42 U.S.C. § 1983

Officials sued under § 1983 are immune from damages for an invasive prison medical procedure when the law governing its use was unclear.

Sparks v. Ronald Stutler and Manuel Largaespada · filed 1996-02-12

Legal uncertainty surrounding the use of invasive medical procedures in prison entitles these defendants to immunity.

A § 1983 defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when the assumed facts show intentional interference with prescribed medical treatment.

Erickson v. Birdsall · filed 1996-02-28

Because Carver's disregard of a doctor's order would show Carver intentionally interfered with prescribed treatment, see Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (explaining deliberate indifference), the district court properly denied Carver summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.

Government medical officials sued individually under § 1983 have qualified immunity when refusing requested treatment is objectively reasonable and violates no clearly established right.

Alston v. Howard · filed 1996-05-08

His refusal to provide Alston with “high performance” footwear, which was not specially made or even therapeutic, was as a matter of law objectively reasonable and not in contravention of any clearly established federal or constitutional right. Similarly, given that Nurse Howard had no authority to prescribe “high performance” footwear, her failure to do so is also protected by qualified immunity.

Probation department employees are qualifiedly immune from a Section 1983 claim based on an asserted duty to provide medical care outside prison when that duty was not clearly established.

Fields v. McKenzie · filed 1996-06-19

Once again, we need not decide this question because probation department employees are immune from suit unless they violate clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known. Bator v. Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1027 (9th Cir.1994). The obligation to provide medical care to criminal defendants outside prison remains ill-defined and defendants therefore are qualifiedly immune.

Officials sued under § 1983 for a prisoner’s medical care are entitled to qualified immunity when the prisoner does not allege facts showing that their conduct was objectively unreasonable.

Benjamin v. Harvey · filed 1996-07-12

Assuming that Benjamin's complaint alleges an Eighth Amendment violation against Hester and Young that extends beyond the day of his injury to his follow-up care, he has not alleged facts to demonstrate that Hester's and Young's conduct was objectively unreasonable.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment in a § 1983 prisoner medical care claim when, on the facts deemed triable, the defendants could not reasonably believe their conduct complied with clearly established law.

Jackson v. Duncan A. McIntosh David Victorino · filed 1996-07-18

Given the district court’s determination that there is a triable issue as to deliberate indifference, the doctors were not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that they could reasonably have believed their conduct did not violate clearly-established law.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to an officer where any constitutional duty to provide emergency medical treatment was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Pearson v. Oklahoma City · filed 1996-10-21

The district court properly concluded that Gray is entitled to qualified immunity. Even if the due process clause required Gray to provide emergency medical treatment beyond calling for an ambulance, that duty was not clearly established when the accident occurred.

Section 1983 generally shields government officials performing discretionary functions from damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Simon v. Norris · filed 1995-06-16

Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for money damages under Sec. 1983 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Government officials are qualifiedly immune from Section 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Sanchez v. Roth · filed 1995-06-22

Since the Court has determined that defendants did not violate any clearly established right of the plaintiff in denying his requests to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, defendants are immune from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

A prison official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Strauch v. Demskie · filed 1995-06-28

As of September 15, 1990 — the date of the second test — there was no clearly established right for a prison inmate to be free from a non-random urine test not based on reasonable suspicion. ... Thus, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Schroeder v. Kaplan · filed 1995-07-07

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity where the right which the officials have allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time the conduct occurred such that a reasonable person would have known that the conduct in question was unlawful.

Public officials sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when the law is clearly established and they could not objectively have believed their conduct was lawful.

Lambert v. Richard · filed 1995-07-10

Because Lambert’s remarks were so clearly protected, Richard and Ream were not entitled to qualified immunity. When the law is clearly established, public officials are immune only when they objectively could have believed that their conduct was lawful.

Government officials are immune from damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Pearson v. B.N. Newcomb · filed 1995-07-13

First, government officials are immune from damages unless their conduct violates clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit requires assessing whether clearly established law could have been violated given the information available to officials at the time.

Reece v. Groose · filed 1995-07-20

But as the previous discussion makes clear, we must do more than determine that the law was "clearly established" in the abstract; we must ask whether that law could have been violated given the information available to the defendants at the time.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Mujahid v. Mindoro · filed 1995-07-20

Because Mujahid's right to call a witness was not clearly established, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against an officer when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Romero v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1995-07-21

We hold that plaintiffs failed to show that DeFabbo violated a clearly established constitutional right and that DeFabbo, therefore, is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action requires the court to determine whether the plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation and whether the right was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred.

Manzano v. South Dakota Department of Social Services · filed 1995-07-25

In order to determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, we engage in a two-part analysis. ... First, we must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutional right. ... Second, we must determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

State officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Neal v. Shimoda · filed 1995-07-27

Likewise, the Court agrees that the State officials sued in their individual capacity are protected by qualified immunity. The Court has found that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Alternatively, any rights which may have been violated are not clearly established.

A § 1983 defendant may assert qualified immunity without admitting the plaintiff’s allegations; the threshold inquiry assumes the alleged facts and asks whether the allegedly violated right was clearly established.

Steven J. KELLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert G. BORG, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1995-07-28

Quite the contrary, defendants need not admit that plaintiffs factual allegations are true in order to assert this defense. The very heart of qualified immunity is that it spares the defendant from having to go forward with an inquiry into the merits of the ease. Instead, the threshold inquiry is whether, assuming that what the plaintiff asserts the facts to be is true, any allegedly violated right was clearly established.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim can be defeated by significant psychological injury when clearly established law recognized that injury at the time of the conduct.

Mary Elizabeth Dunn, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Mike Denk, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee · filed 1995-08-01

Denk insists, however, that psychological harm, no matter how severe, did not constitute significant injury under clearly established law at the time of the arrest. We are not persuaded. It was clearly established before January 1990, when Denk arrested Dunn, that both physical and psychological injuries were compensable in civil rights actions.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from personal damages liability when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Van Dyke v. Washington · filed 1995-08-03

I find that in 1992 it was not clearly established that the CJCC was a bona fide religion entitled to first amendment protection. Indeed, I find that the question remains unsettled in 1995. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from personal liability and from money damages on all aspects of the plaintiff's free exercise claim.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim turns on the law clearly established when the official acted; a later decision narrowing the right does not create an immunity defense.

