42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not treat an off-duty police union demonstration as state action merely because officers wore uniforms and carried service weapons and radios.

Machos v. City of Manchester · filed 1997-05-09

Kelley and the other Union members neither acted under color of state law nor did they abuse official power granted to them by the government. That Union members were dressed in uniform, carried service weapons, and carried two-way police radios, is insufficient, under the facts presented in this case, to transform otherwise private Union activity into state action.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an official without state-conferred legal control over the challenged decision is not liable for influencing it.

Guerrero v. Refugio County · filed 1997-05-15

Even if Judge Stone’s letter was interpreted as politically motivated, without state-conferred legal control, Judge Stone could not be liable under § 1983. Thus, Guerrero has failed to establish an element of his cause of action, namely that the judge was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a sexual harassment claim against a state official who exercised state-derived authority over the plaintiff during the harassment.

Whitney v. State of New Mexico · filed 1997-05-19

Applying the standards set out in West, as elucidated by the Ninth Circuit in Vang Dang, this court resolves that Whitney’s allegations of sexual harassment by Patrick are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Read liberally, Whitney’s complaint alleges that Patrick harassed her at a time that Patrick had some state-derived authority over her ability to get a license.

Section 1983 permits a sexual harassment claim against a state official when the official uses state authority over the plaintiff to commit the alleged harassment.

Whitney v. State of New Mexico Charles Patrick, Employee of the State of New Mexico John/jane Doe, Unknown Employ · filed 1997-05-19

Read liberally, Whitney’s complaint alleges that Patrick harassed her at a time that Patrick had some state-derived authority over her ability to get a license. ... Whitney’s allegations of sexual harassment by Patrick are sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private political party committee’s removal of members does not qualify without state involvement in that decision.

Johnson v. Knowles · filed 1997-05-21

The Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing that the Defendants acted under color of state law. Thus, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing the Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not reach a political party committee’s removal of members when the state is not tied to the challenged decision.

Johnson v. Knowles · filed 1997-05-21

Although the Committee conceivably could act under color of state law for some purposes, there is nothing tying the State of California to the particular decision that the Plaintiffs challenge, namely, the Committee's decision to oust Johnson and Wadsworth from the Committee on the basis of their sexual orientation.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a defendant acted under color of state law; without it, summary judgment for that defendant is proper.

Eisenbise v. Kathleen Walters Robert Herzog Shumaker, Mr. Wanda Eisenbise · filed 1997-05-21

To the extent that Eisenbise contends that the district court erred by granting summary judgment for defendant Wanda Eisenbise, this contention lacks merit because Eisenbise produced no evidence that she acted under "color of state law."

A state parole officer acts under color of state law for § 1983 when making a traffic arrest using his peace-officer authority, even if off duty.

Oliver v. Cuttler · filed 1997-05-24

Whether the defendant was off-duty as plaintiff contends or on duty as maintained by the defendant, the defendant was acting “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires facts supporting a reasonable belief that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of law; an unsubstantiated warning purportedly relayed by a police officer is insufficient.

Finnucane v. Dandio, No. Cv 0366182 (May 28, 1997) · filed 1997-05-28

The claim that his right to assemble and to speak freely were abridged because of the message given to the plaintiff by his wife, purportedly from a Branford police officer, is void of any facts that would support a reasonable belief that an officer was acting under color of law.

Section 1983 requires a police officer’s alleged misconduct to relate to official duties or real or apparent state authority to count as action under color of state law.

Segreto v. Kirschner · filed 1997-05-30

That being said, however, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that defendants’ actions had anything to do with the nature of their jobs as police officers or were related in any way to the real or apparent authority of the police department. Accordingly, summary judgment properly was granted on plaintiffs § 1983 claim that these defendants violated his constitutional rights.

Court-appointed attorneys who do not act under color of state law are not amenable to suit under § 1983.

Copley v. Ellis · filed 1997-06-11

Copley's court- appointed attorneys are not amenable to suit under§ 1983 as they did not act under color of state law.

Federal officials do not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely by administering a federal-state program that state officials must follow; concerted action with state officials is required.

Strickland v. Shalala · filed 1997-07-09

Therefore, the Secretary and state officials were actually antagonists, rather than co-conspirators engaged in a “symbiotic venture” to deprive the appellees of their rights under the Constitution or federal law. Without proof of such a conspiracy, the federal officials cannot be found to have acted “under color of state law.”

A federal official does not act under color of state law for § 1983 by promulgating and enforcing regulations in a cooperative federal program when state officials merely comply and do not conspire with the federal official.

Strickland v. Shalala · filed 1997-07-09

Accordingly, because the Secretary was not acting under "color of state law" when she promulgated and enforced federal regulations forcing the state to collect overpayments from the plaintiffs, we REVERSE the district court's award of attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).

Section 1983 permits a color-of-state-law claim against an on-duty, uniformed police officer when alleged sexual assault is entwined with abuse of police authority, including use of a police cruiser and threats of tickets.

Haberthur v. City of Raymore · filed 1997-07-11

Haberthur has alleged sufficient facts to raise a colorable claim that Untrif's actions were entwined with an abuse of his police authority. Haberthur's complaint asserts that Untrif used the City's police cruiser to follow her home and that he threatened her with tickets on two occasions. On these occasions and when he sexually assaulted her, Untrif was on duty in uniform.

Section 1983 treats a private store that hires a police officer to deter theft as acting under color of state law in its relevant actions when the employment relationship sufficiently involves the state.

Groom v. Safeway, Inc. · filed 1997-07-18

Thus, the employment relationship gives the private entity and the state agent an overlapping identity and interest and sufficiently involves the state in the relevant actions of the private entity to bring those actions under color of state law.

Municipal officials and officers acting under color of state law satisfy the state-action component of a § 1983 claim.

