42 U.S.C. § 1983

Qualified immunity may be denied to a police officer in a § 1983 action alleging a stop and arrest without probable cause when the facts warrant denial.

Lyons v. City of Wynne · filed 1997-04-29

Danny Newsome appeals from the district court's 1 denial of qualified immunity to him in Ozell Lyons's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Lyons alleged that Newsome, a police officer with the Wynne, Arkansas, police department, violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by stopping and arresting him without probable cause. Having reviewed the parties' submissions on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity on the facts of this case.

In a § 1983 damages action, officers may receive qualified immunity as a matter of law when undisputed facts establish the defense despite other factual disputes.

Brescher v. Pirez · filed 1997-04-30

But if there are undisputed facts which require the application of the qualified immunity defense, the fact that there are other disputed issues is of no moment, and the court should grant summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on child welfare officials for removal decisions that violate no clearly established law.

White Ex Rel. White v. Chambliss · filed 1997-04-30

If section 1983 liability attaches too readily to removal and placement decisions, the course of public agencies would invariably become one of inaction, thus leaving children in abusive environments. The facts presented by White reveal that the DSS defendants violated no "clearly established" law in removing White's children from her custody. Therefore, qualified immunity must lie.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when a reasonable officer could have believed the use of force was lawful under the circumstances.

McRae v. Tena · filed 1997-04-30

As for the shooting itself, we hold that Tena has qualified immunity. ... A reasonable officer could have believed that under all the facts and circumstances, Tena's response, shooting Dual after he began his count-down to throw the metal object but before he actually threw it, was lawful.

Section 1983 shields officers from civil damages through qualified immunity when the law would not have made the alleged Fourth Amendment violation obvious to reasonable officers.

Alvarez v. Montgomery County · filed 1997-04-30

In any event, whether or not the officers’ conduct was constitutional, if the state of the law was not sufficiently developed at the time that it would have been obvious to reasonable officers similarly situated that their actions were violative of the Fourth Amendment, the officers would be entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages. ... At a minimum, the officers enjoyed qualified immunity in these circumstances.

Section 1983 shields a police supervisor through qualified immunity when no clearly established law made the supervisor’s failure to train or supervise deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.

City of Hialeah v. Fernandez · filed 1995-09-27

Because at the time of the actions at issue here no decision clearly established that Chief Bolanos's actions or inactions constituted deliberate indifference, he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit depends on whether the right was clearly established and whether a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct lawful; the right of people in custody to be free from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs was clearly established by 1992.

Carnell v. Grimm · filed 1996-01-30

The above cases demonstrate that at the time of the alleged misconduct in this case, persons in custody had the established right to not have officials remain deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs. ... The second step of analysis for a qualified immunity determination is whether under the clearly established law a reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct was lawful.

In a § 1983 claim concerning an official’s episodic failure to protect a pretrial detainee from suicide, qualified immunity must be assessed using the subjective deliberate indifference standard.

Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss. · filed 1996-01-30

We elected to hear the case en banc, and now find that the district court applied an erroneous legal standard in denying summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. We hold that the episodic act or omission of a state jail official does not violate a pretrial detainee’s due process right to medical care or protection from suicide unless the official acted or failed to act with subjective deliberate indifference to the detainee’s rights, as defined in Farmer v. Brennan, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). We vacate and remand for review of the claims of qualified immunity under the correct legal standard.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison doctors from a § 1983 claim when evidence permits a jury to find that they knew of serious medical needs and their deliberate indifference remains a factual question.

Miller v. Schoenen · filed 1996-02-15

Miller has produced adequate proof to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that he had serious medical needs, and that the defendants knew of those needs. Whether the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Miller's needs is a question of fact, not clear one way or the other on this record. Thus, they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, prison doctors are not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment when a triable issue of deliberate indifference remains and they could not reasonably believe their alleged conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Raymond D. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Duncan A. McINTOSH; David Victorino, Defendants-Appellants · filed 1996-04-11

Given the district court’s determination that there is a triable issue as to deliberate indifference, the doctors were not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that they could reasonably have believed their conduct did not violate clearly-established law.

Section 1983 does not afford prison officials qualified immunity when established law made their deliberate indifference to an inmate’s safety unlawful.

Haley v. Boniface Gross, Lieutenant McKee and Michael Ellis · filed 1996-05-29

The deliberate indifference standard under which the jury reasonably found the defendants liable was well-established at the time of the defendants’ conduct. ... They could not have reasonably believed that their indifference to Haley’s pleas for help was lawful.

In a § 1983 claim alleging deliberate indifference, qualified immunity is assessed objectively even though liability requires proof of the official’s subjective knowledge.

Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss. · filed 1996-11-22

In sum, the mere fact that the plaintiff, in order to prevail on the merits, must establish subjective deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants does not mean that the objective nature of the qualified immunity analysis is any different.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when a triable factual issue remains about deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs.

Meeks v. James H. Gomez Eddie Myers, Warden Dr. Blair · filed 1997-02-06

The district court correctly concluded that the existence of a triable issue of fact as to deliberate indifference precluded granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when controlling law renders the asserted due process claims nonactionable.

Flint Electric Membership Corp. v. Whitworth · filed 1995-11-15

Even though the EMCs' rights to a property interest in the contracts remain, we nevertheless hold that because of a change in the law governing the viability of their due process claims, the defendants are now entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to a prison doctor who authorizes involuntary antipsychotic medication without due process when clearly established law would alert a reasonable official that the conduct violates the inmate’s rights.

Hogan v. Carter · filed 1995-12-11

This Court believes that a reasonable official in Dr. Carter's position would have known that authorizing the involuntary administration of Thorazine on Hogan, against his will and without any procedural due process, was violative of Hogan's constitutional rights. Because the relevant legal principles governing this claim were clearly established at the time of the incident in question, Dr. Carter is not entitled to summary judgment on his defense of qualified immunity.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 due process claim when the asserted right was not clearly established so that reasonable officials would have understood their conduct violated it.

Liebson v. New Mexico Corrections Department · filed 1996-01-02

If the court determines that plaintiff has asserted the violation of a constitutional right, the court must then determine whether that right was clearly established so that reasonable officials in defendants’ situation would have understood their conduct violated that right. ... Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Ms. Liebson has alleged an actionable due process claim, we are not convinced the due process rights at issue were so clearly established that reasonable officials in defendants’ situation would have understood their conduct violated those rights.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect public officials who interfere with an agreed process for resolving an employee’s status when that interference violates a clearly established right to procedural due process.

Watson v. University of Utah Medical Center · filed 1996-01-19

If Medical Center officials agreed to follow a specific avenue to resolve the status of plaintiffs employment, and then actively interfered with that process, they violated plaintiffs right to procedural due process, a right clearly established at the time. ... Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs liberty claim.

A prison hearing officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when he reasonably believes his assessment of confidential informants’ credibility satisfies due process.

Campo v. Keane · filed 1996-02-06

By questioning Lt. Finn and Sgt. Leghorn, defendant Pico fulfilled what he reasonably believed to be his obligation to assess the credibility of the confidential sources. He is therefore protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity and entitled to a grant of summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from damages when they reasonably could have believed their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s due process rights.