Leslie v. Doyle · filed 1995-08-10

At the time that Doyle acted (which is the relevant date for qualified immunity purposes), it had clearly been established that placing an inmate into segregative custody for no reason violated the inmate's constitutional rights. ... It has only been afterward, through the Sandin decision, that what had previously been thought to be clearly established has been ruled otherwise — and that sequence is not the stuff of which a qualified immunity defense may be fashioned.

Individual defendants in a § 1983 action are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts bear on the objective reasonableness of their conduct under clearly established law.

VanScoy v. Town of Bethel Heights, Ark. · filed 1995-08-14

As to Howard and Butler, we agree with the district court that VanScoy established a dispute as to facts relevant to the objective reasonableness of Howard's and Butler's actions in light of clearly-established law.

Officials sued for damages under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when their challenged conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Spradley v. Martin · filed 1995-08-21

Further, even if the application of the established state procedure did result in a constitutional violation, Defendants Glover and Roberts are entitled to qualified immunity. Whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity depends upon whether, in taking the challenged action, they violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Romero v. Board Of County Commissioners Of The County Of Lake · filed 1995-08-22

We hold that plaintiffs failed to show that DeFabbo violated a clearly established constitutional right and that DeFabbo, therefore, is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Muslim v. Frame · filed 1995-08-23

Because it was not then clearly established that such rules violate free exercise, if indeed free exercise is now violated by such rules, the defendants are immune from claims for damages based on the enforcement of these rules.

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that their conduct violated clearly established law.

Gene F. Lenz, and v. Roger W. Dewey and Sue E. Mecca, And · filed 1995-08-24

There is no evidence that the Defendants violated any law, much less any evidence that they knew or should have known that their warnings to the board triggered Mr. Lenz’s right to due process. Furthermore, there is no evidence that they did not act in good faith. Hence, qualified immunity should have protected them from liability.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when their alleged conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right of access to the courts.

Bremiller v. Cleveland Psychiatric Institute · filed 1995-08-25

Consequently, by allegedly destroying documents related to Plaintiffs complaint, Defendants violated a clearly established right of the Plaintiff to access to the courts. Defendants’ alleged actions defeat any entitlement to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 shields an official from individual-capacity liability through qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Sizemore v. Randall Aliff, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Wyoming County, West Virginia · filed 1995-08-25

Because in 1992 it was not clearly established whether a tax deputy could be fired for political patronage, we find that the district court erred in denying individual-capacity qualified immunity status to Aliff, and remand for the district court to enter an order granting Aliff qualified immunity in his individual capacity and to proceed with this case against Aliff in his official capacity on the remaining issues.

Qualified immunity does not protect a government official from a § 1983 claim if the official took adverse employment action against a public employee for protected political activity when the prohibition was clearly established.

Neice v. Sawyer · filed 1995-08-28

If indeed Neice could prove that impermissible criteria motivated Judge Sawyer to take adverse employment actions against him, there could be no qualified immunity for that conduct.

Government officers sued for damages under Section 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Brewer v. Fawn D. Carl · filed 1995-08-31

This immunity shields a state official from liability for damages unless his conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 732 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Brewer has not established the violation of any statutory or constitutional right and, thus, has failed to overcome Carl's and Mata's qualified immunity.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages under § 1983 when the official’s conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Lewis v. Alcohol Drug Service Of · filed 1995-09-07

We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that Wonnacott was entitled to qualified immunity against Lewis' 5 1983 claim for monetary damages and in granting summary judgment to Wonnacott on that basis.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a violation of clearly established law and unreasonable conduct.

Zamakshari v. Dvoskin · filed 1995-09-08

All defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from this § 1983 suit since Zamakshari cannot show that a “clearly established” law was violated and that any of defendant’s actions were unreasonable.

Qualified immunity does not protect prison officials from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable official would have known their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Newell v. Sauser · filed 1995-09-11

The district court correctly held that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because Newell alleged a violation of clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable official should have known.

Officials performing discretionary functions are immune from § 1983 damages unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Sanderfer v. Nichols · filed 1995-09-15

A government official performing a discretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity from suit for civil damages unless his actions violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct was not objectively unreasonable under clearly established federal law at the time.

Rodriguez v. Phillips · filed 1995-09-15

To succeed on a claim for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must show that state officials, acting under color of state law, deprived plaintiffs of a right guaranteed them by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Moreover, defendants’ actions at that time must have been objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established federal law; otherwise, those actors are entitled to qualified immunity.

A jail officer has qualified immunity from § 1983 liability for failing to protect an inmate when the officer could not reasonably have known that the conduct violated the inmate’s clearly established rights at the time.

Price v. Sasser · filed 1995-09-19

Because Tadlock could not reasonably have known that his behavior violated Price’s clearly established rights at the time he was assaulted, Tadlock is entitled to qualified immunity and is, thereby, shielded from liability under that defense.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their acts did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Lazoda v. Maggy · filed 1995-10-02

Viewing all the evidence and drawing all inferences in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the court concludes that defendants meet their burden with regard to showing that it was objectively reasonable to believe that their acts did not violate plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights. Thus, the court holds as a matter of law that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when reasonable officials could differ about whether the conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Gunaca v. State of Texas · filed 1995-10-03

Because reasonable public officials could have differed on the lawfulness of Esparza's actions at the time they occurred, Esparza is entitled to qualified immunity.

A sheriff has qualified immunity from individual-capacity § 1983 damages when deputy sheriffs’ asserted right against nonreinstatement for political speech was not clearly established at the time.

Randy Allen Orga Dusty Stanaway v. Preston S. Williams, Individually and in His Capacity as Sheriff of York County · filed 1995-10-06

Because the right asserted by Orga and Stanaway was not clearly established when Williams decided not to reinstate them, we affirm the district court's granting of partial summary judgment in favor of Williams based on qualified immunity.

A public official asserting qualified immunity in a § 1983 action is protected if the right allegedly violated was not clearly established; if it was, the court asks whether the official could reasonably have believed the conduct lawful.

Kruse ex rel. Kanoa v. Hawai'i · filed 1995-10-12

When a public official asserts qualified immunity from liability in a § 1983 action, we must determine whether (1) the law governing the official’s conduct was clearly established and (2) whether under that law, an official could have reasonably believed the conduct was lawful.

Public officials sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity unless the governing law was clearly established and a reasonable official would have understood the conduct to be unlawful.

