42 U.S.C. § 1983

A plaintiff bringing an action under § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies.

STS Management Development Inc. v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance · filed 1997-03-24

Initially, we note that in an action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 the plaintiffs are not required to exhaust their administrative remedies (see, 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, cert denied 481 US 1008; Zinermon v Burch, 494 US 113, 124).

Section 1983 claims concerning a child’s special education require exhaustion of IDEA administrative remedies before suit.

Tyson v. Kanawha County Board of Education · filed 1997-04-29

The Court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs must exhaust their administrative remedies in order to maintain any or all of their claims, including those claims arising under the Rehab Act, Title II of the ADA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suing over violations of the Medicare Act’s nursing home resident rights provisions.

Talbot v. Lucy Corr Nursing Home · filed 1997-07-01

In the face of the strong presumption against requiring the exhaus- tion of state administrative remedies in § 1983 suits, the existence of these state administrative review procedures does not suffice to evi- dence Congress' intent to implicitly create an exhaustion requirement for claims asserted under the resident rights provisions of the Medi- care Act pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs alleging constitutional violations to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing in federal court.

Franzon v. Massena Memorial Hospital · filed 1997-08-08

In the present case, plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim alleges violations of Franzon’s constitutional rights; therefore, Franzon should not be required to exhaust his state administrative remedies before filing in federal court.

Section 1983 does not require nonprisoner plaintiffs to exhaust union arbitration remedies before bringing their claims in federal court.

Knight v. Kenai Peninsula Borough School District · filed 1997-12-08

Congress imposed only a limited exhaustion requirement on actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as this case was. The statute requires exhaustion only when brought by prisoners. Thus, mandating exhaustion in this case would not be consistent with congressional intent.

Section 1983 does not require administrative exhaustion before filing a federal action.

Bromley v. Michigan Education Ass'n-NEA · filed 1998-02-10

Under existing circuit law, there is no administrative exhaustion requirement to file a federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 ordinarily does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies, but a plaintiff may not use it to circumvent the EAHCA’s exhaustion requirement for an equal-protection claim based on the same educational-placement dispute.

Mitchell Ex Rel. Mitchell v. Walter · filed 1982-05-14

Although § 1983 is generally held not to entail any requirement that a plaintiff exhaust state administrative remedies, ... For this reason, the Court holds that plaintiff’s equal protection claim must be dismissed due to plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their remedies under the EAHCA.

Section 1983 claims seeking relief also available under the EAHCA require exhaustion of the EAHCA's administrative procedures.

Laura v. v. Providence School Board · filed 1988-02-26

What this all means is that prior to instituting a civil action “under such laws” as provide relief which is also available under § 1415 (e.g. § 1983), a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies “to the same extent” as would have been required “had the action been brought” under § 1415.

Section 1983 claims seeking relief also available under the IDEA require exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative remedies.

Association for Community Living in Colorado v. Romer · filed 1993-04-27

A plaintiff must exhaust these same remedies before bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for relief that is also available under the IDEA.

A Section 1983 claim wholly derivative of an EAHCA claim cannot proceed until the EAHCA administrative remedies are exhausted, even when the claim seeks monetary damages unavailable under the EAHCA.

Dewayne Moore, by and Through His Parents and Next Friends, Ralph and Linda Moore v. Harriman City Schools Roane County · filed 1994-01-21

The district court found that, as the civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is entirely derivative of the EAHCA claim, it may not go forward until the EAHCA exhaustion requirement is satisfied. The fact that the Moores seek a type of relief not available under the Act, namely, monetary damages, is not controlling. To hold otherwise would allow EAHCA plaintiffs "to frustrate Congressional purpose by bypassing the administrative process in virtually every case containing" damage claims derived from the Act.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional claim concerning a student residency determination when IDEA administrative procedures and judicial review are unavailable for that challenge.

Catlin v. Sobol · filed 1995-03-30

Therefore, the court holds that neither the administrative procedures in § 1415(b)(2) nor the corresponding judicial review provided for in § 1415(e)(2) are “available” to plaintiffs in this case, and plaintiffs’ consequent resort to § 1983 to pursue their constitutional claims is proper.

Section 1983 claims seeking relief also available under the IDEA are subject to the IDEA’s administrative exhaustion requirement.

Schlude v. Northeast Central School District · filed 1995-07-24

Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is subject to the same exhaustion requirement as her IDEA claims.

Section 1983 claims seeking relief for alleged failures to provide appropriate special education require exhaustion of IDEA administrative remedies before suit.

Frith v. Galeton Area School District · filed 1995-09-20

Courts have uniformly held that plaintiffs are precluded from seeking relief in state or federal court under the IDEA or section 1983 until they have exhausted their administrative remedies.

Section 1983 claims generally do not require exhaustion of state remedies, but claims that could have been brought under the IDEA must first exhaust IDEA remedies.

Campbell v. NYE County School Dist. · filed 1995-10-10

A Sec. 1983 claimant is not normally required to exhaust state remedies, Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Assoc., 496 U.S. 498, 523 (1990), although a court may in its discretion so require, Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir.1992). ... However, if a Sec. 1983 claim could have been brought under the IDEA, the plaintiff must jump the exhaustion hurdle just as if she had brought the suit under the IDEA.

Section 1983 supplies no independent jurisdictional basis and cannot support a damages claim when the plaintiff has not exhausted the IDEA administrative process.

Doe v. Vernon Parish School Board · filed 1996-06-04

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide an independent jurisdictional basis for this suit. Plaintiff's present inability to institute suit under the IDEA, precludes a claim for damages under § 1983.

A court may require a prisoner pursuing Section 1983 relief to demonstrate administrative exhaustion under 42 U.S.C. § 1997 and may dismiss without prejudice when the prisoner fails to comply with that order.

Williams v. E.M. Grizzard Dave Bass Edward Jones · filed 1986-09-23

The district court could properly require Williams to demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997. The court's dismissal of Williams' complaint, without prejudice, when Williams failed to comply with its order that he establish exhaustion, was not an abuse of discretion.

A court may require a prisoner pursuing Section 1983 relief to demonstrate administrative exhaustion under 42 U.S.C. § 1997 and may dismiss without prejudice when the prisoner fails to comply with that order.

Headley v. David A. Garraghty, Warden Ed Wright, Assistant Warden Michael C. Samberg, Waden Allyn R. Sielaff · filed 1986-09-12

The district court could properly require that Headley demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997. The court's dismissal without prejudice of Headley's complaint, when Headley failed to comply with its order, was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1983 requires a federal court to hear a prisoner's suit when no adequate state administrative or judicial remedy is available.

