42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; conduct by the United States military does not meet that requirement.

Tu v. Major General Koster · filed 2004-04-16

Plaintiffs’ complaint does not state a claim under § 1983 because the activities of the United States military were not taken under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Quansah v. Sanmina Corp. · filed 2004-04-16

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Quansah’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Sanmina because Sanmina was not acting under color of state law.

Retained criminal defense counsel does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Ward v. Agnew · filed 2004-04-19

The district court concluded that Ward’s lawsuit was foreclosed by Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), because Agnew was not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability. The district court’s reliance on Dodson was appropriate; and it is uncontested by Ward on appeal.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for deprivations under color of state law.

Venus v. Goodman · filed 1983-01-26

42 U.S.C. § 1983, one basis for an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, established an action for the deprivation of civil rights under state law.

Section 1983 does not cover claims against state officials acting under federal authority rather than under color of state law.

Ostroff v. State of Fla., Dept. of Health · filed 1983-01-31

The defendants, however, although a state agency and a state official, were not acting under color of state law, but were acting under federal authority. Hence, any Civil Rights claim Ostroff might have against the defendants cannot be brought under § 1983, but must be brought directly under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, pursuant to the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

Section 1983 does not cover claims against federal officials because they do not act under color of state law.

Williams v. Bezy · filed 2004-05-03

Although plaintiffs civil rights claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because federal officials do not act under color of state law, civil rights claims are cognizable against federal officials under the authority enunciated in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390-97, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

A private attorney does not act under color of state law for § 1983 by issuing subpoenas and opposing a motion to quash.

Smith v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc. · filed 2004-05-19

Hahn dictates that a private attorney issuing a subpoena does not become a state actor for the purposes of section 1983. Plaintiffs’ tenuous efforts to extend the state action rationale of Lugar and Edmonson to Hilltop, which merely issued subpoenas and opposed plaintiffs’ motion to quash, are unavailing. Plaintiffs simply cannot establish action under color of state law.

Section 1983 covers prison officials acting under color of state law.

Reinert v. Haas · filed 1984-05-01

Defendants are acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires that the alleged abuse be committed under color of state authority.

Negrich v. Hohn · filed 1965-10-07

This section first requires that the abuses complained of be committed under “color” of State authority. Here we think plaintiff must be held to have made out his case.

Section 1983 provides a right of action only against persons acting under color of state or territorial law.

Edwards v. Habib · filed 1968-07-11

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964 ed.) establishes a right of action for the deprivation of any “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” only against persons acting under color of law. And only under color of the law of a state or territory.

Section 1983 reaches action taken under color of state law, not action by federal officials.

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics · filed 1969-04-10

Only action taken under color of state law is reached by 42 U.S.O. § 1983, and 28 U.S.O. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law, which this court construed to require misuse of official power.

Miller v. Kusper · filed 1971-07-15

A requirement of a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is that the accused person be acting "under color of" state law. This connotes a misuse of power, as opposed to the present situation where defendants are neither abusing their authority nor applying the law in an unconstitutional manner.

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender’s representation of a client merely because the defender was appointed and paid by the state; that representation is not under color of state law.

United States Ex Rel. Wood v. Blacker · filed 1971-12-09

For all of the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the appointment of defendants to the Public Defender and their acceptance of the representation of the plaintiffs did not make them officers or servants of the State. Consequently, their actions were not performed for the state nor “under color of” state law within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging a private business’s policy to show that state law encouraged, mandated, or affirmatively authorized the policy; unrelated regulatory licenses do not suffice.

Debra Millenson, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated v. The New Hotel Monteleone, Inc. · filed 1973-05-09

For Millenson to succeed it is necessary for her to show that the state licensing system encourages, mandates, or affirmatively authorizes the admission policies of the grill. A cursory examination of these state licensing statutes manifestly leads one to the conclusion that they are completely unrelated to the admission policies of the licensees.

Section 1983 requires state involvement in the challenged conduct; a private company’s later publication of police records did not meet that requirement when the police did not know of the publication plan.

Tosh v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc. · filed 1973-06-22

These facts simply will not stretch far enough to constitute the minimal state involvement in the subsequent publication requisite to support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is not met merely because a private business has a county service contract and is subject to nondiscriminatory state regulation.

Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, a Partnership · filed 1975-07-08

Hence the state regulation of Eversole, even in combination with the benefits from its contract with the county, does not amount to significant state involvement.

Section 1983 treats a state officer’s conduct in the course of official duties as action under color of state law.

Levoy Jasper Meredith v. State of Arizona · filed 1975-09-30

First, there is no doubt that Miller was acting in the course of his official duties. What he did was done “under color” of state law.

Section 1983 does not reach a private company's conduct merely because it receives substantial income from government-financed projects.

Bethel v. Jendoco Construction Corp. · filed 1978-02-01

Second, plaintiff's allegations that the defendant companies derive a substantial portion of their income from construction projects financed in whole or in part by state governmental agencies, without more, are insufficient under Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961) to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against a private company under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a nexus between the state’s involvement and the challenged conduct before a private hospital’s employment decision can be treated as state action.

Manning v. Greensville Memorial Hospital · filed 1979-05-15

Accordingly, because plaintiff can point to no nexus between the asserted contacts with the state and the isolated decision of the hospital administrator to discharge her, her discharge cannot be elevated to the level of state action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983's under-color-of-law requirement is met when a county-operated hospital and its administrator act as agents of the state.

Lane v. Lincoln County Hospital · filed 1982-02-19

A question at the threshold is whether the Hospital and its administrator were acting at the pertinent times under color of Tennessee law. Undoubtedly, in this situation they were.

Section 1983 requires the challenged deprivation to occur under color of state law; a private nursing home's discharge decision does not satisfy that requirement merely because the home participates in Medicaid.

Taylor v. St. Clair · filed 1982-09-16

Accordingly, since the decision of the private nursing home to discharge Mrs. Taylor was not under "color of state law", the appellants have failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Section 1983 treats actions by the University of Pittsburgh and Temple University as taken under color of state law because of their symbiotic relationship with Pennsylvania.

Krynicki v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1984-09-28

Therefore, we are bound by Third Circuit precedent to hold that a "symbiotic relationship" exists between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on the one hand and Pitt and Temple on the other. Actions taken by those two institutions are, therefore, actions taken under color of state law and are subject to scrutiny under section 1983.

Section 1983 applies to acts taken under color of state law, not acts of the federal government.

