42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 child protective services workers are qualifiedly immune from personal liability unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Stem v. Ralph Ahearn and Chris Card · filed 1990-08-13

To hold the child protective services workers personally liable here, Stem must pierce the qualified immunity that they inherently enjoy by demonstrating that the workers breached “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

A state employee has qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Hampton v. Motley · filed 1990-08-22

Once again, however, that issue escapes confrontation because, even if we were to decide that West Virginia officials were under a substantive due process duty to provide affirmative protection to these children, we would be compelled to conclude that Motley is entitled to qualified immunity. Because the issue of constitutional responsibility of state employees under circumstances such as those present in this case is still an open one, it follows that the contours of the substantive due process right Motley is accused of violating are not sufficiently clear to hold her liable for civil damages.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects officials performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violates clearly established rights; a factual dispute over whether the official committed the alleged violation can prevent summary judgment.

Laidley v. McClain · filed 1990-09-13

Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from suit insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Because a genuine issue of fact remains as to whether the defendant engaged in such conduct, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Claypool v. Boyd · filed 1990-09-24

Leeke and Boyd are entitled to qualified immunity to damage suits if they can show that their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... This lone, antiquated opinion from another jurisdiction does not clearly establish the law in this area. ... Therefore, under Harlow, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they knowingly require a prisoner to use a machine posing a serious risk of injury, in violation of clearly established protection against reckless indifference to prisoner safety.

Warren v. State of Mo. · filed 1990-09-26

Accepting as true the allegations of plaintiffs Complaint, as I must do in ruling a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, defendants are not shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity. For instance, if defendants required that plaintiff work on a machine in the furniture factory that they knew posed a serious risk of injuring plaintiff, they would have violated the clearly established prohibition against reckless indifference to a prisoner’s safety.

Government officials are immune from civil damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Lucero v. Dennis B. Hart, Rugh J. Papp, and Susie Mitchell · filed 1990-10-03

Government officials are immune from liability for civil damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim turns on whether the official’s alleged conduct violated the injured person’s clearly established right; uncertainty about the parents’ right to sue after his death does not establish immunity.

Steffenhagen v. Armontrout · filed 1990-10-11

Because the focus of the qualified immunity determination is on the nature of defendants’ conduct, the right that must be “clearly established” is Mark’s constitutional right to be protected by defendants from attack by other inmates. This right was clearly established at the time of Mark’s death. Whether Mark’s parents had a clearly established right to sue is irrelevant to the qualified immunity determination.

In a Section 1983 procedural due process claim, qualified immunity can turn on whether the inadequacy of available state post-deprivation remedies was clearly established.

Coriz v. Martinez · filed 1990-10-16

Coriz argues that the Harlow inquiry into whether the law was clearly established should apply only to the defendants' acts, not to the adequacy of the remedies available to redress those acts. We concede that this is an unusual application of qualified immunity, but we conclude that the district court applied the law correctly.

Qualified immunity protects officials from a § 1983 procedural due process claim when it was not clearly established that the state lacked an adequate post-deprivation remedy.

Coriz ex rel. Coriz v. Martinez · filed 1990-10-16

Coriz has failed to show that it was clearly established that New Mexico did not provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy.

Qualified immunity from § 1983 damages depends on an objective assessment of whether the asserted right was clearly established; defendants’ subjective beliefs do not affect that inquiry.

G-69 v. Degnan · filed 1990-10-17

Plaintiffs’ showing of additional evidence of defendants’ subjective beliefs about the relationship is irrelevant to this objective inquiry. As incongruous as it sounds, Anderson’s requirement of a “particularized” legal right means that, even though defendants may have subjectively perceived a standard employment relationship involving plaintiff’s property and liberty interests, it was objectively reasonable under the law at that time for defendants to conclude that their alleged breach of the agreement did not give rise to due process pretermination rights.

A local official sued under Section 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity from a public employee’s retaliatory discharge claim when the employee’s speech was protected by clearly established law and the evidence creates a genuine factual dispute over the alleged retaliation.

John W. Burgess Linda M. Burgess, Husband and Wife v. Pierce County, a Municipal Corporation Joseph Stortini Jane "Doe" · filed 1990-11-02

As the law stood when Stortini fired Burgess, discharging a public employee in retaliation for protected speech violated clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known. ... We conclude, as did the district court, that Burgess has made a sufficient evidentiary showing to create a genuine issue of material fact as to his allegations. ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, once a defendant raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing a violation of a clearly established constitutional or statutory right.

Martinez v. Harper · filed 1990-11-08

In sum, once a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff assumes the burden of showing that the defendant violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Qualified immunity is unavailable in a § 1983 claim when the constitutional rights at issue are clearly established, and the defendant’s good faith is irrelevant.

Broderick v. Roache · filed 1990-11-21

Because the constitutional rights at issue in this case are clearly established, the qualified immunity defense is not available and the good faith of the defendant is irrelevant.

Government officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless clearly established law would have put a reasonable official on notice that the challenged conduct was unlawful.

Nicholson v. Georgia Department of Human Resources · filed 1990-11-27

Unless it can be said that the state of the law was of such clarity that a reasonable official should have been on notice that his or her challenged conduct was unlawful, that official is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a public official when uncertain state law leaves the asserted constitutional property right not clearly established.

Allen Hopkins, Cross-Appellant v. John E. Stice and Texas Dept. Of Corrections, John E. Stice, Cross-Appellee · filed 1990-12-11

In sum, whether Hopkins enjoyed a property interest under state law in his position, putting aside the differences between a demotion and termination, sufficient to trigger due process protection was equivocal at best. Stice was entitled to immunity from the damage claim.

Officials are protected from personal liability under § 1983 by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Floyd Spruytte, Jr. v. Perry Johnson, Theodore Koehler, Robert Mallette, John Hawley, Audrey Lindstrom · filed 1990-12-11

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly determined that the defendants were entitled to protection from personal liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity, for the reasons stated by that court. The cases from other circuits, cited by Spruytte, do not support his argument that a clearly established right to the items in question existed at the time he was in administrative segregation.

Qualified immunity does not shield public officials from personal liability under Section 1983 when clearly established law made the constitutional violation apparent to a reasonable official.

Powell v. Basham · filed 1990-12-11

Qualified immunity shields a public official from personal liability for constitutional violations "if his conduct was objectively reasonable as measured by clearly established law." Darnell v. Ford, 903 F.2d 556, 562 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). ... These comments involve matters of public concern and are sufficiently similar to those found protected in Cox to establish clearly Powell's First Amendment right to engage in this speech. ... Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's decision to deny defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials are subject to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer District · filed 1990-12-27

The doctrine of qualified immunity affords protection against individual liability for civil damages to officials “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established with sufficient specificity at the time of their conduct.

