42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983's federal remedy is supplemented, not supplanted, by state remedies, so a parallel state constitutional claim does not require abstention.

Pue v. Sillas · filed 1980-06-25

The Court has expressly held that state remedies supplement, but do not supplant, federal remedies under section 1983. ... A general rule of abstention based on state constitutional provisions would violate this important and well-established principle.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust available state remedies before bringing a federal suit attacking a statute's constitutionality; the federal remedy supplements state remedies.

Walker v. Wegner · filed 1980-07-02

Exhaustion of available State remedies, which in this case would entail appealing to the State courts in South Dakota after the administrative hearing, is not required before the plaintiffs may file their suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, attacking the constitutionality of the statute; the Federal remedy provided under § 1983 is intended to supplement State remedies so that the latter need not be exhausted before the former is invoked.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs alleging constitutional claims to exhaust state remedies before suing.

Mehler v. Blum · filed 1980-10-01

Exhaustion of state remedies is not required in suits, like plaintiffs’, which allege constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing a federal civil-rights action.

Davis v. Fowler · filed 1980-12-18

In any event, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not require the exhaustion of state remedies.

A prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement must exhaust available state remedies before seeking damages under § 1983.

Thomas v. Dietz · filed 1981-04-16

Before applying to this Court for either a writ of habeas corpus or damages under § 1983, plaintiff must first exhaust available state remedies.

A plaintiff may maintain a § 1983 action without first exhausting available state remedies.

Hunt v. Roth · filed 1981-05-13

Hunt's failure to exhaust state remedies does not affect his section 1983 action. Exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to maintaining a section 1983 action.

A damages action by a state prisoner may be brought under § 1983 without prior exhaustion of state remedies, but its limitations period may expire while habeas remedies are being exhausted.

Franklin v. Joseph Webb, Assistant Public Defender, St. Louis, Missouri · filed 1981-07-16

Accordingly, as petitioners themselves concede, a damages action by a state prisoner could be brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal court without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies. ... However, it is conceivable that the statute of limitations as to his claim for damages under section 1983 could toll before Franklin has had an opportunity to exhaust his state and federal habeas corpus remedies. We therefore remand for consideration of the statute of limitations problem and for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to pursue damages in federal court without first exhausting state remedies.

Davis v. Rendell · filed 1981-09-15

If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy release the traditional purpose of habeas corpus. In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy. Accordingly ... a damages action by a state prisoner could be brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal court without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for every tort committed by a state officer when state remedies are available.

Peery v. Davis · filed 1981-10-15

Adhering to the Supreme Court’s admonition that § 1983 should not provide a remedy for all torts committed by state officers, the Court believes that plaintiff’s Complaint is not properly cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state remedies before proceeding in federal district court.

Smith v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1982-03-24

A plaintiff suing under section 1983 is not required to show exhaustion of state remedies before proceeding in federal district court.

Section 1983 is not the federal remedy for a state prisoner’s claim that would undermine or conflict with the validity or duration of confinement; the prisoner must first exhaust habeas remedies.

Clark v. Claude Williams, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a District Judge · filed 1982-11-24

In this circumstance, Clark’s sole federal remedy is habe-as corpus, not a civil rights suit. ... Therefore, appellant should exhaust his habeas corpus remedies before seeking relief through' a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to the exhaustion requirement applicable to habeas claims.

Moorish Science Temple of America, Inc., and Bro. R. Smallwood-El v. Smith · filed 1982-11-26

Unlike habeas claims, claims asserted pursuant to § 1983 are not subject to the exhaustion requirement.

A Section 1983 plaintiff need not exhaust available state remedies before seeking federal relief.

Higgason v. Duckworth · filed 1983-11-01

There being no requirement of exhaustion in civil rights actions, the failure to have raised the issue in the State courts would not preclude consideration of the issue by the court.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies as a jurisdictional prerequisite for a claim alleging deprivation of federal constitutional rights.

Foerst v. Banko · filed 1984-04-04

The short answer to this contention is that section 1983 never requires exhaustion of state remedies as a jurisdictional prerequisite in cases alleging deprivations of federal constitutional rights.

A federal court may not require exhaustion of state-law remedies before a plaintiff brings a § 1983 action.

Schwartz v. Judicial Retirement System of NJ · filed 1984-04-12

I cannot require that he exhaust state law remedies before bringing this § 1983 action.

A federal court may not require exhaustion of state-law remedies before a plaintiff brings a § 1983 action.

Schwartz v. Judicial Retirement System · filed 1984-04-12

I cannot require that he exhaust state law remedies before bringing this § 1983 action.

A plaintiff need not exhaust alternative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action.

Smith v. United Transportation Union Local No. 81 · filed 1984-05-21

Moreover, it is well settled that the law does not require a plaintiff to exhaust alternative remedies before bringing suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state or local remedies before bringing suit in federal court, so a local statute providing a local-court review remedy cannot bar an otherwise proper Section 1983 action.

District Properties Associates v. The District of Columbia · filed 1984-09-07

A state statute establishing that a federal Section 1983 plaintiff has a remedy available in state court (which is the effect of the relevant section of the DC APA) could not act to bar an otherwise appropriate action under Section 1983, for there is no requirement that plaintiffs in Section 1983 cases exhaust state remedies before bringing their suits in federal court.

A claim brought under § 1983 that in substance challenges the fact or basis of a prisoner's confinement, rather than the conditions of confinement, falls within an exception to the usual rule against exhaustion and must first be presented to the state for resolution before it may proceed under § 1983.

Alexander v. Walter T. Johnson Jane G. Greenlee Joy J. Johnson Wymene Valand Henry W. Oxedine James Woodward · filed 1984-09-24

Ordinarily, a claim of constitutional injury cognizable under § 1983 is not subject to the exhaustion requirement. ... An exception to this well-established rule, however, arises when an inmate challenges the right of the state to detain her as opposed to the physical conditions under which she is held or some other aspect of the state’s treatment of her while she is in confinement.

Negligent conduct may support a Section 1983 claim when it causes a constitutional deprivation and no adequate state tort remedy is available.

Shields v. Martin · filed 1985-04-10

In this case, no adequate state tort remedy exists. ... Thus, we hold that a negligent cause of action is maintainable in this ease under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A discharged public employee may state a § 1983 liberty-interest claim without first requesting a name-clearing hearing and may obtain one by proving the violation at trial.

No. 83-1544 · filed 1985-05-13

Plaintiff's failure to earlier request a name-clearing hearing does not defeat his claim. He may still be entitled to a hearing if he can prove at trial that his liberty interest was indeed violated.

A discharged public employee may state a § 1983 liberty-interest claim without first requesting a name-clearing hearing and may obtain one by proving the violation at trial.

Eames v. City of Logan · filed 1985-05-13

Plaintiff’s failure to earlier request a name-clearing hearing does not defeat his claim. He may still be entitled to a hearing if he can prove at trial that his liberty interest was indeed violated.

An alleged unauthorized departure from valid state procedures does not establish a § 1983 due-process claim when state law supplies an adequate postdeprivation remedy.

