42 U.S.C. § 1983

A public school teacher's sexual relationship with a former student does not constitute state action under § 1983 when it begins after the teacher-student relationship ends and arises from unrelated private employment.

K.L. v. Southeast Delco School District · filed 1993-07-27

Mr. Merker was not engaging in state action during his alleged out-of-school relationship with plaintiff. The alleged sexual relationship began approximately three months after plaintiff stopped being one of Mr. Merker’s students. For those three months, and throughout the length of the relationship, plaintiff was an employee of Mr. Merker in a business wholly unrelated to the Southeast Deleo School District. ... When these acts occurred, Mr. Merker was his boss and perhaps his friend, but not his teacher. Because Mr. Merker was not acting as a teacher and was not representing the school district, he was not a state actor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for workplace harassment by public employees acting as private persons rather than under color of state law.

Redpath v. City of Overland Park · filed 1994-06-09

Carney and Castillo, however, have no § 1983 liability for the alleged sexual and racial harassment of plaintiffs because, as plaintiffs’ co-workers, any such conduct by them did not occur under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches actions by state officials administering federal programs when those actions under color of state law deprive a person of constitutional rights.

Zack Green v. Glenn Dumke, Chancellor, California State Colleges · filed 1973-06-18

The College argues that it is immune from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because, in conducting the hearing, the College was acting pursuant to federal law and not under color of state law. The College is too modest about its role and too restrictive in its reading of the section 1983 script. ... The College is a state institution. The state clothed it with authority to act; its officers and agents derived their authority to conduct the hearing from the College. ... The actions of state officials caused Green’s loss, and they acted under color of state law. Federal jurisdiction was appropriately laid under section 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3).

A state administering a jointly funded federal benefits program acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when its challenged policy is a state choice and the state is not merely a passive implementer of federal rules.

MITSON BY AND THROUGH JONES v. Coler · filed 1987-10-05

However, under the facts presented herein, the state cannot be characterized as a purely passive actor so as to preclude Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not reach a private insurer’s termination of workers’ compensation benefits or a private doctor’s medical opinion when their challenged conduct cannot be fairly attributed to the state.

Barnes v. Sam R. Lehman, M.D., United States Fire Insurance Company and Crum and Forster Insurance Companies · filed 1988-12-28

Barnes fails to state a cause of action under § 1983 because the challenged actions of Dr. Lehman and the defendant insurance company may not be fairly attributed to the state. No deprivation “under color of state law” has been shown.

Section 1983 does not reach a private insurer’s denial of benefits when the insurer makes and executes the decision without state involvement.

Brownell v. State Farm Mutual Insurance · filed 1991-01-31

In the present case, the decisions to refer claims to Worldwide for assessment and to refuse payment were made and executed by State Farm without any state involvement. Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that defendants acted under color of state law, and therefore defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim will be granted.

Section 1983 does not treat a private insurer as a state actor merely because state law permits it to convene a medical review panel and adjust workers' compensation benefits based on the panel's findings.

Grenz v. EBI/Orion Group, Inc. · filed 1992-07-09

This does not amount to the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the state, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974), because the medical review panel does not itself decide a worker's entitlement to benefits, but rather reports its findings to the insurer, which then decides whether to adjust the worker's benefit status.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is met when a public entity suspends vested benefits under a state statutory scheme and its own policy.

Thorning v. Hollister School District · filed 1992-12-30

Respondent’s actions in suspending payment for the continued health and welfare benefits were based upon the inapplicable 1990 revised policy declaration, and section 53200 et seq. Therefore, refusal to pay for the benefits was an act under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats state officials administering federal disability benefits as acting under color of state law when state law creates and empowers their agencies.

Sorenson v. Concannon · filed 1994-11-17

The DDS, VRD, and DHR are Oregon agencies created by Oregon law and are empowered to act by Oregon law, not federal law. Cooperation with the federal government does not erase the manifest state action of these Oregon agencies. For these reasons, I conclude that the State Defendants act under “color of state law” for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches acts performed under color of state law, and minimal state regulation or tax-exempt status of a private parochial school does not by itself satisfy that requirement.

Family Forum v. Archdiocese of Detroit · filed 1972-08-23

In order to bring an action under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), the plaintiffs must be challenging acts which were performed by persons acting under color of state law. ... In the case at bar plaintiffs are challenging actions taken by persons who have been and are acting in their capacity as church officials and school board members of a parochial school. ... But in the case before this Court, the state has minimal control over private educational facilities. The state is concerned only with sanitation, qualifications of teachers and minimum course requirements. We do not find this minimal amount of regulation, even when considered in conjunction with the tax exempt status, to be sufficient entanglement to constitute state action. ... For these reasons we find no substantial state action to confer jurisdiction on this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of state law, and state support or regulation of a private university is insufficient without a connection to the challenged discrimination.

Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology · filed 1975-10-28

The facts set forth in the complaint do not support the conclusion that defendants acted under color of state law in their discrimination against plaintiff. ... We are satisfied that Count I of the pleading before us does not state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action, and a private university may be subject to it when its relationship with the state is sufficiently pervasive or symbiotic.

Braden v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1977-03-11

Because every claim based on § 1983 requires state action as a jurisdictional prerequisite, we must determine whether the district court erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the University of Pittsburgh was not acting “under color of” state law. ... All in all, the comprehensive statutory arrangement, carefully interweaving the functions of the University of Pittsburgh and the Commonwealth, and the manner in which it has been effectuated hardly suggests that state action does not exist. If anything, there would appear to be adequate grounds for believing that Pitt is vested with a status more closely akin to that of a state college rather than that of a private institution of higher education. ... Consequently, the district court did not commit error when it declined to dismiss the complaint for a purported absence of state action.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of federal rights under color of state law; a private school's conduct does not satisfy that requirement merely because a state board accredits or regulates it.

Cummings v. Virginia School of Cosmetology, Inc. · filed 1979-02-26

Here, however, it is manifest that it is the action of the defendant school that prompted the instant suit, and the defendant board’s inclusion as a party defendant could only have been for the purpose of attempting to characterize and establish the defendant school’s actions as being within the ambit of the “color of state law” requirement of § 1983. Such effort is doomed to failure. No factual allegation is made, nor, indeed, can the Court envision any that would raise the action of the school as having been under “color of state law”.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private university whose relationship with the state fails both the symbiotic relationship and close nexus tests is not liable under the section.

