42 U.S.C. § 1983

An officer sued under § 1983 for an arrest without probable cause has qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest was supported by probable cause in light of clearly established law and the information known to the officer.

James Harold Peterson Paula Peterson v. City of Plymouth Michael Ridgley David Lindman Mark Bevins · filed 1995-07-14

The officers are immune from liability if, in light of clearly established law and the information known to the officers, a reasonable officer could have believed the arrests were supported by probable cause.

An officer sued under § 1983 for false arrest is not entitled to qualified immunity when the officer lacked even arguable probable cause to arrest.

Williamson v. Mills · filed 1995-09-27

Because Mills lacked even arguable probable cause to arrest Williamson, Mills was not entitled to qualified immunity against Williamson's claim of false arrest.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they arrest without probable cause and reasonable officers in their position would not have believed probable cause existed.

Seminara v. City of Long Beach, Rory Hainley, and Joseph Lembi · filed 1995-10-06

Moreover, reasonable officers in the defendants' positions would not have believed that probable cause for arrest existed. Because probable cause is lacking, and the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity, Seminara is entitled to summary judgment on the question of liability of the Defendant officers.

Officers sued under § 1983 for false arrest have qualified immunity if their mistaken belief that probable cause existed was reasonable under clearly established law.

Booker v. Ward · filed 1995-10-13

If probable cause did not exist, the officers are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity if their mistake as to the existence of probable cause for an arrest was reasonable despite the pertinent law that was clearly established as of the August 1987 incident.

Officers sued under § 1983 for false arrest lack qualified immunity when no reasonable officer could believe the known facts supplied probable cause for the arrest.

Baldwin v. Chandler · filed 1995-10-20

Under these circumstances, we conclude defendants could not have reasonably believed they had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs.

Officers sued under § 1983 may claim qualified immunity for an arrest without probable cause if their conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law and the information they possessed at the time.

Williams v. Weber · filed 1995-11-02

Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs § 1983 claims on the grounds of qualified immunity. Defendants are entitled to this defense, even if there was no probable cause to arrest plaintiff for obstructing legal process or battery, if their conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law and the information defendants possessed at the time.

An officer sued under § 1983 for false arrest has qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable to believe probable cause existed or reasonable officers could disagree about probable cause.

Beal v. City of New York · filed 1995-11-21

An arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law if the record shows "either (a) that it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed; or (b) that officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met." Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.1987).

Section 1983 affords officers qualified immunity from an unlawful arrest claim when they reasonably believe they had probable cause to arrest.

Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police · filed 1995-11-22

Kirvay and Guzzardo are, therefore, immune from this claim.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity from a false-arrest claim when an officer reasonably, even if mistakenly, believed probable cause existed for the arrest.

Fink v. Gonzalez · filed 1996-01-08

For purposes of qualified immunity, however, we need not determine whether Fink was actually guilty of criminal trespass, or even if probable cause to arrest him for that crime actually existed. Rather, we must only ask whether an officer in defendants’ position could have reasonably, even if mistakenly, believed that he or she had probable cause to make the arrest.

In a § 1983 action, officers who arrest someone in reliance on a state attorney’s advice are immune for conduct within the scope of that advice.

Reihley v. Slocum · filed 1996-01-17

When police officers rely upon a state attorney's advice in executing an arrest, they are immune from suit for conduct within the scope of the attorney's advice.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 false-arrest suit cannot support summary judgment when a material dispute about what the officer knew affects whether he had arguable probable cause.

Johnson v. Schneiderheinz · filed 1996-01-31

Because what the Sheriff actually knew, as opposed to what he subjectively believed, is critical to a determination of both the merits and the defense of qualified immunity, I must deny the motion for summary judgment on both of the alternative grounds advanced by the Sheriff.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false-arrest claim when the officer had at least arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Graham v. Harman · filed 1996-03-05

Upon our review of the record, we agree with the district court that the police officer was entitled to qualified immunity, as he had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Graham for violating the obstruction ordinance.

Police officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability for an arrest when it was objectively reasonable to believe probable cause existed or reasonable officers could disagree about whether it existed.

Steiner v. City of New York · filed 1996-03-14

Qualified immunity exists if the undisputed facts and all permissible inferences favorable to the plaintiff show either (a) that it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe probable cause existed, or (b) that officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether there was probable cause.

A defendant in a Section 1983 excessive-force suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the law at the time of the arrest was uncertain whether significant nonphysical injury could support the claim.

Dunn v. Mike Denk, Cross-Appellee · filed 1996-03-19

Given the explicit language of Johnson, and its footnote 1 in particular, we conclude that the law at the time of this arrest was uncertain regarding whether “a significant injury will be caused by unnecessary force without significant physical injury.” On the present facts, Denk was entitled to qualified immunity from the claims asserted in this case.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity from an unlawful arrest claim when the facts known to them supplied probable cause for the arrest.

Swenson v. Culberson County · filed 1996-04-23

It is the opinion of this Court that the aggregate number of traffic violations after the initial stop warranted sufficient probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs, and yet Plaintiffs’ due process rights remained at all times inviolate. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claim of unlawful arrest pursuant to Section 1983 must fail and Officers Lauderdale, Dieshler, and Williams are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to such claim.

Qualified immunity does not shield a § 1983 defendant when an officer strip searched an arrestee in 1992 based on an inability to confirm her identity without individualized suspicion.

Kelly v. Charles C. Foti, Jr., City of New Orleans, John Doe, and Jane Roe · filed 1996-04-29

Turning to the second prong of qualified immunity analysis, we conclude that an officer’s inability to confirm an arrestee’s identity did not make a strip search objectively reasonable in 1992.

Section 1983 shields an officer from a false arrest damages claim through qualified immunity when reasonable officers could disagree about the existence of probable cause.

Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga · filed 1996-05-03

Because, at the very least, reasonable police officers might have disagreed as to the existence of probable cause, Officer Grant is entitled to qualified immunity from Mrs. Lowth’s suit on the false arrest claims.

Section 1983 claims for false arrest against police officers are barred by qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause for the arrest.

Wishnatsky v. Bergquist · filed 1996-05-29

We conclude that, under these circumstances, a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to arrest Wishnatsky for trespassing. Accordingly, Willoughby and Bernd are immune from suit on Wishnatsky’s § 1983 claims.

In a § 1983 action, disputed facts about what an officer knew and did before an arrest prevent the district court from deciding qualified immunity.

Johnson v. Krohn · filed 1996-06-07

In other words, where, as here, there are disputed issues of fact as to what the officer knew and did or failed to do and as to what the plaintiff did before the arrest, the district court cannot decide the qualified immunity question.