Brunelle v. Town of South Kingstown · filed 1997-07-31

We find in the record before us clear showing of the “who” subject of inquiry, namely, municipal officials and officers acting under color of state law, but it is more difficult to identify from that record the “what” federal right, privilege, or immunity secured to Brunelle that the trial justice determined he had been deprived of by any of the defendants.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a claim against private repossession agents fails when they did not do so.

Kiefer v. Harris · filed 1997-08-21

Although we liberally construe claims brought by pro se litigants, Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993), it is clear that Harris and ALSC did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983’s color of state law requirement is sufficiently pleaded when an official uses power derived from office to commit the alleged misconduct and the plaintiff encountered the official because of that authority.

Jones v. Clinton · filed 1997-08-22

Although, as previously noted, it remains to be seen whether plaintiff will be able to sustain these allegations, she has sufficiently alleged that the President exercised power possessed by virtue of his being Governor of the State of Arkansas in committing the alleged acts and that she only came into contact with him due to his authority as Governor. Plaintiffs allegations thus satisfy § 1983’s color of law requirement.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that defendants acted under color of state law, and a claim may be dismissed without leave to amend when the plaintiff’s concessions foreclose that showing.

Earnest A. Darden v. Alameda County Network of Mental Health Clients Sally Zinman Lisa Connor Nancy Thomas Jim McClure P · filed 1997-08-29

Because Darden's concessions established that there were not sufficient facts to establish that defendants were acting under color of state law, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Darden's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim without leave to amend.

Section 1983 does not subject private partnerships and their officers to suit when they did not act under color of State law.

Hudson View II Associates v. Miller · filed 1997-09-18

They cannot be alleged to have acted under color of State law and are therefore not subject to a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not treat coworker harassment as action under color of state law when the coworkers lack supervisory authority over the plaintiff.

Saunders v. Hunter · filed 1997-10-02

Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, neither Sutton or Cox had the authority to create a hostile work environment and therefore the plaintiff is unable to show Sutton and Cox were acting under “color of law.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private doctor or hospital only when the challenged conduct has a sufficiently close nexus to the state.

Jackson v. East Bay Hospital · filed 1997-10-06

Although it may be possible to bring a section 1983 claim against a private doctor acting in a private hospital, the claim must satisfy the factors listed above. After careful examination pf the complaint, the court finds that plaintiff’s factual allegations do not support a section 1983 claim against Steele. Plaintiff’s allegations do not create a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the doctor or the hospital.

De facto authority based on control over services a plaintiff needs can satisfy § 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement even without supervisory authority.

Lopez v. SAN LUIS VALLEY, BOCES · filed 1997-10-17

If defendants had the power to withhold needed services from the La Jara Elementary School, they had some authority over plaintiff because they controlled services plaintiff required for her school. ... Accordingly, I find that genuine issues of fact exist whether defendants acted "under color of state law," and I will deny defendants' motion on this ground.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement can be met by de facto authority over a plaintiff arising from control of services the plaintiff needs.

Lopez v. San Luis Valley, Board of Cooperative Educational Services · filed 1997-10-17

Defendants’ alleged harassment and discrimination against plaintiff would not have been possible but for their state-law-based authority to provide special services to Colorado schools. Accordingly, I find that genuine issues of fact exist whether defendants acted “under color of state law,” and I will deny defendants’ motion on this ground.

Section 1983 does not treat a supplier as a state actor merely because it contracted with a state agency to supply a chemical.

Narron v. Vance · filed 1997-10-24

The fact that 3-M had a contract with TDCJ to supply a chemical does not make 3-M a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a nexus between a police officer’s official position and the challenged conduct for the officer to have acted under color of state law.

Roe v. Humke · filed 1997-10-30

We conclude that Humke was not acting under color of law because there was no nexus between his position as a police officer and his abuse of Doe on the day in question.

Section 1983’s state-action element is sufficiently alleged at frivolousness screening when a correctional counselor’s official position enabled her alleged sexual harassment of an inmate.

Walker v. Taylorville Correctional Center · filed 1997-11-05

Thus, Walker’s allegations were sufficient for purposes of § 1915(d) to satisfy the state action element of the § 1983 claim he was attempting to bring against Dinning in her individual capacity.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is met when a state motor vehicle official uses state authority to suspend driver’s licenses.

Aurelio v. Rhode Island Department of Administration · filed 1997-11-13

Defendants were obviously acting under color of state law. ... The State controls the issuance and revocation of automobile and commercial licenses through the DMV and the power exercised by Harrington in ordering the suspension of those licenses was only made possible because of his position as a state official.

Section 1983 does not treat a private ambulance service as a state actor merely because it is state regulated, uses a publicly owned ambulance, and participates in a public 911 system.

Chumbley v. Gashinski · filed 1997-11-19

Although LIFEFLEET was licensed and regulated by the State, the ambulance in question was owned by a local taxing district, and local 911 service is a State service, the Court finds that these facts do not establish state action when examined under precedential decisions which bind this Court.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; an officer’s purely personal confrontation does not satisfy that requirement.

Barreto-Rivera v. Medina · filed 1997-11-25

The confrontation between Medina and Ortega was one of a purely personal nature, and therefore, no reasonable jury could find that Medina was acting under color of law when he shot Ortega. As a constitutional violation by a state official’s subordinate can only occur if the act was committed under color of law, there is no cause of action against Police Superintendent Pedro Toledo-Dávila. Plaintiffs’ claim against Medina also fails, since as an element of any § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must establish Defendant acted under color of state law.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law element is satisfied when a state attorney general’s special counsel uses his official position in the challenged conduct.

