42 U.S.C. § 1983

Individual defendants in a § 1983 due process suit have qualified immunity when the asserted property interest in employment was not clearly established at the time of the challenged action.

Hunt v. Chicago Housing Authority, a Municipal Corporation, James Gilmartin and Charles Clarke · filed 1992-09-14

Thus, we must conclude that in 1983, at the time of Mr. Hunt's firing, it was not yet clearly established that an employee manual or handbook could create a property interest in employment under Illinois law, particularly in the circumstances present here. The individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Hunt's due process claims.

State parole agents and supervisors are immune from § 1983 damages for requiring antipsychotic medication as a parole condition when the need for an independent medical determination was not clearly established at the time.

Felce v. Patrick Fiedler, Earl Brunk, Also Known as Andy Brunk, David H. Dhein, and James L. Schansberg · filed 1992-09-15

We conclude that the defendants are qualifiedly immune from Mr. Felce’s requests for damages because the procedural rights were not so clearly established in November 1990 that a reasonable parole agent or supervisor would have known that conditioning Mr. Felce’s parole upon antipsychotic drug treatment, without any independent determination of the medical need for such treatment, was violative of Mr. Felce’s procedural due process rights.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action has qualified immunity when the defendant could reasonably believe the conduct was constitutional under the clearly established law at the time.

Proudfoot v. Williams · filed 1992-09-17

Qualified immunity insulates state actors from liability if they could have reasonably believed that the action was constitutionally valid in light of the legal rules that were “clearly established” at the time the action was taken. ... Therefore, Witman is entitled to this defense.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing qualified immunity must identify statutory or decisional law showing that the asserted constitutional right was clearly established when the challenged conduct occurred.

Elder v. Holloway · filed 1992-09-17

For these reasons we conclude that the plaintiff in a § 1983 action, who bears the burden of showing that the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct, must identify the body of law which proves that the right was so clearly established that a reasonable officer would be alerted to its constitutional parameters.

Section 1983 affords public officials qualified immunity for discretionary acts unless those acts violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1992-09-18

The current doctrine covers the state official's discretionary actions with the cloak of qualified immunity so long as the official's actions do not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Public officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability unless they violate clearly established federal rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Hodge v. Carroll County Department of Social Services · filed 1992-09-21

Accordingly, public officials enjoy qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 unless their actions violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

State officials cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. Stephenson · filed 1992-09-24

State officials cannot be held liable for damages under section 1983 unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

An officer sued under § 1983 who violates a clearly established right may still claim qualified immunity by proving extraordinary circumstances that excused ignorance of the governing law.

Pritchett v. Alford · filed 1992-09-28

Even where an officer has violated a right found by a court to be a "clearly established" one, he may yet establish his immunity to suit by "claim[ing] extraordinary circumstances and prov[ing] that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2738.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for retaliating against protected speech about workplace sexual harassment, because that retaliation violates a clearly established right.

Wilson v. UT Health Center · filed 1992-09-30

And any retaliation for Wilson's speech on a matter of such prominent public concern as workplace sexual harassment represents a violation of a clearly established right, so under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield state officials from a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on alleged concealment or misrepresentation of facts to judges or prosecutors when a reasonable official would recognize that the conduct violates clearly established rights.

Doe v. State of La. · filed 1992-09-30

But whether or not defendants George and Bennett were aware of these cases is of no moment. Any reasonable state actor employed in a capacity which embraces law enforcement would surely realize that misrepresenting or concealing facts to judges or prosecutors is a violation of the accuseds' guaranteed rights under the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages for a politically motivated transfer when the asserted constitutional protection was not clearly established at the time of the transfer.

Manuel C. Pedro-Cos v. Contreras · filed 1992-09-30

Appellants are correct in their assessment of the status of the law as of 1986. We have repeatedly stated that, pri- or to our decision in Agosto-De-Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir.1989) (en banc), and the Court’s decision in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990), the law was not so well settled that reasonable people should have been aware that such constitutional protection existed.

Police officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability if a reasonably competent officer would not have known that their conduct violated clearly established law.

King v. Chide · filed 1992-10-05

Qualified immunity cloaks a police officer from liability if a reasonably competent law enforcement agent would not have known that his actions violated clearly established law.

An officer may be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim without a prior case involving the same facts when existing law gave fair warning that the conduct was unconstitutional.

San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose · filed 2005-04-04

There need not be prior authority dealing with this precise factual situation in order to deny Linderman qualified immunity for his actions.

For qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim, a right may be clearly established without a prior case involving precisely equivalent facts.

Duong v. Telford Borough · filed 2006-05-25

The “appropriate level of specificity” required for Fox to be on notice that his conduct was unreasonable need not reach a level of precise equivalence.

In a § 1983 claim, a court cannot resolve qualified immunity by summarily concluding that the law was clearly established; it must ask whether a reasonable officer would have understood that the conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted.

Trolley Boats, LLC v. City of Holly Hill Florida · filed 2009-01-28

By summarily concluding that the law was clearly established, the court bypassed the prong’s “relevant, dispositive inquiry” altogether – namely, “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S. Ct. at 2156.

In a Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the right at issue was clearly established to overcome qualified immunity.

Robinson v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2009-04-27

The plaintiff “bears the burden of proving that the rights [he] claims were ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged violation.”

Section 1983 defendants may invoke qualified immunity when the risk to an inmate and the officials’ response do not defeat that defense.

Massick v. North Central Correctional Facility · filed 1998-02-13

On the other hand, the exposure was brief, and the inmates were separated as soon as Mr. Massick specifically complained about being placed with someone who was HIV positive. Situations like this are inherently matters of degree, and we cannot say that the risk was so substantial, and the defendants’ reactions to it so unreasonable, as to negative a defense of qualified immunity.

Officials facing individual-capacity damages claims under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for exposing an inmate to airborne friable asbestos when a reasonable official would understand that the exposure could violate the Eighth Amendment.