Section 1983 does not shield arresting officers with qualified immunity when their denial of an arrestee’s requested medical care as punishment was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Nerren v. Livingston Police Department Billy Ray Nelson, Sheriff and Bob Key, and Matthew Parrish, and Robe · filed 1996-07-02

In sum, whether Nerren’s allegations are analyzed under a pretrial detainee’s more general right under Bell and Valencia to be free from punishment or his more specific right to medical attention announced in Jones and Hare, Nerren has stated a claim and the Arresting Officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 liability when no reasonable official would understand that communicating a good faith statutory interpretation or instructing an arrest based on it violates constitutional rights.

Ernest A. Emerson, Quay Wood, Brian McRae, Glenn Zoch and Louis diDonato v. Borland · filed 1996-07-17

We believe that under these facts, no reasonable official would believe that the mere communication to independent law enforcement officials of a good faith interpretation of a statute or the instruction to arrest an individual who is violating the statute based on that interpretation could be a violation of Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Appellants were, therefore, entitled to be protected from liability by the qualified-immunity defense.

Section 1983 does not give an arresting officer qualified immunity for objectively unreasonable conduct that causes an arrest without probable cause.

McLain v. City of Jackson, MS · filed 1996-10-02

Qualified immunity does not shield an arresting officer from liability for objectively unreasonable conduct which results in an arrest without probable cause.

In a Section 1983 false arrest claim, qualified immunity turns on whether an officer reasonably could have believed probable cause justified the arrest when the right against arrest without probable cause was clearly established.

Adams v. County of Los Angeles Charles B. Musgrave Lt. Thomas Ewens Gary E. Vance Dan Strasburg Deborah Strasburg · filed 1996-11-22

The right not to be subject to arrest without probable cause is so clearly established that we go directly to the question whether Musgrave reasonably could have believed probable cause justified Adams's arrest.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe probable cause existed.

Marriott v. Strong · filed 1996-11-25

We agree with the district court that it was objectively reasonable for Strong to believe he had probable cause to arrest Marriott, and that he was thus entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 improper arrest claim, an officer has qualified immunity when undisputed facts could lead a reasonable officer to believe probable cause existed, even if actual probable cause is not established.

Johnson v. Schneiderheinz · filed 1996-12-09

It is not necessary for us to decide whether the facts support actual probable cause to arrest; we simply hold that there were sufficient undisputed facts and information available to support a reasonable law enforcement officer's belief that probable cause existed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for an arrest when a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest was lawful.

Twiddy v. City of Healdsburg S. Brouchard, Officer Spotswood, Officer Steve Cox, Officer Rob Thiessen, Res Office · filed 1996-12-20

After reviewing the information upon which defendants based their conclusion that there was probable cause to arrest Twiddy for driving with a suspended license, we conclude that a reasonable officer could have believed that arresting Twiddy was lawful.

An officer sued under § 1983 for wrongful arrest may be entitled to qualified immunity even when the court does not decide whether the arrest was supported by probable cause.

Barnes v. Danner · filed 1996-12-23

However, since we find that Danner was entitled to qualified immunity, we need not address whether Danner acted with probable cause.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity to police officers whose actions are motivated by good faith and probable cause.

Hollis v. Bailey · filed 1981-10-13

Qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 exists for police officers whose actions were motivated by good faith and probable cause.

In a Section 1983 false-arrest action with disputed facts, probable cause and qualified immunity both turn on the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct and present a jury question.

Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers · filed 1984-10-12

Thus, on the facts and circumstances of this case, a finding of probable cause— which would preclude the finding of a constitutional violation for section 1983 purposes — and a finding of entitlement to qualified immunity — which would preclude liability even if the defendants had violated Deary's constitutional rights — both turn on the reasonableness of the defendant police officers’ actions in arresting and detaining Deary — a determination which we have held presents a question of fact for the jury.

Police officers sued under Section 1983 for an arrest are qualifiedly immune if a reasonable officer in their position would not have known probable cause was lacking.

Stevens v. Sanpete County · filed 1986-01-09

The court concludes as a matter of law that, even assuming that the defendants did not have probable cause to arrest Stevens for theft, a reasonable person in their position would not have known that he lacked probable cause. The defendants are therefore immune from suit.

A police officer is immune from § 1983 liability for an arrest supported by probable cause.

Hutchinson v. Grant · filed 1986-08-05

A police officer has immunity if he arrests with probable cause.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim when uncontroverted evidence establishes probable cause and good faith.

Valenti v. Akron Police Department City of Akron Thomas Overfield Howard Arnett Warren Hayes Jerry Foys · filed 1986-09-15

In the absence of controverting evidence, these facts clearly establish that probable cause existed for the arrest of the appellant, and that the arresting officers acted in good faith. It follows that the individual appellees are entitled to qualified immunity on the facts established by the record, and that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in their favor.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on a Section 1983 seizure claim when, viewed favorably to the plaintiffs, no reasonable officer could believe probable cause existed and the seizure violated clearly established rights.

Dale E. Kraus and Rosetta M. Kraus, Husband and Wife Cindy D. Kraus, Individually and Todd W. Montgomery, Individually v · filed 1986-09-17

We therefore hold that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, a reasonable officer would not have believed he had probable cause to effect this seizure of Kraus and Montgomery, and the officers reasonably should have known that their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights. The district court properly declined to grant the officers’ motion for summary judgment as to the illegal arrest claim.

Qualified immunity cannot be granted at summary judgment when disputed facts could show that no reasonable officer had probable cause for the arrest.

Van Houten v. Baughman · filed 1987-06-30

Because this case is before us in the posture of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, we find that it is inappropriate to grant immunity to Defendant at this time. ... Hence, we cannot say that Defendant is entitled to immunity as a matter of law.

In a § 1983 unlawful-arrest action, a police officer has qualified immunity if a reasonable officer in the circumstances could have believed there was probable cause to arrest.

Diana Pepper Sevigny v. Andrew F. Dicksey, Individually, and the Town of Carolina Beach, (Two Cases) · filed 1988-05-18

This is an appeal from a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that a police officer had violated the plaintiff’s fourth amendment rights by arresting her without probable cause. ... At the more specific level here at issue — a war-rantless arrest by a police officer — the test is whether a police officer acting under the circumstances at issue reasonably could have believed that he had probable cause to arrest, i.e., to believe that the arrestee was committing or had committed a criminal offense.

In a § 1983 unlawful arrest action, factual disputes over probable cause preclude summary judgment on a sheriff’s qualified immunity defense when the plaintiffs’ version of events shows a clearly established Fourth Amendment violation.

