42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies that burden their pursuit of constitutional rights.

Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School District No. 1 of Clarendon County · filed 1965-08-19

However, where such remedies are not part of a voluntary system permitting interracial transfers, but rather operate as a burden to an individual seeking constitutional rights, they need not be exhausted before courts can be looked to for relief.

Section 1983 proceedings are not subject to the state remedy exhaustion requirement of the habeas corpus statute.

Conover v. Montemuro · filed 1973-05-08

The exhaustion requirement of the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b), does not apply to proceedings brought under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to challenge parole eligibility procedures on due process grounds without exhausting state remedies when they do not seek immediate or earlier release.

Bradford v. Weinstein · filed 1975-06-02

On the authority of Preiser and Wolff, we therefore hold that plaintiffs may litigate their due process objections to defendants' parole eligibility proceedings in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without the need for exhaustion under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).

A plaintiff need not exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action in state court.

Md.-Nat'l Cap. P. & P. Comm'n v. Crawford · filed 1984-06-06

We agree with the reasoning of these cases and, therefore, hold that Crawford was not required to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the Commission prior to instituting her § 1983 action in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state remedies before bringing suit.

Jones v. Clark · filed 1984-12-06

As the law stands, there is no requirement that a section 1983 plaintiff exhaust state remedies before bringing suit.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before a civil rights action may proceed.

Pearl Investment Company, a California Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1985-10-29

The practical effect of abstention in these cases may be to impose an exhaustion requirement not appropriate to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a substantive due process claim in federal court despite the availability of state remedies.

Littlefield v. City Of Afton · filed 1986-02-11

We agree with the Fifth Circuit that Parratt does not bar a claim based on a violation of a substantive constitutional right. Claims based on substantive due process, as distinguished from some procedural due process claims, may be brought in federal court.

Section 1983 allows a person to bring a federal civil action without first exhausting available state judicial or administrative remedies.

Fetner v. The City of Roanoke, a Municipal Corporation Henry v. Bonner, Etc. · filed 1987-04-06

The Supreme Court repeatedly has made clear that the right to bring an action under § 1983 need not depend on the exhaustion of state judicial or administrative procedures.

A plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 for a procedural due process deprivation must plead and prove that state remedies are inadequate.

Sproul v. City of Wooster · filed 1988-02-26

As a result, plaintiffs § 1983 claim must fail because he did not “plead and prove” that Ohio does not provide an adequate state remedy.

A prisoner's § 1983 challenge to discipline that cost good-time credits must be stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies when a favorable ruling would affect the length of confinement, even if the prisoner drops a request to restore the credits.

Bressman v. Farrier · filed 1990-05-30

Because a federal determination on the merits of this claim would affect the length of Bressman's confinement, the district court was correct in staying Bressman's claim. Furthermore, we do not believe Bressman's subsequent attempt to omit his request for restoration of good-time credits warrants a different result.

A § 1983 plaintiff alleging a procedural due process deprivation under established state procedures need not plead or prove that post-termination state-law remedies are inadequate.

Mitchell v. Robin Fankhauser and the Board of Education of Fayette County, Kentucky · filed 2004-07-14

In the present case, Mitchell was not deprived of his property interest in his job pursuant to a random or unauthorized act. Mitchell, therefore, “was required neither to plead nor prove the inadequacy of post-termination state-law remedies in order to prevail.”

Section 1983 permits a substantive due process claim even when state tort law provides a remedy for the same conduct.

Love v. Sheffield · filed 1985-12-11

We said that substantive due process claims challenging “government actions that, even if undertaken with a full panoply of procedural protection, are, in and of themselves, antithetical to fundamental notices of due process,” 451 U.S. at 545, 101 S.Ct. at 1918, may be asserted in federal court regardless of the existence of a state tort remedy designed to compensate the injured party for the conduct. Love’s allegations invoked the same sort of substantive due process guarantees involved in Gilmere.

Section 1983 relief in federal court does not require exhaustion of state remedies.

Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. · filed 1986-01-10

It is well established, however, that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to § 1983 relief in Federal Courts.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment claim for arrest and detention without probable cause even when state courts offer remedies.

Christian v. Timmermann · filed 2004-12-28

This may be pursued under § 1983 whether or not state courts offer remedies of their own.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before filing a federal lawsuit.

Capua v. City of Plainfield · filed 1986-09-18

This Court notes that plaintiffs’ cause of action is properly in federal court. The Supreme Court has unambiguously ruled that exhaustion of State judicial or administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing federal claims.

Radolf v. University of Connecticut · filed 2005-03-30

Of course, Dr. Radolf was not required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to exhaust state remedies before bringing his federal claims.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing a claim.

Chaz Construction, LLC v. Codell · filed 2005-05-11

A plaintiff is not required to exhaust state remedies before pursuing a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to pursue an Article 78 proceeding before suing, although that proceeding may provide the process required by the Due Process Clause.

Lawrence v. Antonucci · filed 2005-09-27

Further, although Lawrence is correct in his assertion that litigants are generally not required to file an Article 78 proceeding before suing under § 1983, an Article 78 proceeding in this matter is not part of an exhaustion requirement, but is, for purposes of the federal Due Process Clause, the process available to Lawrence for a violation of FOIL.

Section 1983 permits a person to pursue a civil rights claim without exhausting state judicial or administrative remedies.

Orozco Ex Rel. Arroyo v. Sobol · filed 1987-11-30

Plaintiffs reply brief on the instant motion correctly argues that she need not exhaust State judicial or administrative remedies before pursuing a section 1983 remedy.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before filing suit.

Kauth v. Hartford Insurance Company Of Illinois · filed 1988-07-19

We recognize that a plaintiff who brings a section 1983 action is not required to first exhaust his state remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a claimant to exhaust state remedies for a completed constitutional violation before filing a federal action.