Essex Ray v. Harry Fritz, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility · filed 1972-10-19

All the members of this panel agree that in the absence of an adequate state administrative or judicial remedy, a federal court must hear a suit by a prisoner under section 1983.

Before exercising jurisdiction over a prisoner's § 1983 complaint, a court may require exhaustion of an available state administrative remedy, even when the complaint seeks only monetary damages.

McCray v. Burrell · filed 1973-10-16

Therefore, this Court concludes that before it will exercise jurisdiction over a prisoner § 1983 complaint, the inmate must exhaust the available state administrative remedy provided by the Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission procedure. Even if the complaint seeks only monetary damages, this avenue of relief should be exhausted.

Section 1983 prisoner civil-rights claims may be dismissed without prejudice until the prisoner exhausts an available state administrative remedy.

Hyde v. Fitzberger · filed 1973-11-07

The time is now for such a reevaluation. The basic argument is and must be that the Commission is by far faster and more effective in dealing with such complaints. Plaintiff loses nothing since he may always seek federal relief if he is unsuccessful administratively. ... The policing of the results of the Commissions’ work by the Federal District Court is, of course, necessary to avoid deterioration of its noble efforts at conciliation into a mere formal prerequisite for federal relief. To this end, no civil rights complaint is foreclosed from being brought in federal court, merely possibly postponed. ... For the reasons hereinabove stated, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice to its reinstitution upon exhaustion of the administrative remedy provided by Chapter 210 of the Laws of Maryland, 1971, to wit: The Inmate Grievance Commission.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for a state prisoner's claim to compensation for labor when the alleged right arises only under state law, and exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required before bringing the action.

Borror v. White · filed 1974-06-06

If petitioner has any “right” to payment for his services as unit barber, it is derived from the laws of Virginia, and is not a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... This court will not require that petitioner exhaust the administrative steps that he is entitled to pursue under Virginia’s inmate grievance procedure before he is heard in a § 1983 action — although he is certainly encouraged to go that route initially with his complaint.

Section 1983 prisoner suits require exhaustion of available state administrative remedies when those remedies provide a fair and adequate remedy.

Washington v. Boslow · filed 1974-05-22

Since exhaustion will be required by this Court, the only remaining issue is whether the Inmate Grievance Commission Act in the instant case accords the plaintiff a fair and adequate remedy.

Section 1983 does not require a prisoner to exhaust available state administrative remedies before bringing a federal action.

McCRAY v. BURRELL · filed 1975-04-10

The holding that exhaustion is required may be reached only by either legislation conditioning resort to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon the exhaustion of available administrative remedies, or by the Supreme Court's re-examination and modification of its controlling adjudications on the subject. Congress has not enacted such legislation. The Supreme Court has not yet begun a re-examination of its previous holdings and we have no basis on which to predict that it will, or, if so, with what result. We think that we have no alternative but to hold that exhaustion may not be required.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner challenging conditions of confinement to sue without exhausting state administrative remedies, regardless of their adequacy.

Hardwick v. Dr. Allen Ault, Commissioner, State Board of Offender Rehabilitation, Etc. · filed 1975-08-08

Accordingly, he may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without exhausting state administrative remedies, regardless of their adequacy.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies such as an inmate grievance procedure.

Forts v. Ward · filed 1977-06-17

There is no requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedies such as an inmate grievance procedure.

Section 1983 does not require a state prisoner to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing a federal action.

United States v. Lightcap · filed 1977-12-14

The general rule in actions under section 1983 is that state remedies need not be exhausted as a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff, including a state prisoner, to exhaust state administrative remedies before seeking a federal remedy.

United States ex rel. Ricketts v. Lightcap · filed 1977-12-14

The general rule in actions under section 1983 is that state remedies need not be exhausted as a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction. ... The Supreme Court later extended this rule specifically to include exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a prisoner challenging conditions of confinement to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing suit.

Arthur Mitchell, Gregory Robertson, and William Birtha v. Beaubouef · filed 1978-09-18

Further, in civil rights litigation challenging the conditions of confinement under section 1983, a prisoner is not obligated to exhaust state administrative remedies.

For a prisoner seeking redress for low-value personal-property deprivations, § 1983 requires exhaustion of available state administrative procedures before filing in federal court.

McKeever v. Israel · filed 1979-10-01

In summary, the Court has today held that when a prisoner seeks redress for alleged deprivations of items of personal property lacking substantial value, he must first exhaust state administrative procedures before filing an action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

For a prisoner action brought under § 1983, the court may require exhaustion of available administrative remedies only under § 1997e's conditions and may continue the action for up to 90 days rather than dismiss it for nonexhaustion.

Kennedy v. Ed Herschler · filed 1981-07-27

In addition, the exhaustion requirement specifies that the court shall continue the matter for a period not to exceed ninety days. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1). As we read the statute, there is no congressional intent to authorize dismissal of a § 1983 action, only continuance of the matter for a period not to exceed ninety days for purposes of administrative exhaustion.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing a nonprisoner action.

United Church Of The Medical Center v. Medical Center Commission · filed 1982-09-23

Patsy is fully dispositive of the exhaustion question in the instant case. We conclude, therefore, that the district court erred in dismissing the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 3 and turn to consider whether the court erred in denying preliminary injunctive relief.

Section 1983 generally allows a prisoner to bring a damages claim about confinement conditions without first exhausting state judicial or administrative remedies.

McKinnis Jr. v. Mosely · filed 1982-12-13

In general, petitioners who base jurisdiction on section 1983 need not exhaust either state judicial remedies or state administrative remedies. ... Therefore, the district court should have reviewed this case on the basis of its sufficiency as a section 1983 action.

Under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, a district court may stay a prisoner’s § 1983 suit for up to 90 days to require exhaustion of certified administrative remedies when appropriate and in the interest of justice.

Winslow v. Murray · filed 1987-05-11

Under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1997 et seq., a district court may stay a prisoner suit brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for up to 90 days in order to require the prisoner to exhaust his administrative remedies, if the court believes that such a requirement is appropriate and in the interest of justice.

A district court may require a prisoner bringing a § 1983 action to exhaust administrative remedies under § 1997e and dismiss without prejudice when the prisoner does not comply.

Bryant v. Warden of Brunswick Correctional Center · filed 1987-12-14

The district court could properly require exhaustion of administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e. Its dismissal of the action, without prejudice, when Bryant failed to comply with its order that he establish exhaustion, was not an abuse of discretion.

A prisoner claiming that his prison file contains misinformation must seek its removal through prison administrative remedies before pursuing relief under § 1983.

