qualified immunity under § 1983, an officer’s failure to display his badge is irrelevant to whether he had probable cause at the moment of shooting to believe the suspect threatened death or serious bodily harm.

Drewitt v. Fred L. Pratt Pizza Hut of America, Inc., City of Norfolk, Party-In-Interest · filed 1993-07-22

In light of the holdings in the above cases, we are convinced that Officer Pratt is entitled to qualified immunity herein. Certainly, such cases demonstrate that the failure of Officer Pratt to display his badge when announcing himself as a police officer and demanding Drewitt to stop his vehicle is irrelevant to the issue of whether at the moment of the shooting Officer Pratt had probable cause to believe that Drewitt posed a threat of death or serious bodily harm to him.

Parole officers are entitled to qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 when the right to a final revocation hearing before imposing a short period of delinquency time was not clearly established when they acted.

Calhoun v. New York State Division of Parole Officers: J. McQuire Ted Clark R. White and G. Stern · filed 1993-07-23

Since in these circumstances the constitutional right now claimed by Calhoun was not clearly established in the spring of 1985, defendants White and Stern were entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to dismissal on qualified immunity grounds when the plaintiff's allegations fail to establish a constitutional claim.

American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, Inc. v. Wicomico County · filed 1993-07-23

If the plaintiffs allegations fail to establish a constitutional claim, the defendant is entitled to dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity, or, of course, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

In a § 1983 excessive-force action, the plaintiff must overcome qualified immunity by identifying a closely analogous prior case or showing that the force was so plainly excessive that officers should have known it violated the Fourth Amendment.

Rice v. James Burks and Mark Harvey · filed 1993-07-26

Under the prevailing law, Rice had the burden to point out a closely analogous case that established that he had a constitutional right to be free from the type of force the police officers used on him — some kind of a hit in the back that knocked him to the ground as he attempted to escape after arrest. ... Rice could have evaded the application of qualified immunity without identifying a closely analogous case if he showed that the force used was so plainly excessive that the police officers should have been on notice that they were violating the Fourth Amendment.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 for an alleged Title VII violation may assert qualified immunity.

Wu v. Thomas · filed 1993-07-27

Qualified immunity is no defense to a Title VII action. But defendants could assert qualified immunity once plaintiffs tried to recover damages under section 1983 for the alleged Title VII violation.

Qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability turns on objective reasonableness but permits examination of the facts known to the official when acting.

Joseph H. Bieluch, Jr. v. Bernard Sullivan, Commissioner of Public Safety, I/o · filed 1993-07-27

Although the qualified immunity defense turns on an objective test, rather than Sullivan’s subjective intent, this does not bar an examination of the fact's known to Sullivan at the time he decided to transfer Bieluch. The “reasonable official” standard merely precludes an inquiry into whether Sullivan thought that he might be violating Bieluch’s first-amendment rights.

Once a defendant raises qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the defendant violated clearly established law.

Hovater v. Robinson · filed 1993-07-27

Once a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the defendant has violated clearly established law.

Section 1983 liability is barred by judicial immunity for acts in a judicial capacity and by qualified immunity for a police officer where no facts allege unreasonable conduct and bad faith.

Schorn v. Larose · filed 1993-07-27

Thus, defendant LaRose is shielded from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because there is no factual allegation that would support a finding that he was acting in anything other than his judicial capacity in finding plaintiff guilty of a traffic offense. Without any factual allegation that would support a finding that defendant Natouk acted unreasonably and in bad faith in devising the stop trap and issuing plaintiff a summons for an alleged civil infraction, defendant Natouk also is shielded from liability.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 is a defense only to individual-capacity claims and cannot defeat an official-capacity claim against a municipal official.

Frank v. Howard R. Relin, Individually and in His Official Capacity as the Monroe County District Attorney · filed 1993-07-28

However, such equitable relief could be obtained against Relin only in his official, not his individual, capacity; and a defense of qualified immunity may properly be raised only with respect to claims asserted against a defendant in his individual capacity. Qualified immunity is not a defense to a claim against a municipal official in his official capacity.

Qualified immunity shields prison officials from damages under § 1983 for disciplining an inmate based on constructive possession of contraband in a work area shared by six inmates when the unlawfulness of that discipline was not clearly established.

Harms v. Godinez · filed 1993-07-29

In the present case, even assuming that a finding of constructive guilt in the present case, where there is only a one-in-six chance of actual guilt, violates the due process rights of the Plaintiff, qualified immunity shields the Defendants from monetary damages. In light of Hill and Mason v. Sargent, 898 F.2d 679, 680 (8th Cir.1990) (constructive possession of contraband found in shared locker did not violate due process), we can hardly say that it was “clearly established” that finding the Plaintiff guilty violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 affords arresting officers qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest lawful under the law existing at the time, even if the charge is later dismissed.

Fordyce v. City of Seattle · filed 1993-07-29

Plaintiff cites the absence of a Worleynephews conversation on the tape placed in evidence, and the later dismissal of the charge, but neither of these factors changes the outcome. The decisive point is that a reasonable officer could have believed it was lawful to arrest and charge plaintiff on August 5, 1990. That being so, the officer defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and to summary judgment dismissing the section 1983 claims against them.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to dismissal on qualified immunity grounds when the plaintiff's allegations fail to establish a constitutional claim.

American Civil Liberties Union Of Maryland, Inc. v. Wicomico County · filed 1993-08-06

If the plaintiff's allegations fail to establish a constitutional claim, the defendant is entitled to dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity, or, of course, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 vehicle-seizure claim when the record lacks evidence supporting a reasonable belief that the vehicle was used to commit a drug offense.

Scott v. Glumac · filed 1993-08-06

The problem is not that the officer failed to articulate a reason for believing that Scott was using the car to commit a Controlled Substances Act violation. If we could tell from the record that a reasonable officer could have believed it, we would affirm the grant of qualified immunity, regardless of what Officer Glumac actually believed or what theory he argued. The real problem is that Glumac failed to offer evidence which could support a reasonable belief that the car was being used to commit a drug offense.