Muslim v. Farley · filed 1996-05-09

Thus, the defendants reasonably could have believed that their conduct did not violate Muslim's due process rights. See Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 416 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987) (no due process from administrative confinement). Even if Sandin changed the law such that Muslim potentially would have a due process claim if his conditions imposed an atypical or significant hardship, it was not reasonable for the defendants to know that Muslim had a potential liberty interest. Therefore, the defendants are qualifiedly immune from suit.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 due process claim when disputed facts determine whether the rule of necessity applies to the defendants’ alleged bias.

Bakalis v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 504 · filed 1996-09-13

Because there is a question of fact as to whether each of the four defendants was actually biased, it is not clear at this point in time that the rule of necessity applied.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on a procedural due process claim when no clearly established law would have informed them that an official’s denial of an available administrative remedy violates due process.

McClure v. City of Long Beach · filed 1996-12-20

The McClures contend that appellants violated their substantive and due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... There was and is no established law that the denial that a remedy exists by a city official not charged with implementation of the remedy itself is a denial of due process. ... As to the Fair Housing Act, due process, Section 1985, and Section 1986 claims, we REVERSE the district court's denial of summary judgment and find that appellants are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 due process claim based on a state-created liberty interest, the state statute bears on whether the federal right was clearly established for qualified immunity.

97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 513, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 835 Mary Ann Carlo v. City of Chino, and Officer Hector Guerra · filed 1997-01-23

Here, the California statute was the basis for Carlo’s claim and thus bears on whether the federal right (procedural protection of the state-defined constitutional liberty right) was clearly established.

Police officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity on a state-created danger claim when the asserted due process right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Cook v. City of Groton · filed 1997-02-06

This case presents an issue of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the context of a claim that police officers breached a duty to protect the plaintiff from an assault by a third person in violation of her right to substantive due process. The due process right to special protection on which the plaintiff relies, which is premised on a state-created danger theory, was not clearly established at the time in question. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not grant qualified immunity to an officer whose failure to verify the address before searching the wrong home violated clearly established law.

Hartsfield v. Lemacks · filed 1995-06-14

Because Newton did nothing to make sure that he was leading the other officers to the correct residence, we conclude that the district court erred in holding that he was protected by qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity for warrantless home searches during a child abuse investigation when material disputes remain over consent or exigent circumstances.

Lopkoff v. Slater · filed 1995-09-26

Fact issues exist as to whether a reasonable officer would have believed that exigent circumstances existed and/or that consent was given sufficient to allow the warrantless searches. Accordingly, the Defendants’ summary judgment motion on qualified immunity grounds on Lopkoffs Fourth Amendment claims is DENIED.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment for § 1983 defendants when disputed facts determine whether a search was lawful.

Spear v. Sowders · filed 1995-12-19

Again the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment, based on qualified immunity, to the defendants. ... Here again, the dispute over crucial facts precludes summary judgment.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from a Fourth Amendment search claim when they reasonably believe the plaintiff consented, even if the search violated her rights.

Carboni v. Meldrum · filed 1996-01-25

Defendants Rene Armstrong, Dr. Waldron, and Dean Meldrum are therefore, entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity grounds, even if the search violated Ms. Carboni’s rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment because they reasonably believed that Plaintiff consented.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to officers when a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause supported a fingerprint search warrant and an arrest for obstruction of justice.

Maitilasso v. Timberlake · filed 1996-02-05

The proper standard to determine if Timberlake and Spears are entitled to qualified immunity is whether in light of clearly established law and the information the officers possessed, a reasonable officer could have believed that he had probable cause to obtain a search warrant for fingerprinting, and that probable cause existed to arrest Maitilasso for obstruction of justice. ... We find that a reasonably competent officer could conclude that there was probable cause to arrest Maitilasso under the circumstances and under relevant precedent.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would know that omitted facts were material to probable cause and belonged in a search warrant affidavit.

Inge v. Lichtenstein · filed 1996-06-18

In light of the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Hylton, we also conclude that a reasonable police officer would have known that the allegedly omitted facts were material to a finding of probable cause and should have been included these facts in an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when reasonable officers in their position could have believed a search was lawful, even if their conclusion was wrong.

Trujillo v. Simer · filed 1996-07-25

The Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if reasonable police officers in their positions could have believed that Mr. Trujillo’s consent was voluntary. The standard is whether the Defendants could have reasonably reached this conclusion, not whether the conclusion was in fact correct.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from damages for a school search when the law at the time did not clearly establish that the search was unconstitutional.

Jenkins v. Talladega City Board of Education · filed 1996-09-23

Because we believe that the only issue raised in this appeal that warrants further examination concerns the court's determination that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment § 1983 claims, our discussion is confined solely to this issue. ... Because we conclude that, on May 1, 1992, the law regarding school searches was not clearly established to the extent that these defendants should have known that their conduct violated constitutionally permissible norms, we need not reach the question of whether Jenkins' and McKenzie's Fourth Amendment rights were, in fact, violated.

A § 1983 defendant accused of submitting a recklessly false warrant affidavit is entitled to qualified immunity if a corrected affidavit would still establish probable cause to arrest or search.

Bagby v. Brondhaver · filed 1996-10-28

Like the Second Circuit in Soares v. State of Conn., 8 F.3d 917, 920 (2d Cir.1993), we conclude from-this that qualified immunity is appropriate if defendant has been accused of submitting a recklessly false affidavit and if a corrected affidavit would still provide probable cause to arrest or search.

Qualified immunity shields officers from a § 1983 Fourth Amendment search claim when their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional law.

Ferguson v. City of Montgomery · filed 1997-02-18

Therefore, the court finds that Markham and McCullough’s stop and search of Ferguson did not violate clearly established constitutional law and that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Accordingly, the court finds Markam and McCullough are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law with regard to Ferguson’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim and that the portion of Ferguson’s § 1983 claim dealing with an improper Fourth Amendment search is due to be dismissed.

Qualified immunity does not defend against § 1983 claims brought against officials in their official capacities.

Lyles v. City of Barling · filed 1998-06-26

Any claims against the defendants in their official capacities may not be defended against on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for constitutional violations by state actors, subject to causation and qualified-immunity rules.

Lewis v. Harrison School District No. 1 · filed 1987-01-08

Next, we must inquire into causation. Lewis must show that his speech was a substantial or motivating factor in his firing. Without this showing, the protected nature of his speech will not alone support a decision for the plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim requires no separate qualified immunity analysis when the underlying constitutional violation has already received one.

Newsome v. Lee County, Ala. · filed 2006-05-15

The initial qualified immunity analysis afforded state officials when evaluating the underlying constitutional violation is sufficient to provide these officers with protection from non-meritorious claims. Indeed, it would be a nearly impossible occasion where certain acts could be found to generate a clearly established constitutional violation, yet a conspiracy to commit such acts would not. The Court finds another qualified immunity analysis would be duplicative and must resultantly sustain Newsome’s claim of conspiracy under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give prison officers qualified immunity from an excessive force claim when the injured inmate raises a triable issue of malicious and sadistic force, even if the force was directed at another inmate.

Charles L. ROBINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. B. MEECHAM, C/O, D. Morris, SC/O, G. Cox, C/O, Defendants-Appellants · filed 1995-07-27

In their motion for reconsideration, the officers conceded that Robins raised an issue of material fact concerning whether excessive force was used on inmate Echavarria. Therefore, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 for excessive force have qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could not have known that the alleged conduct violated clearly established law.