LaBounty v. Coughlin · filed 1998-02-13

To grant defendants immunity we must find that "no rational jury could fail to conclude" that it was reasonable for defendants to believe that exposing LaBounty to asbestos would not violate his rights. Given the known dangers of friable asbestos in 1991-92 5 , we hold that a reasonable person would have understood that exposing an inmate to friable asbestos could violate the Eighth Amendment.

An officer who arrests someone based on fellow officers’ oral statements has qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim if it was objectively reasonable to believe those statements established probable cause.

Rogers v. Powell · filed 1997-08-11

Therefore, we hold that where a police officer makes an arrest on the basis of oral statements by fellow officers, an officer will be entitled to qualified immunity from liability in a civil rights suit for unlawful arrest provided it was objectively reasonable for him to believe, on the basis of the statements, that probable cause for the arrest existed.

Prison officials lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim for requiring a Muslim inmate to handle pork when the inmate’s right to avoid contact with pork was clearly established.

Hayes v. Long · filed 1996-01-12

In our view, it was clearly established after Finney that Muslim inmates have the right to avoid contact with pork or with any food that has been contaminated by pork. ... Accordingly, we hold defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to dismissal on qualified immunity grounds when the pleaded facts, if true, would show a violation of clearly established law.

Krohne v. Peterson · filed 1996-01-17

At this stage of the proceeding, dismissal would be premature because Krohne has alleged a set of facts, which, if true, indicate that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to officials performing discretionary functions when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of clearly established law.

Marshall v. BD. OF CTY. COM'RS FOR JOHNSON CTY. · filed 1996-01-22

The individual Board members, while performing the discretionary functions delegated to the planning commission and board of county commissioners, are entitled to qualified immunity, for the reason that plaintiff has not shown a violation of clearly established law.

Government officials have qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Marshall v. Board of County Commissioners for Johnson County · filed 1996-01-22

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials generally are shielded from liability for civil damages under § 1983 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Public officials sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when the claimed right was not clearly established and a reasonable person would not have known the conduct violated it.

Silva v. Town of Springer · filed 1996-01-29

Public officials have qualified immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 as long as (1) at the time of the alleged conduct there was no clearly established statutory or constitutional right that was claimed to have been violated, and (2) a reasonable person would not have known that his or her conduct was violating that clearly established right. Oldfield v. Benavidez, 116 N.M. 785, 790, 867 P.2d 1167, 1172 (1994); Jennings, 115 N.M. at 389, 851 P.2d at 511; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). We agree with Appellees that the trial court properly applied the defense of qualified immunity to Baca’s 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claims.

State officials may invoke qualified immunity against a Section 1983 damages claim by a voluntarily admitted mental patient when the asserted due-process right was not clearly established.

Wayne Kennedy and Alice Kennedy v. C. Keith Schafer John Twiehaus Robert O. Muether Jacqueline Howard Kelly Shaw and Peg · filed 1996-01-31

In other words, we agree with the District Court that defendants are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity if Kathleen is properly classified as a voluntary patient. We need not and do not decide whether ParwatikaPs holding in favor of voluntary patients’ due-process rights remains good law. We do decide that an action for damages brought by a voluntary patient is subject to a qualified-immunity defense.

Qualified immunity bars individual-capacity damages under § 1983 when a reasonable public official would believe the conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Arce v. Banks · filed 1996-02-06

In any event, even if the alleged facts rose to the level of a constitutional violation, ... qualified immunity protects Banks from liability for damages in her individual capacity.

A § 1983 defendant has qualified immunity from a claim based on an unsuccessful attempt to influence protected speech when no materially similar precedent clearly established that the attempt violated the First Amendment.

Suissa v. Fulton County, GA · filed 1996-02-06

Stated somewhat differently, the speech retaliation decisions do not "dictate, that is truly compel," id., the conclusion that an unsuccessful attempt to prevent protected speech violates the First Amendment. Therefore, the district court should have granted Hubbard's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant from a § 1983 claim when the law governing the alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Lafountain v. Richard Johnson, Warden, Otf Prison Facility · filed 1996-02-06

On the merits of the case, the judgment for defendant on the basis of qualified immunity was proper, as the law with regard to prisoners' exposure to environmental tobacco smoke was not clearly established at the time of his alleged actions.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would know.

Armendariz v. Penman · filed 1996-02-07

The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity only “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Individual officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Genas v. State of New York Department of Correctional Services · filed 1996-02-12

Since, as we discuss below, it was not clear at the time of the defendants’ acts that the interest asserted by the plaintiff was protected by the Constitution, we reverse, and grant the individual defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their qualified immunity defense to plaintiffs Free Exercise claim.

In a § 1983 damages suit, an official has qualified immunity if the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Genas v. State of New York Department of Correctional Services · filed 1996-02-12

If the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the court should sustain the qualified immunity defense.

In a section 1983 suit, qualified immunity shields a government agent if a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct lawful in light of clearly established law and the information available at the time.

State v. SUPERIOR CT. IN CTY. OF MARICOPA · filed 1996-02-20

We hold that Sherwood was protected by qualified immunity, and thus that the trial court should have entered summary judgment in Sherwood’s favor. The doctrine of qualified immunity to section 1983 claims is one of federal law. As a consequence, we follow federal court decisions on the subject. Qualified immunity shields government agents if a reasonable government officer could have believed his actions to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information he possessed at the time.

A public official is qualifiedly immune from individual liability under § 1983 when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Chan v. City of Chicago · filed 1996-02-20

In conclusion, at the time of Mr. Chan’s transfer in 1989, the law was not clearly established that the type of injury inflicted upon him violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment; therefore, Mr. Wodnicki is qualifiedly immune from liability.

Government officials performing discretionary functions are protected by qualified immunity from § 1983 damages if their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

L.Q.A. ex rel. Arrington v. Eberhart · filed 1996-02-21

Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability if their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

State actors sued under § 1983 receive qualified immunity only if their belief that their conduct was lawful was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.