Vincent v. Department of Health & Human Services · filed 1984-12-20

42 U.S.C. § 1983 only applies to acts taken under color of state law and thus could not apply to acts of the federal government.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivation of a federal right under color of state law.

Stewart v. Bernstein · filed 1985-09-03

In seeking to hold the state defendants liable for her transfer out of KNC, appellant must establish that she was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right under color of state law. ... Since appellant cannot meet the under-color-of-law requirement of section 1983, her claim against the state defendants must fail.

A state attorney general reviewing a condominium conversion plan acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Bender v. Continental Towers Ltd. Partnership · filed 1986-04-04

As defendant Abrams plainly acted under col- or of state law, the only issue is whether plaintiffs were deprived of some right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

A special patrolman with power to arrest is a government official subject to liability under § 1983.

Rojas v. Alexander's Department Store, Inc. · filed 1986-12-30

Such a special patrolman, with the power to arrest, is a government official subject to section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires plaintiffs to show deprivation of a constitutional right and that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Albert v. Carovano · filed 1987-07-21

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, plaintiffs must allege, first, that the conduct complained of has deprived them of a constitutionally protected right and, second, that the defendant acted "under color of any statute ... of any State."

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private bank for conduct that did not occur under color of state law.

Laird v. Texas Commerce Bank-Odessa · filed 1988-11-03

Defendant Texas Commerce Bank (“TCB”) — Odessa is a private banking institution and none of the actions performed or complained of in this lawsuit occurred under color of state law. Accordingly, summary judgment for Defendant is appropriate as to this claim.

Section 1983 does not cover public defenders acting in their role as counsel because they are not acting under color of state law.

Carlton v. Samuel Mann City of Detroit Police Department Douglas Baker Renee Cooper John C. Mouradian D · filed 1989-08-08

Second, the public defenders were not acting under color of state law during their representation of Carlton.

Section 1983 does not treat a teacher’s off-duty conduct during an activity unrelated to school duties as action under color of state law.

D.T. v. Independent School District No. 16 of Pawnee County · filed 1990-01-25

Here, the plaintiffs voluntarily participated with Epps in basketball camp fundraising activities which were not related to school activities, and thus, not undertaken under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law; a former spouse enforcing a divorce judgment does not do so.

Mitan v. Mitan · filed 1990-02-01

Mitan cannot satisfy the requirements necessary to maintain a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978). The sole named defendant in her complaint, her ex-husband, does not act "under color of state law" when he acts to enforce the provisions of the judgment of divorce.

Section 1983's under-color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when a county coroner acts under state authority and an established office practice.

Brotherton v. Cleveland · filed 1991-04-03

The latter requirement, under color of state law, is easily satisfied in this case: OHIO REV.CODE Sec. 2108.60 permitted the coroner, an employee of Hamilton County, to have a technician remove Steven Brotherton's corneas without regard to anyone's consent; the coroner's office took advantage of this statute by customarily removing corneas before inspecting records or receiving consent.

Section 1983 imposes liability for conduct under color of state law, not federal law.

Smith v. Kitchen · filed 1997-12-12

Thus, because Smith’s complaint alleges conduct under color of federal law, i.e. the Internal Revenue Code, there is no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for conduct under color of federal law.

Michael Duane, Smith v. Millie R. Kitchen, Randy Komisarek, and Keith Woods · filed 1997-12-12

Thus, because Smith's complaint alleges conduct under color of federal law, i.e. the Internal Revenue Code, there is no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law element is satisfied when police detectives procure and execute a search warrant in their official capacity.

Arkansas Chronicle v. Easley · filed 2004-06-17

Because it is clear that “a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law,” there is no doubt that defendants Murphy and Milefsky&emdash; both detectives in the Fairfax County Police Department&emdash;were acting under color of state law when they participated in procuring and executing a search warrant on Culbertson’s home in Virginia.

Section 1983 does not treat bishops as state actors merely because state property law permits them to control church property or defers to their authority over it.

St. Matthew's Slovak Roman Catholic Congregation v. Wuerl · filed 2004-06-17

To the extent that their power to suppress the parishes and dispose of parish property flows from the operation of general state property law, they are no more state actors than any citizen who engages in transactions in property, either on his or her own behalf or as a trustee. And insofar as the 1935 Act mandates that the state will defer to the Bishops in their exercise of authority over church property, that also does not transform the Appellees into state actors.

A private security guard whose recourse against an unruly visitor is to call police is not a state actor under § 1983.

Johnson, Pamela E. v. LaRabida Children's · filed 2004-06-22

Stephens was no substitute for the police and, therefore, not a state actor.

A private doctor may act under color of state law for Section 1983 when government officials coerce or significantly encourage the challenged conduct.

Ruhlmann v. Smith · filed 2004-06-28

Defendants also claim that the jury’s finding that they acted under color of state law is not reasonably supported by the evidence. ... For example, the evidence adduced at trial reasonably supported a finding that Smith acted under the influence or coercion of county officials, with whom he was in telephonic contact on more than one occasion. The jury could have found, from the evidence presented, that he, under this influence or coercion, exerted his own influence or coercion in instructing other Benedictine employees, including Puglisi, to ensure plaintiffs admission, purportedly under Section 9.39.

Section 1983 covers acts by airport officials and their agents performed under color of state law.

Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Commissioners · filed 1985-03-29

The acts and practices of all of the named defendants and their agents, as described herein, were performed under color of state law and were actions of the state within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Municipal social services workers and police officers can satisfy § 1983’s requirement that defendants act under color of state law.

Ehret v. New York City Department of Social Services · filed 1985-04-19

2. All the defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law element is satisfied when police officers act within the scope of their duties.

Rodriguez v. Rico · filed 2004-07-19

In order to prevail in a § 1983 claim plaintiff must bring forth evidence that (1) defendant acted “under color of state law” and (2) deprivation of a federally protected right. ... There is no controversy over the fact that the named defendants were acting within the scope of their duties as PRPD officers at all relevant times. Therefore, the first element is satisfied.

Section 1983 requires defendants to act under color of state law; a private credit union’s employment and collection decisions do not meet that requirement without a sufficient connection to the state.

Hauschild v. Nielsen · filed 2004-07-21

Though there is some connection between the Credit Union and the State, it does not involve the Credit Union’s decision to fire Hauschild for violating its policies or to pursue normal collection efforts on past-due loan amounts and that connection does not rise to a level that permits a finding that Defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when state agency officers act within the scope of their duties.