Young v. Lane · filed 1991-01-07

If, indeed, there even exists a constitutional requirement that clergy for plaintiffs must be compensated, we cannot reasonably expect defendants to have known of its parameters at the time of their allegedly unconstitutional conduct. As such, the alleged violation has not been so "clearly established" at the time of the conduct as to remove defendants' qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields an individual school official from § 1983 liability for failing to protect a student from assault by fellow students when that constitutional duty was not clearly established.

Reeves Ex Rel. Jones v. Besonen · filed 1991-01-15

Even if the Plaintiff could show that the Defendants here did owe him a constitutional duty of protection against the assault by his fellow students, the doctrine of qualified immunity would shield the individual Defendant here, Arnold Be-sonen, from liability under § 1983. ... In this respect, the Court notes that the Plaintiff’s reliance on various police custody and Eighth Amendment prison cases do not “clearly establish” the Plaintiff’s constitutional right to state protection from physical assault under the circumstances of this case.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an official against a First Amendment claim when the unlawfulness of disciplining an assistant prosecutor was not clearly established at the time.

Finkelstein v. Bergna · filed 1991-01-29

However, this distinction was not sufficiently clear from the case law in 1982 to deny a reasonable official in Bergna’s position qualified immunity from Finkelstein’s first amendment claim.

Section 1983 damages are barred by qualified immunity when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of the officials’ conduct.

McKinney v. Pat Anderson Carol Ployer H.L. Whitley George W. Sumner John Nye · filed 1991-02-01

At the time the defendants acted, there was no clearly established liability for exposing prisoners to ETS. The defendants are therefore entitled as a matter of law to prevail on their defense of qualified immunity, and McKinney’s claim for damages must fail.

Section 1983 affords individual officials qualified immunity from damages when their conduct violates no clearly established constitutional right.

Boyle v. William Burke, Joseph Yergeau, Mark G. Kelliher, Peter Weeks, Ruth Griffin and Raymond Labrie · filed 1991-02-06

We next examine plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their constitutional rights to equal protection and procedural due process. We agree with defendants that they are entitled to qualified immunity from damages arising from these alleged constitutional violations. Not only have defendants violated no clearly established rights to due process and equal protection, we do not believe they have violated any such rights at all.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from damages when they violate no clearly established constitutional right.

Greg Oliver, Kate Oliver v. Evert Elkins, Elizabeth McNamara Dennis M. Straub, John Jabe, Robert Brown, Jr. · filed 1991-02-08

the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from damages liability because they violated no clearly established rights under the first, eighth, or fourteenth amendments. ... Upon review, we hereby affirm the district court's judgment for the reasons stated in the district court's order filed on August 3, 1989, and the magistrate's report filed on March 8, 1990.

Section 1983 claims against public officials are subject to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to identify clearly established federal rights that a reasonable official would have known the challenged conduct violated.

Achterhof v. Selvaggio · filed 1991-02-27

After carefully reviewing the supplementary materials, I conclude that dismissal of the section 1983 claims is appropriate. Plaintiffs have failed to cite controlling federal constitutional law setting forth clearly established rights that an objectively reasonable person in defendants’ position would have known were being violated by the child abuse investigation and surrounding circumstances.

Qualified immunity does not support dismissal of a Section 1983 forced-medication claim when the patient’s right to a decision based on professional judgment was clearly established and the record does not establish that such judgment was exercised.

Johnson v. Petro Coto, Leon Fields, Marry Myers · filed 1991-02-27

While the procedural protection required as a result of Washington v. Harper may not have been clearly established at the time of the incident in question, Johnson's right to be free from the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication unless the decision to medicate him was the product of the exercise of professional judgment was clearly established. Since it cannot be established from this record that the decision to medicate Johnson resulted from the exercise of professional judgment, it is not clear that the affirmative defense of qualified immunity will bar recovery by Johnson.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Roque-Rodriguez v. Hon. Jose Lema Moya · filed 1991-02-27

For the reasons stated, we reach solid ground in ruling that the defendants were entitled to immunity from civil damages in respect to the failure-to-promote claim.

Section 1983 affords government officials qualified immunity unless a reasonable official knew or should have known the challenged action violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission · filed 1991-02-27

Qualified immunity extends to every official action except those that any reasonable official knew or reasonably should have known violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities have qualified immunity from patronage transfer claims arising before the constitutional prohibition was clearly established by Rutan.

Walsh v. Ward · filed 1991-03-01

Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff is suing the Defendants in their individual capacities they are entitled to qualified immunity on any claims based upon the Court’s Rutan decision.

An official sued under § 1983 has qualified immunity for actions taken before a claimed permit entitlement became clearly established when it was objectively reasonable to believe the actions lawful.

Natale v. Town Of Ridgefield · filed 1991-03-05

Because we believe that there was a legitimate dispute as to whether the permit applications should have been granted, we find that Katz acted reasonably. Consequently, Katz is entitled to qualified immunity from any liability stemming from actions he took prior to Bogardus.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against officials for conduct that did not violate constitutional principles clearly established at the time.

Al-Alamin v. Gramley · filed 1991-03-06

More fundamentally, we cannot say that the defendants' activity, much of which preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Turner, violated constitutional principles well-established at the time. In reaching this determination, we must keep in mind that the "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

Government officials may assert qualified immunity from § 1983 liability, but summary judgment on that defense requires no genuine factual dispute over whether they committed the alleged violation of clearly established law.

Harris v. City of Pittsburg · filed 1991-03-18

The Supreme Court has held that government officials enjoy qualified immunity from section 1983 liability for actions performed in the course of their official duties. ... To survive a motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the plaintiff must allege a violation of clearly established law, and there must exist a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendant committed the relevant acts. ... Therefore, the district court was correct in holding that summary judgment was not appropriate.

Social workers sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity for conduct that violates no clearly established constitutional or statutory right.

Caldwell v. LeFaver · filed 1991-03-20

Therefore, because we find that defendants Farnsworth and Francetich have not violated any clearly established constitutional or statutory right, we hold that they are protected by qualified immunity for their conduct here.

In a § 1983 suit, town officials performing discretionary functions can claim qualified immunity in their individual capacities unless they violate clearly established rights.

Matlock v. Town of Harrah, Okl. · filed 1991-03-21

Defendants Mixon, Spaeth, and Jorski can claim qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities when performing discretionary functions as town officials, so long as their acts do not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Qualified immunity shields officials from § 1983 claims based on rights that were not clearly established at the time, but not from claims based on clearly established rights.

