42 U.S.C. § 1983

A private person may be liable under § 1983 when acting in concert with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Arceo v. City of Junction City, Kansas · filed 2002-01-17

Under the “joint action” test, a § 1983 claim may arise when some private party acts “in concert” with (i.e., conspires with) state officials in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not treat a private bystander’s brief, ad hoc assistance to a police officer as action under color of state law.

James Proffitt, Special Administrator of the Estate of William R. Woodall v. Ridgway · filed 2002-02-01

But we do not think that the rendering of brief, ad hoc assistance to a public officer transforms a bystander into a state actor, exposing him to liability under federal law and, by doing so, discouraging people from helping the police.

Section 1983 reaches a private attorney who conspires with a state judge to deprive someone of a constitutional right.

Hamilton v. Arnold · filed 2002-02-21

A private attorney who conspires with a state judge is within § 1983’s purview. ... We are satisfied that no reasonable jury could have found a conspiracy between the judge and this defendant on the speculative evidence presented by Hamilton, even giving him the benefit of all inferences.

An official who makes complaints to police without exercising official authority is not individually liable under § 1983 for those complaints.

Lilly v. City of Salida Ex Rel. City Council of Salida · filed 2002-03-19

While the Salida police may have been more responsive to her complaints than those of other citizens, she did not exercise any authority as a member of City Council in making those complaints and she had a valid reason as a nearby resident to seek the assistance of the police in enforcing the ordinance. That does not constitute the kind of abuse of authority that creates liability for an official acting under color of law.

A claim under § 1983 sufficiently alleges action under color of law when a municipal building inspector cites a property owner for a building code violation in his official role.

Kurzyna v. City of New Britain, No. Cv00-0504388s (Apr. 11, 2002) · filed 2002-04-11

The plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that Wnuk was acting under color of law when he cited her with violating BOCA State Building Code § 117.4.

Section 1983 does not treat a private person as a state actor merely because the person gives information to law enforcement officers.

Loeks v. Reynolds · filed 2002-04-12

A private person does not become involved in joint action with a law enforcement agency simply by furnishing information to officers. ... Absent any factual basis for a claim that Reynolds was acting under color of state law, appellant’s § 1983 suit against him was properly dismissed.

A federal employee may be sued personally under § 1983 for acts taken under color of territorial law, even while acting within the scope of federal employment.

Anderson v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 2002-04-22

Whether Davila was a federal employee acting within the scope of his federal employment, he clearly was acting under the color of Virgin Islands law as Commissioner when the alleged acts were committed. Accordingly, I find that Anderson’s section 1983 claim may proceed against Davila personally.

A private employer does not act under color of law for § 1983 purposes merely by reporting a suspected crime to police, without evidence of a prearrangement or conspiracy.

Suarez-Rodriguez v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2002-04-24

Even if Mr. Ortiz had been coerced, plaintiffs’ argument does not prove that FedEx acted under color of law or that a prearrangement or conspiracy existed between FedEx and the Police.

A private party’s joint participation with state officials in an alleged constitutional violation can support a § 1983 claim against that party.

Everett-Dicko v. Ogden Entertainment Services, Inc. · filed 2002-05-02

As a result, to the extent that the plaintiffs’ complaint relied on a joint-participation theory, it has alleged § 1983 cause of action against the private defendants.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement is not met when a county declines to issue permits because it claims no authority over the private property involved.

Southwest Advertising, Inc. v. County of Clark · filed 2002-05-08

The County is not acting under color of law, it is refusing to act under color of law adverse to the property interests of third parties.

Section 1983 does not treat a private utility as a state actor merely because it possesses sovereign power; the utility must exercise that power.

Moongate Water Co. v. Butterfield Park Mutual Domestic Water Ass'n · filed 2002-06-03

However, simple possession of sovereign power does not convert a private entity into a state actor. Indeed, that transmogrification occurs only when the entity exercises that power.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations showing that a private defendant acted in concert with a state actor; a conclusory allegation is insufficient.

Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Russell Rinchiuso, Richard Cotugno · filed 2002-06-04

A merely conclusory allegation that a private entity acted in concert with a state actor does not suffice to state a § 1983 claim against the private entity.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived them of a federal right.

Broomfield v. Garnes · filed 2002-06-07

Under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Private individuals who do not act under color of state law cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Preston v. New York · filed 2002-06-27

Preston’s § 1983 claims against the Individual Doctors fail because they are against private individuals who were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private news media that independently observe and photograph a government search without acting jointly with the government.

Brunette v. Humane Society · filed 2002-06-28

During the search, the Media’s actions were its own; they were not “state actions” directed by or jointly conceived, facilitated or performed by the Humane Society. Because the Media was not a state actor during the search, it cannot be held hable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach private utility employees whose actions lack a sufficiently close connection to the state, even when a utility commission permits the disputed practice and declines to hold a hearing.

Spickler v. Lee · filed 2002-07-01

Simply put, Defendants’ actions lack a “sufficiéntly close nexus” with the State to burden Defendants with the mantle of state actors.

Section 1983 requires the plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Farahani v. University of Connecticut, No. Cv 01-0809033 S (Jul. 9, 2002) · filed 2002-07-09

In the present case, the plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Sarafarazi was acting under color of law.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is not met when a private party disregards state employees’ warnings rather than jointly engaging with them in the challenged conduct.

Hawkins v. Trents Flying Svc · filed 2002-07-11

Because the allegations of the complaint are to the effect that Trents disregarded the warnings of prison employees to refrain from spraying near the prison unit, we conclude that the Adickes test, which applies when a private party and state officials are “jointly engaged . . . in the prohibited action,” see 398 U.S. at 152, has no application.