Kruse v. State of Hawai’i · filed 1995-10-12

When a public official asserts qualified immunity from liability in a Sec. 1983 action, we must determine whether (1) the law governing the official's conduct was clearly established and (2) whether under that law, an official could have reasonably believed the conduct was lawful.

A state official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established right and its unlawfulness would be apparent to a reasonable official.

Better Government Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw · filed 1995-10-16

Taking Plaintiffs allegations as true, Defendant McGraw’s actions simply do not pass muster under this standard. The unlawfulness of his conduct should have been apparent to him. Accordingly, the Court concludes as a matter of law Defendant McGraw is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for alleged conduct that violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Maguire v. Coughlin · filed 1995-10-18

Therefore, the Eighth Amendment right that defendants allegedly violated was clearly established when they allegedly violated it; they are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs claims about the conditions in his Auburn cell.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from individual-capacity damages when plaintiffs fail to show that clearly established law put them on notice their conduct was unlawful.

Wittmer v. Peters · filed 1995-10-20

Therefore, since Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of establishing that Defendants were on notice that their actions violated clearly established law, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Kiser v. Garrett · filed 1995-10-20

We hold, therefore, that the appellees were entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are shielded from damages liability by qualified immunity when the plaintiff lacks a clearly established constitutional right.

Verney v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission · filed 1995-10-26

We have already determined that Plaintiff did not have a “clearly established constitutional right” in employment with the Commission. Because Plaintiff cannot meet the first requirement of Harlow, the individual Defendants are shielded from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects prison officials from damages for housing a former protective custody inmate with former general population inmates in segregation when no clearly established right requires separation and no conflict is documented.

Hundley v. Philip Parker, Warden Patti R. Webb and Rick Pershing · filed 1995-11-02

Since the consent decree in Kendrick did not require that inmates in the segregation unit of the KSP be housed separately depending upon their classification prior to entering that unit and because we are unable to locate any precedent suggesting that such a right inures to prisoners once classified as protective custody inmates, we conclude that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that there was no clearly established right for plaintiff to be housed separately from inmates who had previously been general population prisoners, at least in the absence of a documented conflict with one of those prisoners.

Section 1983 officials have qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established such that a reasonable officer would know the conduct was unlawful.

Birmingham v. Michael Schacher, Ben Hicks, Glenn Faber · filed 1995-11-07

Officials are immune from liability under Section 1983 when the constitutional right they violate is not clearly established such that a reasonable officer would understand that his actions were prohibited by law.

Qualified immunity does not shield foster care officials from a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the alleged placement of a child in a known abusive foster home violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Taahira W. Ex Rel. McCord-Salley v. Travis · filed 1995-11-20

Accordingly, under the facts as alleged in the complaint, again mindful of the liberal standard pertaining to motions to dismiss, the immunity defense does not shield Defendants from liability at this stage of the litigation.

A § 1983 defendant cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when a reasonable jury could find that denying a clearly established right was objectively unreasonable.

Boomer v. Irvin · filed 1995-11-20

Based oh this court’s review of the record under these standards, I find that a reasonable jury could conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for Officer Bach to refuse plaintiff’s request to attend Jummah services. Plaintiffs right to attend these services is clearly established.

A government official sued for damages under § 1983 has qualified immunity if the official’s conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person should have known.

Taylor v. Rhode Island Department of Corrections · filed 1995-11-21

Qualified immunity shields government officials who are exercising discretionary powers “from [personal] liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.”

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Dabbs v. Amos · filed 1995-11-21

How ever, for the reasons set forth within, we believe the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and thus summary judgment also should have been granted to them on the Sec. 1983 claim. ... Nonetheless, in light of the above authority we cannot conclude that in this particular case, after Dabbs campaigned for a certain Board member and publicly supported the Superintendent in a dispute with the Board, she had a clearly established right to retain a position that she conceded involved policymaking, confidential, and public relations responsibilities. Consequently, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and should have been granted summary judgment on the First Amendment claim.

In a § 1983 damages action, advice of counsel does not confer qualified immunity when clearly established law should have made the violation apparent to a reasonable official.

Molloy v. Blanchard · filed 1995-11-22

Here, the advice of counsel cannot shield the defendant from liability where the law was so clear and where advice of counsel should not have prevented a reasonable police chief from knowing that it applied to plaintiff.

Qualified immunity shields an individual officer from a Section 1983 damages claim when the plaintiff cannot show that the relevant law was clearly established at the time.

Haney Ex Rel. Haney v. City of Cumming · filed 1995-11-27

Should the plaintiff fail to show that the law was clearly established at the time in question, the individual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official could believe the conduct lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the officials possessed.

Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley · filed 1995-11-30

Similarly, we conclude that the defendants were also entitled to qualified immunity for the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim. Again, we look to an objective inquiry: whether a reasonable official could have believed his conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the officials possessed.

A prison guard is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim unless his conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right that a reasonable official would have recognized.

Prosser v. Davis Ross CO,I · filed 1995-12-01

We conclude that a reasonable official in Ross's position at the time the attack occurred would not have believed that his actions violated Prosser's clearly established constitutional rights. Ross is therefore entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would have known that requiring a Muslim inmate to handle pork violated a clearly established right.

Hayes v. Long · filed 1995-12-07

Accordingly, we hold defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable official would have known.

Pam Good v. Olk-Long · filed 1995-12-08

It is well settled that qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for money damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable official would have known.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

King v. Vincent Branson Carla J. Harrison Anthony Codogan · filed 1995-12-08

Since King did not have a firmly established right to being celled away from ambient tobacco smoke, the defendants were properly afforded qualified immunity for housing him with inmates who smoked, at least until they received medical advice to the contrary.

Qualified immunity defeats an individual-capacity Section 1983 claim unless the official violated a clearly established right guaranteed by federal law.

Hirschfeld v. Spanakos · filed 1995-12-15

And while a reasonable defendant would have understood from existing law that the alleged acts were tortious under State law, the right that must be clearly established to defeat qualified immunity in a Section 1983 case is a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 damages claims against public officers are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Anderson v. Gilberto Romero and Arthur Douglas · filed 1995-12-15

But the only question presented by this appeal, so far. as the disclosure of Anderson’s medical situation is concerned, is whether in 1992 the constitutional right of a prisoner in Anderson’s position—that is, a carrier of the AIDS virus—to be free from the specific acts that the defendants are alleged to have committed was clearly established, for if not the defendants cannot be made to pay damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... To summarize the decision thus far, we hold that Anderson’s claim for damages based on the assertion that his constitutional rights were violated by the disclosure of his HIV status to other inmates or to prison staff, or by other actions taken against him on the basis of his HIV status (except insofar as those actions are alleged to have been taken purely to punish him for that status), is barred by the doctrine of official immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to a qualified immunity jury instruction when the governing rights were clearly established and they show no extraordinary circumstances excusing ignorance of the law.