Long v. Norris · filed 1991-04-03

For the above stated reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court insofar as we find that qualified immunity should be granted to the wardens in regard to the plaintiffs’ claims under the fourth and first amendments, and we affirm the district court’s judgment denying the wardens’ qualified immunity against claims alleging violations of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

In a § 1983 damages claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that individual officials violated rights clearly established when they acted to overcome qualified immunity.

Farias v. Bexar County Board of Trustees for Mental Health Mental Retardation Services · filed 1991-04-12

Farias had the burden to show the individual defendants violated rights that were clearly established at the time of the conduct in issue.

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Hilliard v. City And County Of Denver · filed 1991-04-24

We hold, instead, that even if such a constitutional right exists, it was not clearly established in the law at the time of the defendants' actions thus entitling them to immunity from suit.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action shields officials from claims based on rights that were not clearly established, but does not shield them from claims based on a clearly established due process right.

Long v. Norris · filed 1991-04-29

For the above stated reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court insofar as we find that qualified immunity should be granted to the wardens in regard to the plaintiffs' claims under the fourth and first amendments, and we affirm the district court's judgment denying the wardens' qualified immunity against claims alleging violations of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Qualified immunity bars monetary relief under Section 1983 when the alleged constitutional deficiency was not clearly established at the time of the official conduct.

Wright v. Deland · filed 1991-04-29

We affirm the district court's finding of qualified immunity. Gerrish was not decided until 1990. Appellant's property was donated in 1988. We do not decide whether we agree with the conclusion in Gerrish that the underlying policy is unconstitutional because, even assuming the constitutional deficiencies of the prison policy, they were not clearly established at the time appellant's property was donated.

A public official has qualified immunity from damages under Section 1983 unless the federal right allegedly violated was clearly established when the conduct occurred.

Garcia v. Las Vegas Medical Center · filed 1991-04-30

A public official is not liable for damages under Section 1983 unless the right violated by the official was clearly established at the time of the violation.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established to a reasonable official at the time.

Wheaton v. Freddye Webb-Petett, Administrator, Adult and Family Services Division of the State of Oregon · filed 1991-05-01

While we conclude that Oregon law gave Wheaton a property interest, this question was fairly debatable in early 1988. Webb-Petett is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Wheaton’s claims for damages.

Officers sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted treaty right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Romero v. Kitsap County · filed 1991-05-01

We hold that the officers are immune because the nature and scope of the plaintiff/appellees’ right to gather shellfish is not clearly established.

State school board officials sued individually under § 1983 have qualified immunity only insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Peelman v. Delaware Joint Vocational School District Board of Education · filed 1991-05-03

Therefore, under the current law as clearly set forth in Davis v. Scherer, the defendant state school board officials will only be shielded from liability in their individual capacities for violations of § 1983 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established in the particular circumstances.

Crosby v. Reynolds · filed 1991-05-06

I conclude, therefore, that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s charge that her constitutional right to privacy was invaded.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct is objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time.

Nos. 90-1528, 90-1529 · filed 1991-05-08

Notwithstanding our concerns, we find appellees' overall actions were objectively reasonable. The statute under which they enforced the checkpoint had not been clearly established to be violative of Moore's constitutional rights at the time the checkpoint was executed. Given that the statutes authorized the stopping of the livestock trailers, appellees' actions fell within the apparent authorization of the statutes. The execution of the safety checks was insufficient to remove this authorization. Applying the test for qualified immunity as expressed in Harlow and further discussed in Anderson, we hold that appellees were entitled to qualified immunity and that summary judgment was properly granted.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their actions are objectively reasonable and no clearly established law showed that the actions violated constitutional rights.

Moore v. Webster · filed 1991-05-08

Notwithstanding our concerns, we find appel-lees' overall actions were objectively reasonable. The statute under which they enforced the checkpoint had not been clearly established to be violative of Moore's constitutional rights at the time the checkpoint was executed. Given that the statutes authorized the stopping of the livestock trailers, appellees' actions fell within the apparent authorization of the statutes. The execution of the safety checks was insufficient to remove this authorization. Applying the test for qualified immunity as expressed in Harlow and further discussed in Anderson, we hold that appellees were entitled to qualified immunity and that summary judgment was properly granted.

Officers have qualified immunity from personal damages liability under Section 1983 if reasonable officers in their position could have believed their conduct lawful in light of clearly established law.

HAMMER v. GROSS · filed 1991-05-13

These defendants are immune from personal liability if reasonable officers in their position, in light of clearly established law, could have believed that the actions they took were lawful. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). We conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable officers could so have believed at the time of Hammer's arrest.

Qualified immunity shields public officials from personal liability for damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violated a clearly established right.

Balaguer-Santiago v. Hon. Jaime Torres-Gaztambide, Etc. · filed 1991-05-14

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields certain public officials from personal liability for damages awarded in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, except where the challenged official conduct violated a “clearly established” right.

In a § 1983 suit, a court ruling on an official’s qualified immunity should identify the clearly established right and the facts creating a genuine issue about its violation.

Wegener v. City of Covington and Joseph Condit, City Solicitor, Lt. Joan Penick (90-5765) and Capt. Gilbert McClu · filed 1991-05-16

When ruling on qualified immunity, the district court should indicate the clearly established right at issue and the factual basis for its conclusion that a genuine issue exists as to the commission of acts violating that right.

Qualified immunity does not shield a defendant from a Section 1983 claim when his actions violate clearly established law.

Bonner v. Donal Campbell, Debbie Brown, Ernest Hiles, Stephen Box · filed 1991-05-20

Box's request for qualified immunity was properly denied as his actions were violative of the law clearly established in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974).

Qualified immunity shields public officials from § 1983 civil liability for political patronage practices short of dismissal when their illegality was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Martinez v. Monroig · filed 1991-05-28

As the challenged patronage practices were not clearly established as violations of federal law when the conduct was allegedly committed, the doctrine of qualified immunity insulates the defendants from civil liability.

State officers have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim unless they reasonably could have known their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Andrews v. Wilkins · filed 1991-05-31

A federal or state officer is protected by qualified immunity unless the officer reasonably could have known that his or her action would violate an individual’s constitutional rights. ... Whatever constitutional right to unhindered private rescue efforts Andrews may have had, it was by no means clearly established that such a right precluded police efforts directed at the safety of the potential private rescuer. ... Therefore, neither a Bivens theory constitutional tort claim nor a section 1983 claim will lie, so we need not determine whether the police were acting under federal or District of Columbia authority in order to determine which action would be appropriate.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the official could reasonably have believed the use of force was lawful under clearly established law.

Frohmader v. Wayne · filed 1991-06-07

The principles of qualified immunity entitle Wayne to summary judgment on the ground that, in light of the clearly established law governing the use of force, he could, as a matter of law, reasonably have believed that his use of force to restrain Frohmader was lawful.

Government officials sued individually under Section 1983 have qualified immunity for discretionary acts unless their conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights.