Parkhurst v. Trapp · filed 1996-02-23

Qualified immunity is available to state actors in Section 1983 suits if those actors reasonably believed that their conduct was lawful. ... However, a good faith belief in the legality of conduct is not sufficient. Such belief must be objectively reasonable. ... We hold that the second search of the Parkhurst residence violated the Fourth Amendment and the police officers reasonably should have known that their conduct was unlawful.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the evidence permits a jury to find it objectively unreasonable for the defendant to believe his conduct did not violate a clearly established federal right.

Arnold v. Sharp · filed 1996-02-27

There are sufficient facts to allow reasonable jurors to conclude it was objectively unreasonable for Sharp to believe his actions did not violate an established federally protected right.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that the official violated a federal right clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Lawson v. Garcia · filed 1996-03-15

Since Garcia failed to demonstrate that Lawson violated a clearly established federal right, Lawson is entitled to invoke the defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects prison officials from § 1983 damages liability for exposing inmates to environmental tobacco smoke when that liability was not clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct.

Howard Lee Vaughn, Jr. v. James Rowland Eddie Ylst I. Henry G. Mueller M. Montes S.L. Hubbard F.X. Chavez J.M. Batchelor · filed 1996-03-18

Here, Vaughn failed to demonstrate that the law regarding a prisoner's involuntary exposure to ETS was clearly established at the time of the defendants' alleged unconstitutional conduct. ... Thus, the district court properly found that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 suit, qualified immunity turns on whether the plaintiff adequately alleged a constitutional violation and whether the governing constitutional standards were clearly established when the alleged violation occurred.

Hamilton v. Peters · filed 1996-03-19

To determine if the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, we must consider first whether Hamilton has alleged adequately a violation of a constitutional right and then whether the applicable constitutional standards were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 liability for a correctional officer’s patronage dismissal when the right to avoid that dismissal was not clearly established at the time.

Flenner v. Sheahan · filed 1996-03-25

Thus, case law was unclear with respect to correctional officers. Accordingly, Sheahan is entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they possessed a clearly established right to avoid patronage dismissal.

A defendant sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional duty was not clearly established.

Stevens v. Umsted · filed 1996-04-01

Furthermore, the duty that Plaintiffs claim existed is so novel that, if the Court found it to exist, Umsted would be entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Hall v. Conklin · filed 1996-04-01

Next, even assuming that the November 2, 1994, mail policy is not constitutional, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for monetary damages because their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Government officials have qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages claims when their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Christian v. Fontenot · filed 1996-04-08

The trial court was clearly wrong in determining that qualified immunity did not shield the discretionary acts of Colonel Fontenot from liability for alleged constitutional violations.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from individual-capacity damages under § 1983 when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable official would know.

David Greene and Starna Hill v. William B. Reeves, A/K/A Brad Reeves (95-5586) Robert G. Stephens (95-5644) Thomas J. Sm · filed 1996-04-08

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials acting in their official capacities are protected from being sued in their individual capacities for damages if their actions did not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity protects prison officials from § 1983 damages when they could reasonably believe that race-based inmate classifications were related to prison security under clearly established law.

Ramirez v. Reagan · filed 1996-04-09

We find that the defendants could have reasonably believed that reviewing the subset of Hispanic inmates that they did was reasonably related to prison security.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing qualified immunity must show a violation of a right that was clearly established at the time; an inmate’s right to a religious diet was not clearly established in this circuit in 1989.

Moen v. Earl · filed 1996-04-10

When defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity the plaintiff bears a heavy two-part burden. ... In light of the above disparity, and the silence of the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit on this issue in 1989, we find that the law regarding an inmate's right to be provided with a religious diet was not clearly established.

In a § 1983 claim, once a defendant raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff must come forward with facts showing a violation of clearly established law.

Washington v. DEPT. OF CORRS. · filed 1996-04-16

However, once a defendant raises qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with facts which show that the defendant's alleged conduct violated the law and that the law was clearly established when the alleged violation occurs.

In a § 1983 action, once a defendant raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff must offer facts showing a violation of clearly established law.

Washington v. State ex rel. Department of Corrections · filed 1996-04-16

However, once a defendant raises qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with facts which show that the defendant's alleged conduct violated the law and that the law was clearly established when the alleged violation occurs.

Section 1983 claims against child welfare investigators are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the investigators’ conduct.

Tiemeyer v. Zaika · filed 1996-04-23

Thus, Tiemeyer’s claims fail because he, like the plaintiffs in Doe and Kiser, cannot show that the law was clear at the relevant time.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established and their conduct was objectively reasonable under existing law.

Veneklase v. City of Fargo · filed 1996-04-24

We hold that plaintiffs did not have a clearly established right on October 10, 1991, to picket in a route encompassing the Bovard residence and the two to three homes on either side of it. We further hold that the arrest of plaintiffs by the defendant officers was objectively reasonable in light of the legal rules in existence at the time the action occurred. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. We therefore conclude that the defendant officials are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that they violated a clearly established right.

Ponder v. Dianna Rodgers Ernest Smith · filed 1996-04-26

After a de novo review, we affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of defendants based upon qualified immunity, concluding that Ponder failed to demonstrate that defendants violated a clearly established right.

Deputy sheriffs acting within their discretionary authority have qualified immunity from individual-capacity § 1983 claims unless the plaintiff proves that they violated clearly established law.

Caldwell v. Brogden · filed 1996-05-10

There is no question that the deputies were acting within their discretionary authority as law enforcement officials. The burden then shifted to Caldwell to prove that they violated clearly established law, a burden that she failed to meet. Consequently, the deputies are entitled to immunity from Caldwell's § 1983 claims against them in both their official and individual capacities.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when unsettled law means the asserted right was not clearly established.

Pace v. Judith K. Moriarty, Individually and in Her Official Capacity James Kolb, Individually and in His · filed 1996-05-10

Because Pace’s due process claim hinges on an unsettled question of statutory construction, Pace did not have a clearly established right to receive due process before her termination, and the officials are entitled to qualified immunity on Pace’s claim for damages.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

DeWald v. Wyner · filed 1996-05-15

It is well settled that public officials are immune in their individual capacities from suits for damages "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known." ... On this record, defendants were plainly entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields government officers from damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established rights an objectively reasonable officer would know.