Vincson Herren and Woody Eugene Herren v. E.J. Bowyer, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Lee Count · filed 1988-08-03

The law is “clearly established” that an arrest without a warrant or probable cause to believe a crime has been committed violates the fourth amendment, and a reasonable police officer would not have believed, on the appellants’ version of the facts, that the arrest in this case was lawful. In light of the factual disputes in this case, the grant of summary judgment was improper on the appellants’ illegal arrest claim.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 wrongful-arrest claim when no reasonable officer with the information the arresting officer possessed could believe there was probable cause.

Merriman v. Walton · filed 1988-09-07

Thus, the question here is whether a reasonable police officer, knowing what Walton knew, could have believed there was probable cause for Merriman’s war-rantless arrest. We think the answer is no.

Officers cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest suit based on a prosecutor’s advice when they should have recognized that probable cause was lacking.

Von Stein v. Brescher · filed 1988-10-05

Likewise, in the present case, it was not objectively reasonable for these Defendants to have relied on the State Attorney’s advice because in their independent judgment, and based on the information they had, they should have realized that there was no probable cause to arrest. On this record, the advice rendered cannot completely insulate these Defendants from liability.

An officer sued under § 1983 for unlawful arrest has qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause for the charged offense or a related offense.

Gassner v. City of Garland, Texas, M.L. Bates · filed 1989-03-07

We thus hold that a reasonable officer in Bates’s position would have had, on the basis of Gassner’s conduct, probable cause to believe that Gassner was committing a crime related to that with which he was actually charged. Because Bates was therefore entitled to qualified immunity from liability on Gassner’s claim of unlawful arrest under federal law, the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment was improper.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on individual officers for an arrest without probable cause when qualified immunity protects their conduct.

Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie · filed 1989-09-19

Mr. Bennett is, however, prevented from holding the individual officers liable under section 1983 for arresting him without probable cause.

Section 1983 officers may be denied qualified immunity on summary judgment when the evidence permits reasonable disagreement over whether an officer could have believed there was probable cause for an arrest.

Tucker v. Firks · filed 1989-09-29

Given the nature of the crime the police were investigating, the discrepancy in the amount of money that was missing from the bank and the amount Buchanan stated he gave Tucker, Tucker’s denial, and the reasonable inference that Buchanan was inherently unreliable in light of his bizarre behavior and the conflict inherent in the polygraph examination result, this court cannot say, as a matter of law, that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a section 1983 unconstitutional-arrest claim when the officer’s belief that probable cause existed was objectively reasonable.

Krause v. R.O. Bennett, Jr. · filed 1989-11-01

Specifically, a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from section 1983 claims charging the officer with unconstitutional arrest if the officer’s conduct was “objectively reasonable.”

Section 1983 qualified immunity may not protect an officer from a wrongful-arrest claim when the officer’s improper conduct induced the acts offered as probable cause for the arrest.

Rinaldi v. City of New York · filed 1990-07-06

If such a finding were to be made, it would appear inappropriate for Hernandez to be protected by qualified immunity, for all of the conduct which defendants claim gave rise to probable cause was in fact induced by the improper conduct of Hernandez.

Qualified immunity does not permit judgment on a § 1983 false arrest claim when, accepting the plaintiff’s account, the officers’ arrest was objectively unreasonable.

Ruiz v. Herrera · filed 1990-08-30

Although it is a delicate task to second guess what a police officer in the line of duty should have done, I must conclude that, accepting plaintiff’s account of the incident, it was not reasonable for the officers to arrest Ruiz and transport her to police headquarters without giving her the chance to exonerate herself by retrieving identification, given all the other circumstances surrounding the incident. I therefore deny defendants’ motion for judgment on their defense of immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from section 1983 liability for an arrest supported by probable cause.

Hubbert v. City of Moore · filed 1991-01-09

We conclude Doran and McCoy had probable cause to make the arrest and thus are entitled to qualified immunity from liability in the Hubberts’ section 1983 action, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Jones v. City and County of Denver, Colorado, 854 F.2d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir.1988).

An officer sued under § 1983 for false arrest has qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable to believe there was probable cause, even if probable cause was absent.

Craig v. Krzeminski · filed 1991-03-20

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity if the officer establishes that it was “objectively reasonable” for him to believe his acts were lawful. ... Thus, even assuming the absence of probable cause to arrest plaintiff in the instant action, defendant has met his burden of demonstrating that it was objectively reasonable for him to believe there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff based on the information available to him at the time of the arrest.

Section 1983 does not support an arrest claim against officers who had probable cause for one offense, even if they charged the arrestee with a different related offense; the officers may rely on qualified immunity.

Loustalot v. Rice · filed 1991-05-17

Where an individual is arrested and there is probable cause of one crime to support the arrest, the fact that he is charged with a second crime, or that he is originally charged with a different related crime, is of no moment; the arresting police officers can rely on qualified immunity and the arrestee does not have a valid § 1983 cause of action.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, an officer has qualified immunity for an arrest without probable cause if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Pritchett v. Lanier · filed 1991-05-31

The test for determining whether the defense of qualified immunity is available to an officer who mistakenly arrests a civil rights plaintiff without probable cause is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed for plaintiffs arrest.

An officer who admits he had no reasonable suspicion for a detention is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim.

Schwab v. Wood · filed 1991-06-12

In this case, however, Wood admits he had no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the part of Schwab. As a consequence, the court holds that no reasonable jury could conclude that a reasonably well-trained police officer would believe that his actions were lawful under these circumstances. It follows Wood is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 affords a police officer qualified immunity from a false arrest claim if the officer reasonably believed there was probable cause to make the arrest.

Brandenburg v. R.L. Murphy, Harry E. Cureton, Warren G. Hatfield, Calvin O. Morton, Roy W. Sharp, and Mark D. · filed 1991-06-21

He is entitled to qualified immunity if he reasonably believed he had probable cause to make the arrest.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known the arrest and prosecution lacked probable cause.

Mahoney v. Kesery · filed 1991-07-18

Having examined the circumstances, the court is confident that a reasonable police officer—perhaps one not burdened with the unique frustrations then facing Officer Kesery—would have declined the temptation to arrest and prosecute the plaintiff on such a flimsy charge. Accordingly, the court is constrained to conclude that Officer Kesery’s qualified immunity defense cannot be sustained.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action cannot be resolved on summary judgment when disputed facts about what officers knew could change whether a reasonable officer would have perceived probable cause.