To overcome qualified immunity under Section 1983, a plaintiff must identify a clearly established constitutional right implicated by the official’s conduct.

Helms v. Gamet · filed 1993-08-06

The relevant question here is whether a reasonable officer could have believed Officer Garnet’s use of force was lawful in light of clearly established law and the information he had at the time. Plaintiffs have made no attempt to show what constitutional right, clearly established or otherwise, was implicated in Officer Garnet’s killing of their dog.

For qualified immunity under § 1983, a plaintiff cannot show that a right was clearly established by relying solely on authority recognizing broad statutory or constitutional rights.

D'AGUANNO v. Gallagher · filed 1993-08-09

Accordingly, a plaintiff cannot prove that a particular right was clearly established by relying solely on authority that grants broad and sweeping statutory or constitutional rights.

State hospital doctors are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 equal-protection claim arising from denial of voluntary admission where the patient's right to equal protection was firmly established.

Noyes v. Moyer · filed 1993-08-09

In their motion to dismiss, defendants fail to address the application of qualified immunity to plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. That Terry Noyes’ constitutional right to equal protection of the laws was firmly established at the time he was denied admittance is without question. ... Therefore, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 when the law does not clearly establish that the combination of legal resources available to inmates is constitutionally inadequate.

Abdul-Akbar v. Watson · filed 1993-08-11

Nor do we conclude, given the inexplicitly defined Bounds standard and the particular mix of resources available here, that "reasonable officials in the defendants' position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of what was in the decided case law, that their conduct would be unlawful." Good v. Dauphin County, 891 F.2d at 1092. We thus hold that the officials in this case were entitled to qualified immunity and, therefore, were shielded from liability for damages.

Officers executing a facially valid arrest warrant are entitled to qualified immunity under Section 1983 when the plaintiff fails to identify pre-arrest case law clearly establishing a duty to investigate the warrant's actual validity further.

Beckman v. Dillard · filed 1993-08-12

To meet this burden, Beckman must point to case law, decided prior to his arrest, that clearly established that Dillard and Dibble were required to investigate further the actual validity of a facially valid warrant prior to executing the arrest. ... Because Beckman has failed meet his burden, either before the district court or on appeal, Dillard and Dibble are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law and inquiry into the reasonableness of Dillard and Dibble's conduct is not necessary.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the inmate’s asserted liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation was not clearly established.

Swenson v. Myrna Trickey Larry Trickey Captain Fred Arflack · filed 1993-08-17

In these circumstances, it is not clearly established that Swenson had a protected state-created liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation in February 1986. Thus, qualified immunity bars his claim.

For a § 1983 claim premised on officials exceeding their state-law authority, qualified immunity bars damages when the limits of that authority were not clearly established, even if the officials ultimately exceeded them.

Berman Enterprises, Inc. v. Jorling · filed 1993-08-24

Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), and its progeny, public officials have immunity from liability for damages under Sec. 1983 when their "conduct does not violate clearly established * * * rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. ... In short, the extent of the commissioners' authority is not yet clearly delineated. Even if it should ultimately turn out that they exceeded their authority, the uncertainty of their authority under New York law protects them from liability for damages in this suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action makes an officer's malicious motives for arrest irrelevant so long as a reasonable officer would have believed probable cause existed.

Gutierrez v. Allen May, Sergeant · filed 1993-08-25

So long as a reasonable police officer would have believed probable cause existed for Gutierrez's arrest, malicious motives for arresting a section 1983 plaintiff are legally irrelevant.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when the plaintiff fails to show that the allegedly violated constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the incident.

Alexander v. Maass · filed 1993-08-25

Here, we agree with the district court that even if we assume that Alexander's federal rights were violated, defendants are not liable because they are entitled to qualified immunity. ... Alexander bears the burden of showing that the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the incident. ... Accordingly, we conclude that it was not clearly established that Alexander's placement in DSU for misconduct while on escape would violate his constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim protects a police officer who establishes an illuminated partial roadblock when its unlawfulness was not clearly established at the time.

Horta v. Sullivan · filed 1993-08-31

As it stood at the time this tragic accident occurred, the law was not so clear that a reasonable police officer would know that establishing an illuminated, partial roadblock at the end of a straightaway violated Fourth Amendment rights. Because Sullivan did not violate a clearly established right of appellant’s, the district court correctly found that he was entitled to qualified immunity from a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State officials have qualified immunity from section 1983 damages claims when the rights allegedly violated were not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Brumley v. Utah State Tax Commission · filed 1993-09-02

However, a plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of a constitutional or statutory right may overcome the defendant officials’ qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. ... Because the constitutional rights in question were not “clearly established” during the twenty-day period, we find no error in the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ civil rights action on the ground of qualified immunity.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed.

Cross v. City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation, and Robert Faulkner, Both as Agent and Individually · filed 1993-09-02

Thus, we affirm for the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion of the district court. ... Summary judgment is also proper as to Count I because Officer Faulkner is entitled to qualified immunity. ... Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to Cross, we conclude that a reasonable police officer could have believed that he had probable cause to arrest Cross on December 14, 1990. ... Therefore, summary judgment as to Count I is also proper on qualified immunity grounds.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 for an arrest when probable cause was not clearly lacking.

Fisher v. The City of Detroit Robert Butucal Richard Ivy Robert Gerds · filed 1993-09-09

Moreover, both arrests were made pursuant to duly issued warrants. Under these circumstances, the defense of qualified immunity would protect the officers from liability for damages in a Sec. 1983 suit. ... In probable cause challenges, police officers are shielded from damages as long as probable cause was not clearly lacking.

Qualified immunity under Section 1983 does not protect police officers who unreasonably create a physically threatening situation during a Fourth Amendment seizure and then use deadly force to protect themselves.

ESTATE OF · filed 1993-09-14

Black cannot be granted immunity because, again taking the plaintiffs' version of the facts, his own unreasonable action prompted the danger he faced. Police officers who unreasonably create a physically threatening situation in the midst of a Fourth Amendment seizure cannot be immunized for the use of deadly force.