Temple v. Marlborough Division of the District Court Department · filed 1985-06-10

Since we conclude that redress under G. L. c. 123 provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the alleged violation of due process rights, it was appropriate to dismiss the claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of remedies before suit.

United States v. State of Alabama · filed 1985-12-07

With respect to the § 1983 claims in this case, there is certainly no requirement of exhaustion of remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide a due-process claim for a state officer’s property deprivation when state law supplies adequate remedies.

Tumneff v. Milwaukee County Department of Public Works · filed 1986-02-13

The state affords plaintiff adequate procedures to remedy the deprivations he has alleged. A review of plaintiff’s complaint reveals that those procedures, and not the federal court, offer him the relief to which he is entitled, if any.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim for deprivation of property requires the plaintiff to allege and prove that available state remedies are inadequate.

Carl Sutton, Jr. v. State of Ohio Governor James A. Rhodes Hamilton County Domestic Relations Court Clayton Shea Edna M. · filed 1986-03-06

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for deprivation of property without procedural due process, the plaintiff must allege and prove that state remedies are inadequate.

Courts may recognize an implicit statutory exhaustion requirement for Section 1983 claims only when congressional intent clearly supports it, and the Medicaid Act contains no such requirement.

Alacare, Inc.-North v. Baggiano · filed 1986-04-02

Courts can find implicit requirements of exhaustion of remedies. But implicit does not mean created of whole cloth. There must at least be some clearly evident indication from Congress that that is its intent. We find none here, and accordingly the trial court must be reversed.

An unauthorized property taking does not state a Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim when state law provides an adequate remedy.

Edwards v. Livesay · filed 1986-04-09

As such, the claim fails to state a violation of procedural due process if there is an adequate remedy to pursue under state law. ... Adequate remedies for an unauthorized taking and conversion of personal property are clearly available under Tennessee State Law.

A Section 1983 property-deprivation claimant must show that available state procedures are inadequate; government participation alone does not turn a contract dispute into a constitutional claim.

Lillehaug v. City Of Sioux Falls · filed 1986-04-18

That one of the parties to the controversy is a governmental unit does not automatically convert a common law contract action to a section 1983 claim. ... The claimant also must show that the state procedures available to challenge the deprivation are inadequate and therefore do not meet due process standards.

Intentional retaliation for asserting a constitutional right is actionable under § 1983 regardless of available state remedies.

Charles Leslie and Carlton Leslie v. Frankie E. Ingram, Jr., Duane F. Davis, and Johnny McDaniel Defendants · filed 1986-04-22

An intentional and wrongful retaliation for the assertion of a constitutionally protected right is a substantive civil rights violation which may be prosecuted in a federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, irrespective of the existence of state remedies.

A state or local government employee may maintain a § 1983 constitutional employment-discrimination action without first invoking Title VII remedies.

Md.-Nat'l Cap. P. & P. Comm'n v. Crawford · filed 1986-07-16

We agree with the above cases, and hold that the failure to invoke Title VII remedies does not preclude a state or local government employee from maintaining in a Maryland circuit court a § 1983 action based upon an asserted violation of the Equal Protection Clause or other provision of the federal constitution.

A state or local government employee may maintain a § 1983 constitutional employment-discrimination action without first invoking Title VII remedies.

Maryland-National Capital Park v. Crawford · filed 1986-07-16

We agree with the above cases, and hold that the failure to invoke Title VII remedies does not preclude a state or local government employee from maintaining in a Maryland circuit court a § 1983 action based upon an asserted violation of the Equal Protection Clause or other provision of the federal constitution.

An adequate state post-deprivation remedy does not bar a Section 1983 claim alleging violation of a substantive constitutional right.

Miga v. City of Holyoke · filed 1986-09-02

Because the plaintiff alleges a violation of the decedent’s right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) is not barred by the availability of a remedy for wrongful death under G. L. c. 229, § 2.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim fails when the state provides an adequate remedy and the claimant deliberately declines the available hearings.

Campbell v. Raymond A. Connors, the State of Ohio, Bureau of Workers Compensation · filed 1986-09-02

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), is dispositive of this case insofar as there is no cause of action under Sec. 1983 if the state provides an adequate remedy for alleged constitutional violations. It is clear that claimant has not pursued his state avenues of redress; indeed he has purposefully thwarted state procedures by not showing up for disability hearings. Thus, plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982).

Adequate state tort remedies do not bar a Section 1983 claim alleging intentional abuse of official power that shocks the conscience or infringes a specific constitutional guarantee.

Wilson v. City of North Little Rock · filed 1986-09-12

[T]he Supreme Court in Daniels and Davidson did not change the rule that intentional abuse of official power, which shocks the conscience or which infringes a specific constitutional guarantee * * * implicates the substantive component of the due process clause regardless of the availability of state remedies. ... [C]laims of this nature involving substantive due process are to be considered without regard to whether adequate state tort remedies provide an alternate form of redress.

The absence of an exhaustion requirement in § 1983 cases does not prevent a federal court with jurisdiction from abstaining in favor of state proceedings.

Jordi v. Sauk Prairie School Board · filed 1987-01-30

The doctrines of exhaustion and abstention are distinct. Exhaustion is the requirement that a litigant avail himself of all available state remedies before filing in federal court; it is a prerequisite to federal subject matter jurisdiction in certain kinds of cases. In contrast, abstention involves the question whether a federal court that has subject matter jurisdiction should decline to exercise it. The lack of an exhaustion requirement in civil rights cases is not relevant to the question whether this court should exercise its jurisdiction or abstain from doing so.

Pullman abstention may apply in § 1983 actions even though exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to suit.

Guiney v. Roache · filed 1987-03-06

exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The ... Pullman ... abstention doctrine, however, is quite distinct from exhaustion requirements, and the Supreme Court has held that abstention may be appropriate in § 1983 actions.

Failure to object to a state-agency rule during notice and comment does not waive a later § 1983 challenge to the rule's legality.

Samuels v. District of Columbia · filed 1987-08-14

The failure to object to a rule promulgated by a “state” agency during the notice and comment period does not constitute a waiver of one’s right to bring a section 1983 action in federal court challenging the legality of a regulation.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies when the state's policy or procedure itself clearly violates constitutional rights.

Smith v. Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Public Safety · filed 1987-11-10

the court finds that where, as in this case, the practice and policy of the state is clearly in violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would not require exhaustion of state remedies. Especially, if the procedures themselves are the source of the constitutional violation.

A prisoner seeking only damages for unconstitutional parole criteria may proceed under § 1983 without exhausting state remedies because the claim does not seek immediate or speedier release.

Walker v. Murray · filed 1987-11-24

Walker's complaint sought monetary relief only, not an immediate or speedier release from confinement. He therefore attacked "something other than the fact or length of his confinement," Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973), making exhaustion unnecessary.

A state prisoner's § 1983 damages action that neither challenges the conviction nor seeks release is not habeas and may be commenced without exhausting state remedies.

