42 U.S.C. § 1983

Discretionary state officials are immune unless they violate clearly established federal rights.

McLaurin v. Fischer · filed 1983-10-26

State officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages under § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or Constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Government officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights known to a reasonable person.

Owens v. City of Derby, Kan. · filed 1984-04-23

Individual government officials are shielded from liability for civil damages under section 1983 if their conduct, judged objectively, does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

A government official has qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages for deprivation of a specific constitutional right only when that right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Blake v. Berman · filed 1984-12-11

Defendants correctly assert that a government official cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving a person of a specific constitutional right unless that right was clearly established at the time the official took the action of which the individual complains.

Qualified immunity in Section 1983 actions turns on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct measured against clearly established law, not subjective good faith.

Hanzel Construction, Inc. v. Wehde & Southwick, Inc. · filed 1985-01-25

The “good faith” test urged by plaintiffs was rejected in Harlow, which determined that a right to a qualified immunity is to be determined through an objective test of the reasonableness of an official’s conduct measured by reference to clearly established law.

State officials sued under section 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Schultz v. Sundberg · filed 1985-04-30

Under the Harlow test, government officials are shielded from liability when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Although Harlow concerned federal government officials, the Court made clear that the same standard applied in suits against state officials under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights known to a reasonable person.

Wilson v. Schillinger · filed 1985-05-01

Government officials performing discretionary functions will be immune from liability for civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

State officials sued under section 1983 have qualified immunity when their actions did not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable official would have known.

Schultz v. Sundberg · filed 1985-04-30

In light of this, it would be impossible to say that the defendants’ actions in requesting and implementing the Rule 16(e) order violated clearly established rights. The defendants have a qualified immunity for their actions.

A public official has qualified immunity from section 1983 damages when the constitutional right violated was not one that a reasonable person would have known was clearly established.

Peters v. Moses · filed 1985-05-17

Applying this standard to the case at hand, I find that the Defendant Moses has successfully established a qualified immunity defense. There is no question that Moses was a public official performing a discretionary function. It requires a giant exercise of imagination to conclude that Peters’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause were rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Public officials lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for retaliating against an employee’s participation in a union grievance process when that prohibition was clearly established.

Gavrilles v. O'CONNOR · filed 1985-06-17

The impermissibility of retaliating against an employee for engaging in union activities was clearly established by 1982. Insofar as the filing and processing of grievances is a legitimate union pursuit, I rule that defendants reasonably should have known that retaliation against plaintiff for participating in that activity is constitutionally prohibited.

A state official does not lose qualified immunity under § 1983 merely by violating a state statute unless that violation also infringes clearly established federal rights.

Augustine v. McDonald · filed 1985-09-10

These specific failures to follow the letter of the Arizona statute do not constitute clearly established constitutional violations.

A Section 1983 damages plaintiff overcomes an official's qualified immunity only by showing that the right was clearly established when the conduct occurred.

Backlund v. Barnhart · filed 1985-12-17

A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.

Whether a right was clearly established for a Section 1983 qualified-immunity defense is a legal question for the court, not a factual question for the jury.

Lutz v. Weld County School District No. 6, William A. Mitchell, James B. Elliott, Winifred Gettman · filed 1986-02-10

Plaintiff’s failure to do so, however, does not raise a jury question, but rather calls for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants who have plead the defense.

A public official who unreasonably authorizes blanket strip searches of minor-offense arrestees may face Section 1983 liability when the unconstitutionality of that policy was clearly established.

Ward v. County of San Diego · filed 1986-03-03

With the foregoing in mind, we survey the legal landscape in May of 1981 and we conclude that the law was sufficiently clear in early 1981 so as to expose a public official who unreasonably authorized blanket strip searches of minor offense arrestees to civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Officers receive qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages when their conduct in executing a search warrant was objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Crooker v. Mulligan · filed 1986-04-16

Under these circumstances, and given the concededly uncertain state of the law as to what exactly may be seized when innocuous material is intermixed with relevant material, we conclude that the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable and that the doctrine of good faith immunity protects them from liability for damages.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 turns objectively on whether the official's conduct violated clearly established law, without regard to other circumstances.

Shouse v. Ljunggren · filed 1986-06-20

The reasonableness of the official’s conduct is measured by asking whether the conduct violates clearly established law; no other circumstances are relevant.

A § 1983 defendant cannot obtain qualified immunity merely by asserting subjective good faith when the constitutional rights at issue were clearly established and should have been recognized.

Scarpa v. Ponte · filed 1986-07-02

Because Scarpa’s due process and First Amendment rights were clearly established and should have been recognized at the time Scarpa was disciplined, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for any violations of those rights proven in this case.

A government official performing discretionary functions is immune from Section 1983 damages unless the official violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right known to a reasonable person.

Karriem v. District of Columbia · filed 1986-07-29

government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... No clearly established constitutional or statutory right to such retraining can be demonstrated.

Qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages is an objective legal question for the court and does not protect conduct violating clearly established rights known to a reasonable official.

McCullough v. Cady · filed 1986-07-30

The rule of qualified immunity is that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” ... This is a purely legal inquiry, to be determined by the court, and it is error to allow the jury to decide this issue.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 damages action asks whether the official violated a right clearly established at the time and whether the official reasonably should have known a violation was occurring.

Blanco v. Delgado · filed 1986-08-08

As applied, this objective qualified immunity test requires a two part analysis: 1) whether the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right “clearly established” at the time of the violation, and 2) whether the government official asserting the qualified immunity reasonably should have known a violation was being committed.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted rights present issues of first impression and therefore were not clearly established.

Olagues v. Russoniello · filed 1986-08-26

The appellants' complaint may be read to include a request for damages based on constitutional or statutory claims such as section 1983, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. We agree with the district court that the government officials involved in this action would be entitled to immunity from such damage claims. ... Under this objective standard, all the government officials are entitled to immunity. In the instant case, all of the appellants' claims under the Voting Rights Act and the first, fifth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution raise issues of first impression. Therefore, the government officials did not violate "clearly established" rights.

Officials executing an invalid administrative inspection warrant are qualifiedly immune from Section 1983 damages when governing statutes were broad enough that a reasonable person would not have understood the search and seizure to violate clearly established rights.

Mark v. Williams · filed 1986-08-27

Thus, under the broad authority to seize items under RCW 69.50.505, a reasonable person would believe that a seizure under the circumstances presented here would not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right. ... Under the facts of ... this case and the standards set forth above, Williams and Morrison are immune from liability for their actions in obtaining and executing the warrant. Therefore, there is no material issue of fact regarding Mark's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Officials receive qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages when the constitutional right they violated was not defined with sufficient clarity to be clearly established at the time.