Qualified immunity under Section 1983 depends on whether the plaintiff identified a clearly established right and whether a reasonable official in the defendant's position should have known that the conduct violated that right.

George FITZPATRICK, Heza Fitzpatrick, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. MEYER · filed 1993-09-14

To determine whether qualified immunity protects the defendants, this court must determine: 1) whether the Fitzpatricks identified a clearly established right alleged to have been violated; and 2) whether a reasonable state official in each of the defendants' positions should have known that his conduct was undertaken in violation of these rights.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 does not protect police officers who unreasonably create a physically threatening situation during a Fourth Amendment seizure and then use deadly force.

Estate of Starks v. Enyart · filed 1993-09-14

Police officers who unreasonably create a physically threatening situation in the midst of a Fourth Amendment seizure cannot be immunized for the use of deadly force.

Qualified immunity protects a police officer from a Section 1983 detention claim when the asserted requirement for an adversary probable-cause hearing was not sufficiently clear and established for a reasonable officer to know the procedures were unconstitutional.

Fiscus v. City of Roswell · filed 1993-09-21

Should it be determined that County of Riverside, decided on May 13, 1991, requires more than what the Court has determined above (such as a preliminary adversary hearing with counsel present all within 48 hours of the arrest), the law cannot be deemed to have been sufficiently clear and established that a reasonable police officer in defendant Dukas’s place, arresting plaintiff on May 30, 1991, would have known that the procedure he followed did not conform to the constitutional demands of a Supreme Court case decided within the same month. ... Such police officer would be entitled to qualified immunity.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages for failing to independently assess confidential informants’ credibility at a March 1985 disciplinary hearing because that right was not clearly established in the Second Circuit at that time.

Richardson v. Donald Selsky, Clement Capuano, William Fenton, Bernard Lonczak · filed 1993-09-22

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, though we note that if the circumstances of'this case had occurred on a more recent' date, the result herein might well have been different. ... We conclude that Richardson has not established that it was clear in this Circuit as of March 1985 that he had a right to have the presiding officer at the disciplinary hearing independently examine the credibility of the confidential informants.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action applies only to government officials sued in their individual capacities, not their official capacities.

Thornton v. City of Albany · filed 1993-09-28

The court notes, however, that the defense of qualified immunity is only applicable to- suits against government officials in their individual capacities. ... Thus, Officers Peters and Ekstrom remain defendants in this case with respect to these claims in their official capacities.

Washington prison officials who implemented a policy permitting digital rectal probe searches before inmates entered an Intensive Management Unit are entitled to qualified immunity from claims under Section 1983.

Malone v. John Doe Fleming, Captain Wcc · filed 1993-09-29

Since the district court's decision in this case, we decided Hemphill. Hemphill holds that Washington state prison officials who implemented the policy permitting digital rectal probe searches on inmates before the inmates' entry into the IMU of a prison are entitled to qualified immunity. Hemphill, 987 F.2d at 591, 594. Therefore, the defendants in this case are entitled to qualified immunity. See id.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a section 1983 unequal-pay claim when a reasonable official could regard differing government experience as justifying the pay disparity and no clearly established right requires equal pay in those circumstances.

Bates v. Hunt · filed 1993-09-30

The qualified immunity defense tightly constrains causes of action under section 1983. ... To overcome this defense, Bates must demonstrate that she had a “clearly established” right to earn as much pay as Heatherly, despite their vastly different levels of experience. ... Therefore, we cannot say that Bates has demonstrated that in these circumstances she had a “clearly established” right to be paid the same as Heatherly. The Governor, in his individual capacity, was due summary judgment on this claim.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from damages under Section 1983 when their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable official would have known.

Connor v. Foster · filed 1993-10-01

Public officials are immune from liability for monetary damages under § 1983 if their conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Foster accordingly is entitled to qualified immunity on Connor’s claim that he used threats to force Connor to sign the consent form.

Prison officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on reliance on a settlement agreement when a reasonable official would know that the agreement did not override clearly established Supreme Court and circuit precedent.

Hershberger v. Scaletta · filed 1993-10-04

The court concludes that a reasonable official would have known that the ... settlement agreement did not overrule prior Supreme Court and subsequent Eighth Circuit decisions. ... Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Before deciding qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim, a court must determine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation; an unripe claim prevents that determination.

Acierno v. Michael Mitchell, in His Official and Individual Capacity New Castle County · filed 1993-10-04

Because plaintiff has secured no final decision from the Board of Adjustment, we will also vacate the district court’s decision on Mitchell’s qualified immunity defense and remand with instructions to dismiss, without prejudice, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Mitchell. Before determining whether Mitchell is entitled to qualified immunity, we must determine whether plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation.

A defendant has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for failing to protect a prisoner from fellow inmates when the defendant had neither the responsibility nor the ability to protect the prisoner.

Latimore v. George Widseth, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney · filed 1993-10-12

We will not refuse qualified immunity to a § 1983 defendant for failing to protect a prisoner from harm at the hands of fellow inmates when that defendant had neither the responsibility nor the ability to protect the prisoner from such harm.

For qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim, an official's conduct is assessed for objective reasonableness under the law existing when the conduct occurred.

Rankin v. Klevenhagen · filed 1993-10-18

Specifically, the district court should evaluate the objective reasonableness of Pinkins' actions with reference to the law that existed at the time of the events in question.

A police officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 illegal-seizure claim when relying on a judicially secured warrant unless the warrant lacks sufficient indicia of probable cause for any reasonably competent officer to conclude that it should issue.

Buchholtz v. Dugan · filed 1993-10-26

A police officer is entitled to rely on a judicially secured warrant as a basis for qualified immunity from a Sec. 1983 action for illegal seizure, unless the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue.

Qualified immunity under section 1983 protects a social worker who reasonably believes that executing a facially valid out-of-state child-custody order with local police assistance complies with federal law.