Mack v. Thomas J. Varelas, Sheriff of Nassau County, and John Doe, Deputy Sheriff of Nassau County · filed 1987-12-22

Such a damages action not only may be brought by a state prisoner in federal court under § 1983, it may be commenced “without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a random deprivation of property or liberty without due process by a state officer acting contrary to state law to plead and prove that available state remedies are inadequate.

Martin v. Morris · filed 1988-02-11

As a result, plaintiff has alleged a single claim for the random deprivation of a property or liberty interest without due process by a state officer who has acted contrary to state law, policy, regulation or custom. In order to maintain a cause of action for such a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must first plead, and ultimately prove, the inadequacy of any available state remedies. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-33 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194, 198-99 (6th Cir.1987); Davis v. Robbs, 794 F.2d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 592 (1986). Review of the complaint indicates that plaintiff has failed to satisfy this requirement.

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing a federal action.

Corporacion Insular De Seguros v. Garcia · filed 1988-02-24

But this, as extensively discussed above, would be tantamount to imposing an impermissible exhaustion of state remedies requirement to this Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 relief for alleged constitutional deficiencies in arrest and confinement warrants must await exhaustion of state remedies.

Sims v. State of South Carolina T. Travis Medlock · filed 1988-03-23

A review of the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate discloses that this appeal from its order refusing relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is without merit. As the district court indicated, any remedy Sims may have regarding alleged constitutional deficiencies in the warrants under which he was arrested and confined must await his exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging an intentional deprivation of liberty contrary to state law to plead and prove that available state remedies are inadequate.

Roscoe W. Fields, Sr. v. Testerman · filed 1988-05-04

Plaintiff failed to state a claim cognizable under Sec. 1983 because his complaint alleged an intentional deprivation of liberty contrary to state law, but he failed to plead and prove that remedies available under state law are inadequate.

A § 1983 claim based on an allegedly falsified court transcript fails if the plaintiff neither alleges nor shows that state remedies are inadequate.

Carson v. Veasy · filed 1988-06-14

The plaintiff moves for counsel on appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant in this civil rights case. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant intentionally falsified and altered the transcript which the defendant filed with the state appellate court. ... We also hold that summary judgment was proper because the plaintiff had not alleged or shown the inadequacy of state remedies.

A § 1983 due process claim challenging disciplinary segregation imposed under established state procedures does not require pleading that available state remedies are inadequate.

James v. Lt. J. Rion, Individually and in His Official Capacity at Northpoint Training Center · filed 1988-06-15

The district court dismissed this claim because plaintiff did not allege that available state remedies are inadequate, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); however, the placement of plaintiff in disciplinary segregation was accomplished pursuant to established state procedures and not as a result of a random and unauthorized act. Plaintiff was therefore not required to plead the inadequacy of state remedies in order to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff seeking to enforce First Amendment rights in federal court to first use available state proceedings, including union grievance procedures.

Narumanchi v. Board of Trustees of Connecticut State University · filed 1988-06-20

Nor is it permissible, in light of Patsy v. Board of Regents, supra, to require initial recourse to available state proceedings, including union grievance proceedings, for the enforcement of First Amendment rights protectable in federal court pursuant to section 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff challenging prison discipline imposed under established state procedure need not plead that state remedies are inadequate.

Fancher v. Dewey Sowders, Warden Joe Rion, Lieutenant Nancy D. Yeast, Corrections Officer Muriel Ohl (Cto) · filed 1988-06-23

Because the discipline in this case was imposed pursuant to established state procedure, rather than as a result of a random and unauthorized act, plaintiff was not required to plead the inadequacy of state remedies in order to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a false-arrest claim when state law supplies an adequate remedy for the arrest.

Massey v. Shepack · filed 1988-06-24

We hold, as did the court in Alvarado, that there are adequate state remedies for false arrest which preclude the application of § 1983 rights to the facts alleged in this appeal.

Section 1983 permits a procedural due process claim against high-level officials who conspire to misuse a licensing process to transfer property, despite available state-law remedies.

Easter House, an Illinois, Not-For-Profit Corporation v. Thomas Felder, Florence McGuire and Joan Satoloe · filed 1988-07-08

We hold only that the phrase is at least narrow enough to exclude a conspiracy by high-level officials to use the licensing process to transfer property from one licensee to another from the class of due process violations that can be cured by state law remedies.

A § 1983 claim challenging prison medical care may proceed despite an unexhausted habeas claim when the medical claim is independent of the challenge to confinement.

Greer v. St. Tammany Parish Jail · filed 1988-08-31

Thus, whether or not plaintiff’s habeas claim is ripe for federal review at this time, his § 1983 claim for improper medical attention is properly before this Court.

A § 1983 procedural due process claim for deprivation of property requires the plaintiff to allege that available state remedies are inadequate.

Grim v. Moore · filed 1988-09-21

Since the Plaintiff has failed to allege the inadequacy of the state remedies available to him in addition to his allegation of the substantive wrong, he fails to make out a claim re-dressable under § 1983 with respect to his second claim.

A prisoner bringing a Section 1983 claim must exhaust available prison grievance procedures for a matter that is not grave.

Johnson v. Fair · filed 1988-10-13

Johnson’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies — again concerning a matter that is not a “grave” one under the Green standard, supra — prevents our consideration of this claim.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust available state remedies before bringing a federal claim.

B.A.M. Brokerage Corp. v. State of New York · filed 1988-11-22

However, there is no requirement that state remedies be exhausted.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available remedies before filing suit.

Edelweiss Development Corp. v. County of Susquehanna · filed 1988-11-30

After reviewing the arguments presented, this Court concludes that although the Plaintiff need not exhaust available remedies, there is an issue of “finality” which must be addressed.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state procedures before bringing a due process claim for an intentional tortious deprivation of a liberty interest.

Maida v. Andros · filed 1988-12-13

But we decline to take the ultimate step of gutting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) by requiring a plaintiff to exhaust state procedures in order to advance a section 1983 due process claim for the intentional tortious deprivation of a liberty interest, whether the deprivation be pled under the rubric of substantive or procedural due process.

In Connecticut, a § 1983 claim seeking a refund of the state motor carrier tax must first be presented to the revenue commissioner and may proceed in Superior Court if rejected.

Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Ass'n of America v. State · filed 1989-01-31

Our holding is no different for the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants’ actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs should have brought that claim also before the commissioner, and if rejected, could have pursued the theory in the Superior Court.

A Section 1983 damages suit should be stayed while the plaintiff exhausts state remedies for a related good-time-credit claim when refiling may pose statute of limitations problems.

Henry Taylor, Jr. v. Edward Murray, William P. Rogers, Thomas R. Israel, Ruffus Flemming, Larry W. Jarvis, Edward Meeks · filed 1989-03-10

The Sec. 1983 suit for damages should be stayed pending exhaustion because of possible statute of limitations problems faced by Taylor should he decide to refile the suit upon satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek damages for police misconduct without exhausting state remedies when the injury does not directly and solely concern the fact or duration of confinement.

Johnson v. City of Chicago · filed 1989-03-22

Because his claims do not directly and solely relate to the fact or duration of his confinement, they fall outside the core of habeas corpus and may be maintained under Section 1983 without exhaustion.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge prison disciplinary hearing procedures without exhausting state remedies when the hearing imposes substantial sanctions affecting conditions of confinement, even if it also revokes good-time credits.