Imperiale v. Hahnemann University · filed 1991-10-31

Under the applicable symbiotic relationship and close nexus tests, Hahnemann was not acting under color of state law as required by section 1983. Plaintiff cannot recover on his section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private school-bus contractor and its employees do not become state actors merely by carrying out a publicly funded transportation program when they perform no traditionally exclusive state function and state regulation does not compel or influence the challenged conduct.

Black v. Indiana Area School District · filed 1993-01-29

With respect to Myers, Claypoole and Vernon R. Claypoole, Inc., the threshold question is whether they were acting under color of state law. If they were not, they can have no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... While Vernon O. Claypoole, Inc. and its employees were carrying out a state program at state expense, they were not performing a function that has been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state" and there was no state regulation that "compelled or even influenced" the conduct which is alleged to have violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. ... We thus conclude that the actions of Myers, Claypoole, and Vernon O. Claypoole, Inc. cannot fairly be attributed to the state and that summary judgment in their favor was required.

A student may plead a § 1983 claim against a private school where the school’s authority over the student may amount to state action.

Curran v. Bureau of Special Education Appeals of the Massachusetts Department of Education · filed 1994-10-24

In this case, the section 1983 action involves a claim by a student, rather than an employee, against a private school. ... Based on these cases, this court rules that plaintiffs have pled a proper section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a state university because a state university is not a “person” under the statute.

Salcido v. University of Southern Mississippi · filed 2014-02-13

We have previously held that state universities are not “persons” under § 1983, and therefore, the statute does not provide a cause of action.

Section 1983 claims against a private school require plausible facts showing that the school acted under color of state law.

MDB v. Punxsutawney Christian Sch. · filed 2019-05-03

Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts in their Complaint to support an inference that Punxsutawney is or was a state actor under any of these principles. On that basis alone, all of their § 1983 claims against Punxsutawney would be foreclosed.

Section 1983 requires state involvement sufficient to constitute action under color of state law; prison officials’ unwitting acquiescence or efforts to counteract the alleged private conspiracy did not satisfy that requirement on these facts.

Dreyer v. Jalet · filed 1972-09-18

However, in view of the evidence ultimately forthcoming at the hearing in these causes, it is apparent that the unwitting acquiescence or response of the TDC officials under these circumstances was not tantamount to concerted action related to defendant’s alleged conduct as a conspirator. Similarly, any action taken by TDC officials and employees to counteract defendant’s alleged conspiracy would not under these facts suffice to create “color of state law”, even though plaintiffs may have been deprived of a protectable right as a result. Accordingly, the facts as fully developed at the hearing compel the conclusion that plaintiffs’ efforts to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must fail.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when a prison official exercises authority conferred by state law; the inquiry does not depend on whether the challenged act was legally authorized.

Wareham v. Jeffes · filed 1989-09-19

A defendant in a Section 1983 action must have exercised power granted by state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority under state law. ... Wareham indicated that the purpose of amending interrogatory No. 7 was to have the jury make a factual determination as to whether Morrash was acting in his capacity as an agent of the state and not to decide the legal conclusion as to whether his action was authorized by the state. We agree with Wareham’s assertion that the jury’s response to interrogatory No. 7 was incorrect as a matter of law.

Section 1983 reaches prison officials acting under color of state law when they deprive a person of rights secured by federal law.

Sands v. Crist · filed 1989-12-15

Under section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or other federal laws. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir.1988). Here, the defendants are prison officials; therefore, they act under state law.

Section 1983 treats a state prison official’s enforcement of a prison policy as action under color of state law.

Hobbs v. Pennell · filed 1991-01-11

Clearly, the enforcement of the complained of policy was carried out under color of state law; Redman and Pennell are both officials of the State of Delaware and DCC is a state correctional facility.

Section 1983 reaches prison officials acting under color of state law.

Friends v. Moore · filed 1991-10-17

The defendants acted under the color of state law.

Section 1983 treats state prison officials as acting under color of state law when they control an inmate or his money in their official capacities.

Grant v. Newsome · filed 1991-11-01

As in Parratt, there is little question that defendants were acting under color of state law when they froze and held his inmate account upon receipt of the letter from the judgment creditor’s attorney and when they refused relief in the two grievance procedures. Plaintiff was in their custody, or at least, as to some, his money was in their control, and they were acting pursuant to their official capacities as employees of the state corrections department.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of a federal right; allegations that prison officials acted under a department rule sufficiently plead the color-of-law element.

Webb v. Lane · filed 1991-12-13

In an action predicated upon section 1983, the court must focus on whether two essential elements are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of State law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution or other laws of the United States. (Jones v. Clark (E.D. Pa. 1984), 607 E Supp. 251, 254.) The pleadings indicate that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts with regard to the presence of this first element.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law element is satisfied when the alleged conduct was committed by state prison officials acting as prison officials.

Guglielmo v. Cunningham · filed 1993-01-28

Here, plaintiff satisfies the first element under Parratt, since he alleges that the defendants committed these violations as prison officials of the New Hampshire state penal system.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a private attorney who is not a state officer and did not act under color of state law.

Dencker v. Terrance Marren Robert Gaston Gloria Sanchez Claus Dencker George W. Foley, Sr. · filed 1996-08-22

Regarding the claims against Dencker's former husband's attorney, George Foley, Sr., the district court properly ruled that (1) Dencker cannot state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Foley is not a state officer and was not acting under color of state law; and (2) that Dencker's complaint does not adequately allege that Foley engaged in any acts which constitute an unlawful conspiracy to violate Dencker's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not reach a news crew that independently enters a home during a police search without exercising a right or privilege created by the state.

Parker v. Boyer · filed 1996-09-04

KSDK's entry into the Parkers' house and videotaping the events that occurred there was therefore not an act committed under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not allow claims based on purely private conduct by private individuals or corporations.

Scarborough v. Brown Group, Inc. · filed 1996-09-25

It is axiomatic and indisputable that purely private conduct by private individuals or corporations is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party’s recommendations about public hiring as action under color of state law merely because state officials follow them.

Gary Vickery, Cross-Appellee v. Janell Jones, William Pearman and Kirk Brown, and Saline County Republican Central Commi · filed 1996-11-22

The fact that the State Defendants acted in compliance with the “rules and recommendations” of the Party Defendants does not turn the Party Defendants’ conduct into state action.

Section 1983 requires conspiracy or joint action with state officials to treat a private party as acting under color of state law.

Mann v. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office · filed 1996-11-25

Although these actions might constitute wrongs to the Plaintiff, they do not rise to the level of a conspiracy or joint action necessary to show color of state law required to bring a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 allows a conspiracy claim against a private party only if the party conspires with someone acting under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Rosano v. Adelphi University · filed 1996-11-25

As to the conspiracy claims, private parties cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they conspire with a person acting under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not treat a private litigant as a state actor based on conclusory allegations that the litigant conspired with state officials.