Lowth v. Town Of Cheektowaga · filed 1996-05-21

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government employees acting in their official capacity from suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless their conduct violated clearly established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known.

Defendants in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when no genuine issue of material fact shows that they violated a clearly established federal right.

Heidemann v. Rother · filed 1996-05-23

Because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants violated Cherry’s clearly established equal protection rights, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim as a matter of law.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against officers whose alleged race-based workplace harassment, if proven, violated a clearly established right.

Jemmott v. Coughlin · filed 1996-05-23

Nonetheless, we reject defendants’ assertion that they are entitled to qualified immunity from Jemmott’s § 1983 claim. Each individual defendant’s alleged conduct towards Jemmott, if proven, did amount to “severe and pervasive” harassment, which therefore violated Jemmott’s clearly established rights.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when no clearly established right to government protection against private violence exists.

Daley v. Hanover County ex rel. Hanover County Dept. of Social Services · filed 1996-05-24

There are no similar allegations of affirmative government action in the present case. Thus, Ferguson and Twisdale were entitled to qualified immunity to the extent they were acting in their individual capacities.

Social services employees sued individually under § 1983 have qualified immunity from a failure-to-protect claim when no constitutional duty to protect against private abuse was clearly established.

Daley v. Hanover County · filed 1996-05-24

Thus, Ferguson and Twisdale were entitled to qualified immunity to the extent they were acting in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Wilson v. Larry Kincheloe, Superintendent Ken Killian · filed 1996-05-29

The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for Wilson's claims regarding contact visits and rehabilitative services because, given established Ninth Circuit precedent at the time of the incidents, the defendants did not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment when the relevant constitutional right was clearly established and the record does not establish that their conduct was lawful.

Clemmons v. Steven J. Davies, Brent L. Duncan · filed 1996-05-29

Finally, because the constitutional right of access to the courts and the principle that the seizure of legal materials from a prisoner may violate that right were clearly established in June 1991, the record also does not support the district court's conclusion that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officers from a § 1983 claim when their conduct was objectively reasonable in light of a clearly established constitutional right.

Coleman v. Grapevine City of · filed 1996-05-31

In assessing a claim of qualified immunity, the court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. ... If so, the court must then decide whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable in order to determine whether he is entitled to qualified immunity.

A prison psychiatrist sued under § 1983 has qualified immunity for ordering emergency antipsychotic medication without a prior hearing when no clearly established precedent required one.

Hogan v. Carter · filed 1996-06-04

Because Hogan is unable to identify a single precedent prior to the complained of action (or, indeed, any precedent since) that even addressed the procedures constitutionally required before an antipsychotic drug may be administered to an inmate in an emergency, much less an authority holding that a full evidentiary hearing must be conducted before a physician, acting in accordance with sound medical judgment and with the prisoner’s best interests in mind, orders the administration of a psychotropic drug in such a circumstance, Dr. Carter is entitled to qualified immunity from the suit brought by Hogan.

Section 1983 defendants performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from damages when a reasonable official could have believed their conduct lawful in light of clearly established law and the information they possessed.

Rahim v. Gomez · filed 1996-06-13

We agree with the district court that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability for damages when reasonable officials could have believed that the conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law and the information that the officials possessed.

Officers sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Porter v. City of Burbank · filed 1996-06-13

The officers enjoy qualified immunity. ... Without any case deciding this issue, we cannot say that the parameters of § 12031(k) were "clearly established."

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff alleges a violation of clearly established rights and presents genuine factual disputes about the officials’ conduct.

Sherman L.G. Noble v. Janice Schmitt and Connie Stevens · filed 1996-06-14

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to § 1983 liability. ... We believe that he has sufficiently asserted violations of clearly established law, and that he has presented genuine issues of material fact in that regard. As a result, we believe that the district court properly denied Defendants qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from a pretrial detainee’s segregation claim when the right to a prior hearing was not clearly established at the time.

Kenny v. George Foster, Lt. B.E. Arbsland M. Barton H. Morse M. Fenoglio · filed 1996-06-14

Because it was not clearly established that a pretrial detainee had a right to a hearing before he could be placed in disciplinary or administrative segregation, appellees are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Government officials are shielded from damages in a § 1983 suit when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights known to a reasonable person.

Adesanya v. Prunty · filed 1996-06-18

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are shielded from liability for civil damages if their conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Act Up!/ Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir.1993).

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when an objectively reasonable officer could have believed the use of force was lawful under clearly established law.

Pittman v. Nelms · filed 1996-06-26

Under these circumstances, an objectively reasonable officer certainly could have believed that his decision to fire was legally justified. ... Thus Nelms is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued individually under § 1983 for discretionary acts have qualified immunity from damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUN. v. Romer · filed 1996-06-27

In § 1983 actions, government officials sued in their individual capacity, and performing discretionary, non-ministerial functions, are qualifiedly immune from liability for damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Qualified immunity supports summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of clearly established law.

Warwick v. Snow · filed 1996-06-27

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense against § 1983 claims alleging excessive force. ... We hold that Snow’s actions were clearly reasonable, rendering summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity appropriate.

Qualified immunity does not shield Section 1983 defendants who violate a clearly established constitutional right merely because they lacked knowledge of the law or acted in good faith.

Dean v. Thomas · filed 1996-07-01

In our opinion, when the law is clearly established, a defendant cannot utilize his lack of knowledge to establish immunity to liability. Lack of knowledge of the law and good faith do not preclude liability.

Municipal building inspectors have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim over an administrative home inspection when they reasonably could believe that clearly established law did not require further inquiry into a contractor’s authority to consent.

Montville v. Lewis · filed 1996-07-01

In light of this, the defendants reasonably could have believed that Rodriguez’s requirement of further inquiry did not apply to their administrative inspection of Mont-ville’s house. That is enough, we believe, to warrant qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 damages claim against an official when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Bell-Bey v. Williams · filed 1996-07-01

Therefore, the defense of qualified immunity bars Bell-Bey’s monetary claims against Williams.

