42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Puckett v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 2001-02-14

Without an allegation of state action or conduct under color of state law, Puckett’s § 1983 claim must also fail.

Section 1983 generally requires a state actor’s conduct to involve an actual or apparent official duty or authority derived from office.

Waters v. City of Morristown · filed 2001-02-22

Section 1983 is generally not implicated unless a state actor’s conduct occurs in the course of performing an actual or apparent duty of his office, or unless the conduct is such that the actor could not have behaved as he did without the authority of his office.

Section 1983 does not reach a public official’s private harassment when the official’s position played no meaningful role in enabling it.

Waters v. City of Morristown · filed 2001-02-22

But in the absence of any credible evidence that Dr. Shuck's official position played a meaningful role in allowing him to harass and abuse Waters, her § 1983 claim against him must fail.

A Section 1983 claim requires facts establishing that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Deparrie v. Hanzo · filed 2001-02-23

The district court properly dismissed deParrie’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because he failed to allege facts to establish that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a violation of federally protected rights by a state or local official acting under color of state law.

Barton v. District of Columbia · filed 2001-02-28

For example, section 1983 allows courts to grant relief when a state or local official acting “under color of’ state law violates a person’s federally protected rights. ... But the plaintiffs have failed to show that any state or local officials, acting under color of state law, violated their federally protected rights.

An off-duty police officer does not act under color of state law merely by calling 911 and reporting an incident as a private citizen would.

Redding v. Beverly St. Eward, Detroit Police Officer · filed 2001-03-01

As the district court rightly concluded, St. Eward’s action in making the 911 calls and reports to the responding officers were “functionally equivalent to that of any private citizen calling for police assistance.” This record presents no genuine issue of fact material to the determination of whether St. Eward was acting-under color of state law. The record demonstrates that she was not.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a union acted under color of state law when it declined to pursue a grievance.

Tyrrell v. City of Scranton · filed 2001-03-02

Likewise, Tyrrell has not stated a due process claim against the union, since he has not alleged facts indicating that the union was acting under color of state law or otherwise was draped in the authority of the state when it allegedly refused to file a grievance on Tyrrell’s behalf.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not provide a cause of action against federal employees acting solely under federal law.

Capozzi v. Department of Transportation · filed 2001-03-02

First, they correctly point out that none of the individual defendants, all of whom are federal employees, is a person “acting under color of state law.” ... Therefore, there is no cause of action under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Webber v. Weaver · filed 2001-03-09

Because Mr. Webber’s complaint does not allege that either Ms. Baumann or Mr. Costandzia acted “under color of state law,” he has failed to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against either of those defendants.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Lewis v. McClennan · filed 2001-03-20

To maintain an action under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he was: 1) deprived of a right secured by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States, 2) by a person acting under color of state law. ... Lewis has not alleged that these defendants were operating as state actors at the time of the assault.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Hines v. Reed · filed 2001-04-02

In the present action, Defendant does not act under color of state law, and Plaintiff has not establish a violation of a right arising under the Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be under color of state law; a defendant with no part in that conduct is not liable for it.

Rogers v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2001-04-03

On August 28, 1998, the Honorable Henry Pitman, United States Magistrate Judge, submitted a Report and Recommendation in which he concluded that CAB and Local 731 were not acting under color of state law, that nothing in the relationship between CAB, Local 731 and NYCTA suggests state action, and that NYCTA had no part in the termination of Rogers’s employment. ... We affirm for substantially the same reasons as set forth in Magistrate Judge Pitman’s August 28, 1998 report and recommendation and the district court’s orders of September 28,1998 and August 29, 2000.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Dekoven v. Bell · filed 2001-04-26

Consequently, plaintiffs civil rights complaint is frivolous as to these defendants because plaintiff has not alleged that they acted under color of law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Edwards v. Cue Time, Inc. · filed 2001-05-01

In order to state a claim under § 1983, Edwards was required to show that he was deprived of a constitutional right by.a person acting under color of state law, without due process. ... Despite being allowed extensive discovery, Edwards was unable to establish any state action in this case.

A state employee acts under color of state law for § 1983 when he uses his authority over an inmate to commit sexual abuse.

Smith v. Cochran · filed 2001-05-09

Based on the foregoing facts, Cochran, as a DPS employee, was acting under color of state law when interacting with Smith.

Section 1983 liability does not attach to actions taken under color of federal law.

Brown v. Philip Morris Inc. · filed 2001-05-17

It is well established that liability under § 1983 will not attach for actions taken under color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a court-appointed attorney for representing a person in a state court commitment hearing because the attorney is not acting under color of state law.

Mawhirt v. Ahmed · filed 2001-05-17

Mawhirt also failed to state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Dye because, as a court appointed attorney representing Mawhirt in a state court commitment hearing, Dye was not acting “under color of state law” and thus is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; action under color of federal law alone does not support liability.

Jesse Brown, Rev., On Behalf Of Himself And All Members Of The Uptown Coalition For Tobacco Control And Health v. Philip · filed 2001-05-17

It is well established that liability under S 1983 will not attach for actions taken under color of federal law. Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163, 1164 (3d Cir. 1971). In light of the fact that Black Smokers have not alleged that defendants are state, rather than federal actors, the District Court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss as to Black Smokers' S 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a police officer’s pursuit of a personal defamation suit does not meet that requirement merely because state law permits the suit.