Prokey v. Watkins · filed 1991-08-19

Nevertheless, if what the policeman knew prior to the arrest is genuinely in dispute, and if a reasonable officer's perception of probable cause would differ depending on the correct version, that factual dispute must be resolved by a fact finder.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a Section 1983 claim when the officer had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Ramos v. Sedgwick County Sheriff's Department · filed 1991-10-29

Having found that the evidence strongly established probable cause to arrest, it surely follows that the Defendants have established arguable probable cause, thereby entitling Defendants to the defense of qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Police officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for an arrest without probable cause when a reasonable officer would have recognized the detention as an arrest.

James Harold Peterson and Paula Peterson v. City of Plymouth, Minnesota Michael Ridgley David Lindman Mark Bevins Steven · filed 1991-11-18

An objectively reasonable officer in Be-vins and Lindman’s position could not have believed that the intrusion on liberty involved in locking Peterson in a squad car for twenty minutes was sufficiently limited under the circumstances so as to constitute merely an investigatory stop. Because Be-vins and Lindman admit that they did not have probable cause to arrest Peterson, they acted unreasonably and, hence, are not entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 for an arrest without probable cause has qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could believe probable cause existed or reasonable officers could disagree about it.

Golino v. City of New Haven · filed 1991-12-03

An arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a suit for damages on a claim for arrest without probable cause if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.

An officer who makes an arrest supported by probable cause has qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim.

Vitale v. Police Officer Glynn · filed 1992-02-19

When Gonzales signed a formal complaint for arrest, Glynn had all he needed to make a lawful arrest. Qualified immunity passed to Glynn as a result of making a lawful arrest.

Officers sued under § 1983 for unlawful arrest have qualified immunity when they could reasonably believe probable cause existed.

Wollin v. Bruce Gondert, Deputy Sheriff, Joseph Seidel, Deputy Sheriff and Jefferson County, Wisconsin · filed 1999-09-02

We hold that under all the facts and circumstances present at the time of Wollin’s arrest, the officers could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed to arrest Wollin. Thus, the deputies are protected from civil liability by qualified immunity.

Police officers may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if they had arguable probable cause for the seizure, even without actual probable cause.

Cerrone v. Brown · filed 2001-04-10

The appellants correctly point out that to be entitled to qualified immunity, they need only have possessed “arguable” probable cause to seize Cerrone, not actual probable cause.

Officers defending a Section 1983 seizure claim may receive qualified immunity if they had arguable probable cause for the seizure.

Cerrone v. Brown · filed 2001-04-10

We also hold that the officers may be entitled to qualified immunity if they had arguable probable cause for the seizure, thus rendering their conduct objectively reasonable.

An officer was entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim.

Colon v. Ludemann · filed 2003-09-23

Thus, the court finds that Officer Ludemann is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the false arrest claims and grants summary judgment accordingly.

An officer has qualified immunity from damages on a § 1983 false arrest claim if arguable probable cause existed, even if probable cause did not.

Escalera v. Glenna Lunn, Individually, Louis Crisci, Individually, Rocco A. Pozzi, Individually, and the County o · filed 2004-03-18

Even if probable cause to arrest is ultimately found not to have existed, an arresting officer will still be entitled to qualified immunity from a suit for damages if he can establish that there was “arguable probable cause” to arrest. Arguable probable cause exists “if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.”

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when arguable probable cause existed, even if actual probable cause did not.

Crosby v. Monroe County · filed 2004-12-28

Qualified immunity applies when there was arguable probable cause for an arrest even if actual probable cause did not exist.

Section 1983 does not allow a Fourth Amendment claim when probable cause existed for the arrest.

Arline v. City of Jacksonville · filed 2005-02-25

However, the existence of probable cause is an absolute bar to a § 1983 action for a Fourth Amendment violation.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Wolk v. Seminole County, Florida · filed 2008-03-12

Therefore, we conclude that Officer Klein is entitled to qualified immunity and we reverse the judgment of the district court denying Klein’s motion for summary judgment.

An officer sued under § 1983 for an arrest is entitled to qualified immunity when arguable probable cause existed, even if actual probable cause did not.

Christman v. Pietrzak · filed 2008-10-16

It is well established in our circuit that when there is “arguable probable cause for an arrest,” “qualified immunity applies” “even if actual probable cause did not exist.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for seeking arrest warrants when plaintiffs offer no facts showing that the decision or alleged affidavit errors were objectively unreasonable.

Shepach v. Tanner · filed 2000-04-17

Plaintiffs did not offer any facts to suggest that Hebert was objectively unreasonable in his decision to seek warrants for Mungia or Shepach or that any misstatements or omissions by Hebert in his affidavits were intentional, reckless, or objectively unreasonable such that an otherwise reasonable officer would not have submitted them to a magistrate.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects officers executing a valid arrest warrant when no clearly established law requires them to resolve a possible statute of limitations defense before arrest.

Pickens v. Hollowell · filed 1995-07-31

At the very least, Baker and Williams establish that the law was not clearly established when this arrest was made in 1992 that an officer had a duty to correctly decide any statute of limitations issues before executing an arrest warrant.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when disputed facts, if credited, show an officer repeatedly punched a handcuffed, cooperative arrestee.

Kerr v. Valle · filed 1995-11-03

Kerr and Duncan’s assertions, that Valle repeatedly punched Kerr in the face while handcuffed and cooperative, if accepted by the jury, would suffice to sustain a claim of excessive force. Valle’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that he is entitled to qualified immunity and there are no material facts in dispute is denied.

A sheriff sued under § 1983 for an allegedly unlawful arrest is entitled to qualified immunity when he reasonably relies on another police department’s repeated confirmation of an arrest warrant.

Knoche v. Wheatley · filed 1995-12-20

Given the defense of qualified immunity, the Sec. 1983 plaintiff must also show that the defendant had no reasonable good faith belief in the legality of the arrest. ... Based on these communications, Wheatley's reliance upon the information about the South Dakota warrant cannot be said to have been unreasonable. Therefore, as a matter of law, Wheatley's is entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 unlawful arrest action based on a facially valid warrant, an officer has qualified immunity unless no reasonably competent officer would have requested the warrant.

Pritchett v. Russell · filed 1996-08-05

In an action for unlawful arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant, a police officer will be granted qualified immunity unless "no officer of reasonable competence would have requested the warrant." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1986); accord Mills v. Graves, 930 F.2d 729, 731 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that "immunity will be lost only where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.").

Officers sued under Section 1983 for seeking arrest warrants are entitled to qualified immunity if probable cause would have existed even with full disclosure to the magistrate.

Duca v. Martins · filed 1996-08-20

Thus, if probable cause would have been found even in the event of full disclosure, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Police officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity for an arrest under a warrant when their belief in probable cause was objectively reasonable and no material misstatements or omissions undermined it.