A public official sued individually under § 1983 for a political dismissal has qualified immunity unless the unlawfulness of the dismissal was clearly established at the time.

Parrish v. Nikolits · filed 1996-07-03

Under our case law, Nikolits is entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity unless Parrish, Wetzel and Lucas can demonstrate not only that Nikolits violated Branti in firing them, but also that it was clearly established at the time that Nikolits's actions violated Branti.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for discretionary conduct that does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Cantrell v. DeKalb County · filed 1996-07-10

Under this standard, governmental officials performing discretionary functions will be shielded from liability for civil damages as long as their conduct does not violate the clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Government officials sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when the pleaded facts fail to establish a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Prater v. Dahm · filed 1996-07-17

In summary, Prater has failed to allege facts which, taken as true, establish a violation of Prater's clearly established constitutional rights. The prison officials are therefore shielded from liability.

State officials performing discretionary functions may invoke qualified immunity as a complete defense to § 1983 damages claims when their conduct does not implicate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

David L. Canedy, Jr. v. Peggy Boardman, Jeffrey P. Endicott, Karen Radtke, and John Bell · filed 1996-07-19

A state official can rely upon qualified immunity as a complete defense against claims under § 1983 when the claims pertain to the performance of discretionary functions, when his or her conduct in performing those functions does not pertain to clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known and when the claims are for monetary damages.

An official sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when his conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right that a reasonable person would have known.

Hanlon v. Lewis · filed 1996-07-23

We conclude that, in light of Lindsey, Weaver, and Miller, Lewis's decision to retroactively apply the provisions of DMO 91-03 violated a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields an officer from damages when he could not have known his conduct might violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Cofield v. Randolph County Commission · filed 1996-08-06

Thus we conclude that Hancock could not have known his actions might violate anyone's constitutional rights. He is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the officer does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Lowery v. Stovall · filed 1996-08-06

A defendant, such as Stovall, is entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct did not contravene "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when a reasonable official could have believed that the challenged conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

David N. OSOLINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lt. KANE, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants · filed 1996-08-12

Based on our analysis of relevant law, we conclude that in light of clearly established principles at the time of the incident a reasonable prison official could have believed that the failure to repair an oven as alleged did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, appellants are entitled to qualified immunity, and summary judgment must be granted.

A defendant is qualifiedly immune from § 1983 liability when the plaintiff cannot prove the significant injury required for an excessive-force claim under clearly established law at the time of the incident.

Daniel v. Harrison · filed 1996-08-15

Because Daniel failed to prove that he sustained a significant injury, as required by the clearly established law at the time of the incident, Harrison is qualifiedly immune from liability under § 1983.

Police officers have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they could reasonably believe their actions were lawful under clearly established law and the information they possessed.

Robinett v. Carlisle · filed 1996-08-15

Police officers are immune if they could have reasonably believed their actions to be lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the officers possessed.

Section 1983 damages claims against prison officials are subject to qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable official would have known.

Abrazinski v. DuBois · filed 1996-08-16

As such, the defendants are responsible in damages only if their actions violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... As the defendants are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, the claims for damages must be dismissed.

Public officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from personal liability under Section 1983 when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College · filed 1996-08-19

Thus, government officials performing discretionary functions, such as, in this case, demoting, evaluating and disciplining Cohen, are entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct; RFRA cannot retroactively make that right clear.

Kenneth Andrew FRIEDMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carroll SOUTH; Henry Risley, Warden; Lee Baker; Bob Williams, Defendant · filed 1996-08-20

The statute cannot be applied retroactively to make the law clear in such a way as to create liability for the prison officials, who are entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clear in 1985. In that year a reasonable official would not have understood that he was violating a free exercise right by denying Friedman a kosher diet.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Estate of Fortunato Ex Rel. Fortunato v. Handler · filed 1996-08-21

In light of the objective qualified immunity standards as applied by any of the City of Philadelphia panel judges, this Court holds both the county and the state police defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from section 1983 liability under all of the circumstances.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Hopkins v. Saunders · filed 1996-08-23

Clearly, there was confusion when Hopkins was dismissed as to whether a division director had a continued right of employment, and the officials are thus entitled to qualified immunity on Hopkins' due process claim.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the challenged conduct did not violate clearly established law.

V-1 Oil Company v. Means · filed 1996-08-26

We hold the truck inspection did not violate clearly established law and Means is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Schwartz v. Pridy · filed 1996-08-26

Pridy and Keck are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violated Schwartz's "`clearly established' constitutional rights." Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity turns on whether the plaintiff asserts a violation of a constitutional or statutory right and whether that right was clearly established to a reasonable official.

Garramone v. Romo · filed 1996-08-27

We analyze assertions of qualified immunity under a two-part framework: first we determine whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and then we decide whether that right was clearly established such that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known that her conduct violated the right.

Prison officials performing discretionary functions are immune from Section 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Reid v. Jerry Stover and Charles Noles · filed 1996-09-09

As an additional basis for affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we hold that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Prison officials who perform discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages when their “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

In a § 1983 suit, disputed facts about whether prison officials violated clearly established rights and acted reasonably can preclude qualified immunity at summary judgment.

Warren v. Keane · filed 1996-09-10

Thus, adjudication of the qualified immunity defense requires the resolution of genuinely disputed questions of fact and defendants’ motion must be denied without prejudice to being renewed on a motion for a directed verdict or on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Section 1983 defendants performing discretionary government functions are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Fisher v. Cocke County · filed 1996-09-12

Because the defendants were acting as government officials and were performing discretionary functions, they are entitled to qualified immunity unless their actions violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Qualified immunity shields officials from damages under § 1983 for discretionary conduct that violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Lyman v. Weld · filed 1996-09-12

The Harlow standard also applies in federal civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 affords officials sued individually for damages qualified immunity for discretionary conduct that does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Stack v. Killian · filed 1996-09-16

Officials who perform discretionary functions are generally entitled to qualified immunity from individual liability for civil damages so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable official would not recognize that enforcing a good-faith interpretation of a statute violates a clearly established right.