Gritchen v. Collier · filed 2001-06-13

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege a violation of his constitutional rights and show that the defendant’s actions were taken under color of state law. ... Pursuing private litigation does not abuse Collier’s position or authority as a police officer, and Gritchen does not argue otherwise. ... We conclude that Collier’s actions were not taken under color of state law.

Section 1983 generally does not reach private parties acting without color of state law, and conclusory allegations unsupported by fact do not state a claim.

Hoskins v. Federal Communications Commission · filed 2001-06-21

The district court properly dismissed Hoskins’ section 1983 claims against the remaining defendants because private parties are not generally acting under color of state law, and conclusory allegations, unsupported by fact, are insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; government funding and contract requirements do not make a private school a state actor when they do not influence the challenged conduct.

Robert S. v. Stetson School · filed 2001-07-03

For example, it is clear that Stetson's receipt of government funds did not make it a state actor. Similarly, although Robert relies on the detailed requirements set out in DOS's contracts with Stetson, those requirements are also insufficient because they did not "compel or even influence" the conduct on the part of the Stetson staff that Robert challenged.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an off-duty deputy performing only private store security duties is not a state actor.

Chapman v. Higbee Co. · filed 2001-07-05

Moreover, as explained above, the security guard in this case did not perform or seek to perform his official duties as a sheriffs deputy; instead, he acted pursuant to his duties as a private security guard. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment in favor of Dillard and dismissing the § 1983 claim is affirmed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant acted under color of state law.

McNally v. Colorado State Public Defender · filed 2001-07-11

McNally’s remaining claims fail because he has failed to establish state action by Defendants, as is required to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a federal Social Security Commissioner’s denial of benefits does not satisfy that requirement without evidence of state action.

Goodale v. Halter · filed 2001-07-17

We agree with the District Court that Section 1983 does not give Ms. Goodale a claim. There is nothing to show that the Commissioner acted under color of state law in denying her claim for benefits.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private party to allege circumstances showing that the party acted under color of state law.

Hinote v. Keith · filed 2001-07-25

A private party (such as Chevron) acts under color of state law only in certain circumstances. ... Hinote’s pleadings do not allege why Chevron should be considered “a person acting under color of state law,” and his appellate brief does not respond to the district court’s conclusion that Chevron was not “acting under color of state law.”

Section 1983 treats a city’s enforcement of a state law as action under color of state law.

Caudell v. City of Toccoa · filed 2001-07-26

These violations stem from defendant’s enforcement of Act No. 163, thus defendant may fairly be characterized as “acting under color” of state law.

Section 1983's color-of-state-law requirement covers officers acting on departmental orders even when disguised as inmates.

Humes v. Gilless · filed 2001-07-30

As to § 1983, the government cannot shield itself from the statute's prohibitions by posing as non-state actors. ... Scott and Ervin, though appearing to be inmates, were in fact acting pursuant to the Department's orders, and therefore acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law; a fellow inmate’s independent misconduct does not satisfy that requirement.

Goodell v. Anthony · filed 2001-07-31

Because plaintiff has failed to show or allege that defendant Anthony was acting under the color of state law at the time he engaged in planting the weapon in the cell, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private parties with no delegated state authority do not meet that requirement.

Fletcher v. United Parcel Service, Local Union 705 · filed 2001-08-14

Here, the statute is clearly inapplicable as none of the defendants or their agents are state actors nor is there any allegation that the state delegated any authority to the defendants or their agents.

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of state law.

Hall v. Creech · filed 2001-08-15

A cognizable § 1983 claim was not raised with regard to the remaining defendants, as they were not acting under color of state law.

Adopting and approving a state bar ethics opinion constitutes action under color of state law for § 1983.

Farrin v. Thigpen · filed 2001-08-16

In adopting and approving 2000 FEO 6, Defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law when depriving the plaintiff of a protected civil right.

Porter v. Wavetech Geophysical, Inc. · filed 2001-08-21

Appellant alleged that neither Wavetech nor its employees acted under color of state law; however, an allegation that defendants acted under color of state law was required under § 1983.

A public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Sosa v. Albin · filed 2001-08-28

It is well-settled that “[a] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is not met when a law enforcement officer merely stands by during a private employer’s termination of an employee.

Staudinger v. Hoelscher, Inc. · filed 2001-08-29

The undisputed evidence is that Nuss did nothing more than “stand by” in case of a disturbance. Here, as in Hall, the question is whether a law enforcement officer’s mere presence is sufficient to establish action under color of state law. See 997 F.Supp. at 1490. The court concludes that under the facts of this case, it was not. A reasonable jury would not conclude on these facts that Nuss exercised his peacekeeping authority in a manner which constitutes state action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant’s conduct drew on authority conferred by state law; a tribe’s adoption of state rules alone does not make its employees state actors.

E.F.W. v. St. Stephen's Indian High School · filed 2001-09-11

As we have stated above, the fact that the Tribes agreed to use state law as their own does not establish that the Tribes therefore derived their authority to act from state law. The Tribes merely exercised their sovereignty in deciding what law would govern their actions.

Section 1983 does not treat a private evaluator as acting under color of state law merely because a public university relies on the evaluation.

Siskaninetz v. Wright State University · filed 2001-09-12

Having reviewed the evidence and pertinent case law, the Court concludes that any reliance by Wright State University and/or Stevenson on Van Dyne’s evaluation of Siskaninetz did not transform that evaluation into state action for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a complaint to use the words “color of state law” when the alleged conduct shows that defendants acted as prison officials.