Edward Viens and Joseph Perruquet v. Harold Daniels, Adrian Barber, Daniel Stock and Judy Pedersen · filed 1989-06-13

Since the disciplinary sanctions (other than revocation of good time) imposed in the present case are not subject to the Preiser rule if considered independently, a federal court need not stay its hand merely because these sanctions were imposed concurrently with a revocation of good time. Hanson v. Heckel does not bar a section 1983 action challenging the procedures used at a prison disciplinary hearing where the hearing resulted, as in this case, in the imposition of significant sanctions other than the revocation of good time. This is true even though good-time credits were revoked as a result of the same hearing.

A property owner must pursue an available appeal to the local board of adjustment before filing a § 1983 action against a city over a zoning decision.

City of Deland v. Lowe · filed 1989-06-15

It was error for the trial court not to dismiss this action without prejudice because Lowe failed or refused to exhaust his administrative remedy of appeal to the Board of Adjustment prior to filing a section 1983 action against the City.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing a claim in federal court.

Reinhardt v. COM. OF MASS. DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERV. · filed 1989-06-28

It is beyond peradventure that there is no requirement that the plaintiff exhaust his state remedies prior to asserting a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing a claim in federal court.

Reinhardt v. Massachusetts Department of Social Services · filed 1989-06-28

It is beyond peradventure that there is no requirement that the plaintiff exhaust his state remedies prior to asserting a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court.

Section 1983 requires a state prisoner to exhaust state remedies before bringing a federal suit ancillary to a post-conviction proceeding when the suit’s sole ultimate aim is to shorten imprisonment.

Scruggs v. Alfred W. Moellering, Gregory Antalis, and Geraldine C. Behr · filed 1989-06-30

We hold that a state prisoner’s federal suit that is ancillary to a post-conviction proceeding, like the post-conviction attack itself under the federal habeas corpus statute, requires exhaustion of state remedies, since the ultimate — and only ultimate — aim is to shorten the length of imprisonment.

Section 1983 damages claims that challenge the validity or length of confinement require exhaustion of state remedies because they amount to habeas corpus proceedings.

Johnson v. State of Texas · filed 1989-08-04

These are all issues which challenged the validity or length of his confinement. The civil rights claim for such damages must first be subject to the exhaustion of state remedies because the challenge amounts to a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A Section 1983 suit seeking recalculation of parole dates based on withheld good-time credits as well as damages ordinarily should be stayed pending exhaustion of available state remedies, but a stay is unnecessary when the underlying challenge lacks merit.

Lumpkin v. Co-I Beverly A. McKennon Women's Unit · filed 1989-08-17

Because Lumpkin sought recalculation of her parole eligibility and release dates taking into account withheld goodtime credits, as well as damages, the principles enunciated in Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir.1987), indicate the district court should have stayed the proceedings pending Lumpkin’s exhaustion of any available state remedies. Nevertheless, because Lumpkin’s challenge that the discipline lacked an evidentiary basis is without merit, see Saenz v. Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir.1987), a stay would only unnecessarily delay the inevitable.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to challenge allegedly discriminatory parole procedures without exhausting state remedies when the challenge does not seek release or contest the denial of parole.

Thomas v. Georgia State Board Of Pardons And Paroles · filed 1989-08-24

Thomas's challenge to the procedure by which parole decisions are made, as opposed to the denial of his parole, can properly proceed under section 1983 without the requirement that state remedies be exhausted.

A section 1983 damages claim that depends on invalidating a current prison sentence must be stayed while the prisoner exhausts state remedies if the limitations period may expire during exhaustion.

Yang v. James Rowland, Ed Veit, L.E. Debord, Estelle Wayne · filed 1989-12-04

Because exhaustion or remedies is a lengthy process, Yang may not be able to complete exhaustion before the limitations period expires on his section 1983 claim. Accordingly, federal proceedings on his section 1983 claim must be stayed until Yang exhausts his state remedies.

A Section 1983 damages action challenging the validity of confinement should be stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies when dismissal could allow the limitations period to bar the claim.

Osborn v. George Sumner, Warden & Director, Ndop Walter Luster, Warden, Sncc · filed 1989-12-12

The district court, however, erred in dismissing Osborn's action for damages rather than staying it until Osborn exhausts his state remedies. A stay is appropriate to prevent Nevada's two-year statute of limitations from barring Osborn's damages action in the future.

Section 1983 permits damages claims attacking a conviction, but those claims must first be exhausted.

Bill Carroll, Jr. v. Jimmy Maynor Aaron J. Johnson Linwood v. Stephenson Joe Freeman Britt Lee Sampson John W. Campbell · filed 1989-12-22

To the extent Carroll is seeking damages rather than release, he may bring his claims under § 1983, though the claims must first be exhausted.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to seek relief for mistreatment in custody without first exhausting state remedies.

Burgos v. Koehler · filed 1990-01-03

In these circumstances, one must take Burgos at his word that he is seeking relief from mistreatment while in jail and not release from confinement. Because Burgos may obtain such relief under § 1983, and that section does not impose any exhaustion requirement, defendants’ motion to dismiss this action for failure to exhaust state remedies must be denied.

Section 1983 permits a federal constitutional challenge despite an earlier state permit application filed before the challenged law was enacted.

Cecos International, Inc. v. Jorling · filed 1990-01-04

It may not be precluded from asserting its rights under § 1983 and § 1988 and having a federal court review its constitutional challenges to an amended state law simply because it had filed an application for a permit before the challenged amendment was enacted.

A § 1983 complaint dismissed for failure to demonstrate exhaustion should be dismissed without prejudice so the plaintiff can refile after showing exhaustion.

Kerr v. State of S.C. · filed 1990-02-08

We note, however, that the district court's dismissal should have stated that it was without prejudice, thus allowing Kerr to refile his complaint once he has demonstrated exhaustion of his claims.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to the absence of pre-termination notice in state law when the alleged deprivation does not stem from random procedural error.

Russell v. Dunston · filed 1990-02-12

Russell does not claim that he was deprived of the right to apply for benefits by random procedural error. Rather, he concedes his application was untimely under RSSL Section 605 and challenges the fact that pre-termination notice of the discretionary discontinuance of medical leave is not provided by state law. That challenge, if meritorious, can be entertained under Section 1983.

Section 1983 generally permits a federal cause of action despite the availability of overlapping state remedies.

Zinermon v. Burch · filed 1990-02-27

Thus, overlapping state remedies are generally irrelevant to the question of the existence of a cause of action under § 1983.

When a prisoner uses Section 1983 to challenge the length of confinement, the court must give the prisoner an opportunity to state whether state remedies have been exhausted before dismissing on that ground.

Charles Sonny Bostic v. Unknown Agents of State of North Carolina Judicial System Unknown Agents of North Carolina Depar · filed 1990-02-28

The district court dismissed the action without prejudice on the ground that Bostic was improperly trying to use a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action to challenge the length of his confinement. We find that the district court erred in dismissing on this ground without giving Bostic an opportunity to state whether he exhausted state remedies.