Young v. Preston Bunch, Dena Whitley · filed 1988-05-04

A review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses that this appeal from its order denying relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is without merit. ... To the extent that Young claims the existence of misinformation in his prison file, he must exhaust his administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion under the good-time-credit rule when administrative reversal has restored the prisoner’s good time credits.

Sprouse v. David Babcock, Charles Harper and Ronald G. Welder · filed 1989-03-20

Because the administrative reversal of the disciplinary decision restored Sprouse’s good time credits, he is not faced with an exhaustion-of-state remedies problem under Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir.1987) (state prisoner bringing section 1983 action must satisfy exhaustion requirement if judgment for prisoner in such action would have preclusive effect in subsequent habeas action for restoration of good time credits).

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state remedies, but a district court may require an inmate to exhaust certified prison administrative remedies.

Williams v. E. Wright, Warden, J. Smith, Regional Administrator, J. Warren, Food Service Manager · filed 1989-03-24

Although generally exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing an action under Sec. 1983, see Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), a district court may require an inmate to exhaust administrative remedies certified to meet certain standards. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997(e).

Section 1983 claims by state prisoners are exempt from state administrative exhaustion, but that exemption does not extend to a federal prisoner’s constitutional claims for injunctive relief.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit · filed 1990-03-06

Although a state prisoner alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982) need not exhaust state administrative remedies, see Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), we feel Patsy 's exemption for section 1983 claims is not applicable here, because it depends in large part on the particular legislative history of section 1983, especially congressional mistrust of factfinding procedures of state institutions.

Section 1983 claims by state prisoners are exempt from state administrative exhaustion, but that exemption does not apply to a federal prisoner’s constitutional claims for injunctive relief.

Johnpoll v. Thornburgh · filed 1990-03-06

Although a state prisoner alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) need not exhaust state administrative remedies, ... we feel Patsy's exemption for section 1983 claims is not applicable here, because it depends in large part on the particular legislative history of section 1983, especially congressional mistrust of factfinding procedures of state institutions.

A § 1983 suit against a parole board that does not concern prison conditions is not subject to an administrative exhaustion requirement.

Perryman v. John D. Parker, Clarence L. Jackson, Lewis W. Hurst, the Virginia Parole Board, Members · filed 1990-11-16

The administrative exhaustion requirement is not applicable in this case because Perryman's suit is against the Virginia Parole Board and does not concern prison conditions.

Section 1983 plaintiffs generally need not exhaust administrative remedies before suing, but prisoners must first use a grievance procedure.

Lindsay v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1994-01-05

Plaintiffs suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit, with the one exception of prisoners, who must first utilize a grievance procedure.

Section 1983 generally does not require a state prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies before suing a state official.

Kalasho v. Kapture · filed 1994-08-15

Plaintiff is correct in that there is generally no exhaustion requirement before a state prisoner may file a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 complaint should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when the plaintiff attached a copy of a prison grievance to the complaint.

Dennis E. Yarrell, and Joe H. Bryant v. Gary T. Dixon Lieutenant Britt · filed 1994-10-20

Dennis E. Yarrell appeals from a district court order that dismissed his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) complaint without prejudice because the court found that Yarrell did not submit proof that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. The record discloses, however, that Yarrell attached a copy of a prison grievance to his complaint. Though we find that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Yarrell's complaint without prejudice for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, we affirm the dismissal of his complaint on modified grounds that his claims are meritless and modify the dismissal to be with prejudice.

A prisoner seeking only money damages under § 1983 need not exhaust a prison administrative procedure that cannot award monetary relief.

Nash v. MS Dept of Corr · filed 1995-12-13

Since he seeks only monetary relief, which is not available through the Mississippi Administrative Review Procedure, exhaustion was not required.

A § 1983 complaint seeking relief beyond monetary compensation is subject to dismissal when the claimant has not exhausted the administrative grievance procedure.

Jimenez v. Story · filed 1996-06-26

Mr. Jimenez, an inmate appearing pro se, appeals from the dismissal of his civil rights complaint and action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because his complaint seeks relief not limited to monetary compensation, and he has failed to comply with the administrative grievance procedure, see 28 C.F.R. § 542.10-.16 (1994), his claim is properly dismissed as he has failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing suit.

Milligan v. Thompson · filed 1998-03-27

Thus, Milligan was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing a cause of action under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination, Bruce v. Northwest Metal Prods. Co., 79 Wn. App. 505, 513, 903 P.2d 506 (1995), review denied, 129 Wn.2d 1014 (1996); Morales, 73 Wn. App. at 371; or under any of the federal civil rights laws, Patsy, 457 U.S. 502-07; Johnson v. Greater S.E. Community Hosp. Corp., 951 F.2d 1268, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Doe ex rel. Doe v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 425 (7th Cir. 1986).

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before a plaintiff brings a claim.

Paul v. City of New Haven · filed 1998-04-07

Thus, a failure by the plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies would not dispose of an otherwise valid § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suit unless Congress has created a specific exception.

Doe v. Pfrommer · filed 1998-06-10

Thus, exhaustion is necessary prior to bringing a § 1983 action only where Congress has carved out a specific exception to the general rule' that exhaustion is not required.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court.

Hopkins v. Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System · filed 1998-06-30

The state’s argument is unavailing because it is more than well-settled that a plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court.

A prisoner bringing a § 1983 prison-conditions claim need exhaust available administrative remedies, but need not pursue a judicial appeal to satisfy that requirement.

Mullins v. Smith · filed 1998-07-27

A prisoner may appeal the results of a request for a rehearing to the appropriate State Circuit Court, as set forth in M.C.L.A. § 791.255. However, this is a judicial, not an administrative, remedy. Consequently, it appears that plaintiff exhausted his state administrative remedies.

Section 1983 claims challenging state or local laws in state court generally do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Broadcast Equities, Inc. v. Montgomery County · filed 1998-10-02

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally inapplicable to § 1983 claims challenging state or local laws in state court.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing federal constitutional claims.

Cooper v. Bombela · filed 1999-01-29

This Court is not about to impose a requirement of exhaustion of their federal constitutional claims in the face of the uniform Section 1983 jurisprudence that rejects such a requirement.

In state court, failure to exhaust administrative remedies for a Section 1983 claim should be raised through summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss.

Parks v. Lazaroff, Unpublished Decision (2-1-1999) · filed 1999-02-01

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Whenever such a claim is brought in a state court, the federal substantive law applies, but the state procedural rules are followed. Thus, the motion under federal rules seems inappropriate. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies ought to be raised by summary judgment and not on a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of EEOC remedies before a court considers otherwise timely conduct.

Osier v. Broome County · filed 1999-05-11

Because there is no exhaustion requirement under § 1983, the Court may consider all post December 11, 1993 conduct, regardless of whether it was asserted in, or related to, an EEOC charge.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suit.