Section 1983 does not treat a court-appointed guardian ad litem as acting under color of state law when performing traditional lawyer functions.

Sophapmysay v. City of Sergeant Bluff, Iowa · filed 2002-08-05

Based on the record before the court, the court finds that defendant Driebilbus, as a court appointed guardian ad litem/attorney for Ammy, performed “traditional lawyer functions" before the juvenile court and therefore did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats medical providers contracted to care for state prisoners as state actors.

Christy v. Robinson · filed 2002-08-20

Section 1983 requires that the violation be committed by a state actor. In the present case, the moving defendants are "stale actors” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Miller v. Conway, et al. · filed 2002-09-03

To the extent Miller has attempted to articulate claims against Haycock under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his complaint fails to allege at least one essential element of such claims: that Haycock acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private lawyer representing a client as acting under color of state law.

Hassink v. Mottl · filed 2002-09-30

Mottl, as a lawyer representing his client, was not a state actor under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against court-appointed counsel fails when counsel did not act under color of state law.

Harris v. State of Texas · filed 2002-10-24

Harris’s § 1983 claim against Phillips lacks “an arguable basis in law” because Phillips was not acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 liability.

A private defendant may be liable under § 1983 when evidence shows an understanding or conspiracy with state officials to violate constitutional rights.

Spencer v. Illinois Community Action Ass'n · filed 2002-10-24

Here, it is clear from the undisputed facts in the record that Spencer has failed to offer any evidence tending to demonstrate that the Association and the IDCCA had an understanding — much less had engaged in a conspiracy — to violate her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a federal agency acting under federal rather than state law.

Whitehorn v. Federal Communications Commission · filed 2002-10-29

Because the FCC acts under federal law, rather than state law, Whitehorn’s allegations do not “establish a basis for judgment against the defendant.”

Section 1983’s causation and color-of-state-law requirements are satisfied by allegations that a state prison chaplain caused a constitutional deprivation while acting as a state officer.

Wares v. VanBebber · filed 2002-11-08

The complaint clearly alleges that the constitutional deprivation was caused by Chaplain VanBebber, who was acting under color of state law as an officer of the State of Kansas.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private consultants for merely advising a town and drafting proposed legislation that the town adopts.

Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Comi · filed 2002-11-20

Where a private actor merely provides professional advice, such advice cannot be considered' state action for purposes of section 1983. ... Therefore, Defendants were not acting under color of state law when they recommended and drafted proposed legislation.

A lawyer representing a client is not a state actor within the meaning of § 1983.

McMillan v. Edwards · filed 2002-12-09

As a lawyer representing a client, Edwards was not a state actor within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor.

Kachmar v. Varone · filed 2002-12-30

In any event, Kachmar's claims are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim. ... We further note that Kachmar has failed to state a claim against Ken and Mujala Patel for the additional reason that neither of them is a state actor.

A § 1983 claim against a private defendant based on a conspiracy with a state actor requires sufficient allegations of that conspiracy.

Bittick v. Mooney · filed 2003-01-09

We also agree with the district court that Mr. Bittick did not sufficiently allege a conspiracy between defendant Sharon Bittick (Mr. Bittick’s ex-wife) and a state actor.

Section 1983 can reach an official’s ostensibly private effort to suppress criticism of official conduct or fitness for office when that effort is closely tied to the official role.

Rossignol v. Voorhaar · filed 2003-01-16

Where the sole intention of a public official is to suppress speech critical of his conduct of official duties or fitness for public office, his actions are more fairly attributable to the state.

Section 1983 does not make a private utility liable for merely following a police order when it did not act in concert or conspire with the police.

Citoli v. City of Seattle · filed 2003-01-21

Puget Sound Energy merely followed the police order to terminate gas services. There is no evidence that it acted in concert or as part of a conspiracy with the police.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law; a conclusory allegation is insufficient.

Westphal v. Lake Lotawana Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2003-01-28

Mr. Westphal failed to plead facts supporting the conclusion that the Association’s action is a state action. ... Nowhere in his petition does Mr. Westphal allege any facts that demonstrate how or why the Association acted under color of state law.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when a police officer’s alleged conduct occurs while performing his duties at an assigned school.

Woods v. Miamisburg City Schools · filed 2003-02-04

At the outset, it is clear that Defendants acted under color of state law. The City is a municipality and Officer Mitchell’s alleged conduct occurred while performing his duties as a police officer at Miamisburg High School.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private lawyer who was not acting under color of state law.

Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court Sacramento County Sheriff's Department and R. Duane Skelton · filed 2003-02-10

Plaintiff cannot sue Mirante's counsel under § 1983, because he is a lawyer in private practice who was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement can present a jury question when an off-duty sheriff’s deputy working as store security initiates a search while wearing his official uniform, badge, and sidearm.

Chapman v. The Higbee Company, D/B/A Dillard Department Stores, Inc. · filed 2003-02-11

Therefore, we find that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the security officer acted under “color of state law” when he asked Chapman to enter the fitting room with the sales manager so that Chapman’s clothes and person could be searched.

Section 1983 does not treat a police officer’s private conduct as action under color of state law merely because others know he is an officer.

Schultzen v. Woodbury Central Community School District · filed 2003-02-19

Although Bumsted, as a police officer, may have been a legal authority figure for persons in the community, which earned him enhanced credibility, the knowledge of Bumsted’s status alone by Wisniewski is not sufficient to convert the actions Bumst-ed took in the pursuit of his private interests into action taken under color of law.

A private juvenile facility and its employees act under color of state law for § 1983 when they have custody of a delinquent child under a court order.

C.K. v. Northwestern Human Services · filed 2003-03-12

Based on our analysis of the above cases, we conclude that Northwestern Academy and its employees were acting under color of state law when C.K. was in their custody.