Shanes-Hernandez v. Clementoni · filed 1995-12-18

Appellee alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of sexual harassment and retaliation for exercising her free speech rights. The standards in both areas of the law were clearly established at the time the conduct occurred and a reasonable person would have known them. Appellants made no attempt to show extraordinary circumstances that might excuse them from knowledge of this law and were therefore not entitled to a qualified immunity instruction.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an official from damages when it was objectively reasonable to believe the conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Sheppard v. Beerman · filed 1995-12-20

The Court further holds that it would have been reasonable for Judge Beerman to believe that he was not violating Sheppard’s First Amendment rights by terminating his employment. Therefore, the Court concludes that Judge Beerman is qualifiedly immune from suit for Sheppard’s damages claim.

Qualified immunity protects an official from a § 1983 claim for dismissing employees without a hearing when the employees had no clearly established property right and existing law did not clearly prohibit the dismissal.

Smith v. Cook · filed 1995-12-28

This Court finds that plaintiffs have not shown that they had a clearly established property right. In addition, existing law did not clearly prohibit the dismissal of plaintiffs without a hearing. As a result, defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Latta v. Keryte · filed 1997-07-01

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages when his "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to a government official when the plaintiff cannot show that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right that a reasonable official would have known.

Penterman v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. · filed 1997-07-02

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Penterman and Kamnik have not met their burden to sufficiently show a violation of clearly established constitutional rights, such that a reasonable official in Dasho's position would know, or should have known, that his conduct violated those rights. Dasho is entitled to qualified immunity against these claims.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from § 1983 damages when they objectively could have believed their conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Ram v. Rubin · filed 1997-07-02

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages if, in light of clearly established law governing the challenged conduct, the official objectively could have believed the conduct was lawful.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violates a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Burnham v. Ianni · filed 1997-07-11

Qualified immunity shields government officials from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.

A government official invoking qualified immunity in a § 1983 action bears the burden of proving that the asserted right was not clearly established.

Burnham v. Ianni · filed 1997-07-11

Ianni bears the burden of proving that the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights were not clearly established.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is not entitled to qualified immunity for violating clearly established law when no extraordinary circumstances excuse her lack of knowledge of that law.

Doby v. Hickerson · filed 1997-07-14

In our view, the district court drew a reasonable line, and correctly concluded that this case did not present "extraordinary circumstances" that justify qualified immunity despite a violation of clearly established law.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer in their position would have known that their arrest violated the plaintiff’s clearly established right to be free from arrest without probable cause.

Roberts v. Swain · filed 1997-07-15

Here, as a matter of law under the undisputed facts, Swain and Ennis were not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because a reasonable person in these officers’ positions would have known, under the circumstances, their actions violated plaintiff’s right not to be arrested without probable cause.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for following a superior’s arrest order when the order does not violate a clearly established right and they have no reason to know probable cause is absent.

Rose v. Town of Concord · filed 1997-07-15

It is presumptively reasonable for a police officer to follow the order of a superior officer so long as that order does not violate a clearly established constitutional or statutory right. ... The Officers are therefore also entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this component of Rose’s section 1983 claim.

A school official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 student-search claim when the asserted right to individualized suspicion was not clearly established at the time of the search.

Smith v. McGlothlin · filed 1997-07-17

As it is fairly clear that Smith was not in fact entitled to individualized suspicion before she could be searched, it could not have been clearly established in 1994 that she had such a right.

Section 1983 individual-capacity defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established as applied to their specific conduct.

Williams v. Hatton · filed 1997-07-17

Accordingly, we reverse the order of the district court denying Hat- ton and Martin qualified immunity and remand this case with instruc- tions to dismiss the complaint against them in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity protects a school official from § 1983 damages when a violation of school rules was not a clearly established constitutional violation.

Saylor v. Board of Education · filed 1997-07-22

Assuming, for purposes of analysis, that Sam Saylor did violate young Randy’s constitutional rights—and perhaps those of his parents as well—we are not persuaded that the rights in question were so clearly established as constitutional rights that a reasonable teacher in Mr. Saylor’s position would have had to realize that a violation of the Code of Conduct would violate the United States Constitution as well.

In a § 1983 damages suit, qualified immunity turns on whether an official performing a discretionary function should reasonably have known the conduct violated a clearly established federal right.

Madiwale v. Savaiko · filed 1997-07-25

The qualified immunity inquiry, then, must establish first, whether the defendant government official was performing a discretionary function and, second, whether, in doing so, the defendant should reasonably have known that the action violated an individual's clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim requires discretionary conduct and no actual or constructive knowledge that the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Stephen v. MacKinnon · filed 1997-07-25

In order for qualified immunity to apply, it must be shown that (1) the defendant was performing a “discretionary” function, and (2) that the defendant did not know, nor should she have known, that the conduct at issue violated a clearly established right. ... Here, the actions of Sgt. MacKinnon and Sgt. Flaherty fail both prongs of the qualified immunity test.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when alleged evidence tampering could deprive plaintiffs of property in violation of clearly established due process rights and the officers have not shown an adequate state remedy.

Frisby v. Crow · filed 1997-07-29

If, as the Frisbys alleged, the evidence tampering resulted in the deprivation of the Frisbys' property, the officers' conduct could amount to a violation of the Frisbys' clearly established due process rights. Cf. Mahers v. Halford, 76 F.3d 951, 954 (8th Cir. 1996) (inmates entitled to due process for deprivation of money received from outside sources). Defendants did not show otherwise. Although it appears that adequate state post-deprivation remedies would satisfy due process, see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541-44 (1981) (post-deprivation remedies adequate when loss is result of random, unauthorized act by state employee); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (Parratt applies to intentional deprivations), defendants have not demonstrated the existence of such a remedy. Thus, the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity was appropriate.

Section 1983 individual-capacity damages claims against public officials are subject to qualified immunity when their discretionary conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Hein v. Arkansas State University · filed 1997-07-30

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity in the discharge of discretionary duties when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

A public official sued for damages under § 1983 has qualified immunity when a reasonable official in the same position would not have known the conduct violated clearly established rights.