MacFarlane v. Smith · filed 1996-11-27

While the complaint states that defendant Crisp and the state officials conspired against him, it fails entirely to plead any facts tending to show the existence of a tainted agreement, such as a “backroom” meeting between the co-conspirators. Since sufficient state involvement in Crisp’s conduct has not been adequately alleged and supported, Crisp will not be treated as a state actor, and the section 1983 claim against him is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 does not treat a private nursing facility and its staff as state actors where a county contract does not direct or influence the challenged treatment decisions.

Sawyer v. Johansen · filed 1996-12-06

There is no evidence before us that the contract with Glenn County directs or influences the treatment decisions made by Merced Manor, Tuggle or Hill. For these reasons, we find that appellees Tuggle, Hill and Merced Manor are not state actors and affirm the district court's summary judgment in their favor.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private defendant only if the defendant willfully participates in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Estwick v. U.S.Air Shuttle · filed 1996-12-09

A private defendant may be held liable under § 1983 only if he was a “willful participant in joint activity with the state or its agents.” ... The amended complaint alleges none of these essential elements. Any cause of action based upon § 1983 is therefore dismissed.

Section 1983 treats private prison operators and their employees as acting under color of state law when they perform the traditional state function of operating a prison.

Street v. Corrections Corporation of America, Jimmy Turner, and Dexter Stephen · filed 1996-12-17

The defendants were “acting under color of state law” in that they were performing the “traditional state function” of operating a prison.

Section 1983 permits a finding that a public official acted under color of law when the official used the authority and influence of his position to harass an employee.

Carroll v. Village of Shelton · filed 1996-12-19

In other words, considering the facts in a light must favorable to plaintiff, Svoboda misused his position as police chief, and the administrative influence of that position, as well as his official responsibility as an equal opportunity contact person, to harass plaintiff with impunity. ... These facts, if proved, would support a jury finding that Defendant Svoboda acted under color of law.

An off-duty police officer’s use of a police business card alone does not make subsequent conduct action under color of law for § 1983 purposes.

Strange v. Porath · filed 1996-12-24

Standing alone, the use of a business card, without more, is not sufficient to place an off-duty officer’s conduct under color of law.

Section 1983 treats the District of Columbia as a state, and a District official who suspends a building permit under governmental authority acts under color of District law.

Tri County Industries, Inc., a Maryland Corporation v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1997-01-14

Section 1983 explicitly treats the District of Columbia as a state, and there is no doubt that Hampton Cross acted “under color” of District law when he suspended Tri County’s building permit.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a private corporation that did not act under color of state law.

Knopfel v. Scott Wetzel Service Albertson's Inc. · filed 1997-01-24

Because neither Albertsons nor SWS was acting under color of state law, they are not amenable to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a protected right.

Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp. · filed 1997-02-27

In the case at bar, plaintiffs Complaint utterly fails to allege that anyone acted “under color of state law” in order to deprive plaintiff of his rights. Absent such an allegation, plaintiff fails to set forth a viable Section 1983 claim.

A private person granted custody by court order is not a state actor under § 1983 merely because of that order when it gives the person no authority comparable to that of a state official.

Key v. Drake · filed 1997-03-25

In the present case, the juvenile court issued orders on several occasions that gave Ingle custody of Robert. However, Ingle was not given authority equivalent to that exercised by a sheriff (or other state officials) by virtue of the order as were the defendants in Del's Big Saver Foods. Ingle did not have the right to seize Robert or any other power such that she could fairly be characterized as a state actor.

A private party’s stadium lease with a city and compliance with municipal restroom regulations do not, without joint action, make the party liable under § 1983.

Glaser v. City of San Diego · filed 1997-03-27

Neither the existence of municipal regulations nor the contractual relationship Glaser describes is sufficient to support a finding that the private defendants participated in joint action with the City to deprive Glaser of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a federal deputy marshal acting as a state peace officer outside the performance of federal duties.

McNally v. DeWitt · filed 1997-04-21

While the plaintiff has failed to plead or otherwise allege Bivens liability in this matter, this fact alone will not defeat his cause of action, for deputy DeWitt was not engaged in the performance of federal duties at the time of the incidents alleged in plaintiffs complaint. The Court’s holding to this effect precludes a motion to dismiss predicated upon the inapplicability of § 1983 to these facts.

Private creditors and their lawyers act under color of state law for § 1983 when they exercise rights under state procedures and obtain sheriff’s deputies’ assistance in executing a writ.

Owens v. Swan · filed 1997-04-25

As both prongs of the test attributing acts of private parties to the state are met in this case, the court finds that Wells Fargo and the Swan defendants were acting under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant alleged to have acted jointly with police to have substantially cooperated with them in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Watt v. Brink's Inc. · filed 1997-05-23

Because they relied on a "joint action" theory of state action, Appellants were required to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Appellees and the LAPD engaged in a "substantial degree of cooperation" that resulted in the allegedly unlawful deprivation of Appellants' constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private hospital whose conduct was not under color of state law.

Copeland v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital · filed 1997-05-30

Since Northwestern was not acting under color of state law, it cannot be liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private television station as acting under color of law solely because a state court rule permits it to televise proceedings.

Brownson v. Bogenschutz · filed 1997-06-05

Simply because a Supreme Court rule allows WLUK to televise court proceedings does not imply that WLUK is acting under color of law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against court-appointed defense counsel for poor representation; an alleged conspiracy with the prosecutor requires specific supporting facts.

Jenkins v. Groover Bryant, State Appointed Lawyer · filed 1997-06-24

The sole and only issue presented is whether a client may sue his court appointed counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the lawyer's alleged failure to properly represent his client. The Supreme Court has clearly instructed that such a suit has no merit. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984). To the extent Mr. Jenkins' original complaint could arguably be read as asserting a conspiracy between the prosecutor and his defense counsel, we must reject that argument as no specific facts are alleged to support the conclusion.

An appointed defense attorney representing a criminal defendant does not act under color of state law and cannot be sued under § 1983 for that representation.

McLittle v. O'BRIEN · filed 1997-08-18

Here, Mr. Vendittelli was appointed to represent plaintiff. ... Accordingly, like the public defender in Polk County, Mr. Vendittelli was not acting under color of law and cannot be sued under § 1983.

A private party who willfully participates with state officials in violating constitutional rights may be liable under § 1983.