Johnson v. City of Bridgeport, No. Cv 95 32 11 29 (Jun. 3, 1999) · filed 1999-06-03

Here, it should be noted that "exhaustion of state CT Page 7617 administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to 1983." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fetterman v. University of Connecticut , 192 Conn. 539 , 549 , 473 A.2d 1176 (1984).

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing an action in Indiana state court.

Bledsoe v. Fleming · filed 1999-06-21

As Bledsoe correctly points out, however, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a § 1983 action in an Indiana state court.

A plaintiff need not exhaust available state administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action.

Stanton by Stanton v. Brunswick School Dept. · filed 1984-01-23

The foregoing authorities make clear that this Plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies available within the Brunswick School Department before seeking to vindicate her First Amendment rights under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, but that rule does not permit a plaintiff to bypass ongoing coercive disciplinary proceedings subject to Younger abstention.

Murphy v. City of Manchester · filed 1999-09-17

In Patsv v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a federal plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies before asserting a claim in federal court for relief based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Under these circumstances, Patsv provides no support for Murphy's attempt to bypass the disciplinary hearing process.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before suit.

Goldstar Auto Sales, LLC v. Town of Halfmoon · filed 1999-10-08

Absent statutory direction to the contrary, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing an action in federal court.

James P. v. Lemahieu · filed 2000-01-12

However, since their case is being brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they are not required to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing an action in federal court.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies; a claim to enforce military regulations requires exhaustion only when those regulations require it.

Dibble v. Fenimore · filed 2000-01-19

The general rule under § 1983, that a plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies, does not apply to a suit arising from the failure of a military service to follow its own regulations, where “[t]he exhaustion requirement is contained in the very regulations that plaintiff seeks to have enforced.” Jones v. New York State Div. of Mil. and Naval Affairs, 166 F.3d 45, 54-55 (2d Cir.1999). The Court has, however, found no exhaustion requirement in any regulation Plaintiff seeks to have enforced; State Defendant has pointed out none. State Defendant’s “exhaustion of administrative remedies” argument is thus unavailing.

Section 1983 claims do not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suit.

Reynolds v. Giuliani · filed 2000-07-21

This Court has already observed that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for such claims under Section 1983. ... Accordingly, the State defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is denied.

A Section 1983 procedural due process claim challenging the adequacy of available procedures is barred when the plaintiff failed to invoke those procedures at the proper time.

Estate of Murphy v. Area Cooperative Educational Services · filed 2000-10-02

Rather, as here, where the plaintiff seeks to challenge in a section 1983 action the adequacy of procedures that the plaintiff failed to invoke at the proper time, the plaintiffs claim will be barred for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.

Section 1983 claims do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before suit, even when constructive discharge supports the claim.

City of Fairbanks v. Rice · filed 2000-10-13

Although a constructive discharge claim is arbitrable, ... here the employees alleged constructive discharge only to support their Whistleblower Act and § 1983 claims, not to support a wrongful termination cause of action. The claims they asserted do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies.

A plaintiff need not exhaust available state administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 due process claim.

Rhude v. Belknap County, NH · filed 2000-10-31

Accordingly, Rhude's due process claim is not precluded by her failure to exhaust available administrative procedures.

Section 1983 generally permits suit in state or federal court without first exhausting state administrative remedies.

Prager v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue · filed 2001-03-23

Patsy and Felder together establish a broad no-exhaustion rule for § 1983 actions whether brought in state or federal court.

Section 1983 plaintiffs must exhaust federal administrative remedies when exhaustion is consistent with the agency’s congressionally assigned role.

Alexandria Resident Council, Inc. v. Alexandria Redevelopment & Housing Authority · filed 2001-06-06

Thus, because exhaustion is consis- tent with the role Congress assigned to HUD, see supra at 4-5, Patsy further buttresses our conclusion that ARC was required to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing this section 1983 action.

Section 1983 claimants need not exhaust state administrative remedies before suing, including when they seek injunctive relief.

Murphy v. Zoning Com'n of Town of New Milford · filed 2001-07-05

The Court agrees with plaintiffs that they are not required to exhaust the state administrative remedies before pursuing them § 1983 claim. ... Nothing in the legislative history or in the Supreme Court’s opinion indicates that Congress intended to exempt § 1983 claims from the exhaustion requirement only if the claimant sought damages.

A § 1983 claim seeking injunctive relief remains subject to the requirement to exhaust an adequate administrative remedy.

Benjamin v. Weinberger, No. Cv 01-0808816 (Oct. 22, 2001) · filed 2001-10-22

When the claim is for injunctive relief and includes a § 1983 claim, however, the court has held that "the fundamental requirement of inadequacy of an available legal remedy in order to obtain injunctive relief remains in full force." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 95. ... The complaint, however, primarily seeks injunctive relief and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot avoid the exhaustion requirement.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of available state administrative remedies before bringing a claim for denial of pre-termination procedural due process.

Cipriani v. Lycoming County Housing Authority · filed 2001-12-14

Thus, given the holdings of Stana and Loudermill, we do not find that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs procedural due process claim on exhaustion grounds, as his § 1983 action alleging a violation of his pre-termination procedural due process rights may be maintained in this court, notwithstanding the availability of state administrative remedies as well.

Section 1983 plaintiffs alleging IDEA violations must exhaust IDEA administrative remedies before suing, even if they seek only money damages.

Frazier v. Fairhaven School Committee · filed 2002-01-09

Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs who bring an IDEA-based claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which they seek only money damages, must exhaust the administrative process available under the IDEA as a condition precedent to entering a state or federal court.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim to exhaust administrative remedies.

Russo v. City of Hartford · filed 2002-02-05

A retaliation claim need not state facts that would support a Title VII hostile work environment cause of action, and the plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies for a § 1983 action under the First Amendment.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.

Leach v. New Mexico Junior College · filed 2002-02-19

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply to bar the litigation of Leach’s Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to seek a conditional use permit before bringing a constitutional or statutory claim challenging a zoning decision.

DiLaura v. Ann Arbor Charter Township · filed 2002-02-25

First, the district court asserted that the conflict was not ripe because the DiLauras had not “sought a ‘conditional use’ ” permit from the town board. This is not a requirement in § 1983 actions, whether alleging constitutional violations or statutory claims.

Section 1983 claims seeking relief available under the IDEA must first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative remedies.

Sabur Ex Rel. Kessler v. Brosnan · filed 2002-05-08

A plaintiff may not frame a cause of action under Section 1983 or any other federal statute and thus avoid the exhaustion requirements.