Lawrence J. Stockler and Phillip J. Goodman v. City of Detroit, Mediation Tribunal Ass'n., and Kaye Tertzag · filed 1991-07-08

This is distinct from a completed constitutional violation for which the state provides an opportunity to seek redress. In that context, under the doctrine of Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), a claimant does not have to exhaust those procedures before bringing a federal 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 plaintiffs generally need not exhaust state remedies before suing, except in prisoner suits.

Loubser v. Thacker · filed 2006-03-08

Except in prisoner suits, there is no requirement that a plaintiff in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 exhaust state remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to seek available state court review before bringing a procedural due process claim.

Peterson v. Dakota County · filed 2006-03-23

In Charchenko v. City of Still-water, the Eighth Circuit recognized that available state administrative remedies did not bar a § 1983 claim. ... This Court thus finds that Plaintiff did not waive her procedural due process claim by not filing a writ of certiorari to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before suit.

Rice v. Schmidt · filed 1967-12-29

The exhaustion requirement is not a prerequisite to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before a plaintiff brings an action.

O'BRIEN v. Galloway · filed 1973-08-15

Because the Hargrave decision did not discuss the doctrine of exhaustion at all but was based on abstention and because of the otherwise expansive attitude expressed toward § 1983 actions by the Supreme Court when discussing exhaustion, this Court concludes that no exhaustion of state remedies is required prior to prosecuting a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state remedies, but courts consider available remedies when deciding whether a procedural due process violation occurred.

Verena Rivera-Powell, Francesca Castellanos, Georgina Sanchez, and Marie Sierra v. New York City Board of Elections, Doc · filed 2006-12-05

The general rule is that § 1983 claims, including First Amendment claims, do not require exhaustion of state remedies. ... When § 1983 claims allege procedural due process violations, we nonetheless evaluate whether state remedies exist because that inquiry goes to whether a constitutional violation has occurred at all.

Section 1983 relief remains available even when a state remedy exists.

Green v. Cauthen · filed 1974-05-20

The availability of a state remedy does not bar plaintiff from pursuing this remedy under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a transfer without first exhausting state remedies when the suit does not seek immediate or early release.

Tai v. Thompson · filed 1975-01-15

While other actions by state prisoners have been limited to habeas corpus relief, the Court of Appeals decision in Clutchette v. Procurer, 497 F.2d 809, 812-814 (9th Cir. 1974), modified on rehearing, - F.2d 613 (October 21, 1974), clearly demonstrates that plaintiff’s action here may be maintained under section 1983. ... Thus, plaintiff is not required to exhaust his state remedies prior to maintaining this action.

A plaintiff who initiates a coercive state administrative proceeding must pursue available state appellate remedies before bringing a related Section 1983 action in federal court.

Brown v. Day · filed 2007-02-28

Here, because the state administrative proceeding was fundamentally coercive in nature, Huffman and Dayton required plaintiff to fully pursue available appellate remedies within the state judicial system before bringing her Section 1983 action in federal court.

Section 1983 actions ordinarily do not require exhaustion of state remedies.

Coates v. Hall · filed 2007-03-12

Exhaustion of state remedies is ordinarily not required for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims ordinarily do not require exhaustion of state remedies, but a claimant cannot use them to bypass habeas exhaustion when seeking relief that shortens confinement.

Robinson v. Leahy · filed 1975-10-08

A 42 U. S.C. § 1983 cause of action is ordinarily not subject to the same exhaustion requirement of § 2254(b) which could arise out of the same factual setting. It was the intention of Congress, however, that the exhaustion requirement apply in this situation, since § 2254 so specifically attends relief that shortens confinement.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state remedies, but comity can require state judicial review before federal relief that would interfere with ongoing state proceedings.

Kahn v. Shainswit · filed 1976-06-01

Such a conclusion does not violate the general rule that a federal litigant need not exhaust state remedies in a § 1983 action. ... Unlike those decisions, this action involves the necessity of affording the state courts the appropriate deference in light of ongoing state judicial proceedings involving the plaintiff herein.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to initiate related state proceedings, but plaintiffs already in state proceedings must exhaust appellate remedies that offer a reasonable probability of relief before seeking federal equitable relief.

Mudd v. Busse · filed 1977-09-08

As in Huffman, this does not undermine the holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) that one seeking redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of federal rights need not first initiate state proceedings based on related state causes of action. In the instant case the state bail setting process had been initiated. Members of the plaintiff class, such as the named plaintiffs, had in fact initiated proceedings in Judge Busse’s court. Under these circumstances, they had an obligation to exhaust the appellate remedies which afforded them a reasonable probability of relief.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before suit.

Papaiya v. City of Union City · filed 2007-08-14

Moreover, even though the Papaiyas did not exhaust these state remedies, their claim does not lack ripeness because the exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before filing suit.

Chmielinski v. Massachusetts · filed 2008-01-22

The Supreme Court has made clear that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to filing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 due process claim that does not allege a Fifth Amendment taking does not require exhaustion of state remedies.

Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago · filed 2008-03-07

Hold Fast Tattoo’s claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has no exhaustion requirement.

Section 1983 claims challenging the constitutionality of a state court conviction are subject to exhaustion of available state court remedies.

Delaney v. Giarrusso · filed 1981-01-05

Rather, habeas corpus is the exclusive initial cause of action when the basis of the claim goes to the constitutionality of the state-court conviction. Delaney’s illegal arrest cause of action clearly goes to the constitutionality of his state-court conviction; it therefore is subject to the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) that the prisoner have exhausted his available state-court remedies.

Section 1983 does not require litigants to exhaust available state remedies before seeking relief.

New Jersey-Philadelphia Presbytery of the Bible Presbyterian Church v. New Jersey State Board of Higher Education · filed 1981-04-14

Moreover, litigants need not exhaust those remedies before seeking relief under Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for deprivation of rights under color of state law without requiring exhaustion of state remedies.

Weaver v. Wilcox · filed 1981-05-29

Unlike actions under the federal Mandamus Act, actions under section 1983 do not carry with them the added requirement that the plaintiff exhaust his state remedies before bringing his federal action.