Section 1983 does not treat a lawyer as acting under color of state law merely because the lawyer is an officer of the court.

Otworth v. Vanderploeg · filed 2003-03-19

A lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches a political party committee acting under color of state law when it enacts a rule restricting access to a state primary ballot, even without express legislative authorization for the rule.

Yassky v. Kings County Democratic County Committee · filed 2003-03-25

Insofar as defendants argue that the lack of express legislative authorization for their enactment of the Rule points to their not being state actors, they misapprehend the reach of Section 1983. Whether or not there is a state enabling act as to the Rule, indeed, whether or not the Rule is lawful under state law, the defendants were clearly acting under color of state law in enacting a Rule that purported to restrict the ability of candidates for state elections to obtain the petition signatures required by state law for access to the primary ballot.

Section 1983 does not reach private bank officials who did not act under color of state law and were not alleged to have conspired with a state actor to deprive someone of a constitutional right.

Douglas v. Doe · filed 2003-06-24

However, the defendants (all unnamed) are not state actors; they are employees or officials of Bank of America and one of its branches in Houston, Texas. It does not appear that any of these private individuals were acting “under color of state law,” nor has Douglas alleged that any of these defendants conspired with a state actor to deprive him of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 provides relief against defendants acting under color of state law, not federal law.

Khan v. United States · filed 2003-07-03

As to the federal defendants, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides relief against defendants who act under color of state, not federal, law.

A public defender is not a government actor subject to suit under § 1983 for representing a defendant.

Davis v. Blount · filed 2003-08-25

Upon de novo review, see Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1171 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint because Davis’s public defender was not a ... government actor, see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Eling v. Jones, 797 F.2d 697, 698-99 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public employee for coworker harassment that does not involve the use of state authority or position.

Ottman v. City of Independence · filed 2003-09-03

Here, the summary judgment facts clearly establish Richardson was a co-worker with no supervisory control or authority over Ottman. Because Richardson was a private actor, he is not liable pursuant to section 1983.

A vendor selling products to prisoners is not acting under color of state law solely by serving as a prison vendor and is not liable under § 1983 on that basis.

Bomer v. Access Catalog Co. · filed 2003-09-04

As a vendor selling products to prisoners in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections, Access was not acting under the color of state law and was not liable to Bomer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a private provider as acting under color of state law when it enforces a restriction initiated and directed by the state.

Gedrich v. Fairfax County Department of Family Services · filed 2003-09-12

Plaintiffs allege that this “no parental contact” policy was not initiated by Alternative House, but was instead initiated and carried out at the behest of the state. Therefore, assuming the truth of this allegation, Alternative House and its employees acted under color of state law in enforcing Bussells’ “no parental contact” restriction.

A private party’s benefit from state authority during an extended property seizure can preclude summary judgment on a § 1983 claim.

Audio Odyssey, Ltd. v. Brenton First National Bank · filed 2003-09-22

Although this seems a minimal showing, the Court cannot find, as a matter of law, the Bank was not benefitting from state authority in extending the seizure of Audio Odyssey’s real property.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an appellate defense attorney who is not a state actor.

Bomer v. Mueckenheim · filed 2003-09-24

Additionally, Bomer’s appellate attorney is not subject to suit under § 1983 since he is not a state actor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a municipal consultant for providing professional opinions and advice that do not constitute action under color of state law.

R-GOSHEN LLC v. Village of Goshen · filed 2003-10-29

A consultant’s professional opinions and the advice he offers to municipalities are not state action and thus cannot support claims against such consultants for liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against privately retained attorneys for acts related to state court litigation because they do not act under color of state law.

Harmon v. Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas · filed 2003-12-08

Absent either element, a claim is not cognizable under § 1983. Here, the defendant attorneys did not act under color of state law as privately retained attorneys, although the acts alleged related to state court litigation.

A private judgment creditor acts under color of state law for § 1983 when seizing property under a state writ with significant aid from sheriff’s deputies.

Copelan v. Croasmun · filed 2003-12-10

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Copelan, the execution of the writ in this case satisfies the two-part test set forth in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982), to determine whether private conduct may be attributable to the state.

Private parties who collude with opposing counsel do not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when the judge is uninvolved in the alleged misconduct.

Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chemical Group, Inc. · filed 2003-12-19

Although the Appellees may have colluded with opposing counsel, Richard fails to allege that the state judge was in any way involved in the misconduct. Indeed, Richard characterizes the state judge as “an innocent agent.” Thus, the Appellees are not state actors under § 1983, and Richard fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person acting with state officials only when the plaintiff alleges specific facts showing an agreement to commit an illegal act and a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Priester v. Lowndes County · filed 2004-01-09

For a private citizen, such as Ward, to be held liable under section 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the citizen conspired with or acted in concert with state actors. ... The district court correctly determined Priester’s complaint failed to allege a conspiracy.

Private persons may be liable under § 1983 when they willfully participate in joint action with state agents.

Memphis, Tennessee Area Local, American Postal Workers Union v. City of Memphis · filed 2004-01-21

Private persons may be held liable under § 1983 if they willfully participate in joint action with state agents.

A lawyer representing a client does not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes merely by being an officer of the court.

Adams v. Morris · filed 2004-01-29

Defendant Frederick is not subject to suit under § 1983. A lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor or a private party acting under color of state law.

Diggs v. Town of Manchester · filed 2004-02-13

Neither Local 1579 nor its President, David Mayer, were agents of the Town of Manchester, nor were they acting under color of state law at any time relevant to the claims in Plaintiffs complaint.

Section 1983 does not cover an assault by a fellow inmate who was neither acting on a correction officer's order nor exercising authority granted by prison officials.

