42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims based on threats accrue only when the threats or threatening conduct result in a constitutional deprivation.

Allen L. Lamar, Cross-Appellant v. L.A. Steele, Cross-Appellee · filed 1983-02-28

Threats alone are not enough. A section 1983 claim only accrues when the threats or threatening conduct result in a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest for a procedural-due-process claim.

Bell v. Sellevold · filed 1983-08-15

Here, we are firmly convinced as a matter of law that defendants have deprived Dr. Bell of neither liberty or property, as those terms are used in the Fourteenth Amendment. This being so, the whole basis of a Section 1983 action on a procedural-due-process theory fails.

An act taken in retaliation for exercising a constitutionally protected right is actionable under Section 1983 even when the same act would have been proper for a different reason.

Edward James Matzker, Jr. v. Raymond Herr, Sheriff, Richard A. Schaab, Lt. And Mary Pearsall, Corrections Officer · filed 1984-11-07

An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have been proper.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a public employee's discharge when the discharge did not violate the employee's constitutional privacy, association, or due process rights.

Baron v. Meloni · filed 1985-01-17

Plaintiff Robert G. Baron, a former member of the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He claims that his discharge from the Sheriff’s Department violated his constitutional right to privacy, free association, and due process. ... Since the orders were reasonable on March 20 and 21, 1980, as shown by undisputed facts provided by defendant Meloni, plaintiff’s discharge was lawful.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a spouse for refusing to write or call an imprisoned spouse because that conduct violates no constitutional right.

Colon v. Colon · filed 1985-01-17

Plaintiff, Alfredo Colon, instituted this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against his wife, Robin Colon, “in her personal individual capacity” for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. ... The facts alleged by plaintiff are admittedly moving, but they most certainly do not amount to a violation of any rights protected by the United States Constitution.

A Section 1983 equal-protection claim fails when the plaintiff does not establish a specific injury caused by enforcement of the challenged government policy.

Tucker v. Alleyne · filed 1985-03-05

Since the plaintiff has failed to establish that he has suffered a specific injury as a result of the enforcement of the defendants’ policy, his constitutional claim under count one of his complaint must fail. For the same reason, he has not proven a violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federally protected right, and interference that causes a state-court mistrial but leaves the plaintiff free to relitigate the claim does not meet that requirement.

LaBarre v. Payne · filed 1985-03-08

An essential element of a prima facie case under 42 USC § 1983 is the deprivation of a federally protected right. ... Although he suffered inconvenience and delay in resolving his claims, the trial court’s grant of a mistrial did not deprive Payne of his right to relitigate the matter. ... Accordingly, while it appears that there was unauthorized interference with the jury deliberation process, we find no deprivation of a federal right in this case and Payne’s claim under 42 USC § 1983 must fail.

Official conduct that is offensive but violates no federal constitutional right does not support an action under § 1983.

Pfeil v. Rogers · filed 1985-03-08

Although we find the officers' conduct offensive, it does not support an action under Sec. 1983 because it did not violate a right guaranteed under the United States Constitution.

An officer's common-law battery does not support Section 1983 liability when the harm is too slight to constitute a constitutional violation and no abuse of government power elevates the tort to a constitutional wrong.

LeSavage v. White · filed 1985-03-20

On appeal the parties brief Count 3 as a Sec. 1983 claim. It is not. It was not submitted to the jury as such, and the harm inflicted on Audrey would be insufficient as a matter of law to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The LeSavages did not allege any abuse of government power sufficient to raise an ordinary tort to the level of a constitutional violation, Williams v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 695 (1980, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019, 101 S.Ct. 3009, 69 L.Ed.2d 391 (1981), nor did the proof tend to show any such abuse.

A prison transfer made in retaliation for exercising a constitutional right is actionable under Section 1983 even when the same transfer would have been proper for a different reason.

Walters v. Thompson · filed 1985-08-08

A transfer taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally-protected right is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even if the transfer, if taken for a different reason, would have been proper.

A Section 1983 action requires a violation of a federal constitutional right; a tort committed by a state employee does not automatically qualify.

Jenkins v. Dan Bolden George Marra · filed 1986-02-27

It is clear that plaintiff's complaint, even when construed in a liberal manner, fails to allege the violation of a federal constitutional right. Absence of this is fatal to the maintenance of a section 1983 civil rights action.

A Section 1983 claim is viable only when a constitutional right has been deprived.

Phelps v. Washburn University of Topeka · filed 1986-04-01

A section 1983 action will only be viable where there has been a deprivation of constitutional right.

Section 1983 provides no relief for a prisoner’s free exercise claim when the prison’s restriction does not violate the First Amendment.

Aliym v. Miles · filed 1988-02-19

Accordingly, since the court finds that the prison’s refusal to allow plaintiff to attend Jumu’ah does not offend the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment, ... there remains no basis for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and no genuine issue of material fact to be decided.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a public employee’s discharge when the employee had no property interest in continued employment and suffered no deprivation of a liberty interest.

Butcher v. City of Sikeston · filed 1988-04-06

In sum, plaintiff did not have a property interest in his employment with the City of Sikeston nor did he suffer a deprivation of any liberty interest as a result of his termination. Without such constitutional deprivations, none of the defendants in this action can be civilly prosecuted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 affords no relief when defendants have deprived the plaintiff of none of the constitutional rights asserted as the basis for the action.

Morse v. Martineau · filed 1988-05-03

The Alliance premises its § 1983 action on the violation of four constitutional rights. ... As will be seen, defendants have not deprived the Alliance of any of these constitutional rights, and thus this action must fail.

Section 1983 requires allegations that permit proof of a violation of a federal constitutional right.

Falls v. Town of Dyer · filed 1988-06-24

There are simply no allegations here that would permit proof of violation of a federal constitutional right under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a constitutional violation; objections to prison placement or discipline without such facts do not state a cognizable claim.

Tolbert v. Seiter · filed 1988-07-15

Therefore, the district court correctly found that Tolbert has failed to allege any facts which demonstrate a constitutional violation cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability for deprivations of constitutionally protected rights, not for violations of tort duties of care.

Susan and Reggie Griffith v. Marlin Johnston, Individually and as Commissioner of the Texas Department of Human Services · filed 1990-05-30

Section 1983 imposes liability for deprivations of constitutionally protected rights, rather than for violations of tort duties of care.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for an arbitrary school selection decision unless the decision rests on constitutionally prohibited factors.