A prisoner whose § 1983 claim attacks the fact or length of confinement must exhaust state remedies before bringing it in federal court.

Lindsey v. Wells · filed 1990-03-05

Because Lindsey's complaint attacked the fact or length of his confinement, it should not have been entertained by the District Court absent exhaustion of state remedies.

In a § 1983 damages suit alleging deprivation of a property interest without procedural due process, the plaintiff must plead and prove that post-deprivation state remedies are inadequate.

Lowe v. William M. Padgett and Knox County, Tennessee · filed 1990-03-06

As to her alleged due process violation, Lowe has neither alleged nor demonstrated that she lacked an adequate state remedy at law. "[I]n section 1983 damage suits claiming a deprivation of a property interest without procedural due process of law, the plaintiff must plead and prove that [post-deprivation] state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate."

A claim under § 1983 that calls into question the validity of a conviction requires exhaustion of state remedies before it can be considered.

Pruitt v. Raymond Petraska Alan Friday Mary Darlene Charles Starnes Calvin Hamrick · filed 1990-03-16

We agree that Pruitt must exhaust state remedies before his claims can be considered under Sec. 1983, because his claims call into question the validity of his conviction.

Section 1983 damages claims attacking a conviction should be held in abeyance pending exhaustion of state remedies when dismissal may cause the limitations period to expire.

Payne v. Fairburn · filed 1990-04-17

Joseph P. Payne, Sr., a Virginia prisoner, appeals from the district court's order which properly construed his claim for money damages under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1985(2) as attacking the validity of his conviction and dismissed the action so that Payne might exhaust his state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b). ... Damage claims such as Payne's should be held in abeyance pending exhaustion rather than dismissed where deferring the right to claim damages until the conclusion of the state proceedings might cause a claim to be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

A prisoner’s Section 1983 claim that would affect the length of confinement must be stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies, even if the prisoner drops a request to restore good-time credits.

Bressman v. Farrier · filed 1990-04-19

Rick Bressman’s section 1983 action seeks damages and the restoration of good-time credits that he lost as the result of a disciplinary action. Bressman alleges the prison violated his constitutional rights by disciplining him for the contents of a letter he wrote to his brother. Because a federal determination on the merits of this claim would affect the length of Bressman’s confinement, the district court was correct in staying Bressman’s claim. Furthermore, we do not believe Bressman’s subsequent attempt to omit his request for restoration of good-time credits warrants a different result.

Section 1983 damages claims in a mixed habeas action may be stayed until state habeas remedies are exhausted when deciding them would overlap with the habeas issues.

Clifford v. Jacobs · filed 1990-04-25

Because of those concerns, the Section 1983 claims were properly stayed pending the exhaustion of state habeas remedies.

A Section 1983 complaint calling into question the validity of an arrest is subject to the state-remedy exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Foxworth v. Montgomery County, Md. · filed 1990-05-22

Foxworth's complaint calls into question the validity of his arrest and is therefore subject to the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.

A person no longer in state custody may refile a § 1983 action attacking a conviction without first exhausting state remedies.

Riggs v. Greiner · filed 1990-06-26

If Riggs is no longer in the custody of the State of West Virginia, as stated in his request for reinstatement, then he may refile his Sec. 1983 action without first exhausting state remedies.

Section 1983 actions challenging prison conditions need not be stayed for exhaustion of state remedies unless they would necessarily affect proceedings concerning the duration of confinement.

Munz v. Crispus C. Nix Ronald G. Welder Charles Harper Kyle Bowden David Babcock and Charles W. Lee · filed 1990-07-05

Offet requires that section 1983 actions must be stayed pending state exhaustion if the 1983 action would necessarily have a preclusive effect in subsequent state proceedings considering the duration of a prisoner’s sentence. ... Offet does not require that challenges to confinement conditions be stayed.

A Section 1983 complaint dismissed for failure to demonstrate exhaustion of claims should be dismissed without prejudice, allowing the plaintiff to refile after demonstrating exhaustion.

Peterson v. NC Parole Commission · filed 1990-11-20

Elmer Leon Peterson appeals from the district court's order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 complaint for failure to submit proof of exhaustion. ... We note, however, that the district court's dismissal should have stated that it was without prejudice, thus allowing Peterson to refile his complaint once he has demonstrated exhaustion of his claims.

A § 1983 challenge to the loss of prison good-time credits must await exhaustion of state remedies even when the credits could shorten a life sentence only after commutation.

Blair-Bey v. Crispus C. Nix, Ronald Welder, Paul Twaddle, John Dewey Eugene Foehring · filed 1990-11-28

However, state remedies must be exhausted under Offet even when the loss of good time credit will not result in a shorter sentence unless the sentence is commuted.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy that a state's exclusive workers' compensation remedy cannot bar when the Section 1983 claim is valid.

Vorwald v. School District of River Falls · filed 1991-01-29

Moreover, the exclusivity provision in a state worker's compensation act cannot preclude recovery on a valid sec. 1983 claim because the federal remedy provided by sec. 1983 supersedes conflicting state law.

Section 1983 claims that call into question the validity of a conviction are dismissed without prejudice when those claims have not been exhausted.

Willis Flowers, Jr. v. Donald Collins, Department Sheriff, McSd Marion County Sheriff Department · filed 1991-01-29

Since all of Flowers's claims call into question the validity of his conviction, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint without prejudice, as Flowers has not shown exhaustion of these claims.

When a state prosecution is pending, a § 1983 civil claim requiring exhaustion after conviction should be stayed until the prosecution and any relevant state collateral review end.

Woodard v. Terry J. Adams, Detective, Wilson Police Department, Donnie Lynn, Detective, Edgecombe County Sheri · filed 1991-01-31

However, when a state prosecution is pending, as in the case at bar, the appropriate course of action is to abstain by staying the proceedings on the civil claim pending the ultimate termination of the state prosecution and any relevant state collateral review proceedings.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before a federal court adjudicates a plaintiff’s federal claims.

Privitera v. California Board Of Medical Quality Assurance · filed 1991-02-25

The district court correctly recognized that its decision to stay the federal issues could not be compelled by notions of exhaustion, Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 146-47, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2311, 101 L.Ed.2d 123, 143-44 (1988); Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2568, 73 L.Ed.2d 172, 188 (1982). However, if a court inappropriately abstains, "[t]he practical effect of abstention ... may be to impose an exhaustion requirement not appropriate to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983." Pearl Inv. Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 774 F.2d 1460, 1463 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170, 106 S.Ct. 2891, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986).

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before a federal court hears the claim, and a stay cannot impose that requirement without a valid basis for abstention.

Privitera v. California Board of Medical Quality Assurance · filed 1991-02-25

To the extent that reading is accurate, it would implicate the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies and would not be appropriate in a § 1983 case.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state remedies before bringing suit.

WAM Properties, Inc. v. Desoto County, Florida · filed 1991-03-12

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 there is no requirement that state remedies be exhausted.