United States of America ex rel. Luther Miller v. Twomey · filed 1973-07-20

It is not contended that Bright was acting under color of state law, either because he was carrying out a specific order of a correction officer or because he had been granted certain authority which enabled him to harm the plaintiff. ... The assault committed by Bright was a common law tort; he did not violate Sec. 1983.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is met when a public official prepares a report required by state law as part of a special assessment.

Kasper v. Larson · filed 1974-02-15

Section 66.60(2), Wis.Stats., required the defendant Larson to prepare and file his “report of benefits” as a necessary step in the special assessment process; to that extent, he was acting “under color of state law”.

A private towing company does not act under color of state law for § 1983 when police merely keep the peace and do not jointly participate in the tow.

Longmoor v. Nilsen · filed 2004-03-31

Accordingly, on this record, PJ’s towing of Longmoor’s car was not state action, and P-J’s is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ civil rights causes of action.

Section 1983 claims against nongovernmental defendants require an allegation that they acted under color of state law.

Moss v. Columbus Board of Education · filed 2004-04-08

The failure to allege that these nongovernmental defendants acted under color of state law precluded § 1983 claims against them.

Section 1983 requires a defendant who acted under color of state law.

Valencia v. Kessel · filed 2004-05-19

The district court properly dismissed Valencia’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because Valencia failed to name a defendant acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law to state a claim.

Baker v. AME Church Judicial Council · filed 2004-06-10

To state a claim under § 1983, it is essential that the person who committed the alleged wrongful conduct was “acting under color of state law;” If the defendant did not act “under color of state law,” the action against him must be dismissed.

Section 1983 treats private persons who jointly carry out a school policy with school officials as acting under color of state law.

Kuehn v. Renton School District No. 403 · filed 1985-01-11

Thus, the school principal, the band director, and the parent booster club members were clothed with the authority of state law when they announced their policy of requiring students' submission of luggage for search prior to departure.

Section 1983 permits claims against private entities performing a traditionally state function when their actions deprive a person of constitutional rights.

Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc. · filed 1985-08-26

Although Prison Health Services and its employees are not strictly speaking public employees, state action is clearly present. Where a function which is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state (or here, county) is performed by a private entity, state action is present.

Section 1983 permits liability when a private party jointly acts with a state official who abuses state authority.

Greco v. Guss · filed 1985-10-01

Thus a private party acting jointly with a state official who abuses his authority also acts under color of state law and is subject to section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 covers misuse of power made possible by authority granted by state law.

Home Insurance Co. v. Leinart · filed 1985-10-15

“Under color of law” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C., § 1983, refers to a misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of that state law.

Section 1983 requires defendants to act under color of state law for a civil rights claim.

Bob Rivera, and Eduardo Rivera v. Al Green, Karen Green, Mitchell Simmons, Carl W. Johnson and Maricopa County Sheriff's · filed 1985-11-08

Rivera has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four defendants who did not act “under color of state law.” Al and Karen Green, Louis Rhodes, and Robert Billars acted as private parties. To the extent that Billars acted as a public defender, he did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires conduct challenged in the action to be carried out under color of state law.

Cassiano v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., Paul Sullivan, Ruben Salazar, Tony Barco and Antonio Gutierrez · filed 1985-11-22

Relying on these factors, we hold that the district court properly found that Amigos was not acting “under color” of state law when it dismissed Cassiano.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law to state a claim.

Lundt v. Hodges · filed 1985-12-31

In reviewing plaintiff’s complaint, the Court finds that no facts are alleged showing how these defendants were acting under color of state law, in that they are either auctioneers, implement dealers or a banker employed by private businesses. Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; alleging that a private person caused an arrest does not, by itself, establish conspiratorial state action.

Zebrowski v. Denckla · filed 1986-04-04

Plaintiffs, however, have failed to show that Denckla was in any way acting “under color of state law,” which for all practical purposes is equivalent to “state action.” ... Plaintiffs have merely alleged that defendant “caused” Edmund Zembrowski to be arrested, an allegation which hardly amounts to conspiratorial state action.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Donald Abdullah Muhammad AKA Donald A. Barnes v. Edward Caldwell, Doctor Raymond Roberts, Correctional Officer Wicomico · filed 1986-09-30

A review of the record discloses that summary judgment was properly entered for Dr. Caldwell as he was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for a person deprived of federal rights by someone acting under color of state law.

Anderson v. Roberts · filed 1986-12-01

The conduct of defendant Roberts on July 23, 1984 was performed under color of state law, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of a constitutional right.

Cox v. Winfield · filed 1987-04-29

Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to establish that the defendant, a private individual, deprived him of a constitutional right under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the challenged deprivation to be committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Muslow v. AG Edwards & Sons, Inc. · filed 1987-06-10

However, Mr. Muslow has failed to prove that any alleged discrimination was committed by anyone acting under "color of law," Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978), or that he was discriminated against on the grounds of his belonging to any of the categories of persons protected by the above cited laws.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law, so private foreclosure conduct without significant state involvement does not support a claim.

Mildfelt v. Circuit Court · filed 1987-08-26

Assuming for purposes of analysis that the complaint sufficiently alleged state action, we hold the district court correctly dismissed the complaint against the individual defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the individual defendants did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Miller v. Memorial Mission Hospital · filed 1987-09-02

To maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; court-appointed counsel does not act under color of state law while representing a client.

Millsaps v. Bingham · filed 1989-09-20

Millsaps cannot satisfy these requirements because his court-appointed counsel did not act under color of state law while representing the interests of a client.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with state officials, but the claim requires evidence of an agreement.