Rhodes v. McDannel · filed 1991-06-10

As to the officers’ individual capacities, they are each entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity exists for governmental officials who perform discretionary functions unless their conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights of another.

A public official is immune from damages under Section 1983 unless the federal right allegedly violated was clearly established in existing case law.

Swanson v. Powers · filed 1991-06-25

Only violations of those federal rights "clearly recognized in existing case law" will support an award in damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity from damages to a state official who reasonably enforces a presumptively valid statute when the asserted federal right was not clearly established.

Swanson v. Powers · filed 1991-06-25

Because the plaintiffs’ asserted rights were not clearly established and because Secretary Powers acted reasonably in enforcing presumptively valid state statutes, we hold that she is entitled to immunity from suit.

Government officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for discretionary acts if the acts did not violate clearly established constitutional rights at the time.

Eule FORD, Appellant, v. Leatrice J. DOWD; Alvin J. Wilson; City of Pagedale, Missouri, Appellee · filed 1991-06-28

rinally, as a Government official Wilson is entitled to qualified immunity for discretionary acts he performs if, at the time of his conduct, it was not “clearly established” that his actions would violate Ford’s constitutional rights.

Officials sued under § 1983 are protected by qualified immunity unless the right they allegedly violated was clearly established when they acted.

Smith v. Thomas A. Coughlin, III K. Collyer, Sr., Counselor, B/s/a K. Collyen, Counselor · filed 1991-06-28

To pierce the shield of qualified immunity, the right alleged to have been violated must have been clearly established at the time the purported improper action was taken.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from damages when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Rodi v. Ventetuolo · filed 1991-08-05

To recapitulate, we hold (1) that the Emergency Provisions of the Morris Rules did endow the plaintiff with a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population, (2) that the allegations of his complaint were, therefore, sufficient to withstand the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but (3) that because the liberty interest was not clearly established in mid-1987, the defendants were entitled to the benefit of their qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against individual officials are subject to qualified immunity when no clearly established law forbade their participation in an administrative tribunal alongside an arguably biased member.

Hicks v. City Of Watonga · filed 1991-08-19

We hold that appellants Green, Brown, Pendergraft, Norton, Patterson, Justice, and Swanegan are qualifiedly immune from damages on the property interest claim because no clearly established law forbade them from participating in the tribunal.

An official sued under § 1983 lacks qualified immunity when a reasonable official in the same position would have understood that the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Harper v. Campbell · filed 1991-08-23

In this circuit, a right is clearly established if any reasonable official in the defendant's position would have clearly understood that he had an affirmative duty to refrain from such conduct. ... Accordingly, the district court's opinion adopting the report of the magistrate denying qualified immunity is AFFIRMED.

Section 1983 permits individual officials to claim qualified immunity from damages when the law governing their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Profitt v. District of Columbia · filed 1991-09-03

The Court, therefore, holds that all of the individually-named defendants may claim qualified immunity since the law at issue was not clearly established at the time the search occurred.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

John Schleck and Robert Kraft v. Ramsey County, Suzanne Alliegro, Michael Moriarity and Kathleen Mahoney · filed 1991-09-26

Because the pre-termination notice and process given to Schleck and Kraft, coupled with the proffered post-termination hearings, did not violate their clearly established due process rights, Alliegro is enti-tied to qualified immunity on Schleck’s and Kraft’s Section 1983 claims.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from § 1983 claims for politically motivated dismissal of public employees when the employees’ First Amendment protection was clearly established before the dismissal.

Velazquez v. Gomez · filed 1991-09-27

Since the First Circuit has held that in 1985 it was clearly established that a transitory employee whose term had expired was protected from politically-based non-renewal, see Cheveras Pacheco v. Rivera Gonzalez, 809 F.2d 125 (1st Cir.1987), defendants’ qualified immunity defense fails as to all the plaintiffs.

In a § 1983 damages action, an official is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when factual disputes remain about conduct that could violate clearly established law.

Scott v. Denison · filed 1991-10-02

The affidavits and depositions submitted by the parties raise factual issues as to whether Denison deliberately disregarded the information he received regarding Scott's condition. Further, Denison has failed to show his actions were objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law as set forth in Gamble. Scott clearly has alleged and substantiated a sufficient claim of deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs to withstand Denison's motion for qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity warrants summary judgment for officials sued under § 1983 when the asserted constitutional rights were not clearly established in the particular circumstances, even if a violation occurred.

Pfoltzer v. County of Fairfax · filed 1991-10-11

The qualified immunity doctrine requires summary judgment even if plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated. ... Undoubtedly, plaintiffs have Fourteenth and First Amendment rights in the abstract; those rights, however, were not clearly established in the particularized circumstances presented here.

Officials sued for damages under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the law making their conduct unlawful was not clearly established when they acted.

Samad v. Leegan · filed 1991-10-15

The Board found Samad guilty of assault on January 21, 1988; therefore, because Hensley had not been decided at the time of Samad's disciplinary hearing, the requirements of Wolff were not "clearly established" at that time. Defendants are, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when they could reasonably believe their conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Baxter v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources · filed 1991-10-24

We conclude that the defendants could reasonably believe that Baxter's dismissal was lawful in light of their efforts. Thus, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment as long as there are no material issues of fact in dispute.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to officers who search beyond a warrant’s scope in violation of clearly established rights.

Hyburnia Husband v. Charles Bryan and Larry Saurage · filed 1991-10-28

So if Husband proves that Saurage searched beyond the well, Bryan and Saurage are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Government officials sued under § 1983 may assert qualified immunity when their alleged conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Cole v. Ruidoso Municipal Schools · filed 1991-10-29

The affirmative defense of qualified immunity is available to government officials in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A government official is entitled to immunity from liability if the official's conduct as alleged in the complaint did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Qualified immunity protects § 1983 defendants when the asserted state-law basis for a procedural due process right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Cole v. Ruidoso Municipal Schools · filed 1991-10-29

Even if it could successfully be argued that section 22-10-16 applies, the argument is not so conclusive as to prove that the school board reasonably should have known that Plaintiff was entitled to such protections. ... Accordingly, even if section 22-1-16 applies, Defendants are still entitled to qualified immunity.

Government officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity and dismissal before discovery when the plaintiff cannot allege a violation of clearly established law.

O'Bar v. Pinion · filed 1991-12-04

If the plaintiff is unable to allege a violation of clearly established law, the defendants who claim qualified immunity are entitled to dismissal before commencement of discovery, because this immunity protects government officials not only from liability but also from trial.

Section 1983 shields public officials from damages when they enforce a presumptively valid statute without violating clearly established rights.