Section 1983 permits a civil rights action without first exhausting available state judicial remedies.

Maddox v. Clackamas County School District No. 25 · filed 1982-04-27

In addition, the federal courts have not required exhaustion of state judicial remedies before hearing a § 1983 claim. ... Although the same considerations may not apply when the suit is brought in state court, given the limited nature of the state remedy provided by ORS 342.835(3), we will not require exhaustion in this case.

Section 1983 does not require a claimant to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing a federal claim.

Rodriguez v. Vila · filed 2008-06-26

Hence, a quasi-judicial officer is entitled to substantive due process and/or equal protection, and may file a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without having to exhaust state administrative remedies.

Section 1983 permits litigants to seek federal redress without first exhausting state judicial or administrative remedies.

Georgevich v. Strauss · filed 1985-09-30

Equally firm is the principle that litigants who properly seek redress in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982) are not required to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative procedures before filing a claim.

Stevenson v. Willis · filed 2008-09-18

It is well settled that there is no requirement to exhaust state administrative procedures prior to the filing of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state administrative or judicial remedies before suit; an implied exception requires clear evidence of congressional intent, which the Medicaid Act does not provide.

Alacare, Inc.-North v. Baggiano · filed 1986-04-02

In Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), the Supreme Court determined that there is no general exhaustion of remedies requirement for plaintiffs pursuing claims under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983 (1985). This Circuit has not previously attempted to mark the precise contours of that holding. We hold today that Patsy does not preclude the finding of implicit exhaustion requirements in congressional enactments. But we also hold that no such requirement exists under the language of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1396, et seq. (1985).

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before filing suit.

Conn v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF CITY OF DETROIT · filed 2008-11-06

There is, however, no general requirement of exhaustion of state remedies before a plaintiff can bring a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff seeking only equitable relief in federal court to exhaust state administrative remedies.

James Ex Rel. Estate of James v. Richman · filed 2008-11-12

We must therefore decline the Department’s request that we impose a de facto exhaustion requirement where, as here, a plaintiff may request only equitable relief in the federal forum.

Section 1983 plaintiffs challenging a completed state employment dismissal need not pursue an optional state administrative appeal before suing in federal court.

Kercado-Melendez v. Awilda Aponte-Roque, Etc. · filed 1987-09-22

But a teacher who alleges that her dismissal was motivated by an unconstitutional purpose need not pursue her administrative remedies within the Commonwealth system, but may proceed directly to federal court to press her claims.

A Section 1983 damages claim that would require a ruling on the validity of a state conviction must await exhaustion of state remedies.

Peterson v. Murante · filed 1987-11-23

The doctrine of comity mandates that plaintiff be required to first exhaust his State remedies prior to bringing this action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

A § 1983 procedural due process claim for deprivation of a property interest is not ripe until the plaintiff exhausts available state remedies.

Crooks v. Lynch · filed 2009-03-02

“[A] litigant asserting a deprivation of [a property right in violation of] procedural due process must exhaust state remedies before such an allegation states a claim under § 1983.” ... This requirement is distinct from exhaustion requirements in other contexts. Rather, this requirement is necessary for a procedural due process claim to be ripe for adjudication.

A § 1983 claim alleging deprivation of a property interest without procedural due process is not ripe until the plaintiff exhausts available state remedies.

Darin Crooks v. Rick Lynch · filed 2009-03-02

"[A] litigant asserting a deprivation of [a property right in violation of] procedural due process must exhaust state remedies before such an allegation states a claim under § 1983." ... Because Crooks had not exhausted the available state remedies, we lack jurisdiction over his property interest claim.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suit in either state or federal court.

Earle v. Gunnell · filed 1989-03-29

Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Crawford that, regardless of the judicial forum, exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing an action under § 1983; the provisions of Art. 41 § 4-102.1(7) notwithstanding.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies before suit, though a court may defer a claim while a voluntarily filed state agency proceeding is pending.

Silverman v. University of Colorado · filed 1975-10-20

Thus, exhaustion of state administrative or judicial remedies has not been required prior to proceeding in the federal court with a claim pursuant to § 1983. ... Under these circumstances and where, as here, plaintiff was not required to file a proceeding with the Commission but elected to do so, we conclude that dismissal of this claim was error, but that the trial court should have discretion, if it so determines, to defer proceedings on this portion of the fifth claim pending the determination of plaintiff's claim by the Commission.

A Section 1983 claim that calls into question the validity of a state conviction requires exhaustion of state remedies before it may proceed.

Sherlocke Evan Francis Holmes v. Sheriff, Virginia Beach City Jail, G. Jeffery Mason, Virginia Beach Public Defender's O · filed 1987-10-13

The district court properly required exhaustion in this case. ... The district court's dismissal of Holmes' complaint without prejudice does not inhibit his filing of a new § 1983 complaint after exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 generally allows a person to seek relief for a state actor’s deprivation of federal rights without exhausting state administrative remedies, subject to rules for procedural due process claims.

Keating v. Nebraska Public Power District · filed 2009-04-13

“Under federal law, a litigant asserting a deprivation of procedural due process must exhaust state remedies before such an allegation states a claim under § 1983.” ... However, it is not necessary for a litigant to have exhausted available postdeprivation remedies when the litigant contends that he was entitled to predeprivation process. ... Accordingly, appellants’ failure to exhaust postdeprivation remedies does not affect their entitlement to predeprivation process, and the district court should not have considered this failure in dismissing the claim.

A prisoner need not exhaust state judicial remedies before bringing a Section 1983 action.

Palmigiano v. James W. Mullen, Warden · filed 1974-02-27

The Supreme Court reiterated last term in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), that a prisoner need not exhaust state judi ... cial remedies before he may bring a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust an available de novo state judicial remedy before suing in federal court.