Emerson v. Borland · filed 1996-09-18

We believe that under these facts, no reasonable official would believe that the mere communication to independent law enforcement officials of a good faith interpretation of a statute or the instruction to arrest an individual who is violating the statute based on that interpretation could be a violation of Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Appellants were, therefore, entitled to be protected from liability by the qualified-immunity defense.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Ann Erwin, Dwight Bleke, Richard Moeller v. Richard M. Daley, Glen Carr, Kelly Welsh · filed 1996-09-18

To the contrary, qualified immunity shields government officials who are performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... The City officials before us in this appeal, however, are entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit when it was objectively legally reasonable to believe the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Dudley v. Johnson · filed 1996-09-19

A government official is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in a § 1983 suit if he can establish as a matter of law that it was objectively legally reasonable for him to believe that his actions did not violate a clearly established legal right.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Hopkins v. John L. Saunders, Kyle Vickers, Charles Ausfahl, Roy Temple, Beth M. Wheeler · filed 1996-09-23

Clearly, there was confusion when Hopkins was dismissed as to whether a division director had a continued right of employment, and the officials are thus entitled to qualified immunity on Hopkins’ due process claim.

A public school principal is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the alleged force violated students’ clearly established constitutional rights and no reasonable principal could believe it lawful.

P.B. v. Koch · filed 1996-09-27

The district court correctly denied Koch’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. The plaintiffs had by 1990 a clearly established constitutional right to be free from the force allegedly used by Koch.

In a § 1983 suit, once a defendant raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the asserted right was clearly established at the relevant time.

Mirek Magdziak, Administrator of the Estate of Tadeusz Glodek, Deceased v. Byrd · filed 1996-09-27

Once a defendant has raised the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the right he or she is asserting was clearly established at the relevant time.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established and reasonable officers could disagree about whether the conduct was lawful.

Brockway v. Shepherd · filed 1996-10-04

Reasonable officials could differ as to whether the definition adopted by the Superior Court did so in a valid manner, although this court concludes that it did not for purposes of the conduct at issue. Milazzo is entitled to the benefit of qualified immunity, and her motion to dismiss will be granted on that basis.

Public officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Shinn Ex Rel. Shinn v. College Station Independent School District · filed 1996-10-03

Additionally, because the Plaintiffs have failed to establish the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, the Defendants in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to a prison official who denies an inmate exercise based on speculative fears of contagion or unrest when the right to exercise was clearly established.

Williams v. Robert B. Greifinger, Deputy Commissioner and Chief Medical Officer of the New York State Department o · filed 1996-10-15

We therefore conclude that it would not have been “objectively reasonable” for a prison official to believe that the possibility of inmate or staff unrest, or of contagion, would suffice to trigger the safety exception to the right to exercise.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Bowie v. California Dept. of Corrections · filed 1996-10-15

As Ballard's actions did not violate clearly established law, he is entitled to qualified immunity and the district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue was proper.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established as applied to their conduct and a reasonable official would not have understood that the conduct violated it.

Andrews v. Crump · filed 1996-10-16

In summary, the undersigned concludes that the right violated in this instance—to be free from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment—was not clearly established at the level of application. Moreover, the contours of the right were not sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would have understood that filing the certificates of tax liability violated the Fourth Amendment. ... Therefore, Defendants Hughes and Crump are entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage of the litigation as to the individual and conspiratorial Fourth Amendment allegations of the complaint.

Police officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights or they reasonably believe their conduct is lawful.

Marshall v. Sullivan · filed 1996-10-17

In general, police officers are entitled to qualified immunity if (1) their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their acts did not violate those rights.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 political discharge claim depends on the objective reasonableness of the official’s conduct under clearly established law.

Phillips v. Nielsen · filed 1996-10-18

Nielsen's alternative claim that she is entitled to qualified immu- nity under Elrod-Branti principles suffers the same defects. The stan- dard for application of the doctrine of qualified immunity is the "objective reasonableness of an official's conduct with reference to clearly established law." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). It is not likely that a reasonable public employer would claim the need of compatible political affiliation on the part of an employee while at the same time disavowing political affiliation as a criterion for employment.

A public official is immune from damages under § 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Hernandez v. Jack O'malley, Individually and in His Capacity as State's Attorney of Cook County, Illinois, and Chr · filed 1996-10-21

Although the complaint survives the motion under Rule 12(b)(6), O’Malley is entitled to immunity from liability in damages. Until the right in question has been “clearly established,” courts do not demand that public officials dig into their pockets.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against public officials when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable official would recognize.

Buchanan v. City of Bolivar · filed 1996-11-07

As the previous discussion illustrates, plaintiffs claims against defendants Lawson and Weaver for violations of the Thirteenth Amendment are at the outset barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity because Lawson and Weaver’s conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages against a public official performing a discretionary function unless a reasonable official in that position would have recognized a violation of a clearly established, well-defined constitutional right.

Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. Massachusetts Department for Social Services · filed 1996-11-08

Public officials performing discretionary functions are immune from damage claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless a reasonable public official in the defendant’s position would have realized that her conduct violated a constitutional right whose existence was well established and whose contours were well defined.

Social services officials sued under § 1983 for child protection work are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Renn Ex Rel. Renn v. Garrison · filed 1996-11-12

We are of opinion and hold that the individual defendants acted within the authority granted by state statute. Accepting plaintiffs' alle- gations as true, we find as well that their actions were reasonable under the circumstances in relation to the boundaries of the family privacy right that had been clearly established. We hold, therefore, that the district court erred in deciding that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officials from individual-capacity § 1983 claims when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Levin v. Childers · filed 1996-11-20

It suffices to say that the interpretation advanced by Dr. Levin was by no means “clearly established” at the time of the brief suspension of Levin’s Medicaid payments. The situation presented here strikes us as precisely the sort of situation where the doctrine of qualified immunity ought to be applied.

