42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 claim involving military service must allege exhaustion of intraservice remedies.

Fuller v. Jerre Kaufman Gordon Ravenscroft Robert T. Simon Richard C. Jernigan · filed 1994-12-13

In this case we do not reach the cognizability issue because Fuller's section 1983 claim must be rejected for failure to allege exhaustion of intraservice remedies.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before bringing an action for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Bowen v. Doyle · filed 1995-02-27

Thus, Bowen is not required by Tyler to exhaust his state remedies before bringing this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing suit.

Mid-American Waste Systems, Inc., and Mid-American Waste Systems of Indiana, Inc. v. City of Gary, Indiana · filed 1995-03-20

This is not to say that Mid-American must “exhaust state remedies.” Exhaustion is unnecessary under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally allows plaintiffs to sue in federal court without first exhausting state administrative or judicial remedies.

Texans Against Censorship v. State Bar of Texas · filed 1995-03-31

Plaintiffs in federal actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are generally not required to exhaust state administrative or judicial remedies prior to bringing suit.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative or state remedies before bringing suit.

Bussinger v. City of New Smyrna Beach, Florida · filed 1995-04-20

Exhaustion of remedies is not required before bringing a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative or state remedies before filing suit.

Bussinger v. City of New Smyrna Beach · filed 1995-04-20

Exhaustion of remedies is not required before bringing a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff alleging a First Amendment violation in a public labor dispute to exhaust state administrative remedies before suing.

Wilbur v. Elton Harris & Town of Rockland · filed 1995-05-04

Congress has provided no such exception to the rule against requiring exhaustion under § 1983 for First Amendment claims in a labor relations context. Accordingly, the district court erred in holding that Wilbur was required to exhaust her state administrative remedies prior to commencing the instant § 1983 action.

The availability of state remedies does not bar a § 1983 claim alleging an intentional deprivation of First Amendment rights.

Harrington v. Lauer · filed 1995-06-08

The Board has moved for the entry of summary judgment with respect to all of plaintiff’s federal claims, arguing that the availability of state remedies preclude plaintiff from proceeding with his civil-rights claims. The Board has misplaced reliance on Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), in support of its argument.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state remedies before suit.

Rivera v. Proctor (In Re Rivera) · filed 1995-07-12

“In general, exhaustion of state remedies ‘is not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983.’ ”

A Section 1983 claim cannot be barred for failure to exhaust state remedies after an unreviewed administrative action.

Thornquest v. King · filed 1995-08-17

First, a section 1983 claim cannot be barred by a plaintiff's failure to exhaust state remedies with respect to an unreviewed administrative action.

Section 1983 allows an involuntarily committed patient to pursue conditions of confinement claims in federal court without exhausting state remedies when the claims do not challenge the confinement itself.

Choe v. Mary Smith Zack Damerman Western State Hospital · filed 1995-09-13

However, because some of Choe's claims were cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988), we modify the district court's order to reflect that summary judgment for the Defendants, rather than dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies, was appropriate on those claims. ... Because these claims were not challenges to Choe's confinement, Choe was not required to exhaust state remedies before pursuing them in federal court.

A plaintiff claiming deprivation of a liberty interest without procedural due process under § 1983 must plead that state remedies are inadequate to redress the wrong.

Shockey v. Fouty · filed 1995-09-20

In Gibbs v. Hopkins (C.A.6, 1993), 10 F.3d 373, 378, the same court applied this pleading requirement under Section 1983 cases to the deprivation of liberty interests without procedural due process of law. ... Our review of the pleadings in this case indicates that the same fatal defect that was present in Gibbs also occurs in this complaint. Accordingly, appellant’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides alternative, supplemental federal relief even when a state law remedy is available.

Allen v. Board of Education · filed 1995-10-17

We note, however that § 1983 was adopted to provide alternative, supplemental relief to persons who almost always have a state law remedy.

Section 1983 provides alternative, supplemental relief even when a state law remedy exists.

Allen v. Board Of Education, Unified School District 436 · filed 1995-10-17

We note, however that Sec. 1983 was adopted to provide alternative, supplemental relief to persons who almost always have a state law remedy.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before suit.

Irwin v. City of New York · filed 1995-10-19

Bearing in mind that there is no requirement of exhaustion of state remedies under Section 1983, the significance of the existence of the Article 78 remedy remains to be determined.

Section 1983 requires a claimant seeking a post-deprivation remedy to first pursue an adequate state remedy.

Marietta Realty, Inc. v. Springfield Redevelopment Authority · filed 1995-10-24

Where a claimant seeks a post-deprivation remedy and the laws of that state provide an adequate one, the plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 action without first exhausting the laws of the state.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust available state procedures to intervene in an ongoing case before seeking federal relief.

Focus v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas · filed 1996-02-01

We find no basis for implying a duty to exhaust all available state process in pursuit of intervention and, accordingly, see no reason why FOCUS, once rejected by the court of common pleas, was not free to seek relief immediately from a federal court.

Section 1983 plaintiffs who are denied intervention in a state proceeding need not exhaust extraordinary state remedies to gain intervention before seeking relief in federal court.

Focus v. Allegheny County Court Of Common Pleas · filed 1996-02-01

If a would-be federal plaintiff in a civil rights action has no duty to attempt to intervene in an ongoing state suit in which he might be able to tender his constitutional issue, it follows, we believe, that FOCUS, once rejected by the court that entered the gag order, had no duty to exhaust all extraordinary state remedies in an attempt to intervene.

Section 1983 does not require a claimant to exhaust state administrative or judicial remedies before suing.

Sears, Roebuck De Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Soto-Rios · filed 1996-03-27

Zinermon does not require that a § 1983 claimant exhaust administrative or state judicial remedies.

Section 1983 permits a taxpayer to pursue an equal protection claim alongside available state tax remedies.

Edward Valves, Inc. v. Wake County · filed 1996-06-13

Can Taxpayer pursue Section 1983 remedies in addition to the state law remedies provided by the North Carolina Machinery Act? We conclude that Taxpayer can.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the constitutionality of continued confinement and seek release or a shorter term without exhausting state remedies.

Phillips v. William E. Gunn, Director of South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services · filed 1996-08-05

Accordingly, we affirm on the district court's reasoning that Appellant's failure to exhaust state remedies precludes this action. Phillips v. Gunn, No. CA-95-3231-3-6BC (D.S.C. Mar. 15, 1996). See Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70, 71-72 (4th Cir.1983) (exhaustion required when prisoner challenges constitutionality of continued confinement and seeks release or shortening of duration of confinement, even if complaint is styled as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) action).