Dangler Ex Rel. Dangler v. Yorktown Central Schools · filed 1991-08-14

If standards have been administered in an arbitrary and capricious manner but not on the basis of any constitutionally prohibited factors, the improper decision does not give rise to a violation of § 1983. On the other hand, use of unconstitutional factors in rendering an arbitrary and capricious decision does give rise to a cause of action under this section.

Section 1983 requires a wrong of constitutional dimension; a state-law wrong alone does not support the action.

Terrovona v. Brown · filed 1991-12-17

An action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be founded upon a wrong of constitutional dimension.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; a claimant seeking its remedy must plead and prove a substantive constitutional injury.

Levine v. Maverick County Water Control & Improvement District No. 1 · filed 1994-06-22

Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights. A plaintiff cannot go into court claiming “a violation of § 1983” because § 1983 is simply a remedial statute. A litigant seeking the remedial benefits provided by § 1983 is required to plead and prove a substantive constitutional injury.

A plaintiff cannot obtain judgment on a § 1983 due process claim without a finding that a federal constitutional right was violated.

O'Kelley v. Snow · filed 1995-05-25

The problem with the district court's order is that the court made no finding of a federal constitutional violation, which is a threshold requirement for a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides a mechanism to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights, so alleging both amounts to one constitutional claim.

Schurr v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc. · filed 1998-06-30

While he alleges violations of both section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, this is really just one constitutional claim. That is because section 1983 is merely the mechanism for the enforcement of Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for independently protected rights, and liability requires an underlying constitutional or statutory violation.

Vasquez v. Housing Authority of the City of El Paso · filed 2000-07-13

“Rather than creating substantive rights, § 1983 simply provides a remedy for the rights that it designates.” ... “Thus, an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not require intent to violate constitutional rights unless the underlying constitutional claim requires it.

Hudson v. New York City · filed 2000-08-06

Section 1983 does not require any intent to violate constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a public official for retaliation against the exercise of a constitutional right, even if the official’s act would otherwise have been appropriate.

McWaters v. Rick · filed 2002-04-04

Retaliation by a public official for the exercise of a constitutional right is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if the act, when taken for different reasons, would have been appropriate.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state law or police department rules without a constitutional violation.

Perry L. Scott, Sr., Michelle M. Scott, Phillip H. Scott, Jr. v. Rodney L. Edinburg and Village of Glenwood, a Municipal · filed 2003-10-09

However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights defined elsewhere; it does not create substantive rights itself.

Afkhami v. Carnival Corp. · filed 2004-01-28

That statement, without more, is insufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983 because the statute is not itself a source of substantive rights. Section 1983 is a remedial statute that provides a civil cause of action when some elsewhere-defined substantive federal right has been violated.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for retaliation based on exercising a constitutionally protected right.

Buise v. Donald Hudkins, Individually and as Superintendent of the Indiana State Farm · filed 1978-09-26

Instead, it is well established that an act in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under Section 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have been proper.

Section 1983 makes retaliation for exercising a constitutional right actionable even if the same act would otherwise have been proper.

Neuberger v. Gordon · filed 2008-07-21

an “act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have been proper.”

Section 1983 requires a constitutional violation to recover on a municipal liability or conspiracy claim.

Holm v. Village of Coal City · filed 2009-09-16

But as the Holms acknowledge, a showing of a constitutional violation is needed to recover on either a Monell claim for municipal liability or a § 1983 claim of conspiracy. ... And they have not successfully established that any constitutional violation occurred.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue for a conspiracy that actually denies an underlying constitutional right.

Signature Pharmacy, Inc. vs Wright · filed 2011-07-19

A plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights by showing a conspiracy existed that resulted in the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires an actual deprivation of constitutional rights; a municipal policy alone does not create a cause of action.

Whitson v. Knox County Board of Education · filed 2012-03-20

But without an actual deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no § 1983 cause of action to begin with.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law or prison rules alone; it requires a constitutional violation.

Holleman v. Penfold · filed 2013-02-22

But Holleman may not use § 1983 to challenge a violation of state law or prison rules; § 1983 protects plaintiffs only from constitutional violations.

Section 1983 makes retaliatory acts actionable even when the same acts would have been proper for another reason.

Wenk v. O'Reilly · filed 2015-04-15

Although the report in Jenkins was false, the heart of a First Amendment retaliation claim, which we have reaffirmed numerous times before 2011, is that “[a]n act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have been proper.” Bloch, 156 F.3d at 681–82 (emphasis added).

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law.

Wheat v. Schriro · filed 2003-11-10

Third, we believe that Wheat stated a claim based on retaliatory threats and harassment by third-shift corrections staff. While he did not name these persons or list them in the caption of his complaint, Wheat specifically alleged that they retaliated against him for his filing of grievances, and there is no reason to believe that on remand their identities could not be discovered.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of constitutional rights, but not for breaches of duties arising only under tort law.

Barnhill v. Lofton · filed 2020-12-04

Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for unlawful arrest, but an arrest does not support liability when made with constitutionally sufficient probable cause.

Taylor v. McDonald · filed 1972-08-11

An arrest must, under Section 1983, meet United States constitutional standards to relieve the law officer from possible civil liability. The constitutional standard adopted by the courts is that the arrest must be made with probable cause that the arrestee is committing a crime or has committed one.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state or local law and a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws; an arrest supported by probable cause does not violate civil rights.

Martin v. Duffie · filed 1971-06-11

The statutory prerequisites to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are clear ... They are: (1) that the defendant act “under color of” state or local law, and (2) that the plaintiff be subjected to a “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” ... This burden of showing a lack of probable cause at the time of the arrest is necessary since it is apparently settled that there is no civil rights violation for an arrest if probable cause existed at the time of the arrest.

Section 1983 provides a false-arrest remedy only when the arrest violated federal constitutional law; violating stricter state arrest rules alone is insufficient.

Street v. Officer Leo Surdyka, Baltimore City Police Department · filed 1974-02-21

Even if Officer Surdyka violated Maryland arrest law, he cannot be liable under section 1983 unless he also violated the federal constitutional law governing warrantless arrests.