Defendants in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the asserted right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Earl v. Thompson · filed 1996-11-20

Here, the record indicates that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Earl failed to demonstrate that he had a clearly established right to receive a pre-segregation hearing at the time he was charged with violating a disciplinary rule.

Public officials sued under § 1983 for unsafe foster placement lack qualified immunity when the child’s right to safe placement was clearly established.

KARA B. v. Dane County · filed 1996-11-25

We hold that the Dane County public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity, that the constitutional duty owed to foster children is based on a professional judgment standard, and that Dane County is not entitled to summary judgment.

A government actor has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if the act did not violate clearly established law or the actor reasonably believed it did not.

1996-11-27 · filed 1996-11-27

A qualified immunity defense is established if: (1) the government actor's action did not violate clearly established law, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for the government actor to believe that his action did not violate such law.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages against individual officials when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

J.M.R. v. County of Talladega · filed 1996-11-27

Under the circumstances alleged in the complaint and under the law existing at the time of the events in question, we hold that the § 1983 claim against the individual defendants cannot withstand a qualified immunity defense.

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Lokmar Y. Abdul-Wadood, and Mario Holsinger v. Dawn MacMillillan and Mark Levenhagen · filed 1996-12-04

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), because no constitutional right to be free from a vested month type of system was clearly established as a matter of law at the time of the alleged violations.

Officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct did not clearly infringe a clearly established right to family integrity.

Dietz v. Damas · filed 1996-12-05

The Second Circuit has repeatedly stated that defendants “enjoy qualified immunity from liability for damages if at the time of the pertinent episode it was not clear that the actions they took violated established constitutional rights, or if it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their actions did not violate such rights as were then clearly established.” ... Here, plaintiffs have not shown that the acts by defendants clearly infringed on the “nebulous right of family integrity.”

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on a Fourth Amendment claim when their conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Carboni v. J. Blair Meldrum, D.V.M, ph.d. D. Phillip Sponenberg, D.V.M., ph.d. Don Waldron, D.V.M. Rene Arms · filed 1996-12-06

The district court first held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Carboni's Fourth Amendment claim because they did not violate clearly established law. ... Having carefully reviewed the record, briefs, and contentions of the parties at oral argument, we can find no error in the district court opinion. We therefore affirm the decision of the district court on the opinion of that court.

Public officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the governing law was not clearly established or a reasonable official would have believed the conduct constitutional under established law.

Oase v. City of Tucson, Arizona · filed 1996-12-06

Public officials sued under section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity if: (1) the law governing the official's conduct was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, or (2) under the established law, a reasonable official would have believed that defendant's conduct was constitutional.

Section 1983 claims against government employees are subject to qualified immunity for objectively reasonable conduct that does not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Israel v. Abate · filed 1996-12-11

In any event, the individual defendants are protected by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government employees from liability for conduct which is objectively reasonable and "does not violate clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

A prison officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim for disclosing an inmate’s HIV status when the inmate’s asserted privacy right was not clearly established at the time and the disclosure was objectively reasonable.

Quinones v. Howard · filed 1996-12-11

It was objectively reasonable for an officer in 1991-92 to have acted in such a manner. Even if Quinones’ did have a privacy right under such circumstances, it cannot be said that any such right was clearly established. ... Therefore, I find that Marinaccio is protected by qualified immunity and, as such, the complaint is dismissed as against him.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 generally receive qualified immunity for discretionary acts unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Stack v. Killian · filed 1996-12-12

Officials who perform discretionary functions are generally entitled to qualified immunity from individual liability for civil damages so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 wiretapping claim when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether the officer listened to private calls that clearly established law protected.

Abbott v. Village of Winthrop Harbor · filed 1996-12-13

It was, thus, “apparent” within the contemplation of the touchstone of Anderson that, if proven, Miller’s conduct of recording and listening to or hearing the Plaintiffs’ private communications was unlawful. The defendant Miller’s motion for summary judgment on Count 11 is thus denied because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether an “actual” invasion of privacy occurred.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no clearly established law proscribed the specific conduct at issue.

Jackson v. Long · filed 1996-12-17

Absent clearly established law that proscribed Sheriff Long's specific conduct, Sheriff Long should not be subjected to suit.

Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 damages if their conduct did not violate clearly established federal rights or they reasonably believed it was lawful.

Maxwell v. City of New York · filed 1996-12-17

Appellants are entitled to qualified immunity if either the checkpoint in question did not violate clearly established federal rights, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), or it was objectively reasonable for defendants to believe their conduct was lawful, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039-40, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

In a § 1983 action, material factual and credibility disputes about whether officials complied with clearly established law preclude summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Smith v. Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 1996-12-18

Material issues of fact and credibility were present that precluded granting summary judgment to the prison officials on the ground of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 damages action against prison officials, a factual dispute over whether they complied with clearly established inmate-safety requirements precludes summary judgment on qualified immunity.

1996-12-18 · filed 1996-12-18

The same factual dispute that precludes a grant of qualified immunity--whether the prison officials were actually complying with the requirements of Finney at the time of the incident--also precludes summary judgment in favor of Smith on the issue of liability.

An officer sued under § 1983 for discretionary acts has qualified immunity only if the officer did not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Gardner v. Rogers · filed 1996-12-20

While it is true that police officers performing discretionary functions are generally entitled to qualified immunity shielding them from personal liability under 42 USC § 1983, such immunity exists only “insofar as [the officer’s] conduct does not violate ‘clearly established’ statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the relevant constitutional standards were not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

David v. Village of Oak Lawn · filed 1996-12-30

Thus, even if plaintiff’s arrest violated plaintiffs constitutional rights, the relevant constitutional standards cannot be said to have been “clearly established” at the time of the investigation. Accordingly, defendants Houk and Vorderer are entitled to qualified immunity.

A public official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for dismissing an employee based on political affiliation when the asserted First Amendment right was not clearly established at the time.

Conner v. McGraw · filed 1996-12-30

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are immune from liability "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Because the right asserted by Conner was not clearly established when McGraw dismissed her, McGraw is immune from suit.