Yount v. Millington · filed 1993-11-22

Accordingly, we hold that given the state of the law in 1985, it was objectively reasonable for Defendant Millington to have believed that participating with the California police officers in executing in California a facially valid New Mexico ex parte custody order, based on allegations of sexual abuse, that complied with the post-deprivation prompt notice and hearing requirements in Children’s Code Rules 53 and 54, would not violate Plaintiffs federal rights.

In a § 1983 action, uncertainty about a plaintiff’s standing to sue cannot support qualified immunity, even if that uncertainty was objectively reasonable when the official acted.

Triad Associates, Inc., D/B/A Guardian Security, Jk Guardian Security Services, Inc., and K & J Management, Inc. v. Rena · filed 1993-11-24

Instead we find persuasive this Court’s reasoning in ... and hold that uncertainty ... as to the eventual plaintiffs standing to bring suit, no matter how objectively reasonable at the time of the conduct in question, cannot be the basis for qualified immunity.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim alleging only that they recommended a political friend for promotion because no clearly established law makes such recommendations a First Amendment violation.

Pickering v. State of Tennessee Department of Transportation · filed 1993-11-29

If the complaint alleges only that Ferguson and Thorne sought to influence Turpin's promotion by recommending him to Layne, then they are entitled to qualified immunity because there is no clearly established law that vouching for political friends offends the First Amendment.

Under § 1983, police officers are entitled to qualified immunity if they reasonably could have believed a criminal summons was lawful in light of clearly established law and the information they possessed.

Gehl Group v. Koby · filed 1993-12-02

Rather, the point is whether a reasonable police official could have believed the summons to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the official possessed. If so, then Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity applies only to § 1983 damages actions against government officials in their individual capacities, not their official capacities.

Pearson v. City of Paris · filed 1993-12-02

The doctrine of qualified immunity, however, applies only to a § 1983 damages action against the government official in his individual capacity and not in his official capacity. ... Thus, the issue of qualified immunity is only relevant to the action against defendant Ford in his individual capacity.

Correctional officers are not entitled to qualified immunity under Section 1983 for carefully reading a prisoner's clearly marked confidential legal mail during a routine cell search because a reasonable officer would know that existing law prohibits it.

Marquez v. D. Miranda C. Wells, Correctional Officers · filed 1993-12-06

Thus, we find that a reasonable official could not have understood existing law to allow them to carefully read a prisoner's clearly marked confidential legal mail during a routine cell search. ... Accordingly, the district court properly denied the qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 is assessed objectively for an unreasonable search or seizure claim, but an officer's intent must be examined when intent is an element of the substantive claim.

Wright v. Jefferson County Police Dept. · filed 1993-12-08

The subjective views of the officers are irrelevant for purposes of determining qualified immunity to a section 1983 action based on an unreasonable search and seizure. However, when intent is an element of the substantive claim, the court must examine the officer's intent under a qualified immunity analysis to determine if he has violated "clearly established" law.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from section 1983 claims for denying religious exemptions from hair-grooming policies when they could not reasonably anticipate that the policies violated prisoners' free-exercise rights.

Carl Dean Swift and David Raymond Gren v. Samuel A. Lewis, Director, Carl Dean Swift, and David Raymond Gren v. Samuel A · filed 1993-12-10

Because the prison officials could not reasonably anticipate any illegality in their determination that the hair-grooming policy met the reasonable relation test of Turner, the officials are protected by qualified immunity for any violation of the prisoners' right to the free exercise of their alleged religious belief under the First Amendment.

To defeat qualified immunity on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Golden Rule Insurance v. Long · filed 1993-12-23

In order to defeat the qualified immunity, plaintiff had to show that defendant violated some clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

A police officer's reasonable belief that probable cause exists insulates the officer from Section 1983 liability for arresting an innocent person.

Yattoni v. Oakbrook Terrace, a Municipal Corporation Detective Michael Delaurentis · filed 1993-12-28

Under Hunter, 112 S.Ct. at 536 a police officer's reasonable belief as to probable cause completely insulates the officer from liability under Section 1983 for the arrest of an innocent person. ... DeLaurentis is therefore entitled to a summary judgment on Yattoni's Section 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity bars Section 1983 damages claims against government officials when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Umbehr v. McClure · filed 1993-12-30

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, summary judgment must be granted against any damages claim plaintiff has against defendants for actions taken in their capacities as government officials. ... We do not believe it was clearly established in 1991 that the First Amendment prohibited defendants from acting to terminate plaintiffs contract with Wabaunsee County because of his public comments. Therefore, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages for any actions taken by them as public officials.

Individual officials have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional rights were not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake · filed 1994-01-03

And that is so even without reference to the further fatal defect that exists in relation to Paxson and Sapoznik (a defect that really follows a fortiori): the fact that neither of the rights sought to be asserted here by O’Hare and Gratzianna was “clearly established” so as to overcome Paxson’s and Sapoznik’s qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) and their progeny.

A government official is immune from a Section 1983 claim when the alleged constitutional inadequacy of the procedure he used was not clearly established at the time.

Russell v. Scully · filed 1994-01-03

Because it was not clearly established at the time of the hearing--or now--that the procedure he used was inadequate, Wright, as a government official, is protected by qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not shield a sheriff who detained a material witness for five days without a probable cause hearing when that delay was clearly unreasonable under established law.

Mignon Marie Stone v. Richard Holzberger Richard A. Carpenter Richard Sizemore William Profitt Terry Payer · filed 1994-01-06

We conclude that it was clearly established in 1989 that five days was clearly beyond a reasonable time. ... Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Holzberger's qualified immunity motion.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 money damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established law that a reasonably competent official would know.

Losee v. Nix · filed 1994-01-14

The Defendants here, Warden Nix, Director of Security Emmett, and Unit 319 Manager Lawson, are entitled to qualified immunity from money damages. Their placement and retention of Losee in investigatory segregation, and the failure to restore Losee’s personal property, full back pay or full credit for “time served” pursuant to institution policies, did not violate any clearly established law of which a reasonable competent public official would know.

In a Section 1983 suit, officers bear the burden of showing entitlement to qualified immunity, which depends on the objective legal reasonableness of their conduct.