Thorne v. City of El Segundo · filed 1986-10-20

However, at the time the events in this case transpired, we conclude that the cases had not delineated the parameters of this right to privacy with sufficient clarity to regard the right as "clearly established," and thus defeat the defendants' good faith immunity.

Individual defendants have qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages when uncertainty about how competing constitutional protections apply means the violated right was not clearly established.

Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools · filed 1986-10-24

In the case at bar, where Free Exercise rights clash with Establishment Clause protections, considerable doubt existed to whether the defendants’ actions violated clearly established constitutional rights. This Court’s initial appraisal of the situation was that the constitution did not protect the plaintiffs from exposure to offensive ideas and that the Board was not in violation of the plaintiffs’ rights as long as the Holt series was neutral on the subject of religion. While the application of the sequential reasoning required by the Sixth Circuit’s on remand has now lead the Court to a different conclusion, the individual defendants cannot be expected to have anticipated this ruling and must be accorded good faith immunity from money damages.

Officials have qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages when they act in good faith and reasonably rely on a judicial commitment order rather than violate clearly established law.

Johnson v. Dr. Joseph Bevilacqua James Dimitris, M.D. Miller M. Ryans, M.D. And Leo E. Kirven, Jr., M.D. · filed 1986-12-11

Because the defendants acted in good faith by reasonably relying on the order of the Circuit Court of Petersburg, the district court properly found that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 action based on federal constitutional law, state constitutional protections do not establish the federal right for qualified-immunity purposes, and a defendant is immune from damages when the governing federal law was not clearly established.

Rodriguez v. Nicholas Munoz Munoz, Executive Director of A.D.T. · filed 1986-12-18

As this section 1983 action is based on the claim that federal constitutional law was violated, the lower court erred to the extent that it may have relied on the protections of the Puerto Rico constitution and of the Puerto Rico courts in deciding whether or not it was clearly established, at the time of the firing, that plaintiff’s position was one where political affiliation was an appropriate requirement. ... Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred as a matter of law in denying Munoz qualified immunity. ... Defendant is immune from liability for money damages, and only plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief remains.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action turns on the objective question whether the official violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Anderson v. City of Hopkins · filed 1987-02-10

The ... Harlow ... Court established an essentially objective test, stating: ... Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their ... conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

State officials receive qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action unless the asserted constitutional right was clearly established and unquestioned when they acted.

Parillo v. Sura · filed 1987-02-13

Whether a right is “clearly established” for qualified immunity purposes is a question of law. ... The existence of the right must be unquestioned. ... A clearly established constitutional right to psychiatric treatment for civilly committed mentally ill persons did not exist in 1982.

Qualified immunity does not justify dismissal when a Section 1983 complaint alleges violation of clearly established law, though the defendant may obtain summary judgment if discovery reveals no evidence supporting that violation.

Robinson v. Beaumont · filed 1987-03-16

If the complaint fails to state a claim of violation of clearly established law the defense of qualified immunity is appropriate and the suit should not be allowed to proceed. On the other hand, if the complaint alleges violation of a clearly established law, the suit should continue. Should discovery fail to uncover evidence supporting the alleged violation sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. If discovery tends to support the allegations in the complaint or fails to disprove them, the matter must be resolved by the trier of fact.

Officials sued for damages over patronage dismissals receive qualified immunity unless it was clearly established that political affiliation was an improper requirement for the plaintiff’s particular position.

Rosado v. Zayas · filed 1987-03-20

If plaintiffs did not have clearly established rights to be free from patronage dismissals, then defendants are entitled to immunity from suits for damages, and the district court orders denying summary judgment on that ground must be reversed.

Qualified immunity turns on whether the law was clear in relation to the specific facts confronting the official, not whether a constitutional right was clearly established only at a high level of generality.

Samuel Colaizzi and Samuel Indovina v. Daniel Walker, (Former) Governor of Illinois · filed 1987-04-08

Our conclusion is that the test for immunity should be whether the law was clear in relation to the specific facts confronting the public official when he acted.

Officials receive qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages for mandatory urine testing when no controlling or other applicable authority clearly established that the testing violated the Fourth Amendment.

Feliciano v. City of Cleveland · filed 1987-04-10

Plaintiff has not come forth with any authority in this circuit or other authority to which defendants have been amenable, which would clearly have apprised them that their conduct infringed Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) and cases cited therein, defendants were immune from personally responding in damages.

State executive officers performing discretionary functions receive qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages unless they violate clearly established federal rights a reasonable person would know.

Chiriboga v. Saldana · filed 1987-04-29

In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a qualified immunity from liability for damages is available to state executive officers performing discretionary functions, “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 privacy claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged disclosure.

Borucki v. W. Michael Ryan, Etc. · filed 1987-08-27

In view of the foregoing, we hold that Ryan’s actions did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of privacy and that he is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages unless they violate clearly established rights a reasonable person would know.

Hood v. Alabama State Personnel Bd. · filed 1987-09-16

Governmental officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Officials receive qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when neither statutory nor case law clearly established the asserted right to reappointment at the time of their conduct.

Hawkins v. Steingut · filed 1987-09-18

Because Hawkins had no clearly-established right to reappointment under either the first or fourteenth amendments, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, in their individual capacities, from Hawkins’ claim for damages under § 1983.

State executive officers performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages unless their conduct violated clearly established federal rights known to a reasonable person.

Amado v. Riefkohl-Rivas · filed 1987-09-28

In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defense of qualified immunity from liability for damages is available to state executive officers performing discretionary functions, “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity protects a public official from Section 1983 damages when the allegedly violated right was not clearly established with sufficiently particular contours at the time of the conduct.

Nunez v. Luiz Izquierdo-Mora, Etc. · filed 1987-11-30

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects a public official from suit in a section 1983 damages action if, at the time of the challenged conduct, the right the defendant allegedly violated was not “clearly established.” ... To be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

State mental-health officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages for failing to provide psychological treatment when no such constitutional right was clearly established at the time.

Knight v. Mark J. Mills, Etc. · filed 1987-12-29

Thus, the question we asked at the outset of this analysis — whether Mills or Boucher or both violated Knight’s clearly established right to treatment — must be answered in the negative, inasmuch as no such established right existed in 1981. This being so, both Mills and Boucher are entitled to the protection of qualified immunity and cannot be held liable for civil damages for their alleged failure to provide Knight with psychological treatment after his recommitment to the Treatment Center in 1981.

Qualified immunity is unavailable in a Section 1983 action alleging the knowing use of excessive force while booking an arrestee because the arrestee’s constitutional right was clearly established.