Nemeckay v. Rule · filed 1995-07-31

Thus, even if a particular jury might be able to conclude, with a proper jury instruction, that there was excessive force, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they could not be expected to anticipate that the law would extend that far.

In a § 1983 excessive force suit, qualified immunity turns on whether a reasonable officer would understand the conduct to be an objectively unreasonable seizure.

Ricky A. White v. Ronald Harmon Ronald Clewett and Keith Blanchard · filed 1995-08-31

Accordingly, the question here as to each individual defendant is whether (as to the qualified immunity aspect) a "reasonable official would understand that what he" did constituted (as to the excessive force aspect) an "objectively [un]reasonable" seizure.

A police officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force claim merely because the force was used in a police station.

Herring v. Washington Lacy, III · filed 1996-03-11

Lacy is not entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that the police station is a special setting.

Officers have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when a reasonable officer with the information they possessed could believe the challenged use of deadly force was lawful.

Isquierdo v. Frederick · filed 1996-04-22

For reasons set forth above, the court concludes that Defendants Cox and Frederick are fully shielded from civil liability by their defense of qualified immunity. Under undisputed evidence in this case, the use of deadly force upon the Plaintiff, a gunman whom the officers reasonably perceived to pose an imminent threat of lethal danger to others, was reasonable and justified.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim when the plaintiff’s account could establish objectively unreasonable force and reasonable officers could not have believed that force lawful.

Ramirez v. City of Reno · filed 1996-04-29

Nor is it possible to dispose of Plaintiffs excessive force claim on the grounds of qualified immunity. ... Therefore, because the court cannot, assuming the truth of Plaintiffs version of the facts, find that the defendants in this case did not violate Plaintiffs right not to be subjected to excessive force, neither can it conclude that reasonable officers in the position of the defendants could have believed themselves constitutionally authorized to use the amount of force Plaintiff claims was used against him.

Officers sued under § 1983 for excessive force have qualified immunity when reasonable officers would not have known that clearly established constitutional law prohibited their search methods.

Taft v. Vines · filed 1996-05-14

Rather, the question is whether, confronted with the facts of this case, reasonable police officers should have known that clearly established constitu- tional law prohibited the methods used in the search. We cannot so hold. Accordingly, the officers were entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on the excessive force claims.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when their alleged conduct violates clearly established law and the evidence permits a jury to find excessive force.

Smith v. City of Los Angeles Harold Moberly Kerell Broussard · filed 1996-09-04

The district court erred because the alleged conduct of the defendants violated clearly established law and because Smith presented substantial evidence at trial from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants used excessive force.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from § 1983 damages for the excessive force found by the jury in these circumstances.

Frazell v. E.K. Flanigan · filed 1996-12-10

We also conclude that in the circumstances of this case, Flanigan has no immunity from the jury’s damage awards.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when no reasonable officer apprised of the law could believe the use of deadly force was justified.

Rought v. Porter · filed 1996-12-26

Because the law clearly forbids the use of deadly force without probable cause justifying its need and requires at least minimal efforts to confirm that probable cause exists, no reasonable officer apprised of the law could have believed that this conduct was justified. Therefore, defendant Porter is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive force claim when disputed facts could show that the officer used unjustified deadly force.

Osborne v. Rose · filed 1997-01-24

Of course, the trier of fact may disbelieve this version of the events. But until it does, I cannot hold that Rose has immunity simply because he was a poor shot.

Section 1983 does not shield an officer with qualified immunity from an excessively forceful handcuffing claim when clearly established law prohibited excessive force and the facts about the force used remain disputed.

Martin v. Heideman · filed 1997-02-14

Because clearly established law in 1991, the time of the incident in this case, prohibited an officer’s use of excessive force, and because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Officer Paul used excessive force under the circumstances, the district court erred by granting Paul qualified immunity on the handcuffing issue.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, minimal force and injury during a lawful arrest do not defeat an officer’s qualified immunity.

Nolin v. Isbell · filed 2000-03-28

We again hold, as we did in a line of cases beginning with Post, that a minimal amount of force and injury,... will not defeat an officer’s qualified immunity in an excessive force case.

An officer sued under Section 1983 for excessive force is entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have perceived an immediate threat of serious physical harm.

Alford v. Cumberland County NC · filed 2007-10-15

We find that a reasonable officer, forced to make a quick decision, could have concluded that Alford posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm. Accordingly, Windham did not violate Alford’s constitutional rights, and Windham is entitled to qualified immunity.

State officials cannot claim qualified immunity in a § 1983 retaliation suit when the right to report suspected patient abuse was clearly established.

White v. State · filed 1995-07-12

White, therefore, has met her burden of demonstrating that reports of patient abuse were "clearly established” as a matter of public concern when the defendants acted. The qualified immunity defense is not available to shield Harrah and Blanchard from liability.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields a public official from civil damages for retaliation through reassigned job duties when the law did not clearly establish that the reassignment was an adverse employment action.

Dahm v. William F. Flynn, Jr., in Both His Individual and Official Capacities · filed 1995-07-24

Because it was not clearly established at the relevant time that qualitative reductions in job responsibilities, without discharge, transfer, demotion, or salary loss, could constitute an adverse employment action, Flynn is immune from civil damages regarding his rearrangement of Dahm’s duties.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for alleged retaliation against an inmate for filing grievances in 1990 and 1991, when the right to be free from that retaliation was clearly established.

Rivera v. Senkowski · filed 1995-08-08

In evaluating that limited issue on the record before us, we agree with the district court that in light of Franco, an inmate's right to be free of retaliation for filing grievances was in 1990 and 1991 a "clearly established statutory or constitutional right[ ] of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison officials from a § 1983 retaliation claim when the inmate’s right to be free from retaliation for filing grievances was clearly established at the time.

Rivera v. Senkowski · filed 1995-08-08

We agree with the district court that defendants did not have qualified immunity.

An official sued individually under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for retaliating against an employee’s protected speech when that prohibition was clearly established at the time.

Clay v. Board of Trustees of Neosho County Community College · filed 1995-10-13

Finally, we conclude that defendant Kirkland is not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs section 1983 claim against him in his individual capacity. In short, the law at the time of the alleged constitutional violations was clearly established that it was unlawful to retaliate against an employee for exercise of First Amendment rights.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 employee speech retaliation claim depends on whether a reasonable official could believe that harm to office efficiency outweighed the employee’s interest in speaking.

Wilkins v. Donald E. Jakeway Vincent Lombardi, and Robert Garber · filed 1996-02-27

In particular, when resolving the issue of qualified immunity, we must determine whether the defendant reasonably could have believed that the harm to office efficiency outweighed the plaintiff's interest in speaking freely.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 retaliation claim when the prisoner fails to raise a genuine factual dispute about whether reasonable officials would believe their actions advanced legitimate penological goals.

Queen v. Gomez · filed 1996-04-01

Further, Queen failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether reasonable prison officials under similar circumstances would believe that their actions advanced legitimate penological goals. Thus, the district court properly found that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 lack qualified immunity for retaliation when a reasonable official would understand that the employee’s speech was protected.

Sullivan v. Houstoun · filed 1996-06-14

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim of a violation of a constitutional right if the right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation and the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he or she is doing violates that right. ... Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not give a sheriff qualified immunity for retaliating against a deputy who cooperates with an official corruption investigation when clearly established First Amendment law forbids the retaliation.