Berridge v. Heiser · filed 1997-12-04

Because Defendant Heiser acted as Special Counsel for the Attorney General when performing the alleged abuse of office, ... Plaintiffs can satisfy the first element of their abuse, of office claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for abuse during a private camping trip when the abuser’s special deputy status had no real nexus to the activity and the abuse was not under color of state law.

Wagoner v. Dyson · filed 1997-12-10

Clearly, the camp outing and molestation were in the ambit of Dyson’s personal pursuits, and his privilege of carrying a gun did not render his pursuits official business. ... Therefore, as a matter of law, the abuse was not action under color of state law.

Head Start personnel decisions do not constitute action under color of state law for § 1983 merely because the program receives extensive federal funding and is heavily regulated.

Moglia v. Sullivan County Head Start, Inc. · filed 1997-12-22

The principal, and dispositive, issue is whether Sullivan County Head Start, Inc. was acting under color of law in discharging the plaintiff. ... Accordingly, I find that the Sullivan County Head Start program is not a governmental entity for the purposes of constitutional litigation, and grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Section 1983 treats conduct of public school employees and state education officials attributable to the state as action under color of state law.

C.H. Ex Rel. Z.H. v. Oliva · filed 1997-12-30

Under the present circumstances, both the Medford and the State defendants clearly acted under the col- or of state law.

Section 1983 treats city officials terminating a police officer as acting under color of state law.

Meek v. Springfield Police Department · filed 1998-01-13

There seems to be little doubt that Defendants were acting under color of state law when terminating Meek.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law, a requirement satisfied by a city’s issuance of parking summonses.

Lai v. New York City Government · filed 1998-01-15

In order to maintain a § 1983 action, plaintiff must allege 1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person- acting under color of state law, and 2) that the conduct complained of deprived her of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... The first part of this test is obviously satisfied in this ease.

Section 1983 permits suit against a private entity acting under color of state law when it exercises state-delegated powers traditionally reserved to the state.

BROWN BY BROWN v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc. · filed 1998-01-20

In exercising such powers, defendant was a state actor subject to suit under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim requires sufficient allegations that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Moore v. Keep · filed 1998-01-20

The district court properly dismissed Moore's claims against the remaining defendants because Moore failed to sufficiently allege that these defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not cover a police officer’s private conduct when the officer neither acts nor purports to act in an official capacity.

Banisaied v. Clisham · filed 1998-01-26

Thus, defendant never acted under the color of state law because he never purported to act in an official capacity or to exercise official responsibilities.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct was connected to state authority; an officer’s off-duty conduct does not qualify without a demonstrated connection to police duties.

Carlsen v. Duron · filed 1998-01-30

We conclude from our review of the record that Mr. Carlsen has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that Officer Duron’s alleged actions related in some way to the performance of a police duty. Therefore, because Mr. Carlsen was convicted of assault and because he did not demonstrate that Officer Duron’s alleged actions were taken under color of state law, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Officers Duron and Earl on the claims related to the car wash incident.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Givhan v. Electronic Engineers, Inc. · filed 1998-02-11

Plaintiff has not shown that EE acted under color of state law, as required by § 1983.

Section 1983 treats the actions of officials at a state operated correctional facility as taken under color of state law.

Kohl v. Smythe · filed 1998-02-12

The Defendants are officials of Halawa, a state operated facility, thus the Court finds their actions to be under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal officers acting under federal law.

Gant v. United States Probation Office · filed 1998-02-13

Additionally, plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 claim against defendants who are federal officers.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Lusker v. Ohrenstein · filed 1998-02-24

Nor can plaintiffs assert a legally sufficient claim under § 1983 arising from Zelmanoffs application for public assistance, for they do not allege that Zelmanoff acted under color of state law in applying for public assistance or in making the alleged false statements in connection with that application.

Section 1983 covers actions by state officials and district boards acting under state law.

Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District · filed 1972-06-26

Here we have divisions created by a state engineer (approved) acting under state law, and these divisions have been maintained by the Board of Directors also purporting to act under state law. This action is within 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires challenged conduct to be under color of state law; the court applies the same state involvement analysis used for Fourteenth Amendment state action.

Parks v. Mr. Ford · filed 1975-07-28

Since the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment is functionally equivalent to the requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the challenged conduct be “under color of state law”, Gibbs v. Titelman, supra, 502 F.2d at 1110, our analysis of the state action issue in the prior Opinion applies with equal force to action “under color of state law”.

Section 1983 requires a link to action under color of state law.

Persons v. Runyon · filed 1998-03-06

However, plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 action under the facts alleged in the complaint because there is no link to action under the color of state law.

A school board can act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.

Alba v. Ansonia Board of Education · filed 1998-03-11

Because we find that the Board was acting under the color of state law, we address each of plaintiff’s constitutional claims in turn.

Section 1983 requires a private security guard to act under color of state law to be liable.

Terry v. Oregon Dept. of Transp. · filed 1998-03-17

The district court did not err by granting summary judgment to the Mall defendants, because Terry failed to raise a material question of fact as to whether the private security guard acted under color of state law when he arrested Terry.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Williamson v. Hartmann Luggage Co. · filed 1998-03-26

Furthermore, the Court notes that as for the plaintiffs Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff has failed to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law and, thus, has no viable claim under Section 1983.

A § 1983 complaint must show how the defendants acted under color of state law.

Bailey v. Shober · filed 1998-04-15

The magistrate judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 because it was vague, conclusory and fanciful, provided insufficient detail to support any claim of a constitutional violation, failed to show how defendants acted under color of state law, and provided no indication that he successfully challenged in state court the allegedly unconstitutional conviction and imprisonment on which some of his claims were based. ... The district court subsequently adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations and dismissed the complaint. ... Construing plaintiff’s pro se pleadings liberally, see Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991), we agree with the district court’s assessment of plaintiff’s complaint.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against federal officials acting under color of federal law because it requires action under color of state law.