Stevens v. Corbell · filed 1988-01-22

Since it is well-settled in this Circuit that knowing use of excessive force in booking an arrestee violates the arrestee’s constitutional rights, the defense of qualified immunity is unavailable to a police officer who the plaintiff has alleged thus used excessive force.

A municipality sued under Section 1983 cannot invoke qualified immunity, although individual officials may be protected from damages when the law was not clearly established.

Finkelstein v. Barthelemy · filed 1988-02-08

As to a defendant municipality, however, there can be no immunity defense.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action when the plaintiff does not identify a clearly established right that the official's conduct could have violated.

W.D.D., Inc. v. Thornbury Township, Chester County and Copeland, John G., Jr. · filed 1988-02-08

If WDD had no clearly established right, then Copeland is immune from suit and is entitled to summary judgment.

Government officials lack qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when they force a classified employee to resign in violation of clearly established procedural protections.

Roberto v. Ricardo J. Bordallo and David L.G. Shimizu · filed 1988-02-11

There is no question that if the plaintiff clearly was a classified employee, the appellants’ actions violated her well-established rights and a qualified immunity claim is of no avail.

State officials sued in their personal capacities under section 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable official would have known.

State Employees' Ass'n of New Hampshire, Inc. v. Lang · filed 1988-02-17

The qualified immunity defense is available to state executive and administrative officials whose official actions are challenged under section 1983. ... Because the individual defendants did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known-, the Court finds the defendants not to be liable in their personal capacities.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials are subject to qualified immunity for retaliation based on a public employee’s internal speech when its First Amendment protection was not clearly established at the time.

Greenberg v. Kmetko · filed 1988-03-09

Under the case law of this Circuit, the district court clearly erred in not applying the doctrine of qualified immunity to shield the defendants from liability for allegedly penalizing Greenberg for First Amendment communications made within the office. ... Thus, qualified immunity does shield the defendants from liability for any actions taken against Greenberg for on-the-job communications, and the district court improperly permitted the jury to find the defendants liable for penalizing Greenberg for communications (freedom of speech) made both within and outside the office.

Section 1983 claims against officials are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted property right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Shields v. Shetler · filed 1988-03-29

I also conclude that the doctrine of qualified immunity operates to bar the plaintiffs claims for relief under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In any event, I need not reach the issue of whether that section creates a property interest, because even if it does, no such property interest was “clearly established” in the law when the defendant disclosed the information. Thus the defendant is entitled to rely on the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims based on officials’ failure to protect a witness from private violence are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional duty to protect was not clearly established at the time.

Piechowicz v. United States · filed 1988-03-29

The other six counts are brought against the two individual defendants, Savage and Ryan, for violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Accordingly, because plaintiffs have failed to allege that the individual defendants violated any clearly established principle of constitutional law, this Court hereby reaffirms its earlier dismissal of the individual defendants in their individual capacities based on the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants cannot assert a good faith defense when the constitutional rights at issue were clearly established.

Holt v. Artis · filed 1988-03-30

In addition, because this case involved clearly established constitutional rights, the trial court should have determined well before trial that the good faith defense was not available to the defendants as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not permit summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts about a public employee’s duties determine whether a politically motivated firing violated clearly established rights.

Wrigley v. Basil G. Greanias, Individually and as State's Attorney in and for MacOn County, Illinois · filed 1988-04-13

However, even when assessed against these principles, we believe that the district court correctly concluded that summary judgment could not be granted here. As the district court noted, and as another panel of this court noted during the earlier appeal, the record reflects a factual dispute between the parties as to the nature of the job in question. ... He does not contend that, even if Mrs. Wrigley’s view of the facts is correct, the state of the law was such that he had reasonable grounds to believe that he could discharge her for political reasons.

Section 1983 defendants are qualifiedly immune from an employee’s procedural due process claim when the employee’s asserted property right in continued employment was not clearly established under state law at the time of dismissal.

Staneart v. Board of Trustees of Ransom Memorial Hospital · filed 1988-04-18

Where a factual issue must be resolved to determine whether Staneart had a right to continued employment, she does not have a clearly established right to employment of which the defendants should reasonably have known. Thus, the defendants are qualifiedly immune.

A public official sued under § 1983 lacks qualified immunity for politically dismissing a zone fire chief when the job is politically neutral and its protection from patronage dismissal was clearly established.

Figueroa-Rodriguez v. Aurelio Lopez-Rivera, Etc., Jose Manuel Figueroa-Rodriguez v. Aurelio Lopez-Rivera, Et · filed 1988-04-22

The long and the short of it, we think, is that a third-tier job in a public safety agency such as the Fire Service, organized along paramilitary lines, could not reasonably have been considered “grist for the political mill.” ... It follows that, on the record presently before us, Lopez did not enjoy qualified immunity.

Officials lack qualified immunity from § 1983 damages for a patronage dismissal when clearly established law protected the employee’s position from politically motivated firing at the time.

Fontane-Rexach v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority · filed 1988-04-22

In sum, we are satisfied that in May 1985 the law was sufficiently “clearly established” that a mid-level deskbound job such as this, replete with administrative tasks of a quintessentially nonpartisan nature, was not suitable grist for the political mill. Accordingly, appellants cannot be said as a matter of law to have been shielded by qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity unless their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Warner v. John A. Graham, Duainne S. Bourcy, Wayne J. Anderson and Weldee Baetsch · filed 1988-04-27

Warner brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against four employees of the North Dakota Department of Human Services: John Graham, Executive Director; Wayne Anderson, Deputy Director; Weldee Baetsch, Director of Personnel; and Duainne Bourcy, Regional Director of the Lake Region Human Services Center, a branch of the Department of Human Services. ... When performing a discretionary function, a government official is entitled to qualified immunity from suit if, at the time of his conduct, it was not “clearly established” that his actions would violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 damages claims against university administrators are subject to qualified immunity when the administrators could reasonably believe their conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Garvie v. Charles O. Jackson and George W. Wheeler · filed 1988-04-27

In this case, plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Provost and the former Dean of the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Tennessee. ... We find that defendants’ actions did not violate any of plaintiff’s clearly established rights and therefore affirm the district court’s judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.

A § 1983 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the asserted federal rights were clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Computer Sciences Corp. v. Ibarra · filed 1988-04-27

When the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is raised, the plaintiff has the burden of convincing the court that its federal constitutional or statutory rights were clearly established at the time of the questioned conduct. ... Named defendants are therefore entitled to the shield of qualified immunity and the plaintiff’s federal constitutional and statutory claims against them must be dismissed.

Officers sued under § 1983 are qualifiedly immune when reasonable officers could have believed their use of deadly force lawful under the clearly established law at the time.