A § 1983 claim should be held in abeyance while the plaintiff exhausts state remedies if dismissal could allow the limitations period to run.

Alexander v. Holman C. Gossett, Jr. Charlie Sanders William E. Gunn · filed 1996-11-27

Accordingly, to preserve any timely § 1983 claim Appellant may have regarding his parole eligibility, we vacate the portion of the district court's order dismissing this claim against Gunn and remand to the district court with instructions to retain Appellant's case on its docket in abeyance until Appellant has exhausted his state remedies.

Section 1983 generally allows federal suits without first exhausting state remedies, but that rule does not create a claim when an adequate state postdeprivation remedy means no due process violation occurred.

Federico v. Board of Education of the Public Schools · filed 1997-01-23

Federico's invocation of the exhaustion doctrine in the present context is inapposite. Generally, plaintiffs with federal or constitutional claims may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court without first exhausting state judicial or administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before asserting a claim.

Cosco v. Uphoff · filed 1997-03-28

Plaintiffs are not required to exhaust state administrative remedies before asserting their § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims cannot be barred by a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust state remedies for unreviewed administrative actions.

Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center v. Cook · filed 1997-04-08

It is well established that a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be barred by a plaintiff's failure to exhaust state remedies with respect to unreviewed administrative actions.

Section 1983 permits a claim for deprivation of First Amendment free speech rights regardless of supplemental state remedies.

State Ex Rel. Eckstein v. Video Express, Unpublished Decision (4-28-1997) · filed 1997-04-28

A Section 1983 claim based upon deprivation of the First Amendment guarantee of free speech is always available regardless of supplemental state remedies.

Section 1983 permits relief for violations of federal rights despite a state workers’ compensation law making its own process the exclusive forum for benefits disputes.

Rumph v. State Workmen's Insurance Fund · filed 1997-05-08

This state law provision, however, does not limit a plaintiffs ability to seek relief for a violation of his federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a supplementary remedy, so a litigant ordinarily need not exhaust available state judicial remedies before seeking federal relief.

Devlin v. Sosbe · filed 1972-07-31

A civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is supplementary to any remedy a state might offer, and a litigant ordinarily need not exhaust his state judicial remedies before seeking relief in the federal courts.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state judicial remedies as a predicate to federal court jurisdiction.

Russo v. Central School District No. 1, Towns of Rush, County of Monroe, State of New York · filed 1972-11-14

Of course, exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not a predicate to a federal court’s jurisdiction in a sec. 1983 claim, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 92 S.Ct. 719, 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).

A § 1983 plaintiff need not exhaust available state-court remedies before invoking the federal remedy.

Stewart v. Pearce · filed 1973-09-17

First, they contend that Stewart had adequate remedies at law available in the state courts which should have been pursued before a federal action was brought. This argument is foreclosed by Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1960) where the Court held that failure to exhaust state court remedies does not defeat a claim under the Civil Rights Act since “[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”

A § 1983 claim of this kind requires a prisoner to ask the state courts for a transcript before seeking federal relief.

United States ex rel. Haines v. Patterson · filed 1973-10-11

But even under § 1983, the essential notion we might loosely (but not with technical accuracy) call “exhaustion” would apply to a case of this kind. For reasons already indicated, the nature of the alleged wrong is such that petitioner should be required to ask the state courts for a transcript before he may come here and be deemed to present a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies before bringing a federal civil-rights action.

Wishart v. McDonald · filed 1973-12-11

While plaintiff may be required to exhaust state administrative remedies, he is not required to exhaust state judicial remedies. ... To exact such a requirement from a plaintiff in a § 1983 action would be to ignore the policy behind the statute of providing a federal cause of action for alleged deprivations of civil rights.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state judicial or non-judicial remedies before bringing the action.

Couper v. Madison Board of Police & Fire Commissioners · filed 1974-01-25

The question is not whether the plaintiff in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is required to exhaust the judicial or non-judicial remedies available to him under state law; he is not so required.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust or invoke available state judicial remedies before bringing a federal civil-rights action.

Mr. And Mrs. Ardmore Canton v. Spokane School District 81, a Public Corporation · filed 1974-05-13

It is well established that state judicial remedies need not be exhausted or invoked to perfect a federal cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, § 1983. “It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 482, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961).

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to challenge unconstitutional conditions of confinement without first exhausting state-court remedies.

Swansey v. Elrod · filed 1975-01-10

In the instant action, plaintiffs directly attack the conditions of their confinement. They seek transfer to another institution only incidently as a matter of relief; if the conditions of their confinement could be corrected within the confines of Cook County jail, the alleged constitutional wrong here would be corrected without transfer to another institution. Thus, this suit attacks the conditions of incarceration not the location thereof and the action is properly brought under § 1983 without exhausting state remedies.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek federal relief without first exhausting state court remedies.

Brown v. Bronstein · filed 1975-01-16

To relegate plaintiff to the state courts upon a possibility they would decide that the action of the defendants was arbitrary and capricious based upon the summons record would not only result in delay, but if her petition there were denied, it would not resolve the basic constitutional issues here presented under the First Amendment and in effect would impose upon her a requirement that she exhaust state remedies contrary to Supreme Court rulings.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of a state statute to pursue a state-court remedy before bringing a federal action.

Foe v. Vanderhoof · filed 1975-02-10

We note also that it is not necessary in a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a plaintiff to pursue a remedy in state courts before bringing the federal action.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state judicial remedies, but a plaintiff seeking equitable relief under it must show that no adequate remedy at law exists and that denial of relief would cause irreparable injury.

Wallace v. Kern · filed 1975-06-30

We recognize, of course, that exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not required in actions brought under section 1983. ... This rule does not, however, alter the traditional equitable principle that a plaintiff seeking equitable relief must demonstrate that no adequate remedy at law exists and that, absent injunctive relief, he will suffer irreparable injury.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies before bringing suit.

Friedlander v. Joseph Cimino, M.D., Individually and as Commissioner of the Department of Health of the City of N · filed 1975-07-09

It is clear, however that exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not required in a case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies before bringing suit in federal court.