D. Franklin Wishart, and v. Paul J. McDonald And · filed 1974-07-10

Although Wishart was entitled to a de novo hearing in a state court, he was not required to exhaust the state remedies before coming into federal court. The federal remedy is separate, and supplements the state remedy.

A § 1983 complaint challenging a conviction or sentence may be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state court remedies.

Lamb v. Herz · filed 1993-06-21

Todd William Lamb appeals from the district court's order dismissing without prejudice his complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), for failure to exhaust state court remedies. Our review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses that this appeal is without merit.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of available state remedies before a prisoner seeks declaratory relief challenging parole procedures.

Cicero v. Olgiati · filed 1976-11-24

The possible availability of a state court proceeding in which the present constitutional issues could be decided does not require abstention; in effect, such a view would read into § 1983 a prerequisite that available state remedies be exhausted, and the Supreme Court has disclaimed any intent to overrule this aspect of Monroe v. Pape, supra.

Section 1983 actions do not require exhaustion of state remedies.

Strader v. Anthony F. Troy, Attorney General of Virginia, and Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 1978-03-28

As Preiser and our decision in McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4 Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 923, 96 S.Ct. 264, 46 L.Ed.2d 249 (1975), cert. dismissed, 426 U.S. 471, 96 S.Ct. 2640, 48 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976), hold, exhaustion of state remedies is not required in actions under § 1983.

A person seeking relief under § 1983 for a deprivation of federal rights need not initiate state proceedings to bring the claim in federal court.

Brown v. Jones · filed 1979-03-19

One seeking redress, however, under § 1983 for deprivation of federal rights need not initiate state proceedings, Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. at 609-10, 95 S.Ct. 1200; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); Ealy v. Littlejohn, 569 F.2d 219, 234 n. 48 (5th Cir. 1978).

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state remedies, but exhaustion is required when a claim attacks the fact or duration of confinement.

Bunn v. Orem · filed 1995-03-07

Although exhaustion of state remedies is not generally a prerequisite to an action under § 1983, Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2568, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), exhaustion is required when the § 1983 claim attacks the fact or duration of confinement.

Section 1983 plaintiffs cannot be required to exhaust state court avenues for what are essentially federal claims.

Robert E. v. Lane · filed 1981-10-05

Section 1983 plaintiffs cannot be forced to exhaust all potential opportunities for obtaining state court approval of what are essentially federal claims.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state remedies for a claim alleging unconstitutional jail conditions.

Abraham v. County of Washoe · filed 1982-09-08

To require, in effect, exhaustion of state remedies in this context would be contrary to the intention of 42 U.S.C.- § 1983 and is not, in the opinion of the Court, the true intent and purpose of Parratt v. Taylor, supra.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing an action.

Maurer v. Individually and as Members of Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Peter J. Pitchess, John P. · filed 1982-10-25

Nor was Maurer required to exhaust his state remedies before bringing his section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing suit in federal court.

Scudder v. Town of Greendale, Indiana · filed 1983-04-08

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), decided after the district court granted summary judgment in the instant case, makes it clear that exhaustion of state remedies is not a condition precedent to bringing suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies before suing in federal court to enforce a federal right.

Washington v. DeBeaugrine · filed 2009-10-01

The Monroe principle has remained inviolate since that time: state judicial remedies need not be exhausted before a claim is pursued in federal court under § 1983.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before bringing federal claims.

Kachalsky v. Cacace · filed 2011-09-02

It is well-settled that “[w]hen federal claims are premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) — as they are here — [a plaintiff is] not required [to] exhaust[ ] ... state judicial or administrative remedies.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (citing McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)).

Section 1983 claims do not require exhaustion of state judicial remedies.

Godin v. Machiasport School Department Board of Directors · filed 2011-12-21

It is settled law that there is no exhaustion requirement for § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before suing for denial of due process.

Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, Miss. · filed 2012-05-14

In addition, exhaustion of state remedies is not required before a plaintiff can bring suit under § 1983 for denial of due process.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff seeking damages in federal court to exhaust state remedies.

Gudzelak v. Jurden · filed 2012-09-06

Gudzelak is not entitled to equitable tolling because there is no requirement to exhaust state remedies for a plaintiff seeking damages in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before suing unless Congress creates an exception.

Koenning v. Suehs · filed 2012-09-18

Under federal law, a plaintiff need not exhaust his state administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 claim, unless Congress creates an exception.

Section 1983 allows a Medicaid claimant to enforce the reasonable promptness right in federal court without first exhausting state judicial review.

Romano v. Greenstein · filed 2013-06-28

We conclude that § 1396a(a)(8) creates a right enforceable under § 1983, and that exhaustion of Louisiana’s procedure for judicial review is not required before a Medicaid claimant files suit in federal court.

Section 1983 plaintiffs generally need not pursue available state judicial or administrative remedies before proceeding in federal court, and the availability of those remedies alone does not justify abstention.

Vasquez v. Rackauckas · filed 2013-11-05

The principle that § 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust available state judicial or administrative remedies necessarily means ... that the mere availability of a state judicial proceeding that allows the opportunity to vindicate federal rights is insufficient to justify abstention under Younger.... ... That rule is especially apt here, as any comity concerns are largely of OCDA’s own making. ... In short, under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to abstain from granting relief under general principles of comity and federalism.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to sue in state court before bringing a federal action.

Bynum v. Municipality, City & County of Denver · filed 2013-12-16

But Mr. Bynum did not need to sue in state court before suing in federal court under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative or judicial remedies before suing.

Alvarez v. Betlach · filed 2014-05-13

We deem this argument waived and, in any event, reject it on the merits because there is no general requirement that a plaintiff exhaust state administrative or judicial remedies before pursuing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A plaintiff bringing a post-deprivation procedural due process claim under § 1983 must pursue available state administrative remedies before the claim can proceed.