Outlaw v. City of Meriden · filed 1996-10-01

Salafia’s belief in probable cause to arrest was objectively reasonable; there were no material misstatements or omissions that would detract from an objective belief in probable cause and these circumstances support a finding of immunity for Salafia and the city by the trial court.

In a § 1983 wrongful-arrest suit, qualified immunity for an officer who sought a warrant turns on whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the affidavit lacked probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant.

Barnes v. Donald Danner, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Deputy Sheriff in Aiken County, South C · filed 1996-12-23

Given that Danner sought an arrest warrant, the question is "whether a reasonably well-trained officer in[Danner's] position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986).

Officers sued under § 1983 for false arrest are entitled to qualified immunity when arguable probable cause makes their belief that an arrest was lawful objectively reasonable.

Lee v. Sandberg · filed 1997-12-19

A review of the circumstances of this case reveals that while the State Troopers, as stipulated, did not in fact have actual probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, they certainly had "arguable" probable cause, and accordingly, it was objectively reasonable for the State Troopers to believe that probable cause existed. ... Having concluded that the State Troopers' actions were objectively reasonable, they are entitled to qualified immunity, and accordingly, summary judgment as a matter of law.

Officials with arguable probable cause to arrest are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim.

Stachel v. City of Cape Canaveral · filed 1999-06-22

Therefore, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Stachel for violating § 806.10(2).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim for wrongful arrest against officers entitled to qualified immunity because they reasonably believed probable cause existed.

Mendenhall v. Riser · filed 2000-05-30

His arrest was reasonable, as it was based on arguable probable cause and a civil action for damages under § 1983 cannot be maintained on these facts.

An officer who procures an arrest warrant has qualified immunity for actions taken in applying for the warrant.

Neiman v. Keane · filed 2000-11-13

The officer procuring the warrant, however, enjoys not absolute but qualified immunity with respect to his actions in the application of the warrant.

In a § 1983 damages action, an officer who obtains a search warrant has qualified immunity if the affidavit provides enough indication of probable cause for the officer’s belief to be objectively reasonable, even if probable cause is ultimately lacking.

Spencer v. Sutterfield · filed 2003-05-28

Further, we find that even if there was not probable cause, the affidavits were not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render belief in its existence objectively unreasonable.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim if the officer had arguable probable cause.

Golden v. City of New York · filed 2006-03-07

In any event, at a minimum, Detective Kanehl is entitled to qualified immunity. See Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir.2000) (stating that in the context of a qualified immunity defense, the defending officer need only show “arguable” probable cause); see also Boyd, 336 F.3d at 76 (stating that “[a]rguable” probable cause exists “if police officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether there was probable cause”). Thus, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs false arrest and imprisonment claims.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when they had arguable probable cause to arrest for at least one charge.

Whittington v. Town of Surfside · filed 2007-06-06

Since at least “arguable probable cause” was present for one or both of the charges for which Plaintiff was arrested, Officers Perez and Giambalvo are entitled to qualified immunity for any false arrest claims brought pursuant to § 1983.

In a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim, officers with arguable probable cause are protected by qualified immunity.

Staco v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2008-02-26

Treating Plaintiffs’ federal claims against the officers as properly pled under § 1983, this Court finds that the existence of arguable probable cause on the face of Plaintiffs’ Complaint bars recovery. ... Because the Court finds that there was at least arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs, the doctrine of qualified immunity bars Plaintiffs’ federal claims against the officers.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when arguable probable cause supports the arrest for an offense, even if another alleged offense lacks it.

Williams v. Taylor-Lee · filed 2010-09-28

Even in the absence of probable cause, however, “an officer is still entitled to qualified immunity if arguable probable cause existed.” Case, 555 F.3d at 1327. ... Because arguable probable cause supported Williams’ arrest for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37, it is immaterial whether arguable probable cause also existed for her arrest for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21.

Officers sued under Section 1983 for false arrest have qualified immunity when they had arguable probable cause to make the arrest.

Basinski v. City of New York · filed 2016-06-14

Whether, or not probable cause actually existed for Basin-ski’s arrest on these bases, the Court finds that, as a matter of law, Browne is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Ba-sinski’s Fourth Amendment false arrest claim because the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Basinski.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if the officer had arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Estate of David Papadakos v. Norton · filed 2016-10-13

To defeat the defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity, the Estate must show that Norton lacked even arguable probable cause to arrest Papadakos.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim if a reasonable officer could have mistakenly believed there was probable cause to arrest.

HENDERSON v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS · filed 2019-07-26

And even if prob- able cause to arrest Henderson for public intoxication did not exist, Officer Baker had “arguable probable cause” to arrest Henderson.

Qualified immunity does not bar a Section 1983 claim against officers whose warrantless home entry was objectively unreasonable because the resident did not consent and no exigent circumstances existed.

Fontenot v. Cormier · filed 1995-06-20

Since there was neither consent nor exigent circumstances to justify the deputies' conduct, their warrantless entry into Fontenot's home and subsequent refusals to leave were objectively unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. ... Further, we have already determined that the defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the grounds of qualified immunity with regard to Fontenot's Section 1983 claims.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for a warrantless home entry when they fail to establish that a reasonable officer could have believed exigent circumstances justified it.

Wallace v. Cliff Lathrope, Rick Del Fiorentino, and the City of Fort Bragg · filed 1995-07-03

We also conclude that the Officers failed to establish that a reasonable officer could have believed that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of Wallace's residence. Thus, the district court properly denied the Officers' summary judgement motion based on qualified immunity on this claim.

A police officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known that a warrantless seizure violated clearly established constitutional law.

Pasqualone v. Gately · filed 1996-04-05

The plaintiff has now waived all claims except the claim against Gately under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Because Gately’s conduct violated Pasqualone’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and because Gately was not entitled to qualified immunity as matter of law, we reverse.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for officers who could reasonably believe their conduct was lawful under clearly established law at the time.

Perkins v. City of West Covina · filed 1997-05-09

We hold that, in light of the law clearly established at the time of the search, the detectives could reasonably believe their seizure of a large amount of cash was lawful. ... We affirm the district court’s finding of qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they have reasonable grounds to believe probable cause supports a search warrant.

Martinez v. City Of Schenectady · filed 1997-05-13

We conclude that the officers "had reasonable grounds to believe probable cause supported the warrant." Magnotti, 918 F.2d at 366. The officers are therefore entitled to qualified immunity from Martinez's section 1983 claim.

An officer sued under § 1983 for a warrant-based search retains qualified immunity when it was not entirely unreasonable to believe the affidavit established probable cause for the items to be seized.