Cordova v. Reed · filed 1975-08-07

At least since the Supreme Court's seminal ruling in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), it has been clear that a plaintiff need not exhaust state judicial remedies before proceeding in the federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to bypass the exhaustion requirement applicable to a challenge to a state-court conviction under § 2254(b).

Pugh v. Hull · filed 1976-08-19

Nor can his attempt to have the alleged trial error reviewed in the context of a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against court officials and others avoid the exhaustion requirements of § 2254(b).

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state-court remedies before bringing a federal civil-rights action.

Thibodeau v. Com. of Mass. · filed 1977-03-09

To the extent that the action is regarded as arising under § 1983, there is no requirement that state remedies be exhausted.

Section 1983 does not require a person asserting federal constitutional claims to present those claims in state court before seeking relief in federal court.

Zablocki v. Redhail · filed 1978-01-18

Second, there are no ambiguities in the statute for the state courts to resolve, and — absent issues of state law that might affect the posture of the federal constitutional claims — this Court has uniformly held that individuals seeking relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 need not present their federal constitutional claims in state court before coming to a federal forum.

Section 1983 provides a basis for a prisoner's monetary-damages claim for an alleged constitutional-rights deprivation, but the federal court may abstain under principles of federal-state comity pending state-court resolution of the underlying issue.

Bullock v. Cuyler · filed 1978-08-15

In addition, we hold that interests of federal-state comity compel this Court to abstain from proceeding with Bullock’s claim for monetary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pending the resolution of the issue underlying that claim by the courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action without prior exhaustion of state judicial remedies, but that rule does not override the federal anti-tax-injunction statute.

McCann v. Silva · filed 1978-09-11

The rule that allows civil rights actions to be maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without the prior exhaustion of state judicial remedies does not constitute an exception to the exhaustion requirement of the above statute.

Section 1983 provides a federal forum for civil-rights claims, and it does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies.

Johnson v. Kelly · filed 1978-09-29

That limitation is necessary to preserve the role of the federal courts in exercising Congress's mandate to provide a forum for the adjudication of civil rights cases brought pursuant to § 1983. ... The extension of Younger principles to all civil litigation, coupled with the definition of "pending state litigation" adopted by the Supreme Court in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349-50, 95 S.Ct. 2881, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975), would effectively impose upon the § 1983 plaintiff a requirement of exhaustion of state judicial remedies, except in cases presenting extraordinary circumstances. Such an extension would undermine the holding of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), that judicial exhaustion is not required under § 1983, and thus would be inconsistent with recent Supreme Court teaching on the place of the Younger doctrine within the jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 actions do not require exhaustion of state judicial remedies before a plaintiff may pursue the claim in federal court.

Johnson v. American Credit Company Of Georgia · filed 1978-10-06

She cannot be denied a federal forum to pursue her § 1983 claim on the ground that an adequate state remedy is available to her. The Supreme Court has squarely held that a plaintiff who brings a § 1983 action need not exhaust state judicial remedies.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to present their federal constitutional claims in state court before seeking relief in federal court.

Ktsanes v. Underwood · filed 1979-03-26

“there are no ambiguities in the statute for the state courts to resolve, and — absent issues of state law that might affect the posture of the federal constitutional claims — this Court has uniformly held that individuals seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not present their federal constitutional claims in state court before coming to a federal forum.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to pursue a monetary-relief claim, but a federal court may dismiss it without prejudice pending resolution of the underlying issues by state courts.

Thomas v. Cuyler · filed 1979-03-26

The plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief will be dismissed without prejudice to refile them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 subsequent to exhaustion of his available state remedies, and the plaintiff’s legal claims will be dismissed without prejudice to refile pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, subsequent to the resolution of the underlying issues by the courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek federal relief without first submitting all federal claims to a state court; only a free and unreserved submission for complete and final resolution bars returning to federal court.

Tovar v. Billmeyer · filed 1979-11-06

A free and unreserved submission to the state court of all federal claims for complete and final resolution is necessary to bar return to the federal court.

Section 1983 does not eliminate a state court's otherwise applicable exhaustion requirement; the federal no-exhaustion rule applies only to actions brought in federal court.

Thompson v. Medical Licensing Board · filed 1979-12-26

The procedural rule set out by the courts above addresses only actions brought in federal court. No case cited by Thompson, nor any which we have been able to locate, demands that a state court abandon its own requirements of exhaustion merely because the claim before it is based upon § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a supplementary federal remedy and does not require a plaintiff to pursue state-court relief first; only a free and unreserved submission of federal claims for complete and final resolution can bar return to federal court.

Tovar v. Billmeyer · filed 1980-01-10

Under such circumstances conflicting results, piecemeal litigation, and some duplication of judicial effort is the unavoidable price of preserving access to the federal relief which section 1983 assures. ... Construed reasonably, this appears to be saying that resort to federal courts for the relief provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred when the plaintiff (1) initially seeks relief in a state court and (2) has the opportunity to raise all his claims, both state and federal, in the state court. This is not the law. England does not so hold. A free and unreserved submission to the state court of all federal claims for complete and final resolution is necessary to bar return to the federal court. ... "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy . . . ."

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies before initiating a federal action.

Gilbert v. School District No. 50, Adams County · filed 1980-03-04

Further, it is not necessary for plaintiff to await disposition of his state action. Exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not required prior to the initiation of an action based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is not the initial remedy for a prisoner’s claim attacking the constitutionality of a state-court conviction; habeas corpus is exclusive initially and available state-court remedies must be exhausted, but claims that do not indirectly attack the conviction may proceed without exhaustion.

Courtney v. Reeves · filed 1981-01-09

Rather, habeas corpus is the exclusive initial cause of action when the basis of the claim goes to the constitutionality of the state-court conviction. Courtney’s coerced guilty plea cause of action clearly goes to the constitutionality of his state-court conviction; it therefore is subject to the requirement that he have exhausted his available state-court remedies. ... It is settled, however, that Courtney can proceed with those section 1983 claims that do not attack indirectly the validity of his conviction without any showing of exhaustion of state-court remedies.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state judicial remedies before bringing suit.

Calkins v. Blum · filed 1981-04-15

While not argued by the plaintiffs, clearly there is no exhaustion of state judicial remedies requirement under § 1983.

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action that may not be dismissed or abstained from merely because a state-court remedy is available.