Moore v. City of Paducah John Penrod, Mayor Joe Viterisi, Commissioner Robert Coleman, Commissioner Joe Flynn, Comm · filed 1990-01-09

Thus, a private party may conspire with the state and be liable under § 1983. ... The evidence proffered in this case could not reasonably support a finding that an agreement existed. Absent such a finding, there can be no conspiracy.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Schultz v. Bob Goldsmith · filed 1991-10-29

The district court properly dismissed as frivolous Schultz's claims against the cigarette and tobacco companies because he cannot show that these defendants act under color of state law. See Neitzke, 109 S.Ct. at 1831; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Private parties may be liable under § 1983 if they wilfully participate in a conspiracy with the state or one of its agents.

Bowman v. City Of Franklin · filed 1993-01-04

Examining first the state action requirement of a § 1983 claim, we note that Waste and Zimmerman are private parties, not state actors. As such they may be subject to liability under § 1983 only if they wilfully participate in a conspiracy with the state or one of its agents.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a private defendant acted under color of state law or conspired with a state actor.

Maynard v. Price Realty Co. · filed 2004-06-24

In his pro se appellate brief, Maynard has made no allegations to suggest that Price Realty either acted under color of state law or conspired with a state actor.

Section 1983 requires allegations that private contractors were willful participants with the State or its agents in the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Montue v. National Concrete Cutting Co. · filed 2004-06-24

The district court properly dismissed Montue’s claims against the contractors performing the retrofitting because he did not allege facts indicating that they were willful participants with the State or its agents in an activity that deprived him of his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 claim that private parties conspired with state judges requires evidence of their involvement; unsupported allegations do not survive summary judgment.

Donaldson v. Clark · filed 1985-03-29

Again, plaintiff has absolutely failed to proffer any evidence suggesting that the private party defendants have in any way attempted to corrupt the state court judges through any personal contact or communication.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives someone of constitutional rights.

White-Battle v. Democratic Party of Virginia · filed 2004-06-29

In the case at bar, Schaefer’s alleged relationship with the Committee and its members does not fit into any of the recognized exceptions when a private party may be deemed a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability. Accordingly, the Court FINDS that Schaefer was not acting under the color of law. Schaefer’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts II and III is GRANTED.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a federal right caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Ellison v. University Hospital Mobile Crisis Team · filed 2004-06-30

For a § 1983 action, Ellison must show that 1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation of a federal right to be caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Kartorie v. Dunham · filed 2004-07-23

A § 1983 plaintiff must establish that the deprivation of a right secured by the constitution or laws of the United States was caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts connecting a private defendant’s challenged conduct to state action; an alleged agreement with a state official is insufficient without a nexus to that conduct.

Rivoli v. Gannett Co., Inc. · filed 2004-07-29

Applying these principles to the case at bar, I find that plaintiff has not adequately pleaded state action, and that she has therefore failed to state a claim under § 1983. Although plaintiff does allege that there was an agreement or “deal” between Gannett and Relin, she has not alleged a sufficient nexus between those two actors with respect to any actions taken, or threats made, against plaintiff by Gannett.

Section 1983 does not treat officials who have yet to assume office as state actors when they lack authority to take the challenged action.

Burrell, William D. v. City of Mattoon · filed 2004-08-06

It is undisputed that the individual defendants, though duly elected and sworn, were not yet in office because they had not been inaugurated as required by City ordinance. Hence, they were not yet “state actors.”

For a workplace harassment claim under § 1983, acting under color of state law generally requires supervisory authority, which may depend on the power to change the plaintiff’s workload or give orders backed by insubordination charges.

Zelinski v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2004-08-11

Generally, in order to act under the color of state law, the wrongdoer must be in a supervisory position in relation to the plaintiff. ... The two primary factors the Court examined to determine whether there was de facto supervisory control were 1) whether the defendant could alter the plaintiff’s workload, and 2) whether the plaintiff would face charges of insubordination for failure to obey the defendant’s order.

A § 1983 claim against a private provider treating a prisoner is not patently meritless for lack of action under color of law.

Abney v. McGinnis · filed 2004-08-18

Accordingly, were it "patently without merit” because on the facts as alleged DiPompo did not act under color of law in treating Abney, no federal subject matter jurisdiction would exist, and we would be required to dismiss the claim. ... The claim is not, however, "patently without merit.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against private persons who jointly engage with an immune state official in the challenged action because they act under color of state law.

Darr v. Wolfe · filed 1985-07-22

But, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980), private persons jointly engaged with an immune state official in the challenged action are themselves acting under color of state law for the purposes of a Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not cover a claim against appointed criminal defense counsel performing traditional lawyer functions because counsel is not acting under color of state law.

Anderson v. Platt · filed 2004-10-29

The district court properly dismissed Anderson’s section 1983 claims against Platt because Platt was not acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is met when a state Medicaid commissioner acts in her official capacity to administer the program.

Leocata Ex Rel. Gilbride v. Wilson-Coker · filed 2004-11-03

The Commissioner's actions in her official capacity as an administrator of Connecticut's Medicaid program occur under color of state law.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is satisfied when an on-duty sheriff’s deputy exercises authority granted by state law during an apprehension.

Strickland v. Shotts · filed 2004-11-24

It is clear that Defendant Shotts was acting in his capacity as an employee of the Elkhart County Sheriffs Department when he exercised this power possessed by virtue of state law, and therefore Shotts is a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private party who willfully participates in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Banks v. Toys "R" Us—Delaware, Inc. · filed 2004-12-16

A private party may be held liable under § 1983 if he or she is a willful participant in a joint activity with the state or its agents.

A private party may face a § 1983 claim when sufficiently particular allegations support an inference that the party conspired with state officials to deprive someone of federal rights.