A Section 1983 suit challenging prison discipline that includes disciplinary segregation cannot be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies merely because the discipline also includes loss of good time credits.

Lamb v. Dewey Sowders, Julie Westerfield, Karen Smors, Rebecca Lawson · filed 1991-03-29

The district court should not have dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust state remedies because the adjustment committee imposed sanctions other than the loss of good time credits, i.e. disciplinary segregation.

Section 1983 claims that do not implicate the fact or duration of confinement do not require exhaustion of state remedies.

Perdue v. Bell · filed 1991-05-21

However, Sec. 1983 claims which do not implicate the fact or duration of confinement need not be exhausted.

A prison inmate must raise an alleged disciplinary hearing error during the prison disciplinary process to preserve a § 1983 claim based on that error.

Saenz v. Murphy · filed 1991-05-22

It is appropriate to apply the principle of waiver to sec. 1983 claims brought by prison inmates because the principle of waiver is supported by the same reasons which have motivated courts to require inmates to exhaust their administrative remedies before they may commence a sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state remedies, but an inverse condemnation claim requires the property owner to use available state procedures first.

Cap'n Hook Auto Parts, Inc. v. Board of Township Trustees · filed 1991-08-23

Although exhaustion of state remedies is generally not a prerequisite to a § 1983 claim, ... exhaustion is required for an inverse condemnation claim brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before seeking relief.

Smith v. Lake City Nursing Home · filed 1991-08-30

Furthermore, there is no need no exhaust state remedies prior to seeking relief under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a furlough denial without exhausting state remedies when the denial concerns a condition of confinement and does not affect its duration.

Morris v. McCotter · filed 1991-09-11

A threshold question is whether the challenge to the furlough policy is a challenge to the “duration of confinement” that requires exhaustion of state remedies under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), or a “condition of confinement” that does not require exhaustion. ... I am of the opinion that the grant or denial of a furlough in the present case does not effect the length or duration of Plaintiffs confinement, thus the Court may properly consider the civil rights claim at this time.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner seeking a trial record rather than release to proceed without exhausting state remedies.

Ruark v. Frank Gunter, and Gale A. Norton, Attorney General of the State of Colorado · filed 1991-10-17

The relief he seeks is the record itself, not release. Accordingly, his petition is properly reviewed as one under § 1983, precluding any requirement of exhaustion of state remedies.

A prisoner seeking medical care for a condition of confinement may bring a Section 1983 action without showing exhaustion of state remedies.

Ross v. O'Grady · filed 1991-11-14

We AFFIRM the district court's dismissal without prejudice, and we remind Timothy Ross that he may refile his claim in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that he will not be required to show exhaustion.

A section 1983 damages claim that collaterally attacks a state conviction should be stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies.

Voth v. Keith Meisenheimer, Asst. District Attorney Brenda Rohrbach Sally Avera, Public Defender Robert E. Jone · filed 1991-12-27

A district court should stay, rather than dismiss, a claim for damages under section 1983 pending the exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge procedures for considering parole applications without first exhausting state remedies when the challenge does not question the basis of confinement.

Clark v. Thompson · filed 1992-04-03

Because a challenge to the procedures a state employs in considering applications for parole does not draw into question the basis of the confinement, it need not be brought under § 2254, and exhaustion of state remedies is unnecessary.

A plaintiff asserting a procedural due process claim under § 1983 must show that available state procedures are inadequate to redress the alleged deprivation.

Cadle v. City of Newton Falls, Ohio · filed 1992-05-01

In Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984), this Court held that in order to state a claim for relief in federal court under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that available state procedures were not adequate to redress the alleged wrong. ... Likewise, Cadle simply failed to allege or show that there were inadequate state remedies available to redress his alleged harm. Therefore, we affirm the district court's judgment to dismiss Cadle's first claim.

A § 1983 complaint that implicates the validity of the plaintiff’s confinement is subject to an exhaustion requirement.

Joseph Jenkins, Jr. v. Patricia Henderson the City of Hopewell · filed 1992-05-19

Jenkins's complaint is subject to the exhaustion requirement because it implicates the validity of his confinement.

Section 1983 damages claims implicating the fact or duration of confinement may proceed after remedies appropriately sought through habeas have been exhausted.

Esquivel v. Ramos · filed 1992-05-19

Esquivel's complaint can fairly be read to encompass such claims as ineffective assistance of counsel that go to the fact or duration of confinement. Once remedies appropriately sought by way of habeas have been exhausted, Esquivel may proceed further in the district court on his damages claims arising under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a supplemental action alongside a state tort action arising from the same facts only when the state action has not adequately vindicated the asserted constitutional right.

Stickney v. Chrysostomos Trikes, Leland Young and City of Sterling Heights · filed 1992-06-08

However, a supplemental section 1983 action is available only when the plaintiff seeks to vindicate a constitutional right that was not adequately vindicated by the state action.

A § 1983 damages action that requires determining whether a prisoner’s conviction is valid must be stayed until the prisoner exhausts habeas corpus remedies.

Marchetti v. Bitterolf · filed 1992-07-02

To determine the truth of these allegations, the district court would be required to determine whether the underlying conviction was valid. Under such circumstances, the district court must stay the civil rights action pending exhaustion of the prisoner's habeas corpus remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before seeking compensation.

Branham v. Robert Brown Ron Schull Tekla Miller · filed 1992-08-20

Branham correctly argues that he was not required to exhaust state remedies before seeking compensation under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge disciplinary procedures without exhausting state remedies when the challenge would have only a speculative and incidental effect on the duration of confinement.

Richard Sisk James Piatt v. Cso Branch R. Austin Lt. Hilton · filed 1992-09-02

Thus, we conclude Sisk’s and Piatt’s section 1983 challenge to the disciplinary procedures has only a “speculative and incidental effect” on the duration of their confinement. ... Under these circumstances, we hold that exhaustion of state remedies is not required.

Section 1983 proceedings that would call the validity of a state conviction into question are stayed while the plaintiff pursues available state remedies.

Figueroa v. Clark · filed 1992-11-05

Because the factual and legal issues raised in this civil rights complaint cannot be addressed without making decisions which directly implicate the validity of plaintiffs criminal conviction, the court will abstain from further consideration of plaintiffs allegations until they are presented to and ruled upon by the state courts.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit.

Smothers v. Benitez · filed 1992-11-17

In a section 1983 action, the plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a prisoner to exhaust state remedies when the claim neither seeks restoration of good time credits nor directly challenges the length of confinement.

Dess v. McCormick · filed 1992-12-01

Dess does not seek the reinstatement of his good time credits, nor does he directly challenge the length of his confinement. Accordingly, he does not need to exhaust his state remedies prior to bringing this claim.

A § 1983 claim questioning the validity of a conviction is treated as a habeas claim and requires exhaustion of state remedies.

Gerald Garner, Priest v. Steve Dunbar Jim Roberts Jim Siemers Julie Armstrong · filed 1993-02-26

Although the district court's treatment of the action as one in habeas and requiring exhaustion of state remedies was correct, see Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29 (4th Cir.) (§ 1983 claim questioning validity of conviction subject to exhaustion requirement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982), the dismissal of the action with prejudice was inappropriate.