Navedo v. Maloney · filed 2001-09-28

In the present ease, there is no real dispute that the defendants were, in fact, acting under color of state law in their capacities as prison officials; Navedo’s failure to use the term “color of state law” in the initial complaint is not dispositive of the issue.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and excludes private conduct from liability.

Matthews v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n · filed 2001-10-23

Plaintiffs due process claim, therefore, fails as a matter of law because the NCAA has not acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Schultz v. Alticor/Amway Corp. · filed 2001-11-01

Nowhere in the Complaint does Schultz make any allegation regarding how these individuals may ... have acted under color of state law or were in any way liable under this section. The claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; reporting for a local newspaper does not satisfy that requirement.

Davis v. Janczewski · filed 2001-11-07

Davis failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because defendant Janczewski cannot be said to have been acting under color of state law in reporting for a local newspaper.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for damages against a private individual who did not act under color of state law.

Crawford v. Frasier · filed 2001-11-15

To the extent plaintiff seeks damages from Frasier as a private individual and not a person acting under color of state law, no claim for relief can be stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a jury to decide whether an off-duty officer acted under color of state law when evidence suggests he responded pursuant to police department duties.

McCloughan v. City of Springfield · filed 2001-11-20

A reasonable jury could conclude that Patterson responded based upon a duty imposed upon him by Springfield police department regulations, and thus, he did so under color of state law.

Private parties do not act under color of state law merely because deputies use their assistance in executing a replevin writ.

Buzzanco v. Lord Corp. · filed 2001-11-27

We do not find that the conduct of these private actors is fairly attributable to the state merely because the deputies utilized their assistance in carrying out their orders.

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of state law.

Murphy v. Devenish · filed 2001-11-29

The district court ruled that the state defendants enjoyed qualified immunity and that the remaining defendants did not act under color of state law. Murphy appeals. The parties are familiar with the facts, so we need not repeat them here. We affirm the judgment of the district court for substantially the reasons stated by the court in its order dated March 21, 2001.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law when performing the challenged act.

Lewis v. Massanelli · filed 2001-12-03

Upon de novo review, we agree with the ... district court that Lewis did not show that defendant was acting under color of state law when he made his report to the police.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a guardian ad litem for conduct outside the custody proceeding when she was not acting under color of state law.

Bolin v. Chavez · filed 2001-12-12

Nonetheless, regardless of the immunity issue, Ross’s alleged conduct in interfering with the grievance proceeding is not actionable under § 1983 because she was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right under color of state law; a municipality and its law-enforcement employees can satisfy the color-of-law element.

Giordano v. City of New York, Howard Safir, Police Commissioner, New York City Police Department, Medical Board, P · filed 2001-12-21

To state a cause of action under § 1983, Giordano must allege (1) that the defendants deprived him of a right “secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States”; and (2) that they did so “under color of state law.” ... The defendants, a municipal and employees of its law-enforcement agency, were plainly acting “under color of state law” in their dealings with Giordano.

Section 1983 does not treat a court-appointed defense attorney performing traditional counsel functions as acting under color of state law merely because of the appointment.

Laurence v. Sollitto · filed 2002-01-09

Accordingly, in performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to an indigent accused, a court-appointed attorney is not acting under color of state law. The defendant, therefore, does not come within the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 merely because he was plaintiffs court-appointed counsel.

Section 1983 covers conduct under color of state law even when that conduct violates state law.

Hawkins v. Wayne Tp. Bd. of Marion County, In · filed 2002-01-09

The election was plainly conducted under color of state law even if state law was not followed in one important respect.

An officer who reports a personal matter to police does not act under color of state law unless he improperly exercises official authority.

Sanchez v. Crump · filed 2002-01-29

I find that Crump did not improperly exercise his official authority in this personal matter to an extent that would warrant a finding that he acted under color of law.

Town officials’ termination of a municipal employee satisfies § 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement.

Learnard v. Inhabitants of Town of Van Buren · filed 2002-01-29

There is no dispute that Defendants acted under color of state law when they terminated Plaintiffs employment. Therefore, Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong of his section 1983 claim.

A public defender performing traditional defense duties does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada Morgan Harris Thomas Rigsby · filed 2002-02-08

We hold that Rigsby, in defending Miranda, performed the traditional functions of a defense attorney and, thus, did not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits personal-capacity suits against government employees acting under color of state law.

Little v. Terhune · filed 2002-02-11

There is no question that defendants are, in their personal capacities, amenable to suit under section 1983 because they were conducting themselves as employees of a government agency, the New Jersey Bureau of Prisons, when they allegedly denied educational programs to inmates confined in the administrative segregation unit of NJSP and thus were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat an officer’s conduct as state action merely because state employment related to or motivated it.

Rossignol v. Voorhaar · filed 2002-02-21

The fact that Defendants’ conduct was related to or motivated by their state employment does not transform that conduct into state action under the standards set forth above.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; Cotton’s criminal defense attorney did not.

Cotton v. Stanger · filed 2002-02-21

The district court correctly dismissed Cotton’s action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, because his attorney did not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 claims against private entities require that they acted under color of state law.

Riggio v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n · filed 2002-03-13

To maintain a section 1983 claim against private entities, a plaintiff must show that they acted under color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement can cover an off-duty police officer who remains subject to duty under department rules.

Estate of Thurman v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2002-03-29

Moreover, the evidence indicates that, although off duty, Miller meets the “under color” requirement. He was acting pursuant to a Milwaukee Police Department rule providing that officers are “always subject to duty” even when they are “technically ‘off-duty.’”