Parham v. Lámar · filed 1998-04-16

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot make a Section 1983 claim against the I.R.S. officials since they do not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Cunningham v. National Broadcasting Corp. · filed 1998-04-23

Second, to the extent Cunningham is alleging a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he has not alleged that defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Whaley v. Kennedy · filed 1998-04-29

Mr. Whaley has failed to assert any conduct under color of state law by Dr. Jennings with respect to these claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private attorney to show that the attorney acted under color of state law.

Polk v. Farese · filed 1998-05-15

Also for the reasons given by the magistrate judge, private attorney Farese is entitled to summary judgment because the Polks failed to demonstrate that he acted under “color of state law.”

A state employee’s private complaint is not action under color of law for § 1983 merely because the employee is a state actor.

Cahill v. O'DONNELL · filed 1998-05-21

The mere fact that Poulin was a state actor does not transform her private complaint into action taken under the color of law for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-law requirement is not satisfied merely because a state court might later enforce a private condominium rule.

Goldberg v. 400 East Ohio Condominium Ass'n · filed 1998-06-23

We think the better view is that there is no state action inherent in the possible future state court enforcement of a private property agreement.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that private defendants acted jointly with a state official; conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not establish action under color of state law.

Fries v. Helsper · filed 1998-07-01

As the district court articulated in its opinion, mere allegations of joint action or a conspiracy do not demonstrate that the defendants acted under color of state law and are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

A police officer acts under color of state law for § 1983 when he uses his official authority to facilitate a sexual assault.

Rogers v. City of Little Rock · filed 1998-08-10

Morgan thus abused his power while carrying out the official duties entrusted to him by the state, and the district court did not err in finding that he acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide an ineffective-assistance claim against a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Van Jackson v. David Compton, 1 · filed 1998-08-21

Jackson's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because, even assuming his attorneys were public defenders (which is not at all clear from his complaint), the Supreme Court has held that "a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981).

A § 1983 claim may proceed when the complaint sufficiently alleges that the defendant harmed the plaintiff’s property while acting under color of state law.

Foremost Insurance Co. v. Public Service Commission · filed 1998-08-25

In addition, Appellant has pled facts sufficient to indicate that Respondent was acting under the color of state law at the time he allegedly harmed the property. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing Appellant’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is equivalent to the Constitution’s state-action requirement for this kind of conduct.

LaRouche, Lyndon H. v. Fowler, Donald L. · filed 1998-08-28

For the kind of conduct at issue here, the "under color of state law" standard of s 1983 and the "state action" requirement for a claim under the Constitution are synonymous.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private company does not meet that requirement merely because it is licensed to do business in the state.

Ponticelli v. Zurich American Insurance Group · filed 1998-09-03

Zurich cannot be deemed to be acting under color of state law by virtue of the fact that it is licensed to conduct business in New York.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender for actions as a defense attorney because those actions are not under color of state law.

Bell v. State of Oklahoma · filed 1998-09-15

... and that the public defender is not subject to § 1983 liability because her actions as a defense attorney are not “under color of state law,” see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Upon review of the facts and applicable law, we affirm for substantially the reasons set forth by the district court.

Section 1983 imposes liability only for actions taken under color of state law; conduct under color of federal law falls outside it.

Michael Duane, Smith v. Millie R. Kitchen, Randy Komisarek, and Keith Woods · filed 1998-09-15

Thus, because Smith’s complaint alleges conduct under color of federal law, i.e. the Internal Revenue Code, there is no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of state law.

Dockery v. Tucker · filed 1998-09-24

Nor can the plaintiff sue Kohl under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which applies only to persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement may be satisfied when a creditor invokes state officials through a state-created provisional remedy and challenges the statute’s constitutionality.

Lewis Service Center, Inc. v. Mack Financial Corp., an Ohio Corporation · filed 1982-12-27

However, we think this issue was recently settled by the Supreme Court ... in which the Court held that the jurisdictional requirements of “state action” and action “under color of state law” may be satisfied by the invocation of the aid of state officials pursuant to state created provisional remedy procedures insofar as the constitutionality of the state statute is challenged.

Court-appointed defense counsel do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when representing a criminal defendant.

Washington v. Greene · filed 1982-12-29

In Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309 (3d Cir.1982), the court held that private and court-appointed attorneys “do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.” Id. at 314. The accusation made by plaintiff raises serious questions about the propriety of defendant’s alleged conduct, but the federal courts, under § 1983, are not the appropriate forum in which to resolve them. I will enter an order granting the motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 reaches county officials administering a federal program when their authority to participate and exercise discretion derives from state law.

Decker v. United States Department of Labor · filed 1983-05-23

Second, the county defendants were acting under color of state law. ... The county defendants’ authority to exercise that discretion is derived from state law.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected right.

Rutledge,et al v. USA,et al · filed 1998-10-05

The district court dismissed the Section 1983 claims because there is no allegation of any violation of federal rights committed under color of state law. The trial court therefore properly concluded that the complaint failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted under the statute and dismissed same under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Officers who actively assist private parties in a seizure pursuant to a sheriff’s department custom act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Open Inns, Ltd. v. Chester County Sheriff's Department · filed 1998-10-20

Such active involvement by the officers, pursuant to a regular custom or practice of the Chester County Sheriff's Department, clearly meets the "color of state law” requirement.

Section 1983 covers alleged assaults by contracted prisoner transport guards when they use custody authority granted by the state to commit the assaults.