A public official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Boreen v. Christensen · filed 1996-12-30

We hold, therefore, that Boreen’s property interest in her employment was not clearly established when she was constructively discharged in 1990 and, consequently, Youngblood is immune from suit.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on an asserted statutory right that was not clearly established when the challenged conduct occurred.

Kees v. Wallenstein · filed 1997-05-14

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... The individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims against Wallenstein is granted on this alternative ground as well.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted statutory right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Hall v. Griego · filed 1995-08-10

At that time, however, there were no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decisions defining the contours of prisoners' rights under the RFRA, nor was there clearly established weight of authority from other courts that could be said to have put defendants on notice regarding the wrongfulness of their conduct. Under these circumstances, defendants are shielded from pecuniary liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants may invoke qualified immunity when they could not reasonably have known at the time of their conduct that it violated a later-enacted statute.

Muhammad v. City of New York Dept. of Corrections · filed 1995-10-17

Since the case law on RFRA only began to develop after plaintiff Muhammad’s incarceration— and since the original complaint was filed about a year prior to the passage of RFRA— the individual defendants could not reasonably have been expected to surmise that their alleged conduct violated this new statute.

Qualified immunity protects a prison official from section 1983 liability for reasonably denying a statutory sentence reduction to a prisoner serving a concurrent life sentence.

Abdullah Seifuddin Shabazz, Also Known as Douglas Maurice Rogers v. Maurice L. Van Benschoten Robert Brown, Jr. Sherry L · filed 1993-06-24

Brown was entitled to qualifed immunity on these claims. The question of whether an official is protected by qualified immunity turns on the objective legal reasonableness of his actions, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established when they were taken. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). Brown did not apply the EPA to Shabazz because was he was serving a concurrent sentence of life imprisonment. This decision was objectively reasonable, as Shabazz does not have an established minimum prison term when his sentences are considered in the aggregate.

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 when the statutory duty they allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Price v. State of Hawaii · filed 1993-08-23

We agree that at the time the challenged actions occurred, the law was not clearly established that Hawaii's reversionary interest in the lot was "land" within the meaning of Sec. 5(f) and subject to its trust provisions. It therefore follows that the state officials did not violate clearly established law and are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for an alleged violation of 47 U.S.C. § 254(f) when that provision neither confers the asserted consumer right nor unambiguously imposes the asserted obligation on states.

Utility Reform Network v. California Public Utilities Commission · filed 1997-07-01

Because section 254(f) does not confer the right asserted by Plaintiff and because it does not unambiguously impose on the States the binding obligation asserted by Plaintiff, section 1983 does not provide Plaintiff a remedy for the CPUC’s allegedly unlawful decision to fund universal service programs with end-user fees rather than with financial contributions from telecommunications carriers.

Section 1983 permits eligible Medicaid recipients to enforce their right to reasonably prompt assistance under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8).

Doe v. Chiles · filed 1998-02-26

In sum, we hold that the appellees have a federal right to reasonably prompt provision of assistance under section 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act, and that this right is enforceable under section 1983.

Section 1983 allows eligible Medicaid recipients to enforce specific EPSDT rights to information, screening services, and corrective treatment.

Frew v. Gilbert · filed 2000-08-14

To conclude, the above-cited EPSDT sections of Medicaid Act create specific rights — to information, to various detailed screening services, and to follow-up or corrective treatment — which may be enforced by plaintiffs under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state statutory rights.

Haddad v. Fromson · filed 2001-05-02

A plaintiff may not base a section 1983 claim upon a violation of state statutory rights.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid recipients to enforce the Medicaid Act’s reasonable promptness requirement.

Bryson v. Shumway, et al. · filed 2001-10-23

Given the similarity between the statutory language in Albiston and the pertinent statutory language in this case, the holding in Lewis, and absent any precedent to the contrary, the court concludes that plaintiffs in this case may employ § 1983 to enforce the reasonable promptness provision of § 1936a(a)(8).

Section 1983 does not enforce rights under a statute that fails to clearly and unambiguously create an implied private right of action.

Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State · filed 2003-06-26

Though not a title VI case, Gonzaga reinforces the conclusion the Appellate Division correctly drew from various federal circuit court decisions: that where a statute does not clearly and unambiguously create an implied private right of action, it also does not create rights enforceable under 42 USC § 1983. Plaintiffs’ only argument to distinguish their case from Sandoval was that they brought their disparate impact claim under section 1983, but Gonzaga shows that this distinction is unavailing, as is plaintiffs’ further attempt to distinguish Gonzaga.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a statute with its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, including the Voting Rights Act.

Moseley v. Price · filed 2004-01-22

Moreover, it is well-settled that § 1983 cannot serve as a means to enforce a statute that has its own comprehensive internal enforcement scheme, as the Voting Rights Act clearly has.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a federal statutory violation when Congress has foreclosed that remedy through sufficiently comprehensive remedies or the statute creates no rights within the meaning of § 1983.

Miener v. State Of Missouri · filed 1982-02-04

A § 1983 cause of action does not lie (1) where Congress has foreclosed a § 1983 remedy through sufficiently comprehensive remedial devices in the underlying act, and (2) where the statute at issue does not create "rights, privileges, or immunities" within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking redress for a statutory violation to identify the right at issue and the statute conferring it.

McKnight v. Taylor · filed 2016-09-29

We also DISMISS Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint, which pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeks to redress Plaintiff’s injuries from "statutory civil violations.” As Defendant correctly argues, Plaintiff has failed to identify the right(s) she seeks to vindicate, or the statute conferring such right(s).

Officers sued under § 1983 for a warrantless arrest have qualified immunity when they reasonably believed the arrest was lawful in light of the unsettled law and the facts they possessed.

Henes v. Morrissey · filed 1995-06-27

We also conclude, however, the deputies could have reasonably believed in light of the uncertain state of the law and the facts they possessed at the time of the arrest, that the arrest was lawful. Accordingly, they are entitled to qualified immunity and the decision of the court of appeals is reversed.