Cooper v. Smith · filed 1996-07-26

Because the law was clearly established at the time that Cooper's speech to the GBI was constitutionally protected, Smith violated Cooper's First Amendment rights when he refused to renew his commission, insofar as that refusal was based on Cooper's cooperation with the GBI. Thus, the district correctly concluded that Smith is not entitled to qualified immunity as to this allegation.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for retaliatory transfers when clearly established law warned that transferring an employee for protected speech violates the First Amendment.

Kirks v. Dallas Tx City of · filed 1996-08-16

Finally, Rollins and Hatler contend the district court erred in rejecting their defense of qualified immunity. Click held, however, that "[t]he law was established clearly enough in this circuit in January 1988 that a reasonable officer should have known that if he retaliated against an employee for exercising his First Amendment rights, he could not escape liability by demoting and transferring the employee rather than discharging him." 970 F.2d at 111. The retaliatory transfers at issue here took place a year later.

Prison officials sued under § 1983 lack qualified immunity for retaliating against an inmate’s exercise of court access when the prohibition on that retaliation was clearly established.

Penrod v. Zavaras · filed 1996-08-26

Defendants do not have qualified immunity in this case, however, because it is well established that prison officials must provide inmates access to the courts, Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, and prison officials may not harass or retaliate against an inmate for exercising his right of access to the courts.

In a § 1983 suit alleging retaliatory discharge, qualified immunity cannot be resolved on objective reasonableness alone when unconstitutional motive is alleged; after discovery, the plaintiff must present particularized evidence of that motive to avoid summary judgment.

Sheppard v. Leon Beerman, as an Individual and in His Official Capacity as Justice of the Supreme Court of the Sta · filed 1996-09-06

The district court therefore erred in finding that Beerman’s actual intent was “irrelevant,” and in not allowing Sheppard discovery to support his claim of unconstitutional motive. If, after sufficient discovery, Sheppard cannot present particularized (direct or circumstantial) evidence of unconstitutional motive, Beerman is then, but only then, entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.

Defendants in a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation suit may raise qualified immunity later when the court denies dismissal at the pleading stage without prejudice to that defense.

Baker v. Coxe · filed 1996-09-20

With respect to allegations that the EOEA Defendants were motivated by a desire to retaliate against the Bakers for exercising their First Amendment rights (Count VII), the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss without prejudice to the ability of the EOEA Defendants to assert their qualified immunity defense at a later point in the proceedings.

Officials sued under § 1983 for retaliating against a public employee’s speech on a matter of public concern lack qualified immunity when the governing First Amendment rule was clearly established.

Andersen v. McCotter · filed 1996-11-12

Because the law in this area was clearly established in March 1994, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for retaliation against protected speech when existing law made the retaliation’s unlawfulness apparent, even without a prior case involving a reporter.

McBride v. Village of Michiana · filed 1996-11-14

At the time of the alleged retaliatory actions, Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit, precedent had clearly established that retaliation aimed at chilling fundamental rights was improper. Although no Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit decisions had, at that time, applied time-honored First Amendment principles to a situation specifically involving governmental retaliation against a news reporter, relevant pre-existing case law made the illegality of such retaliation apparent.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not bar a prisoner’s retaliation claim based on filing grievances, because the grievances are protected speech.

Griffin v. Thomas · filed 1997-01-08

In this regard, we proposed to hold that there is no qualified immunity for Plaintiffs claims of retaliation, since his grievance was a form of protected speech. ... Our review of Plaintiffs complaint indicates that his allegations that he was subjected to retaliation as a result of his having filed two grievances were sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of this claim as to the remaining Defendants and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 retaliation claim when the plaintiff raises no genuine factual issue about whether reasonable officials would believe their actions advanced legitimate penological goals.

Hirano v. Nielson · filed 1997-02-07

In addition, we conclude that Hirano failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether reasonable prison officials under similar circumstances would believe that their actions advanced legitimate penological goals. Thus, the district court properly found that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for retaliating against a graduate student for the content of his speech when established student-speech law made that conduct unlawful regardless of whether the speech concerned a public or private matter.

Qvyjt v. Lin · filed 1997-02-11

Thus, the court finds that it was clearly established by no later than 1973, when the Supreme Court decided Popish, that state university officials cannot retaliate or punish a graduate student for the content of his speech, regardless of whether that speech touches matters of public or private concern. Defendants’ defense of qualified immunity, therefore, must fail.

Qualified immunity does not bar an individual-capacity § 1983 claim against an official for retaliating against a public employee whose clearly established First Amendment right protected his speech as a citizen on matters of public concern.

Myers v. Town of Landis Gene R. Beaver, in His Official Capacity as Mayor of the Town of Landis and in His Ind · filed 1997-02-20

The district court, however, denied Beaver's motion for summary judgment as to the First Amendment claim against him in his individual capacity, ruling that he was not entitled to qualified immunity for his alleged actions. ... Our review of the record reveals no error in the district court's analysis. We therefore affirm that court's decision to allow Myers to proceed to trial on his First Amendment claim against Beaver individually, for the reasons stated in its memorandum opinion.

In a § 1983 retaliation suit, particularized circumstantial evidence of improper motive can defeat a qualified immunity argument that officials acted objectively reasonably.

Mascetta v. Miranda · filed 1997-03-05

Thus, to the extent that defendants’ papers can be construed to suggest that Mas-cetta’s testimony constitutes insufficient evidence to meet the heightened evidentiary standard applied when a defendant has raised a qualified immunity defense, we reject that assertion as well.

In a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation suit, the court must complete the Pickering balance and qualified immunity inquiry before sending the question of retaliatory motive to a jury.

Vista Community Services v. Dean · filed 1997-03-19

The Pickering balancing test and the remainder of the qualified immunity inquiry must be done before a case is sent to the jury for its determination of whether a plaintiff was actually fired for his speech.

In a § 1983 excessive-force suit governed by the former significant-injury requirement, substantial psychological injury can satisfy that requirement and defeat qualified immunity.

Dunn v. Denk · filed 1995-06-13

Accordingly, to defeat Denk's qualified immunity defense Dunn was obliged to prove a significant injury. ... The case at bar, however, is exceptional; the evidence of record was sufficient for the jury to find significant injury in Dunn's emotional trauma.

Section 1983 permits recovery for excessive force even when the injuries are neither permanent nor severe.

Burbank v. Davis · filed 2002-10-23

Thus, though the extent of Burbank’s injuries will be relevant to a determination on the merits of this claim, the fact that the injuries may not be permanent or severe does not bar recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires more than a de minimis physical injury to support an excessive force claim based on handcuffing.

Tarver v. City of Edna · filed 2005-05-25

As Tarver does not allege any degree of physical harm greater than de minimis from the handcuffing, we find that he has not satisfied the injury requirement of a § 1983 claim.

Investigating officers are qualifiedly immune from § 1983 damages when their conduct is objectively legally reasonable, including executing a search warrant supported by probable cause.

Franqui v. Rico · filed 1988-01-22

Defendants, as governmental officials performing the discretionary function of investigating police officers, and absent any showing of malice or improper purpose, are entitled to qualified immunity from damages in civil actions where their actions follow “objective legal reasonableness.” ... Because defendants possessed a warrant supported by probable cause, they had an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant violated no clearly established fourth amendment principle. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages on this claim and defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to this cause of action.