Klein v. Lawrence Ryan and Frank Lombardo · filed 1988-05-16

Plaintiff Klein brought this action against defendants Ryan and Lombardo under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Under the clearly established law of Illinois on May 12, 1983, we find that reasonable police officers would have been justified in using deadly force to prevent the escape of a person they reasonably believed to have committed the forcible felony of burglary. Therefore, the defendants are qualifiedly immune from suit.

Officials sued under § 1983 cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity for a blanket policy of strip-searching misdemeanor arrestees when the policy's unconstitutionality was clearly established.

Walsh v. Franco · filed 1988-06-06

There have been no doctrinal developments altering the principles noted in Weber, and we therefore agree with the district judge in the present case that at the time of Walsh's arrest in 1985, the unconstitutionality of a blanket policy calling for strip searches of all misdemeanor arrestees was clearly established. Accordingly, appellants should have known that their policy was unconstitutional, they are presumed to have known it, and they were not entitled to summary judgment upholding their immunity defense.

In a § 1983 action, a district court must address an official’s qualified immunity defense before requiring discovery when the defense challenges whether the alleged conduct violated clearly established law.

Francis v. Coughlin, III · filed 1988-06-20

The district court rejected defendants' claims of immunity in a footnote, preferring instead to move the case forward to the discovery stage in order to reach the merits "with dispatch." While we understand the court's desire to avoid prolonged motion practice in what ought to be a relatively straightforward case, we are also mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition that "[u]nless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery." Id. (emphasis added).

Section 1983 damages claims against state correction officials are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional duty was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Hensley v. Wilson · filed 1988-06-20

We conclude, therefore, that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under Mitchell, because any violations they committed were not of “clearly established law.” They are therefore immune from claims against them for damages.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a state official for discretionary Medicaid plan decisions that violated no clearly established right.

Bethany Medical Center v. Harder · filed 1988-07-01

Dr. Harder contends that he is immune from liability under section 1983. ... For all these reasons, the court finds that Dr. Harder is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions in developing and implementing the state Medicaid plan and in making assurances to HCFA in regard to that plan.

Section 1983 affords state officials qualified immunity from damages when the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established at the time of their conduct and they acted reasonably without malice.

Harper v. State · filed 1988-07-07

The State's final argument is that Harper's suit must be dismissed because he has proved no violation of a "clearly established" constitutional right so as to overcome the State's qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... At the time of the State's actions at issue in this case, the law regarding prisoner's rights to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment was not clearly established. ... We conclude that there was no disregard of a clearly established constitutional right and that the State acted reasonably, not maliciously, and in good faith.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious prosecution or abuse of process claim when no corresponding constitutional right was clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Carey v. City of Fall River · filed 1988-07-15

Desrochers and Conroy have qualified immunity on the alleged constitutional violation arising out of the state law torts of malicious prosecution or abuse of process. ... Thus, the court concludes that no constitutional counterpart of malicious prosecution or abuse of process was clearly established in 1983 and, therefore, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Private defendants in wrongful attachment actions under § 1983 may assert qualified immunity when they did not know and reasonably should not have known that their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin · filed 1988-08-10

We find that private defendants are entitled to a defense of qualified immunity in wrongful attachment actions under section 1983.

Section 1983 allows private defendants in wrongful attachment suits to assert qualified immunity if they did not know and reasonably should not have known that their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin · filed 1988-08-10

We therefore hold that private defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in wrongful attachment suits under section 1983.

Government officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless their actions violate clearly established law that a reasonable person would have known.

Coen v. Runner · filed 1988-08-16

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that protects government officials from personal liability unless their actions violate clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known.

Executive officials have qualified immunity from individual damages liability under § 1983 when the asserted statutory or constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Giacalone v. Abrams · filed 1988-08-17

It is well settled that executive officials enjoy immunity from liability for damages if their actions do not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. ... We hold that the defendants are immune from individual liability for damages.

An official is immune from suit under § 1983 when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Latimore v. President and Bd. of Governors of University of North Carolina at Charlotte · filed 1988-08-24

We agree with the district court that Chancellor Fretwell was immune from suit under section 1983. The district court properly reasoned that Dr. Latimore had no clearly established constitutional right to have the same claims heard in federal court and by the Chancellor simultaneously.

Section 1983 defendants sued for damages in their personal capacities have qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Avery v. Powell · filed 1988-08-29

Moreover, there is no question that at the time defendants acted there was no clearly established constitutional right entitling plaintiff to be incarcerated in an environment free of tobacco smoke. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages in their personal capacities.

Officers have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when they could reasonably believe their conduct complied with clearly established constitutional law.

Beverly Osabutey and Ulysses Gaither v. Larry E. Welch and C.B. Kearney · filed 1988-09-16

We believe that the exigencies of the situation, coupled with the personal corroboration of a tip from a known and reliable informant, provide sufficient basis for a finding that the officers were acting within the protection of the qualified immunity discussed in Anderson.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action turns on whether the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established when the official acted.

Runge v. David Dove, Henry Kosters, in Their Individual and Official Capacities and the Douglas School District 5 · filed 1988-09-19

The standard for determining whether an official is protected is an objective one: whether the constitutional rights the defendant is claimed to have violated were clearly established at the time the alleged violation occurred.

An executive official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable official in his position would not have understood that his conduct violated a clearly established right.

V-1 Oil Co. v. State of Wyoming, Department of Environmental Quality · filed 1988-09-28

As an executive official, Steven Gerber is entitled to assert qualified immunity from this suit. ... Based upon the status of the law and the information he possessed, the court must conclude that a reasonable official in his position would not understand that he was violating a right.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim depends on whether a reasonable official would understand that the conduct violated a clearly established right, even if the availability of a private damages action is uncertain.

Del A. v. Edwin Edwards, Individually and as Governor of the State of Louisiana · filed 1988-09-28

We conclude, therefore, that the issues of whether the Child Welfare Act creates substantive rights enforceable under Section 1983 and whether if a private Section 1983 right of action exists, the right is limited to injunctive relief are not directly relevant to the question of qualified immunity. These issues implicate whether the officials will ultimately face liability for their actions, not whether the officials could understand that their actions violated the Child Welfare Act.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless the asserted right was clearly established by controlling precedent or, exceptionally, other decisions that unmistakably established the unlawfulness of their conduct.

Ohio Civil Service Employees Association v. Seiter · filed 1988-10-04

Our review of the Supreme Court’s decisions and of our own precedent leads us to conclude that, in the ordinary instance, to find a clearly established constitutional right, a district court must find binding precedent by the Supreme Court, its court of appeals or itself. In an extraordinary case, it may be possible for the decisions of other courts to clearly establish a principle of law. For the decisions of other courts to provide such “clearly established law,” these decisions must both point unmistakably to the unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and be so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that his conduct, if challenged on constitutional grounds, would be found wanting.