Section 1983 permits recovery for a false arrest without probable cause and does not require exhaustion of state judicial remedies before the federal action.

Simpson Sartin, Jr. v. The Commissioner of Public Safety of the State of Minnesota · filed 1976-05-05

Moreover, exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not a prerequisite to the maintenance of a civil rights action in federal court. ... Indeed, Sartin’s action in federal court against Mickelson pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is his remedy at law. ... An arrest without probable cause is violative of rights secured by the Constitution and can be the basis of recovery pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a due-process claim against police officers acting under color of law when they make a warrantless arrest without probable cause and cannot reasonably believe probable cause exists.

Butler v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc. · filed 1977-05-05

The court must conclude as a matter of law that these arrests were not founded upon probable cause, and that the defendant police officers could not reasonably believe that there was probable cause for these arrests. As a result, the court must conclude that plaintiffs Butler, Jenkins, James, Jackson, and the two Nashes were deprived of due process of the law.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim for a constitutional false arrest when the arrest lacked probable cause, with probable cause decided by the jury.

No. 77-1190 · filed 1978-04-17

Clearly, an arrest without probable cause is a constitutional violation actionable under § 1983. ... We are convinced that the question of probable cause in a § 1983 damage suit is one for the jury.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a constitutional false-arrest claim when an arrest is made without probable cause.

Nacirema Operating Co. v. Lynn · filed 1978-06-05

Clearly, an arrest without probable cause is a constitutional violation actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police officer for an unlawful arrest made with probable cause or a valid warrant, or for a subsequent incarceration beyond the officer's control.

Mundy v. The State of Georgia, Officer D. C. Brown, of the Dekalb County Police Department · filed 1978-12-18

A police officer who arrests someone with probable cause or a valid warrant is not liable in a § 1983 suit for unlawful arrest. ... Nor is that officer liable for any subsequent incarceration over which he no longer has any control.

In a § 1983 illegal-arrest action, an officer relying on probable cause as a defense must show that probable cause existed when the arrest was made; a warrant issued afterward is irrelevant.

Robinson v. Goff · filed 1981-06-19

When a defendant officer in a civil action relies upon probable cause as a defense to a charge of illegal arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must establish that probable cause existed at the time the arrest was made. A warrant, subsequently issued, is irrelevant to the determination of whether the officer arresting an individual without a warrant had probable cause to arrest.

Section 1983 permits an unlawful-arrest claim against an officer when the arrest allegedly lacks probable cause and a valid arrest warrant.

Reineman v. Valley View Community School District 365-U · filed 1981-11-04

Reinemans claim William’s January 28 arrest violated the .Fourth Amendment because it was supported by neither probable cause nor a valid arrest warrant. Such an allegation will ground a Section 1983 action against Ellingsworth.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil-rights claim for an arrest made with probable cause.

Firnhaber v. Klink · filed 1982-05-28

The Supreme Court has stated that an arrest made with probable cause does not give rise to a claim for deprivation of civil rights. ... I conclude that as a matter of law Mr. Roller had probable cause for this arrest. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted.

Section 1983 claims based on an alleged lack of probable cause fail when the plaintiff's conviction establishes probable cause for the arrest.

DiNicola v. DiPaolo · filed 1982-09-29

Plaintiffs conviction also establishes, for purposes of his federal cause of action, that there was probable cause for his arrest. Bergstralh v. Lowe, 504 F2 1276 (CA9 1974), cert. denied 420 US 930, 43 LE2 402, 95 S.Ct. 1131 (1975); Howell v. Tanner, 650 F2 610 (CA5 1981). All of his claimed federal constitutional violations center around an alleged lack of probable cause. But since probable cause does exist, these claims must also fail.

Section 1983 imposes liability for an arrest and detention without probable cause, but not merely because an arrested person is later shown innocent.

Johnson v. Petersen · filed 1983-05-10

There can be no doubt that no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises simply because a person who is later shown to be innocent is arrested and jailed. ... Only arrest and detention without probable cause; that is, outside of constitutional standards, creates liability.

Probable cause completely defeats a § 1983 arrest claim even if the law authorizing the arrest is later held unconstitutional.

Bernstein v. Aivazis · filed 1983-07-27

The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a § 1983 claim even though the statute (or ordinance) under which the officer arrests is later declared unconstitutional.

Actual probable cause is an absolute defense to a Section 1983 claim challenging an arrest.

Roberts v. Hochstetler · filed 1983-09-12

The actual existence of probable cause is an absolute defense and bar to section 1983 actions.

In a § 1983 action for unlawful arrest, whether probable cause existed is generally a question for the jury because it turns on disputed factual matters, so summary judgment for the officers is appropriate only if no reasonable jury could find they lacked probable cause.

Mckenzie v. Lamb · filed 1984-07-24

By contrast, in a Sec. 1983 action the factual matters underlying the judgment of reasonableness generally mean that probable cause is a question for the jury, see Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 265 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829, 103 S.Ct. 65, 74 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Gilker, 576 F.2d at 247; and summary judgment is appropriate only if no reasonable jury could find that the officers did or did not have probable cause to arrest.

In a Section 1983 false-arrest damages action, probable cause is generally a jury question when material facts or credibility are disputed, though summary judgment remains available when no genuine dispute exists.

Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers · filed 1984-11-08

We concluded that the question of probable cause in a section 1983 damage suit is generally one for the jury, reasoning as follows: ... We do not hold that every civil case involving an issue of probable cause must be tried to a jury and cannot be resolved on summary judgment. ... To the contrary, where no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and where credibility conflicts are absent, summary judgment may be appropriate.

A lawful arrest supported by probable cause cannot support recovery under Section 1983 against any defendant.

Bodzin v. City of Dallas, Alonzo Burgin, Steven Padgett, and Skaggs Companies, Inc. · filed 1985-08-19

The arrest of Bodzin was lawful as a matter of law, and he cannot recover under § 1983 from any defendant.

Probable cause is an absolute bar to a Section 1983 unlawful-arrest claim.

McKeown v. Oglesby · filed 1986-04-22

The existence of probable cause is an absolute bar to a § 1983 unlawful arrest action.

A preliminary-hearing finding of no probable cause to bind a defendant over for trial does not resolve whether officers had probable cause for a warrantless arrest challenged under Section 1983.