Section 1983 provides an action for claims challenging the conditions of confinement, without requiring exhaustion of state remedies.

Davis v. Captain Davis Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 1993-03-09

Davis's Eighth Amendment claim challenges the conditions of his confinement rather than the fact or length of his confinement and therefore should be raised in a separate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) action; exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to such an action.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of available state remedies before a plaintiff seeks damages in federal court.

Rubin v. Smith · filed 1993-04-07

Plaintiffs’ ability to seek a remedy in state court is not a bar to pursuing them section 1983 claim for damages in federal court.

A prisoner whose § 1983 civil rights claim alleges constitutional violations underlying his conviction must exhaust habeas remedies before continuing the civil rights action.

Christoffel v. Benzenhoefer · filed 1993-04-19

Christoffel alleged that his constitutional rights were violated during his arrest, and therefore he must exhaust his federal habeas remedies before he can continue with his civil rights claim. See Marchetti, 968 F.2d at 965-67. The district court properly stayed his civil rights action in order to allow Christoffel to proceed with his section 2255 motion. See id. at 967; Young, 907 F.2d at 878.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement without exhausting state remedies.

Gibson v. State of North Carolina · filed 1993-04-26

Finally, to the extent that Gibson challenged the conditions of his confinement, he need not exhaust state remedies, but the district court did not err in dismissing those claims without prejudice to Gibson's right to file an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative and judicial remedies before suit, but the plaintiff must state a claim for relief under the statute.

Impink v. City of Indianapolis, Board of Public Works · filed 1993-05-06

The Impinks correctly assert that it is not necessary for them to exhaust State administrative and judicial requirements before pursuing a § 1983 claim. However, they must first meet the burden of stating a claim for which relief can be granted under § 1983 before they may pursue such remedy.

A § 1983 claim for a state tax refund or damages is premature when adequate state administrative remedies are available and the claimant has not exhausted them.

McManus v. State, Department of Revenue & Finance · filed 1993-05-19

The district court properly dismissed the claim under § 1983 because there are adequate state administrative remedies, and McManus failed to exhaust them.

Section 1983 complaints seeking release from confinement may be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies.

Fulgham v. Edward W. Murray, Director of System · filed 1993-05-28

We also note that because the core of Fulgham's complaint sought his release from confinement, it could have been dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies.

Claims construed under Section 1983 that call into question the validity or duration of confinement require exhaustion of remedies.

O'Neal v. Broadwater · filed 1993-06-03

While certain claims could have been construed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978), dismissal without prejudice was not error because remedies on these claims must be exhausted because they call into question the validity or duration of his confinement.

Section 1983 claims challenging prison conditions do not require exhaustion of state remedies.

Smith v. Rowland · filed 1993-06-07

It was thus unnecessary for Smith to exhaust state remedies, and the court was in error for dismissing his action for failure to exhaust, or for failure to prove exhaustion of state remedies to the district court.

A Section 1983 damages action challenging the constitutionality of confinement should be held in abeyance pending exhaustion of state remedies when exhaustion delays are not attributable to the plaintiff and the statute of limitations remains a concern.

Payne v. Fairburn · filed 1993-06-17

Payne is attempting to exhaust state remedies and his inability to do so quickly cannot be attributed to him. Our concern about the statute of limitations remains. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's decision and remand the case for placement in abeyance pending exhaustion of state remedies.

A § 1983 suit that challenges the legality of a conviction must be dismissed rather than stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies, with equitable tolling potentially available upon refiling.

Heck v. James Humphrey, Dearborn County Prosecutor, Robert Ewbank, Attorney, and Michael Krinoph, Indiana State Poli · filed 1993-07-01

We think the dismissal of Heck’s suit should therefore be affirmed. When and if he exhausts his state remedies and refiles this suit, and the defendants plead the statute of limitations, the district judge will have to decide whether the elements of equitable tolling have been met. ... We hold merely that the suit was properly dismissed, rather than stayed.

A prisoner's § 1983 damages claim attacking the fact or duration of confinement requires exhaustion of state remedies and should be stayed pending exhaustion when dismissal would risk a statute of limitations bar.

Stubbs v. Foley · filed 1993-07-02

Therefore, although exhaustion of state remedies is not generally a prerequisite to an action under § 1983, Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982), exhaustion is required when the § 1983 claim attacks the fact or duration of confinement. ... However, we direct the district court to stay this case pending exhaustion of state court remedies to guard against a statute of limitations problem.

Section 1983 claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and police misconduct in obtaining arrest warrants do not require exhaustion of state remedies when the plaintiff was never convicted of the crimes at issue.

Garland v. Mike Fowler, Detective, and Larry Smith, Spartanburg County Sheriff Allen Wood, Officer Randall Mil · filed 1993-07-06

However, Garland never was convicted of the crimes for which he claims false arrest, malicious prosecution, and police misconduct, so exhaustion of state remedies was not required.

A plaintiff must exhaust state remedies before pursuing § 1983 claims that touch on the duration of confinement.

McCombs v. Norris · filed 1993-08-04

Though we do not agree with the district court that some of McCombs's claims are frivolous per se, we affirm the district court's order because Plaintiff must exhaust his state remedies for these claims which touch on the duration of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).

Section 1983 authorizes damages for unconstitutional conditions of confinement and generally does not require exhaustion of state remedies.

Griffey v. Robert C. Borg, Warden Ted Zink, Associate Warden C. Tristan, Acting Program Administrator · filed 1993-08-24

Rather, section 1983 authorizes the recovery of money damages for constitutional violations, and it usually does not require the exhaustion of state remedies. Id. Thus, to the extent Griffey's amended complaint sought damages for the conditions of his confinement and the 230 days that he was kept in the SHU past his release date, the section 1983 action should have been allowed to proceed.

Section 1983 claims that call into question the validity or duration of confinement are subject to exhaustion of state remedies even when they do not seek habeas relief.

Tomey v. Gissy · filed 1993-09-23

Also, it appears Plaintiffs claim concerning the presentence report calls into question the validity of his confinement; § 1983 claims which call into question the validity or duration of confinement, even if not seeking habeas relief, is subject to exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). Nothing in the record in this matter reflects Plaintiff has exhausted his state remedies.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before filing a civil rights suit.

Reid v. The City of Flint Flint Firefighters Iaff Union, Local 352 · filed 1993-10-06

Unlike other statutory schemes under administrative law, there is no exhaustion of state remedies requirement before a civil rights suit may be filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 action seeking restoration of good-time credits is subject to the habeas corpus requirement to exhaust state remedies.

Leeson v. K. L. Murphy, Assistant Warden, Benton Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction Arkansas Departme · filed 1993-10-12

Because Leeson seeks the restoration of good-time credits, the district court properly applied the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus exhaustion requirement to Leeson's § 1983 action.

A Nevada bar applicant must seek state supreme court review of an intermediate admission denial before pursuing a § 1983 challenge to that denial in federal court.