Section 1983 requires a claim based on a federal statute to allege compliance with that statute's administrative preconditions before the claim is viable.

Barlow v. Marion County Hospital District · filed 1980-07-29

Accordingly, the Court holds that a claim under § 1983 based upon the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 300p-2(c) [§ 300s-6] must allege compliance with the administrative preconditions to a private suit set forth in the statute in order to be viable.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies, but an as-applied zoning challenge requires a final decision by the relevant government body.

Canyon Del Rio Investors, L.L.C. v. City of Flagstaff · filed 2011-05-24

We further hold that while a plaintiff is not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an as-applied challenge to a zoning decision must be predicated on a final decision by the relevant government body.

The limitations period for a prisoner’s § 1983 claim may be tolled while the prisoner attempts to exhaust administrative remedies but prison staff prevent those attempts.

Doe v. Selsky · filed 2013-06-10

In the case at bar, I conclude that plaintiff has alleged enough facts that, if true, could render his claims timely. ... At the very least, however, plaintiff has submitted enough to preclude dismissal, at this stage, on limitations grounds.

Section 1983 claims alleging substantive due process and equal protection violations do not require administrative exhaustion, and state sovereign immunity does not bar those claims against a county.

Swan Beach Corolla, L.L.C. v. County of Currituck · filed 2014-07-01

We hold that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the claims are not barred by sovereign immunity or failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not generally require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before suing.

West Alabama Women's Center v. Williamson · filed 2015-08-13

Most simply, “there is no requirement’that a plaintiff exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a suit-under § 1983.” ... As such, any administrative exhaustion requirement is inapplicable here.

Section 1983 claims seeking relief available under the IDEA are subject to the IDEA's administrative exhaustion requirement.

Cave v. East Meadow Union Free School District · filed 2008-01-23

Finally, we reject appellants’ argument that their § 1983 discrimination claim is not subject to the exhaustion rule. The language of Section 1415(Z) of the IDEA is sufficiently broad and encompasses complaints asserted under any federal statute, as long as they seek relief available under the IDEA.

Section 1983 generally does not require administrative exhaustion, but a regulatory takings claimant must still obtain a final land-use decision by seeking available local relief.

Pakdel v. City and Cty. of S.F. · filed 2020-03-17

Plaintiffs protest that requiring them to have sought an exemption through the prescribed procedures amounts to imposing an administrative exhaustion requirement in the guise of a finality requirement. It is true that, in general, “there is no requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action.” Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 192. But the Court in Williamson County nevertheless held that, in the takings context, a property owner’s failure to seek a variance through procedures made available by the local land-use authority meant that the authority had not reached a final decision.

Section 1983 requires a violation of the Constitution or a federal statute for a claim to succeed.

Home Health Services, Inc. v. Currie · filed 1983-05-17

Assuming for present purposes that MUSC acted under color of state law, Home Health's Sec. 1983 claim must fail as there was no violation either of the Constitution or any federal statute.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for conduct under color of law only when it deprives a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.

Ralph d.crabtree v. Brennan · filed 1972-08-10

Official conduct under color of law is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only where plaintiff is thereby subjected to “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” The Constitution confers no right to be employed as a secondary school teacher by a particular school system.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for unconstitutional denial of public employment when the plaintiff has a property or liberty interest, but a mere breach of contract without a due process violation is not cognizable under it.

Russell v. Harrison · filed 1983-04-28

At the outset, we recognize that an unconstitutional denial of public employment can be attacked in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. In a termination setting, plaintiffs must demonstrate a property or liberty interest in their public employment before their right to due process attaches. ... Once these rights are established, they can be vindicated in § 1983 actions. However, a mere breach of contract, without a violation of due process rights, is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy only for a deprivation of constitutionally secured rights; a trivial or insubstantial state-law invasion is not enough.

Wells v. Boyd Ward · filed 1972-12-27

While it is true that the state law with respect to arrest is looked to for guidance as to validity of the arrest since the officers are subject to those local standards, it does not follow that state law governs. On the contrary, the rights claimed arise under the federal law and thus the ultimate standard must be § 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and federal decisions. ... The differences are though in terms of not only the requisite elements under § 1983, but also in the gravity of the right which has been invaded. ... It does not follow that all such invasions however trivial or frivolous serve to activate remedies under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as those parts of the Bill of Rights which are incorporated in and made a part of due process. ... No doubt the Act as it is presently administered comprehends a broader range of invasions than was then contemplated, but the violation must still be such as to constitute a deprivation of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. ... When an accused, as did the appellant here, freely chooses custody rather than the simple expedient of acknowledging receipt of the ticket and agreeing to appear, it does not add up to an invasion of constitutional rights. ... He appears to have misconceived the thrust and reach of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federal constitutional right; a violation of state law alone is insufficient.

McGregor v. Schmidt · filed 1973-05-24

Furthermore, even if such a statutory duty did exist, the parole board’s refusal to comply with a state statute, without more, would not state a federal constitutional claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability when the defendants' conduct deprives the plaintiff of no constitutional liberty or property right.

Davis v. Winters Independent School District · filed 1973-06-04

There being no deprivation of any of plaintiff’s rights to liberty or property under the Constitution of the United States by these defendants under these facts, and there being no actual or de facto tenure policy or continuing contract policy by the Winters Independent School District, the defendants cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and plaintiff must be denied any recovery on his complaint.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish an invasion of federally protected constitutional rights; mere tortious conduct is insufficient.

Gonyaw v. Ladue · filed 1973-06-04

It is, of course, essential to recovery in both cases under § 1983 that the plaintiff establish an invasion of federally protected constitutional rights; otherwise there is no federal jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for failing to bring a state detainee promptly before a magistrate when the failure violates state law but does not violate a constitutional right.

Anderson v. J. J. Nosser, James Bradley v. J. J. Nosser · filed 1971-05-27

Nevertheless, we hold that plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action under section 1983, for they have not demonstrated a violation of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires allegations showing that the challenged state action violated a constitutional right; broad and conclusory allegations without such a showing do not state a claim.

Patterson v. Walters · filed 1973-07-19

but this allegation is broad and °conclusory in nature and is insufficient to state any violation under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and 28 U.S.C. Section 1343. Plaintiff does not allege that his incarceration was done illegally nor that his imprisonment was in violation of any constitutional right that he might have.

Section 1983 does not itself impose a time limit for paying just compensation and does not create a claim absent a constitutional deprivation.