Reitz v. County Of Bucks · filed 1997-09-08

If a jury finds, however, that the prosecutors violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights and that these private defendants were willful participants in the prosecutors' activity, then these individuals may be subject to § 1983 liability.

Private media defendants who jointly participate with police in the challenged conduct act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Barrett v. Outlet Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 1997-09-18

These alleged facts show that the Media Defendants participated in joint activity with the City Defendants, and that the Media Defendants acted under color of law for purposes of § 1983.

A private party is liable under § 1983 only if it conspires with a state actor to violate federal rights; allegations that a union negotiated a new agreement and failed to prevent a hiring change do not sufficiently plead such a conspiracy.

Sacco v. Pataki · filed 1997-10-10

A private party may be liable under § 1983 only if it conspired with a state actor to violate federal rights. ... The allegations that Local 807 entered into a new collective bargaining agreement without consulting its rank and file members and was not able to prevent the Javits Center’s abrogation of the old collective bargaining agreement with the TSA do not sufficiently establish a conspiracy between the Union Defendants and the Javits Center to deprive the Sacco Plaintiffs of liberty.

Section 1983 does not govern civil rights claims against federal prison employees or contractors acting under federal authority; those claims arise under federal question jurisdiction through Bivens.

Harlan Clement Gibbs 19446039 v. Bureau of Prison Office · filed 1997-10-22

Although plaintiff captioned his civil rights action as one arising under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this Court, noting that defendants are federal employees or contractors, finds that jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331.

A private person acting jointly with public officials can act under color of law for purposes of § 1983.

Roche v. Donahue · filed 1997-11-06

Donahue may be considered to be acting “under color of law” for § 1983 purposes even though he is not a public official. ... The facts set forth in the complaint are sufficient to support the inference that Donahue was acting jointly with public officials who themselves acted under color of law, and the complaint therefore sufficiently alleges a cause of action.

Section 1983’s state action element is satisfied when the alleged deprivation is by governmental actors such as a city and a public transit authority.

New York Magazine v. Metropolitan Transit Authority · filed 1997-12-01

The state action element of the Section 1983 claim is easily satisfied. The persons who allegedly deprived the Plaintiff of its First Amendment right were the City and the MTA, both governmental actors.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation committed under color of state law; a private English university does not meet that requirement.

Park v. Oxford University · filed 1997-12-01

Because plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Oxford University— a private English educational institution— has acted under color of state law, his complaint fails to state a claim under 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private individual who conspires with a state actor to pursue a common unconstitutional goal.

Naguib v. ILL. DEPT. OF PROF'L REG. · filed 1997-12-03

Private individuals cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless they conspire with a state actor to achieve a common, unconstitutional goal.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead specific facts showing that the person who violated the plaintiff’s rights acted under color of state law.

Barrier v. Marin General Hospital Arnold Knepfer, M.D. · filed 1997-12-17

In order to properly state a claim under section 1983, the plaintiff must plead specific facts that the violation of his rights was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

A private residential treatment center acts under color of state law for § 1983 when the state delegates to it total responsibility for the care of juveniles in state custody.

Lemoine Ex Rel. Estate of Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Center, Inc. · filed 1998-01-06

Based upon the extensive contractual relationship between the state and New Horizons, wherein New Horizons assumed the state’s total responsibility for the care of troubled juveniles, the Court finds that under the public function doctrine analysis, New Horizons is a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Private parties may be liable under § 1983 when they conspire with state officials to commit the challenged conduct.

Arill v. Maiz · filed 1998-01-07

Thus, although private persons can be sued under § 1983, plaintiffs can only bring such actions where the private defendant has engaged in a conspiracy with state officials.

Section 1983 does not treat private creditors and their lawyer as acting under color of state law merely because they use state law and state courts to pursue property.

Stanwood v. Robert J. Burch Linda Carol Laird Smith Jerry C. Smith · filed 1998-01-16

Stanwood's allegation that defendants, who are creditors of a third party and their lawyer, were using state law and the state courts to deprive Stanwood of his property is not sufficient to characterize defendants as persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is not met when a state university football player on an athletic scholarship attacks a referee during a game.

Indorato v. Patton · filed 1998-02-02

This case presents the question of whether a varsity football player on an athletic scholarship at a state higher educational institution, who attacks and injures a referee during a game, acts under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994 & Supp.1997). The court finds that the answer is no and dismisses this ease, without prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 applies to conduct under color of state law; federal officials acting only under federal law are outside its scope.

Dahler v. Goodman · filed 1998-02-19

Dahler also alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but this claim is clearly without merit because section 1983 applies only to government conduct “under color of state law,” rather than under color of federal law.

Section 1983 can reach a private apartment operator whose cooperation in an arrest makes it a state actor, but providing officers a passkey falls short of the substantial cooperation required.

Parker v. Prince George's County, Maryland Police Department · filed 1998-02-24

This is not to say that, in certain circumstances, an apartment operator may not become a "state actor” for purposes of incurring civil liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The facts of this case, however, fall far short of the “substantial degree of cooperative action” in effecting an arrest that might trigger such liability.

Section 1983 treats a private hospital as a state actor when its practice of holding a child during a child welfare investigation is sufficiently entwined with government policy.

Kia P. v. McIntyre · filed 1998-04-15

Accordingly, the Court determines that the Hospital’s practices in this regard were sufficiently “entwined” with City policy to warrant its being treated as a state actor for purposes of this action.

Section 1983 treats retained counsel as acting under color of state law when counsel actively participates in a government body's decisions on its behalf.

Cordova v. Vaughn Municipal School District Board of Education · filed 1998-05-12

Given Castille’s alleged active participation in the entire process, his actions as retained counsel are actions that can fairly be attributed to the school board, and therefore constitute state action.

Mere allegations that private parties conspired with a state judge do not establish action under color of state law for a § 1983 claim.

Fries v. Helsper · filed 1998-06-01

As the district court articulated in its opinion, mere allegations of joint action or a conspiracy do not demonstrate that the defendants acted under color of state law and are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Marion v. Marion, No. Cv 97 0057153 S (Jun. 18, 1998) · filed 1998-06-18

Looking at the evidence in favor of the plaintiff, the court cannot find that the AKC's change in registration of the litter to Marjorie Marion, assuming the plaintiff is a co-owner of the litter, is an interference with a federal right of the plaintiff by a person acting under the color of state law. Thus, the court finds that the plaintiff, even as a co-owner of the litter, does not have a cause of action against the AKC pursuant to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .

Section 1983 covers a private prison guard who uses his correctional authority to gain access to and coerce an inmate.