A private person does not act under color of state law merely by swearing to an affidavit in an accusatory instrument.

Kash v. Honey · filed 2002-04-11

Purcell also did not act jointly with a state actor merely by swearing to an affidavit in an accusatory instrument. Private misuse of an otherwise valid state statute is not state action.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is met when a state agency deprives people of civil rights pursuant to a state constitution.

Falwell v. Miller · filed 2002-04-15

Therefore, since the SCC is depriving the Plaintiffs’ civil rights pursuant to the Constitution of the Virginia, it is doing so “under color of’ State law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a privately retained attorney does not qualify unless acting in concert with state actors.

Gidron v. Calle · filed 2002-05-28

Here, Gidron has failed to state a cognizable § 1983 claim because he has not alleged, nor does it appear to be the case, that his privately retained attorney was a state actor or was acting in concert with other state actors.

Section 1983 requires a state officer to use or misuse state authority to act under color of state law; possessing that authority alone is insufficient.

Townsend v. Moya · filed 2002-06-05

Moreover, that Hill had direct authority over Townsend does not imply that he exercised that authority during the altercation. The inquiry is not whether authority is possessed, but whether it is used or misused. Here, it was neither used nor misused, and therefore Hill did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Daniels v. Charter One Bank · filed 2002-06-21

In order to assert a § 1983 civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege and prove that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; an unsupported assertion that a private hospital receives public funding does not establish state action.

Jane v. Bowman Gray School of Medicine-North Carolina Baptist Hospital · filed 2002-07-02

Given that the Plaintiff in this case has not provided any evidence even to support his contention that the hospital receives public funding, he has fallen far short of the showing required to establish state action when a private hospital is the Defendant. Therefore, all of Dr. Jane’s § 1983 claims, which require a defendant to act under color of state law, must fail.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is adequately pleaded by alleging that a sheriff acted in his official capacity.

Duvall v. Lawrence · filed 2002-07-16

Reviewing his allegations, we find that Plaintiff adequately alleges that Tawney was acting under color of state law in his office as sheriff of Monroe County.

Section 1983 does not reach a private school’s student discipline when the school is not a state actor.

Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine Central Institute · filed 2002-07-18

Thus, MCI does not fit within the two state-action exceptions invoked by plaintiff on appeal, nor other arguable exceptions that were discussed by the district court but are no longer relied upon by plaintiff.

Section 1983 requires a nexus between a defendant’s governmental role and the alleged violation for the conduct to be under color of state law.

S.J. v. Kansas City Missouri Public School District · filed 2002-07-25

But absent some nexus between Mr. Robertson's governmental role, if any, and his violation of S.J.'s rights, her claim against the school district under § 1983 must fail. Since she fails to establish a violation "under color of law," as required by § 1983, her claims against the individual defendants also must fail.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations committed under color of state law; claims against a federal probation officer acting under federal authority proceed under Bivens.

Briand v. Lavigne · filed 2002-08-14

In the title of his complaint Briand expressly frames his action as one seeking remedies under Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lavigne is a United States Probation Officer and thus, to the extent he was acting-under the authority of his position he was acting under color of federal law. With respect to alleged constitutional violations this is properly characterized as a Bivens action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Liu v. Runyan · filed 2002-08-26

Because Liu did not allege that Runyan was a state actor, she had no § 1983 claim against him.

Receiving federal aid alone does not make a private person a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Miller v. Conway · filed 2002-09-03

As to Miller’s related argument, he is incorrect to the extent he asserts that simply because Haycock (allegedly) receives some sort of federal aid, he is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a court to determine whether a defendant acted under color of state law; the parties cannot establish that legal requirement by stipulation.

Neuens v. City of Columbus, Officer Isaac Bridges · filed 2002-09-12

For the reasons stated below, we find that the district court erred when it accepted Bridges’ stipulation that he was acting under color of law and considered only the second prong of § 1983 analysis.

Section 1983 does not reach a fellow inmate’s private assault when the inmate did not act in conjunction with a state employee.

Figalora v. Smith · filed 2002-10-21

Defendant Smith is a fellow inmate and plaintiff does not allege that she acted in conjunction with any state employee. Furthermore, plaintiffs description of the assault indicates that it was private conduct which is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a connection between a public employee’s official conduct and the alleged violation for the employee to act under color of state law.

Waters v. Metropolitan State University · filed 2002-10-25

In the end, there needs to be a clear intersection between the defendant’s official conduct and the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. ... When Matthews approached Waters about pursuing a sexual relationship and allegedly persuaded her to drop out of school in the spring of 1996, Matthews was not acting in his official capacity as a teacher or an advisor.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; a public official’s private threat to sue does not meet that requirement.

Colombo v. O'COnnell · filed 2002-11-04

Even if Colombo had alleged an actual chilling effect, her claim still would fail because O’Connell was not acting under color of state law when he threatened to sue her. A plaintiff fails to state a claim under Section- 1983 where the plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is met when zoning officials conduct hearings under state authority and order a landlord to serve tenants with notices to quit.

Ruiz v. New Garden Township · filed 2002-11-07

The hearings presided over by the defendants took place under the authority of state law. The defendants also acted under color of state law when they ordered DiUbaldo to serve the plaintiffs with Notices to Quit-.

A private utility does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 merely by obeying a police order, absent evidence that it acted in concert or conspired with police.