Hopkins v. The City of Bloomington · filed 2014-12-22

In Hopkins’s case, she did not exhaust available state administrative remedies offered pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 169A.63 (2009) prior to bringing her § 1983 claim, and she makes no argument she exhausted those available remedies. ... Accordingly, because Hopkins voluntarily ceased pursuing available state administrative remedies, she waived her ability to pursue a post-deprivation procedural due process claim and the district court did not err by dismissing her claim.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state proceedings before pursuing federal claims when a state ruling could affect, but not avoid, the federal questions.

Patel v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2015-02-27

Abstaining when a state law determination merely has the potential to affect—rather than avoid—a federal question transforms Pullman from an exception into a rule, effectively “impos[ing] an exhaustion requirement not appropriate to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

A plaintiff asserting a post-deprivation procedural due process claim under Section 1983 must exhaust state remedies before the claim can proceed.

Parke W. Little v. Rummel · filed 2015-06-30

... Little failed to exhaust state remedies following the Dickinson Civil Service Commission's approval of Little's termination–a prerequisite to bringing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action–and thus his post-deprivation procedural due process claims fail.

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before suing, though certain procedural due process claims are an exception.

Charleston v. McCarthy · filed 2016-03-30

In fact, the requirement that a litigant exhaust state remedies before bringing a procedural due process claim, stated in Crooks and others, is just an exception to the general rule; the general rule holds .that a plaintiff need not exhaust state remedies before bringing an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 plaintiffs bringing Medicaid Act claims need not exhaust state remedies before seeking federal relief.

Cruz v. Zucker · filed 2016-11-14

As the Second Circuit has stated, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 assigns “federal courts a ’paramount’ role in protecting federal rights,” Roach v. Morse, 440 F.3d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503, 506, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982)), and a § 1983 plaintiff bringing a claim under the Medicaid Act need not first exhaust state remedies. Id. at 56-58. This rationale applies even more forcefully to the present case.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff pursuing a post-termination procedural due process claim to exhaust available state remedies when no pre-termination violation is adequately pleaded.

Raymond v. Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota · filed 2017-01-31

Because Raymond did not sufficiently plead a pre-termination procedural due process violation, exhaustion of state remedies is required to proceed on his post-termination claim.

Section 1983 civil rights claims arising from a municipal taking may proceed without first exhausting state taking claims when the claims are not sufficiently dependent on them.

Empire Design & Development, LLC v. Bettencourt · filed 2018-03-21

However, at this stage and on the present record, the Court is not persuaded that the civil rights claims so closely depend on the state claims that Empire must either pursue the state claims exclusively or “exhaust” those claims before the civil rights claims may be brought here.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before bringing suit.

3637 Corp. v. City of Miami · filed 2018-05-09

"The Supreme Court repeatedly has made clear that the right to bring an action under § 1983 need not depend on the exhaustion of state judicial or administrative procedures."

A § 1983 claim can be precluded by a state administrative decision when the plaintiff fails to seek available state judicial review and state courts would treat the decision as binding.

Doe v. Regents of the University · filed 2018-06-06

We also agree with The Regents that Doe’s § 1983 and Title IX claims are precluded because he has failed to exhaust judicial remedies by filing a § 1094.5 writ petition in state ... court.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state agency or court remedies before suing.

Tucker v. City of Chicago · filed 2018-10-19

As Tucker points out, a plaintiff need not exhaust her remedies through state agencies or courts before bringing a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits property owners to bring takings claims upon a taking without first exhausting state law remedies.

Jensen v. Village of Mount Pleasant · filed 2019-07-03

Property owners may now bring takings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon the taking of private property, without first exhausting state law remedies.

Section 1983 does not generally require plaintiffs to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before suing.

Sullivan, Stacy v. Town of Stockholm · filed 2019-08-23

There is no general duty to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before pursuing an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against a local ordinance adopted under color of state law.

National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Pine Belt Regional Solid Waste Management Authority · filed 2004-10-29

We reject that contention. The instant suit is one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against local government ordinances adopted under color of state law on the ground that the ordinances are invalid under and contrary to the United States Constitution. ... "When federal claims are premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies."

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before bringing a federal claim.

National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Pine Belt Regional Solid Waste Management Authority · filed 2004-11-18

We reject that contention. ... “When federal claims are premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies.”

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff alleging a due process deprivation under municipal policy to file a New York Article 78 proceeding before suing.

Leung v. The Town of Oyster Bay · filed 2019-10-21

Here, the Plaintiffs alleged in the complaint that the Defendants deprived them of due process pursuant to Town policy; thus, they were not required to file an Article 78 proceeding before bringing this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims do not require exhaustion of state remedies, but that rule does not apply to a filing construed as a habeas petition.

Sanders v. Dakota District Court · filed 2019-12-16

Although Sanders is correct that exhaustion is ... not required for § 1983 claims, ... he has not brought a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not require a litigant to exhaust state remedies before filing suit.

Rudman v. Board of Education for Township School District 113 · filed 2020-01-30

Section 1983 does not require a litigant to exhaust state remedies before filing suit.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to seek a state writ before suing when the claim does not challenge a final administrative order.

Doe v. White · filed 2020-02-24

The Court agrees with plaintiff and finds that based upon the nature of plaintiff’s claim – which does not challenge the validity of a final administrative order – plaintiff was not required to seek a writ in state court prior to filing this lawsuit.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing an action.

Wildgrass Oil and Gas Committee v. State of Colorado · filed 2020-03-18

However, “the settled rule is that ‘exhaustion of state remedies ‘is not a prerequisite to an action under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.’” Knick v. Twp. of Scott, PA, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994)). Wildgrass need not have exhausted state remedies before bringing these claims.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to pursue available state administrative or judicial procedures before bringing constitutional claims in federal court.

INDIANA FINE WINE & SPIRITS, LLC v. COOK · filed 2020-05-11

The Court is not persuaded by the ATC's assertion that state administrative and judicial procedures should have been pursued before IFWS brought its constitutional challenge in this Court. The general rule is that plaintiffs may bring constitutional claims under §1983 without first bringing any sort of state lawsuit, even when state court actions addressing the underlying behavior are available.