Gwynn v. TransCor America, Inc. · filed 1998-10-21

As discussed in relation to venue, Ter Linden and Goodman had custody of Gwynn as agents and prison guards of the State of Colorado, pursuant to the contract between TransCor and the Colorado Department of Corrections. Viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Gwynn, ter Linden sexually assaulted her throughout the trip and Goodman failed to prevent such assaults. In so doing, Defendants used the state power as a coercive force to further their wrongful acts against Gwynn. Such acts constitute action under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Jackson v. Yellow Logistics, Inc. · filed 1998-10-21

Section § 1983 therefore only provides a cause of action if plaintiff shows that defendant acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Einstein v. Medeck · filed 1998-11-05

However, the complaint contains no allegation the landlord was a state actor acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; private citizens who do not act under color of state law are not amenable to suit.

Heinemann v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. · filed 1998-11-13

Defendants are not amenable to suit under § 1983 because, as private citizens, they do not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s conduct to be under color of state law; a political party’s decisions to retain a filing fee and expel a member did not meet that requirement here.

Lindstedt v. MO Libertarian · filed 1998-11-18

We conclude that Lindstedt did not point to any facts showing the Libertarian Party was acting under color of state law when it refused to refund his $200 or when it acted to expel him from his positions within the Libertarian Party.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a television station's filming and airing footage of an arrestee does not satisfy that requirement.

Burke v. KXJB-TV, CHANNEL 4 · filed 1998-12-07

KXJB&s filming of Burke and then airing the film clip were not committed under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats official acts of a county as actions under color of state law.

Kohl Industrial Park Co. (A Partnership) v. The County of Rockland · filed 1983-06-07

Official acts of a county satisfy the “under color of state law” component of section 1983.

Under Section 1983, whether a police officer acted under color of law depends on the nature of the act, and the issue may require a trial when material facts are disputed.

Whitney v. Mallet · filed 1983-12-14

It is the nature of the act performed, not the clothing of the actor or even the status of being on duty, or off duty, which determines whether the officer has acted under color of law. ... Our review of the factual allegations as well as the material found in the affidavits and depositions persuades us that, resolving all doubts against the movants, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Savant and Mallet were acting under "color of law" within the context of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private person’s delivery of a recording to police and prosecutors, by itself, as action under color of state law.

Spetalieri v. Kavanaugh · filed 1998-12-22

That Clarke brought the tape to the District Attorney’s Office and the KPD is insufficient to constitute state action for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Richardson v. Albertson's INC. · filed 1999-01-05

After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the district court that Mr. Richardson failed to allege that defendants acted under color of state law, as required for his § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant acted under color of state law; a political party’s refusal to refund a filing fee and its internal decision to expel a member do not meet that requirement without facts showing state action.

Lindstedt v. Missouri Libertarian Party Rebecca M. Cook James Givens State of Missouri · filed 1999-01-05

To succeed in his § 1983 claims, Lindstedt had to show the Libertarian Party’s actions were taken under color of state law, resulting in a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. ... We conclude that Lindstedt did not point to any facts showing the Libertarian Party was acting under color of state law when it refused to refund his $200 or when it acted to expel him from his positions within the Libertarian Party.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law; a conclusory allegation is insufficient.

Lemons v. US Air Group, Inc. · filed 1999-01-19

Here, Lemons has failed to allege in his Amended Complaint any facts which would support his contention that Defendants acted “under the color of federal and state laws,” in terms of state action. Lemons has also not attempted to further explain this conclusory allegation in his Response. Accordingly, this Court finds that Lemons has not alleged facts sufficient to maintain a claim under Section 1983 and, therefore, his second cause of action based upon Section 1983 is hereby dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; private individuals and entities that are not state actors do not meet that requirement.

Doe v. Rosenberg · filed 1999-01-29

The district court, granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissed [ Doe ]s § 1983 claim on the ground that the defendants are not state actors and that they therefore did not act under color of state law. ... On the question of whether the defendants acted under color of state law, we affirm for substantially the reasons set forth in the district court’s comprehensive and scholarly opinion.

An Illinois appellate defender does not act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes when representing a client.

Cornes v. Karen Munoz, Assistant State Appellate Defender · filed 1983-12-28

In view of our holding that an Illinois appellate defender does not act under color of state law when representing a client, we need not consider appellant’s absolute immunity argument.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal employees whose actions are not under color of state law.

Soeken v. Herman · filed 1999-02-17

Because Reynolds claims are focused on the actions of federal employees, who do not act under the color of state law, he does not have a cognizable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private actor whose challenged conduct is not state action.

Perkins v. Londonderry Basketball · filed 1999-02-18

For the foregoing reasons, I find that there is no state action for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment egual protection or § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to have been committed under color of state law.

Logan v. Lillie · filed 1999-04-13

Those counts of the complaint do not state a cause of action against Mother because she is not a state actor. She is not the employee, agent or officer of any government agency. To have a viable Section 1983 claim, the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a jury to find that officers acted under color of state law when their police status enabled their conduct, even if they had a criminal purpose.

Zambrana-Marrero v. Suarez-Cruz · filed 1999-04-21

Even if Suarez and Rolon’s purpose in searching Zambra-na was to steal whatever they could from him, we believe a jury could conclude that their actions were taken under color of law because they were enabled by their status as police officers.

A § 1983 claim requires the alleged constitutional violation to involve someone acting under color of state law or in concert with the state.

McAlister v. Miller · filed 1999-04-22

No constitutional violation has been asserted against a person who acted under color of state law or acted in concert with the state.

State police officers acting in their official capacities act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Angel v. Kasson · filed 1983-12-29

There is no question that the defendants, in their capacities as officers of the New York State police, acted “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires state action; government ownership and funding of a transit system do not make a private manager’s independent discharge decision state action.

Arredondo v. Laredo Municipal Transit System · filed 1984-01-06

Accordingly, the Court finds no state action. Defendant’s motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s complaint under § 1983 will be DISMISSED.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for representing an indigent defendant in state criminal proceedings because that representation is not under color of state law.