Bailey v. State · filed 1991-12-06

A public official is not liable for damages in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the conduct complained of “violate[s] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... We hold that, absent the guidance of such opinions, defendants Powers and Boyles were entitled to immunity from civil liability for complying with a statute that was presumptively valid.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim depends on whether an official’s conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law at the time.

Larue v. Fairman · filed 1991-12-06

Whether an official is protected by qualified immunity turns upon the objective legal reasonableness of the action, in light of legal rules clearly established at the time the action was taken. The contours of the right allegedly violated must be sufficiently clear so that a reasonable official would understand that what he or she is doing violates that right.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity as a defense to damages claims against individual officials when reasonable officials could believe their conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Gossman v. Dr. David T. Allen Chris Gorman Irv Maze Darryl Owens and Harvey Sloane, Louisville & Jefferson Cou · filed 1991-12-12

Therefore, qualified immunity may be offered as a defense to Gossman’s First Amendment claim for damages. ... Accordingly, we hold that the individual defendants have qualified immunity from Gossman’s First Amendment claim for damages.

Government officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity if they reasonably could have believed their conduct lawful under clearly established law and the information they possessed.

Tracy Ray Vaughan, and Mark Koch, Donald Nelson, and Mark Osborne v. Ricketts · filed 1991-12-13

Qualified immunity is available to government officials if they could reasonably have thought that their actions were lawful in light of the clearly established law and the information they possessed.

Officials sued under § 1983 for opening inmates’ outgoing legal mail to judges or court clerks have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Stone-El v. Fairman · filed 1991-12-17

In the absence of an authoritative decision holding that an inmate’s legal mail addressed to a judge or court clerk may not be opened under any circumstance, we conclude that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and, accordingly, dismiss Stone-El’s amended complaint in its entirety.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing qualified immunity bears the burden of showing that the asserted constitutional right was clearly established when the official acted, including by presenting pertinent legal authorities.

Elder v. Holloway · filed 1991-12-19

First, we have said that a § 1983 plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the constitutional right purportedly violated was clearly established at the time of the official's conduct. ... Unless the plaintiff presents legal authorities that bear on the point, he fails to carry his burden.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing qualified immunity must identify the relevant statutory or decisional law showing that the asserted right was clearly established when the official acted.

Elder v. Holloway · filed 1991-12-19

For these reasons we conclude that the plaintiff in a § 1983 action, who bears the burden of showing that the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct, must identify the body of law which proves that the right was so clearly established that a reasonable officer would be alerted to its constitutional parameters.

A § 1983 plaintiff facing qualified immunity must show that the defendant violated law that was clearly established when the defendant acted.

Maryann P. Swan v. Wayne Riley Marty Kauffman and Richard Newton Sway · filed 1991-12-23

Once qualified immunity has been raised, plaintiff must come forward with facts to show defendant's conduct violated the law and the law was clearly established when the acts occurred. ... Ms. Swan failed to demonstrate the defendant police officers violated clearly established law which they should have known.

State officials sued for damages under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity and dismissal before discovery when the plaintiff cannot allege a violation of clearly established law.

O'bar v. Pinion · filed 1991-12-31

If the plaintiff is unable to allege a violation of clearly established law, the defendants who claim qualified immunity are entitled to dismissal before commencement of discovery, because this immunity protects government officials not only from liability but also from trial.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 even when its officials have qualified immunity because the constitutional duty was not clearly established when they acted.

Randy James Barber, Administrator of the Estate of Kenneth Robert Barber, Deceased v. City of Salem, Ohio · filed 1992-01-07

While officials may not be liable under section 1983 because their actions (or failure to act) were not constitutional violations according to clearly established law at the time the actions took place, a municipality may nevertheless be liable if the actions complained of rise to the level of constitutional violations in light of present law.

Qualified immunity shields public officials from damages under § 1983 when their conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.

Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, Texas · filed 1992-01-10

The protections afforded by the qualified immunity defense turn on the "objective legal reasonableness" of the defendant's conduct examined by reference to clearly established law. ... Finding that the defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable, we REVERSE the district court's denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment and REMAND for entry of judgment for defendants Newsom and Hamilton.

Officials sued under § 1983 cannot receive qualified immunity when the record lacks facts needed to decide whether their conduct violated clearly established law.

Mitchell v. Rice · filed 1992-01-10

Because the record in this case does not adequately address all the issues necessary to determine whether prison officials violated clearly established law, we cannot grant qualified immunity at this time.

State officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if reasonable officers could have believed their conduct lawful under clearly established law and the information available at the time.

James W. Mensh, Bennie P. Mensh v. R.A. Dyer, M.G. Tsoleas, Jr., C.M. Chidester, Jr., and Ted Banholzer, Gerald C. Fayed · filed 1992-01-13

The state police officers are entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity if they can establish that reasonable officers could have believed that their actions were lawful in light of both clearly established law and the information the officers possessed at the time.

A government official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Wright v. Whiddon · filed 1992-01-14

The legal right that Wright's parents seek to assert on his behalf--the right to press a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, asserted by a pretrial detainee against whom deadly force is used while he is attempting to escape--was not clearly established in September 1985. As a result, Ireland is entitled as a matter of law to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose civil damages on government officials protected by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Duffy v. Wetzler · filed 1992-01-15

Second, the court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ claims under 42 USC § 1983 was correct. ... The claimed right under 4 USC § ill was not "clearly established” until Davis, and so the individual defendants are "shielded from liability for civil damages.”

Qualified immunity shields officials from personal liability under § 1983 for politically motivated personnel actions short of discharge when the constitutional protection was not clearly established.

Castro-Aponte v. Maria Ligia-Rubero, Etc. · filed 1992-01-21

Similarly, we rule that as of the time suit was filed in this case, the law was unclear as to the extent of constitutional protections against politically motivated personnel actions which do not rise to the level of discharge; without more, the government officials are shielded from personal liability by the qualified immunity doctrine.

Officials lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim when clearly established law makes an adverse employment action taken in response to protected speech unreasonable.

Cheatwood v. City of Oxford · filed 1992-02-04

The court next turns to the qualified immunity defense asserted by Merrill and Smith. ... Therefore, the court concludes that defendants could not reasonably have believed that any adverse personnel action taken against plaintiffs’ in response to the newspaper interviews could be constitutional.

A § 1983 claim against individual defendants fails at the qualified immunity threshold when the asserted federal constitutional right was not clearly established when they acted.

Soong v. University of Hawaii at Hilo · filed 1992-02-11

Under Siegert the protected right must be clearly established. In the instant case, Soong has failed to satisfy the threshold inquiry set forth in Siegert, the existence of a clearly established federal constitutional right. Consequently, Soong’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the individual defendants must be dismissed.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable official would have known.