Section 1983 permits a public official sued for damages to invoke qualified immunity when he reasonably believed the challenged action was constitutional, even if it was unconstitutional.

Young v. Coder · filed 1972-08-17

Although there are obvious differences between the considerations applicable to a police officer making an arrest and a mayor discharging a municipal employee, I believe that the same test should be applied to the case at bar. Therefore, if the defendant reasonably believed that the discharge of plaintiff was within the defendant’s constitutional authority, then he is immune from personal liability for the consequences even though the discharge may have been unconstitutional.

Section 1983 affords public defenders qualified immunity from damages for acts performed in the discharge of their official duties.

John v. Hurt · filed 1973-11-16

The legislative history of 42 U. S.C. § 1983 does not indicate that Congress intended to “abolish wholesale all common law immunities.” ... We conclude that public defenders, like state prosecutors, and state and city attorneys, enjoy a qualified immunity for acts performed in the discharge of their official duties.

Section 1983 damages claims against executive officers may be barred by official immunity when no bad faith is alleged.

Lloyd v. Oswald · filed 1974-05-07

Even under the limited immunity applicable to executive officers, ... these defendants cannot be held liable in money damages. ... Plaintiff has made no claim that defendants have acted in bad faith.

Section 1983 affords state officials varying degrees of qualified immunity from damages claims based on their discretion, official responsibilities, and the circumstances at the time of the challenged action.

Safeguard Mutual Insurance v. Miller · filed 1975-03-31

A state official sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is entitled in varying degrees to immunity, the variation being dependent upon the extent of his discretion, the responsibilities of his office, and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.

Section 1983 permits monetary damages against a state official who knew or reasonably should have known that an official action would violate constitutional rights, or who acted with the malicious intention to cause such a deprivation.

O'Connor v. Donaldson · filed 1975-06-26

Under that decision, the relevant question for the jury is whether O’Connor “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of [Donaldson], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to [Donaldson].”

Section 1983 allows monetary-damages claims against state officials, subject to the scope of qualified immunity.

Donaldson v. J. B. O'connor, M. D. And John Gumanis, M. D. · filed 1975-08-08

We now hold, as to both Doctors O’Connor and Gumanis, that the district court’s instructions were insufficient in defining the scope of the qualified immunity possessed by state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against public officials for negligent performance of their duties alone.

Bogard v. Cook · filed 1975-11-11

In the opinion of the court, the jury’s finding that the defendant public officials’ negligent performance of their duties was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries is insufficient to support the imposition of liability for monetary damages upon them pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages are governed by tort-liability principles, including a good-faith defense.

Giampetruzzi v. Malcolm · filed 1975-11-24

Monetary damages may not be granted here. Allowance of damages in § 1983 actions is governed by the law of tort liability including the defense of good faith.

Section 1983 recognizes an affirmative defense for officials who act in good faith and reasonably believe their actions are constitutional.

Demkowicz v. Endry · filed 1975-09-16

The Supreme Court has grafted upon the categorical language of § 1983 an affirmative defense of acting in good faith (a subjective standard) and in the reasonable belief that the action is constitutional (an objective standard).

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to sue a public official, but qualified immunity is unavailable when the record does not establish that the official acted within the scope of his authority.

United States of America Ex Rel. David Tyrrell v. Fred Speaker, Former Atty. General of Pa. · filed 1976-06-21

Although the immunity of certain officials is available in defense of a suit by a prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this principle has not been applied by this court where, as here, the record is silent on the authority of the public official.

Qualified immunity does not protect a state official from § 1983 damages when the official knew or should have known the conduct violated constitutional rights or acted with malicious intent.

Wilder v. Irvin · filed 1976-09-05

However, no state defendant is immune from such liability if the state defendant “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff] or [that] he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the [plaintiff].”

In a § 1983 damages action, the plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence of the official’s bad faith or knowledge of the constitutional defect.

Stadium Films, Inc. v. Joseph R. Baillargeon, Etc. · filed 1976-09-23

Our own precedents have placed this burden on the plaintiff in a § 1983 action for damages.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for state officers who act in good faith and reasonably believe their conduct is lawful when they lack absolute immunity.

Doe v. McMillan · filed 1977-07-29

The Supreme Court has recognized a qualified immunity, available at common law and in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), covering acts done in good faith and with a reasonable belief in their legality by state officers unprotected by an absolute immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against public officials are subject to qualified immunity when the officials' good-faith performance of their public duties cannot reasonably be questioned.

Margoles v. Wisconsin State Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1978-02-23

Application of the test for official immunity, as here argued by defendants, of course, does not involve determination whether there is a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of liability in the absence of such immunity, but, rather, whether there is any evidence, sufficient as a matter of law, to permit a determination that good faith performance of public duty may reasonably be questioned. If “Yes,” there is no immunity; if “No,” the motion for summary judgment under consideration must be allowed by applying defendants’ qualified immunity as Wisconsin public officials.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on officials protected by qualified immunity for good-faith actions taken with reasonable grounds for believing they were lawful.

Jenkins v. McCollum · filed 1978-03-07

These defendants are therefore not liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when the officials act in good faith, reasonably believe their actions are constitutional, and act without malice.

Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate · filed 1978-06-23

In contrast, other governmental officials enjoy only a qualified immunity shielding them against liability when they act in good faith and reasonably believe their actions are constitutional. Stated differently, to be entitled to such immunity, they must act reasonably and without malice. ... We therefore affirm the district court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the damage claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 suits against state officials and direct constitutional damages suits against federal officials are governed by the same immunity principles, generally providing qualified immunity for executive officials exercising discretion except where absolute immunity is essential.

Butz v. Economou · filed 1978-06-29

Accordingly, without congressional directions to the contrary, we deem it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials. The § 1983 action was provided to vindicate federal constitutional rights. That Congress decided, after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enact legislation specifically requiring state officials to respond in federal court for their failures to observe the constitutional limitations on their powers is hardly a reason for excusing their federal counterparts for the identical constitutional transgressions. To create a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its head.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials are subject to qualified immunity, and an official is immune under the objective test when he could not reasonably have known that his action was unconstitutional.

Peterson v. Christensen · filed 1978-08-16

The plaintiff also seeks compensatory and punitive damages from the defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged deprivation of due process by the defendant under color of law. ... The plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment also seeks a ruling that the defendant is not immune from this suit. ... In my judgment, there is no issue of material fact and judgment should be granted as a matter of law to the defendant finding that he could not reasonably be required to have known that the regulation pursuant to which he acted was unconstitutional. ... Thus, only to the extent that the plaintiff relies on the objective test for defeating the defendant’s claim of immunity, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.

Section 1983 liability does not arise when officers reasonably and in good faith believe deadly force is necessary to protect themselves or others from death or great bodily harm.

Maiorana v. MacDonald · filed 1979-04-18

We also recognize that an arrest may sometimes entail the use of deadly force and that liability under § 1983 will not arise if the officers involved reasonably believed in good faith that such force was necessary to protect themselves or others from death or great bodily harm.

Section 1983 permits a defendant to invoke a good-faith defense when the defendant acted objectively and subjectively in good faith.