A plaintiff challenging a California administrative decision through a § 1983 procedural due process claim must seek state judicial review first; otherwise, the administrative decision has preclusive effect.

Richardson v. Bacerra · filed 2020-05-29

Doe, in contrast, stands for the specific proposition that a party seeking relief from an adverse California administrative decision must first pursue review of that decision in state court by way of administrative mandamus; if the party fails to do so, he may not bring a procedural due process claim under § 1983 challenging the process provided by that administrative body because the administrative decision is deemed final and must be given preclusive effect in federal court. Doe is on point and controls here. Plaintiff failed to pursue judicial remedies in state court. Accordingly, the underlying administrative decision is given preclusive, binding effect and cannot be the subject of a procedural due process challenge.

Section 1983 does not require a Pennsylvania school district employee to exhaust state remedies before suing over an adverse personnel decision.

Moffitt v. Tunkhannock Area School District · filed 2020-09-30

It is a long-settled principle that “exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa., 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019) (emphasis in original) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994)). This general rule extends to cases like the present one where an employee of a Pennsylvania school district challenges the district’s adverse personnel decision.

Section 1983 permits a property owner to bring a takings claim against a local government without first seeking compensation through state procedures.

Ellis v. Clarksdale Public Utilities · filed 2020-11-13

Though not acknowledged by Public Utilities, the Supreme Court in Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, explicitly overruled the state-litigation requirement of Williamson County, explaining that “[a] property owner may bring a takings claim under § 1983 upon the taking of his property without just compensation by a local government.” 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2179 (2019) (property owner was not required to bring an inverse condemnation claim in state court before pursuing takings claim under § 1983). Thus, dismissal is not warranted simply because the Ellises have state remedies available to them.

Section 1983 plaintiffs may seek injunctive relief for constitutional claims without first exhausting available state remedies.

NA MAIN STREET LLC v. COOK · filed 2020-12-22

We know of no exhaustion requirement that plaintiffs must satisfy before seeking injunctive relief for § 1983 claims such as those presented here; the general rule, in fact, "is that plaintiffs may bring constitutional claims under § 1983 without first bringing any sort of state lawsuit, even when state court actions addressing the underlying behavior are available." Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa., ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2172–73, 204 L.Ed.2d 558 (2019).

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing a claim.

Full Circle of Living and Dying v. Sanchez · filed 2020-12-29

As explained above, exhaustion is not a prerequisite to plaintiffs’ claim under § 1983. This argument fails.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an action.

Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1972-08-21

The failure to exhaust administrative remedies, however, is not a bar to action under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek relief against state officials without exhausting administrative remedies when the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial to warrant a three-judge court.

Lawson v. Brown · filed 1972-10-13

Defendants’ contention that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies must be overruled. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312, n. 4, 88 S.Ct. 2128,' 2131, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968) rejects this contention. ... The constitutional challenge is sufficient in this present case to meet this test. ... Therefore, a cause upon which relief may be granted has been made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not completely eliminate exhaustion of available state administrative remedies; courts may apply the requirement flexibly, including when an adequate administrative remedy exists.

Ella Metcalf, Etc. v. Harold O. Swank, Etc. · filed 1971-07-01

In summary, we are unable to find a complete abrogation of the exhaustion requirement in Civil Rights Act cases in the decisions cited by plaintiffs. Rather, we find only a pattern of flexibility in imposing the exhaustion requirement in this special area. Because of the important federal aspects of Civil Rights Act cases, the requirement may be more easily dispensed with in particular cases. This does not indicate, however, that it may be completely ignored.

Section 1983 plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief must exhaust available state administrative remedies unless those remedies are inadequate or pursuing them would be futile.

Becker v. Oswald · filed 1973-07-20

These salutary effects counsel adoption by this court of the majority rule: failure to exhaust state administrative remedies bars a civil rights suit for injunctive relief unless the remedies are inadequate or resort to them would be futile.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state administrative remedies before pursuing a federal claim.

Cottrell v. VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER COMPANY · filed 1973-08-03

Plaintiffs respond, and the Court agrees, that 42 U. S.C. § 1983 does not require exhaustion of remedies. See generally, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961).

Section 1983 claimants need not exhaust state administrative or judicial remedies before a federal court considers the merits of their federal civil-rights claim.

Alabama Education Association v. Wallace · filed 1973-08-22

However, the contention that exhaustion of state remedies is a prerequisite to a federal court’s considering on its merits a case seeking relief under Section 1983 is of no validity. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) and the cases therein cited.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before a plaintiff challenges a state welfare plan in federal court, but that rule does not require an Illinois court to hear an unexhausted claim when state administrative review is available.

Chicago Welfare Rights Organization v. Weaver · filed 1973-09-25

Our conclusion is not altered by the circumstance that the plaintiffs stated their claim in two counts, one based upon the State law and the other upon the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. sec. 1983). ... The fact that a Federal district court would take jurisdiction of an action of this kind neither requires nor justifies the courts of this State in doing so. ... The situation is not the same insofar as Illinois courts are concerned. The governing statute provides for administrative review at the instance of individual applicants or recipients, and it provides that administrative decisions shall be judicially reviewable under the Administrative Review Act. Illinois provided a remedy for the grievances that the plaintiffs assert, but they did not choose to pursue it.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing an action under the statute.

Hurley v. Van Lare · filed 1973-10-03

The exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to the maintenance of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when a defendant acting under color of state law deprives a person of constitutional or statutory rights, and administrative remedies need not be exhausted first.

Stern v. Massachusetts Indemnity and Life Insurance Co. · filed 1973-10-12

In determining whether a private person’s conduct falls within Section 1983, the issue is “whether under all the facts and circumstances the action fairly can be said to be that of a State instrumentality acting under color of State law.” ... In light of the pervasive regulatory scheme extant here, we find that the allegations of the Complaint sufficiently set forth the requirement of state action. ... To be entitled to relief under Section 1983 plaintiff must show not only that the defendants were acting under color of law, but also that the defendants deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution and laws. ... Accordingly, we find that plaintiff has stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... It is well settled that where a plaintiff states a good cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, administrative remedies do not have to be exhausted.