Nelson v. Mattern · filed 1994-01-14

The court must focus on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the conduct and defendants bear the burden of demonstrating an entitlement.

Section 1983 actions against state actors in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity.

Burns-Toole v. Byrne · filed 1994-01-19

An action brought under § 1983 against a state actor in his individual capacity, however, is subject to the defense of qualified immunity.

An official sued for damages under § 1983 has qualified immunity when binding precedent did not clearly establish that the official’s conduct was unconstitutional.

Carter v. Dutton · filed 1994-01-21

Warden Dutton did not have the benefit of any binding judicial opinions clearly establishing the unconstitutionality of the TDOC's one-year waiting period. He is entitled to qualified immunity, and summary judgment in his favor is not in error.

Qualified immunity protects a jail nurse from § 1983 damages when she reasonably believed a detainee consented to the challenged medication.

Vickers v. Scott Mellinger, Doris Maxey and Pat Lakey, R.N. · filed 1994-01-21

Anderson focuses our inquiry on whether it was objectively legally reasonable for the nurse to conclude that Vickers consented to the administration of antipsychotic drugs. 483 U.S. at 641. Because the nurse's belief was reasonable, she is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim protects a correctional officer who negligently uses excessive force while making a discretionary, permissible decision, if a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct lawful.

Foster v. McGrail · filed 1994-01-25

That is, qualified immunity protects a correctional officer against liability for negligence when, in making a quick decision about how much force to use, the officer must weigh the interests of institutional discipline and order against the interests of an inmate in not having excessive force used against him. For this reason, defendant’s conduct was “objectively reasonable” in the circumstances — that is, a reasonable custodial officer could have believed that what he was doing was permissible — and the defendant is protected by qualified immunity.

A defendant in a § 1983 damages action is entitled to qualified immunity when the specific constitutional right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Wiley v. Doory · filed 1994-01-27

For the foregoing reasons, we therefore conclude that the specific constitutional right allegedly violated in this case, if such a right exists, was not clearly established. Thus, appellant Doory is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects a public college official from § 1983 liability for reviewing a student election decision when the relevant law was not clearly established and her conduct was objectively reasonable.

Westmoreland v. State · filed 1994-01-31

Nonetheless, we do find that qualified immunity protected her from liability for her actions. ... Not only was the law at the time of Westmoreland’s disqualification not "clearly established” regarding the constitutional rights of college students to engage in the process of electing student officers, but Ford-Andrich’s actions, which were taken in good faith and comported with the legal advice she was given, were actions which a reasonable official would have taken under similar circumstances.

Prison officials are qualifiedly immune from § 1983 damages when they reasonably believed their conduct conformed to the law.

Sabil M. Mujahid, AKA Terry Smith v. Tera Harper, Chairman Jeffrey Tom, Chairperson Allan Anduha, Lt., Chairperson · filed 1994-02-01

We conclude that the prison officials could have reasonably believed that their actions were in conformity with the law. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's determination that the prison officials have qualified immunity from Mujahid's claims for damages.

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity for prison equipment injuries when no clearly established law makes their conduct a constitutional violation.

Arnold v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 1994-02-03

Thus, even had Arnold offered sufficient evidence that being forced to work with a malfunctioning pot was cruel and unusual punishment, Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that it has not been “clearly established” that the right to properly functioning prison equipment is of a constitutional magnitude.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 claim when clearly established law makes their unconstitutional conduct apparent to a reasonable official.

Centanni v. Eight Unknown Officers · filed 1994-02-03

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s ruling that the Officers effectively arrested Centanni without probable cause and its denial of the Officers’ motion for summary judgment on their claim for qualified immunity because clearly established law renders such action unconstitutional.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the challenged conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional law.

Hunter v. City of Warner Robins, Ga. · filed 1994-02-04

In an area of such uncertain constitutional parameters, the reprimand of an employee, or the withdrawal of a recommended promotion, cannot be said to have violated clearly established constitutional law. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity is GRANTED.

Section 1983 damages claims against public officials are subject to qualified immunity unless the violated right was clearly established in a particularized sense.

Jones v. Stine · filed 1994-02-10

A public official can be held liable in civil damages for violating another’s right only if the contours of the right are so clearly established in a particularized sense that he should reasonably have understood that he was violating that right.

Qualified immunity is a defense to damages actions under Section 1983, but it does not apply to official-capacity suits.

Supreme Video, Inc. v. Steven Schauz, James Thome, and One or More John Does · filed 1994-02-10

Although qualified immunity is a defense to actions for damages under Section 1983, the same is not true in official-capacity suits.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when their conduct violates no clearly established right.

Jenness v. Nickerson · filed 1994-02-15

Even considered in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the facts demonstrate that the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from the section 1983 claim against them.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the law does not clearly establish that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Tomrell v. Leavenworth County · filed 1994-02-17

Finally, defendants Morris and Duncanson are entitled to qualified immunity. Although the contours of the Fourth Amendment are well known generally, the case law falls far short of “clearly establishing” in this context (1) that the limitations placed on plaintiffs liberty constituted a seizure or (2) that those limitations were unreasonable under the circumstances.

Section 1983 affords an officer qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show that clearly established law made the officer’s alleged conduct unlawful at the time.

Donovan v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1994-02-18

Donovan therefore has failed to carry her burden of showing the existence of clearly established case law making Zirbes’ alleged conduct unlawful. Zirbes was entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court properly granted summary judgment to him.

Officers who reasonably rely on a building safety official’s factually grounded emergency evacuation decision may receive qualified immunity from § 1983 damages.

Flatford v. City of Monroe · filed 1994-02-22

Officers should, therefore, have wide latitude to rely on a building-safety official’s expertise where that expert determination appears to have some basis in fact.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to an arresting officer when, on the plaintiff’s factual account, a reasonable officer could not have believed the arrest was lawful under clearly established law.

Osborne v. Howard · filed 1994-02-23

Here, the Court finds that plaintiff has presented a factual account whereby a reasonable officer could not have believed that his arrest was lawful in light of clearly established law. The Court therefore rejects defendants’ qualified immunity defense.