Hiraldo Cancel v. State Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 2004-07-23

There is no ^controversy that under the facts as charged the named defendants were acting within the scope of their duties as officers of a state government agency at all relevant times. Therefore, the first element is satisfied.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; conduct satisfying the Fourteenth Amendment’s state action requirement meets that requirement.

Stephen Tancredi and Ronald Speidel v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York Stock Company, and Metlife, Inc., · filed 2004-08-09

If a defendant’s conduct satisfies the state action requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment, then that conduct also constitutes action “under color of’ state law for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a claim fails without an allegation or evidence of that element.

Monte v. Ernst & Young LLP · filed 2004-08-10

Plaintiff has neither alleged nor provided any evidence that E & Y acted under color of state law. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to Plaintiffs claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation committed under color of state law and does not reach merely private conduct.

Estate of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Management, Inc. · filed 2004-09-03

Both the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 exclude from their reach “merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy against private prison operators who act under color of state law by performing the traditional public function of prison operations.

Lacedra v. Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility · filed 2004-09-13

The instant case is distinguishable in that Plaintiff had an adequate remedy available to him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Defendants acted under color of state law when they performed the traditional public function of prison operations.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

D'Amato v. Rattoballi · filed 2004-09-17

With respect to the claims under § 1988, D’Amato does not allege that Rattoballi acted under color of state law, and his § 1983 claim is therefore unavailing.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law when depriving a plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Scott v. AOL Time Warner · filed 2004-09-30

Plaintiffs failed to show, as required by section 1983, that the Defendants, acting under the color of state law, deprived them of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not cover a candidate’s alleged misrepresentation about his qualifications when he exercised no state power and had no agreement with election officials.

D'Agostino v. Delgadillo · filed 2004-10-01

D’Agostino does not allege that Delgadillo was exercising any powers of the state in the primary election or that there was any agreement between Delgadillo and the city clerk or elections officials. Delgadillo was merely a candidate for public office. These facts do not establish that Delgadillo’s alleged misrepresentation was “fairly attributable” to the city defendants.

Public defenders representing a defendant in state criminal proceedings do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Vanfossen v. Saxton · filed 2004-10-05

The district court dismissed Vanfossen’s complaint after determining that her public defenders had not acted under color of state law. Having carefully reviewed the record and the applicable legal authority, we find no error in the district court’s disposition of this matter.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations showing that private defendants acted under color of state law; conclusory allegations that they worked with a court clerk are insufficient.

GUIMBELLOT v. Rowell · filed 2004-10-06

The conclusory allegations of Guimbellot and Zodun that the defendants acted “in concert with the state court Minute Clerk,” that the Minute Clerk “participated with and assisted” the defendants, and that their “actions were materially and affirmatively aided” by her are inadequate to state a claim for conspiracy with state actors to deprive them of their right of due process. Further, the conclusory allegation that the defendants “acted in a capacity normally undertaken by law enforcement personnel” in obtaining what amounts to a court order to conduct discovery in the form of testing the building for mold is inadequate to state a claim that the defendants acted under color of state law in performing what is traditionally an exclusive public function.

Section 1983 requires that the challenged conduct be committed under color of state law.

Biby v. Board of Regents of University of Nebraska · filed 2004-10-20

An essential element in any § 1983 claim is that the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 applies to constitutional rights violations committed under color of state law.

Ricks v. Glen · filed 1985-08-05

Sections 1988 and 1983 permit a prevailing plaintiff to collect attorney fees where a plaintiffs constitutional rights have been violated under color of state law.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is met when a city wholly owns and operates the defendant utility.

Higgins v. Philadelphia Gas Works · filed 1985-10-09

The requisite state action for a § 1983 action is present in this case. All of the real and personal property subsumed under the name "PGW" is wholly owned and operated by the City of Philadelphia. PGW therefore acts “under color or state law" for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege state action; an attorney receiving public funds while performing traditional lawyer functions does not act under color of state law.

Shahid v. Brooklyn Legal Services Corp. · filed 2004-11-15

A complaint that fails to allege state action fails to state an actionable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is not met merely because a state issued discrete orders to a private hospital without delegating a state obligation to it.

Mitchell v. St. Elizabeth Hospital · filed 2004-11-29

Here, by contrast, the State of Indiana had no obligation to do anything for Mitchell, and thus it had no function to delegate. The state merely issued a discrete set of orders to the hospital, and such orders do not give rise to state action.

Section 1983 treats an ambulance service and its board members acting in their official capacities as acting under color of state law when municipalities are deeply entwined in the service’s establishment, operation, management, and finances.

Framsted v. Municipal Ambulance Service, Inc. · filed 2004-12-06

Because the member municipalities are so entwined in the establishment, operation, management and finances of defendant MAS, the actions of both defendant MAS and its board members in their official capacities must be considered to have been taken “under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat private attorneys or public defenders performing traditional defense functions as acting under color of state law.

Ellibee v. Hazlett · filed 2004-12-13

Neither public defenders performing their “traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding” nor private attorneys act under color of state law. ... We have reviewed the record, Ellibee’s brief, and the applicable law and affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims Ellibee asserted against defendants pursuant to § 1983 for substantially the reasons stated by the district court.

A Section 1983 complaint must allege facts establishing that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Amerson v. American National Insurance · filed 2004-12-16

The district court correctly determined that Amerson had alleged no facts which established that the defendants had acted under color of state law.

A private person acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when the person conspires with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Storey v. United States · filed 1986-03-12

As the court has already mentioned, a private defendant may be found to act under color of state law when he participates in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of constitutionally protected rights.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions do not meet that requirement.

Carson v. Tulsa Police Department · filed 2008-02-21

Mr. Carson’s attorneys, Mr. Hjelm and Mr. Silva, employed by the Tulsa County Public Defender’s Office, are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To be liable under § 1983, the defendant must have acted under color of state law. “[P]ublic defender[s] do[] not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”

A public defender performing traditional advocacy functions does not act under color of state law and cannot be sued under § 1983 for those acts.

Hinton v. Dennis · filed 2010-01-25

Furthermore, these alleged acts were taken by Mr. Dennis while performing his traditional advocacy functions and were, therefore, not taken under color of state law. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Mr. Dennis may not be sued under § 1983.

Public defenders acting as defense counsel do not act under color of state law for § 1983 claims.