Northwood Apartments v. Max Lavalley, Thomas Sommerville and City of Royal Oak · filed 1981-05-14

The argument that a federal right of action, specifically created under § 1983, may be dismissed because a state remedy to enforce such cause of action is available is even less persuasive than the argument that a diversity case may be dismissed or remanded because the state provides a clear remedy. Thus, the notion that the availability of a state court remedy is a proper basis for abstention is incorrect.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state judicial remedies before pursuing a federal constitutional claim.

Boudin v. Thomas · filed 1982-06-14

Section 1983 requires me, however, to decide the issue of Ms. Boudin’s allegedly punitive confinement solely on federal constitutional grounds. ... The rationale supporting Section 1983 and its non-exhaustion requirement is not applicable in the context of the issues presented in this case. ... But the law has yet to catch up with reality and I am mandated to rule on the issues presented herein even though state judicial channels have not been utilized.

Section 1983 generally does not require a claimant to attempt to vindicate a federal claim in state court before bringing the claim in federal court.

Etlin v. Robb, Governor of Virginia, Et Al. · filed 1982-06-28

Assertion of a federal claim under § 1983, as a general matter, need not be preceded by an attempt to vindicate that claim in state court.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies before bringing a federal action.

Cozart v. Arnold F. Winfield, Individually and in His Capacity as Supervisor for Evanston Township, and Evanston · filed 1982-09-02

However, . plaintiffs failure to exhaust state remedies does not bar his bringing a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to bring a federal constitutional takings claim in federal court without first pursuing a parallel state-court action.

Stearns v. Smith · filed 1982-09-03

This Court concludes plaintiff can bring his cause of action in federal court despite his subsequently filed and pending action in state court.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to present federal constitutional claims in state court before seeking relief in federal court.

Shapiro v. Cooke · filed 1982-10-27

However, in the present case there are no ambiguities in § 520.9 for state courts to resolve, and “absent issues of state law that might affect the posture of the federal constitutional claims — this Court has uniformly held that individuals seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not present their federal constitutional claims in state court before coming to a federal forum.”

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies before bringing a federal claim.

Charles T. Coleman, Sr. v. Dave Faulkner, Sheriff Tulsa County, Robert Duckert, Captain Tulsa County Jail, Sheriff's Dep · filed 1982-12-08

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state judicial remedies.

Section 1983 has no requirement that a plaintiff first exhaust state judicial remedies.

Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, Richard Donnelly v. Parma Board of Education · filed 1983-11-17

The Supreme Court, however, made it clear long ago that there is no state judicial exhaustion requirement in § 1983 eases.

A § 1983 plaintiff need not exhaust state judicial remedies before filing federally.

Rubie Rogers v. Robert Okin, M.D., Etc., Rubie Rogers v. Robert Okin, M.D., Etc. · filed 1984-06-14

A plaintiff alleging a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not first exhaust state judicial remedies.

A Section 1983 plaintiff cannot be required to exhaust state judicial remedies before obtaining federal adjudication of federal claims.

Promovision International Films, Ltd. v. Trapani · filed 1984-10-04

The court could not have been requiring the plaintiff to exhaust its state judicial remedies.

A § 1983 plaintiff need not first seek to vindicate federal claims in state court before seeking federal relief.

American Motor Club, Inc. v. Corcoran · filed 1986-09-25

“[I]t is settled law that a § 1983 litigant need not first seek to vindicate his federal claims in state court before turning to a federal court for relief.”

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust available state judicial procedures before bringing a federal claim for constitutional deprivation.

Courtemanche v. Enlarged City School District · filed 1988-05-05

There is, of course, no requirement that a valid section 1983 claim initially be pursued in a state court proceeding. To the contrary, plaintiff need not exhaust available state judicial procedures before challenging a constitutional deprivation in Federal court.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies before bringing suit.

Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin · filed 1988-11-23

The state maintains that Bethune could have petitioned a state court for relief in advance of the administrative hearing, but this confuses Younger with a requirement of exhaustion of state judicial remedies, and there is none in Sec. 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to initiate a state court action before suing in federal court.

Alleghany Corp. v. Haase · filed 1989-03-07

There is also no disrespect even though the state court could hear the constitutional claims if the federal plaintiff instituted a proceeding in state court, because there is no requirement that § 1983 actions must first be filed in state court.

Section 1983 claims seeking injunctive relief to shorten confinement after a parole denial require exhaustion in state court before they can be heard in federal court.

Marvel v. Cavanaugh · filed 1990-05-18

Although he requests injunctive relief under Sec. 1983, the core of his complaint concerns the state parole board's refusal to parole him, and the relief he seeks is intended to shorten the duration of his confinement. His claims are, therefore, subject to exhaustion in state court before they can be heard in federal court.

A § 1983 complaint centered on the length or duration of confinement must be dismissed without prejudice while the prisoner exhausts available state court remedies.

Jaindl v. T. Saylor, Ava I. Gift, Robert W. Miller, Karen A. Elliott, Karen Price, Jon P. Galley · filed 1991-06-04

Although Jaindl does not seek his immediate release from his Maryland sentence, the validity of his confinement is central to his claim. He contends that defendants should have already released him to the Florida detainer. When the core of a prisoner's claim is the length or duration of his sentence, the proceeding is in habeas. Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir.1983). Jaindl is now in the process of exhausting available state court remedies by his asserted filing of a writ of habeas corpus in the Maryland state court. This Sec. 1983 complaint must be dismissed without prejudice to his exhausting his state court remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state court remedies before bringing a federal action.

Puig v. Rosario · filed 1992-02-18

Where a party brings suit under section 1983, there is no requirement that state court remedies be exhausted prior to bringing a federal action.

A prisoner seeking damages under section 1983 that would require finding the current sentence invalid may proceed only if the claims were presented to state courts or the federal ruling could not compel release.

Gates v. Iljana · filed 1992-08-05

We understand Gates' argument, but the rule of law in the Seventh Circuit, like our own, is clear: if the requested relief requires as its predicate a determination that the sentence currently being served is invalid, then a party may proceed under section 1983 only if the claims (1) have been presented to the state courts or (2) the federal court's determination could not be used to compel the party's release from confinement.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not use state judicial remedies before bringing an action in federal court.

Linda A. Leaf and Andrew B. Haynes v. Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin, Board of Attorneys Professional Responsib · filed 1992-11-12

Haynes was not required to utilize state judicial remedies before, or instead of, bringing a Section 1983 action in federal court.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to maintain a damages claim challenging the fact or duration of confinement unless the prisoner has exhausted state court remedies challenging the conviction and imprisonment.