Williams v. H. Wayne Kobel, Donald Blankenship, and Paul A. O'Neal · filed 1986-04-23

We hold that in a § 1983 action challenging probable cause in a warrantless arrest that a finding of no probable cause at the preliminary hearing does not resolve the issue of whether or not probable cause existed for the arrest in the view of the fact that that issue is not properly before the court in the absence of a specific motion challenging probable cause for arrest.

A guilty plea establishes probable cause and defeats a Section 1983 unlawful-arrest claim.

Padro v. Heffelfinger · filed 1986-05-06

Padro’s guilty plea is sufficient to establish that the arrest was made with probable cause.

A Section 1983 false-arrest claim is governed by whether the arrest was supported by probable cause and a good-faith belief in its lawfulness.

Washington v. Simpson · filed 1986-11-26

The standard for determining lawful arrest under both the section 1983 3 and the Arkansas tort claim is centered on the issue of good faith and probable cause.

A Section 1983 false-arrest claim is governed by whether the arrest was supported by probable cause and a good-faith belief in its lawfulness.

Washington v. Simpson · filed 1986-11-26

The test for lawful arrest under both Arkansas and federal constitutional law is similarly grounded on the existence of good faith and probable cause.

A Section 1983 false-arrest claim fails when the arrest was supported by probable cause because no federal constitutional right was deprived.

Clay v. Coolidge Conlee, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of St. Francis County, St. Francis · filed 1987-05-12

We hold that as a matter of law there was probable cause for Clay’s arrest. ... That being the case, his arrest did not deprive him of any federal constitutional right, and he thus has no cause of action against Conlee under § 1983.

Reasonable grounds for an investigatory detention defeat a § 1983 damages claim for unlawful detention even when the officer's suspicion ultimately proves mistaken.

Fulk v. Roberts · filed 1987-11-09

It is of no consequence that plaintiff was not in fact violating the law if there was a basis for believing he was. ... The existence of cause for any detention by a peace officer is an absolute bar to a claim for damages.

A city and arresting officer incur no § 1983 liability for an arrest supported by probable cause under a constitutional ordinance.

Hershey v. City of Clearwater, a Municipal Corporation, Tami Jo Swain · filed 1987-12-21

The city ordinance is therefore constitutional, and an arrest could properly be made for a seeming violation of such an enactment. There is thus no liability on the part of the city or on the part of the arresting officer to petitioner Hershey based on his claim of arrest under an unconstitutional ordinance.

An arrest without probable cause violates a clearly established Fourth Amendment right actionable under Section 1983, so an officer is not entitled to dismissal on qualified-immunity grounds merely as a matter of law.

White v. Taylor · filed 1988-01-13

It is clear that as a matter of law arrest without probable cause violates rights clearly established under the Fourth Amendment and that an officer who makes such an arrest is not entitled, solely as a matter of law, to qualified immunity.

A Section 1983 claim and recovery may be based on an arrest made without probable cause.

Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1988-01-21

It is, of course, well established that a Section 1983 action and recovery may be premised upon an arrest lacking probable cause.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim arising from a search, seizure, detention, or prosecution supported by probable cause, even if officers acted maliciously.

Schertz v. Waupaca County · filed 1988-03-22

probable cause is an absolute bar to a section 1983 claim arising out of a search, seizure, detention or prosecution regardless of the lack of good faith or malicious motives on the part of the law enforcement officers.

A certificate of probable cause to appeal is improper in a § 1983 action.

Isiah v. Williams v. Duane L. Water, M.D. · filed 1988-03-28

The district court was clearly correct in denying the application for the certificate of probable cause as improper in a Sec. 1983 action and, in any event, the order of denial was not an appealable order.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for extended detention without a prompt judicial determination of probable cause.

Katona v. City of Cheyenne · filed 1988-04-28

The Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended restraint of liberty following arrest. ... Violations of this requirement are redressable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

An arrest supported by probable cause under a statute presumptively valid at the time cannot support a Section 1983 claim.

Turner v. Dammon · filed 1988-05-03

The Female Sitters arrests were undisputedly made on probable cause and pursuant to a statute that was presumptively valid at the time. They cannot, therefore, be the basis of a valid Sec. 1983 claim.

In a § 1983 false arrest action, probable cause for a closely related charge can defeat the claim even if probable cause did not exist for the charge on which the plaintiff was arrested.

Biddle v. Amy J. Martin and Paul Lehmann · filed 1993-04-22

We also note that in § 1983 actions for false arrest, probable cause need not have existed for the charge for which the plaintiff was arrested, so long as probable cause existed for arrest on a closely related charge.

A certificate of probable cause to appeal is unnecessary in a Section 1983 action.

Seagle v. Thomas J. Merkel Sylvia Thibaut North Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 1994-08-16

"Because a certificate of probable cause to appeal is unnecessary in a Sec. 1983 action, we deny Appellant's motion for same"

Probable cause to arrest under an unconstitutional ordinance does not immunize defendants from liability under § 1983.

Charles M. Grossman, M.D. v. City of Portland, a Public Body, and Todd Davis · filed 1994-09-06

Therefore, a finding of probable cause under the ordinance in no way renders the arrest “privileged,” or immunizes the defendants from liability.

In a Section 1983 damages action, probable cause is a question of law for the court when the facts are undisputed or support only one reasonable inference.

Fleming v. Barry J. Harris, Serial 33096, Police Officer for the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department · filed 1994-12-16

Although probable cause in a section 1983 action is sometimes a jury question, when the issue of probable cause arises in a damage suit and the facts are not disputed or are susceptible to only one reasonable inference, the question is one of law for the court.

Probable cause is a defense to a false arrest claim under § 1983.

Breaux v. Jefferson Davis Sheriff's Department · filed 1997-02-05

Probable cause is a defense to a claim based on an alleged false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).

Probable cause is an absolute bar to a Section 1983 claim alleging false arrest.

Rankin v. Evans · filed 1998-01-29

Since probable cause constitutes an absolute bar to both state and § 1983 claims alleging false arrest, the remaining question for us to address is whether the trial court correctly concluded that probable cause did exist as a matter of law.

Probable cause bars § 1983 claims for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, even if the defendant acted with malicious motives.