Kennedy v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2018-09-21

Finally, because Kennedy’s public defenders were not acting under color of state law in their capacity as his attorneys, he may not bring § 1983 claims against them.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for representing a client because that work is not done under color of state law.

Fallis v. County of Minnehaha · filed 2019-11-15

However, the claims against Tracy Smith must be dismissed as a public defender cannot be sued under § 1983. ... “The conduct of counsel, either retained or appointed, in representing clients does not constitute action under color of state law for purposes of a § 1983 violation.”

Section 1983 does not reach a public defender’s traditional representation of a criminal defendant because that work is not performed under color of state law.

Richmond v. US Marshals · filed 2020-02-27

For purposes of Section 1983, the Supreme Court has held that “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” ... Plaintiff alleges, essentially, that his public defender provided ineffective assistance of counsel. That is a traditional attorney function. Accordingly, plaintiff’s state public defender, Lindsay Garner, is immune from suit.

Section 1983 does not apply where the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendant health center is a government entity.

Lee v. South of Market Health Center · filed 2020-05-07

Preliminarily, the plaintiff did not allege that the Health Center is a government entity (and it appears that it is not.)25 Section § 1983 does not apply.

A private contractor providing prison healthcare acts under color of state law and is treated as a government entity for Section 1983 claims.

NAYLOR v. WEXFORD HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INC. · filed 2019-12-09

Because Wexford acts under color of state law by contracting to perform a government function, i.e. providing healthcare services to inmates, it is treated as a government entity for purposes of Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not treat a private hospital’s abortion rules as action under color of state law when the state did not influence their adoption or enforcement.

Jane Doe and Herbert F. Sandmire, M.D. v. Bellin Memorial Hospital · filed 1973-06-01

Nor do we believe that the implementation of defendant’s own rules relating to abortions is action “under color of” state law within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and a private hospital's state funding, tax exemption, and regulation do not suffice when the state is not significantly involved in the challenged activity.

Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, an Oregon Corporation Doing Business as Sacred Heart General Hos · filed 1974-11-21

Thus we find that the provision of 13 percent of Sacred Heart General Hospital’s construction costs since 1961 through the Hill-Burton and HEW programs, exemption from taxes and regulation by the state do not provide a basis for a § 1983 suit.

Private medical providers who furnish care to jail inmates can act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Henderson v. Battle Creek Medical Education Corporation Associated Physicians, Defendants · filed 1988-10-12

The Supreme Court has recently held that a physician under contract with a prison does act under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. West v. Atkins, 56 U.S.L.W. 4664 (U.S. June 20, 1988). Therefore, the district court was incorrect to hold that the defendants did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private hospital does not become a state actor by reporting suspected child abuse under state law or receiving statutory immunity for that report.

Thomas v. Beth Israel Hospital Inc. · filed 1989-03-20

The fact that Beth Israel was complying with the New York State Child Protective Services Act (Social Services Law Title 6, § 411 et seq.) by reporting suspected child abuse does not mean it acted under color of state law. ... Nor is the hospital’s conduct converted into state action for § 1983 purposes by the fact that § 419 of the New York Social Services Law provides Beth Israel statutory immunity for reporting suspected cases of child abuse. ... Because Beth Israel was not acting under color of state law, therefore, Thomas’s § 1983 claim against it must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private hospital caring for a child at a child services agency’s direction during an investigation does not meet that requirement without sufficient state involvement.

Miriam P. v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center · filed 1990-07-03

In sum, we find that defendant was not acting under color of State law in caring for the child pending the completion of SSC’s investigation. Therefore, the Supreme Court erred in denying the hospital’s motion to dismiss the section 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 treats private hospital personnel acting pursuant to a state court order as acting under color of state law.

McKenzie v. Doctors' Hospital of Hollywood, Inc. · filed 1991-06-24

Because these defendants acted pursuant to, and under the authority of, the Circuit Court order, this Court’s subject matter jurisdictional requirement has been met. The defendants were effectively acting under the color of state law.

Allegations that private medical providers contract with a state to serve indigent citizens sufficiently plead action under color of state law under the joint action or governmental nexus tests.

Lopez v. Dept. Of Health Services · filed 1991-07-30

Here the district court’s sua sponte dismissal was improper because Lopez’s complaint alleges that defendants Maryvale Samaritan Hospital (“Maryvale”) and Southwest Ambulance Service (“Southwest”) are under contract with the state of Arizona to provide medical services to indigent citizens. These allegations are sufficient to support a section 1983 action because under either the joint action or the government nexus analysis they set forth a claim that defendants Southwest and Mary-vale act under color of state law.

Private medical contractors and their employees providing jail health care under a county contract act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes.

Henry v. Ryan · filed 1991-09-30

There is no doubt that CMS and its employees are governmental actors for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. ... Here, CMS entered into a contract with the DuPage County Jail to provide medical services and health care evaluations to those in custody. The company and its employees agreed to assume the government’s obligation of providing adequate medical care. Thus, CMS and its employees can be considered state actors.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private medical certification board that lacks state funding and delegated licensing authority and only prepares and grades certification exams.

Goussis v. Kimball · filed 1993-02-18

Because ABIM is a private, non-profit unregulated entity which receives no state funds and which has not been delegated by the state any role in the licensing or regulation of professional conduct, and whose role only involves the preparation, administration, and grading of a test which, inter alia, is used by peers to determine recognition of high professional achievement (board certification), it is not a state actor and its conduct does not constitute state action for purposes of imposing liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private hospital to show that the state was responsible for the hospital’s challenged actions.

Cogan v. Harford Memorial Hospital · filed 1994-02-24

The Hospital is a private corporation and the individual defendants are agents and officers of the Hospital. Section 1983 cannot apply unless Cogan shows that the state was responsible for the Hospital’s actions. Plaintiff offers no evidence showing state action or a deprivation of a constitutional right. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate against the § 1983 claim.

Private hospitals and physicians do not act under color of state law merely by using state involuntary commitment procedures while providing mental health care.

Trimble v. Androscoggin Valley Hospital, Inc. · filed 1994-03-30

A private physician or private hospital should not become a state actor for purposes of section 1983 liability merely by invoking or acting in accordance with, or by failing to invoke or act in accordance with, the provisions of RSA 135-C when exercising professional judgment-or delivering professional services related to the involuntary hospitalization of persons in need of mental health care.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private treatment provider does not meet that requirement when the state does not control how it administers treatment.