Giron v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 1998-07-02

Torrez forced Giron to have sex with him under color of state law because he exercised coercive authority over her through his employment, and because he used his employment to gain access to her—he used his state-conferred authority as a corrections officer to accomplish the deed.

Section 1983 reaches a school athletic association and its official when they act under color of state law.

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic Ass'n · filed 1998-07-29

Thus, the initial question for the Court is whether the Defendants TSSAA and Carter are “state actors” subject to constitutional limitations under Section 1983. The Court finds that the TSSAA and Carter act under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party only when that party’s challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state; public supervisors’ reliance on the party’s evaluations does not alone establish that connection.

Kelly v. Forest Hills Local School District Board of Education · filed 1998-08-14

Three tests exist to determine whether a private party’s conduct may be attributable to the state and therefore actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... While Plaintiff contends that many of their supervisory duties were either implicitly delegated to Kesler by Hamilton or Hubbard or assumed by Kesler, the fact is that Hamilton and Hubbard remained her supervisors and them reliance upon Kesler for evaluations of her performance do not make his actions fairly attributable to the state.

A private person who is not a state actor may be liable under Section 1983 if she conspires with state actors.

Fiumara v. McCarthy · filed 1998-08-18

As Fiumara has not alleged that Marshall herself was a state actor, she can only be subject to liability under section 1983 if she conspired with state actors.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; working for or with the Boy Scouts does not, by itself, make a defendant a state actor.

Geolas v. Boy Scouts of America · filed 1998-09-11

In fact, the court, in its June 6, 1998 order, ruled that the Boy Scouts is not a state actor. Accordingly, no other defendant can be considered a state actor simply because that party workedfor or with the Boy Scouts. Summary judgment, therefore, is granted to defendants as to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a private employer for garnishing wages when the employer is not acting under color of state law.

Stouch v. Williamson Hospitality Corp. · filed 1998-09-15

Assuming that Williamson improperly garnished Stouch’s wages, Stouch’s claims fails to state a cause of action as (1) the amount of garnishment was not “excessive” under 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(1)(C) as the restriction on the amount of wages that may be garnished provided in § 1673 does not apply to “any debt due for any State or Federal tax,” and (2) Williamson is not a state actor nor would it be acting under color of state law in garnishing Stouch’s wages.

Section 1983 permits claims against private parties who cooperate in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Dolin on Behalf of ND v. West · filed 1998-09-21

Dr. Dolin, Mr. Uhrig, and Dr. Underwager are not state actors, and thus are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A private party acts under color of law if the private party cooperates in joint activity with the state or its agents.

A private individual is liable under § 1983 when the individual acts jointly with state officials, receives significant aid from them, or otherwise acts in a way chargeable to the state.

ACORN v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1998-10-29

“[i]n order to hold a private individual liable under § 1983, it must be shown that the private person was jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or that the private individual’s conduct is in some other way chargeable to the state.”

A § 1983 claim requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Boss Man Einstein, Also Known as Accountability Burns, on Complaint as Boss Einstein-Burns! v. Dan Medeck, Downtown Y Bu · filed 1998-11-05

However, the complaint contains no allegation the landlord was a state actor acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches a private prison company that incarcerates inmates because it performs a function exclusively reserved to the state.

Kesler v. King · filed 1998-12-07

Applying the public function test to the actions of Defendant CCRI, the Court concludes that this private company was performing a function, the incarceration of inmates, that falls within the exclusive responsibility of the state, and thus was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches a private party who willfully joins state officials in a conspiracy to deprive someone of a constitutional right.

Abbott v. Latshaw · filed 1998-12-11

Although not an agent of the state, a private party who willfully participates in a joint conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of a constitutional right acts"under color of state law" for purposes of S 1983.

Section 1983 can reach a private party that jointly participates with state officials; allegations that it supplied equipment through a state agency and acted in concert with officials can suffice at the pleading stage.

Balderaz v. Porter · filed 1983-12-14

Defendants who are not state officials may nevertheless be liable under § 1983 if they “jointly participated” in the actions of state officials. ... But Plaintiffs have gone beyond a mere conclusory allegation. They allege that C.M.I. manufactures and distributes the intoxilyzer equipment in question through the Ohio Department of Health, and acted “in concert” with the Defendants. Amended Complaint, 11119, 40. These allegations, though rather bare, are sufficient to put C.M.I. on notice of the type of conduct of which Plaintiffs accuse them.

Section 1983 liability for sexual harassment by nonsupervisory police co-employees requires evidence that the defendants exercised state authority over the plaintiff.

David v. Baniszewski · filed 1998-12-23

Our review of the record supports the district court’s determination that Officer David made no showing that defendants had exercised any authority over her.

Section 1983 permits claims against private entities when the complaint plausibly alleges that their conduct was attributable to the state through a close nexus or a joint relationship.

Coleman v. Town of Hempstead · filed 1999-01-04

Applying the generous standard of review required on a motion to dismiss, and the criteria set forth' above, the Court finds that the facts alleged in the Complaint permit the inference that LabCorp and University Services were acting under color of state law, under either the close-nexus or symbiotic relationship tests.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a private sporting organization’s board member when the challenged decision cannot be attributed to the state.

Pacheco v. Federacion Ecuestre De P.R. · filed 1999-01-15

The Centro Ecuestre and Federación Ecuestre are private entities, and their decisions with regard to allowing individuals to participate in their official events or facilities is a matter that in no reasonable manner can be characterized as coerced, encouraged by, or for the profit of, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Therefore, the action against Roig in her individual capacity or in her capacity as member of the Governing Board of the Centro Ecuestre cannot be validly pursued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach a union’s private conduct unless the union acts under governmental authority.

Turner v. Goldberg, Unpublished Decision (2-3-1999) · filed 1999-02-03

A cause of action pursuant to Section 1983 does not lie against non-governmental actors. OSCEA is an employee organization. Its actions against appellant were made in a private capacity, and thus, OSCEA does not fall within the purview of Section 1983. Furthermore, the record does not establish that OSCEA was clothed with governmental authority.

Section 1983 covers private parties who act in concert with state officers because they act under color of state law.

Unger v. Hacker · filed 1983-12-21

It is well established that private parties who act in concert with officers of the state are acting under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private employee when a jury could find that the employee’s conduct in performing a delegated public function is attributable to the state.

Doe v. City of Chicago · filed 1999-03-23

There remains a jury question as to whether this behavior may be fairly attributed to the state under § 1983.