Lee v. Purpero · filed 1993-02-26

Consequently, Mr. Lee cannot maintain his present 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint unless he has exhausted his state court remedies relating to his challenge of his state court conviction and imprisonment.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies before filing a claim in federal court.

Cushing v. City of Chicago · filed 1993-09-03

This argument is without merit; Cushing was not required to exhaust state judicial remedies before filing a § 1983 claim in federal court.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies before filing a claim in federal court.

Cushing v. City Of Chicago · filed 1993-09-20

This argument is without merit; Cushing was not required to exhaust state judicial remedies before filing a Sec. 1983 claim in federal court.

Section 1983 claimants need not exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal court.

South Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. City of Boston · filed 1995-01-17

The Veterans could have raised these claims and sought this relief in the courts of the Commonwealth. They were not, however, required to do so. “The Supreme Court ... has held expressly that [42 U.S.C. § 1983] claimants need not avail themselves of state judicial and administrative remedies before going to federal court.”

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state court or administrative remedies before filing suit.

Globe Glass & Mirror Co. v. Brown · filed 1995-06-19

However, a federal plaintiff does not have to exhaust state court or administrative remedies prior to bringing a suit for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as plaintiffs have done here.

A plaintiff may bring a § 1983 suit in federal court without first exhausting available state judicial or administrative remedies.

Olmeda v. Schneider · filed 1995-06-23

A plaintiff may properly bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit to federal court even if the state provides judicial or administrative remedies that appear completely adequate to redress the injuries. In other words, a plaintiff need not exhaust state remedies before initiating a § 1983 suit in this Court.

A plaintiff need not pursue a claim in state court before bringing a section 1983 suit.

Pica v. Sarno · filed 1995-09-05

A plaintiff in a section 1983 suit is not required to exhaust his claim in state court.

A section 1983 damages claim challenging probable cause for an arrest does not require exhaustion of state court remedies when the charges were dropped and the claim cannot affect a state proceeding or sentence.

Sellers v. R.J. Allen, Officer · filed 1996-07-08

As the district court noted in its opinion, a section 1983 claim which calls into question the validity of a state court proceeding or impacts on the duration or validity of a sentence is subject to the exhaustion requirement. Appellant was arrested for trespassing. Appellant asserts in his complaint however, that the trespassing charges were dropped and the case never proceeded to trial. Accordingly, a decision regarding the existence of probable cause would not impact the concerns expressed in Hamlin and exhaustion is therefore unnecessary.

Section 1983 generally permits a federal suit without first exhausting state judicial or administrative remedies.

Federico v. BD. OF EDUC. OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS · filed 1997-01-23

Federico's invocation of the exhaustion doctrine in the present context is inapposite. Generally, plaintiffs with federal or constitutional claims may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court without first exhausting state judicial or administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require nonprisoner litigants to exhaust state medical malpractice remedies before bringing a federal action for damages arising from involuntary commitment.

Levy v. Beare · filed 1997-11-05

Thus, a litigant seeking damages under § 1983 based on his involun- tary commitment to a mental hospital need not exhaust state remedies under a state medical malpractice statute prior to filing suit in federal court.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before a plaintiff pursues a Fourteenth Amendment due process or equal protection claim.

Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, Virginia · filed 1998-01-23

State remedies need not be exhausted in order to pursue a § 1983 action claiming a vio- lation of these federal rights.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before suing for violations of Fourteenth Amendment due process or equal protection rights.

Front Royal And Warren County Industrial Park Corporation v. Town Of Front Royal · filed 1998-01-23

Absent is a similar concern with whether IPC's Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims are ripe. State remedies need not be exhausted in order to pursue a § 1983 action claiming a violation of these federal rights.

A Section 1983 plaintiff need not exhaust state remedies when solely challenging a state statute’s constitutionality on a claim substantial enough to require a three-judge court.

Cordova v. Reed · filed 1975-08-07

Exhaustion is not required, as here, when a plaintiff’s sole challenge is to the constitutionality of a state statute and the claim is sufficiently substantial to require convening of a three-judge court.

Section 1983 requires a property owner bringing a takings claim to exhaust adequate state remedies for just compensation before filing an independent action.

Partership v. Town of Windham, No. Cv95-0248230s (Apr. 24, 1998) · filed 1998-04-24

Because state procedures providing for takings without just compensation include the statutory right of appeal set forth in General Statutes § 8-132 , as well as the opportunity to file an action in replevin seeking the return of any personalty within the condemned property, those remedies must be exhausted before the plaintiff may initiate an independent action in the Superior Court pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 claims seeking injunctive relief for violations of federal constitutional rights may proceed without exhaustion of state remedies.

Simi Investment Co., Inc. v. Harris County, Tex. · filed 1998-08-26

Simi expressly requested injunctive relief based in part on the county’s violation of Simi’s rights to governmental regularity under the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These federal questions are ripe without exhaustion of state remedies.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 action need not first exhaust state administrative remedies or pursue the claim in state court.

R.S.S.W., Inc. v. City of Keego Harbor · filed 1998-09-23

It is now well established that a plaintiff asserting a § 1983 action “need not exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing an action in federal court [or] attempt to vindicate his or her claim in state court before asserting it in federal court.”

Section 1983 reaches alleged constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law in judicial proceedings, including judges and court-appointed persons.

Miofsky v. Superior Court of California · filed 1983-01-03

If, as Miofsky claims, the Constitution does protect the confidentiality of the information, we know of no ground for exempting from the broad reach of § 1983 actions taken by persons acting under color of state law in judicial proceedings, whether those persons are judges or others appointed by judges to act on behalf of the court.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state remedies before suit.

Continental Insurance Co. v. Illinois Department Of Transportation · filed 1983-06-08

... even if exhaustion of remedies were required in section 1983 cases, as with an immaterial statutory exception it is not, Patsy v. Board of Regents, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), it would not be required here; the futility exception would come into play.

Section 1983 permits a foster parent to seek declaratory relief and damages for a constitutional violation despite New York’s Article 78 remedy for challenging a child’s removal.

Rodriguez ex rel. Kelly v. McLoughlin ex rel. Cardinal Children'sn & Family Services · filed 1999-01-08

Because plaintiff seeks relief other than return of a foster child, the New York statutory scheme, including an Article 78 proceeding, does not provide the exclusive remedy. Accordingly, the Court rejects defendants’ argument that plaintiffs § 1983 action is barred.