Section 1983 defendants may invoke qualified immunity when the constitutional right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Eng v. Coughlin · filed 1988-10-04

Milligan’s omissions in 1983 did not then constitute a violation of Eng’s “clearly established” rights, and Milligan could properly invoke the defense of qualified immunity from suit.

Section 1983 officials cannot claim qualified immunity from damages for violating a right that was clearly established to a reasonable official.

Domegan v. Michael v. Fair · filed 1988-10-20

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which, if successfully pleaded and maintained, discharges officials from the need to stand trial on damage claims. The defense is unavailable when an official has violated a “clearly established” right.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Zaire v. Dalsheim · filed 1988-10-25

This argument is persuasive. The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”.

Section 1983 defendants sued for damages have qualified immunity when the complaint fails to allege a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Landstrom v. Illinois Department of Children & Family Services · filed 1988-10-31

This discussion has been prolonged more than was really necessary, simply to demonstrate that plaintiffs have cited no cases (nor has this Court found any) even remotely suggesting either Harris’ or District Employees’ actions violated plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights. That being so, all individual defendants enjoy qualified immunity from a suit for damages.

Section 1983 does not give a public official qualified immunity for an adverse employment decision based on a public university employee’s speech on matters of public importance when the prohibition was clearly established.

Carrillo v. Colombi-Monguio · filed 1988-11-03

At the time of Carrillo's termination in September 1985, it was clearly established that a public university could not base an adverse employment decision on its employee's speech concerning matters of public importance.

Qualified immunity does not shield state child welfare officials from § 1983 damages for placing a child in abusive custody when the child’s right to humane custodial care was clearly established.

Doe v. Bobbitt · filed 1988-11-04

The defendants thus have no qualified immunity from any civil damages liability that may result from Michelle’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 officials have qualified immunity from damages unless the right allegedly violated was clearly established when they acted.

Estrada-Adorno v. Jose R. Gonzalez, Etc. · filed 1988-11-10

In a case such as this one, where a plaintiff asserts that a government official has subjected her to "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the official enjoys a “qualified immunity” from liability for damages. He is immune unless, at the time he took action, the right at issue was clearly established.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct; objective legal reasonableness is measured against the law then in force.

Walentas v. Lipper · filed 1988-11-25

Rather, Harlow and its progeny make clear that the objective legal reasonableness of an official's actions must be viewed in light of the action's relationship to the clearly established law at the time, and not to some more general standards of reasonable and appropriate governmental conduct. ... Thus, since the legal proposition argued by Walentas was not clearly established at the relevant time, Lipper's conduct was protected by qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity for violating clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rights through arbitrary or discriminatory zoning enforcement.

Brady v. Town of Colchester · filed 1988-12-01

We conclude that the appellees are not entitled to claim the defense of qualified immunity in the event that they are found to have violated the appellants' fourteenth amendment rights.

Officials sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known that their conduct violated a clearly established right.

Nesmith Through Nesmith v. Grimsley · filed 1988-12-07

The crux of the issue before this court is whether The Citadel defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. ... This court agrees with the magistrate that plaintiff has failed to raise any material issues of fact on the question of whether any person in the same position as The Citadel defendants “reasonably should have known” that their conduct — (i.e., the punishment that they gave to those cadets violating college rules) — would cause the plaintiffs constitutional rights to be violated. ... Therefore, this court adopts the magistrate’s recommendation that summary judgment be granted to The Citadel defendants based on the legal principle of qualified immunity established in Harlow and its progeny.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 generally have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights a reasonable person would have known.

Richardson v. Chevrefils · filed 1988-12-12

Under the doctrine, “government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory and constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when available state remedies make an alleged procedural due process violation not clearly established.

Birkenholz v. Gary Sluyter, Jon P. Schrage and Larry L. Muir, Daniel Keniston and Woodhaven Learning Center · filed 1988-12-13

Given the adequacy of Birken-holz’ remedies under state law, any due process violation by defendants could not have been apparent. Because any violation could not have been apparent, Birkenholz’ due process right was not “clearly established” for qualified immunity purposes. Therefore, in light of the requirements set forth in Harlow and Anderson, defendants are protected by qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional duty was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Pryor v. City of New York · filed 1989-01-27

Even were the Court to assume that a special relationship existed, qualified immunity would nevertheless attach. It was by no means “clearly established” in 1986-1987 that defendants owed a special duty to a person in plaintiff’s position.

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when they could reasonably conclude that their conduct violated no clearly established constitutional right.

Farkas v. Ross-Lee · filed 1989-01-30

Accordingly this Court determines that defendants could have reasonably concluded that the transfer of Farkas from the DFM to the DCHS and their subsequent false and malicious accusations did not violate any constitutional property or liberty interests.

Municipal officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 claims unless their conduct violates clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Murray v. City of Sioux Falls · filed 1989-02-08

Qualified immunity is available to municipal officials who perform discretionary functions so long as the conduct of the officials does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to government officials when the alleged constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Neu v. Corcoran · filed 1989-03-03

It would not be clear to a reasonable government official that the defamation Neu has alleged is a deprivation of a protected liberty interest that triggers due process requirements. We therefore conclude that Corcoran and Randolph are entitled to immunity with respect to Neu's federal claim.

In a § 1983 action, officers cannot obtain qualified immunity on summary judgment when disputed facts, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, could establish a violation of clearly established rights.

Duncan v. Storie · filed 1989-03-13

Duncan’s version of the arrest asserts violations of clearly established coh-stitutional rights and it would be improper to grant summary judgment before the finder of fact has determined these issues.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to officials who willfully or recklessly interfere with a juvenile’s clearly established right of access to the courts by withholding potentially exculpatory information.

Germany v. Carol Vance, Suzanne Germany v. Carol Vance · filed 1989-03-20

We also agree with the district court that the right of access was sufficiently clear in 1980, when the conduct in question took place, as to preclude qualified immunity for defendants, if they willfully or with reckless indifference interfered with such right.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action requires the court to decide whether the controlling legal standard was clearly established before the jury considers the official’s conduct.

Torner v. Reagen · filed 1989-03-22

The issue turns on whether, as a matter of law, the controlling legal standard was clearly established, a matter to be resolved by the court rather than the jury.

Qualified immunity cannot be resolved on summary judgment when disputed facts determine whether officers violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Duncan v. Storie · filed 1989-04-18

Duncan's version of the arrest asserts violations of clearly established constitutional rights and it would be improper to grant summary judgment before the finder of fact has determined these issues.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violated clearly established law at the time.