Bailey v. Lally · filed 1979-07-21

That is because a defendant in a 1983 case is entitled to the defense of good faith if he objectively and subjectively so acted.

Section 1983 damages suits allow nonjudicial officials performing adjudicatory functions to claim qualified immunity when they act without malice and lack actual or constructive knowledge that their actions would violate constitutional rights; the immunity is an affirmative defense that defendants must plead and prove.

290 Madison Corp. v. Capone · filed 1980-03-12

Nonjudicial government officials who perform functions of an adjudicatory nature enjoy qualified immunity to § 1983 suits for damages. ... The Court concludes that the instant defendants are nonjudicial government officials who perform adjudicatory functions and who therefore are eligible to avail themselves of the protective umbrella of qualified immunity. ... The aforementioned immunity is “qualified” in the sense that two conditions must obtain in order for it to protect a particular defendant. First, the official must act without malice. Second, the official must not have known or reasonably cannot be expected to have known that his actions would violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. ... Qualified immunity is not a presumption which plaintiffs must rebut but rather is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and as to the elements of which, ... defendants have the burden of proof.

Section 1983 generally gives state officials broad immunity from suit unless they knew or should have known that their official actions would violate constitutional rights.

Shutt v. Moore · filed 1980-06-16

State officials have a broad immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they specifically knew or should have known that their official actions would violate constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose personal monetary liability on law-enforcement officers who follow unsettled law in good faith and conduct the search reasonably.

Wallace v. King · filed 1980-07-01

On the other hand, law enforcement officers should not be held personally liable for monetary damages because they have followed the policy or instructions of their superiors, where the controlling law had not been authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court, the appropriate United States Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state, where the officers have acted in good faith, and where the searches were conducted in a reasonable manner, as shown by the evidence in this case.

Qualified immunity is a defense to liability under § 1983, not a bar to the existence of a § 1983 cause of action.

Harmasse Leclair and Elizabeth Leclair, Appellees-Cross-Appellants v. William Saunders, Appellant-Cross-Appellee · filed 1980-09-26

It is quite clear that qualified immunity is irrelevant to the existence of a cause of action under § 1983, since it operates only as a defense available to the official in question.

Section 1983 defendants are protected by qualified immunity only when they act in good faith, judged by objective and subjective components, and a facially valid search warrant alone does not establish good faith.

Farmer v. Lawson · filed 1981-03-02

Police officers, sheriffs and deputies are enshrouded with a qualified immunity from § 1983 liability. ... The good faith defense has both an objective and a subjective component: an officer or sheriff is not acting in good faith if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights. ... These cases reveal that the existence of a facially valid search warrant is not necessarily sufficient to find that the officers acted in good faith. The officers must act in good faith in their efforts to obtain the warrant. ... The burden of proof is on the defendants to demonstrate that their actions were taken in good faith.

Section 1983 claims may be subject to qualified immunity, but the official must raise and establish that defense; when that requires factual development, the claim may not be summarily dismissed under § 1915.

Henriksen v. Bentley · filed 1981-03-26

Where a public official has or may have a defense based on qualified immunity, the burden is on the official to raise the defense and establish his entitlement to immunity. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). This is not to say that in every case in which qualified immunity is an issue, a trial on the merits is necessary. Summary disposition consistent with the Federal Rules of Procedure may be appropriate. See Butz v. Economou, supra at 508. However, dismissal of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is not appropriate in such cases.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity to state officials acting within their official responsibility when they did not know and reasonably could not have known that their action violated another person's constitutional rights and acted without malicious intent to cause that deprivation or other injury.

Crews v. Petrosky · filed 1981-03-19

Qualified immunity is available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where an official (1) did not know or reasonably could not have known that the action, within the sphere of official responsibility, violated the constitutional rights of another person; and (2) acted without malicious intent to cause deprivation of such rights or other injury.

Section 1983 actions brought in state court are governed by the federal standard of qualified immunity, rather than a state immunity standard.

Finch v. Wemlinger · filed 1981-09-11

We will continue to apply the federal standard of qualified immunity in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought in state court.

Section 1983 treats a corporation as a person, but requires its challenged actions to be under color of state law or sufficiently connected to state authority; a defendant seeking qualified immunity must satisfy both objective and subjective elements.

Fowler v. Nicholas · filed 1981-09-18

Because a corporation is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, it may be liable for the violation of constitutional rights. ... However, as Magistrate Naythons points out, a person cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless its actions were taken under color of state law or had a sufficiently close nexus to state authority. ... The Supreme Court has defined this qualified immunity as being composed of two elements, an objective and subjective test. ... To be immune from liability under § 1983, a defendant must satisfy both elements.

Section 1983 claims against state social workers are subject to qualified immunity when the officials act in both objective and subjective good faith.

Langton v. Maloney · filed 1981-10-20

The initial question for the court is whether a state social worker is qualifiedly immune from liability under section 1983. ... The immunity standard requires that an individual defendant have acted in both “objective” and “subjective” good faith. ... It is clear that Ms. May, a social worker with the Department of Children and Youth Services, is entitled not only to assert the defense of qualified immunity but also to summary judgment on the basis of that immunity.

Section 1983 does not make government officials immune from damages merely because they acted in a discretionary capacity; the official must establish entitlement to good-faith immunity through the applicable legal and factual inquiry.

McGrath v. State · filed 1981-11-20

The trial court found the defendants to be immune under section 1983 without a factual determination. ... Without an analysis of the type of immunity to which the respondents are entitled, and a factual determination that their activity fits within the immunity, the trial court erred in holding that respondents were immune from suit based on the discretionary nature of their activities.

Section 1983 imposes liability based on an official's own actions under color of state law; individual officials may assert qualified immunity by showing good faith and probable cause, but municipalities cannot use qualified immunity as a defense.

Valdez v. City of Ottawa · filed 1982-04-22

The plaintiffs correctly argue that the defendant’s position within the police department is immaterial to his liability under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. Kossaris’ liability is predicated on his own actions and decisions. If the defendant acted under color of State law and deprived the plaintiffs, of a constitutional right, he is liable under section 1983. ... Moreover, the individual defendants can assert qualified immunity only by showing they acted in good faith and with probable cause. ... The city of Ottawa is also a defendant in this case, and it cannot assert qualified immunity as a defense to liability under section 1983.

A § 1983 suit for retroactive damages against officials is barred when qualified official immunity shields them.

West v. Keve · filed 1982-06-11

Defendants Keve and Anderson are shielded by their qualified official immunity from this § 1983 suit for retroactive damages against them in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be barred by qualified, good-faith immunity.

Smith-Bey v. District of Columbia · filed 1982-09-07

Defendants Barry and Holland are entitled to a qualified, good faith immunity against Section 1983 prosecutions.

Section 1983 does not immunize a public official from damages when the official knew or reasonably should have known that the action would violate constitutional rights, or acted with malicious intent to cause such a deprivation.

Kaufman v. Board of Trustees, Community College District No. 508 · filed 1982-10-08

is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiffs] or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the [plaintiffs].

Section 1983 claims against government officials are barred by qualified immunity unless the officials knew or reasonably should have known that their actions violated constitutional rights.

Silverman v. Ballantine · filed 1982-12-08

Defendants are entitled to a qualified immunity in a Section 1983 case unless they knew or reasonably should have known that their actions violated plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 allows damages against an official who violates constitutional rights, but qualified immunity protects the official unless he knew or should have known the action was unlawful.