Officials sued in their official capacities under § 1983 cannot assert qualified immunity, which is a personal immunity defense.

Grimm v. Jackson · filed 1994-02-23

It is also clearly settled that government officials sued in their official capacities are not entitled to personal immunity defenses such as qualified immunity from suit.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when official conduct violates no clearly established constitutional or statutory right.

Isajewicz v. Bucks County Department of Communications · filed 1994-02-25

An official is immune from suit if his actions were within the scope of his duties and did not violate any clearly established constitutional or statutory rights.

Qualified immunity shields a defendant from personal-capacity damages liability under § 1983 when the challenged conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Lee v. Vallabhaneni · filed 1994-02-28

Dr. Vallabhaneni is qualifiedly immune from liability for damages in his personal capacity because his treatment of Lee under Illinois' pre-1990 procedures for medicating prisoners did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to an officer who uses deadly force when a reasonable officer should have known it was contrary to clearly established law.

Bray v. County of San Diego · filed 1994-03-02

An objective reason must exist for the officer to believe that the use of deadly force is necessary to protect himself or others from death or serious injury. That was simply not the case here. Moreover, that fact should have been apparent to a reasonable officer from the rule established in Garner. Accordingly, neither Wickham nor Fewell is entitled to a qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity shields an arresting officer from liability under § 1983 when the officer had arguable probable cause for at least one charged offense.

Mincieli v. Bruder · filed 1994-03-07

Because she had arguable probable cause for at least one of the four charges included in the probable cause affidavit, Bruder’s shield of immunity is not lost.

Qualified immunity bars individual-capacity damages claims under § 1983 against government officials when the plaintiff cannot show that the asserted right was clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Bradford v. State of Hawaii · filed 1994-03-10

On the facts set forth in the record, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that defendants violated a clearly established right. Qualified immunity therefore immunizes defendants in their individual capacities from suit on plaintiffs claims.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on an official protected by qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the official violated a clearly established right a reasonable official would understand.

Brown v. Weis · filed 1994-03-11

Plaintiffs simply have not shown, even at the level of notice pleading, that the Commissioner acted in a manner “that a reasonable official would understand” to be in violation of a “clearly established” right.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages based on a regulation’s facial unconstitutionality when existing case law allowed them reasonably to conclude that the regulation was facially constitutional.

Rappa v. New Castle County · filed 1994-03-11

We conclude that officials in the position of these individual defendants reasonably could have concluded, based on the existing case law, that the relevant sections of the state law and the county ordinance were facially constitutional. Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment to the individual defendants and remand with direction to enter summary judgment in their favor on the claims for damages, to the extent that they are based on the facial unconstitutionality of the respective regulations.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless a reasonable officer in the same position would understand that the conduct violates a clearly established right.

Darnel Walker, Jr. v. Kenneth Woods, Police Officer for the City of Lansing, Michigan · filed 1994-03-11

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity unless the contours of the right asserted by the plaintiff are so clear that a reasonable officer in the defendant's position would understand that what he is doing violates that right.

A government official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Abell v. Dewey · filed 1994-03-15

Abell has failed to carry her burden of establishing that at the time of the challenged conduct, the law was clearly established that a probationary employee subject to dismissal “for reasonable cause” had a constitutionally protected property interest in public employment. Therefore, we hold that Dewey has qualified immunity to the cause of action brought by Abell under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established enough for a reasonable official to know the conduct violated it.

Barajas v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections · filed 1994-03-17

Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... This bundle of allegations cannot be said with any reasonable legal certainty to constitute a clearly established right or rights that any of the named defendants could have known they were violating.

Section 1983 damages claims against public officials are subject to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that the challenged conduct violated a protected right.

Rouse v. Nielson · filed 1994-03-18

The Court has carefully reviewed the recommendation concerning qualified immunity and concludes that it is proper. While it is true, as plaintiff argues, that in 1991 the First Amendment prohibited government officials from discharging certain employees solely because of their political affiliation, even assuming that the Court has incorrectly applied the Elrod-Branti test, it was not clearly established that the position of Legal Assistant was not one for which political affiliation was a proper requirement.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from an excessive detention claim when the governing constitutional rule was not clearly established at the time of the detention.

Sims v. Lucas · filed 1994-03-22

At the time of the arrest, under the Gerstein v. Pugh standard which the United States Supreme Court itself subsequently said was vague, see County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 SCt 1661, 1669 (1991), it was not clearly established that a detention of 30 to 35 hours between an arrest for rape for which there was probable cause and the initial judicial probable cause determination was violative of plaintiff's constitutional rights. Consequently, this court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's excessive detention claim on qualified immunity grounds.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields an officer from personal liability when a reasonable officer could believe the conduct was lawful under the rules clearly established at the time.

George v. Carusone · filed 1994-03-24

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability when they reasonably could have thought that their actions were consistent with the rights they allegedly violated. ... Ambrogio is qualifiedly immune from plaintiffs § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Thrower v. Barney · filed 1994-03-30

The court agrees with defendants that they, as a matter of mixed fact and law, do enjoy qualified immunity on the facts construed most favorably to plaintiff, and are therefore immune from the claims made pursuant to § 1983.

A public official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the official did not violate clearly established law.

Lawrenz v. James · filed 1994-04-06

Defendant James is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law in terminating Plaintiff.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages claims when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Grantham v. Trickey · filed 1994-04-12

We conclude that under Bartlett, the record supports the district court's conclusion that Grantham's free speech rights were not "clearly established" and, therefore, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Public officials sued individually for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established in the circumstances.

Grantham v. Trickey · filed 1994-04-12

The district court committed no error in granting summary judgment to the defendants on Grantham’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging unlawful discharge in violation of his First Amendment free speech rights. The defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in the suit against them in their individual capacities, and the suit for equitable relief against the defendants in their official capacity is not supported by the factual record in this case.

Qualified immunity bars damages under § 1983 when the asserted constitutional right was not clear enough for a reasonable official to know the challenged conduct violated it.