Scout v. City of Gordon · filed 1994-04-12

There being no evidence that the state controlled how and in what manner the alcohol abuse treatment provided by the rehabilitation center would be administered, the required “under-eolor-of-state-law” element of Scout’s section 1983 claim has not, and evidently cannot, be shown.

Section 1983 does not treat a private therapist as a state actor merely for requesting police transport of a patient for an involuntary commitment evaluation, even when police policy is to honor such requests.

James v. Grand Lake Mental Health Center, Inc. · filed 1998-09-24

If a doctor's certification of a patient for transport to a hospital for involuntary commitment (certainly more than mere advice) does not constitute state action, we do not see how a therapist's request for transportation of a patient to a hospital for an examination to determine if involuntary commitment is warranted rises to that level, regardless of police policy.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison healthcare provider when its policy, practice, or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Gill v. Obaisi · filed 2019-07-26

A for-profit company that provides health care in prisons is a government agent for purpose of section 1983 liability. ... Gill has accordingly stated a Monell claim based on a policy, practice, or procedure.

Section 1983 covers conduct taken under color of state law, including a guard’s misuse of authority granted by the state.

Russell v. Joseph Bodner, Security Officer of the State Correctional Facility at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania · filed 1973-05-29

Judged according to the standard of Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per- cur-iam), and of Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1970), the complaint sufficiently alleges that the guard, relying on his position and authority as such, entered the plaintiff’s cell and confiscated his cigarettes without justification. Accepting these allegations as true, as in the present posture of the case we must, the guard’s action was under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law, meaning a misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible by that authority.

Robert BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CHAFFEE · filed 1979-12-26

Acting under color of state law as required by section 1983 is defined as the "(m)isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184, 81 S.Ct. 473, 482, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) 2 (quoting with approval from United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941)). We find no allegation in the pleadings of how Chaffee misused the authority granted him as sheriff to injure Brown during the defense in the Hiett case. Chaffee's position as sheriff does not make his every action one under color of law; only when he is using the power granted by the state does it become state action. Defending a personal lawsuit in a way harmful to another is not action made possible because the wrongdoer has state authority. See Taylor v. Nichols, 558 F.2d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 1977) (filing a complaint and testifying at trial is not acting under color of state law).

Section 1983 covers misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law, even when the official acts outside legal authority and for purely personal pecuniary motives.

Brown v. J. A. Miller, Jr., Etc., and Mississippi Telephone Corporation, Etc. · filed 1980-11-26

Action taken “under color of” state law is not limited only to that action taken by state officials pursuant to state law. ... Based upon these interpretations, the evidence establishes that the defendant mayor acted under color of state law: The defendant had the power to take the complained of action by virtue of his authority as mayor, and he took such action while clothed with that authority. ... For similar reasons, it is not significant for purposes of defeating a § 1983 action that the misuse of power under color of state law was motivated solely for purely personal reasons of pecuniary gain.

Section 1983 treats an official’s misuse of power made possible by state-law authority as action under color of state law.

Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie · filed 1981-05-11

The misuse of power possessed and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law is action under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a private party's joint participation with state officials in a state-created prejudgment attachment as action under color of state law, but does not provide a cause of action for the private misuse of that procedure alone.

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. · filed 1982-06-25

In summary, petitioner was deprived of his property through state action; respondents were, therefore, acting under color of state law in participating in that deprivation. Petitioner did present a valid cause of action under § 1983 insofar as he challenged the constitutionality of the Virginia statute; he did not insofar as he alleged only misuse or abuse of the statute.

A personally motivated misuse of official power remains actionable under § 1983 when the wrongdoer could act because clothed with state-law authority.

Colon v. Lomelo · filed 1983-12-06

Still, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim must be denied in part, because even disputes motivated by purely personal reasons are actionable under § 1983 provided the alleged misuse of power is made possible “because the [alleged] wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law ____”

Section 1983 treats an off-duty deputy as acting under color of state law when the deputy purports to exercise retained official police authority.

Revene v. Charles County Commissioners · filed 1989-08-14

Even when "off duty," then, Charles County deputy sheriffs retain authority to conduct official police action, and any action purportedly taken pursuant to this authority would be under color of state law whether the deputies "hew to the line of their authority or overstep it." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1040, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) (Douglas, J.).

Section 1983's color-of-state-law requirement excludes a deputy's purely personal harassment when his acts were neither made possible by nor a misuse of his official authority.

Brown v. Turner · filed 1989-12-01

In this case, the evidence shows the situation between plaintiff and Turner was of a purely personal nature. Plaintiff testified that the phone calls intensified after Turner became a deputy and that he was afraid Turner would use his position to frame plaintiff for a narcotics violation. Turner also threatened plaintiff while patting his deputy weapon and was wearing his deputy uniform and driving a deputy car when some of the incidents occurred. However, Turner and plaintiff had a history of animosity beginning at the time of the Brown divorce when plaintiff accused Turner of having an affair with Pam. There is no evidence that Turner was acting under color of state law or that the actions involved were made possible by his cloak of authority or misuse of that authority.

Section 1983 permits injunctive and declaratory relief against state or municipal officials alleged to deprive plaintiffs of constitutional rights, and city officials are persons covered by the statute.

Murphy v. Kansas City, Missouri · filed 1972-07-28

Initially, defendants contend that the City of Kansas City, Missouri, is not a “person” within the meaning of that section and therefore 28 U.S.C. § 1343 is not applicable to confer jurisdiction. ... These individuals are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and it is alleged that their conduct pursuant to state statutory and constitutional provisions, and pursuant to the Charter of the City of Kansas City, deprives plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. ... Further, plaintiffs’ complaint requests only injunctive and declaratory relief and does not claim monetary compensation. Monroe v. Pape involved a request for monetary damage against a municipality, and since that decision the courts have allowed injunctive and declaratory relief against states and municipalities. ... Therefore, the doctrine of Monroe v. Pape is clearly distinguishable, and does not remove the instant suit from the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 does not cover federal agents acting under color of federal rather than state law.

John Meiners, Cross-Appellee v. Dennis Moriarity, Cross-Appellants · filed 1977-10-06

Defendants at the time of the raid were federal agents operating under color of federal and not state law, and thus did not fall within section 1983.

City officials are persons under § 1983 and may be sued to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.

Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County, a California Nonprofit Corporation v. The City of Petaluma, a Califo · filed 1975-10-02

This court, however, has recently faced the very issue raised by the City and has held that a city official is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 and that a district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 over an action to enjoin him from enforcing an unconstitutional statute.