A private, self-employed psychologist acting pursuant to a state court order is not acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Williams v. Bierman · filed 1999-04-13

Dr. Carra is a private, clinical psychologist and is a private person acting in a private capacity pursuant to a State court order. Dr. Carra is not acting under color of state law, and thus cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Private parties who act jointly with a state official may be treated as state actors under § 1983.

Coakley v. Jaffe · filed 1999-04-23

Drawing every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiffs, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs have, at least for present purposes, sufficiently pled the existence of joint action that warrants treating defendants Jaffe, Heller, and Neveloff as state actors for purposes of assessing plaintiffs’ federal false arrest claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private person who was not acting under color of state law.

Levy v. Alfano · filed 1999-04-29

It is, of course, well settled that a private person who is not acting under color of State law may not be sued under Section 1983.

Section 1983 treats a private party as acting under color of state law through joint action when the private party and public actors share a common, unconstitutional goal.

Sander P. Stagman v. James Ryan, Joseph Claps, Edward Ludwig, and Richard Jones · filed 1999-05-06

We have held that to establish joint action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the public and private actors shared a common, unconstitutional goal.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with a state actor if the state actor played a significant role in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Fullman v. Philadelphia International Airport · filed 1999-05-10

Conspiracy with a state actor will subject a private party to liability under § 1983, provided that the state actor played a significant role in the alleged deprivation of rights suffered by the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not treat a private contractor as acting under color of state law solely because it has a business relationship with the state.

White v. Cooper · filed 1999-05-20

However, a business relationship alone is insufficient to show that ADS acted under color of state law as to the allegations of deliberate indifference to plaintiffs constitutional rights.

A tribe without an “internal tribal matters” exemption cannot use that exemption to defeat a Section 1983 claim, though whether it acted under color of state law may remain unresolved.

Boudman v. Aroostook Band of Micmac Indians · filed 1999-06-16

While it is true that when the Passama-quoddy or the Penobscot act with respect to “internal tribal matters,” they are not liable under Section 1983 because they have not acted “under color of state law,” see Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 485 (1st Cir.1997), this particular analysis does not apply to Defendant because it does not enjoy an “internal tribal matters” exemption. To the extent there is a question as to Defendant's status as a state actor for purposes of the Section 1983 claim, this issue was not raised by Defendant in the Motion to Dismiss and should be addressed at the summary judgment stage.

Section 1983 does not treat a private attorney as a state actor merely for using state subpoena procedures.

Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, Inc. · filed 1999-07-16

We hold, therefore, that an attorney does not become a state actor simply by employing the state's subpoena laws.

A private party acts under color of state law for § 1983 when it willfully participates in joint activity with state officials.

Barton Protective Services, Inc. v. Faber · filed 1999-07-21

We find that this evidence was sufficient to support a jury's conclusion that Barton was a willing participant in joint activity with state agents.

Section 1983 covers an off-duty police officer working as a private security guard when she uses her police authority to stop and arrest a suspect.

Abraham v. Raso · filed 1999-07-26

Based on Griffin, it is clear that even though Raso was working off duty as a security guard, she was acting under color of state law: she was wearing a police uniform, ordered Abraham repeatedly to stop, and sought to arrest him.

Private parties who willfully participate in a corrupt conspiracy with a judge act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983, whether the judge is motivated by greed or favoritism.

DuBose v. Kelly · filed 1999-08-17

For purposes of determining the liability of private parties, it does not matter whether the state official is motivated by avarice, as in Dennis, or favoritism, as alleged here. The key inquiry is whether the private party was a willful participant in the corrupt conspiracy.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as a state actor when a police officer independently responds to that party’s legitimate request for assistance.

Ginsberg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc. And Michael P. Healey, John Fitzgerald · filed 1999-08-18

Where, as here, a police officer exercises independent judgment in how to respond to a private party’s legitimate request for assistance, the private party is not “jointly engaged” in the officer’s conduct so as to render it a state actor under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private repossessors when police involvement is insufficient to make the repossession action under color of state law.

John Barrett and Lynne Barrett v. Mary Harwood Scott Smith John Durant James Phillips and the Village of Malone · filed 1999-08-25

Since we have already concluded that Officer Durant did not participate in the repossession to an extent sufficient to “act together with” or “aid” Smith and Harwood in the repossession, the private individuals cannot be found liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private party who willfully participates in a corrupt conspiracy with a state official, regardless of the official's motive.

Dubose v. Kelly · filed 1999-09-17

For purposes of determining the liability of private parties, it does not matter whether the state official is motivated by avarice, as in Dennis, or favoritism, as alleged here. The key inquiry is whether the private party was a willful participant in the corrupt conspiracy.

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of state law.

Northeast Mines, Inc. v. Town of Smithtown · filed 1984-02-03

In order to maintain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendants must have acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 claims require a defendant to act under color of state law.

Bach v. Mason · filed 1999-10-21

As noted in the court’s previous order, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can only be brought against individuals acting under color of state law. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims must be dismissed to the extent that they are brought against individuals acting under color of federal law or nongovernmental individuals.

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation to be committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Abarca v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. · filed 1999-10-27

In the present case, plaintiffs cannot show that a violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

A § 1983 claim against private parties requires sufficient facts showing that they acted under color of state law, including any claimed joint participation with a state judge.

Chavez v. Propp · filed 1999-11-09

In this court, Chavezes’ basic position, as set forth in their brief, is that the district court erred in dismissing their federal claims, and that their complaint contained sufficient facts to support a § 1983 claim. In other words, the allegations in their complaint are sufficient to show that the defendants acted under color of state law and that in so doing they jointly participated with a state actor, the state district court judge.2 We disagree. In our view, Crabtree controls the instant appeal, and we are in accord with the reasoning of the district court in the instant case and the result it reached, namely, dismissal of the Chavezes’ federal claims and a dismissal without prejudice of its supplemental state claims.

Section 1983 permits liability for a store’s participation in a shoplifting investigation when a state procedure or working relationship gives the store authority to substitute its judgment for the police officers’ judgment.

Cruz v. Peter Donnelly, John Adams, a & P Food Stores and William Rayburn · filed 1984-02-10

Thus the Lugar test for private liability under § 1983 is wholly consistent with the analysis in the latest caselaw on suspected shoplifters. According to both, the critical issue before us today is whether the state, through its agents or laws, has established a formal procedure or working relationship that drapes private actors with the power of the state.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private person who acts under color of state law, including through a conspiracy with state actors.