Raines v. Lack · filed 1989-04-20

Qualified immunity protects government officials from damage claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the plaintiff demonstrates that defendant’s actions violated a rule of law which was clearly established at the time of the violation.

A government official has qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages for refusing to reinstate a voluntarily retired employee when no clearly established right to reinstatement exists.

Morse v. Belsom · filed 1989-05-16

I find that Woodfork’s actions in refusing to reinstate the plaintiff were clearly protected by the superintendent’s qualified immunity.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their discretionary conduct did not violate rights clearly established enough for a reasonable official to know the required course of action.

Deckert v. Lang · filed 1989-05-23

Since the law of Wyoming, and for that matter the general law, contains no well-developed legal principles defining the obligations or procedures to be followed by prison officials in matters involving commutations, we hold that Deckert had no clearly established rights which were violated. We also hold that, in view of the record, Lang and Shillinger could not have originally known, by application of the objectively reasonable standard, what the law required of them. Consequently, they are both entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in their behalf.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on public officials acting within their discretion unless the particular right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of injury.

Danese v. Asman · filed 1989-05-26

Without a showing that the particular rights claimed to be violated were clearly established in law at the time of the alleged injury, we will not find public officials acting within their discretion personally liable for the violations of these rights.

State officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages for an alleged procedural due process violation when the governing right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Price v. Thomas H. Brittain, Jr. · filed 1989-05-31

However, we need not resolve those concerns here, since we hold, as the district court did, that the defendants’ qualified immunity precludes an award of damages on this issue.

In a § 1983 damages claim, officials are entitled to qualified immunity when conflicting circuit decisions and the absence of binding precedent leave the asserted right not clearly established.

Philip W.L. Lum v. Raymond Jensen, Robert Drake, and the State of California · filed 1989-05-31

In our view, the absence of binding precedent in this circuit plus the conflict between the circuits is sufficient, under the circumstances of this case, to undermine the clearly established nature of a right.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages when the asserted right was not clearly established with enough particularity for a reasonable official to anticipate that the challenged conduct would violate it.

Lanier v. Michael Fair, Etc. · filed 1989-06-01

Given the above chronology, we cannot conclude that in 1984 a liberty interest in a reserve parole date “was established with sufficient particularity that a reasonable official could anticipate that his actions would violate that right.” We therefore hold that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Lanier’s reserve parole date claim.

When officials raise qualified immunity on summary judgment in a § 1983 damages claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing a clearly established constitutional right.

Olzinski v. MacIona · filed 1989-06-07

Once the issue of qualified immunity is properly injected into a case by a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of the allegedly “clearly established” constitutional right.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 for race-conscious foster placement are entitled to qualified immunity when the relevant constitutional standards were not clearly established at the time of their actions.

J.H.H. v. O'Hara · filed 1989-06-23

Under the unique circumstances of this case, consideration of race in a foster placement decision made pursuant to a regulation requiring that a child’s racial and ethnic needs, among others, be taken into account is an insufficient basis for imposing liability. The constitutional standards for consideration of the racial, ethnic, or cultural needs of a child in foster placement were not so clearly established in 1984 that defendants should be forced to defend their decision in these damage suits.

Qualified immunity shields public officials from a § 1983 claim when the asserted federal right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Saquebo v. Roque · filed 1989-06-30

We can conclude that defendants are shielded from suit by qualified immunity because there was no law clearly established in plaintiffs favor.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for a campaign of petty political harassment when prior precedent clearly established that such retaliation was actionable.

Pieczynski v. Katherine Duffy and Roberto Maldonado · filed 1989-07-07

But the principle that a campaign of petty harassments can violate the First Amendment (unless de minimis) was clearly stated in Bart, and should have placed these defendants on notice that false accusations and petty humiliations, if orchestrated into a campaign of political retaliation, are actionable.

Officials sued under § 1983 cannot invoke qualified immunity against claims that they violated clearly established procedural due process rights.

Weaver v. NEW YORK CITY EMP. RETIREMENT SYSTEM · filed 1989-07-21

On plaintiff's procedural due process claims of burden shifting and inadequate notice of the right to be heard, I find that Eskalis and Herkommer may not invoke qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not support a directed verdict for officers when disputed facts could permit a jury to find that their conduct violated clearly established rights.

Robert Brown, Jr. v. Captain Baker Sgt. Heidle Skip Ball Joel Smith John Rolling and Patrick Floyd · filed 1989-07-24

Since the district court, confronted with this conflicting testimony, did in fact resolve issues of credibility and factual disparities, it improperly determined, on a directed verdict, that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity for alleged politically motivated reductions in job duties when the governing law was not clearly established.

Rodriguez v. Nazario · filed 1989-07-31

Since the Agosto de Feliciano panel expressly left open the question of whether qualified immunity was appropriate in cases of allegations of deprivation of functions we can only conclude at this time that the law was not and has not been clearly established on this matter.

Section 1983 permits liability for an official’s disciplinary suspension of a public employee for exercising First Amendment rights, and clearly established law defeats qualified immunity for that conduct.

Finkelstein v. Bergna · filed 1989-08-02

It was clearly established at the time of Finkelstein’s suspension that disciplinary suspensions based upon proper exercise of first amendment rights may give rise to § 1983 liability.

Individual defendants in a Section 1983 action have qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Carter v. City of Lorain · filed 1989-08-08

The various police officers and city officials named as defendants in the complaint enjoy qualified immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 unless their actions violated some constitutional right of Counts that was clearly established at the time the defendants acted.

Public officials sued personally under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless the particular right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the alleged injury.

Danese v. Asman · filed 1989-08-18

Without a showing that the particular rights claimed to be violated were clearly established in law at the time of the alleged injury, we will not find public officials acting within their discretion personally liable for the violations of these rights.

Section 1983 qualified immunity requires the asserted right to have been clearly established in the context of the defendant’s particular action.

Jerome Polenz and Donna Polenz v. Thomas Parrott and Russell Borland · filed 1989-08-22

For purposes of qualified immunity, it is not enough to assert that a broad or abstract right, such as the right to due process or the right to exclusive use and enjoyment of one’s land, is clearly established. Rather, the court must frame the right in the context of the particular action.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on foster placement officials for considering a child’s racial and ethnic needs under a regulation when the relevant constitutional standards were not clearly established.

J.H.H. and S.C.H. v. O'Hara · filed 1989-09-06

Under the unique circumstances of this case, consideration of race in a foster placement decision made pursuant to a regulation requiring that a child's racial and ethnic needs, among others, be taken into account is an insufficient basis for imposing liability. The constitutional standards for consideration of the racial, ethnic, or cultural needs of a child in foster placement were not so clearly established in 1984 that defendants should be forced to defend their decision in these damage suits.