Willis-Bey v. Brummer · filed 1984-01-10

The claims against Phillips also must be dismissed because she cannot be sued under § 1983, as a public defender representing an indigent in state criminal proceedings does not act under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not cover a defendant’s actions taken under tribal authority unless the defendant acted under color of state law.

E.F.W. v. St. Stephen's Mission Indian High School · filed 1999-05-04

It is well settled that a defendant’s actions pursuant to Tribal authority are not “under color of state law” for the purposes of maintaining an individual capacity suit against that defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Court-appointed attorneys and guardians ad litem do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 merely by serving in those roles.

Adams v. People Of The State · filed 1999-05-05

Unfortunately for Mr. Adams, his mere assertions that the actors in his probate claim were so acting cannot refute our holding in Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 155 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), that court-appointed representatives such as attorneys or guardian ad litem are not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private insurer’s decision to withhold disputed workers’ compensation payments pending utilization review does not satisfy that requirement.

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan · filed 1999-05-24

We conclude that an insurer’s decision to withhold payment and seek utilization review of the reasonableness and necessity of particular medical treatment is not fairly attributable to the State. Respondents have therefore failed to satisfy an essential element of their § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Swartz v. Schering-Plough Corp. · filed 1999-06-17

Although there are some strained allegations that Swartz’ equal protection and due process rights were violated, there is no cogent allegation that the Schering Defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law element is sufficiently pleaded when the complaint alleges that the defendants acted under color of state law.

D'Amico v. Johnson · filed 1999-06-22

Here, the plaintiff has properly alleged that the defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public employee for coworker harassment when the employee has no supervisory authority over the plaintiff and does not act under color of state law.

Quinn v. Nassau County Police Department · filed 1999-06-28

Turning to the facts of this case, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that Rice was only a co-employee of the plaintiff and was not acting “under color of state law.” Quinn has not alleged or proven that Rice had any supervisory role or authority over his employment. Accordingly, Quinn fails to state a claim against Rice under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Rice’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Section 1983 cause of action as against him is granted.

A § 1983 claim requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Hamilton v. Bartholomew · filed 1999-06-30

Defendants Bartholomew, James and Donald Eldredge, Ranger, Limb, Porter, and Workman are not state actors and cannot be ... said to have acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions does not meet that requirement.

Jones v. Evans · filed 1999-07-13

Potential liability under § 1983 attaches only to persons who are acting under color of state law. The Supreme Court expressly held in Polk County v. Dodson , 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), that “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”

A private arbitrator does not act under color of state law merely because a public employer is party to the collective bargaining agreement that gives the arbitrator authority.

McDaniels v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1999-07-16

Nor does the fact that defendant City of Philadelphia, a public entity, is a party to the collective bargaining agreement from which the private arbitrator derived his authority cloak the actions of the private arbitrator with the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires state action causing the plaintiff’s injury; an injury caused by a private person does not satisfy that requirement.

Carter v. City of Rayville · filed 1999-08-30

There was no state action that caused the injuries Carter suffered. Cal White, not a state actor, caused those injuries.

Section 1983 requires more than a defendant's status as a state official to establish action under color of state law.

MacFarlane v. Kenison · filed 1999-08-31

Merely pointing out the obvious fact that Kenison is a state official is insufficient.

A private attorney does not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes merely by issuing a subpoena.

Michael F. Hahn and Marie Hahn v. Star Bank · filed 1999-09-02

Because we are of the opinion that Timson was wrongly decided, we now put this circuit on record as holding that a private attorney issuing a subpoena does not become a state actor for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover federal officers acting under federal law; participation by state officers alone does not make the federal activity state action.

Albajon v. Gugliotta · filed 1999-09-07

The mere participation of some state officers is insufficient to turn a federal law enforcement activity by federal officers into a state action sufficient to support a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Jones v. Peden · filed 1999-09-10

...constitutional violation and did not allege defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a mayor who participates in an official pay decision meets that requirement.

Fortner v. CITY OF ARCHIE, MO. · filed 1999-10-07

Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it is certainly believable that the Mayor could and did take part in the decision-making process that led to the allegedly inequitable raises at issue in this case. Therefore, he was acting “under color of state law” as is required by § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private contractor acted under color of state law when it made the challenged hiring decision.

Halstead v. Motorcycle Safety Foundation, Inc. · filed 1999-10-08

In application of all of the foregoing, we find that the amended complaint fails to allege sufficient facts from which it may be found that the Motorcycle Safety Foundation was acting under color of state law when it purportedly made the decision to not offer the position of State Coordinator to Mr. Halstead.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when private employers or insurers invoke a state-created benefits suspension process with state agency participation.

Baksalary v. Smith · filed 1984-02-01

Thus, plaintiffs must show a deprivation by defendants which satisfies both section 1983’s “under color of state law” requirement and the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement. ... This filing is sufficient to constitute “joint participation” and to subject private invocation of the automatic supersedeas to the due process clause.

Section 1983 covers a police officer’s conduct under color of state law when the challenged acts are tied to the officer’s official position.

Gritchen v. Collier · filed 1999-10-18

The events in this case, starting with the traffic stop, followed by the citizen complaint, and ending in the threats of a defamation suit under § 47.5, are all unavoidably tied to Collier's position as a police officer. For purposes of this action, Defendant's conduct was under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; treating an inmate did not satisfy that requirement where the physician was neither employed by the prison nor under contract with the state to provide inmate care.

Nunez v. Horn · filed 1999-10-29

Here, however, Dr. Horn was not employed by the Bureau of Prisons, nor was he under contract with the state to render medical services to prison inmates. Consequently, plaintiff has not shown that defendant in this case acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private physician when the evidence creates a genuine factual dispute about whether he acted under state compulsion or conspired with state officials to violate constitutional rights.