DesROCHES BY DesROCHES v. Caprio · filed 1997-07-31

Caprio is immune from monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if his conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable official would have known at the time of the conduct. ... Given this, a reasonable school official in the place of the defendant would not have known that the proposed search in question violated clearly established rights. ... Accordingly, Defendant Caprio is immune from monetary damages.

Individual defendants in a § 1983 suit have qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows they knew or reasonably should have known their actions violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Clark v. Town of Kersey · filed 1997-08-08

Since plaintiff wholly failed to demonstrate how the individual defendants knew or should have known their actions violated those constitutional rights, he has not overcome the qualified immunity defense.

Police officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity for discretionary acts unless their conduct violates clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Degraff v. District of Columbia · filed 1997-08-08

Moreover, police officers are protected by a qualified immunity in section 1983 cases when they “perform! ] discretionary functions ... insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established ... rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Government officials are generally immune from money damages under § 1983 unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Minigan v. Irvin · filed 1997-08-18

As a general rule, government officials are immune from liability for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 shields officials from damages for failing to independently assess a confidential prison informant’s credibility when the asserted due process right was not clearly established at the time.

Glaspie v. Mahoney · filed 1997-08-20

Since the acts complained of here occurred over the course of Glaspie’s disciplinary hearing on October 9, 16, 26 and 27, 1992, almost one year prior to the Second Circuit’s decision in Richardson, Mahoney and Selsky are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Glaspie’s claim that their failure to independently assess the credibility of the confidential informant violated his constitutional rights.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when they could reasonably believe their alleged conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Jubilee v. Horn · filed 1997-08-22

Thus, in light of this conflicting precedent, we agree with Defendants that they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs substantive due process claim. There is substantial authority upon which Defendants could reasonably believe that their alleged conduct did not violate clearly established rights under the Due Process Clause.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from a due process claim based on a state-created danger theory when that theory was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

ESTATE OF ROSENBAUM BY PLOTKIN v. City of New York · filed 1997-08-22

Thus, the Court concludes that the state-created danger theory was not clearly established in 1991 and that Dinkins and Brown consequently could not have reasonably understood that their alleged conduct could have implicated plaintiffs’ due process rights. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ federal civil rights claims, to the extent that they are premised upon a violation of plaintiffs’ due process rights, are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 action, a supervisory school official cannot claim qualified immunity for failing to respond to complaints of sexual harassment after that duty became clearly established.

Oona, R.-S.-, a Minor, by Kate S., Her Guardian, Kate S. And Ken R. v. Patricia McCaffrey Gerald Hill Ronald Lundy · filed 1997-08-25

Thus, after Franklin, a school official in a supervisory position cannot claim immunity for the failure to respond to complaints of harassment and discrimination.

Officials may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on the dormant Commerce Clause when the claimed right was not clearly established.

Heart of America Grain Inspection Service, Inc. v. Missouri Department of Agriculture · filed 1997-08-26

Again, we have reviewed de novo and, although we think it is a close question, we agree that Hopkins was entitled to qualified immunity on HOA's Commerce Cause claim, and thus summary judgment was properly granted.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from damages under Section 1983 unless the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Eubanks v. Larson · filed 1997-08-28

Qualified immunity shields Sheriff Lawson from liability for civil damages as long as his conduct did not violate Dehart's clearly established constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from § 1983 damages unless a reasonable officer with the information available would have known his conduct violated clearly established law.

Jo Ann Eubanks, as Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph Daniel Dehart, Deceased v. Lawson · filed 1997-08-28

If a reasonable officer, acting on the information that was available to Lawson, would have known that his actions violated clearly established law, then Lawson is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields a government official from a § 1983 damages claim unless the complaint alleges a constitutional violation and the constitutional standards were clearly established at the time.

Khuans v. School District 110 · filed 1997-09-02

Therefore, qualified immunity will apply unless (1) the conduct alleged in the complaint sets forth a constitutional violation and (2) the constitutional standards were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Section 1983 defendants lack qualified immunity for retaliatory employment action against sheriff’s deputies based on political activity or association when clearly established law barred that action unless the activity was sufficiently disruptive.

Vojvodich v. Lopez · filed 1997-09-05

Appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity because at the time that they took adverse action against Vojvodich and Garza, the law was clearly established that a sheriff could not take retaliatory employment action against his deputies based on political activity or association unless the activity was sufficiently disruptive.

Section 1983 defendants lack qualified immunity for retaliatory employment actions based on deputies’ political activity or association when clearly established law barred those actions absent sufficient disruption.

Garza v. Lopez · filed 1997-09-05

Appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity because at the time that they took adverse action against Vojvodich and Garza, the law was clearly established that a sheriff could not take retaliatory employment action against his deputies based on political activity or association unless the activity was sufficiently disruptive.

Section 1983 defendants performing discretionary government functions have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Jones v. City of Dothan, Alabama · filed 1997-09-17

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from civil litigation and liability where "their conduct does not violate clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Section 1983 does not give qualified immunity to an official who reasonably should have known that suspending a bail bond company’s privileges without notice or a hearing violated clearly established due process rights.

Holt Bonding Co., Inc. v. Nichols · filed 1997-09-18

Qualified immunity shields Nichols from' liability unless he violated HBCI’s clearly established rights and reasonably should have known he was doing so. This court believes that a reasonable official would have known that Nichols’ refusal to accept all bonds written by HBCI, without any notice or hearing, violated the clearly established rights of HBCI.

Government officials performing discretionary functions may assert qualified immunity against § 1983 damages claims unless their conduct violates clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Guite v. Wright · filed 1997-09-25

Any individual government officials performing discretionary functions have a qualified immunity defense to a Section 1983 claim for damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

An officer sued under § 1983 has qualified immunity unless a reasonable officer would have known that the conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Asfour v. Cosslett · filed 1997-09-29

To determine whether an officer's conduct is immunized, we employ a three-step analysis. First, we identify the specific constitutional right allegedly violated. Next, we determine whether at the time of the alleged violation the right was clearly established. Finally, if the right was clearly established, we determine whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have known that his actions violated that right.