Although a Section 1983 plaintiff must prove the underlying constitutional violation, a defendant may bear the burden of proving particular facts or explaining particular conduct.

Pace v. Hymas · filed 1986-10-28

They do show, however, that in certain circumstances a defendant in a § 1983 case will have the burden of proving a fact or explaining certain conduct.

A plaintiff seeking damages under Section 1983 bears the burden of proving that the defendant owed and breached a duty and that the breach caused actual damages.

Jones v. Counselor Hamelman, Sgt. Hampton, Officer Likens, and Officer Swain · filed 1989-02-22

As in a common law tort action, the plaintiff in a civil rights tort action bears the burden of establishing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, that the defendant breached his duties to the plaintiff, and that his breach caused the plaintiff actual damages.”

In a Section 1983 excessive force action, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the force was unreasonable under the circumstances.

Miller v. Dick I. Taylor, City of Knoxville · filed 1989-06-09

In a section 1983 action where the alleged deprivation of a federal right is the use of excessive force, therefore, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that defendant used excessive force, or that the force used was unreasonable under the circumstances.

Section 1983 sex-discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Jones v. Rivers · filed 1989-07-26

Finally, the McDonnell Douglas framework also applies to plaintiffs claim that defendants’ acts of sex discrimination violated her due process rights protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Parker v. Strong · filed 1989-08-09

In a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof that defendant violated his constitutional rights.

In a § 1983 action challenging a warrantless search, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on whether seized items fall within the plain view exception.

Crowder v. Sinyard · filed 1989-09-21

We thus hold that the burden of proof on the issue of whether the items seized were in plain view rests on the plaintiff in a section 1983 action based upon a warrantless search which defendants seek to justify under that exception to the warrant requirement.

In a § 1983 claim alleging discharge for constitutionally protected conduct, the employee must show that the conduct substantially motivated the discharge, after which the employer must show it would have discharged the employee anyway.

Tower v. Area Metropolitan Services Agency Council · filed 1989-11-02

Under the Mt. Healthy analysis, the employee must establish that her conduct was constitutionally protected, and that it was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to discharge her. The burden of proof then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that it would have discharged the employee even in the absence of the protected conduct.

A § 1983 plaintiff bears the burden of showing an enforceable statutory right; the state defendant then bears the burden of showing Congress foreclosed the § 1983 remedy.

Carelli v. Howser · filed 1990-02-14

We read this language as placing the burden of proving that enforceable rights exist in a § 1983 action on the plaintiffs. Once the plaintiffs have met this burden, however, the burden is on the state defendants to show that Congress intended to foreclose a § 1983 remedy.

In a Section 1983 claim alleging an unreasonable search, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving unreasonableness.

Ruggiero v. Krzeminski · filed 1991-03-18

We find that no error was committed by the district court in so instructing the jury, and that, in any event, the burden of proving unreasonable search in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) should be borne by those who urge unreasonableness.

In a § 1983 action alleging an unreasonable search, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion; a warrantless search may require the defendant to produce evidence of an exception, but does not shift that ultimate burden.

Ruggiero v. Krzeminski · filed 1991-03-18

Rather, the presumption may cast upon the defendant the duty of producing evidence of consent or search incident to an arrest or other exceptions to the warrant requirement. However, the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion must remain squarely on the plaintiff in accordance with established principles governing civil trials.

In a § 1983 challenge to a warrantless arrest, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the information supporting probable cause was not reasonably trustworthy.

Romero v. Damon Fay, Bob Stover, Chief of Police, and Albuquerque, City of John Doe, Albuquerque Police Officers · filed 1995-01-25

The instant case, however, involves the validity of a warrantless arrest under civil law pursuant to § 1983. Thus, the burden rests on Plaintiff to demonstrate that the statements by Duran and Guiterrez did not constitute reasonably trustworthy information.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, defendants bear the burden of showing that the arrest was privileged, which they may do by showing probable cause.

Hernandez v. City of Rochester · filed 2003-04-30

Given this unequivocal statement by the Second Circuit, which subsequent cases have not called into doubt, I conclude that defendants here have the burden of showing that plaintiff’s arrest was privileged, which they may do by showing the existence of probable cause.

A plaintiff bringing a false arrest claim under Section 1983 must show that the arrest lacked probable cause.

Benoit v. City of Lake City · filed 2018-10-16

However, a plaintiff must demonstrate the absence of probable cause in order to prevail on a false arrest claim under Section 1983.

A federal court cannot entertain a § 1983 claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel until the plaintiff has exhausted available state remedies.

McCaskill v. Mason · filed 1988-02-05

Additionally we note that even were McCaskill to allege facts sufficient to bring the claim under the purview of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 the district court could not entertain the action until McCaskill had exhausted his state remedies on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

When a Section 1983 claimant alleging medical injuries elects to pursue Maryland health-claims arbitration concurrently with a judicial action, the court may decline to address the Section 1983 claims until that arbitration has run its course.

Long v. Rothbaum · filed 1986-09-09

we hold that because Long elected to file a claim with the Health Claims Arbitration Office concurrently with pursuing his § 1983 claims in trial court, the court correctly declined to address those claims before the arbitration remedy had run its course.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to pursue a civil-rights complaint seeking recognition of claimed constitutional rights and related injunctive relief without proceeding under § 2254's exhaustion requirement.

Galligher v. McCarthy · filed 1972-11-22

We hold that, under Wilwording v. Swenson, 1971, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S.Ct. 407, 30 L.Ed.2d 418, the petition is to be treated as a complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) and (4). As such, it is not subject to the exhaustion requirements of section 2254.

Section 1983 provides a federal civil-rights remedy that may be invoked without first exhausting available state remedies, and it supplements rather than displaces state remedies.

Stewart v. Wohlgemuth · filed 1972-08-21

This action was brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce rights and privileges secured by the Constitution of the United States and this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4). It has been many times held that actions for relief under the Civil Rights Act are not subject to exhaustion of state remedies. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S.Ct. 407, 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971). The remedy provided by these Acts “is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked”. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961).

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state remedies before bringing an action in federal court.

Mills v. Larson · filed 1972-08-25

The simple answer to this is that under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, exhaustion of state remedies is not required as a prerequisite to an action in Federal Court.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state remedies, but § 1341 prevails when a § 1983 action conflicts with that specific federal limitation on jurisdiction in state-tax cases.