Nugent v. Hayes · filed 2000-02-14

The Seventh Circuit has consistently held that “the existence of probable cause for an arrest totally precludes any Section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, regardless of whether the defendant had malicious motives for arresting the plaintiff.” ... To survive summary judgment, Mr. Nugent must therefore demonstrate he was arrested without probable cause.

A certificate of probable cause is not required in a § 1983 cause of action.

Rabalais v. Martinaze · filed 2000-02-15

A CPC is not necessary in a § 1983 cause of action.

Probable cause insulates a police officer from liability in a § 1983 action.

Holcomb v. Oliver · filed 2001-12-03

No plain error occurred as probable cause does insulate a police officer from liability in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 bars an unlawful arrest claim when the officers had probable cause for the arrest.

Ochana v. Flores · filed 2002-04-11

If a defendant can establish probable cause for the arrest, a plaintiff is absolutely barred from maintaining an unlawful arrest claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits officers sued for false arrest or imprisonment to assert a probable-cause defense.

Banish v. Locks · filed 1969-07-16

The Supreme Court indicated in Pierson Ray, supra, that the same principles v. governing tort liability traditionally, apply to Civil Rights actions brought under section 1983. ... These facts, plus the many others before the court, unequivocally support the court’s conclusion that as a matter of law probable cause for the arrest existed.

Probable cause is a defense to a § 1983 claim based on false arrest when it would defeat the underlying false-arrest claim.

Christine Hunter and Barbara Jean Mims v. George A. Clardy, Kenneth F. Copeland · filed 1977-08-29

There, we held that where the defense of probable cause is available to negate a charge of false arrest, it is also a defense under a § 1983 claim based on an alleged false arrest. ... Here, on the facts as found by the district court, a criminal offense (simple battery, see Ga.Code Ann. § 26-1304) was committed in the presence (and on the person) of the arresting officer, thereby justifying arrest without warrant under Ga.Code Ann. § 27-207.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a warrantless arrest without probable cause, while probable cause bars a false arrest action.

Misty Kingsland v. City of Miami · filed 2004-08-31

A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Constitution and provides a basis for a section 1983 claim. ... The existence of probable cause at the time of arrest, however, constitutes an absolute bar to a section 1983 action for false arrest.

An initial conviction establishes probable cause against a Section 1983 claim for arrest without probable cause when the conviction is later set aside without a finding of innocence after a trial on the merits.

Robert Brown Arthur James v. Daniel Willey, Originally Sued as David Willey · filed 2004-12-15

We agree with the district court that the initial convictions were sufficient in this case to prove probable cause, ... because the initial convictions were not “subsequently overturned upon a finding of innocence following a trial on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction,” Rogers v. Carter, 133 F.3d 1114, 1117 (8th Cir.1998).

Section 1983 provides a false arrest claim for which probable cause is a complete defense.

Rizzo Ex Rel. Rizzo v. Edison Inc. · filed 2005-03-10

“Probable cause to arrest ‘constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest, whether that action is brought under state law or § 1983.’”

In a Section 1983 damages suit, a court may decide probable cause on summary judgment when the evidence viewed favorably to the plaintiff cannot support a contrary finding.

Taylor v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2005-07-28

“Although, generally, ‘the question of probable cause in a Section 1983 damage suit is one for the jury,’ Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir.1998), a district court may conclude ‘that probable cause did exist as a matter of law if the evidence, viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably would not support a contrary factual finding,’ and may enter summary judgment accordingly.” Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir.1997)). That is the case here, as the District Court correctly held.

Section 1983 permits a person to recover for a state actor's deprivation of constitutional rights, including an arrest made without probable cause.

Holton v. Mohon · filed 1987-09-08

To prevail on a § 1983 claim for false arrest, Plaintiff must prove that the officer made the arrest without probable cause.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 false arrest claim must show that the arrest lacked probable cause.

Sullivan v. City of Pembroke Pines · filed 2006-01-12

To prove a § 1983 claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must demonstrate the absence of probable cause.

Section 1983 retaliation claims that do not rest on a retaliatory prosecution theory fall outside Hartman’s probable-cause rule when the claimed damages do not result from criminal charges pursued by a prosecuting agency.

Grassilli v. Barr · filed 2006-09-13

In upholding the jury’s liability finding, we reject defendants’ argument based on Hartman v. Moore (2006) 547 U.S. 250 [164 L.Ed.2d 441, 126 S.Ct. 1695], that the judgment must be reversed because Grassilli did not prove that the officers lacked probable cause when they participated in the law enforcement contacts forming the basis for the section 1983 action. We conclude Hartman is inapplicable to most of Grassilli’s claims because these claims were not brought on a retaliatory prosecution theory and the claimed damages did not result from criminal charges pursued by a prosecuting agency.

Section 1983 does not permit a false arrest claim when a guilty plea establishes probable cause for a related charge arising from the same incident.

Gray v. Burke · filed 2006-10-31

Since pleading guilty to the disorderly conduct charge established probable cause for the theft of services charge, plaintiff is now precluded from bringing a section 1983 claim for false arrest for theft of services.

Probable cause defeats a § 1983 false arrest claim as a matter of law.

Lorenzo v. City of Tampa · filed 2007-12-17

A conclusion that probable cause existed as a matter of law will defeat both a state law and a § 1983 false arrest claim.

Probable cause is an absolute bar to a false arrest claim under Section 1983.

Fronczak v. Pinellas County Florida · filed 2008-03-24

The existence of probable cause creates “an absolute bar to a section 1983 action for false arrest.” Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1990).

Section 1983 provides a claim for a wrongful arrest when police lacked probable cause.

Parsons v. City of Pontiac · filed 2008-07-22

In order for a wrongful arrest claim to succeed under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the police lacked probable cause.

Section 1983 permits a claim for wrongful arrest when police lacked probable cause, subject to qualified immunity.

Parsons v. City of Pontiac · filed 2008-07-22

We ultimately conclude that this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Parsons, is not susceptible to only one reasonable determination—that the detectives had probable cause to arrest Parsons.

Section 1983 permits claims for constitutional deprivations, and probable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim.

Montano, Esteban v. City of Chicago · filed 2008-07-23

Because the existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a § 1983 false-arrest claim, Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006), summary judgment is proper if the record establishes that “at the moment the arrest was made[,] . . . the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge . . . were sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing” Ruiz and Mendez committed the offense of drinking in a public way.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state actors for violating constitutional rights through an arrest without probable cause.