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted rights were not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Whalen v. County of Fulton · filed 1997-10-02

We therefore agree with the individual defendants that the rights sought to be protected were not clearly established and that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from § 1983 damages depends on whether an officer should have known that the conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Jones v. City of Youngstown · filed 1997-10-14

Individual claims of immunity must be analyzed on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis to determine whether the constitutional rights were so clearly established when the alleged misconduct was committed that any official in the defendant’s position would understand that what they were doing violates those rights.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when their conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

BD. OF COM'RS OF EFFINGHAM CTY. v. Farmer · filed 1997-10-15

The test for determining whether a defendant is protected from suit by reason of qualified immunity is the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law; in this regard, a reasonably competent public official should know the established law governing his conduct.

Officials performing discretionary governmental functions are qualifiedly immune from damages under § 1983 when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Stephens v. Geoghegan · filed 1997-10-17

Because Stephens, Upman and Worlds did not violate Geoghegan's clearly established statutory or constitutional rights, as delineated in Loudermill, they are entitled to qualified immunity from his federal civil rights claim.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when they reasonably could have believed their conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Howard v. Pierce · filed 1997-10-22

In short, defendants could have reasonably believed that their actions relating to filing the second misbehavior report and prosecuting the matter in the second disciplinary proceeding as well as plaintiffs ensuing confinement in SHU, did not violate plaintiffs clearly established rights. They are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the plaintiff shows a violation of a clearly established right and the objective reasonableness of the force remains genuinely disputed.

Clark v. Gonzalez · filed 1997-10-24

Clark has therefore shown for qualified immunity purposes a violation of a clearly established right. In addition, the evidence reveals that a genuine issue of material fact remains regarding the objective reasonableness of such force.

In a § 1983 qualified immunity claim, the court decides whether officers acted objectively reasonably under clearly established law; a jury resolves disputed historical facts material to that decision.

Sharrar v. Felsing · filed 1997-10-24

We thus hold, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hunter, that in deciding whether defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of “clearly established law” that is for the court but also whether the actions of the officers-were objectively reasonable. Only if the historical facts material to the latter issue are in dispute, as in Karnes, will there be an issue for the jury.

A correctional officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the law governing approved-vendor and publisher-only restrictions on soft-cover books was not clearly established.

Blair v. E. Gums, Correctional Officer · filed 1997-10-24

We agree with the district court that the law as to approved vendors and publisher-only requirements with respect to soft-cover books is not clearly established. ... Accordingly, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Defendant Gums was entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish that the asserted constitutional right was clearly established.

Gill v. Heath · filed 1997-10-27

Because Gill failed to establish that he had a clearly established constitutional right not to be briefly and partially viewed in the nude by female correctional officers, Heath was entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from claims based on conduct that violated no clearly established constitutional right.

Ervin v. Mangum · filed 1997-10-27

Defendants are entitled to immunity from these claims because they committed no violation of clearly established constitutional law.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant in a § 1983 action when the asserted right was not clearly established or a reasonable officer could have believed the challenged conduct lawful.

Hogue v. Jared S. Lauderdale William Horton · filed 1997-11-06

To determine whether qualified immunity is appropriate, a court must identify the specific right allegedly violated and determine (1) whether that right was so clearly established as to alert a reasonable officer to its constitutional parameters and, if so, (2) whether a reasonable officer could have believed lawful the conduct at issue.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim when the right was clearly established such that a reasonable official would know the challenged conduct violated it.

Koop v. Rolfs · filed 1997-11-06

Additionally, because the right to have an adequate law library is clearly established such that a reasonable prison official would know failure to provide such a library would violate the right, the district court erred by granting summary judgment on this claim on qualified immunity grounds.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an official from individual liability when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Cudd v. Aldrich · filed 1997-11-07

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Defendant Aldrich is entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff, as an assistant district attorney, did not have a clearly established constitutional right to First Amendment protection from political patronage termination at the time she was fired.

Qualified immunity does not support dismissal of a § 1983 claim when the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct.

Soltero v. City of Compton · filed 1997-11-13

Defendants appeal the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from the removal of the Soltero children from their home. We have jurisdiction only to decide whether the law governing defendants' conduct was clearly established. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995); Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir.1997). We conclude that it was and affirm.

Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability under § 1983 for discretionary acts when a reasonable official could have believed the acts lawful under clearly established law.

Fontanilla v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1997-11-14

As a result, the qualified immunity doctrine protects the individual defendants from civil liability for performance of their discretionary functions.

Section 1983 damages claims against an officer are barred by qualified immunity when the officer’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Colston v. Barnhart · filed 1997-11-21

Because a reasonable officer in Barnhart's position could have believed that he and Langford were in imminent danger of serious bodily harm or death at the hand of Colston, Barnhart was objectively reasonable in shooting Colston. Accordingly, the district court's order denying Barnhart's motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity is reversed and judgment is rendered granting that motion.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional violation; the court considers whether a right was clearly established only after finding such a violation.

Rowe v. Lambe · filed 1997-11-28

In order to determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, we engage in a two-part analysis. ... The first question is whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation. ... It is not until we have made that required determination that we may analyze whether such right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

A public official may be entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim alleging a dormant Commerce Clause violation when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Heart of America Grain Inspection Service, Inc. v. Missouri Department of Agriculture · filed 1997-12-02

HOA also argues that it has a cause of action against Hopkins under § 1983 because Hopkins's actions violated HOA's rights under the dormant Commerce Clause. ... Again, we have reviewed de novo and, although we think it is a close question, we agree that Hopkins was entitled to qualified immunity on HOA's Commerce Cause claim, and thus summary judgment was properly granted.

A government official sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when his conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established rights.

Schwimmer v. Kaladjian · filed 1997-12-09

Given that Guilford’s conduct in removing Yoel was objectively reasonable, the Court must grant Guilford qualified immunity for his actions.

Section 1983 shields an official sued in an individual capacity through qualified immunity when a reasonable official could have believed the challenged conduct lawful under the law clearly established at the time.

Kathleen Cope and Teresa D. Davis v. Devra S. Heltsley, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Hopkins County Cour · filed 1997-12-16

For the reasons we have tried to suggest, we think the clerk could reasonably believe that the exception applies to the selection of deputy clerks. That being so, we conclude that County Clerk Heltsley is entitled to prevail on her claim of qualified immunity against suit in her individual capacity.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when other public officials could view their conduct as objectively reasonable and consistent with clearly established rights.

Bullard v. The City of Houston · filed 1997-12-23

We hold that their submissions of affidavits upon IAD request could be viewed by other public officials as objectively reasonable reactions to Bullard’s conduct rather than actions that clearly violate Bullard’s right to give truthful testimony free from the threat of retaliatory discharge.