Social workers sued under § 1983 for temporarily taking a child into protective custody have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Heidi Baker Evan Baker, a Minor by and Through His Guardian Ad Litem, Heidi Baker v. I.G. Racansky Mavis Knox · filed 1989-09-26

Given these circumstances, we cannot say that Racansky or Knox violated clearly established law when they took Evan into protective custody, and held him until the September 16th hearing.

Public officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when a reasonable official in their position would not understand that the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Miller v. Campbell County, Wyo. · filed 1989-10-02

Based upon the status of the law and the information possessed by these defendants, the court must conclude that a reasonable official in their position would not understand that what he was doing violated a right.

A public official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when the challenged conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Lane v. J.H. Griffin Muhammad Nubee, Chaplain Rae McNamara Director of Prisons James Woodard, Sec. Of Corre · filed 1989-10-06

Qualified immunity is the right to be immune from litigation where the specific action taken by a public official does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Officials sued under § 1983 are protected by qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights known to a reasonable person.

Williams v. H.F. Shiflett, Sergeant, Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 1989-10-11

The denial of witnesses in light of Williams's refusal to sign the citation did not violate any "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity merely because the alleged excessive force preceded Whitley, where the prohibition on unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain was already clearly established.

Haynes v. Marshall · filed 1989-10-12

There is no merit to defendants’ argument that they are entitled to a qualified immunity from plaintiff’s section 1983 claim because the actions occurred prior to Whitley. At the time of Haynes’ death, it was clearly established that the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constituted cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on state social workers for failing to protect a foster child when the constitutional duty to do so was not clearly established at the time.

Eugene D. ex rel. Olivia D. v. Karman · filed 1989-11-13

However, we are convinced that the differences are sufficient to require us to hold, under an objective legal reasonableness standard, that it was not clearly established at any time during the relevant period that such an obligation existed by virtue of the Constitution.

School board members are qualifiedly immune from § 1983 damages for discretionary decisions that did not violate clearly established rights.

Pierce v. Engle · filed 1989-11-20

The court finds that because the individual defendants were acting as school board members in voting not to renew the Pierces’ respective contracts and in deciding matters in connection with Preston Pierce’s leave of absence, and the Pierce’s rights in these matters, if any existed, were not “clearly established,” these defendants are qualifiedly immune from plaintiffs’ § 1983-related claims.

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted parental association right is too unsettled to be clearly established.

Willard v. City of Myrtle Beach, SC · filed 1989-11-22

In any event, the wholly imprecise “contours” of any alleged parental right to the companionship and association of their children cognizable under § 1983 constrains this court to conclude that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under the facts and circumstances of this case.

Qualified immunity protects a government official from a § 1983 claim unless the asserted right was clearly established when the official acted.

Francis v. Coughlin · filed 1989-12-04

To defeat an official’s claim of qualified immunity, the individual's right must have been clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

A state official is immune from damages under § 1983 if the plaintiff fails to establish that the official violated a clearly established right, but qualified immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief.

Markowski v. Edgar · filed 1989-12-15

Since he has not met his burden (nor could he have met it), the Secretary is entitled to immunity from a lawsuit for damages. The Secretary is not immune from a suit for prospective injunctive relief, and Markowski may still ask for attorney’s fees and costs, should he prevail.

A plaintiff opposing qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action must show a violation of a clearly established right before the defendant bears the ordinary summary judgment burden.

Powell v. Thomas J. Mikulecky, George Oates, Ruth Stephens and Wendall Gilliam · filed 1989-12-15

Only after plaintiff has shown a violation of a clearly established right does the defendant assume the normal burden of a movant for summary judgment of establishing that no material facts remain in dispute that would defeat her or his claim of qualified immunity.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the allegedly violated right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Katz v. Molic · filed 1989-12-21

Even if plaintiff’s complaint were read to allege a deprivation of a federal right, it would still fail to state a claim because defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. ... The grant of qualified immunity, then, turns upon whether there was a clearly established constitutional right of which the defendants knew or should have known at the time, a question of law which may be addressed by a motion to dismiss the complaint.

State officials have qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time or they reasonably believed their conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Smith v. Coughlin · filed 1989-12-28

State officials are immune from suits for damages alleging constitutional violations if it was not clearly established at the time of their acts that the interest asserted by the plaintiff was a protected one, or if it was objectively reasonable for the officials to believe that their acts did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Government officials performing discretionary functions are immune from § 1983 damages if a reasonable official could have believed their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Beeson v. Johnson · filed 1990-01-02

Qualified immunity shields from civil damages liability government officials performing discretionary functions so long as the officials' conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... For these reasons, we hold that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in respect of the damages claim against them, hence to summary judgment in their favor on those claims.

A § 1983 plaintiff bears the burden of showing, or sufficiently pleading on a motion to dismiss, that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established to overcome qualified immunity.

Landstrom v. Illinois Department Of Children And Family Services · filed 1990-01-09

As Judge Shadur correctly stated, see id. at 1274, it is plaintiffs' burden to show--or in this case, given the Rule 12(b)(6) context, to sufficiently plead--that the constitutional right was clearly established.

A § 1983 claim may be dismissed on qualified-immunity grounds at the pleading stage when the allegations, taken as true, fail to show a violation of a clearly established right.

Landstrom v. Illinois Department of Children & Family Services · filed 1990-01-09

This unusual procedural posture is not problematic, however, because the plaintiffs' initial pleadings themselves, taken as true, fail to adequately allege the violation of any clearly established right. Thus, dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is proper without additional fact development.

State social workers have qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages for foster-care injuries arising from 1974 to 1982 because a constitutional duty to protect foster children was not then clearly established.

Eugene v. Karman · filed 1990-01-22

However, we are convinced that the differences are sufficient to require us to hold, under an objective legal reasonableness standard, that it was not clearly established at any time during the relevant period that such an obligation existed by virtue of the Constitution. 10 It would therefore be improper to impose personal liability on these defendants on that basis.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit turns on whether the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law, without considering the official’s subjective intent in that inquiry.

Auriemma v. Rice · filed 1990-02-06

Therefore, whether Rice intended to enact an affirmative action plan is not relevant. Rather, it is the objective reasonableness of Rice’s actions in light of clearly established law that must be considered.

A public official has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 political affiliation discharge claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the discharge.

Monks v. Marlinga · filed 1990-02-14

Absent such authority, the Court concludes that the principle that political affiliation was not a requirement for the effective performance of the assistant prosecutor’s position was not clearly established in 1984, and in fact is not clearly established today. The defendant Marlin-ga is therefore immune from liability for the plaintiffs’ section 1983 political affiliation discharge claims.