Gigliotti v. Redevelopment Auth. of City of New Castle · filed 1973-07-24

It should first be noted that the Fifth Amendment (and hence the Civil Rights provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1983) does not fix any time limit for payment of “just compensation.” ... Thus in the absence of any constitutional rights of which defendant Authority deprived plaintiffs, there is no cause of action stated under the Civil Rights provision, and the motion to dismiss must be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil-rights action when the alleged police conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Barker v. Johnson · filed 1973-08-29

There being no unlawful search and seizure, there can be no action based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Section 1983 does not support a federal claim for random effects of departmental promotion practices that do not amount to a specific deprivation of First or Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Captain C. J. Taylor v. The City of Jackson, L. J. Sullivan, Intervenors · filed 1973-11-20

Fairly read the complaint as amended says no more than that the effects of the challenged new departmental practices fell randomly upon various individuals on the force. This is not enough to rise to constitutional levels. See McDowell v. Texas, 465 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc); Dorsey v. NAACP, 408 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1969).

Section 1983 requires a constitutional deprivation; violating an employer's disciplinary rules alone is insufficient, while denial of an impartial due-process hearing can support a claim.

Fitzgerald v. Cawley · filed 1973-12-12

Finally, plaintiffs claim that the span of delay between the date of the offense and the newly scheduled trial violates the defendant’s own rules which call for trial without unreasonable delay. Even assuming a violation of these rules, this does not rise to the level of constitutional deprivation cognizable in a Section 1983 suit. ... Obviously, such claims, if provable, would present a colorable claim under Section 1983 since implicit within the due process clause, which governs these disciplinary proceedings, is the requirement that any hearing be fair and impartial.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for allegations that do not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation.

Chapman v. Reynolds · filed 1974-07-12

Many of these allegations, as previously noted, even if established, would not be remediable pursuant to § 1983 since they do not attain constitutional significance.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a wrongful act by a state employee unless the act violates a federal constitutional right.

United States Ex Rel. Dean v. Johnson · filed 1974-09-11

Turning next to the allegation that his personal correspondence is read by prison employees, and assuming the truth of such allegation, if it be a wrong, it is not a wrong of federal constitutional magnitude, therefore not congnizable under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 provides a claim only when the challenged conduct deprives a person of a constitutional right.

Yarborough v. City of Warren · filed 1974-10-11

Since the Court has found that the referendum did not deprive plaintiffs of any constitutional rights the Court cannot find any violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for excessive force that violates an arrestee's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, but a violation of a state-created right alone is not cognizable under the statute.

Charline Hamilton, Administratrix of the Estate of Carey Clayton Yates v. Chaffin · filed 1975-01-15

The use of excessive force constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and, as such, is actionable under Section 1983. ... Although it is uncontradicted that the officers failed to comply with the Section 7185-06 procedure, we conclude that this violation of a state-created right does not reach constitutional proportions. It is therefore insufficient to constitute a violation of a right cognizable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach a prison official's denial of honor-farm placement when the denial is not a significant deprivation of liberty raising a constitutional issue.

Madison v. Sielaff · filed 1975-04-23

Denial of plaintiff’s request for placement on the honor farm is not such a significant deprivation of liberty, and does not raise a constitutional issue within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a violation of a constitutional right to pursue a civil-rights claim.

Donald K. Gearheart and Richard Kurtz v. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland · filed 1975-05-08

A necessary element of a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 is the violation of a constitutional right. No such violation has here been demonstrated and the District Court was correct in its dismissal of the civil rights claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim for alleged jail conditions that do not amount to a deprivation of constitutional magnitude.

Feazell v. Augusta County Jail · filed 1975-06-25

This allegation does not merit consideration as no deprivation of a constitutional magnitude has been alleged. While the cellmate’s alleged habits may be revolting to petitioner, they do not give rise to a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide an actionable claim when the challenged conduct involves no constitutional deprivation.

Bomher v. Reagan · filed 1975-09-12

Since no constitutional deprivation could be found from the summary tax collection activities of appellees, there could be no actionable conspiracy. The district court committed no error in dismissing appellant’s complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) and 1986 for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 provides relief only when the alleged conduct amounts to a constitutional violation and otherwise does not state a claim.

Hundley v. Sielaff · filed 1975-12-09

To establish a claim of cruel and unusual punishment, the complainant must allege conditions which are so foul, so inhuman, and so violative of basic concepts of decency that they fall within the proscriptions of the eighth amendment. ... The plaintiffs’ singular allegation that they are denied recreation periods while confined to safekeeping does not state a claim for relief under Section 1983 for imposition of cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for generalized jail-condition allegations that do not rise to constitutional dimensions.

Fore v. Godwin · filed 1976-02-02

The generalized allegations of overcrowdedness and verbal abuse from correctional officers do not, in this instance, rise to constitutional dimensions and hence are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A school-athletics regulation is not cognizable under § 1983 unless it denies a constitutionally protected right or employs a suspect classification.

Albach ex rel. Albach v. Odle · filed 1976-03-25

The supervision and regulation of high school athletic programs remain within the discretion of appropriate state boards, and are not within federal cognizance under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the regulations deny an athlete a constitutionally protected right or classify him or her on a suspect basis.

Defamation by public officials, without deprivation of a federal right, does not support damages under § 1983.

Morris v. Danna · filed 1976-04-01

The law in this circuit is that damages for defamation by public officials are not recoverable under § 1983: ... because a defamed person has not been deprived of any right, privilege or immunity secured to him by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States. ... The Court concludes that this rule provides the answer to the constitutional privacy claim made here.

A plaintiff whose allegations do not show a constitutional deprivation fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Hill v. Trustees of Indiana University · filed 1976-04-05

because we find that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a substantive claim against any one of the defendants upon which relief can be grant ... ed under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment, we need not consider these questions.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for attempted coercion when the plaintiff suffered no actual injury and cannot show a constitutional violation.

DeMaria v. Jones · filed 1976-05-03

Petitioners in this case are unable to show that they suffered injury from the attempted coercive tactics of the law enforcement officers and federal prosecutors, nor are they able to show that attempted coercion is a violation of any constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not provide federal jurisdiction for ordinary tort claims that do not rise to constitutional levels.

Searight v. State of NJ · filed 1976-05-06

May the claim be viewed as coming within the civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, etc.? Aside from the bar of the statute of limitations, it is clear that it may not. Ordinary tort claims, though cast in terms of civil rights claims, but which do not rise to constitutional levels, are not within the jurisdiction of the district courts.

Section 1983 does not support recovery when the challenged conduct does not infringe a constitutional right.

Norbeck v. Davenport Community School District · filed 1976-12-28

We find, even assuming the truth of Norbeck’s contention, that the evidence failed to show any infringement of a constitutional right and should not have been submitted to the jury as a possible basis of recovery under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an invidiously discriminatory purpose to support an equal-protection claim based on a height requirement; disparate impact alone is insufficient.