Kiesling v. Spurlock · filed 2017-06-09

Whether or not the existence of probable cause for one item in a warrant is sufficient to immunize defects as to all of the other items, we conclude that Spurlock retains the shield of immunity conferred by the warrant because it was not entirely unreasonable for him to believe that his affidavit established sufficient probable cause for the search and seizure of the items included in the warrant.

Officials sued individually under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss if the complaint fails to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Williams v. Alabama State University · filed 1997-01-06

The question of qualified immunity should be resolved in the defendant's favor on a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Individual officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no clearly established law would have alerted a reasonable official that the alleged conduct was unconstitutional.

Nolen v. Jackson · filed 1997-01-06

We have not discovered, nor have Appellees presented, any support for the position that a reasonable public official should have been aware that the conduct alleged in this case constituted a violation of clearly established law. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's denial of Appellants' motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity and dismiss this appeal as to all other parties and issues.

Qualified immunity permits summary judgment on a § 1983 equal protection claim when the defendant did not violate the plaintiff’s equal protection rights.

Hansen v. Judy Rimel, R.N., John Dahm · filed 1997-01-07

Because Hansen was not similarly situated to other inmates for the purpose of using a telephone, there could have been no equal protection violation. The district court erred as a matter of law in denying Dahm a grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and we accordingly reverse its judgment.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability for denying requested sweat lodge access when their conduct was objectively reasonable in light of legitimate penological interests.

Thomas v. Gunter · filed 1997-01-08

We hold the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on qualified immunity grounds. Defendants' denial of plaintiff's request for daily and extended access on weekday afternoons to the prison sweat lodge was rationally related to legitimate penological interests.

Qualified immunity bars relief under § 1983 unless the complaint shows that officials violated a constitutional right that was clearly established when they acted.

McMorrow v. Little · filed 1997-01-08

The officials' qualified immunity will bar relief to McMorrow unless his complaint states facts showing that the officials violated one of his constitutional rights and that the right was clearly established when the officials violated it.

A § 1983 false-arrest claim against an officer fails on qualified-immunity grounds when the officer reasonably believes an offense is being committed and the plaintiff lacks justification for the conduct.

Roy v. John Aiello, Trooper, Connecticut State Police, Troop D, Danielson, Connecticut · filed 1997-01-10

The appellant's primary claim of false arrest, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was properly dismissed on the ground of qualified immunity. ... Her suit against the arresting officer fails for the basic reason that the officer had a reasonable basis to believe that the offense of disorderly conduct was being committed and that the appellant lacked justification to bar the DOT work crew from her property.

An officer’s violation of state law does not by itself defeat qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim; immunity turns on whether the constitutional duty was clearly established.

Soto v. Carrasquillo · filed 1997-01-13

Accordingly, Soto’s arguments with regard to Law 54, even if her alleged facts are true, do not resolve the qualified immunity question. The focus is rather on whether there is clearly settled law on the constitutional violation at issue.

Individual defendants in a Section 1983 damages action are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Hogan v. Pataki · filed 1997-01-15

Naturally, then, in so far as the individually named defendants are concerned, they are entitled to qualified immunity in that their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Public officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional right that they reasonably should have known.

Brayton v. Monson Public Schools · filed 1997-01-17

Beyond this, even if a constitutional violation were properly alleged, all of the individual defendants would be entitled to the protection of qualified immunity. Public officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability for their actions, provided their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which the official reasonably should have known.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 privacy claim when their actions were objectively reasonable under the law at the time.

Doe v. Marsh · filed 1997-01-22

Having concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were objectively reasonable, we need not reach the remaining issues raised by the plaintiffs.

Section 1983 affords individual school board members qualified immunity when a reasonable member would not have known that relieving a superintendent of duties while continuing pay and benefits violated clearly established law.

Harris v. Board of Education · filed 1997-01-23

Because the members of the Board could not have reasonably believed that their actions in relieving Harris of his responsibilities while continuing to pay him the economic benefits of the position were illegal, the Board members as individuals are entitled to qualified immunity on his charge of a deprivation of a property right.

Government officials have qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights a reasonable person would have known.

Scallet v. Rosenblum · filed 1997-01-29

Assuming, arguendo, that Scallet's interest in some academic speech was constitutionally protected, Appellees are still entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Government officials are immune from Section 1983 liability for money damages as long as "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

An officer has no qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for planting incriminating evidence when the conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights.

Riley v. City of Montgomery, AL · filed 1997-01-30

Accordingly, Wooten is entitled to no immunity for such claims. Thus, to the extent that the district court granted Wooten summary judgment on Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims based on the alleged planting of cocaine, the district court was mistaken.

Qualified immunity protects officers from a § 1983 claim when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which reasonable officers would have been aware.

Michael Kunik and Lisa Kretschmer v. Racine County, Wisconsin · filed 1997-01-30

We have no occasion either to approve' or disapprove of these kinds of investigatory tactics, because we agree with the district court that this conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which reasonable officers would have been aware.

Officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity if their conduct did not violate a statutory or constitutional right clearly established when they acted.

Spiegel v. City of Chicago · filed 1997-02-04

Officers enjoy qualified immunity so long as their conduct did not violate a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time they acted.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Spiegel v. City of Chicago · filed 1997-02-04

Even if the officers violated Spiegel's Fourth Amendment rights in the manner he claims (an issue we leave unresolved here), his right not to have the police prevent him from entering an apartment that was in the possession of the landlord was not clearly established at the time the police blocked his attempt to enter. ... Accordingly, we find that the individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity and were correctly dismissed from this suit by the district court.

Qualified immunity for a section 1983 claim requires a federal analysis distinct from state official immunity; resolving state immunity does not resolve federal immunity.

Hudson v. Vasquez · filed 1997-02-06

However, the federal test is nevertheless distinct from the state test, and resolution of state law immunity issues does not resolve federal immunity issues under section 1983.

An official cannot claim qualified immunity under § 1983 for conduct clearly established to be beyond the scope of the official’s discretionary authority.

Better Government Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw · filed 1997-02-06

We hold, therefore, that an official who performs an act clearly established to be beyond the scope of his discretionary authority is not entitled to claim qualified immunity under § 1983.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless the complaint alleges a constitutional violation of a right that was clearly established when they acted.

Mcmorrow v. Little · filed 1997-02-06

The officials' qualified immunity will bar relief to McMorrow unless his complaint states facts showing that the officials violated one of his constitutional rights and that the right was clearly established when the officials violated it.

Individual police officers have qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 unless the plaintiff proves they violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Bogle v. City of Warner Robins · filed 1997-02-12

Qualified immunity protects individual police officers from liability under § 1983 unless the plaintiff can prove that the officers violated a “clearly established” constitutional right.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the complaint sufficiently alleges sexual harassment or discrimination violating clearly established equal protection rights.