An official sued under § 1983 for racial discrimination has qualified immunity when the challenged conduct did not violate clearly established law at the time, regardless of the official’s subjective intent to implement affirmative action.

Auriemma v. Rice · filed 1990-03-06

Therefore, whether Rice intended to enact an affirmative action plan is not relevant. Rather, it is the objective reasonableness of Rice's actions in light of clearly established law that must be considered. ... Thus, since Rice's actions meet the Lehman requirements that defined affirmative action law in this Court as of 1983, we believe that at that time it was not clearly established that Rice's transfers violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. As such, Rice is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs' racial discrimination claim.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 equal protection claim when the particularized right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Hynson v. City of Chester · filed 1990-03-08

The individual officers, however, possess a qualified immunity to plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987), the particularized right at issue here did not become clearly established until the Third Circuit’s decision in Hynson.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the official’s conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Redding v. Marsh · filed 1990-03-13

The court finds that Marsh is entitled to qualified immunity in that his conduct did not violate the clearly established constitutional rights of which reasonable persons would have known.

Individual defendants retain qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional violation was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Marvin v. King · filed 1990-03-28

Finally, it should be noted that the Court’s prior ruling granting summary judgment for the individual defendants on the qualified immunity issue remains intact. As is obvious from this opinion, the statutes and regulations involved in this case are less than lucid. Certainly it was not clearly established in January of 1985 that the defendants’ actions would violate Marvin’s constitutional rights.

Public officials have qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability unless clearly established law gave them reason to know their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Moore v. Hayman · filed 1990-03-30

In application to the instant case, it must be demonstratedthatthe investigatory group either knew or had reason to know that their actions were unlawful.

State officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity for official conduct that did not violate clearly established rights at the time.

Bohn v. Waddell · filed 1990-04-06

The Court grants summary judgment to all Defendants on Count 1, holding such Defendants have an immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the acts complained of were all done in the performance of official duty, and the Plaintiffs' rights were not clearly established before the Davis decision.

Section 1983 defendants receive qualified immunity when the constitutional rule governing their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Molinelli v. Tucker · filed 1990-04-09

In sum, we find that the fourth amendment status of urine testing of public employees was not "clearly established" in October 1986 and that prison officials requiring such tests at that time are therefore entitled to the protection of the qualified immunity defense.

Individual officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 action when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Virden v. Roper · filed 1990-04-23

In light of the foregoing, we hold that for the purposes of this appeal it has not been shown that the alleged violation of the state statutes in question constitutes a clearly established right under the federal constitution. See Mitchell, supra. It follows that the appellants in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity in this § 1983 action.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when his conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Juici-Rich Products, Inc. v. Lowe · filed 1990-04-23

Even if we are mistaken as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact with respect to the substance of JuiciRich’s claims, it is clear that Lowe’s actions in no way violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known, and therefore Lowe is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions.

Qualified immunity can protect an official from a § 1983 claim despite a clearly established right when extraordinary circumstances prevented the official from knowing the governing legal standard.

V-1 Oil Company, a Wyoming Corporation v. State of Wyoming, Department of Environmental Quality Steven P. Gerber · filed 1990-04-30

Because Gerber was prevented by extraordinary circumstances from knowing the relevant legal standard, he is qualifiedly immune.

Qualified immunity shields a defendant from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established and the defendant reasonably believed his conduct lawful.

McMillan v. Healey · filed 1990-05-21

Thus, the right plaintiff asserts to notice of the potential penalties for a charged infraction was not clearly established at the time defendant acted, and it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that he was not violating plaintiff’s rights by confining him to an SHU in accordance with state law.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable official would have known.

Amsden v. Thomas F. Moran, Etc. · filed 1990-05-29

Qualified immunity shields government officials wielding discretionary powers “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity can bar § 1983 damages against state officials when the constitutional rule allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Ross v. Hinton · filed 1990-06-04

Assuming arguendo that plaintiff Max Ross could prove a constitutional violation in the search of his office and desk, and assuming that he could prove that the defendants’ conduct actually caused this constitutional deprivation, where there was no clearly settled law at the time defendants acted, defendants may escape § 1983 damages liability under good faith immunity.

In a § 1983 claim, individual defendants have qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Jordan v. State of Tenn. · filed 1990-06-07

Even if this Court were to agree with the Second Circuit that voluntary residents of a state institution are owed a constitutional duty of safe conditions, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there was no such “clearly established” constitutional right at the time of Valion Jordan’s death.

An official sued individually for damages under § 1983 has qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known that the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Schalk v. Gallemore · filed 1990-06-20

Although the question is a close one, we cannot say that a reasonable official should have known that Schalk’s allegations raised matters of public concern as a matter of clearly established law. We therefore conclude that Gallemore is entitled to qualified immunity in a claim for damages against him individually.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing qualified immunity bears the burden of showing that the defendant violated clearly established law; identifying a legal test and alleging its violation is insufficient.

Hannula v. City of Lakewood and Jane Doe, and Don Lively · filed 1990-06-29

Because of these societal costs, once a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense the plaintiff assumes the burden of showing that the defendant has violated clearly established law. To overcome the defense, the plaintiff must do more than identify a clearly established legal test and then allege that the defendant has violated it.

A plaintiff pursuing a § 1983 claim against an official who asserts qualified immunity must allege facts showing a violation of clearly established law; the official may raise that immunity through a motion to dismiss.

Sawyer v. Creek County · filed 1990-07-18

Unlike other affirmative defenses, qualified immunity is not merely a defense to liability; it is also an immunity from suit. Qualified immunity protects a defendant from discovery, trial, and the other burdens of litigation. For this reason, prior to filing an affirmative defense, a defendant can challenge a complaint by filing either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment if the plaintiff has failed to come forward with facts or allegations that establish that the defendant has violated clearly established law.

A § 1983 complaint against a state official must allege facts showing a violation of a clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Sawyer v. County of Creek · filed 1990-07-18

We hold that Leona Sawyer's federal cause of action against Ramirez should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for a failure to allege sufficient facts showing a violation of a clearly established right.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing qualified immunity must show that the applicable law was clearly established by controlling or closely analogous authority.

Abouzari v. Foster · filed 1990-07-19

The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the applicable law was clearly established at the time in question, and the failure to establish a clearly existing constitutional standard derived from authority in a controlling or clearly analogous case does not create a jury question.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to an official whose conduct violated a clearly established right of a pretrial detainee to refuse forced medication.

Bee v. Greaves · filed 1990-08-02

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's ruling that the relevant law was clearly established and that Dr. Greer was therefore not entitled to summary judgment.