Snow v. Village of Chatham · filed 2000-01-21

Section 1983 imposes liability only upon state actors, or private individuals who act under color of state law. The O’Rourkes could only be liable as state actors if they had engaged in a conspiracy with the Village Defendants, and contributed to the abuse of the legal system in attempting to drive Plaintiff from the apartment. Plaintiff has adduced no such evidence, aside from offering a theory under which anyone who grew up in the same town as another individual would presumptively have joined a conspiracy against a third party.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a public defender for representing a client because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Garner v. Cole · filed 2000-01-25

Second, Garner failed to state a section 1983 claim against the public defender, because the public defender was not acting under color of state law when representing Garner.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private party acted under color of state law; conclusory allegations of joint action are insufficient.

Degrassi v. City of Glendora · filed 2000-03-20

These conclusory allegations do not set forth facts supporting a claim that the Andrewses acted under color of law.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when police officers use their authority to seize and shoot a person.

Ovando v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2000-03-28

Here, there is little question that the acts by police officers were committed under color of state law.

A private person who supervises and maintains custody of a jail inmate on behalf of a county may be liable under § 1983 as a state actor.

Mauldin v. Burnette · filed 2000-03-30

As the person responsible for supervising and maintaining custody of plaintiff Mauldin from Monday through Friday of each week on behalf of Lamar County, James Burnette is subject to potential liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Gamble v. Carlton · filed 2000-04-12

The court dismissed Gamble’s claims against defendants Carlton, Joffe, and Stewart because they were not acting under color of state law. ... We have carefully reviewed the pleadings and briefs, the record on appeal, and the district court’s decision, and we agree with the district court’s resolution of plaintiff’s arguments and agree that plaintiff has failed to state any legally cognizable claims against defendants.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as a state actor merely because it reports suspected criminal activity to law enforcement officials.

Fleeger v. Bell · filed 2000-04-12

However, contrary to the suggestion extended in Fleeger’s submissions, the mere reporting of suspected criminal activity to law enforcement officials does not constitute the type of joint action capable of transforming a private party into a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 holds a private person liable for conspiring with a state actor when they agree to deprive someone of constitutional rights and the private person willfully participates in joint activity with the state.

Hanania v. Loren-Maltese · filed 2000-05-05

Establishing sec. 1983 liability through a conspiracy theory requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that (1) the private individual and a state official reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights and (2) the private individual was a willful participant in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Section 1983 does not treat a private insurer as acting under color of state law merely because it operates in a heavily regulated industry.

Hayes v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2000-05-08

It is clear that Allstate is not acting under color of state law, and that it cannot be considered a government actor merely because it does business in a heavily regulated industry.

Section 1983 does not apply to appointed counsel acting within the scope of counsel’s duties because counsel is not acting under color of state law.

Allen v. Roberts · filed 2000-05-19

As such appointed counsel, acting within the scope of his duties, Mr. Roberts was not acting under color of state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not applicable.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to be fairly attributable to the state; conclusory allegations of collusion with government do not suffice.

Poling v. K. Hovnanian Enterprises · filed 2000-05-24

Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations that the individual defendants have colluded with the East Windsor Township and the New Jersey Department of Transportation to “deprive plaintiffs of partnership property interests and/or liberty interests under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, or usage” (compitio 363, 364) are insufficient to state a claim for violation of section 1983 because plaintiffs have alleged no conduct of the individual defendants’ that is “fairly attributable to the state.”

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; an assistant county attorney representing a client in private divorce proceedings is not a state actor for that conduct.

Sepeda v. Densford · filed 2000-06-07

Although this fact was not finally determined by the district court, further development of the facts is not required because the district court concluded correctly that Mr. Densford, in representing Ms. Sepeda in the civil divorce proceedings, had not acted as a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

A court-appointed personal representative administering a private estate does not act under color of state law for § 1983.

Loyd v. Raymond L. Loyd, Kenneth L. Owens, and Judith Owens · filed 1984-03-26

We recognize, of course, that in the case of the personal representative, the fiduciary is protecting interests of the creditors and, indeed, the state, insofar as obligations to the state are concerned, but nevertheless the personal representatives are acting in a private capacity and not as functionaries of the state.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a person acting under color of state law.

Bernard Thomas Church v. A. B. Smith A. Young · filed 1992-10-28

While the district court was incorrect in noting that MCI was not named as a defendant by Church, the result remains the same.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to act jointly or conspire with state officials; supplying information that leads to an arrest does not alone establish that connection.

Torgerson v. Writsel · filed 2000-07-21

Certainly, the fact that Writsel furnished information to the police that ultimately led to Torgerson’s arrest does not, by itself, support a finding of joint or conspiratorial state action in his arrest.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a union merely for negotiating a collective bargaining agreement with a government employer; the negotiations alone do not establish that the union acted under color of state law.

McGovern v. Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters · filed 2000-07-26

Mere negotiation in the course of completing a collective bargaining agreement does not rise to the level of an improper conspiracy. ... Therefore, defendant did not act under the color of state law, and cannot be subject to liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 treats state university professors and administrators as state actors when they perform their official responsibilities in taking the challenged action.

Ornelas v. Regents Univ. of NM · filed 2000-08-21

The fact that we consider the defendants to be state actors does not undermine our deference to their academic decisions.

A § 1983 claim against a private party requires allegations connecting that party to state action; conclusory allegations of a conspiracy with a state officer are insufficient.

Bryant v. TX Utilities Svcs · filed 2000-09-14

Based on such review, we agree with the district court that Appellees’ alleged activities do not rise to the level of a conspiracy, sufficient to state a claim under §§ 1983, 1985 or 1986.

A state employee acts under color of law when she uses access provided for her official duties to obtain confidential information for a private purpose.

Mcdade v. West · filed 2000-09-15

Therefore, since she committed an act that was related to her official duties, we conclude that Ms. West acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a licensed attorney’s representation of a client as action under color of state law.

Evitt v. Durland · filed 2000-11-28

However, the proposition that a licensed attorney representing a client is acting under color of law for purposes of § 1983 has been squarely rejected.

Section 1983 requires sufficient evidence of conspiracy or joint action with the state to hold a private defendant liable for acting under color of law.

Sigmon v. CommunityCare HMO, Inc. · filed 2000-12-11

We find that Sigmon failed to put forth sufficient evidence of a conspiracy or joint action to show that the Appellees acted under color of law, as is required for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats an on-duty police officer’s actions as taken under color of state law.

Sulkowska v. City of New York · filed 2001-01-24

In this case, the first element is undisputed, because the actions about which plaintiff complains were committed by Officer Daskalakis, who, as a police officer in the course of duty, clearly acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private person who merely reports a nuisance to officials who independently decide to act.