Section 1983 claims are not precluded by the existence of a state statutory remedy for the asserted wrong.

Raykowski v. New York City Department of Transportation · filed 1999-03-18

However, since, as the parties agree, petitioner’s remaining claim, for violation of his civil rights (42 USC § 1983), is not properly disposed of as an incident (see, CPLR 7806) of his article 78 claims, and the claim is not precluded by the existence of a State statutory remedy for the asserted wrong (see, 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, 487, cert denied and appeal dismissed 481 US 1008), the claim should not have been dismissed, but should have been permitted, albeit in the form of a plenary action, and we modify accordingly (see, CPLR 103 [c]; People ex rel. Brown v New York State Div. of Parole, 70 NY2d 391, 398).

Section 1983 claims that fall within the core of habeas corpus require exhaustion of state judicial remedies, even when styled as claims for damages.

Christianson v. Spalding · filed 1983-12-30

While it may be unfortunate from plaintiff’s point of view that a claim styled- as one for damages under § 1983 is found to fall “within the core of habeas corpus”, thus necessitating exhaustion, the fact of the matter is that federal relief in the form of immediate or more speedy release from incarceration (normally a matter of more pressing concern) is subject to just this sort of delay. ... Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that plaintiff would not be entitled to relief in this court as plaintiffs claims fall “within the core of habeas corpus”, Preiser v. Rodriguez, supra, and plaintiff has made no showing that he has exhausted state judicial remedies as to each claim.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state medical malpractice procedures before bringing constitutional claims.

Herer v. Burns · filed 1984-01-03

The Supreme Court has stated categorically that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983. ... Therefore, the plaintiffs are not required to avail themselves of the Virginia Medical Malpractice Act before this court has jurisdiction to consider constitutional and pendent wrongful death claims.

Section 1983 does not require a public employee to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a First Amendment claim.

Bonnell v. Lorenzo · filed 1999-08-27

Accordingly, Bonnell is not required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to sue in federal court without first exhausting administrative or state remedies.

John Gil Construction, Inc. v. Riverso · filed 1999-09-23

Section 1983 allows plaintiffs with constitutional and/or federal claims to sue in federal court without first exhausting administrative or state remedies.

Section 1983 has no judicially imposed requirement to exhaust state remedies before bringing a claim in federal court.

Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Kaye · filed 2000-04-05

The Sixth Circuit’s blanket requirement that district courts abstain from all First Amendment challenges to state court injunctions seems to be at odds with the Supreme Court’s repeated admonitions that federal courts should abstain only rarely. It is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recent confirmation that “ § 1983 contains no judicially imposed exhaustion requirement; absent some other bar to the suit, a claim either is cognizable under § 1983 and should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and should be dismissed.”

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suit.

Patin v. Munster · filed 2000-04-05

We agree that Patsy, 457 U.S. at 516, 102 S.Ct. at 2568, held that “exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983.”

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before suing for deprivation of constitutional rights.

Smith v. Bd. of Election Com'rs for City of Chicago · filed 1984-03-09

We believe that the City Board’s position is more aptly characterized as an exhaustion argument. It is well settled that parties seeking redress for deprivation of their constitutional rights need not exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies before a federal action alleging constitutional violations.

Silverman v. Marion Barry, Mayor of the District of Columbia · filed 1984-03-19

Under Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), decided after the district court issued its order in this case, exhaustion of state judicial and administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to a section 1983 federal court action alleging constitutional violations.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of remedies, but a procedural due process claim does not arise when a plaintiff declines to use available, apparently adequate procedures.

Alvin v. Suzuki · filed 2000-09-12

Alvin appears to conflate the two, and contends, as an alternative to his claim that he attempted to use the available procedures, that he need not go through the processes available because of the general rule there is no exhaustion requirement for 42 U.S.C. S 1983 claims. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982); Hohe v. Casey, 956 F.2d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 1992). However, exhaustion simpliciter is analytically distinct from the requirement that the harm alleged has occurred. Under the jurisprudence, a procedural due process violation cannot have occurred when the governmental actor provides apparently adequate procedural remedies and the plaintiff has not availed himself of those remedies.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state judicial remedies before a federal constitutional claim is brought in federal court.

Thomas, Caren Cronk v. Chicago Park Dist · filed 2000-09-14

Since 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, the statute under which federal constitutional claims are litigated in the federal courts, does not impose any requirement (with immaterial exceptions) of exhausting state judicial remedies, the victim of foot dragging in state court can always bring a parallel suit in federal court, complaining that the delay is denying him an adequate remedy for the violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a due process claim for access to potentially exculpatory evidence without exhausting state remedies when the prisoner seeks neither immediate release nor a challenge to the conviction.

Harvey v. Horan · filed 2000-09-29

The plaintiff does not seek immediate release from prison and disclaims any challenge to his conviction at this time, conceding that the DNA tests may show his conviction was valid. The denial by the Commonwealth’s Attorney, to whom Virginia authorities have directed persons acting on plaintiffs behalf, of access to possibly exculpatory evidence states a claim of denial of due process and gives this court jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which, unlike a petition for writ of habeas corpus, has no exhaustion requirement.

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing an action.

Bowen v. Doyle · filed 2000-10-18

Tyler was a habeas proceeding; Bowen’s federal claim is asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This difference is dispositive. “In general, exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983, even an action by a state prisoner. The federal habeas corpus statute, by contrast, requires that state prisoners first seek redress in a state forum.”

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available statutory remedies before bringing a claim.

Frumento v. City of West Haven, No. 417928 (Nov. 17, 2000) · filed 2000-11-17

The plaintiff is not required to exhaust his statutory remedies before bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .

Section 1983 does not require a claimant with a final, concrete takings claim to seek relief in state court first.

Washlefske v. Winston · filed 2000-12-06

If we were, in this circumstance, to require Washlefske to file his claim first in a Virginia court, we would be transforming William- son County’s finality rule into a rule of exhaustion. This result would be in diametric opposition to a foundational decision of modern § 1983 jurisprudence, Monroe v. Pape, which held that "[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the State remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before suit, but that rule does not prevent Younger abstention when a related state criminal prosecution is pending.