Barnhill v. Board of Regents of the UW System · filed 1992-02-12

More specifically, qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Section 1983 claims for monetary damages are barred by qualified immunity when the officials did not violate a right that was clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Carrelli v. Ginsburg · filed 1992-02-12

According to the dictates of Harlow v. Fitzgerald and Anderson v. Creighton, the Commission officials are entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages in this suit.

Qualified immunity protects a building inspector from Section 1983 liability when no clearly established law required him to notify a homeowner of a hearing right and his decision to restrict use of the home was objectively reasonable.

McGee v. Donald Bauer, Individually, David Bieniasz, Individually, and Village of Lombard · filed 1992-02-14

Our conclusion is that the district court correctly ruled that Bauer is qualifiedly immune from liability. McGee cites no case indicating that a building inspector or other similar official must provide notice of a right to a hearing. In addition, as concluded above, Bauer’s initial decision to attach the stickers is not constitutionally problematic. Bauer is hence protected by qualified immunity.

Government officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when the asserted right was unclear at the time or they reasonably believed their conduct complied with clearly established law.

Schmelz v. Monroe County · filed 1992-02-19

A government official will be protected from suit if the rights that he allegedly violated were unclear at the time of his actions or he reasonably believed that what he was doing did not violate clearly established law. ... Therefore, we conclude that the defendants' actions did not constitute deliberate indifference under the circumstances and that the district court erred in failing to grant the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the issues of qualified immunity and deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits liability for a pretrial detainee’s suicide when officials are deliberately indifferent to a substantial suicide risk; that rule was clearly established in the Seventh Circuit before 1986, defeating qualified immunity on a supported showing of such indifference.

Hall v. Ryan · filed 1992-02-28

Therefore Camic and Joseph together clearly established in our Circuit before 1986 the rule that prison officials will be liable under Section 1983 for a pretrial detainee's suicide if they were deliberately indifferent to a substantial suicide risk.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that they violated a clearly established right.

Richie v. Short · filed 1992-03-04

Because Richie has failed to show that defendants violated any clearly established right, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

A § 1983 qualified-immunity defense turns on whether the challenged conduct was objectively reasonable under the law clearly established when the alleged constitutional violation occurred.

Frohmader v. Deputy D. Wayne · filed 1992-03-12

In assessing a defense of qualified immunity, we must determine the objective reasonableness of the challenged conduct by reference to the law clearly established at the time of the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 damages claims against prison officials are subject to qualified immunity when their discretionary conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional law.

Gawloski v. Dallman · filed 1992-03-16

Prison officials performing discretionary duties are entitled to qualified immunity if their actions do not violate clearly established constitutional law of which a reasonable prison official would have known.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when no clearly established law makes their investigation of a fellow officer’s private activities bearing on job performance unlawful.

Dusenbury v. William F. Stovall, Charles W. Clark, Jack O'Neil · filed 1992-03-19

Given the state of the law, then, it cannot be said that any right of privacy in off-duty matters that impact on-duty performance was clearly established at the time of the investigation. Cf. Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1138-40 (9th Cir.1986) ("Thorne II ") (noting "continued disagreement about the nature and scope of constitutional protection" from an employer's inquiry into personal, sexual matters that have no bearing on job performance). For this reason, Clark and O'Neil are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants receive qualified immunity at summary judgment when the conduct supported by the evidence, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, did not violate a clearly established constitutional or statutory right at the time.

Mozzochi v. Richard S. Borden, Jr., Paul J. Gibbons, Richard S. Borden, Jr., Paul J. Gibbons, Town of Glastonbur · filed 1992-03-19

Therefore, when undertaking a qualified immunity analysis on a motion for summary judgment, a court should ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the conduct that may be proved at trial is conduct that, at the time it occurred, violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right. If the answer is no, the court should grant a defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Government employees sued individually under § 1983 for discretionary acts have qualified immunity unless they deprived the plaintiff of a right clearly established in the particular circumstances and recognizable to a reasonable person at the time.

Caron v. Silvia · filed 1992-03-23

The judge correctly set forth the scope of immunity protecting the defendants, sued as individuals, for discretionary acts they performed as government employees. Caron was obliged to show that the defendants deprived her of a “clearly established” right, that is, one, not in the abstract but based upon particular circumstances, of which a reasonable person would have been aware at the time.

A § 1983 defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity when she knew or should have known that her conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Diercks v. Lynda Durham, Lynda Musgrove James Wilde · filed 1992-03-23

We have no hesitation in concluding that the law was clearly established at the time of this occurrence, that Durham knew or should have known about the law, and that she was aware that she violated Diercks’ due process rights through her conduct. Durham is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from § 1983 liability for placing children in a foster home they know or suspect is dangerous when the children’s right to reasonable safety was clearly established.

Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Department Of Human Services · filed 1992-03-24

We are convinced that these cases clearly alerted persons in the positions of defendants that children in the custody of a state had a constitutional right to be reasonably safe from harm; and that if the persons responsible place children in a foster home or institution that they know or suspect to be dangerous to the children they incur liability if the harm occurs.

Police officers performing discretionary duties are immune from damages under § 1983 when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights a reasonable person would know.

Abbruzzese v. Mitchell Hammond Michael Hatzo Westerville Police Department City of Westerville · filed 1992-03-25

If police officers are performing discretionary duties and their conduct did not violate what a reasonable person would know to be clearly established statutory or constitutional rights, the officers are shielded by qualified immunity from liability for civil damages.

Qualified immunity shields a government official from § 1983 liability when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the official’s conduct.

Maust v. Headley · filed 1992-03-26

Hence, we conclude that Hardy actions were shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity and therefore summary judgment in favor of the defendants was appropriate.

Police officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when liability for their conduct was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Medina v. City & County Denver · filed 1992-03-31

We affirm summary judgment for the police officers based on qualified immunity. It was not clearly established at the time of the accident that recklessness could give rise to section 1983 liability, nor was it clearly established that the police could be liable to third parties for injuries caused by a suspect.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Mendoza v. Blodgett · filed 1992-04-01

Because the impropriety of the defendants’ conduct was not clearly established before this case, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on a politically motivated transfer in 1985 because the law prohibiting personnel actions short of discharge was not clearly established then.

Rodriguez-Pinto v. Tirado-Delgado · filed 1992-04-02

Since the First Circuit has unambiguously stated that the law regarding political discrimination short of discharge was not clearly established in our circuit until December of 1989, when Agosto-de-Feliciano came down, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when clearly established law required special precautions for a suicidal pretrial detainee.

Bragado v. City of Zion/Police Department · filed 1992-04-06

Additionally, it was clearly established at the time of Bra-gado’s March 30, 1988 arrest that the “deliberate indifference” standard applied to the handling of suicidal pretrial detainees, and that failure to take special precautions toward such detainees could violate that standard.