Williams v. Payne · filed 1999-11-03

This Court denies the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claims since a genuine issue for trial remains as to whether Brock was a state actor pursuant to the “state compulsion” test or conspired with state officials to deprive Williams of certain fundamental constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private parties to allege how they acted under color of state law.

Ratcliff v. Archer Motor Sales · filed 1999-11-05

Ratcliff has purportedly sued the private-party defendants for violations of his civil and constitutional rights, but he has neither identified any constitutional provisions that the defendants might have violated nor suggested how the defendants might have acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state employee for conduct under color of law merely because of that employment; the employee must exercise authority derived from the state.

Petrosky v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles · filed 1999-11-15

Under this standard, Hass was not acting under color of law and cannot be liable under section 1983. He was merely a state employee, coequal with Petrosky, and lacked any power either to compel her to act or to take official action against those who might harass her.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a union president’s actions performed for the union rather than under color of state law.

Cahill v. O'DONNELL · filed 1999-12-07

The acts complained of by the plaintiffs and attributed to McCormack, namely (1) inflammatory letters in the PBA newsletter, (2) denial of counsel in Cerrone litigation, and (3) invoking of the unionized members of the State Police’s right to representation during the Onondaga investigation, were undertaken by McCormack in his capacity as president of the PBA. He did not hold his position as president by virtue of action by the state and he performed functions for the union, not for the government.

Section 1983 requires the defendant’s conduct to be under state control or encouragement.

Bennett v. Connecticut Hospice, Inc. · filed 1999-12-21

Whatever the defendant did or did not do in the furtherance of the daughter’s wishes to be cremated in no way can be construed as acting under the control or encouragement of the state.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is not met merely because a private merchant detains a suspected shoplifter under a state shopkeeper’s privilege.

Moher v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc. · filed 1984-02-21

Such a claim has been repeatedly held to be jurisdictionally defective in a § 1983 action inasmuch as acting under such a statute “does not transform tortious conduct by a private merchant into an action undertaken by the state or under color of law.”

Section 1983 imposes liability when a defendant acting under color of state law deprives a plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Nakao v. Rushen · filed 1984-02-21

Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability must be granted, because the uncontradicted evidence shows that defendant Campbell acted under color of state law to deprive plaintiff of rights protected by the fourth amendment.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private defendant when it acts under color of state law.

Steinert v. Winn Group, Inc. · filed 2000-01-27

A private defendant may be liable under section 1983 when it acts “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a court-appointed attorney performing traditional counsel functions because the attorney does not act under color of state law.

Mawhirt v. Ahmed · filed 2000-02-14

The Court notes that “it is well-established that court appointed attorneys performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel ... do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir.1997); see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981).

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Crissman v. Dover Downs, Inc. · filed 2000-02-17

As set forth above, the Crissmans have failed to offer evidence that Dover Downs acted under color of state law as required for a section 1983 claim. Therefore, the court will grant summary judgment in favor of Dover Downs on the claims in the Crissmans’ amended complaint.

Section 1983 treats a hospital’s participation in an involuntary commitment as action under color of state law.

Schneider v. Taylor · filed 2000-03-03

Plaintiff correctly alleges that PMC’s participation in his involuntary commitment constituted an action taken “under the color of state law” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; conduct by private individuals without state action does not support a claim.

Sanders v. Shoe Show, Inc. · filed 2000-03-17

It is undisputed that Snyder and the employees of the Shoe Show were acting in their capacity as private individuals and that no state action took place in the altercation. Further, no evidence in the record supports the inference that any of the defendants in this case were acting on behalf of the state. We conclude that the trial court properly entered the summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiff's claims based on the United States Constitution and § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an unsupported allegation of an agreement with a sheriff’s office does not establish that element for a private defendant.

Snyder v. Fleming · filed 2000-03-22

In order to state a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must establish that the defendants acted under the color of state law. ... However, the plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing of an agreement between Defendant Fleming and the Sheriffs Office to deprive the plaintiff of her property.

A private individual is liable under § 1983 only when the conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Livingston v. Garcia · filed 2000-04-26

“In order to hold a private individual liable under § 1983 for a constitutional violation requiring state action, a plaintiff must show . . . that the individual’s conduct is ‘fairly attributable to the State.’” Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1465 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). The Livingstons make no such showing here.

A staff member of a state-run school acts under color of state law under Section 1983 when allegedly abusing a resident.

Bright v. Hickman · filed 2000-05-05

Hickman is a staff member at Crockett State School, an institution run by the State of Texas. Thus, Hickman acted under color of state law.

A public defender is not categorically excluded from acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Hendrix v. Indiana State Public Defender System · filed 1984-03-14

If this court were to hold that public defenders can never act under color of state law, the inevitable result would be that public defenders could not be sued for declaratory or injunctive relief in federal court, while state court judges could be. This court declines to hold that the Supreme Court intended such an anomalous result.

Section 1983 requires proof that a defendant deprived the plaintiff of a federal right while acting under color of state law.

McIntosh v. White · filed 1984-03-19

The plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be based upon proof that the actions of the defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, while that defendant was acting under color of state law.

A police officer acts under color of state law for Section 1983 when carrying out police duties under authority conferred by the state.

Houston v. Tucker · filed 2000-06-01

Thus, the court holds that the defendant was acting under color of state law and within the discretionary authority granted to him under state law, when he tried to enter Ms. Porter’s home and arrested both plaintiffs.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant acted under color of state law; action under tribal authority alone does not suffice.