Guardians Ass'n of New York City Police Department, Inc v. Civil Service Commission of New York · filed 1977-03-17

They make no showing that defendants employed a height requirement with an invidiously discriminatory purpose, as is required to make out a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1981 or § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for constitutional violations by state actors, so a plaintiff cannot obtain relief under it without showing a constitutional deprivation.

LeGrande v. Redman · filed 1977-06-15

From the undisputed record it is evident that the plaintiff’s rights to due process of law and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were not violated in this case. As a matter of law, therefore, plaintiff has not presented a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal cause of action for common-law battery that does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.

Donahue v. Maynard · filed 1977-07-05

Even had plaintiff proved his theory, all that could be found is that he was the victim of a common law battery. Such a claim, although suitable for a cause of action in State courts, does not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for minor prison disciplinary matters absent a significant deprivation of constitutional rights.

Moss v. Ward · filed 1977-07-18

It is not the function of the Federal Court to tamper with the prison administration in the minor disciplinary matters which form the bulk of the plaintiff’s complaint. Federal Courts should not intervene, absent a significant deprivation of inmates’ constitutional rights. Consequently, the plaintiff has failed to establish any claim cognizable under Section 1983, and the complaint must be in all respects dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations of constitutional rights, including liberty deprivations without due process caused by abuse of process.

Jennings v. Arthur Shuman, Jr., Robert J. Conway, Gustave Naring, and John Doe · filed 1977-11-30

An abuse of process is by definition a denial of procedural due process. A deprivation of liberty or a determination of guilt or innocence may not be made on the basis of willingness to accede to extortionate demands. ... Such deprivations without due process state an injury actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires infringement of a constitutionally protected property interest before a civil-rights claim may proceed.

Ellentuck v. Klein · filed 1978-01-04

We hold, however that, regardless of whether a wrong was committed under state law, no civil rights claim is stated in the first cause of action for the reason that no constitutionally protected “property” interest was infringed by the actions of the named defendants.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for defamatory statements and malicious conduct alone absent a constitutional violation.

Christensen v. Rice · filed 1978-08-31

However, defamatory statements and malicious conduct alone do not establish a constitutional violation for which relief may be obtained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for negligent conduct that causes no constitutional deprivation.

Christian v. Owens · filed 1978-09-07

Even assuming that the failure to search in this case was negligent, no cause of action under Section 1983 is presented since no constitutional deprivation was occasioned by the failure to search.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for negligence or an intentional tort by a state official unless the alleged conduct also constitutes a constitutional deprivation.

Jordan v. Robinson · filed 1979-01-18

“ . . . [A]n allegation of negligent conduct by a state public official is not sufficient, in and of itself, to bring a claim within § 1983. ... Plaintiff’s characterization of the treatment as “cruel and unusual” does not make it so. At oral argument plaintiff admitted that the essence of his medical claims is medical malpractice; he alleged that Dr. Gilberte failed to use novocaine while removing a cyst on plaintiff’s back and that Dr. Webster, while excising a lesion above plaintiff’s eye, affected and impaired his vision. These are claims of negligence, or, at most, considering plaintiff’s charge at oral argument that improper medical procedures were followed in order to harass him, claims of intentional torts. Since no constitutional deprivation is present on these facts, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1983 encompasses claims against state officials whose intentional or grossly negligent acts or failures to act, under color of law, deprive people of constitutional rights and cause physical or emotional injury.

White v. Rochford · filed 1979-02-13

Under either of these interpretations of the Due Process Clause, the complaint sufficiently alleged a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. ... It is clearly established that although officials may not be held liable for simple negligence, they may be held liable for “gross negligence” or “reckless disregard” for the safety of others. ... This indifference in the face of known dangers certainly must constitute gross negligence. ... Thus, as to the five-year-old plaintiff whose asthma was aggravated, his cause of action is well within that encompassed by § 1983 arising, as it does, from allegations of intentional or grossly negligent acts or failures to act leading to physical injury. ... Admittedly the case for the other defendant who alleges only psychological injury is somewhat closer, but we nonetheless feel that the protections of the Due Process Clause against arbitrary intrusions on personal security includes both physical and emotional well-being.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only when a person acting under color of state law deprives the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Reid v. Barrett · filed 1979-03-30

In order to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 imposes liability only for violations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws, not for violations of duties of care arising from state tort law.

Baker v. McCollan · filed 1979-06-26

Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under traditional tort-law principles.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for verbal harassment or abuse that does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.

Collins v. Cecil Cundy, Campbell County Attorney and Sheriff Hladky, Sheriff of Campbell County · filed 1979-08-17

Verbal harassment or abuse of the sort alleged in this case is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a violation of a prison regulation actionable when the regulation does not secure a constitutional right.

Pollard v. Baskerville · filed 1979-12-14

Therefore, because the regulation in question is not intended to secure a constitutionally protected right, a violation of the regulation is not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for handicap discrimination absent invidious discrimination against similarly situated individuals that violates the Constitution.

Miener v. State of Mo. · filed 1980-01-25

Plaintiff apparently is also proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Counts II and III, pursuant to which a damage award is allowable. It is clear, however, that a cause of action under that statute is not stated. Sherer v. Waier, supra. As in Sherer, the facts as alleged in the complaint do not appear to involve any invidious discrimination against similarly situated individuals. What is involved are allegations of discrimination against plaintiff because of her handicaps. Such discrimination is made illegal by Section 504, not the constitution.

Section 1983 requires a substantive constitutional or federal-law deprivation, not merely a conclusory assertion, to support relief.

Smith v. Wells · filed 1980-10-23

Based upon its review of plaintiff’s civil rights complaint and upon the authorities cited herein and in the three previous actions brought in this court by plaintiff based upon the fact situation recited above, this court is satisfied that plaintiff’s complaint herein is one of mere form and not of substance and that, moreover, plaintiff can make no argument on the facts or the applicable law which would support his claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint therefore should be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for deprivations of rights secured by the United States Constitution or federal laws, not state-law rights.

Armstrong v. Tennessee Valley Authority · filed 1980-12-24

Only deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Pool v. Northern · filed 1980-12-30

Although plaintiff has alleged facts pertaining to defendant Carol Gaddy, none of these facts constitutes a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, which is essential under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the complaint is dismissed as to defendant Carol Gaddy.

A violation of prison guidelines alone does not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Kelly v. Cooper · filed 1980-12-29

The Court will assume, for present purposes, that defendant Tilman did, in fact, violate prison guidelines by not granting a continuance under these circumstances. Nevertheless, plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under § 1983, and a response from defendant will not be required at this time.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for an ordinary state tort claim that does not rise to the level of a constitutional claim.