Arnie King v. Joseph Higgins, Douglas Vinzant · filed 1983-04-27

We agree with defendant that he is entitled to a qualified immunity from damages under Section 1983. ... Thus, he is liable for damages only if he knew or should have known that his action would violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. ... Whether or not, based on the appeal and the reports of the disciplinary board members, defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff had been deprived of his rights, he knew or should have known enough to have investigated further. ... We agree with the Magistrate that in light of the information before him, defendant’s failure to investigate further to determine whether plaintiff had received his constitutional rights constituted reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights and leaves him unable to assert a good faith defense to his liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State-hospital officials sued for § 1983 damages have qualified immunity when they neither knew nor reasonably should have known that their conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Stuebig v. Hammel · filed 1983-08-18

they neither knew nor reasonably should have known that their failure to supervise various therapeutic programs at Farview would violate plaintiff’s rights. ... Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

Officials who acted in good faith were not liable for damages under § 1983 for the challenged seclusion practices.

Rubie Rogers, and Cross-Appellants v. Robert Okin, M.D., and Cross-Appellees · filed 1980-11-25

Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were not violated by the seclusion practices employed at the state hospitals, and thus argue that the denial of damages under section 1983 was certainly correct. Because we hold that the district court did not err in finding that the defendants acted in good faith, we need not decide whether plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were in fact violated.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against school board members for an official decision made in good faith when they neither knew nor reasonably should have known it would violate a constitutional right.

Sullivan v. Meade Independent School District No. 101 · filed 1976-03-24

The Supreme Court has recently discussed the circumstances under which school board members may be held liable for damages in an action under § 1983. ... While the Court’s holding expressly applied only to the “specific context of school discipline,” id., its reasoning is equally valid with respect to a school board member’s other official duties. ... Thus, it cannot be said that the members of the School Board either knew or reasonably should have known that their actions would violate a “constitutional right” of Ms. Sullivan. ... Thus, they cannot be held liable for damages.

Section 1983 does not permit local government entities or officials sued in their official capacities to assert a good faith immunity defense, though individuals sued in their individual capacities may assert it.

Highfield Water Co. v. Public Service Commission · filed 1980-05-20

The defense of good faith immunity may be asserted by all defendants in their individual capacities. The defense may not be asserted by them in their official capacities; nor may it be asserted by the Washington County Sanitary District or the Washington County Commission.

Section 1983 requires courts to assess both sincerity and reasonableness when a defendant claims good faith immunity based on a presumptively valid statute.

Richard Guzman and Mary Ann Guzman v. The Western State Bank of Devils Lake, a North Dakota Corp. · filed 1976-08-27

We conclude that where a plaintiff asserts denial of constitutional rights under § 1983, a defendant’s claim of good faith immunity due to reliance on a presumptively valid statute must be considered in light of not only the sincerity in his belief that what he was doing was right, but the reasonableness of his actions in the circumstances.

Section 1983 claims may be subject to a good faith immunity defense that can be submitted to the jury when supported by the evidence.

Simineo v. School District No. 16 · filed 1979-03-22

As to the matter of good faith and immunity, the court properly instructed the jury on the issue, and the jury found a lack of good faith. The submission of the issue was warranted by the proof, and there was sufficient evidence in the record from which the jury could find an absence of good faith.

Section 1983 gives municipalities qualified immunity for good faith conduct, so a plaintiff's concession of the municipality's good faith precludes a claim against it.

DeVasto v. Faherty · filed 1979-11-14

As the vast majority of the courts have determined, a balance of those considerations requires qualified immunity for good faith conduct. Plaintiff’s concession of the City’s good faith role in this action, thus, precludes the existence of a claim against the City.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officers who act in good faith under apparently valid authority during an extradition.

McBride v. Soos · filed 1981-04-30

This Court finds that the defendants acted in good faith throughout the entire matter in question and must not, therefore, be held liable under § 1983.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to good faith immunity as a matter of law based on assisting another officer when the evidence permits a finding that he initiated the arrest without probable cause.

Persinger v. Doug McKenzie (85-5034) Robert A. Webb (85-5064) · filed 1986-04-11

On this record, defendant Webb was not, as a matter of law, entitled to a directed verdict or to a defense of good faith immunity on the ground that he merely assisted in the arrest and reasonably relied on officer McKenzie's finding of probable cause.

Officials may avoid individual damages under § 1983 when they establish good faith, including reasonable reliance on counsel concerning a right that was not clearly established.

Farr v. Chesney · filed 1977-09-09

It was not unreasonable for the Defendants to rely upon the advice of the County Solicitor of Mifflin County. Consequently, the Defendants are immune from damages individually for terminating Farr’s services as a consultant in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 permits defendants involved in an unconstitutional policy to invoke a good faith immunity defense.

Gross v. Pomerleau · filed 1979-02-22

Although Monell, supra, would apparently allow § 1983 liability for an unconstitutional policy such as the Memorandum, it does not abrogate the good faith immunity defense which these defendants may successfully invoke.

Good-faith immunity in a § 1983 action protects officials from monetary damages, but does not bar injunctive relief.

Young v. Harris · filed 1981-03-13

First, the Court notes that this immunity protects § 1983 defendants from being made the object of an award of monetary damages, and not from being subjected to an injunction.

Section 1983 good-faith immunity does not shield school board members from liability for publicizing stigmatizing charges after deciding not to rehire a teacher.

Bomhoff v. White · filed 1981-10-28

Extending a good-faith immunity defense to charges made public following that decision does not relate to the discretionary act sought to be protected by the defense, i. e., the decision not to rehire the particular teacher.

Good faith immunity can protect defendants from liability on a Section 1983 excessive-force claim.

Caridi v. Forte · filed 1997-05-27

In any event, the conduct of each Defendant is protected by good faith immunity.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for a public official and a reasonable good faith defense for public and private defendants.

Mohican Valley Concrete, Inc. v. Wade, No. Cv95-0321003s (Oct. 14, 1997) · filed 1997-10-14

Lowery is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity; see Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735 , 744-47 (1994) (qualified immunity available as a defense against a § 1983 action when it was objectively reasonable for the public official to believe that his acts were lawful); and both defendants are entitled to the defense of reasonable good faith.

A municipality may not assert qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action.

Taylor v. Collins · filed 1983-11-21

A municipality is not entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity in section 1983 actions.

Law-enforcement officers sued under Section 1983 for actions purportedly taken pursuant to a court order are entitled at most to qualified immunity, not absolute quasi-judicial immunity, where the order did not actually authorize the conduct taken.

McCurry v. Tesch · filed 1984-06-29

Since we hold that the state-court orders did not authorize the law-enforcement officers’ actions here, those actions cannot be characterized as ministerial or merely in obedience to court directives. Thus, there is no basis for the application of absolute, quasi-judicial immunity.

A government official sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may assert qualified immunity only if the defense would have been recognized for that function at common law and extending it is consistent with the purposes of § 1983.

State v. Haley · filed 1984-08-10

Thus, in order to uphold Charney's and Erickson's qualified immunity defenses, we must determine that they would be entitled to such a defense under the common law and that extending the defense to them is consistent with § 1983.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action is a legal issue for the judge, and the defendant’s subjective belief is irrelevant.