Skepton v. County of Bucks · filed 1986-02-19

Plaintiff, to survive a motion to dismiss, must allege with sufficient factual particularity that the private and state actors “directed themselves toward an unconstitutional act by virtue of a mutual understanding or agreement.” ... Skepton’s allegations are thus sufficient to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 claims against a private prison operator may proceed when the operator acts under color of state law and the complaint plausibly alleges that its employees could have helped remedy an overdetention.

Wormley v. United States of America · filed 2009-02-24

This provision does not resolve the issue of whether defendants could have remedied plaintiff’s situation, but it does render plausible plaintiff’s claims that defendants could have—and perhaps should have—informed DOC of plaintiff’s inquiries regarding her incarceration, an act which possibly could have resulted in her release. This is enough for plaintiff’s § 1983 claims to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of state law or prison policy alone.

Ballard v. Connie Pierce · filed 2010-11-22

The alleged violations of state law and prison policy arising from Ballard’s work assignment and disciplinary proceedings, even if true, likewise fail to state a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of state law or internal prison regulations alone.

Ponce v. Lucas · filed 2017-02-27

Finally, Ponce’s claims that the searches violated state and internal prison regulations do not entitle him to relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state statutes or prison policies alone.

Hill v. Walker · filed 2018-01-19

Even if Appellees violated Mississippi Code § 47-3-3 or MDOC Policy 25-11-E, Hill cannot seek relief for such wrongdoings through a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law or prison policy that do not deprive a person of federally protected rights.

(PC) Johnson v. Frauenheim · filed 2019-10-17

Thus, the violation of any state law or regulation that reaches beyond the rights protected by the federal Constitution and/or the violation of any prison regulation, rule or policy does not amount to a cognizable claim under federal law, nor does it amount to any independent cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state prison rules or regulations unless the conduct also violates a federal right.

(PC) Cox v. Kernan · filed 2019-12-16

However, violations of state prison rules and regulations, without more, do not support any claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state prison policy alone.

Edwards 203782 v. Washington · filed 2020-11-19

Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants violated MDOC policy therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches constitutional deprivations carried out under color of state law, including actions by employees of a state-controlled public hospital.

Doe v. Temple · filed 1976-06-25

Because the Medical College of Virginia is a public hospital, established and controlled by the State of Virginia, and because defendant Krebs is a state employee, the actions of the defendants may properly be considered to have been taken “under color of law” so as to involve state action, and will support a claim of constitutional deprivation that survives the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Section 1983's under-color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when a county hospital terminates an employee.

Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital · filed 1982-08-18

The court finds that the defendant, a county hospital, was acting under color of state law within the meaning of section 1983 when it terminated the plaintiff’s employment.

Section 1983 treats the actions of a public hospital authority created under Georgia law as state action.

Wofford v. Glynn Brunswick Memorial Hospital · filed 1989-01-23

Because the Hospital is a public hospital authority created under O.C.G.A. Secs. 31-7-1 et seq., its actions constitute state acts within the meaning of Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 treats officials, agents, or employees of a local government hospital as acting under color of state law when they act in those roles.

Caine v. Hardy · filed 1989-06-14

Hinds General Hospital is a local government institution and the individual Defendants in this lawsuit were acting as local governmental officials, agents or employees of Hinds General. Thus, the Court finds that the individual Defendants were acting “under color of state law” for the purposes of establishing section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 treats officials managing a public hospital as acting under color of state law when they exercise delegated authority over hospital staffing and scheduling.

Faucher v. Rodziewicz · filed 1990-01-09

In the instant case, therefore, we too hold that Mr. Rose and Dr. Rodziewicz were county officials acting under color of state law for purposes of Dr. Faucher's suit under sections 1983 and 1985.

Public hospital officials exercising delegated management duties act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Faucher v. Rodziewicz · filed 1990-01-09

We hold, therefore, that although the Appellants acted under color of state law, they did not deprive Dr. Faucher of any of her due process rights made actionable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a hospital’s treatment decisions do not qualify merely because the hospital receives public funding.

Mitchell v. Chontos · filed 1990-12-20

The provision of those services by a third party does not transform that party into a state actor, even where the hospital is supported by public funds.

Section 1983 reaches a local governmental hospital authority when it exercises state-authorized power over a physician’s privileges application.

Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Authority · filed 1991-01-29

DCH, as a local governmental entity, is subject to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Section 1983 provides individuals with a private cause of action when constitutional deprivations occur under color of state law. As discussed above, DCH's application process and decision was the exercise of a power specifically authorized by the state. Thus, DCH was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats a physician exercising state-conferred authority as a public hospital medical advisor as acting under color of state law.

Baxter v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority · filed 1991-03-29

As a matter of law, Slovis was a state actor, acting under color of state law, and his conduct may be fairly attributed to the state.

A publicly funded county hospital district that is an independent legal entity rather than a branch of the state is a person subject to suit under § 1983 and acts under color of state law.

Mitchell v. Amarillo Hospital District · filed 1993-07-20

As a result, the Hospital is a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment being satisfied, the actions of the Hospital are also actions committed by a “person” under color of law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders for official actions taken in representing a client because those actions are not under color of state law.

Weinstein v. TOWNSHIP OF FRANKLIN, NEW JERSEY · filed 1995-09-15

Defendants Smith and Gaynor of the Public Defender’s Office contend that their official actions taken in connection with the representation of plaintiff were not under color of state law for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court agrees with this contention.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s conduct to be fairly attributable to the state; a private organization cannot be sued under it without allegations that it acted under color of state law.

Byrd v. Moseley · filed 1996-09-17

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may seek redress when a person “acting under color of state law” deprives the prisoner of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or under federal law. ... Nor would anything in the Complaint support a finding that the private organization’s conduct is “fairly attributable” to the state.