Guy v. State of Illinois · filed 1997-02-14

At this stage of the litigation, defendants cannot escape liability as to plaintiffs equal protection claim based on a qualified immunity defense. In 1994, it was clearly established that a state actor’s sexual harassing and discriminatory conduct could provide the basis for a violation of equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Correctional officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they reasonably interpret a court order as authorizing physical restraint to obtain a blood sample.

Freeman v. Jackson · filed 1997-02-14

We agree with the district court that defendants' interpretation of the order--as allowing them to physically restrain Freeman to obtain a blood sample--was reasonable, thus entitling them to qualified immunity.

Public officials sued under § 1983 for conspiring to violate FERPA have qualified immunity when the asserted FERPA right was not clearly established.

Brown v. City of Oneonta · filed 1997-02-14

Qualified immunity therefore protects the appellants who are alleged to have conspired to create, release, and use the list in violation of sections 1983 and 1985(3).

Government officials sued under Section 1983 are protected by qualified immunity when their alleged conduct did not violate clearly established law at the time.

Bradley v. Central Naugatuck Valley Help, No. Cv95-0126436s (Feb. 20, 1997) · filed 1997-02-20

The plaintiff has failed to show that Fan and Osborne violated clearly established law in allegedly failing to provide appropriate supervision of the plaintiff in a community residence. Therefore, their actions or inactions as alleged in the fourth count are protected by qualified immunity under federal law.

Individual defendants in a § 1983 action have qualified immunity when reasonable officials in their position could have believed their conduct was lawful.

Coover v. Saucon Valley School District · filed 1997-02-26

We believe that reasonable Board Members acting in June 1995 could have believed that their actions were lawful. Accordingly, Defendant Board Members are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action is available only to officials sued in their personal capacities.

Reyna v. City of Weslaco · filed 1997-02-27

Qualified immunity is available only to officials sued in their personal capacities. ... The record indicates that both the judge and prosecutor were sued in their official capacities. We hold that the trial court erred in granting qualified immunity to the municipal judge and city prosecutor.

Section 1983 defendants are protected by qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Medeiros v. O'Connell · filed 1997-02-27

No subsequent developments in the law served to clarify the existence of that right before January 1993, when the events at issue in this case occurred. Accordingly, the defendants are protected against liability on the due process claim by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment for officials sued individually under § 1983 when disputed material facts prevent deciding whether their conduct was lawful.

Finley v. Trent · filed 1997-02-28

Under these circumstances, the Court must determine whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct was lawful given the allegations raised in the complaint. Believing that material facts are in dispute, the Court cannot find that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

A § 1983 defendant seeking to defer a qualified immunity defense until trial must show significant factual disputes would likely defeat an earlier motion and make that motion wasteful.

Falkner v. Houston · filed 1997-03-06

At the very least, the defendant official should show that significant disputed facts would very likely preclude a successful motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and that the filing of such a motion would be nothing but a waste of time and money.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Blueford v. Prunty · filed 1997-03-06

Thus, we hold that Blueford’s right to be free from Moses’ conduct was not “clearly established.” We therefore need not answer whether Moses could have had a reasonable belief that his conduct was lawful, or consider whether the district court erred by failing to hold the prison workplace to a higher standard than the general prison environment. We conclude that the district court did not err in finding Moses qualifiedly immune from liability.

Prison officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for denying a prisoner access to weekly religious services without a justification when a reasonable jury could find their conduct objectively unreasonable.

Harris v. Lord · filed 1997-03-07

Moreover, I find that a “reasonable jury could conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for [defendants] to refuse plaintiffs request to attend religious services.” Boomer, 919 F.Supp. at 126. Therefore, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for denying plaintiff access to her weekly religious services.

A § 1983 claim may be dismissed before discovery if the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of clearly established rights.

Carmen v. Boyd · filed 1997-03-10

We undertake this task because a § 1983 cause of action may be dismissed before discovery commences if a plaintiff fails to allege violations of clearly-established rights.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from § 1983 damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Gardner v. Howard · filed 1997-03-12

Qualified immunity shields government officials from § 1983 damage liability unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

A prison official sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for ignoring a specific threat to a specific inmate when the official would understand that doing so violates a clearly established Eighth Amendment right.

Rider v. Louw · filed 1997-03-13

The contours of the right to be free from “cruel and unusual punishments” in this context, as of the time of the events, were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official who ignored a specific threat to a specific inmate would understand that what he was doing violated that right. ... Therefore, Louw is not qualifiedly immune from suit, and the motion for summary judgment must be denied on this ground as well.

Section 1983 claims against state officials are barred by qualified immunity unless the complaint alleges a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established when the officials acted.

McMorrow v. Little · filed 1997-03-17

The officials' qualified immunity will bar relief to McMorrow unless his complaint states facts showing that the officials violated one of his constitutional rights and that the right was clearly established when the officials violated it.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

McMORROW v. LITTLE · filed 1997-03-17

We conclude, however, that it was not clearly established at the time of the conduct that either type of conduct was a constitutional violation. Therefore, the officials are entitled to qualified immunity, and we must dismiss McMorrow's claim that the officials violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Qualified immunity shields public officials from damages under § 1983 when their conduct did not violate rights clearly established at the time.

May v. Baldwin · filed 1997-03-19

The affirmative defense of qualified immunity shields public officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages under § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or eonstitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

A defendant sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, or if the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable.

Johnson v. Dallas County Texas · filed 1997-03-21

Assessing the defense of qualified immunity is a two-step process. First, we must determine whether Johnson has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. If Johnson has alleged such a violation, we then decide if the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable. Even if an official’s conduct violates a constitutional right, he is entitled to qualified immunity if the conduct was objectively reasonable.

A § 1983 defendant can be denied qualified immunity on a Fourth Amendment claim for ordering a mandatory blood test that serves no governmental interest when the unlawfulness was clearly established.

Krocka v. Riegler · filed 1997-03-21

Given the facts that must be presumed true at this stage, the court concludes that the law was sufficiently clear that Bransfield should have known that ordering a blood test to measure levels of a legally prescribed drug was a violation of Krocka’s Fourth Amendment rights. ... A mandatory blood test that fails to serve any governmental interest is violative of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court concludes that, on the facts alleged in the complaint, Bransfíeld is not entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 damages action, an official is denied qualified immunity only when the law was clearly established and a reasonable official could not have believed the conduct was lawful.

Somers v. Thurman · filed 1997-03-25

Therefore, an official is denied qualified immunity only if the law was clearly established and a reasonable official could not have believed the conduct was lawful.