Citoli v. City of Seattle · filed 2002-11-25

Puget Sound Energy merely followed the police order to terminate gas services. There is no evidence that it acted in concert or as part of a conspiracy with the police.

Section 1983’s public function test does not treat involuntary commitment by private individuals as state action because the function is not traditionally and exclusively the state’s prerogative.

Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Department of Social Services · filed 2002-11-26

Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court has mandated that the function be one “exclusively” and “traditionally” the prerogative of the state, it must be held that involuntarily commitment by private individuals is not a public function. Thus, as a matter of law, the private defendants were not performing a public function when they acted to involuntarily confine plaintiff.

A private attorney representing a public school board is not acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Raines v. Indianapolis Public Schools · filed 2002-11-26

But, as a private attorney, Tarter was not acting “under color of state law” for the purposes of a section 1983 suit when he represented the Board.

Section 1983 does not apply to conduct by federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Myles v. United States · filed 2002-11-27

Because Mr. Myles is challenging conduct by federal officials taken under color of federal law, section 1983 is inapplicable.

Section 1983 does not cover claims against legal counsel who did not act under color of state law.

Delaney v. Souther-Wyatt · filed 2002-11-27

DeLaney’s claims against legal counsel are not cognizable under section 1983, because they do not involve parties acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law to state a cognizable civil rights claim.

Perkins v. Null · filed 2002-12-10

First, plaintiff did not allege that either defendant acted under color of state law as required to state a civil rights claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

Gayman v. Principal Financial Services, Inc., Principal Financial Group, Inc., and Principal Life Insurance Co · filed 2002-12-17

But a claim under § 1983 is tenable only if the defendants acted under color of state law — in other words, if they are state actors.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by someone acting under color of state law; an official performing county duties under state authority meets the color-of-law requirement.

Shooting Point, L.L.C. v. Cumming · filed 2002-12-20

To state a cause of action under section 1983, plaintiffs must show that (1) Cumming acted under color of state law; and (2) his actions deprived plaintiffs of rights created by the Constitution or federal law. Because Cumming was performing duties for the county under authority of state law, the issue remaining in this case is whether the complaint adequately alleges deprivations of constitutional rights.

Police officers acting in their official capacities act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Sietins v. Joseph · filed 2003-01-06

In the instant case, there is no question that the Police Defendants were acting in their official capacities, i.e. were acting under color of state law at all relevant times.

Section 1983 does not cover federal employees acting under color of federal law rather than state law.

Bryan v. Murphy · filed 2003-01-13

To begin with, the court notes that Bryan mistakenly designates the action in his complaint as an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because all of the named defendants are federal employees, they are acting under color of federal law, not state law.

Section 1983 treats a political party as acting under color of state law when the state delegates authority over primary elections to it.

Campbell v. Bysiewicz · filed 2003-01-29

However, a private entity such as a political party becomes a state actor if it is endowed with powers under state law as it then acts “under color of state law” for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... This principle would apply to the Parties, as here the state has delegated to them “the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections,” being a state function; furthermore, they conduct primary elections “under state statutory authority.”

Section 1983’s state action requirement is satisfied when city defendants act under color of state law.

Brancato v. City of New York · filed 2003-02-05

There is no doubt that the allegations set forth by Brancato satisfy the state action element of a § 1983 claim; all the Defendants clearly acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires an officer to act under color of state law; the court assesses the totality of the circumstances, including the officer’s objective, visible conduct, to determine whether that requirement is met.

Neuens v. City of Columbus · filed 2003-02-11

Rather, the Court must examine the totality of the circumstances, and evaluate whether the officer was acting under color of state law based on his objective, visible conduct.

Off-duty police officers who engage in a private bar fight without exercising police authority do not act under color of state law for Section 1983.

Lyons v. Adams · filed 2003-02-18

As discussed above, Lyons cannot assert a constitutional claim for the beating itself because Adams, Blevins, Slechter, and Dorsch did not act under color of state law.

A § 1983 claim for a First Amendment violation must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Davis v. Studdert · filed 2003-02-25

Although the complaint also alleges that the church defendants violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, it does not allege that these defendants acted under color of law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a defendant whose authority to hold federal prisoners comes solely from federal law.

Sarro v. Cornell Corrections, Inc. · filed 2003-02-27

The authority to maintain custody of federal prisoners is one created by federal law and reserved solely to the federal government. Therefore, Sarro’s § 1983 claims are not viable against any of the defendants.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied by the condemnations and citations issued by borough officials in this case.

Grimm v. Sweeney · filed 2003-03-07

It is clear in this case that the condemnations and citations that form the basis of the plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims were issued under color of state law.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement is met when a state-entwined educational service center and its officers discharge an employee.

Jenkins v. Area Cooperative Education Services · filed 2003-03-10

Accordingly, for the same reasons articulated in St. Ledger, the Court finds that, as a matter of law, the defendants engaged in state action when they discharged Jenkins. Correspondingly, the Court concludes that Jenkins’ termination was carried out “under color of state law.”

Section 1983's color-of-law requirement can cover off-duty officers who suppress criticism of their official conduct, even after removing their badges.

Rossignol v. Voorhaar · filed 2003-03-12

The fact that these law enforcement officers acted after hours and after they had taken off their badges cannot immunize their efforts to shield themselves from adverse comment and to stifle public scrutiny of their performance.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law.

Morgan v. United States · filed 2003-03-18

Consequently, Morgan’s Complaint failed to state a cause of action under section 1983, which requires action under the color of state law.