A § 1983 claim against an officer fails under qualified immunity when the plaintiff does not identify a violation of a clearly established right.

Washington v. Steve Gardalla, D.E.A. Detective Craig D. Corgan, District Attorney John G. Lanning, District Judg · filed 1992-04-06

Our review of the record shows Mr. Washington has failed to establish and identify the violation of a clearly established right. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed his case.

A § 1983 defendant has qualified immunity from damages when the constitutional right asserted was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Williams v. Nancy Anderson and S.D. Parwatikar · filed 1992-04-09

Thus, we hold that Nurse Anderson and Dr. Parwatikar are shielded from Mr. Williams’ claim for damages by the doctrine of qualified immunity; neither Nurse Anderson nor Dr. Parwatikar violated any constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the incident.

Section 1983 damages are unavailable against prison officials when it was not clearly established that their seizure of inmate property without a prior hearing violated due process.

Furrow v. Martin Magnusson, Etc. · filed 1992-04-10

If the matter is not readily apparent to this court at this time, clearly it would not have been apparent to a reasonable prison official in July 1989 that the due process clause would preclude the procedure followed in this case. We rule, therefore, that defendants enjoy qualified immunity from damages liability.

State employees sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity for discretionary acts unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights known to a reasonable person.

Orwick v. Fox · filed 1992-04-13

As state employees, these defendants are afforded qualified immunity from liability in the performance of their discretionary duties unless their conduct violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

In a § 1983 action, an officer must prove the affirmative defense of good faith after the plaintiff establishes that the asserted right was clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Gurno v. Town of LaConner · filed 1992-04-20

Good faith in a § 1983 action is an affirmative defense that a police officer must prove once the plaintiff has established that the rights claimed to be violated were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their discretionary acts do not violate clearly established constitutional law.

The Naturist Society, Inc., T.A. Wyner v. John Fillyaw, Individually and as Official Park Manager, John D. MacArthur Bea · filed 1992-04-22

In considering the Society’s damages claim, the district court must also bear in mind the applicable law regarding qualified immunity. Public officials are immune in their individual capacities from suits for damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.”

Section 1983 defendants performing discretionary duties have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Maust v. Headley · filed 1992-04-23

However, even if Johnson can be construed to implicitly support a liberty interest in unimpeded visitation, the subsequent amendments to the Criminal Code certainly brought the viability of this interest into question. Hence, we conclude that Hardy actions were shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity and therefore summary judgment in favor of the defendants was appropriate.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Mendoza v. Blodgett · filed 1992-04-28

Because the impropriety of the defendants' conduct was not clearly established before this case, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

State officials sued for constitutional violations under § 1983 may invoke qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

White v. Leon Taylor, Etc., Clell Harrell · filed 1992-04-29

Qualified immunity is available to state officials sued for constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Chief Harrell was therefore entitled to qualified immunity from individual liability.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a Section 1983 suit when they knowingly violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Cooper v. Dupnik · filed 1992-05-05

Here, members of the Task Force did not hesitate; instead they set out to and did violate rights which they knew the Constitution guaranteed. Qualified immunity is manifestly inapplicable, even on the appellants’ version of what happened.

Officers have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted basis for liability was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

No. 90-1166 · filed 1992-05-11

Our analysis leads us to conclude that it was not clearly established in 1986 (1) that recklessness could give rise to liability under section 1983 or (2) that a police officer could be liable under section 1983 for an injury caused not by the officer but by a suspect being chased by the officer.

Qualified immunity bars individual-capacity damages claims under Section 1983 when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established, but does not defeat official-capacity claims.

Paul W. Cagle Guy R. Epperson Steven A. McCullom Terry Norwood and Jeffrey L. Parker v. Gilley · filed 1992-05-15

Therefore, those rights were not clearly established in August and September, 1988 when the deputies in the instant case were not reappointed by Gilley. ... Likewise, granting Gilley the protection of qualified immunity does not affect the merits of any claims— either monetary or equitable — the deputies may possibly have against him in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Bradley County, Tennessee.

State officials sued personally under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established federal right.

Berman Enterprises, Inc. v. Jorling · filed 1992-05-19

Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), immunity for agency officials acting within the discretion granted them by the legislature will be found unless their conduct “violate[s] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Since even at this stage it is not clear that any federally created rights have been violated, the defendants are entitled to immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff opposing officers’ qualified-immunity defense bears the burden of showing that they violated a clearly established right.

Cross v. City of Des Moines, John Woolsey Dennis Rich, Cindy Louise Cross v. City of Des Moines, John Wools · filed 1992-05-28

But Cindy Cross has not responded — as is her burden — by showing that the officers in fact violated a clearly established right.

Government officials performing discretionary functions may have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability unless their conduct violates clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Houghton v. Carroll v. South · filed 1992-06-11

Government officials performing discretionary functions may enjoy qualified immunity from section 1983 liability for actions performed in the course of their official duties, “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed a warrantless probation search lawful under clearly established law.

Shea v. Karla L. Smith, Scott Baker, Robert Rumgay · filed 1992-06-11

The defendants acted within the contours of the law as it existed at that time, are entitled to qualified immunity, and summary judgment was properly granted them.

Officials sued personally under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff has not shown that they violated a clearly established right.

Cox v. Wallace Wilkinson John Wigginton John Runda Shirley Sharp Steve Smith · filed 1992-06-12

Defendants in this case were entitled to qualified immunity because Cox did not show that the lack of a revocation hearing in 1981 denied him a clearly established right.

In a § 1983 suit, once an official raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the law was clearly established.

King v. Marmon · filed 1992-06-15

Once a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff carries the burden of convincing the court the law was clearly established.

Qualified immunity limits § 1983 damages claims based on an asserted constitutional right that was not clearly established when the alleged conduct occurred.

Adams v. James · filed 1992-06-18

Officials pleading qualified immunity are liable for damages only if the contours of the right they are alleged to have violated are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” ... In the present case, there was no clearly established right that established a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of a personal constitutional right unique to law clerks at the time Plaintiffs filed their complaint. Nor does there appear to be such a right at the present time. Therefore, Plaintiffs would be entitled to qualified immunity on this issue.

A prisoner can overcome qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim against prison employees by pleading conduct under color of state law that deprived the prisoner of a clearly established constitutional right.

Onnette v. Reed · filed 1992-06-25

Appellant therefore pled conduct by persons acting under color of state law and the deprivation of the right against cruel and unusual punishment, which is a right secured by the Constitution. Appellant adequately pled a section 1983 claim alleging cruel and unusual punishment and met his burden of asserting that the TDCJ employees violated a constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.

In a § 1983 claim, once an official raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the official’s alleged conduct violated law clearly established at the time.