A state official is not liable under § 1983 for damages unless the official directly participated in violating a clearly established right; qualified immunity applies where the right was not clearly established at the time.

Tesson v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare · filed 1997-03-27

Finally, however, while no qualified immunity analysis was performed in Johnson, supra, giving the appearance that none need be done, earlier cases indicate that a state official, such as the Commissioner, would not be liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 unless the plaintiff can prove that-the state official “directly participated in violating the plaintiffs ‘clearly established’ rights.” ... Here, plaintiff has not asserted, much less proven, that, prior to the Appeals Court decision in this case, plaintiffs rights in the particular circumstances here were clearly established.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity does not shield officials at summary judgment when the assumed facts show they violated a clearly established right that reasonable officials in their positions would have known.

Wilkie v. Board of Commissioners of Chatham County · filed 1997-03-28

We affirm the district court's determination that on the facts assumed for purposes of the summary judgment motion, the individual defendants' conduct would have violated Wilkie's clearly established right to non-discriminatory treatment of which reasonable officers in their positions would have known. We decline to review the court's fact-related determination in denying the qualified immunity/summary judgment motion that genuine issues of material fact respecting that defense exist and require resolution by trial.

In a § 1983 suit, officials are not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment when the assumed facts show a violation of a clearly established right that reasonable officials in their positions would have known.

Wilkie v. Board of Cnty Comm · filed 1997-03-28

We affirm the district court's determination that on the facts assumed for purposes of the summary judgment motion, the individ- ual defendants' conduct would have violated Wilkie's clearly estab- lished right to non-discriminatory treatment of which reasonable officers in their positions would have known.

In a § 1983 excessive-force claim, officers are not entitled to qualified immunity if the claimant proves they violated clearly established constitutional law.

Redo v. Sylvestri · filed 1997-04-02

If Redo proves her allegations, then the officers are not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, since their conduct violated clearly established constitutional law.

An official whose act was clearly established to be beyond the scope of the official’s discretionary authority cannot claim qualified immunity under § 1983.

In re: Allen v. · filed 1997-04-02

We hold, therefore, that an official who performs an act clearly established to be beyond the scope of his discretionary authority is not entitled to claim qualified immunity under § 1983.

A police officer sued under Section 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for selectively enforcing an unwritten policy against clearly protected student speech.

Robert Davis, Cross-Appellee v. Ed Yovella, Chief Anthony Bowman William T. Snyder, Chancellor University of Tennessee R · filed 1997-04-02

We disagree and find that Bowman is not entitled to qualified immunity because he inequitably enforced an unwritten policy against clearly protected speech.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when their conduct was objectively reasonable under the clearly established law at the time.

Cyr v. City of Dallas, TX · filed 1997-04-07

We agree with the district court, however, that the Officers’ actions were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding them. It was not clearly established in February 1993 that the use of mace on handcuffed passive abortion protestors constituted excessive force.

An officer sued under Section 1983 has qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed the challenged conduct lawful in the circumstances.

Thompson v. Mahre · filed 1997-04-07

The question on qualified immunity is not whether Sergeant Steen's judgment was mistaken, only whether a reasonable officer could have made the judgment to enter as these officers did in these particular circumstances. He could have. For that reason, Sergeant Steen is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, based upon the facts found by the district court.

Police officers may be shielded by qualified immunity from liability under Section 1983 when undisputed facts establish the defense.

Astrada v. Howard · filed 1997-04-08

The undisputed facts detailed above lead the court unavoidably to its conclusion that officers Howard, Reis, Carpenter and Allen were shielded by qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 false arrest suit, a probable cause instruction using a reasonable officer standard can answer a challenge to a qualified immunity instruction based on alleged reliance on the officer’s subjective beliefs.

Wisniewski v. Stevens · filed 1997-04-11

Second, Wisniewski argues that the district court erred in its qualified immunity instruction to the jury. Wisniewski asked that the instruc- tions define "knowingly" in terms of what a reasonable officer should have known. Wisniewski contends that the instructions caused the jury to accept Stevens' subjective beliefs concerning probable cause. However, the instruction on probable cause in fact noted that "a police officer must have information that would lead a reasonable per- son who possesses the same official expertise as the officer to con- clude that the person being arrested has committed or is about to commit a crime." Therefore, the instruction on probable cause itself provided the jury with the "reasonable officer" standard that Wis- niewski requested.

In § 1983 damages suits, an official is denied qualified immunity only if the law was clearly established and a reasonable official could not have believed the conduct lawful.

Thompson v. Souza · filed 1997-04-16

Thus, an official is denied qualified immunity only if the law was clearly established and a reasonable official could not have believed the conduct was lawful.

In a § 1983 suit, a qualified-immunity appeal cannot resolve a factual dispute over whether officials acted to obey the law or to retaliate for political affiliation.

Berdeca-Perez v. Zayas-Green · filed 1997-04-16

To the extent that the appellants claim that their actions are insulated from First Amendment scrutiny as a matter of fact because their only intention was to obey the law, the record presents an issue of fact as to their intent — an issue of the type that can no longer be resolved on interlocutory appeal.

A plaintiff opposing qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action bears the initial burden of showing that officials violated clearly established rights.

Thompson v. Souza · filed 1997-04-16

Thompson bears the initial burden of proving that the Officials violated rights clearly established under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their use of force was reasonable under clearly established law at the time.

Collins v. Scott · filed 1997-04-18

The use of force was restrained and, moreover, was reasonable in light of clearly existing law to counteract the Plaintiffs persistent disruptive refusal to obey an order to strip search. The Defendants are entitled to have the claims against them dismissed because of qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 claim against officers, qualified immunity can be resolved at the rights-violation step if plaintiffs fail to show that the officers violated a constitutional or statutory right.

Davis v. Gracey · filed 1997-04-21

If we determine that plaintiffs have failed to show the officers’ conduct constituted a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, we need not address the other elements of the qualified immunity inquiry.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit may renew a qualified immunity defense at summary judgment after its rejection on a motion to dismiss and limited discovery.

Griffin v. Edwards · filed 1997-04-25

This affirmance is, however, ordered without prejudice to the rights of the public defendants to move for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity at a later date, after such limited discovery as the district court may deem necessary to determine whether a genuine issue exists as to the illegality of the public defendants’ conduct.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force handcuffing claim when the prohibition on excessive force was clearly established and a genuine issue of fact remains about whether the officer used excessive force.

Martin v. Heideman · filed 1997-04-29

Because clearly established law in 1991, the time of the incident in this case, prohibited an officer's use of excessive force, and because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Officer Paul used excessive force under the circumstances, the district court erred by granting Paul qualified immunity on the handcuffing issue.