In a § 1983 civil-rights case, failure to pursue a speedy and effective state administrative appeal need not be an absolute bar; it may be considered as a factor in deciding whether constitutional rights were violated.

Blanton v. State University of New York · filed 1973-11-19

In Eisen, supra, 421 F.2d at 567-569, we distinguished four Supreme Court decisions which were thought by some to have cast doubt on the requirement of exhausting administrative remedies “as simply condemning a wooden application of the exhaustion doctrine in cases under the Civil Rights Act;” we thought a “quite different situation would be presented, for example, when a complaint alleged that a subordinate state officer had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by acting because of bias or other inadmissible reasons, by distorting or ignoring the facts, or by failing to apply a constitutional state standard, and the state has provided for a speedy appeal to a higher administrative officer,” a good description of the situation here. ... While we therefore see no occasion to retreat from this portion of Eisen, it is unnecessary to go as far as to hold that the four plaintiffs’ failure to appeal to the President of the College constituted an absolute bar at least as to their due process claims. At minimum such failure to appeal can be taken as one of the factors to be weighed in determining whether these plaintiffs were deprived of any of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 plaintiffs are not required to exhaust available state administrative remedies before filing an action, under the Fourth Circuit rule stated by the court.

Jones v. Superintendent · filed 1974-01-18

At this date, the rule in the Fourth Circuit remains that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required before filing a § 1983 action. ... Whether the Administrative Grievance Procedure for Inmates Incarcerated within the Virginia Correctional System will be found to be similarly effective will be determined by this court in a proper case, but as of now that route of exhaustion will not be required.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff with an otherwise valid claim to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking relief.

414 Theater Corp. v. Murphy · filed 1974-05-17

In any case, appellants’ argument that appellee, having submitted its application, must be required to exhaust its administrative remedies is frivolous, because appellee clearly states an otherwise good cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a supplementary federal civil-rights remedy that may be pursued without first exhausting state administrative remedies.

Crawford v. City of Houston, Texas · filed 1974-06-26

Federal civil rights remedies are supplementary to state remedies. A plaintiff may be permitted to prosecute an action under § 1983 without prior, resort to state administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before a federal court hears constitutional claims when the administrative body's expertise is not needed.

Magri v. Giarrusso · filed 1974-08-07

Of course, the exhaustion of administrative remedies ought nevertheless to be required when such remedies are found to be adequate in light of the nature of the issues raised for adjudication. In the case at bar, however, the only issues presented are constitutional in nature which involve the possible abrogation of important free speech rights. We do not think it appropriate in such a situation to compel a § 1983 claimant to-present constitutional issues such as those raised here to the City Civil Service Commission, where their particular expertise is not required, before bringing them to a federal court for resolution.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies when the available remedy is inadequate.

Plano v. Clifford W. Baker, Individually and as Supervising Principal of the Westmoreland Central School Dist · filed 1974-10-11

In Ray v. Fritz, 468 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam) we held that exhaustion of state administrative remedies in § 1983 actions is not required where the administrator is not empowered to grant the relief sought. ... In light of the procedural nature of the administrative remedy, the issues presented, and the relief sought, we hold that the state administrative remedy in this case was inadequate, and that it was error to dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust that remedy.

Section 1983 actions are not jurisdictionally barred merely because available state administrative or judicial remedies were not used.

Crawford v. Short · filed 1975-01-15

Failure to utilize available state administrative or judicial remedies has no jurisdictional consequence in federal suits filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing a claim in federal court.

Marshall v. Spangler · filed 1975-07-02

Because the plaintiff need not exhaust her administrative remedies before pursuing a 1983 claim in federal court, ... defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 1983 claims do not require exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies.

Siletti v. New York City Employees' Retirement System · filed 1975-10-07

Claims premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3) need not be predicated on exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, but an employee who voluntarily rejects an available hearing cannot later seek federal relief from the resulting deprivation.

Allen v. Lovejoy · filed 1975-10-23

This is not to say that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required under §§ 1983 and 1985 but that an employee cannot voluntarily spurn an offered hearing and later come into federal court seeking relief from her own decision.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing an action.

Panzarella v. Boyle · filed 1975-12-22

It is clear that a plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies as a precondition to bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 civil-rights actions do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, but they must present an actual, ripe controversy for judicial determination.

McGarry v. Curvin · filed 1976-01-07

Since the jurisdiction of this Court over the instant controversy is alleged to exist under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the usual requirement of exhaustion of remedies does not apply hereto. Civil rights cases, such as this, must, however, present an actual controversy and be “ripe” for judicial determination in the sense that there must have been some determinative administrative determination from which relief is sought.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state administrative remedies before bringing an otherwise valid action.

Fialkowski v. Shapp · filed 1975-12-17

Thus we hold that exhaustion is not required.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies when the plaintiff specifically attacks the procedure itself.

Thacker v. Whitehead · filed 1976-01-23

The complaint, however, could be construed as a specific attack on the grievance procedure followed by the University. Under these circumstances, plaintiff would not be required to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing an action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Federal courts do not require exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies before hearing claims premised on § 1983.

Cofone v. Manson · filed 1976-03-17

When federal claims are premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) — as they are here — we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff alleging First Amendment violations to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before filing in federal court.

Hochman v. Board of Education of the City of Newark, Defendants-Respondents · filed 1976-04-22

When federal claims are premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) —as they are here — we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights.

A section 1983 plaintiff generally need not exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies, but must pursue an adequate administrative procedure designed to prevent an imminent civil-rights deprivation.