Weaver v. Boyles · filed 2001-02-21

In sum, the defendant Sapata did not act under color of state law in telephoning the City of Topeka and providing information about a nuisance on the plaintiffs property.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; an employer’s withholding of federal income taxes from wages does not satisfy that requirement.

Reese v. Bayview Electric Co. · filed 2001-03-09

As the defendants are not state actors, nor was the withholding of federal taxes from Reese’s salary attributable to the state, Reese did not state a cause of action under § 1983.

A public defender is not amenable to suit under § 1983 for defense work without evidence of joint action with state officials.

Trobaugh v. Sondag · filed 2001-03-19

We are unable to infer from plaintiff’s evidence, however, or from anything else in the record, that defendant conspired with the county attorneys to induce plaintiff to plead guilty. Therefore, defendant is not amenable to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private citizen to allege that the citizen acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Mizkun v. Blanas · filed 2001-04-04

Mizkun also failed to allege that Zupan, a private citizen, acted under the color of California law and deprived him of a right protected by either the federal constitution or federal law.

A defense attorney performing traditional functions as counsel in a criminal proceeding does not act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes.

Ferrell v. Barr · filed 2001-04-13

A defense attorney does not act "under color of state law" for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 purposes when he performs a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Private parties’ alleged misuse of a state statute, without a challenge to the statute itself, does not state a § 1983 claim.

Zeckendorf v. Lutz · filed 2001-04-17

Finally, since plaintiffs do not challenge the New York statute under which defendants applied ex parte for entry into plaintiffs’ residence, but instead allege merely that defendants, private parties, misused a statute, they fail to state a claim for violation of 42 USC § 1983 (see, Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co., 457 US 922, 940).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a complaint alleging no such involvement fails to state a claim.

Strother v. Harte · filed 2001-04-25

The complaint here does not allege any involvement by anyone acting under color of state law. Hence, plaintiffs fail to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private individual as a state actor merely because the individual files a criminal complaint.

Smith v. City of Gretna Police Department · filed 2001-04-26

The filing of a criminal complaint is insufficient to transform a private individual into a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability.

A town supervisor acts under color of state law for § 1983 when he fires a town employee or tells a resident he will be fined for a permit violation.

Emanuele v. Town of Greenville · filed 2001-05-08

This Court has little difficulty concluding that when the Town Supervisor fires an employee, or telephones a citizen of the town to tell him that he is going to be fined for building a deck without a permit, he is acting under color of law.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is satisfied when private defendants willingly participate in the challenged conduct of police officers.

Smith v. Germania of America · filed 2001-05-10

The plaintiffs’ complaint merely alleges that the Germania defendants willingly participated in the officers’ actions because the officers acted under policies adopted by their employer. If the plaintiffs can prove this, they will have satisfied the requirement of state action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for conduct by a private party that did not act under color of state law.

Johnson, Robert A. v. City of Evanston · filed 2001-05-11

For example, the Clinic’s acquisition of his car from the public streets may violate Illinois law, but the Clinic did not act under color of state law and so cannot be liable for this deed under sec.1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a private actor’s taking of property when the actor did not act under color of state law.

Johnson v. City of Evanston, Illinois · filed 2001-05-11

... but the Clinic did not act under color of state law and so cannot be liable for this deed under § 1983.

A private defendant’s joint action with the state can satisfy § 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement, which the jury decides as a factual issue.

Doe v. Gonzaga University · filed 2001-05-31

Whether the defendants were acting under color of state law is an issue of fact for the jury. Where there is joint action of the sort described at trial, the jury had substantial evidence to find that action under color of state law is present.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state; a private school’s receipt of government funding does not alone make its staff state actors.

Robert S. v. Stetson School, Inc. · filed 2001-07-03

Particularly in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rendell-Baker, we agree with the District Court that Robert failed to show that the challenged actions of the Stetson staff may be fairly attributed to the state.

An officer can act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 despite a clerical error in recording his commission.

Pipoly v. Premier Parks, Inc. · filed 2001-08-20

A clerical error by the Clerk of Courts-neither discovered nor corrected until soon after the Geauga Lake incident-does not negate the fact that Rockwood was acting under color of state law as deputy sheriff on the day in question.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is met when the defendants are a public nursing home district and its personnel.

Tinder v. Lewis County Nursing Home Dist. · filed 2001-10-17

Here, Defendants admit that Lewis County Nursing Home District is a governmental entity, created and existing as a creature of statute. It is axiomatic that these Defendants are state actors and, as such, their conduct occurred "under color of state law."

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; state action cannot be attributed to a private organization without a sufficient connection between the state and the challenged conduct.

Adams Ex Rel. Harris v. Boy Scouts of America-Chickasaw Council · filed 2001-11-21

Because the Boy Scouts Chickasaw Council was not acting under color of state law, appellants’ claims against that party under §§ 1981 and 1983 fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of law.

Goldberg v. Peters · filed 2001-11-26

In opposition to the respondent’s prima facie demonstration of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the respondent was acting under color of law (see, 42 USC § 1983; Dahlberg v Becker, 748 F2d 85, cert denied 470 US 1084; Powell v Jarvis, 460 F2d 551; Perlstein v Rode & Horn Lbr. Corp., — F Supp 2d —, 2000 WL 1693679 [ED NY, Nov. 6, 2000]; Torgerson v Writsel, 109 F Supp 2d 107).

Section 1983 requires allegations sufficient to establish that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Faust v. Walt Disney Co. · filed 2001-11-28

The § 1983 claim against Disney must also fail because Faust’s allegations against Disney fall far short of establishing that Disney should be treated as having acted under the color of state law.

A private citizen does not act under color of state law merely by giving information to police officers.

Lockhead v. Weinstein · filed 2001-12-20

But the mere furnishing of information to police officers does not constitute joint action under color of state law which renders a private citizen liable under § 1983.

Private citizens who conspire with public officials to deprive others of federal rights can be treated as state actors under Section 1983.

Seeds v. Lucero · filed 2001-12-21

Such evidence, albeit circumstantial, is sufficient to transform the Vander-Vossens into state actors for purposes of Section 1983 analysis.

Section 1983 permits a jury to find that a private security guard acted under color of state law when he represented that he was exercising his authority as a special police officer during an altercation and arrest.

Grant v. John Hancock Mutual, Life Insurance · filed 2002-01-08

Grant’s allegations against Glancy in this count stem directly from the altercation and arrest, during which Glancy represented that he was using the authority granted him as a Special Officer. There is sufficient evidence to leave it to the jury to determine whether Glancy was acting under color of state law.