Thompson v. Clarke · filed 1994-04-14

In summary, the contours of the alleged constitutional right which the plaintiffs claim the defendants violated in this case were not clear enough that a reasonable official would have understood that what he or she was doing violated that right (if it exists at all). Accordingly,, the motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity must be granted.

Qualified immunity shields an official from liability under § 1983 unless the official violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Toney v. Davis · filed 1994-04-20

The standard for qualified immunity is that a defendant, acting under color of office, is immune from liability unless he violated clearly establish constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when pre-existing law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated a federal right.

Hansen v. John Soldenwagner Raymond Malecki John Puleo, City of Sunrise · filed 1994-04-21

Therefore, we hold that defendants in their individual capacity are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed their use of deadly force was lawful, even if the suspect did not actually have a gun.

No. 92-16008 · filed 1994-04-21

Under the totality of these circumstances, a reasonable officer could have believed that shooting Thayer was lawful. See Romero, 931 F.2d at 627 (qualified immunity requires that a reasonable officer could have believed that the conduct at issue was lawful). The totality of the undisputed facts demonstrates that reasonable cause to shoot at Thayer existed whether or not he actually had a gun in his clothing at the time he was shot.

Section 1983 affords a police officer qualified immunity for obtaining a search warrant if a reasonably competent officer could have concluded that probable cause existed and the warrant should issue.

Cameron v. T.S. Payne, Officer Glynna Smith, Investigator · filed 1994-04-25

A police officer is entitled to immunity if a reasonably competent officer could have concluded that probable cause existed and that a search warrant should issue.

Section 1983 does not give an official qualified immunity when it was not objectively reasonable to believe his conduct respected the plaintiff’s clearly established rights.

Frank v. Relin · filed 1994-05-02

In light of this factual determination, I find that it was not objectively reasonable for defendant, the Monroe County District Attorney and an attorney, to believe that his termination of plaintiff did not violate her First Amendment rights. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity as to the claim against him in his individual capacity.

A defendant official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless a genuine issue shows that the official violated clearly established law.

Reaves v. O'Neill · filed 1994-05-04

Following Harlow, this circuit has stated that summary judgment should be entered for defendant officials on qualified immunity grounds "unless there is a genuine issue as to whether the defendant in fact committed a violation of clearly established law." ... Applying these standards, we believe that the district court erred in denying Officer O'Neill qualified immunity on Reaves' claims.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 unlawful-arrest claim if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed for the arrest.

Kelly v. Bender · filed 1994-05-04

An arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity on an unlawful arrest claim if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed for the arrest. ... Thus, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Qualified immunity does not require dismissal of a § 1983 claim against social service employees when the complaint’s allegations suffice to defeat that defense.

Dorsey v. Arty · filed 1994-05-11

Defendants are employees of the Carroll County Department of Social Services (CCDSS), and they appeal the district court's refusal to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity an action brought against them by Mr. and Mrs. Ronald Dorsey under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... After a careful study of the record and the briefs, close attention to the oral arguments and a review of the applicable law, we are persuaded that the district court properly refused to dismiss the three remaining claims for the reasons set forth in its memorandum order dated April 28, 1993. Therefore, we affirm the district court's resolution of these issues.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 arrest suit turns on whether the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable, without regard to the officer’s subjective beliefs.

Bridgewater v. Caples · filed 1994-05-11

As discussed above, an officer is shielded by qualified immunity if his conduct was objectively reasonable; an officer’s subjective beliefs are not relevant to qualified immunity analysis.

In a Section 1983 claim based on an arrest warrant, qualified immunity does not protect an officer whose deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth led the magistrate to issue the warrant.

Beard, III v. City of Northglenn, Colorado · filed 1994-05-11

If, after all, a claimant is able to prove the necessary deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard to impeach a facially valid warrant, the reasonableness inquiry has to be resolved against the defendant since no reasonably competent officer could believe an arrest legal where it was his deliberate or reckless deception that led the magistrate into issuing the warrant.

Public officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity only when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Casey v. City of Cabool, Missouri · filed 1994-05-13

This immunity, however, is available only if defendant's "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." ... Since the rights infringed in this case were clearly established, the judgment of the district court with respect to defendants Gentry and Roberts was proper.

State officials acting under a presumptively valid statute are immune from individual-capacity damages under § 1983 when their conduct is not clearly unlawful under existing precedent.

Dickerson Carolina, Inc. v. Harrelson · filed 1994-05-17

If an official's acts are not clearly unlawful under existing precedent, the official is not personally liable. ... Because defendants acted pursuant to a presumptively valid statute, the trial court did not err by granting their motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for damages under § 1983.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against a school superintendent for a student’s assault when the superintendent took reasonable protective steps and was not deliberately indifferent.

Walton v. Alexander · filed 1994-05-19

Alexander's actions may have been ineffective in halting the molestation, but her actions did not reflect that she was deliberately indifferent. Alexander provided reasonable conditions of safety to protect the bodily integrity of Walton. Therefore, as to the third prong of the test, no failure to act or action on her part had a causal connection with the second assault which occurred in 1988. Summary judgment should have been granted to Alexander on the grounds of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim turns on whether the plaintiff asserted a constitutional violation, whether the right was clearly established, and whether a reasonable official would have known the conduct violated that right.

Kinney v. Raymond Kalfus, Marilyn Butts Harriet Swinger · filed 1994-05-25

In order to determine whether Dr. Kalfus is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity, we engage in a three-step inquiry: first, whether Kinney has asserted the violation of a constitutional right; second, whether this constitutional right was clearly established at the time the incident occurred; and third, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Kinney, whether there is a genuine issue of material fact whether a reasonable official would have known his actions violated that right.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against individual officials when qualified immunity applies because the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Williams v. Kentucky · filed 1994-05-26

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Williams’ procedural due process claim because it was not clearly established at the time of her demotion that a tenured public employee had a due process right to a predemotion hearing. Accordingly, the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Williams’ procedural due process § 1983 claim based on qualified immunity is REVERSED. Williams cannot pursue her due process claim for money damages against defendants in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to officers when no objectively reasonable officer could believe the challenged search complied with the Fourth Amendment.