Hale v. Fish · filed 1990-04-30

The district court did not err in holding Major Jones and Special Agent Magee liable under § 1983 for their arrest, without probable cause, of the plaintiffs. Major Jones and Special Agent Magee were not entitled to qualified immunity, as the district court properly held.

Section 1983 bars false arrest and false imprisonment claims when probable cause exists.

Corines v. Broward County Sheriff's Department · filed 2009-04-14

The existence of probable cause creates an absolute bar to an action for false arrest and false imprisonment under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an unlawful arrest claim when probable cause exists.

Simmons v. Ronald Pryor and City of Evanston · filed 1994-06-08

In order to prevail in an unlawful arrest action, the plaintiff must show lack of probable cause.

Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to a § 1983 false arrest claim.

Mutter v. Sanders · filed 2009-05-04

The existence of probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any claim under section 1983 for false arrest.

Probable cause is an absolute bar to a § 1983 false arrest claim.

Phillips v. Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission · filed 2009-05-06

Probable cause is an absolute bar to a Section 1983 claim alleging false arrest.

Section 1983 permits a false arrest claim for a warrantless arrest without probable cause, but probable cause bars the claim.

Baker v. Moskau · filed 2009-06-30

A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Constitution and provides a basis for a section 1983 claim, but the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest constitutes an absolute bar to a section 1983 action for false arrest.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed when probable cause for the plaintiff’s arrest and detention has been conclusively established.

Martin v. Rosenzweig · filed 2010-02-04

Thus, plaintiff cannot meet his evidentiary burden with respect to the 42 USC § 1983 cause of action and Supreme Court should have granted defendants’ motion dismissing that cause of action.

Section 1983 does not allow a false arrest claim when probable cause existed, and the plaintiff must prove its absence.

Larsen v. Village of Elk Grove Village · filed 2011-07-27

The existence of probable cause bars a claim under § 1983 for false arrest, and the plaintiff carries the burden of establishing the absence of probable cause.

Probable cause is a complete defense to a Section 1983 false arrest claim.

Riccio v. New York · filed 2012-05-10

The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a § 1983 claim for false arrest. ... This Court finds Defendants had probable cause to arrest and charge Plaintiff for the crime of aggravated harassment in the second degree under New York law.

Probable cause is an absolute bar to a § 1983 claim based on a warrantless arrest.

Robert Holt, Jr. v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-08-08

A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and provides the basis for a § 1983 claim. Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1990). But the existence of probable cause is an absolute bar to such a claim.

A conviction for the offense of arrest conclusively establishes probable cause and defeats a § 1983 false arrest claim.

Stephens v. Broward Sheriff's Office · filed 2014-12-10

Accordingly, the conviction stands and the Court holds that probable cause has been conclusively established, defeating the Plaintiffs § 1983 claim for unlawful seizure.

Probable cause is a defense to a Section 1983 false arrest claim.

Plude v. Adams · filed 2015-03-09

Probable cause is a defense to both a Section 1983 claim of false arrest and a common law claim for malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 false arrest claims are defeated when probable cause justifies the seizure.

Peterson-Hagendorf v. City of New York · filed 2015-11-30

Accordingly, probable cause, which justifies a seizure, is a complete defense to that claim. ... F.S.’s complaint established probable cause for Plaintiffs arrest.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a false arrest claim to prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest.

Buchanan v. Metz · filed 2016-05-11

To prevail on a false arrest claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff [must] prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.”

Probable cause is a complete defense to a § 1983 claim for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Semmig v. Charlack · filed 2016-10-12

The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to a cause of action alleging false arrest ... including a cause of action asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to recover damages for the deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law that is the federal-law equivalent of a state common-law false arrest cause of action (see Betts v Shearman, 751 F3d 78, 82 [2d Cir 2014]; see also Jenkins v City of New York, 478 F3d 76, 84 [2d Cir 2007]).

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a false arrest when probable cause existed.

Ewell v. Toney · filed 2017-04-10

Probable cause is an absolute defense to claims of wrongful or false arrest under the Fourth Amendment in section ... 1983 suits.

Probable cause is a complete defense to Section 1983 claims for Fourth Amendment false arrest and malicious prosecution.

Ball v. Miller · filed 2018-08-22

"The [*2]existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution" ( Paulos v City of New York, 122 AD3d 815, 817; see Shaw v City of New York, 139 AD3d 698, 699; Batten v City of New York, 133 AD3d 803, 805), "including causes of action asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to recover damages for the deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law that are the federal-law equivalents of state common-law false arrest and malicious prosecution causes of action" ( Paulos v City of New York, 122 AD3d at 817).

Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to a Section 1983 false-arrest claim against police officers.

Milhouse v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation · filed 2019-09-20

“Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any claim under Section 1983 against police officers for wrongful arrest.”

Probable cause is a complete defense to Section 1983 claims equivalent to common-law false arrest or malicious prosecution claims.

Burns v. City of New York · filed 2020-03-04

The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution ( see Gisondi v Town of Harrison , 72 NY2d 280, 283; Williams v City of New York , 153 AD3d 1301, 1302; Shaw v City of New York , 139 AD3d 698, 699; Batten v City of New York , 133 AD3d 803, 805), including causes of action asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to recover damages for the deprivation of federal constitutional rights under color of state law when they are the federal law equivalents of state common-law false arrest and malicious prosecution causes of action ( see Betts v Shearman , 751 F3d 78, 82 [2d Cir]; Williams v City of New York , 153 AD3d at 1302-1303; Paulos v City of New York , 122 AD3d 815, 817).

Probable cause to arrest is a complete defense to a false arrest claim under § 1983.

Harrison v. Cty. of Nassau · filed 2020-03-12

And probable cause to arrest is a complete defense to such a claim brought under either § 1983 or New York law.

In a § 1983 false-arrest case, the court decides the ultimate probable-cause question when the historical facts are undisputed.

Gerics v. Trevino · filed 2020-09-11

Thus, we conclude that the ultimate question of probable cause (separate from the determination of historical facts) in a civil case when the historical facts are undisputed is a question of law for the court and not a jury.