A § 1983 claim survives an exception of no cause of action based on qualified immunity when the petition alleges sufficient facts showing violation of a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Lambert v. RIVERBOAT GAMING ENFORC. DIV. · filed 1997-12-29

Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Kyle, 588 So.2d at 1161, who merely made a conclusory allegation of retaliatory action, we conclude that plaintiffs herein have alleged sufficient facts to assert that defendants violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known and, therefore, have stated a cause of action. We therefore find that the pleadings set forth sufficient facts to survive the exception of no cause of action founded on qualified immunity as claimed by Lt. Poulard.

Individual defendants may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot show that the asserted right was clearly established.

Hughes v. Alabama Department of Public Safety · filed 1998-02-23

Even if Hughes’ evidence did present a question of fact as to the issue of constructive discharge, Hughes has not demonstrated that the individual Defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have understood their conduct to violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Weiler v. Purkett · filed 1998-03-02

Thus, even if Weiler had alleged a transgression of constitutional magnitude, the defendants would still be entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct was objectively reasonable under the clearly established law at the time.

Hare Ex Rel. Hare v. City of Corinth · filed 1998-03-05

Instead, we hold that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, do not constitute objectively unreasonable conduct when applied against the deliberate indifference standard.

A state prison official may be individually liable for damages under § 1983 when qualified immunity does not protect conduct that violates clearly established constitutional law.

McNamara v. J. C. Moody, Etc. · filed 1979-11-15

The Supreme Court has recognized that while 42 U.S.C. § 1983 exposes state and local officials to individual liability for damages under some circumstances, Congress did not intend by enacting that section to strip such officials of immunity afforded them at common law. ... Under these principles, the evidence before the trial judge justified an award of damages against appellant.

A public official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff's First Amendment rights were clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Hall v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com'n · filed 1998-03-06

Finally, the Court concludes that Hopkins defense of qualified immunity must be denied. Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment were clearly established at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit.

A government official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 civil action when a reasonable official would not have known that the conduct violated clearly established rights.

Brown v. Belen, City Of · filed 1998-03-16

Under Harlow, Sergeant Chavez, a government official who was performing discretionary functions, was shielded from plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action if his conduct did not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

County defendants sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct was objectively reasonable under the plaintiff’s clearly established rights.

Petrazzoulo v. United States Marshals Service · filed 1998-03-17

The standard for determining whether the county defendants are entitled to qualified immunity is set forth above, as is this court’s determination as to plaintiffs clearly established rights. Thus, the only question that need be addressed here is whether, given their knowledge of Dr. Todd’s “recommendation,” the county defendants’ failure to provide plaintiff with dentures was objectively reasonable. In light of the fact that plaintiff was a federal prisoner who was transferred out of the county’s facility prior to the date established for the provision of treatment, I find that the defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional duty was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Santamorena v. Georgia Military College · filed 1998-07-31

Because we conclude that Plaintiff and H.S. were owed no clearly established constitutional duty by Defendants at the time of the incident, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

For qualified immunity under § 1983, a plaintiff need not identify a prior case involving the same conduct if preexisting law made the conduct’s unlawfulness apparent.

Armijo Ex Rel. Chavez v. Wagon Mound Public Schools · filed 1998-10-28

In showing that the law was clearly established, the plaintiff does not have to show that the specific action at issue had been held unlawful, but the alleged unlawfulness of the defendant’s conduct must be apparent in light of preexisting law.

In a § 1983 damages suit, a lower state court decision that conflicts with circuit precedent cannot clearly establish a right sufficient to defeat qualified immunity.

Charles W. v. Maul · filed 2000-06-05

In claiming the existence of a constitutional right, plaintiff may not exploit a lower state court opinion — inconsistent with this Circuit’s precedent — as clearly establishing that right sufficient to deprive state officials, regardless of the level of their positions, of a qualified immunity defense.

In a § 1983 public employee speech claim, qualified immunity turns in part on whether the employee’s right to speak was clearly established when the official acted.

Branton v. City of Dallas · filed 2001-11-09

We conclude that the statements made by the internal affairs officer addressed a matter of public concern; that the statements are entitled to First Amendment protection; and that the internal affairs officer’s right to speak was clearly established at the time the Chief acted.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit does not require an earlier case with materially similar facts if existing law gave the officer fair warning that the conduct was unlawful.

Hope v. Pelzer · filed 2002-06-27

Although earlier cases involving “fundamentally similar” facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a finding. The same is true of cases with “materially similar” facts.

Qualified immunity protects an official from a Section 1983 claim when existing law did not give fair warning that the official’s conduct violated the asserted right.

McClendon v. City of Columbia, City of Columbia James R. Carney · filed 2002-09-05

In summary, even if a “consensus” of circuits had adopted some version of the state-created danger theory in July of 1993, this consensus did not at that time establish the contours of an individual’s light to be free from state-created danger with sufficient clarity to provide Detective Carney with fair warning that his conduct violated that right. Accordingly, Detective Carney is entitled to qualified immunity from McClendon’s § 1983 action.

In a § 1983 qualified-immunity claim, courts consider relevant decisions from other circuits when deciding whether an officer had fair warning that conduct was unlawful.

McClendon v. City of Columbia · filed 2002-11-08

In light of Wilson, we must consider both this court’s treatment of the state-created danger theory and status of this theory in our sister circuits in assessing whether a reasonable officer would have known at the time of Detective Carney’s actions that his conduct was unlawful.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim when established law gives fair warning that the conduct is unlawful, even without a prior case involving the same facts.

Austin v. Johnson · filed 2003-05-28

Defendants' contention that no case has specifically proscribed the withholding of medical treatment for boot camp attendees reads the right too narrowly; officers need only have "fair warning" that their conduct is unlawful.

Officers cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim on the ground that the warrant requirement for administrative searches or Fourth Amendment protection of fenced backyards was unclear in 1996.

Brocuglio v. Proulx · filed 2003-06-13

To the limited extent that defendants raise pure issues of law, their contentions are without merit. At the time of the events giving rise to this action, it was clearly established that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies to administrative searches such as this, ... and that a fenced-in backyard is “curtilage” entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison officials from a § 1983 claim when precedent clearly establishes that slippery showers without protective measures can endanger a disabled prisoner.