Section 1983 permits a claim against private defendants when the pleaded facts could show that they acted under color of state law.

Machos v. City of Manchester · filed 1996-09-23

And, while it may be unlikely, it is not inconceivable that plaintiffs will demonstrate that Kelley and the Union were acting under color of state law when the events in question transpired.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private college’s state-certified campus police training program, without state funding, does not alone satisfy that requirement.

Gardiner v. Mercyhurst College · filed 1996-10-18

The instant record shows only that Mercyhurst College is certified to run, and does run, a program to train campus police. It further shows that Mercyhurst College does not receive state funds for this purpose. While it does appear that this training might help an individual qualify for a police officer’s job beyond Mereyhurst’s campus, this is not enough to establish that the Mercyhurst group acted under color of law.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement may be satisfied when an on-duty deputy uses his official authority to commit the alleged misconduct.

Johnson v. Cannon · filed 1996-11-19

This Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts which could be sufficient for a jury to find that Armstrong was acting under the color of state law at the time that Plaintiff alleges her constitutional rights were violated. Additionally, the Complaint clearly alleges that the Sheriff was acting under color of state law at the time of the alleged incident inasmuch as he was serving in the capacity of Pasco County Sheriff, and presiding over the Pasco County Sheriffs Office. The Court denies the Motion to Dismiss as to this issue.

Section 1983 does not cover a state judge’s personal conduct that is unrelated to official duties.

Monsky v. Moraghan · filed 1996-11-27

Judge Moraghan’s choice to bring his dog to work appears to stem from personal pursuits and such activities are outside the scope of § 1983.

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of state law and does not reach private conduct.

Hamm v. Lake View Community Hospital · filed 1996-12-02

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting under “color of state law” and does not reach the conduct of private individuals.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a defendant acted under color of state law; claims against non-state actors cannot proceed without them.

Ogden v. San Juan County Detention Center · filed 1996-12-02

Upon careful review of the record, we agree with the district court that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the non-state actors; we also agree the Plaintiff has failed to plead facts necessary to maintain his other claims.

Section 1983 permits a sexual harassment claim against a co-employee who exercises supervisory or other state authority over the victim, even if the co-employee lacks a formal supervisory title.

David v. City & County of Denver · filed 1996-12-03

Thus, if Officer David can establish that, in committing the alleged sexual harassment, Officers Baniszewski and Johnson had supervisory authority over her or in some other way exercised state authority over her, see Noland, 39 F.3d at 271, then she may be able to recover on her § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment sexual harassment claim.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a private spouse and her attorneys when they did not act under color of state law.

Nowicki v. Bruff · filed 1996-12-03

Further, dismissal of plaintiff's claims against his ex-wife and her two attorneys is affirmed because these defendants did not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

A court-appointed limited guardian whose authority is confined to consenting to medication does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Holley v. Deal · filed 1996-12-05

Thus, the Court finds that Defendant Fraley’s actions, as limited guardian for Plaintiff, are and were not taken “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires conduct fairly attributable to the state; a private insurance agent negotiating an automobile accident settlement does not act under color of state law.

Bowman v. Joey Doom, Agent to Liberty Mutual Insurance, Fayette County Deputy Sheriff Montgomery · filed 1996-12-13

In order to be subject to suit under § 1983, a defendant's conduct must be fairly attributable to the state.

An off-duty police officer acts under color of state law for § 1983 when he identifies himself as an officer and threatens to use police authority to arrest someone.

Laughlin v. Olszewski,et al · filed 1996-12-30

Although Olszewski was employed by Ameristar at the time of the incident at issue, he identified himself to Laughlin as a City of Houston police officer and threatened to use the authority conveyed to him by virtue of his status to arrest Laughlin if he did not vacate the premises. ... Therefore, Olszewski acted "under color of" state law for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant acted under color of state law, and failure to establish that element warrants summary judgment.

Wold v. Red Lion Inn · filed 1997-01-06

Furthermore, Wold failed to allege evidence that Red Lion and Donohoe acted under color of law. Wold failed to establish one of the essential elements of his § 1983 claim against Red Lion and Donohoe; therefore, the summary judgment on the § 1983 claim against Red Lion and Donohoe was properly granted.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be related to the defendant’s governmental duties or status to qualify as action under color of state law.

Monsky v. Moraghan · filed 1997-01-14

Absent indicia that Judge Moraghan’s behavior was related to the performance of his governmental activities or to his governmental status, there is no basis for a finding that his conduct was committed under color of state authority.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state authority; wholly private conduct cannot support a claim.

Gray v. Toshiba America Consumer Products, Inc. · filed 1997-01-16

Section 1983 requires that the defendant act under the color of state authority.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law and its conduct to be fairly attributable to the state.

DeSerrato v. Hillhaven · filed 1997-01-21

An actionable claim under § 1983 requires that defendant act under color of state law and that its conduct be fairly attributable to the state.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law and the challenged conduct to be fairly attributable to the state.

Angela C.R. Deserrato v. The Hillhaven Corporation · filed 1997-01-21

An actionable claim under § 1983 requires that defendant act under color of state law and that its conduct be fairly attributable to the state.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a police officer who forces his way back into a home after being excluded acts privately when his state authority plays no part in the assault that follows.

Almand v. DeKalb County, Georgia · filed 1997-01-24

We conclude that Bryant was not acting under color of state law when he broke into Almand's apartment and raped her.

Section 1983 does not reach a fellow inmate’s conduct as an inmate representative without significant state involvement.