An officer with at least arguable probable cause to arrest is protected by qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim.

Germany v. City of Huntsville · filed 2020-12-29

Therefore, the Court finds that Hall had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Germany thereby barring any § 1983 claim for false arrest.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim based on a delayed disciplinary hearing when the prisoner had no clearly established due process right to a timely hearing at the time.

Allen v. Jack McCormick Gary Weer L.E. Bearley · filed 1997-07-17

We conclude Allen has failed to show that, as of 1992, he had a clearly established due process right to a timely disciplinary hearing. See Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 698 (9th Cir.1997) (stating that prisoner bears initial burden of proving defendants violated clearly established right); Blueford, 108 F.3d at 255; Malik, 71 F.3d at 727. Accordingly, we REVERSE the order of the district court denying Appellants qualified immunity, and we REMAND with instructions to grant Appellants qualified immunity.

A correctional officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 retaliation claim when clearly established law prohibited filing a false disciplinary charge in retaliation for an inmate’s grievance.

Moore v. Clazona J. Hall · filed 1997-08-29

We further find that Hicks is not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim, as the law at the time was clearly established that officers could not file false conduct violations against inmates in retaliation for an inmate&s grievances.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison officials from a § 1983 claim for denying an inmate a witness at a disciplinary hearing when the right to call witnesses, subject to institutional safety and correctional goals, was clearly established at the time.

Smith v. Maschner · filed 1996-01-11

The court concludes that plaintiff has met his burden of repudiating defendants’ defense of qualified immunity by showing that the core right of a prison inmate to call witnesses at prison disciplinary proceedings, except for reasons related to institutional safety or correctional goals, was clearly established at the time of the actions complained of herein. Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is denied.

Prison officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their interpretation and application of disciplinary rules is objectively reasonable, even if arguably wrong.

Lee Moorman, Jr. v. Thalacker · filed 1996-05-14

Qualified immunity protects prison officials from liability for their objectively reasonable efforts to divine whether a course of conduct amounts to an "attempt," even should their answer be arguably wrong.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields prison officials who reasonably interpret and apply prison disciplinary rules when no clearly established judicial interpretation forecloses their reading.

Moorman v. Thalacker · filed 1996-05-14

Where there is no clearly established judicial interpretation to the contrary, we defer to prison officials' interpretation and application of their rules to the facts so long as that interpretation and application is not objectively unreasonable.

Section 1983 did not provide a cognizable claim for the alleged constitutional violations in these prison disciplinary hearings and subsequent administrative appeals.

Williams v. Harms · filed 1998-02-20

With respect to Williams's claims that his constitutional rights were violated during the course of two disciplinary hearings and the administrative appeals that followed, the district court did not err by dismissing these claims because they are not cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to recover at least nominal damages for a proven denial of due process in a disciplinary proceeding if the claim would not necessarily invalidate the proceeding’s result.

Collier v. Dragoo · filed 1998-07-30

A prisoner is entitled to recover at least nominal damages under § 1983 if he can prove a denial of due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding that would not necessarily invalidate the result of the proceeding.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages action for the prison disciplinary proceeding addressed in this opinion.

Wallace v. Bell · filed 1998-12-10

Wallace’s arguments regarding the prison grievance procedure lack a factual foundation, and his action for damages resulting from the disciplinary proceeding is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

A prisoner's due process challenge to a disciplinary proceeding may be premature under § 1983.

Flowers v. Collins · filed 1999-02-12

Flowers’ claim of a denial of due process at the disciplinary proceeding is not yet cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims challenging adverse prison disciplinary rulings are subject to Heck’s requirements.

Murphy v. Stewart · filed 1999-12-16

Murphy has failed to meet the requirements of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). See Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998)(holding that Heck includes adverse rulings in prison disciplinary proceedings), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1052 (1999).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging prison disciplinary proceedings when success would imply the disciplinary conviction was invalid, unless that conviction has previously been invalidated.

Cole v. Loock · filed 2000-04-21

In order for Cole to succeed on his § 1983 claims, federal law requires that he first prove in a prior separate action that the disciplinary proceedings which he alleges deprived him of his civil rights were invalid.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for the prisoner's challenge to his disciplinary proceedings.

Peterson v. Rogers · filed 2000-05-12

Further, to the extent that Peterson seeks to challenge the disciplinary proceedings against him, such relief is not properly sought under § 1983.

A prisoner challenging procedural defects in disciplinary hearings must satisfy the preconditions for bringing a Section 1983 claim.

Sheppard v. Shaffer · filed 1997-12-01

Sheppard has not met the required ... preconditions to bring a section 1983 claim on these grounds.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to the procedures used in a prison disciplinary hearing when the plaintiff does not seek to invalidate the disciplinary decision.

Williams v. Wilkinson · filed 2000-11-29

Here, in contrast to Huey, Mr. Williams is not attacking the “judgment of the state agency,” but the process that was used in reaching that judgment. Mr. Williams claims that he was not permitted to call two witnesses at his hearing, Allen Williams and Ms. Sharpe, but does not claim that he is innocent of the charge. And, in his demand for relief, Mr. Williams asks for monetary damages and injunctive relief, but does not ask this Court invalidate the RIB’s decision as the plaintiff in Huey did. The Court, therefore, finds that Huey is not applicable to the present case and DENIES the Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Reconsideration.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to prison disciplinary procedures when success would imply that the disciplinary conviction and punishment were invalid, unless the conviction has been overturned.

Smith v. Corrections Corp. · filed 2001-02-28

A challenge to the procedures used in a prison disciplinary hearing is not cognizable under § 1983 if a judgment in favor of the prisoner would imply that the prisoner’s conviction and punishment was invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for monetary and equitable relief based only on procedural defects in a prison disciplinary hearing when success would imply that the punishment was invalid.

Johnson v. Moore · filed 2001-03-20

A claim for monetary and equitable relief complaining only of procedural defects in a prison disciplinary hearing which, if established, would imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not yet permit the prisoner’s due process and insufficient evidence claims arising from his prison disciplinary proceedings.

Galvan v. Downs · filed 2001-04-12

Galvan’s claims of a denial of due process and insufficient evidence in connection with his prison disciplinary proceedings are not yet cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to prison disciplinary procedures unless the proceeding’s result has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Wilson v. TX Bd of Cr Justice · filed 2002-03-22

A challenge to the procedures used in a prison disciplinary proceedings is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the result of such proceeding has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to a prison disciplinary proceeding that extends incarceration only after the proceeding has been successfully challenged through administrative or habeas proceedings.