Section 1983 claims against private defendants require allegations that they acted under color of state law, including through a nexus with a state actor.

Grigsby v. Kane · filed 2003-03-19

Count II of the complaint alleges Section 1983 violations. The complaint does not, however, allege that these defendants acted under the color of state law either by being employed by the Commonwealth, or through any nexus between them and any named state actor. Therefore, the court will dismiss this count.

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Gaines v. White River Environmental Partnership · filed 2003-04-04

First, Gaines submitted no evidence (and has not even argued) that White River acted under color of state law for purposes of his § 1983 claim.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is sufficiently pleaded against a state jail authority housing federal detainees when the alleged harm stems from the authority’s control over its guards and policies.

Jarno v. Lewis · filed 2003-04-11

For these reasons, we find that Jarno’s complaint is sufficiently pled with regard to the state action component of its § 1983 claim against the Authority.

Section 1983 does not cover claims against state officers acting in a federal capacity during a federal forfeiture.

North Carolina Ex Rel. Haywood v. Barrington · filed 2003-04-11

As such, Haywood’s claim cannot stand as a § 1983 claim against persons acting under color of state law, but rather must be viewed as a Bivens claim against persons acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 applies to conduct under color of state or territorial law, not federal law.

Ranger v. Tenet · filed 2003-04-16

Second, § 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of state or territorial—not federal—law.

Section 1983 permits suit only against persons acting under color of state law, so federal defendants cannot be sued under it for federal action.

Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. United States · filed 2003-04-22

Plaintiffs cannot sue the federal defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because § 1983 actions can be maintained only against persons who take action under color of state law to violate the constitutional rights of others.

Section 1983 requires defendants to act under color of state law; federal appellate court deputy clerks do not meet that requirement.

Richardson v. Armato · filed 2003-04-22

Although the defendants were not acting under color of state law as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994), Richardson’s claims against them might be liberally construed as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; federal officers performing federal duties do not meet that requirement without state authority or concerted action with state officials.

Case, Derek v. Milewski, Michael · filed 2003-04-25

Case’s allegations, however, fail to meet either of the § 1983 tests for “under color of state law.” Nowhere in the complaint does Case allege that the State of Illinois cloaked the federal officers in any degree of state authority.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; federal officers acting solely under federal authority do not satisfy that requirement.

Case v. Michael Milewski, Michael Hoyle, and John Knowlton · filed 2003-04-25

To state a claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the activity deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Hobleman v. Kentucky Fried Chicken · filed 2003-05-08

Construing the plaintiffs “fourth cause of action” as a section 1983 claim, it fails for lack of the requisite allegation that the defendants were acting under col- or of state law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional right by an entity acting under color of state law.

Mease v. City of Shawnee · filed 2003-05-22

There is no dispute that the City was acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the alleged violation to be committed by a state actor under color of state law.

Gazarkiewicz v. Town of Kingsford Heights · filed 2003-05-27

In order to sus...tain a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that the alleged violations were committed by a state actor, or, as stated in the statute, under “color of state law.”

A private hospital’s county contract to provide involuntary commitment services, together with close county oversight, can support a finding that it acted under color of state law for § 1983.

Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne · filed 2003-05-30

Indeed, the evidence of record supports a finding that Holy Spirit was acting under color of state law. Holy Spirit’s motion for summary judgment will be denied on this ground.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

Cabrera v. Horgas · filed 1999-12-10

The magistrate judge analyzed the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint and determined that defendants did not act “under color of state law” as required by § 1983 and Polk County v. Dodson , 454 U.S. 312 (1981), ... We affirm the order of the district court dismissing the complaints for substantially the reasons given by the magistrate judge and adopted by the district court.

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant acted under color of state law; without it, the claim cannot survive summary judgment.

Boren v. Griffith · filed 2003-06-05

In their motion for summary judgment, appellees specifically stated the elements for which they asserted there was no evidence: (1) that appellees acted under color of state law, and (2) that appellees engaged in intentional or reckless conduct that was so extreme and outrageous as to cause appellants’ emotional distress. Appellants did not produce any summary judgment evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on these claims.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; state regulation and public funding of a hospital, without more, do not establish that its physicians acted under color of state law.

Williams v. Maddi · filed 2003-06-13

Thus, the moving defendants established that they were not acting under color of state law for purposes of the cause of action alleging a violation of plaintiffs civil rights under 42 USC § 1983, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders for traditional representation because they do not act under color of state law.

Marks v. Stewart · filed 2003-06-17

Moreover, Marks’ claims against the public defender were properly dismissed because public defenders are private individuals for purposes of section 1983 and therefore do not act under color of state law.

Appointed counsel does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Kay v. Perret · filed 2003-06-24

The district court also properly concluded that the complaint lacked merit because, as appointed counsel, Perret was not acting under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a public employee to act under color of state law; conduct in a private capacity does not satisfy that requirement.

Nadig v. Nagel · filed 2003-06-27

Because I agree that, during the events in question, Nagel was not acting under color of state law, I will dismiss this count because plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law element is satisfied when defendants act within the scope of their duties as state officers.

Herrera v. Davila · filed 2003-07-17

All parties concede that the defendants were acting within the scope of their duties as state officers at all relevant times. Therefore, the first element is satisfied.

A school district official acts under color of state law for Section 1983 when the alleged misconduct is related to his official position.