Llaguno v. Mingey · filed 1985-06-05

This is an issue of law, for the judge to decide. What the defendant believed, an issue of fact, is neither here nor there.

A state-law violation alone does not overcome a state official’s qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit.

Schiff v. Kerrigan · filed 1986-01-02

The violation of state law alone would not be sufficient to overcome an official’s qualified immunity.

The qualified-immunity defense applies to Section 1983 actions on the same terms as it applies to Bivens constitutional-tort actions.

Arcoren v. Peters · filed 1986-02-13

The qualified immunity defense applies equally to RzVews-styled constitutional tort actions and cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a motive-based Section 1983 claim with no direct evidence of improper motive, an official is qualifiedly immune if evidence supports a rational decision on the stated basis; without such evidence, motive remains a triable issue.

Harris v. Eichbaum · filed 1986-09-02

If, however, there is no direct evidence, but only inferences, that the officials actions were improperly motivated, the court should determine whether there is any evidence to support the stated basis for the official’s decision, ... whether there is any evidence upon which the official could have rationally decided to take the challenged action for the reason which the plaintiff claims is pretextual. If so, this court should not second-guess the official, and the official is entitled to qualified immunity. If not, then the official’s motive is still a genuine issue, and the case should proceed to trial.

Officials are qualifiedly immune from Section 1983 damages when the law did not clearly establish that their investigative procedure violated constitutional rights, even if fuller factual development might later show the procedure was unconstitutional.

Darryl H. v. Coler · filed 1986-09-09

Under these circumstances, we believe that the individual defendants in this case are protected from damage liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Since we cannot determine the constitutionality of the procedures employed by the DCFS without a more fully developed record, we can hardly maintain that the individual defendants should have known that their efforts to fulfill their public responsibilities violated a clearly established constitutional right. Accordingly, regardless of whether the physical examination is ultimately found to be unconstitutional, the defendants, in their individual capacity, are entitled to summary judgment.

Officials receive qualified immunity when the constitutional rule governing their conduct was an open question, because immunity does not require predicting future constitutional developments.

Deibler v. City of Rehoboth Beach · filed 1987-04-30

The divergence of opinion among the four judges who reached the merits of this issue is a testament to the decisive fact that the law governing this case was an open question at the time the individual defendants acted. ... To impose liability on that basis would require the Court to adopt the hind-sight based reasoning on immunity issues that the ... Harlow ... Court so clearly rejected.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 action when the constitutional right was well established and they knew the facts giving rise to the protected claim.

Warner v. Graham · filed 1987-05-15

THIS COURT FINDS THAT PLAINTIFF'S FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS WERE WELL-ESTABLISHED AT THE TIME OF HER TERMINATION, AND THAT DEFENDANTS ARE THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY KNEW OF PLAINTIFF’S RELIGIOUS CLAIMS.

A single out-of-circuit district-court opinion does not clearly establish a constitutional right for purposes of defeating qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action.

Askari Abdullah Muhammad, 017434 v. Louie L. Wainwright, Richard Dugger, Clayton C. Strickland, David Watson, Thomas L. · filed 1987-12-28

Put differently, a district court opinion, particularly from outside the circuit, cannot, in and of itself, settle the law. Thus at the relevant time, defendants, at best, had only some reason to suspect that their actions might be unlawful.

A § 1983 equal protection claim requires intentional discrimination, for which qualified immunity is no defense.

Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of the Southeast Judicial District · filed 1988-04-22

However, Gutierrez's damage claims, including her section 1983 claim, are based primarily, if not exclusively, on allegations of purposeful discrimination. Discriminatory intent is an essential element of a 1983 action where the underlying claim is a violation of the equal protection clause. Qualified immunity is not a defense in such cases.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 protects officers when reasonable officers could believe that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless home entry and brief restraints based on the information available to them.

Elwood v. County of Rice · filed 1988-05-06

Even without the Peterson affidavit, we are persuaded that reasonable officers could believe the war-rantless entry and momentary restraints on Sandra and Kenneth Elwood were justified by these exigent circumstances. The deputies are therefore entitled to qualified immunity from liability under Section 1983.

State officials cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit for defamatory statements that foreclose a person from a chosen profession when existing law made the conduct unlawful.

Neu v. Corcoran · filed 1988-09-22

However, as set forth above, this circuit has held that an individual has a liberty interest in maintaining reputation plus the right to engage in his chosen profession. Both Huntley and Baden were decided before the Defendants made the allegedly defamatory statements. Therefore law forbidding such conduct was extant, and the Defendants can not avail themselves of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit does not foreclose inquiry into an official’s actual motive when motive is an element of the alleged constitutional violation.

Feliciano-Angulo v. Hon. Hector Rivera-Cruz, Etc. · filed 1988-09-30

But Harlow does not rule out the need to inquire into the actual reasons behind an official’s conduct when the official’s state of mind is a necessary component of the constitutional violation he allegedly committed.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when reasonable officers could have believed that existing probable-cause and exigent-circumstances law permitted their warrantless entry.

Whitt v. City of Rockford · filed 1988-10-21

Given this factual scenario, officers of reasonable competence could have concluded that the law of probable cause and exigent circumstances as it existed in 1984 permitted defendants to enter Moore’s apartment without a warrant. Therefore, the court concludes that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 defendant cannot claim qualified immunity when preexisting law made the unlawfulness of the conduct apparent, even without a binding case on the precise conduct.

Brady v. Gebbie · filed 1988-10-31

Specific binding precedent is not required to show that a right is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes. Ostlund, 825 F.2d at 1374. Based on the aforementioned preexisting law, the unlawfulness of Gebbie's actions would have been apparent. See id. The district court thus did not err in its implicit conclusion that the law was clearly established for purposes of Gebbie's qualified immunity defense.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by qualified immunity when officials could not reasonably have understood that their conduct violated the plaintiff’s civil rights.

Doyle v. Dukakis · filed 1988-11-04

Therefore, because the defendants herein could not reasonably have understood that their conduct, even if politically motivated, violated Doyle’s civil rights, they enjoy immunity from liability for damages, and the claims against them under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 must be dismissed.

A public official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages suit when existing precedent did not clearly establish that the specific conduct was unlawful.

Clark v. Brown · filed 1988-11-04

Qualified immunity entails the right to be immune from litigation where the specific action taken by a public official is not clearly unlawful under existing precedent.

Government officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated constitutional rights.

Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier · filed 1988-11-09

We hold that Porter and Flandrick are entitled to qualified immunity and, thus, we do not reach the issue of whether absolute immunity is appropriate under these circumstances. Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 unless their conduct violated "clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (emphasis added).

Government officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when the law at the time of their conduct did not clearly establish that their actions violated a constitutional right.

Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier · filed 1988-11-09

We hold that the law in existence at the time of the defendants’ actions failed to establish clearly that the second ordinance was unconstitutional. The defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

State employees sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they act within their official discretion and reasonably believe their actions are appropriate in the circumstances.

Tingle v. State of Tennessee D.H.S., Marguerite W. Sallee, Larry Butler, Hilton Bolton, Saundra Richardson, · filed 1988-12-06

It is reasonable to conclude that Ely and Richardson acted within the scope of their official discretion, as required by Harlow, since enforcement of the Act requires considerable discretionary action. Moreover, in light of the circumstances surrounding the case, Ely and Richardson reasonably believed their actions were appropriate and they acted in good faith.