Sandlin v. Johnson · filed 1981-03-11

What appellants denominate a denial of equal educational opportunity sounds rather in tort as a breach of some duty owed by teachers or school boards to their pupils to give them an education. If there is any such cause of action, it does not rise to the level of a constitutional claim and, therefore, is not cognizable in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a constitutional right; alleging only a common-law tort by a state official is insufficient.

Cramer v. Crutchfield · filed 1981-05-12

A valid cause of action under § 1983 is not alleged simply by the assertion that a common law tort was committed by a state official. Rather, to have a meritorious claim, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of some constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for rent increases that, standing alone, do not amount to racial discrimination.

Tiller v. Aviles · filed 1981-06-10

The defendants’ acts of raising rent, which may or may not have been done unlawfully, in and of themselves do not amount to racial discrimination so as to give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Other state remedies are available for such an alleged wrong.

Section 1983 provides redress for violations of rights protected by the United States Constitution.

Township of Jefferson v. City of West Carrollton · filed 1981-06-23

Having disposed of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments, by concluding •that the State of Ohio annexation statute does not offend any federal constitutional guarantees of due process or equal protection of the law, this Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have, likewise, failed to state a claim for relief under the Federal Civil Rights statutes, 28 U.S.C. Section 1343 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which provide redress for the violation of rights protected by the Constitution of the United States.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to pursue an Eighth Amendment claim based on allegations that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs.

Kelsey v. Ewing · filed 1981-06-24

Appellant Dwight W. Kelsey, an inmate at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Stillwater, appeals from the December 2, 1980, order of the district court dismissing his claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. ... Kelsey's uncontested allegations, when taken as a whole, are more than sufficient to state such a constitutional claim. Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint as frivolous.

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights claim only when the defendants deprive the plaintiff of a substantial right guaranteed by the Constitution.

Kendrick v. Schnorbus · filed 1981-07-27

Going then to the merits of the appeal, we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted. As pointed out by the trial judge, although the litigation had been pending for some time, Kendrick was altogether unable to show any basis for his claim that the defendants deprived him of any substantial right guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a constitutional violation to state a claim.

Alston v. Fair · filed 1982-01-26

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the'plaintiff must first allege a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a prison official's violation of administrative regulations when the conduct is not constitutionally improper.

Chaka v. Nash · filed 1982-04-07

Schomig’s actions, while wrong, were not constitutionally improper, and do not provide a basis for a claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 claims based on retaliation for exercising First and Fourteenth Amendment rights are resolved the same way as the corresponding constitutional claims.

O'CONNOR v. Mazzullo · filed 1982-04-26

The § 1983 claim is identical to, and is therefore resolved in the same way as, the constitutional claims discussed above.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law; allegations that do not amount to a violation of a recognized constitutional right fail to state a claim.

Loren v. Jackson · filed 1982-05-18

Since plaintiff’s action purports to be a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against defendants for their deprivation under color of state law, of his constitutional rights, the factual allegations in his complaint must be examined to determine whether, if believed, they amount to any violation of recognized constitutional rights. ... Hence, the allegation was insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; similarly, the allegation fails to state a claim even under state tort law since the alleged use of threats by the arresting Deputy Whitmire was within the bounds of permissible privilege accorded an officer making an arrest of a person reasonably believed to have committed a criminal offense.

Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of constitutional or federal rights, not for ordinary tort-law duties of care.

Archie L. Hull, Individually and as Next Friend and Natural Father of Rodney Lee Hull v. City of Duncanville · filed 1982-06-16

The municipal actions so pleaded may constitute a tort, but they do not constitute a constitutional tort that justifies a 1983 action. “Section 1983 imposes liability for violation of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under traditional tort-law principles.”

Section 1983 applies to police actions taken under color of state law only when those actions violate a constitutional right; an almost imperceptible impact on the free exercise of religion is not enough.

Pinski v. Village of Norridge · filed 1982-06-29

It is clear that in taking the actions alleged, the police were acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983. ... We are not prepared to find that police action which has an almost imperceptible impact upon the free exercise of religion is a violation of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a defamation-based claim when state actors’ defamatory conduct causes a loss of employment or business and implicates a liberty interest in later employment opportunities; reputation alone is insufficient.

Petrone v. City of Reading · filed 1982-06-23

However, in explaining and limiting its holding, the court observed that loss of reputation “alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment ... [is] by itself” insufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. ... In the case at bar, plaintiff has alleged that defendants, state actors, have, through defamation, caused him a loss of employment: his business. He has also asserted a deprivation of a liberty interest, i.e., “later opportunities for ... employment”. ... Accordingly, plaintiff has properly stated a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 makes an official act retaliating against the exercise of a constitutionally protected right actionable, even if the act might otherwise have been proper for a different reason.

Benson v. Allphin · filed 1982-07-16

An official act in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983, even if the act, when taken for a different reason, might otherwise have been proper.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Powell v. Nigro · filed 1982-07-28

Whatever may be the scope of the right to sue granted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it extends in any event only to “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].”

Section 1983 requires an actual denial of a civil right before a cause of action arises and does not itself punish conspiracy.

Goldschmidt v. Patchett · filed 1982-08-16

Section 1983 does not, however, punish conspiracy; an actual denial of a civil right is necessary before a cause of action arises.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federal constitutional rights, not for violations of state arrest law alone.

No. 81-1596 · filed 1982-10-07

For reasons that follow, we hold that these claims-of an unconstitutional arrest followed by an unconstitutional detention by Mickelson-fail legally, irrespective of the sufficiency of the evidence to support them factually. Mickelson's actions in first arresting Fisher and then detaining her in custody until county officers assumed her custody violated no constitutional rights cognizable under § 1983, even if the facts are as contended by Fisher and assuming arguendo that they constituted violations of state law. ... The states are free to impose greater restrictions on arrests, but their citizens do not thereby acquire a greater federal right. ... Probable cause remains the sole constitutional standard by which this § 1983 claim is to be judged. ... It is immaterial-if it be the case-that the ensuing arrest on probable cause violated Virginia law. Because no federal constitutional right was violated by the arrest, Fisher's § 1983 arrest claim against WMATA and Mickelson was properly denied by directed verdict.

Section 1983 does not provide an actionable claim for prospective adoptive parents who lack a protected constitutional interest in the adoption.

Edward A. Zak and Charlotte Zak v. Pilla · filed 1982-11-02

This court affirms the dismissal but on other grounds. Appellants do not assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor do they have a protected constitutional interest as parents seeking an adoption, particularly since they do not even assert any custodial right nor that there has been a final denial of their application to adopt a child. Even had appellants asserted such a final denial, however, this cause of action should be properly dismissed by a federal district court for lack of jurisdiction.