Arum v. Miller · filed 2003-07-28

Accordingly, the Court finds that Miller was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; employment by a state-funded legal-services nonprofit alone does not establish it.

Young v. McKune · filed 2003-07-30

Accordingly, a showing that defendant Cavenee worked for Legal Services, Inc. is, without more, insufficient to establish that defendant Cavenee acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private community association’s fees and assessments do not meet that requirement when its conduct cannot be attributed to the state.

Kalian at Poconos, LLC. v. Saw Creek Estates Community Ass'n · filed 2003-08-05

Kalian’s § 1983 claim still fails, however, because Kalian cannot show that the Association acted under color of state law when it imposed the fees and assessments upon Kalian.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant committed a constitutional violation while acting under color of state law.

Pedro v. Sakai · filed 2003-08-18

The district court properly dismissed Pedro’s claim against Ostendorp because Pedro failed to allege that Ostendorp committed a constitutional violation while acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat an attorney’s actions as private counsel as state action merely because the attorney also serves as a municipal judge.

Cruz v. Hopper · filed 2003-08-19

Cruz has not shown any state action on Hopper’s part; that she may have been a municipal judge is irrelevant given that Cruz does not sue her in that capacity, citing her actions taken as a private attorney only.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; the head of a federal agency acting under federal law does not qualify.

Payne v. Secretary of the Treasury · filed 2003-08-20

Payne has not stated a § 1983 claim because the Secretary, as the head of a federal agency, acts under color of federal law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a mayor-elect acting before taking office acts as a private individual.

Gonzalez-Caratini v. Garcia-Padilla · filed 2003-08-27

Prior to being sworn in as mayor GARCIA-PADILLA “possessed no power by virtue of state law to misuse” Carlos v. Santos, 123 F.3d 61, 65 (2nd Cir.1997). Hence, he was acting strictly as a private individual at the time.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is satisfied when a police officer acts under color of state law.

Olivera v. Town of Woodbury, New York · filed 2003-09-02

Because Lt. Shore was acting under color of state law, as a member of the Town of Woodbury police department, when he was interviewed by McKenna and Fiorille, the so-called “state action” requirement is met — or would be met, if anything that Lt. Shore did actually violated plaintiffs rights.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement is not met when a state employee harasses a coworker without exercising state-derived authority over that coworker.

Zelinski v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2003-09-10

Weinstock did not enjoy a position of authority over Zelinski deriving from his status as a state trooper. Therefore, Zelinski cannot satisfy the state action requirement of § 1983 as to Wein-stock.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a complaining witness who does not act under color of state law.

Dillberg v. County of Kitsap · filed 2003-09-12

Ruggenberg is not liable under § 1983 because she did not act “under color of state law.” She merely served as a complaining witness, which does not convert her into a state actor.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; allegations of private conduct without facts suggesting state action do not state a claim.

DeRay v. Larson · filed 2003-09-16

Because the Constitution does not regulate private conduct, and because section 1983 explicitly reaches only action “under the color of state law,” DeRay does not state a valid constitutional claim or properly invoke section 1983.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant acted under color of state law and does not reach entirely private conduct.

Tribune-Review Publishing Co. v. Westmoreland County Housing Authority · filed 2003-10-01

The statutory language indicates that an essential element of an action hereunder is proof that the defendant acted under color of state law. It is axiomatic that there must be state action to prevail because the statute does not reach entirely private conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public employee for harassing a coworker without using state authority or position.

Ottman v. City Of Independence · filed 2003-10-01

When the alleged harassment does not involve the use of either state authority or position, courts have declined to find co-workers liable under section 1983. ... Here, the summary judgment facts clearly establish Richardson was a co-worker with no supervisory control or authority over Ottman. Because Richardson was a private actor, he is not liable pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law; a private company’s conduct qualifies only if it can fairly be attributed to the state.

Thomas v. Better Business Bureau of the Mid-South · filed 2003-10-21

Furthermore, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant deprived him of some right or privilege secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that the defendant acted under color of state law. ... Thomas’s allegations do not indicate that the Better Business Bureau engaged in conduct which could be attributed to the state. Therefore, Thomas did not allege a civil rights action against the Better Business Bureau.

Under § 1983, evidence that a town is entwined with a committee’s management or control can preclude summary judgment on whether the committee acted under color of state law.

Willis v. Town of Marshall · filed 2003-11-25

Since the current facts resemble the facts of Lebrón more closely than the facts of any other case, the Lebrón entanglement logic applies, and the Court cannot, at this point, rule that the Committee’s decision was not state action under color of law.

Section 1983 permits a sexual harassment claim against a state employee who supervised the plaintiff or exercised state authority over her.

Maestas v. State of Colorado · filed 2003-11-26

In contrast, Ms. Maestas may recover in her § 1983 claim if Mr. Lujan either (1) was her supervisor or (2) exercised state authority over her.

Section 1983 claims against a privately retained attorney must be dismissed when the attorney was not acting under color of state law.

D'Amato v. Rattoballi · filed 2003-12-08

The district court properly concluded that D’Amato’s section 1983 claims against Rattoballi should be dismissed on the ground that Rattoballi, a privately retained attorney, was not acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not cover an off-duty officer’s private altercation when the officer does not invoke governmental authority.

Hallstein v. City of Hermosa Beach · filed 2003-12-09

The altercation between Hallstein and Bohacik at the downtown gym involved no conduct “under color of State law,” and therefore does not come within § 1983. Officer Bohacik was off duty and wearing street clothes at the time and did not invoke his governmental authority.