Johnson v. Martinez · filed 2003-06-17

The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim because the right at issue was not clearly established. This was error in light of our precedent holding that “slippery floors without protective measures could create a sufficient danger [to a disabled detainee] to warrant relief.” See id. at 1129-30 (reversing summary judgment where prison officials were aware that pretrial detainee who used crutches had fallen and injured himself on slippery shower floor yet declined to “take reasonable measures to assist [plaintiff] in showering safely”).

Government officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when existing law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated the asserted constitutional right.

Snider v. Jefferson State Community College · filed 2003-09-15

Because the pre- existing case law available to Defendants at the time of the alleged harassment did not make apparent that the Equal Protection Clause protected against same-sex sexual harassment, Defendants are entitled to immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit compensatory damages against school administrators or board members when qualified immunity protects them because their conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Sapp v. Renfroe · filed 1975-04-11

In Wood v. Strickland,-U.S. -, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), decided since this case was argued, the Court held that a school administrator or a school board member is immune from liability for compensatory damages in civil rights suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless: ... A compensatory award will be appropriate only if the school board member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the student’s clearly established constitutional rights ... In the absence of authoritative decisions from the Supreme Court, from this court, or even from other circuits, we hold as a matter of law that the Board did not violate Sapp’s “clearly established constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 permits damages against a state or county tax official for violating clearly established constitutional rights only when the violation is intentional or reckless and the conduct cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.

Bormann v. Tomlin · filed 1978-11-15

A state or county tax official will be liable for damages under § 1983 only if he violated the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights intentionally or with reckless disregard of those rights. The tax official must have personally acted with an impermissible motivation or with such intentional and reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot be reasonably characterized as being in good faith.

Section 1983 damages liability is subject to qualified immunity when a public official acted in good faith and did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Atcherson v. Honorable Judge John Siebenmann · filed 1979-10-23

We disagree. Assuming without deciding that Judge Siebenmann acted as an administrator and not in his judicial capacity, we hold that he established a qualified immunity defense to damages liability. ... Therefore, in the specific context of school discipline, we hold that a school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student. ... The remaining question is whether, at the time of the events giving rise to this action, Judge Siebenmann knew or should have known that his actions would violate Atcherson's "clearly established" constitutional rights. That question must be answered negatively. ... In sum, the evidence indicates that Judge Siebenmann made an error in judgment in requesting Ms. Atcherson's resignation. However, because he acted in good faith that error does not subject him to financial liability.

Section 1983 does not make officials liable for damages when qualified immunity shields them because they could not reasonably have known their actions would violate clearly established constitutional rights.

David Dilmore, as the Representative of Ernest Dilmore, Deceased, Plaintiff v. Stubbs · filed 1981-02-09

Defendants therefore are immune from liability under § 1983 for any damages that Dilmore allegedly suffered as a result of the Whitfield policy.

Section 1983 imposes liability for constitutional violations by officials acting under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity when the violation was not clearly established and the official acted reasonably and in good faith.

Hocker v. Woody · filed 1981-07-23

Under this provision officers are liable for unlawful searches and seizures. ... Thus, to prevail in a section 1983 action, the plaintiff must show, according to established law, a prima facie violation of a constitutional right and the absence of any reasonable, subjective good faith intent. ... Reliance on advice of counsel, rather than being an absolute defense, is only a factor to be considered on the issue of good faith. ... In this case, there was no clear disregard of established law and therefore we conclude as a matter of law that Woody acted reasonably, not maliciously, and in good faith.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity, which generally shields officials performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald · filed 1982-06-24

Moreover, we concluded that it would be “untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under [42 U. S. C.] § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials.” ... We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officials protected by qualified immunity when the governing constitutional law was not clearly established.

Souders v. Kroboth · filed 1982-09-23

Jeffrey Souders, the plaintiff in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeks damages from defendants, Frank Kroboth and Alan Dale, in their individual capacity for violating his federal constitutional rights. ... On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to “know” that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. ... Because a conflict presently exists among the circuits concerning the applicability of the exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings, ... I conclude that defendants are immune from liability for damages for the use of illegally seized evidence in connection with plaintiff’s parole revocation hearing.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on state officials protected by qualified immunity unless they act maliciously or violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Strathie v. Department of Transportation of Pennsylvania · filed 1982-10-01

As stated above, these defendant state officials are not immune from section 1983 liability if they acted with a malicious intention to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights, or if they knew or should have known that their actions would violate clearly established constitutional rights.

In damages suits under § 1983, qualified immunity is governed by the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct measured against clearly established law, rather than by malice or other subjective factors.

Adams v. Thompson · filed 1983-04-14

This testimony is not sufficient to raise the issue of qualified immunity from damages in suits under § 1983. The Supreme Court has made it quite clear that this defense no longer has any subjective features. ... Qualified immunity now depends on the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, not upon malice or other subjective factors.

Section 1983 defendants are immune from damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Eliason Corp. v. Bureau of Safety & Regulation of the Michigan Department of Labor · filed 1983-05-25

The Court concludes that the conduct of deputies Knittel and Colby did not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Based on their qualified immunity from damages, deputies Knittel and Colby are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the § 1983 claim asserted against them in Count I.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages when the constitutional right was not clearly established at the time, including where recognizing the right required a novel appellate interpretation.

Engblom v. Carey · filed 1983-07-15

The Second Circuit’s decision in 1982 was the first involving the literal application of the Third Amendment. In terms of preexisting caselaw, it cannot be said that the defendants should have ... known that housing the National Guard in facility-residences given the “necessity of quick action” would violate the plaintiffs’ Third Amendment rights.

Qualified immunity fails when a § 1983 plaintiff’s constitutional right was clearly established and defendants knew of it, but personal liability still requires proof that each defendant violated the right and proximately caused the injury.

Jackson v. W.I. Hollowell · filed 1983-09-22

In sum, it is abundantly clear that Jackson’s constitutional right to be free from inadequately screened trusty shooters was clearly established and that the defendants were aware, individually and jointly, of this constitutional guarantee. Hence, we affirm the district court’s refusal to accord the defendants the protections of qualified immunity. This, however, does not establish each individual defendant’s liability to Jackson. Although the defendants have failed to demonstrate their entitlement to the protections of qualified immunity, a separate inquiry must be made to determine whether Jackson adequately demonstrated that his clearly established constitutional right was violated by each defendant and that each defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of his injury.