Bethel v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority · filed 2000-06-15

In the present appeal the complaint is devoid of any allegations that the MTGE, the MTGA, or the individual defendant Keane were acting under any authority other than that of the Mohegan tribe. The trial court properly dismissed Count 9 of plaintiffs complaint for failure to allege an essential element of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 covers an off-duty police officer who uses police authority to detain and search someone.

Bouye v. Marshall · filed 2000-06-21

He used his authority as a police officer to detain and search Mr. Bouye. His actions were not those of a purely private citizen. For these reasons, Officer Marshall was acting under color of state law, and within his discretionary authority granted under state law, when he effectuated the allegedly unlawful seizure of Mr. Bouye.

Section 1983 applies to deprivations under color of state law, not acts carried out under federal law.

Komasinski v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 1984-06-06

Because these actions were carried out under color of federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply. Therefore, the complaint fails to state a cause of action cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; for that reason, the claim will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A § 1983 complaint must allege that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Harris v. Bush · filed 2000-07-25

Nor does Plaintiff allege Defendants John Heer, Baptist Hospital, Morris Eady, and Lake-view Center acted under color of state law.

A state corrections officer acts under color of state law when opening a prisoner's cell.

Mendez v. Walker · filed 2000-08-19

It is evident that defendant Walker, as a state corrections officer, was acting under color of state law when he opened plaintiffs cell.

Section 1983 does not treat a litigant and her lawyers as acting under color of state law merely because they use the state court system.

Sturgeon v. Benton · filed 2000-11-08

Second, the judicial defendants were immune from civil liability for damages, see Liles v. Reagan, 804 F.2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1986), Sturgeon’s ex-wife and her lawyers did not act under color of state law by using the state court system.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when the defendant’s conduct qualifies as state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Charles Crissman Wendy Crissman Christine Crissman v. Dover Downs Entertainment Inc. Dover Downs, Inc · filed 2000-11-08

Where a defendant's conduct is state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also conduct “under color of state law” for § 1983.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when correctional officers act in their roles at the prison where the plaintiff is incarcerated.

Jordan v. Bellinger · filed 2000-11-27

Here, there is no dispute that the defendants were acting under the color of state law because, at the time of the occurrence of the alleged conduct, they were correctional officers at the institution where Jordan was incarcerated.

A defense attorney’s appointment to represent a criminal defendant does not, by itself, make the attorney a state actor for § 1983 liability.

Mundine v. Johnson · filed 2000-12-08

The district court concluded that Mundine’s suit was foreclosed by Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), because Brown was not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of § 1983 liability. The district court’s reliance on Dodson was appropriate. Although Mundine attempts to distinguish Dodson by pointing out that Brown was eventually appointed to represent him, his effort is unavailing because Dodson itself involved a public defender.

Defense counsel does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely because the court appointed him to represent a defendant.

Mundine v. Brown · filed 2000-12-08

The district court concluded that Mundine’s suit was foreclosed by Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), because Brown was not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of § 1983 liability. The district court’s reliance on Dodson was appropriate. Although Mundine attempts to distinguish Dodson by pointing out that Brown was eventually appointed to represent him, his effort is unavailing because Dodson itself involved a public defender.

Section 1983 may cover a governmental employee who exercises actual authority over a coworker, even without a formal supervisory relationship.

Beattie v. Guilderland Central School District · filed 2000-12-14

A governmental employee may be found to be acting “under color of law” for purposes of Section 1983 liability where the employee exercises actual authority over a complaining co-employee, even where the employee is not in a formal supervisory relationship with the complaining co-employee.

Section 1983 claims against public defenders serving as a guardian ad litem or supervising one may survive dismissal when the pleadings do not establish that they acted outside the color of state law.

Sophapmysay v. City of Sergeant Bluff · filed 2000-12-18

The record before the court does not permit it to determine, as a matter of law, that defendant public defenders here did not act under color of state law when performing the responsibilities of their positions.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Dry v. City of Durant · filed 2000-12-19

In sum, we hold that the § 1983 claims against the defendant officers fail as a matter of law because the plaintiff cannot satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not reach conduct by a private university that is not acting under color of state law.

Hack v. The President And Fellows Of Yale College · filed 2000-12-28

Yale, as a private university, did not act under color of law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private person merely because the State regulates that person's activities.

Wright v. Dunbar · filed 2001-01-08

Moreover, the mere fact that the State had the power to regulate the activities under its environmental laws does not convert Dunbar’s actions into that of the State.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

Herbin v. Hoeffel · filed 2001-01-18

Appellant failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the defendants did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983’s color of law requirement is not met when alleged harassers had neither actual nor apparent authority over the plaintiff’s work.

Samedi v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2001-01-26

As Plaintiff fails to present a genuine issue of material fact that Jones and Godwin possessed any authority — be it actual or apparent — over Plaintiffs work, the color of law requirement of section 1983 is not satisfied as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not cover an off-duty officer’s conduct in a purely personal dispute when the officer does not exercise state authority.

Garner v. Wallace · filed 2001-02-07

Because Officer Wallace was not in his territorial jurisdiction, involved in a purely personal dispute, never attempted to make an arrest, and did not threaten or attempt to arrest Garner, his actions, although beyond the bounds of civility, were not state action as recognized under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law; a claim against private attorneys fails without facts showing they were state actors.

Xiangyuan (Sue) Zhu v. Fisher, Cavanaugh, Smith & Lemon, P.A. · filed 2001-02-07

In order to set forth a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must assert that defendants acted under color of state law to deprive her of a federal right. ... Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support a finding that defendants are state actors. Thus, plaintiff fails to set forth a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not treat a defense attorney as acting under color of state law when performing traditional functions as counsel to a criminal defendant.

Franco v. King · filed 2001-02-14

The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Franco had failed to state a cognizable constitutional claim, because a defense attorney does not act “under color of state law” for § 1983 purposes when he performs a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.