Griffin v. Goord · filed 2003-05-01

As the district court correctly observed, a disciplinary proceeding that extends the term of incarceration may not be challenged in a § 1983 action unless it has already been successfully challenged in administrative or habeas proceedings.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a prison disciplinary procedure when success would not necessarily invalidate a disciplinary action affecting the fact or length of confinement.

Crawford v. Tasista · filed 2003-10-17

Our recent decision in Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir.2003), however, holds that Edwards does not preclude a prisoner’s section 1983 action challenging a prison disciplinary procedure that, if successful, would not necessarily invalidate a disciplinary action that affects the fact or length of confinement. Consequently, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Section 1983 does not make claims about the process received at a prison disciplinary hearing cognizable when barred under Edwards and Heck.

Houser v. Parker · filed 2003-10-31

Houser’s claims surrounding the process he received at the disciplinary hearing are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit the due process challenge to a prison disciplinary proceeding addressed here.

Sheffield v. Twaddle · filed 2005-08-16

The district court also properly dismissed Sheffield’s claim that his due process rights were violated ... during a disciplinary proceeding on the basis that such a claim may not be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a due process challenge to prison discipline that revoked good-time credits unless the punishment has been invalidated.

Bachman v. Kuhn · filed 2006-02-22

Bachman’s due process claim challenged the propriety of a disciplinary proceeding that resulted in the loss of 360 days of good-time credit. The district court properly dismissed this claim because Bachman did not allege that this punishment had been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit damages or declaratory relief for a prison disciplinary proceeding that cost good-time credits when a favorable judgment would imply the invalidity of the conviction or duration of confinement, unless the relevant conviction has been reversed.

Coleman v. Department of Public Safety & Corrections · filed 2007-06-19

If a prisoner is ... challenging the validity of the procedures used in a prison disciplinary proceeding to deprive him of good-time credits and a favorable judgment would imply the invalidity of the conviction or the duration of confinement, his claims for damages and declaratory relief are not cognizable in a § 1983 action until the relevant conviction has been reversed.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim for failure to provide a written statement of the evidence relied on in a prison disciplinary proceeding.

Mahogany v. Stalder · filed 2007-09-18

Therefore, a claim for damages based on a failure to receive a written statement of the evidence relied on in a prison disciplinary proceeding is cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 may provide damages for deficient prison disciplinary procedures if the claim does not implicate the validity of the disciplinary conviction or affect the sentence’s duration.

Rosin v. Rick Thaler, Director · filed 2011-03-14

Moreover, Rosin’s request for damages on the basis that his disciplinary proceedings did not meet minimum standards of procedural due process may be cognizable in a § 1983 suit as long as it does not implicate the validity of the disciplinary conviction or affect the duration of Rosin’s sentence.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to pursue an action over prison discipline when the disciplinary findings were invalidated before suit and lost good-time credits were restored.

Cobb v. Woodford · filed 2011-03-18

As Cobb argued in his motion for reconsideration, however, he was not challenging any loss of good-time credits. Cobb demonstrates in his complaint and the attachments thereto that the disciplinary findings were invalidated through the inmate appeals process prior to his filing this action and that his good-time credits were restored. Therefore, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (“§ 1983 remains available for procedural challenges where success in the action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner”) (emphasis omitted)).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for false disciplinary charges that would imply the invalidity of a punishment involving lost good-time credits unless the disciplinary decision has been overturned.

Freeman v. Lesley Sims · filed 2014-03-07

Contrary to Freeman’s assertions, his claim of false charges, if credited, necessarily implies the finding of guilt and punishment for the violation, which included the loss of good-time credits. Because Freeman did not show that the disciplinary decision had been overturned, the district court did not err in dismissing this claim.

A Section 1983 plaintiff may pursue claims about prison disciplinary sanctions affecting conditions of confinement by permanently waiving claims about sanctions affecting the duration of confinement.

Randolph v. Prieur · filed 2019-08-22

Given Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court has liberally construed his statements as "abandoning, not just now, but also in any future proceeding, any claims he may have with respect to the duration of his confinement" that arose out of Plaintiff's May 20, 2017 proceeding. ... Based upon the foregoing, all claims set forth in the Complaint related to disciplinary sanctions imposed on Plaintiff, which affect the duration of his confinement, are dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for a prisoner to challenge the loss of privileges imposed after a disciplinary hearing.

Urena v. Annucci · filed 2020-10-23

Petitioner’s claim(s) involving loss of privilege are more appropriately presented in a 42 U.S.C. §1983 action. ... For these reasons, the Court adopts MJ McCarthy’s R & R in its entirety.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary proceeding when the punishment does not affect the duration of custody.

Fleming v. Indiana Department of Correction · filed 2020-12-21

Mr. Fleming’s punishment did not involve earned time credits or otherwise affect the duration of his custody. ... He thus may proceed under § 1983.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law gave them notice that knowingly delaying treatment for a detainee’s urgent medical needs violated due process.

Lancaster v. Monroe County · filed 1997-07-11

To summarize, a jury reasonably could find that: (1) each of the individual defendants knew Lancaster had urgent medical needs that would be significantly exacerbated by delay, and (2) each of the defendants delayed obtaining treatment for Lancaster until after he suffered a seizure. Because the law clearly established that such conduct violated a pre-trial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Private companies and their employees that contract to provide prison medical services for profit without close government supervision cannot claim qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Vista McDuffie v. Hopper · filed 1997-10-23

Richardson farther makes clear that those who contract to engage in government services without supervision, and for profit in a competitive marketplace, subject themselves to liability under § 1983 without the protections of immunity. CMS and its employees are within Richardson's holding. They are, therefore, not entitled to claim the protections of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity may be denied at summary judgment on a § 1983 claim alleging constitutionally inadequate prison medical care.

Rouse v. Plantier · filed 1997-12-05

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their defense of qualified immunity to Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims will be denied as to Defendants, Plan-tier, Dr. Cardinale, Dr. Reddy, and Nurse Allen, and dismissed as moot as to Defendant, Fauver.