Section 1983 treats a state university professor who misuses the authority of that position while performing teaching duties as acting under color of state law.

Hayut v. State University Of New York · filed 2003-12-18

A professor at a state university is vested with a great deal of authority over his students with respect to grades and academic advancement by virtue of that position. When a professor misuses that authority in the course of performing his duties, he necessarily acts under color of state law for purposes of a section 1983 action.

Defense counsel does not act under color of state law merely by defending a client.

Kearley v. Parrish · filed 2004-01-05

Kearley’s claim that counsel’s actions in defending him were done under color of state law, thereby making counsel liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for ineffective assistance, is without merit.

Under § 1983, a defendant may act under color of state law by purporting to exercise state authority, even if a private person could have taken the same action.

Dean v. Byerley · filed 2004-01-08

Thus, the fact that Byerley could have made a private report on Dean’s character or privately sought a trespass action is not controlling, and it was inappropriate for the district court to grant summary judgment on that basis. Rather the controlling issue is whether-Byerley possessed state authority and whether Byerley purported to act under that authority.

Section 1983 does not treat a private actor’s mere compliance with state law as action under color of state law.

Diefenderfer v. Office of Recovery · filed 1999-07-01

... Johnson were required by law to garnish Diefenderfer’s wages; private actors who merely comply with state law are not thereby acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 makes a person liable for depriving someone of federal rights under color of state or territorial law.

Wheeldin v. Wheeler · filed 1963-06-03

By § 1983 Congress made liable in civil suits “every person” who “under color” of any state or territorial law deprives anyone of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States.

Section 1983 claims require allegations that the defendants acted under color of state law.

McDonald v. Lawhorn · filed 2004-01-29

The district court properly dismissed the claims against defendants Lawhorn, Comforti, and Yellow Cab Metro, Inc., because McDonald’s allegations did not indicate that they were acting under color of state law.

A § 1983 claim must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Martinez v. City of St. Louis · filed 2004-01-30

(3) plaintiffs' complaints do not allege that F.I.R.E. acted under color of state law or that F.I.R.E. acted in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats Baltimore City officials acting in their official capacities as acting under color of state law.

Collins v. Schoonfield · filed 1972-05-15

Baltimore City officials, acting in their official capacities, act under color of state law within the meaning of that statute.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a defendant, including a private lawyer, acted under color of state law.

Penry v. Thurston County · filed 2004-02-23

Finally, Penry failed to present evidence that Foster, Penry’s ex-wife’s counsel in their divorce proceedings, acted under color of state law.

A city council member’s use of his position to influence police can satisfy § 1983’s requirement that he act under color of state law.

Lunini v. Grayeb · filed 2004-02-27

The evidence, in particular the statements attributed to Grayeb by Lunini, when viewed in the light most favorable to Lunini, demonstrate the existence of a genuine factual issue as to whether Grayeb was acting under color of state law in trying to influence the police not to arrest him.

Section 1983 cannot be invoked against private universities acting under color of no state law.

Cannon v. University of Chicago · filed 1976-08-27

Accordingly, neither Lau nor any other decision relying thereon for the proposition that an implied private right of action lies directly under Title VI is of help to the plaintiff at bar, who is unable to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because she is suing private universities acting under color of no state law.

Section 1983 treats county legislators’ actions taken by virtue of their official positions as actions under color of state law.

Pfeiffer v. Lewis County · filed 2004-03-17

Here, Doney and Hurlburt’s actions were taken by virtue of their positions with the County legislature. As such, their actions were under color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when state officials act within the scope of their duties.

Rivera v. Fagundo · filed 2004-03-18

It is beyond peradventure that both FA-GUNDO and MUJICA were acting within the scope of their duties as state officials during the process leading to this suit.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement excludes merely private conduct, however wrongful.

Mottl v. Missouri Lawyer Trust Account Foundation · filed 2004-03-23

Like the “state action” requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the “under color of state law” element of a § 1983 action excludes merely private conduct no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private actors may be liable when acting in concert with state officials.

Thomas v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. · filed 2004-03-24

Neither defendant in this case is a state actor. Although private actors acting in concert with state officials may be subject to § 1983 liability, Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980), Thomas did not allege that either Glaxo or the FDA acted in concert with a state agent. Thus, neither Glaxo nor the FDA is subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation under color of state law; a state university’s delegation of athletics rulemaking can satisfy that requirement.

Fluitt v. University of Nebraska · filed 1980-03-28

The basis for civil rights actions under §§ 1983 and 1343 is a deprivation under color of state law or regulation. University of Nebraska Athletic Director Robert Devaney testified that the University of Nebraska was a state institution. It has, in essence, delegated most of its rule-making authority in the area of athletics to the Big Eight Conference which is made up of eight state supported schools, and the NCAA, whose rules are incorporated into the Big Eight Conference.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a private defendant’s conduct is fairly attributable to someone acting under color of state law.

Chladek v. Verizon N.Y. Inc. · filed 2004-04-12

With regard to Verizon, the Amended Complaint fails to allege action that can be fairly attributed to a person acting under color of state law as required by § 1983; thus, this claim fails as well.

State officials act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983 when they fill a judicial vacancy through gubernatorial appointment.

Duncan v. Poythress · filed 1981-09-28

There is no doubt that the Georgia officials were acting under color of state law in filling the judicial vacancy created by Justice Bowles’s resignation through gubernatorial appointment rather than through a special election.