Bland v. McHann · filed 1972-09-01

Taxpayers seek to circumvent § 1341 by arguing that relief under § 1983 is supplemental and is not limited to any requirement of exhaustion of state remedies. We do not disagree with the general rule that exhaustion is not required in § 1983 cases; however, in this case § 1983 collides full force with a specific congressional limitation on federal jurisdiction. In such circumstances we are convinced that § 1341 must prevail.

Section 1983 does not require a prisoner to exhaust state remedies before bringing a federal civil-rights action.

Blair v. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New York State · filed 1972-11-27

This appeal is from the summary dismissal without a hearing of a prison inmate’s pro se complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, jurisdiction properly being based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4). Exhaustion of state remedies is not required.

Section 1983 provides an additional federal remedy, so a plaintiff need not exhaust available state remedies before bringing a § 1983 action.

Abbott v. Thetford · filed 1973-01-26

This Court feels bound by prior decisions, under the principle of stare decisis, to the holding that exhaustion of state remedy is not a prerequisite to a proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for constitutional-rights deprivations under color of state law, and a plaintiff need not exhaust state remedies before bringing the action.

Freeman & Bass, P.A. v. State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation · filed 1973-06-06

Sections 1983 and 1985 create federal causes of action for the deprivation under color of state law of the constitutional rights of citizens. By themselves, these sections are not jurisdiction conferring; they are cognizable as actions in federal court only by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and (4), Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972). ... If proved, these allegations would constitute a violation of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights secured to the plaintiffs from infringement by state action through the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs thus state a cause of action cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Contrary to the contention of defendants, this court has jurisdiction notwithstanding plaintiffs’ possible failure to exhaust their state remedies. ... Moreover, the Supreme Court has continuously held that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine does not apply to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 provides a supplementary federal remedy for constitutional-rights violations, so a plaintiff need not first pursue or exhaust an available state-law remedy before invoking it in federal court.

McNeese v. Board of Education for Community Unit School District 187 Cahokia · filed 1963-06-03

“It is no answer that the State has. a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.” ... Such claims are entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts.

Section 1983 provides a supplementary federal remedy, so a plaintiff need not exhaust available state legal or equitable remedies before suing.

Sostre v. McGinnis · filed 1971-02-24

Nor is exhaustion of state legal or equitable remedies necessary to a Section 1983 action, which provides “a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State might have.”

A plaintiff proceeding under § 1983 need not first exhaust available state remedies.

Levier v. Mr. Robert N. Woodson, Penal Director · filed 1971-06-01

The present proceeding seeking injunctive relief by requiring the respondents to forward his mail to the Governor, state’s Attorney General, and state’s Pardon Attorney was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Hence, we deem inapplicable the argument that LeVier has not affirmatively shown that he has exhausted various state remedies said by respondents in their brief to be available to him.

Section 1983 litigation over school disciplinary procedures is not ripe until the school authorities have first had an opportunity to make the matter final through institutional review.

Williams v. Vermilion Parish School Board · filed 1972-06-30

The merits of this complaint should be presented to the Vermilion Parish School Board for final disposition there before filing suit in this court under § 1983.

Section 1983 suits do not require exhaustion of state remedies.

McGhee v. Moyer · filed 1973-09-12

The short answer to this contention is simply that a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not require the exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 allows a federal action against state officials without exhausting local remedies when the officials allegedly act beyond their statutory powers or exercise those powers unconstitutionally.

Rivera v. Chapel · filed 1973-10-15

This suit clearly falls within the exception of the doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies, as it is brought against officials who have allegedly acted beyond the statutory powers or have exercised their statutory powers in a constitutionally void manner.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state remedies before bringing federal civil-rights claims in federal court.

Allee v. Medrano · filed 1974-05-20

Nor. w;as there any requirement that appellees first exhaust state remedies before bringing their federal claims under the Civil Rights-Act of 1871 to federal court.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for simple property damage caused by negligent state agents when an adequate state remedy is available, because no constitutional deprivation has occurred; this is not an exhaustion requirement.

Bonner v. Coughlin · filed 1975-06-02

This is not to suggest that the plaintiff in a § 1983 action must exhaust his state remedies before seeking federal relief. Rather, it seems to us that the availability of an adequate state remedy for a simple property damage claim avoids any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before bringing a facial constitutional challenge in federal court.

Hoffman v. Jannarone · filed 1975-09-30

In this case which presents a challenge to the facial constitutionality of the state statute as authoritatively construed, exhaustion of state remedies is not required as a prerequisite to resort to this court in an action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before seeking relief.

Bonner v. Circuit Court · filed 1975-11-28

In mentioning these procedures, we in no way do violence to the doctrine that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to relief under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 claims do not require exhaustion of state remedies, but a federal court may still abstain from hearing them when the dispute presents uniquely local matters.

Tonwal Realties, Inc. v. Beame · filed 1976-01-08

Plaintiffs are correct in asserting that the maintenance of a § 1983 claim does not depend upon exhaustion of state remedies. ... A substantial body of law, howeyer, supports this Court's belief that abstention may still be appropriate despite a civil rights complaint and, indeed, is virtually demanded in a case of this nature.

Section 1983 permits actions to protect constitutional rights violated under color of law without first exhausting state remedies.

Woe v. Mathews · filed 1976-01-16

Plaintiffs, however, do not contest the appropriateness of civil commitment by reason of mental illness and their claims more properly are characterized as actions to protect their constitutional rights, violated by defendants under col- or of law, for which they need not first seek redress in a State forum.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing an action under the statute.

Roe v. Ray · filed 1976-01-28

Plaintiff need not exhaust her state remedies in this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff who has suffered or faces injury-in-fact to proceed directly to federal court without first exhausting state remedies, but the rule does not eliminate the separate injury-in-fact requirement.

Rolling Cloud v. Gill · filed 1976-04-29

The suspension of the exhaustion requirement for § 1983 suits does not establish a corollary suspension of the requirement of injury-in-fact. The suspension of the exhaustion requirement only means that, after injury-in-fact has occurred or is threatened, plaintiffs ordinarily need not first seek redress from state procedures. They may instead proceed directly to the federal courts.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional challenge seeking declaratory and injunctive relief without requiring the plaintiff to proceed in habeas corpus when release is not requested.

Goldy v. Beal · filed 1976-07-08

Because plaintiffs in this case do not request release from custody, they are not required to proceed by habeas corpus.

Exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Cruz v. Ward · filed 1976-12-17

Yet they contend, and the defendants have not contested, that an exhaustion of their state remedies is not a prerequisite to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. The Court agrees.

Section 1983 does not require a civil-rights plaintiff to exhaust available state remedies before filing in federal court.

Lecates v. JUSTICE OF PEACE CT. NO. 4, ETC. · filed 1976-12-23

Counsel for the justice of the peace argued that Lecates should have brought his case in the State courts first, by way of either a mandamus action or a petition for a writ of certiorari. The simple answer to this is that a plaintiff in a civil rights action has no obligation to exhaust state avenues of relief before coming into federal court.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state remedies before seeking relief in federal court.

Wolder v. Clare J. Rahm, as Administrator of the Estate of Herbert C. Merillat · filed 1977-02-09

The district court’s ruling that the plaintiff made a binding election when she failed to pursue her state remedies runs contrary to the doctrine that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to relief under §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 actions do not require exhaustion of available state remedies before suit is filed.

Lasco v. Koch · filed 1977-02-25

Analyses of these cases leads to the conclusion that exhaustion of state remedies is not required in actions brought under § 1983, though all the decisions seem to me to have involved the traditional no-exhaustion concerns of inadequacy or futility or lack of jurisdiction.

Section 1983 provides a federal claim supplementary to available state remedies, and plaintiffs need not exhaust state remedies before the court exercises jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims.

Morial v. Judiciary Commission of State of La. · filed 1977-03-02

A Federal claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) is supplementary to any State remedies that may be available to the plaintiffs. There is no requirement in the present case that plaintiffs exhaust State remedies in order for this Court to assert jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state remedies before bringing a federal action.

Members of the Jamestown School Committee v. Schmidt · filed 1977-03-08

If this Court were required to abstain whenever a state law implicating a state interest was challenged, then it would have to abstain in every case challenging state statutes brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Such exhaustion of state remedies has never been, and is not, required.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff in this situation to exhaust contractual grievance and arbitration remedies before filing suit in federal court.

Rodgers v. Berger · filed 1977-08-22

Because plaintiff’s case is of such a nature, I do not believe that the available administrative remedies would have been able to properly respond to her demands. Actually, by the fact that plaintiff had been denied tenure by the Chicopee School Committee, it is evident that her resort to the grievance procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, already discussed, would have been futile through level three (which is that of filing a grievance with that very Committee). All that would have remained for plaintiff to do would be to take her grievance to the American Arbitration Association. That organization, beneficial as it is in many situations involving disputes, is not in my mind the appropriate body to deal with plaintiff’s claim. I therefore do not feel that, in this situation, plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court. Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is therefore denied.

A prisoner may bring a damages claim under § 1983 in federal court without first exhausting state remedies, even when a claim seeking restoration of good-conduct credit must proceed through habeas corpus.

Zaczek v. Huber · filed 1977-08-24

To the extent that the plaintiff seeks restoration of good conduct credit, the appropriate remedy is a writ of habeas corpus, not Section 1983. ... In the case of the damages claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy. However, the damages claim can be brought by inmate Zaczek under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 provides an alternative federal forum for constitutional-rights claims, and a damages action need not await exhaustion of related state criminal proceedings when federal adjudication will not substantially interfere.

Clark v. Lutcher · filed 1977-08-30

When a suit at law for money damages over which this Court properly has jurisdiction is begun, the Court cannot exercise equitable discretion to refuse to exercise jurisdiction. ... in light of the minimal interference with the state criminal proceeding, the clear policy of affording litigants a federal forum in which to vindicate constitutional rights represented by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ... the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss this action on the basis of comity.

A § 1983 action directly challenging the constitutionality of a prisoner's conviction or confinement is not properly before a federal court until state remedies have been exhausted.

Edwards v. Phil H. Joyner, Investigator, Dekalb County Police Dept. · filed 1978-01-27

A § 1983 action raising issues that go directly to the constitutionality of a prisoner’s conviction or confinement is not properly before the federal court until state remedies have been exhausted.

Section 1983 provides a supplementary federal remedy, so a plaintiff need not first seek and be denied relief under state law.

New Jersey Education Association v. Burke · filed 1978-05-03

It is no answer (to a suit under § 1983) that the state has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state non-judicial remedies before bringing a federal constitutional claim.

Lister v. Lucey · filed 1978-05-04

This case was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Waiting for non-judicial proceedings also is inconsistent with the related federal policy of not requiring exhaustion of state non-judicial remedies in such cases.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before a federal action, but federal courts may abstain from deciding the action while a related state proceeding is pending.

Samuel Gibson, III v. George L. Jackson, Individually and as Superior Court Judge of Jones County, Georgia · filed 1978-08-23

Even when suit is brought for violation of federal civil rights, pursuant to Section 1983, a proceeding that does not require the exhaustion of state remedies as a prerequisite to federal action, ... federal courts may refrain from decision until a related state court proceeding is resolved.

Section 1983 actions do not require plaintiffs to exhaust state remedies before invoking the federal remedy.

MacKey v. Stanton · filed 1978-11-08

“The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”

For prisoner § 1983 claims alleging deprivation without due process of low-value tangible personal property, the plaintiff must first use adequate internal prison grievance procedures.

Secret v. Brierton · filed 1978-12-05

Having extrapolated from these cases a non-rigid approach to the exhaustion requirement, the circumstances of the instant case present, in our opinion, an appropriate setting for requiring the plaintiff to utilize the available internal prison remedies before filing a § 1983 claim. ... We confine the applicability of our holding to prisoner § 1983 cases which allege deprivation without due process of law of tangible items of personal property of no great monetary value.

A prisoner bringing a damages action under § 1983 need not exhaust available state remedies.

Ware v. Percy · filed 1979-04-19

I believe that an extension of the exhaustion requirement to damage actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is contrary to case law developed by the Supreme Court in this area.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to invoke the federal remedy without exhausting state remedies.

Walker v. Wegner · filed 1979-09-28

No exhaustion of state remedies is required before the § 1983 federal remedy can be invoked.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before filing suit.

Johnson v. Brelje · filed 1979-11-08

The general rule, of course, is that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite for the filing of a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides a supplementary federal remedy even when state remedies are available.

Hall v. Tawney · filed 1980-05-09

It is of course settled that relief under § 1983 does not depend upon the unavailability of state remedies, but is supplementary to them.