Hummel-Jones v. Strope · filed 1994-05-26

We believe that no objectively reasonable law enforcement officers could have believed that this search comported with the Fourth Amendment’s basic requirement of reasonableness. The appellees are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Prue v. City Of Syracuse · filed 1994-06-06

In these circumstances, we conclude that Prue's entitlement to a pretermination hearing was not "clearly established" at the time he was terminated. Defendants Hunt and Cowin were therefore entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

For § 1983 qualified immunity, a detective’s knowledge and alleged culpability cannot be imputed to fellow detectives who did not know of the exculpatory evidence.

John Kelly, Jr. v. Steven Curtis Julie M. Gibson J.R. Moore Chatham County, Ga · filed 1994-06-08

There is no authority for imputing to those two detectives the knowledge and alleged culpability of another detective; the law did not then, and does not now, clearly establish such vicarious co-employee liability. We reject Kelly’s unprecedented argument.

Section 1983 does not allow a false arrest claim based on a seizure for which the officers are entitled to qualified immunity, regardless of pre-existing law.

Bradway v. Gonzales · filed 1994-06-10

Accordingly, we hold that because the Troopers are entitled to qualified immunity for the seizure, that seizure cannot form the basis of a false arrest claim under Sec. 1983, irrespective of pre-existing law.

Section 1983 shields a police officer from damages through qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct complied with clearly established constitutional law.

Moody v. Ungerer · filed 1994-06-13

Because a reasonable officer could have believed that Trooper Moody’s conduct comported with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we hold that he has immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would know the conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Hurst v. Finley · filed 1994-06-14

The court finds that a reasonable officer in Finley’s situation would have believed that he was violating Hurst’s clearly established constitutional rights. Therefore, the court finds that defendant Roosevelt Finley is not entitled to qualified immunity for the § 1983 claims against him in his individual capacity.

A § 1983 defendant lacks qualified immunity for sexual harassment occurring after the Tenth Circuit clearly established on May 22, 1989, that such conduct can violate equal protection.

Lankford v. City of Hobart · filed 1994-06-14

Contrary to the urging of Mr. Medrano in his brief, we hold that on May 22, 1989, with this court's opinion in Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th Cir.1989), it became clearly established that sexual harassment can constitute a violation of equal protection and give rise to an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 shields an officer who executes a judicial arrest warrant from liability unless a reasonably well-trained officer would have known the arrest was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.

Stigall v. Madden · filed 1994-06-17

The warrant itself, however, shields Mr. Burrow from liability for executing it, unless a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the arrest was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization.

Officials sued under § 1983 retain qualified immunity when alleged violations of state administrative procedures do not violate a clearly established federal right.

Bowman v. Alabama Department of Human Resources · filed 1994-06-20

Therefore, the court finds that the violations by the defendants of state regulations are “irrelevant to the merits of the underlying constitutional claim”, i.e., the underlying constitutional claim being the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ daycare center license. Accordingly, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because, under Davis v. Scherer, “[o]ffieials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision.”

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when the asserted right was not clearly established in the particular circumstances of the official’s conduct.

Meadows v. James Kelly, Individually West Virginia Parkways Economic Development and Tourism Authority · filed 1994-06-20

Because the right Meadows alleges Kelly has violated is not clearly established, Kelly was entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of established statutory or constitutional rights.

Williams v. Sandy Pretzer James Zummer · filed 1994-06-21

Finally, because Williams has failed to show that defendant Pretzer violated any of his established statutory or constitutional rights, summary judgment is also proper on the ground that defendant Pretzer is entitled to qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Section 1983 does not allow public officials to claim qualified immunity from damages suits brought against them in their official capacities.

Linda L. Harrell, Individually, as Personal Representative, and as Surviving Spouse of Larry Gene Harrell, Deceased v. D · filed 1994-06-22

Because qualified immunity does not shield public officials from civil damages in their official capacities, the district court erred in granting summary judgment, based on qualified immunity, for Morris and Phillips in their official capacities.

Qualified immunity shields a defendant in a § 1983 action when its conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Hubbard v. Board of Education · filed 1994-06-24

The state of the law was unclear at the time the Board acted, and the Board apparently guessed right. The district court correctly held the Board had not violated a clearly established law and was entitled to qualified immunity for its actions.

Section 1983 officers are protected by qualified immunity if their actions were reasonable under the circumstances.

Vines v. Town of Poughkeepsie · filed 1994-06-25

Even if the charges made by the tickets filed by the police against plaintiff had been dismissed on the merits, rather than being mooted by a finding at the administrative parole revocation hearing that plaintiff was guilty of the offenses charged, qualified immunity would protect the officers if their actions were reasonable under the circumstances.

A school superintendent sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when her response to a known sexual assault shows no deliberate indifference and does not cause a later assault.

Joseph Walton, as Next Friend of Christopher Walton, a Minor v. Alma Alexander, Alma Alexander · filed 1994-07-01

Alexander’s actions may have been ineffective in halting the molestation, but her actions did not reflect that she was deliberately indifferent. Alexander provided reasonable conditions of safety to protect the bodily integrity of Walton. Therefore, as to the third prong of the test, no failure to act or action on her part had a causal connection with the second assault which occurred in 1988. Summary judgment should have been granted to Alexander on the grounds of qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established in the circumstances they faced.

Greiner v. City of Champlin · filed 1994-07-05

We do, however, hold that plaintiffs have not shown that it was clearly established on the night of their party that their rights were paramount over the governmental interest in dispersing them. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for failing to secure a pre-extradition hearing when their duty to do so was not clearly established.

White v. Armontrou · filed 1994-07-06

The district court held, therefore, that it was not clearly established law that a records officer or a control center desk officer could be held liable for failure to ensure that a prisoner received a hearing prior to an extradition transfer and, accordingly, that Mr. Lauf and Mr. Miller were entitled to immunity in this suit. ... We agree with the district court's analysis on that point.