Powell v. Fournet · filed 1992-06-25

Once a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the law was clearly established at the time the incident at issue occurred and that the defendant's alleged conduct violated that law.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability under Section 1983 when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time or the official reasonably believed the conduct did not violate that right.

Cecere v. City of New York · filed 1992-06-26

The defense of qualified immunity shields governmental officials from civil liability if the official's conduct did not violate constitutional rights that were clearly established at the pertinent time or if it was objectively reasonable for the official to believe that the conduct did not violate such rights.

Qualified immunity does not shield a parole officer from a § 1983 damages claim when the asserted constitutional right was clearly established and no reasonable officer could have believed the alleged conduct was lawful.

Sepulveda v. R. Ramirez, Cresa B. Appleby, Parole Agent Jim Ludwig · filed 1992-06-26

We hold that Officer Ludwig was not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. At the time of Officer Ludwig’s alleged actions, Ninth Circuit law clearly established Sepulveda’s right to bodily privacy. Moreover, no reasonable parole officer would have believed that the action allegedly taken by Officer Ludwig was lawful.

A § 1983 excessive-force complaint survives a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity when its allegations sufficiently plead a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Talmadge McDonald Iii, a Minor, by His Mother and Next Friend, Glynis R. McDonald v. Haskins · filed 1992-07-01

Although McDonald’s somewhat skeletal allegations of wrongdoing skirt close to providing insufficient facts upon which to base a determination, we find that he sufficiently pleads the violation of a clearly established constitutional right to survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if they could reasonably believe their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Phifer v. A.L. Lockhart, M.C. Reed, Willis H. Sargent · filed 1992-07-15

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if they could reasonably believe their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

An official lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim for violating a public employee’s clearly established free speech rights.

Edwards v. Department of Transportation · filed 1992-07-22

Dugan is not protected by qualified immunity.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from section 1983 liability unless their conduct violates clearly established rights that a reasonable official would have known.

Taylor v. Richard K. Bowers, Carl Doerhoff, Kent Grewe, Maryland Butts, Helen Farr, Loren Stout · filed 1992-07-31

Government officials are shielded from liability under section 1983 for the performance of discretionary functions “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Government officials are protected from personal liability under § 1983 by qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a right clearly established at the time.

Rodriguez v. Coughlin · filed 1992-08-12

The qualified immunity standard as stated by the Supreme Court establishes that government officials may be protected from personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions when their “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). ... Accordingly, because the Fourth Amendment status of urinalysis testing was not “clearly established” in either March or December, 1988, when plaintiff was tested, the prison officials named herein are entitled to qualified immunity, and plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claims are dismissed.

Government officials performing discretionary functions are immune from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights a reasonable official would know.

News-Tribune v. Medure · filed 1992-08-13

Accordingly, the Court is constrained to find that the deputy is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ claim for § 1983 damages.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a prisoner’s claim based on one hour of weekly exercise when the right to more exercise was not clearly established.

Henderson v. Michael P. Lane and J. Gallassi, Curtis Henderson v. Michael P. Lane and J. Gallassi · filed 1992-08-13

Thus, there is no “clearly established” right to more than one hour of exercise per week, and the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from damages when reasonable officers could disagree whether their conduct violated a clearly established right.

Reed v. Phillip Clay Mike Barry John Jacobs, John McFadden Scotty Baesler · filed 1992-08-19

The official will be immune "if officers of reasonable competence could disagree" on whether the conduct violated the plaintiff's rights. See Gossman v. Allen, 950 F.2d 338, 341 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). ... Under these circumstances, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their arrest of Reed.

Police officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their discretionary conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Pritchett v. Alford · filed 1992-08-19

The test of qualified immunity for police officers sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is whether in performing discretionary functions, they have engaged in conduct that violates “clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim for a warrantless home arrest that violated a clearly established right.

Buenrostro v. Pablo Collazo, A/K/A Pablo Collazo Marrero · filed 1992-08-26

On this record, the appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim.

In a § 1983 suit, a qualified-immunity motion requires the court to determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence supports a violation of clearly established law.

Carrillo v. Rostro · filed 1992-08-28

Applying this proposition to a request for qualified immunity, we examine whether the opposing party has presented evidence to support a violation of clearly established law, so as to require a trial on the merits.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for a prison official who refers an inmate’s religious-material package for security review when that action does not violate clearly established First Amendment law.

Wiideman v. Leander · filed 1992-08-28

Given that prisons may enact regulations that infringe upon inmate's first amendment rights for security reasons, we agree with the district court that the mailroom official was entitled to qualified immunity for her action in referring the package to the prison review committee.

Qualified immunity protects state public defender officials from § 1983 damages when their conduct in arranging replacement appellate counsel did not violate a clearly established right.

Forte v. Sullivan · filed 1992-08-28

On this record, then, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct that preceded the Appeals Court's order requiring Forte to proceed pro se.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against an official protected by qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Murphy v. Denis Dowd Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 1992-08-28

Assuming, without deciding, that a prisoner’s involuntary exposure to ETS can state a constitutional claim, we conclude here that the district court properly granted Dowd summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Dowd is not required to guess how the law will be decided in the future, and at the time he assigned Murphy to a cell with a smoking cellmate, there was no clearly established constitutional right to be free from exposure to ETS.

Public officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims for discretionary conduct performed with an objectively reasonable belief that it did not violate clearly established rights.

Arrington v. County of Dallas · filed 1992-09-01

Qualified immunity bars suits for damages against public officials for conduct within the scope of their discretionary duties, performed with an objectively reasonable belief that the conduct does not violate the clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of another.

An officer sued under § 1983 for an arrest without probable cause is entitled to qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of the arrest was not clearly established under the specific facts confronting the officer.

Regina Warlick, Cross-Appellant v. Herman Cross, Cross-Appellee · filed 1992-09-02

Assuming, as the jury seems to have found, that probable cause was lacking under these circumstances, we cannot say that such a conclusion was the necessary result of clearly established law, thus Officer Cross is entitled to qualified immunity.

In § 1983 damages actions, qualified immunity protects individual officials whose conduct was objectively reasonable and did not violate clearly established constitutional law.

Jensen v. Gunter · filed 1992-09-09

Qualified or good faith immunity is an affirmative defense, on which defendants have the burden of pleading and proof. ... It provides a defense from money damages to individual officials for actions which were objectively reasonable and not in violation of clearly-established constitutional law.

Officials exercising discretionary authority have qualified immunity from Section 1983 claims unless their conduct violates clearly established federal rights that a reasonable person would have known.

De Quintero v. Aponte-Roque · filed 1992-09-10

Government officials exercising discretionary authority are entitled to qualified immunity in respect to claims under section 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”