NTL, L.L.C. v. Pryor · filed 2001-01-19

While Zablocki does reaffirm that a plaintiff need not exhaust state remedies before bringing a section 1983 claim, it also expressly held that Younger was inapplicable because there were no pending state proceedings in which the plaintiff might have challenged the constitutionality of the statute in question. See 434 U.S. at 379 n. 5, 98 S.Ct. 673. In the instant case, there is undisputedly a pending criminal prosecution against Bradford, at which he might assert a defense that § 13A-12-200.il is unconstitutional. Thus, Zablocki is distinguishable, and Plaintiffs’ argument pertaining to exhaustion in section 1983 cases simply misses the mark.

A plaintiff need not exhaust available state remedies before bringing a claim under Section 1983.

Ancheta v. Watada · filed 2001-01-30

This argument, however, is unavailable. The law is clear that a plaintiff need not exhaust available state remedies before bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state law remedies before seeking relief.

Petersen v. Davenport Community School District · filed 2001-03-21

In litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there is no requirement that a plaintiff exhaust available state law remedies as a condition of seeking the remedy provided by the federal statute.

A plaintiff need not exhaust state tort remedies before bringing a Section 1983 action.

Pepper v. Gish · filed 2001-03-26

Contrary to Pepper’s contention, he is not required to exhaust state tort remedies before bringing a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust judicial review of a state agency’s final decision before filing suit.

Deupree v. State · filed 2001-04-25

Nor were plaintiffs required to “exhaust” judicial review of ODOT’s decision before filing this action.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies, although the claim must still be ripe for adjudication.

Lee v. Clark County District Attorney's Office · filed 2001-05-11

Although Lee is correct that under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), he is not required to exhaust State remedies to pursue a Section 1983 lawsuit, the issue presented here is not one of exhaustion but of ripeness.

Section 1983 generally does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before bringing a federal claim.

Ross v. City of Orlando · filed 2001-06-04

As such, Patsy controls, not Williamson County, and the Plaintiffs failure to appeal does not bar this § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies, including by intervening in another party’s state suit, before suing in federal court.

Green v. City of Tucson · filed 2001-07-09

There is yet another reason why the district court’s Younger intervention rule cannot stand: Requiring a plaintiff to intervene in state litigation brought by parties to which he is a stranger would contravene the principle that plaintiffs have no duty to exhaust their state administrative or judicial remedies before pursuing a § 1983 action in federal court.

Section 1983 plaintiffs generally need not exhaust available state judicial or administrative remedies before suing in federal court.

Green v. City of Tucson · filed 2001-07-09

Either way, the requirement is inconsistent with the longstanding principle that §§ 1983 plaintiffs can ordinarily go forward in federal court if they choose to do so, and need not bring their cause to state court first.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing a federal action.

Brown v. Damiani · filed 2001-07-19

This reasoning squares with the general principle that exhaustion of state remedies is not required in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before suing.

Brandon A. v. NHDOE · filed 2001-08-08

This argument lacks merit for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court held in Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In this Wisconsin municipal-flooding dispute, the court treated § 1983 as requiring both a federal constitutional basis and the absence of an adequate state remedy.

Anhalt v. CITIES AND VILLAGES MUTUAL INS. CO. · filed 2001-10-24

A claim under this section has two components: a federal constitutional basis and an assertion of an inadequate state remedy. ... While we have determined that their state law claims lack merit, this cannot be construed as an absence of state law remedies. See id. at 743-44. Therefore, the residents' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim fails.

Section 1983 claims based on substantive due process or equal protection do not require exhaustion of state remedies, but the challenged decision must be final.

Blumenthal Investment Trusts v. City of West Des Moines · filed 2001-11-15

Having concluded that the Trust’s § 1983 claim is based on theories of substantive due process and equal protection, we must also conclude that the district court erred in ruling that the Trust was required to appeal the City’s decision before pursuing remedies under § 1983. As we stated above, exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite for substantive due process and equal protection violations. Such claims may be pursued if the decision they challenge is final.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state remedies before bringing a federal civil rights claim.

Embury v. King · filed 2001-12-13

It is well established that a § 1983 plaintiff need not exhaust State remedies before bringing a federal civil rights claim.

A plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 for a procedural due process deprivation of property must show that available state procedures and remedies are inadequate.

Jefferson v. Jefferson County Board of Education · filed 2002-02-11

“In section 1983 damage suits for deprivation of property without procedural due process!,] the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving the inadequacy of state processes, including state damage remedies!,] to redress the claimed wrong.” ... Accordingly, she may not seek relief under § 1983 for her five-day suspension.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust post-deprivation procedures before suing when predeprivation process may have been required.

Newman ex rel. Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran · filed 2002-04-16

The parents were not required to exhaust post deprivation procedures prior to bringing this suit.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state habeas remedies before filing an action.

Canady v. Thaler · filed 2002-08-21

Exhaustion of state habeas remedies is not a prerequisite for filing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal action merely because the limitations period for an available state remedy has expired.

Reyes v. Erickson · filed 2003-01-03

Moreover, plaintiffs cannot bring a federal Section 1983 action simply because Article 78’s four-month statute of limitations has now expired.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing a claim.

Veterans Legal Defense Fund v. Schwartz · filed 2003-05-30

While a plaintiff is not required to exhaust state remedies to bring a § 1983 claim, this does not change the fact that no due pro- cess violation has occurred when adequate state remedies exist.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment claim even when state law provides a parallel remedy.

McCullah, George E. v. Gadert, Mark · filed 2003-09-22

The Court has never held that § 1983 is available only for cases with no state analog; indeed, it has specifically underscored that the contrary is true.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not await the outcome of state proceedings before bringing federal constitutional claims in federal court.

Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino · filed 2003-11-03

Furthermore, a plaintiff is no under obligation to await the state court outcome before bringing his § 1983 federal constitutional claims in a federal forum.

Section 1983 plaintiffs in school desegregation cases need not exhaust state administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal court.

Armstrong v. Board of Education of Birmingham · filed 1963-07-12

In the course of its opinion the district court stated: “Before this court may grant injunctive relief, the administrative remedies provided therein [in the Alabama School Placement Law] must first have been exhausted.” That ruling was directly contrary to repeated decisions of this Court.

Section 1983 does not allow a state prisoner to avoid the exhaustion requirement by presenting a habeas claim as a civil rights claim.