Bliss O. Bignall, Jr., Et Ux. v. North Idaho College · filed 1976-06-17

The plaintiff in a section 1983 suit usually does not need to exhaust either state judicial or administrative remedies. ... The College violated the Bignalls’ procedural rights only if it offered an inadequate hearing. If the suggested procedure would have been adequate, the Bignalls cannot state a claim under the Civil Rights Act for a denial of their procedural rights when they themselves elected to forego a complete hearing.

In this circuit, plaintiffs had to exhaust speedy, adequate, and non-futile state administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action.

Black v. Beame · filed 1976-08-30

Under that latter doctrine as it is applied in this Circuit, state administrative remedies must be exhausted before the bringing of a § 1983 action if those remedies are speedy, ... adequate and not futile.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required in a § 1983 action once a plaintiff raises a constitutional question.

Steadman v. Hundley · filed 1976-09-21

Nor is exhaustion of administrative remedies required in § 1983 actions. Once a plaintiff raises a constitutional question, a federal court is the appropriate forum for decision.

A federal plaintiff challenging state administrative action need not exhaust state judicial remedies before bringing a § 1983 claim.

Suggs v. C. W. Transport, Inc. · filed 1976-09-21

That plaintiff failed to appeal his award to the Illinois Circuit Court does not strip this court of jurisdiction, because exhaustion of state remedies is not required under § 1983.

A plaintiff need not exhaust state administrative remedies before litigating a § 1983 injunctive action in federal court.

McNea v. Garey · filed 1976-09-30

Furthermore, plaintiffs are not required to exhaust their state administrative remedies before litigating their § 1983 injunctive action in federal court.

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state administrative remedies before seeking federal relief.

Wagle v. H. Max Murray, as Principal of the R. A. Long High School · filed 1977-01-19

Generally, suits under the Civil Rights Act are excepted from the rule because the remedy afforded by the Act “is supplementary to the state remedy.” ... This statutory scheme negates the existence of any state interest in requiring exhaustion of the administrative remedy. ... Balancing the relevant factors, we conclude that appellant is not barred by failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

An action under § 1983 need not be dismissed for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies when no speedy, sufficient, readily available remedy remains, particularly where administrative expertise would offer little assistance.

Orazio v. Town of North Hempstead · filed 1977-02-16

The Second Circuit, despite dicta in numerous Supreme Court decisions, has retained a rule that each action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be scrutinized to determine whether the court should require exhaustion of State administrative remedies. ... No such showing has been made in this case. ... Therefore, this is not an appropriate case in which to require exhaustion of State administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before suing when those remedies are inadequate or pursuing them would be futile.

Buffalo Teachers Federation, Inc. v. Helsby · filed 1977-07-29

Reasons similar to those just canvassed result in rejection of defendants’ related contention that the plaintiff should be required to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing this § 1983 action. In this Circuit, the operative rule is that state administrative remedies must be exhausted if they are adequate and their pursuit would not be futile. ... The administrative remedies available to the plaintiff do not satisfy these requirements.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit.

Simpson v. Weeks · filed 1978-01-18

It is well settled that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to a suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a state employee asserting civil-rights violations for wrongful dismissal to exhaust available state administrative remedies before seeking preliminary injunctive relief in state court.

Williams v. Greene · filed 1978-04-18

The exhaustion doctrine has been employed by the courts in appropriate cases to require a plaintiff to take advantage of available administrative remedies before resorting to the courts for redress of his grievances. ... However, as a general rule the failure of a plaintiff to exhaust his state administrative remedies has not been considered a bar to a claim asserted under § 1983. ... In view of the foregoing authority we are compelled to conclude that where as in the present case a state employee asserts civil rights violations under § 1983 for his wrongful dismissal, the Superior Court retains its traditional power to grant preliminary injunctive relief without requiring him to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in Chapter 126 of the General Statutes.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing in federal court.

McKenna v. Fargo · filed 1978-05-25

Exhaustion of State administrative remedies is not required pri- or to commencement of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an action to protect constitutional rights.

Fujiwara v. Clark · filed 1978-06-08

Exhaustion of administrative remedies has never been a prerequisite to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to protect constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing a federal civil-rights action.

Evansville Book Mart, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis · filed 1979-09-21

In a similar vein, exhaustion of administrative remedies might in some cases be required but, again, since the City has indicated a desire to have the issue resolved, and since this is a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such exhaustion will not be required.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit.

Michelson v. Cox · filed 1979-09-17

Mr. Osmundson is not required to exhaust his state administrative remedies as a prerequisite to filing suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state administrative remedies before bringing a federal action.

Thompson v. Southwest School District · filed 1980-01-18

It is well established that plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked. ... For these reasons the Court finds that defendants’ allegations that this case is premature because of plaintiff’s failure to exhaust her state remedies is not well taken, and plaintiff’s failure to pursue her state remedies does not bar this action.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff seeking to vindicate constitutional rights to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit.

Bossier City Medical Suite, Inc. v. City of Bossier City · filed 1980-01-21

However, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff need not exhaust his state administrative remedies in order to file a Section 1983 lawsuit seeking vindication of his constitutional rights. ... Further, it is the established law in this circuit that a plaintiff seeking to protect his constitutional rights cannot be precluded from federal court because of failure to exhaust either his state judicial or administrative remedies. ... Accordingly, this court concludes that plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Bossier City’s zoning code does not effect the jurisdiction of this court. The suit is ripe for adjudication and defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is DENIED.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.

Patsy v. Florida International University · filed 1980-02-28

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite of a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 does not categorically bar requiring exhaustion of adequate state administrative remedies before seeking relief in state court; whether exhaustion is required depends on the case.

Castelaz v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1980-03-04

The doctrine of exhaustion is a discretionary rather than a constitutional rule in §1983 cases. ... We believe, that the no-exhaustion rule as applied to §1983 claims brought in state courts is not to be “woodenly” applied. ... We conclude that Mr. Castelaz, based on the allegations in his complaint, was required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking relief in state courts under §1983.