Netzky v. State Bar of Nevada · filed 1993-10-19

There is no way to predict what the Nevada Supreme Court would have done with such a petition, and the chance that Netzky would have received a remedy shows that there has been no deprivation of a federal right. Thus, Netzky's failure to first petition the Nevada Supreme Court has left the district court, and this court, without jurisdiction to review his challenges to the Nevada Supreme Court Rules.

Section 1983 permits a property owner to bring an action for damages and attorney’s fees concurrently with a state paving-assessment appeal under article 1105b.

City of Grand Prairie v. Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth · filed 1993-10-21

No constitutional or state law doctrine precludes a property owner from filing, concurrently with its article 1105b appeals hearing, a suit to recover damages and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies for a damages action alleging an unrepresentative jury pool when the relief sought is not akin to habeas relief.

Ryan v. DuPage County Jury Commission · filed 1993-10-28

Because the relief they seek is not akin to that provided by the habeas statute, and because § 1983— unlike the habeas statute — has no exhaustion requirement, Ryan and Primm may bring this damages action in federal court even though they did not pursue state remedies.

Section 1983 permits a taxpayer class challenging the constitutionality of a property tax assessment system to sue in Pennsylvania common pleas court without first exhausting state statutory remedies.

Murtagh v. County of Berks · filed 1993-11-10

In this case, Felder and Howlett command the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County to exercise jurisdiction over a section 1983 action without requiring the complete exhaustion of state statutory remedies.

Available state remedies do not bar a substantive due process claim under section 1983, administrative exhaustion is not required for such a claim, and state nonclaim statutes do not bar section 1983 actions.

Cox v. City of Lynnwood · filed 1993-12-13

Lynnwood next claims that the availability of a state remedy under RCW 64.40 bars any remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We disagree. ... In addition, exhaustion of administrative remedies also is not required to maintain a substantive due process claim under section 1983. ... In addition, state nonclaim statutes do not bar action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 generally permits claims against state actors for violations of federal statutes, but a claim seeking relief also available under the IDEA cannot proceed until the IDEA administrative process is exhausted.

Torrie by and Through Torrie v. Cwayna · filed 1994-01-20

Section 1983 is generally available to redress violations of federal statutes by state actors. ... In this case, plaintiffs’ claims under Section 1983 and the Rehabilitation Act, Section 504, seek relief that is also available under the IDEA. ... Because plaintiffs have not exhausted the IDEA administrative process their claims under these statutes may not go forward.

A civil rights plaintiff challenging the fact or duration of confinement must exhaust available state habeas remedies before proceeding with a Section 1983 claim.

Hand v. Lewellyn Young, Judge · filed 1994-02-14

A civil rights plaintiff who challenges the fact or duration of confinement must also exhaust his state habeas remedies prior to proceeding with his Sec. 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before filing in federal court, and pursuing state remedies does not by itself toll the limitations period.

Coleman v. O'Grady · filed 1994-03-03

We believe the district court disposed of these issues correctly in its order of October 6, 1992 (which we attach), and on that basis, its judgment is AFFIRMED. ... Following the reasoning of Patsy and its progeny, Coleman could have brought his complaint, alleging defendants' violation of his due process rights, in federal court within the applicable two year limitation period. ... Furthermore, because the congressional remedy for Sec. 1983 violations does not require prior resort to state proceedings, the theory that Congress wished to hold open the independent federal remedy during any time period necessary to pursue alternative state-court remedies cannot be assumed.

A § 1983 action that requires exhaustion of state remedies should remain on the district court docket during exhaustion when the limitations period may run.

Hamlet v. Collins · filed 1994-03-23

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) complaint. Our review of the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge discloses that the district court correctly determined that exhaustion of state remedies was required. We note, however, that the statute of limitations may run while Hamlet exhausts state remedies. See S.C.Code Ann. Sec. 15-3-530(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp.1991). Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order and remand the case with directions to retain the action on the district court docket pending exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 does not excuse a taxpayer from using an adequate and complete state tax appeal remedy to challenge tax collection.

Devinki v. Takacs · filed 1994-05-17

Indeed, the courts have made clear that lawsuits involving tax collection are an exception to the general rule that a § 1983 plaintiff is not required to exhaust state remedies. ... The appeal scheme set forth in § 138.430 is an adequate and complete remedy at law.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies to avoid dismissal of a due process claim.

Dede v. Captain Robert Baker · filed 1994-05-18

Contrary to the district court's findings, exhaustion is not required to avoid dismissal of a due process claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state remedies, but a claim attacking a conviction or the fact or length of confinement must first exhaust those remedies.

Curry v. Randall · filed 1994-05-19

Although exhaustion of state remedies is not generally a prerequisite to actions under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988), see Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), exhaustion is required when the Sec. 1983 claim attacks the fact or length of confinement. See Alexander v. Johnson, 742 F.2d 117, 126 (4th Cir.1984). Because Curry is challenging the fact of her conviction, she must exhaust state court remedies before pursuing her federal action.

Section 1983 damages claims that require deciding the validity of a prisoner’s conviction must be stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies.

Grey v. Ted Rutt Pierce County Sheriffs Department Starlene Hicks · filed 1994-06-08

Because the district court would necessarily have to adjudicate the validity of Grey's conviction to decide these claims, the district court properly stayed Grey's action pending exhaustion of state remedies.

A § 1983 claim challenging a guilty plea should remain on the docket while the plaintiff exhausts state remedies if dismissal could jeopardize a timely claim under the statute of limitations.

Slone v. Pratt · filed 1994-06-14

Although the general rule is that the case should be dismissed rather than retained on the district court's docket pending exhaustion of state remedies, Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53, 54 (1971), a civil rights claim should be retained on the docket if dismissal would create a statute of limitations problem. Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 32 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 911 (1982). The record does not disclose when Slone became aware of the Defendants' alleged actions making it difficult to determine when the statute of limitations began to run. Accordingly, to preserve any timely claim Slone may have, we vacate and remand to the district court with instructions to retain Slone's case on its docket until he exhausts his state remedies.

A Section 1983 claim whose requested relief would necessarily affect the length or duration of confinement is subject to the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).

Neff v. Karen Warner the Chesapeake Center · filed 1994-07-22

Because granting Neff relief on his claim would necessarily affect the length or duration of his confinement, the district court properly determined that the claim was subject to the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b) (1988); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.1983).

Section 1983 allows a federal constitutional challenge even when a state procedural remedy is available.

Alpine Christian Fellowship v. County Commissioners · filed 1994-09-06

It is a challenge to the constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, raising a justicia-ble issue in this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As was determined in Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, State of Colorado, 859 F.2d 820 (10th Cir.1988), the state procedural remedy is not exclusive.

When exhaustion of state remedies may jeopardize the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim attacking a conviction, the court should stay the claim pending exhaustion rather than dismiss it.

Nance v. Antonio Harris Denise Fili Stuarto. Simms Bertina Silver, Detective Marvin Sydnor, Detective · filed 1994-10-18

Because exhaustion of state remedies may jeopardize Nance's ability to file his Sec. 1983 claim within the applicable statute of limitations, we vacate the district court's dismissal and remand for entry of an order staying proceedings pending exhaustion of state remedies.