Torricellas v. Poole · filed 1997-02-04

Assuming the service of process was properly effected, this Court finds sua sponte that plaintiff cannot state a claim under Section 1983 against defendant Frey, and the Complaint should, thus, be dismissed against her. The plaintiff alleges that defendant Frey, as an inmate representative to the auxiliary, was acting as an agent of the state under color of law. There is no merit to this contention.

Section 1983 requires a real nexus between a public school teacher’s sexual misconduct and the teacher’s official duties for the misconduct to occur under color of state law.

Becerra v. Asher · filed 1997-02-14

We conclude that Asher's sexual assaults on Juan Doe did not occur under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for action under color of state law, not federal law.

Bonnichsen v. United States, Department of the Army · filed 1997-02-19

Defendants move to dismiss these claims on grounds these statutes furnish a remedy only against action taken under color of state law, not federal law. That clearly is true of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state university resident assistant does not act under color of state law by signing a criminal complaint as a victim when the conduct is unrelated to official duties and merely reports alleged criminal conduct.

Teta v. Packard · filed 1997-02-26

Because the complained of conduct in this case bore no meaningful relation to Packard’s duties as a resident assistant and Packard did not do anything beyond merely reporting Teta’s alleged criminal conduct, Teta cannot establish that Packard was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Lovell v. Waits · filed 1997-02-27

Lovell has not raised cognizable constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Investigation, ... because the defendants are not alleged to have acted under color of either state or federal law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, a requirement satisfied by the borough and its police chief in this suit.

Kelly v. Borough of Sayreville, New Jersey Douglas A. Sprague, Chief of Police of the Borough of Sayreville · filed 1997-03-05

Inasmuch as the appellees undoubtedly acted under color of state law, our inquiry focuses on whether they violated Kelly’s property or liberty interests.

Section 1983 does not treat an officer’s personal acts outside the officer’s jurisdiction as under color of state law merely because the officer invokes police status without effectively wielding state authority.

Rodriguez v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1997-03-07

Any attempt that they made at using their status as police officers to influence or to put the weight of the government behind their actions was too feeble to turn their endeavors into ones that were taken under the color of state law. The two officers’ mere identification of themselves as police officers and their conduct in Chicago fails to persuade this court that they had taken their personal drinking binge and turned it into a situation in which they held themselves out as police officers who were entitled to brandish all the power of the state.

Section 1983 does not reach officers acting as federal employees because they are not acting under color of state law.

Bordeaux v. Lynch · filed 1997-03-13

As federal employees, Lynch and Toomey were not state actors and thus are not amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a private attorney or law firm that did not act under color of state law.

Moore v. Best, Heyns and Klaeren, P.C. Robert F. Best, Individually County of Muskegon · filed 1997-03-18

Here, plaintiff did not present a cognizable claim for money damages against the defendant attorney and his law firm because these defendants did not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a court-appointed attorney a state actor merely because the attorney allegedly failed to act for the client.

Copus v. City of Edgerton · filed 1997-03-20

Plaintiff contends that Polk County does not apply because Strizie took no action on behalf of plaintiff and therefore was not actually acting as his attorney, but it takes more than an accusation of inaction to turn a court appointed attorney into a state actor subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; an allegation lacking such conduct fails to state a claim.

Johnson v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company · filed 1997-03-27

In addition, it is noted that plaintiff alleged no act by defendant that can be construed as taken under color of state or federal law cognizable under § 1983 or under the authority enunciated in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390-97 (1971).

Section 1983 permits a sexual harassment claim against a police officer coworker who exercises supervisory or other state authority over the victim.

David v. City And County Of Denver · filed 1997-03-31

Thus, if Officer David can establish that, in committing the alleged sexual harassment, Officers Baniszewski and Johnson had supervisory authority over her or in some other way exercised state authority over her, see Noland, 39 F.3d at 271, then she may be able to recover on her § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment sexual harassment claim.

A police officer does not act under color of state law for § 1983 when using processes available to the general public to secure an arrest warrant as a private citizen.

Kile v. Betuel · filed 1997-03-31

The line is drawn, and a police officer does not act under color of state law, therefore, when that officer makes use of the same processes available to any member of the general public in effectuating a result authorized by law.

Section 1983 requires a real nexus between a teacher’s sexual abuse and the teacher’s duties for the abuse to occur under color of state law.

Becerra v. Asher · filed 1997-04-07

Unlike in Doe, Asher was not Juan's teacher "before, during, and after" the sexual abuse, nor was this wrongful conduct "on and off school grounds." On this evidence we hold that there was no " 'real nexus' ... between the activity out of which the violation occurs and the teacher's duties and obligations as a teacher," as Doe requires.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, so private individuals ordinarily cannot be held liable for their own conduct.

Malloy v. Coleman · filed 1997-04-09

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that the actions which constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights be performed by a person “acting under color of state law,” private individuals cannot normally be held hable under § 1983 for their conduct.

Section 1983 does not reach professional peer review by a private hospital because that activity is not action under color of state law.

Berg v. Shapiro · filed 1997-04-17

Professional peer review at private hospitals has not been viewed as the prerogative of the state. ... Accordingly, because the Hospital was a private hospital, we conclude that the trial court was correct in dismissing plaintiffs § 1983 claim based on the actions of the peer review committee.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Barrois v. Unidentified Party · filed 1997-04-24

Barrois has not raised cognizable constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), because the defendants are not alleged to have acted under color of either state or federal law.

A private political party official is not acting under color of state law for § 1983 without facts connecting his conduct to state officials or making it attributable to the state.

D'AURIZIO v. Palisades Park · filed 1997-04-29

Accordingly, D’Aurizio alleges no facts which convert Tuscano, a private party, into an official acting “under color of state law.” Therefore, D’Aurizio’s section 1983 claim against Tuscano is dismissed.