May v. Peyton · filed 1967-05-09

It is well established that a state prisoner cannot escape the exhaustion requirement by claiming that his charge is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (deprivation of civil rights).

Section 1983 relief cannot be denied because a claimant failed to seek an available state administrative remedy first.

Damico v. California · filed 1967-12-18

This was error. In McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, noting that one of the purposes underlying the Civil Rights Act was “to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State might have,” id., at 672, we held that “relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not first sought under state law which provided [an administrative] remedy,” id., at 671.

A federal court may dismiss a § 1983 suit without prejudice when an adequate, nonfutile state administrative remedy remains available.

Brockway v. Tofany · filed 1970-03-19

Since the remedy offered to the plaintiff by the state license commissioner is neither inadequate nor futile, cf. Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d at 569, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is granted, but without prejudice to the filing of a new action in the event that the Commissioner fails to afford a hearing to the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs in a school desegregation case to exhaust state administrative remedies before seeking federal relief.

Whitley v. Wilson City Board Of Education · filed 1970-05-26

The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, guarantees to any person within the jurisdiction of the United States equitable and legal redress for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. ... The Court declined in McNeese to require exhaustion of state administrative proceedings as a prerequisite to adjudication of a school case involving constitutional principles.

Section 1983 requires exhaustion of a fair and adequate state grievance procedure designed to prevent a threatened deprivation of rights before further federal proceedings.

Toney v. Reagan · filed 1971-04-28

For the foregoing reasons plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction is denied and the outstanding temporary restraining order is dissolved pending plaintiffs’ exhaustion of what this court finds to be the fair and adequate grievance procedures available to them under Executive Order 112 and, subject to this order, the court reserves power to consider further proceedings herein.

Section 1983 permits a suit alleging specific constitutional deprivations without first exhausting state judicial remedies when the requested relief does not include release from custody.

Gomez v. Miller · filed 1972-04-14

The rule of Wilwording and Rodriguez applies here. The case is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging clear, definable and discrete deprivations of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust or resort to state remedies before bringing a federal claim.

Gionorio v. Gomez · filed 2004-02-04

Even conceding that plaintiffs have available adequate state court remedies, they are still not barred from bringing purely federal claims in federal court. “[P]lain-tiffs’ use or failure to use [state] remedies does not preclude their action in federal court. ‘[I]t is firmly settled that exhaustion or resort to state remedies is not a prerequisite to a § 1983 claim.’ ”

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative or judicial remedies before bringing a federal claim.

Mortillaro v. State of Louisiana · filed 1972-08-10

The United States Supreme Court has routinely held that the federal remedy afforded by § 1983 is supplementary to state remedies, and that the latter need not be sought and refused in order for a federal district court to have jurisdiction over the claim. ... Thus the Court is not without jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims because of plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their state remedies, whether administrative or judicial.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to bring a civil rights action without first exhausting available state administrative remedies.

Brooks v. Center Township · filed 1973-10-03

We hold that the district court erred in deciding that Brooks was required to pursue what benefit Ind.Code Sec. 12-2-1-18 (1971) offers to welfare recipients before filing his civil rights action. ... Beginning with Monroe v. Pape, however, the Court has persisted in holding that the civil rights remedy under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is supplementary to any state administrative remedies and that federal jurisdiction may be invoked without exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy that may be pursued without first seeking an available state remedy.

Carr v. Thompson · filed 1974-10-17

In construing the Civil Rights Act, the Supreme Court has held that a federal remedy under the Civil Rights Act is supplementary to any remedy that may exist under state law, and that it is not necessary to seek the state remédy before invoking the federal one. ... Therefore, the court finds that jurisdiction is proper.

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before filing suit against a municipality.

Dickinson Leisure Industries, Inc. v. City of Dickinson · filed 2004-02-27

To impose a blanket requirement that a plaintiff first pursue available state-created remedies in state court before filing a Fifth Amendment takings claim against a municipality in federal court would contradict the well-established principle that a plaintiff need not exhaust state remedies before seeking relief under federal law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy in addition to any state criminal remedy arising from the same facts.

Lamb v. Hutto · filed 1979-03-29

The remedy provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) is supplementary to any state criminal remedy arising out of the same facts.

A plaintiff with an otherwise valid § 1983 claim need not exhaust state administrative remedies before suing in federal court.

Southern New Jersey Newspapers, Inc. v. State · filed 1982-01-29

In any event, the Supreme “Court has expressly held .. . that state administrative remedies need not be exhausted where the federal court plaintiff states an otherwise good cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 permits a discharged state employee to sue state officials in their personal capacities in state court without first completing state administrative remedies.

East Mississippi State Hosp. v. Callens · filed 2004-04-15

In so holding that, notwithstanding our existing statutorily mandated administrative remedies, a state employee may judicially pursue § 1983 actions in state court against state officials in their personal or individual capacities, we must still consider the issue of qualified immunity.

A Pennsylvania taxpayer must exhaust adequate administrative and judicial remedies for a tax assessment challenge before pursuing a § 1983 action.

Beattie v. Allegheny County · filed 2004-04-15

As noted above, Taxpayers have not established that the statutory remedy is inadequate to address their alleged injury. ... this court concluded that “[bjecause Pennsylvania’s administrative process for challenging tax assessments provides taxpayers with an adequate state remedy, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider taxpayers § 1983 action absent the exhaustion of their administrative and judicial remedies.” ... We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing Taxpayers’ § 1983 action.

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state remedies before bringing a civil rights action.

DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ADVOCACY CENTER, INC., Plaintiff, Appellant, and Harold Tuttle, et al.… · filed 1982-09-22

We note, however, that the Supreme Court has recently reiterated that exhaustion of possible state remedies is normally not a prerequisite to bringing a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not require plaintiffs to exhaust available state remedies before bringing a civil rights action.

Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center, Inc. v. Melton · filed 1982-09-22

We note, however, that the Supreme Court has recently reiterated that exhaustion of possible state remedies is normally not a prerequisite to bringing a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We thus do not think that DDAC is precluded from bringing its suit on exhaustion grounds.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek injunctive relief in federal court despite an available parallel state remedy for the same alleged deprivation.

Rubino v. City of Mount Vernon · filed 1982-10-14

In this procedural posture, there is no distinction between the parallel remedies available to Rubino — an Article 78 proceeding in state court compelling compliance with the State Board’s determination and this section 1983 action seeking injunctive relief.