42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims may be brought only against persons acting under color of state law.

D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School · filed 1992-08-11

It is clear that § 1983 actions may only be maintained against persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits claims only against persons acting under color of state law.

D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School · filed 1992-08-11

It is clear that § 1983 actions may only be maintained against persons acting under color of state law.

A public high school wrestling coach acts under color of state law when coaching a school team at a school sponsored meet.

Fenstermaker v. Nesfedder · filed 1992-08-31

A high school wrestling coach is unquestionably a state actor when engaged in coaching a school wrestling team at a school sponsored wrestling meet.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private contractor or its employees merely because they carry out a state program under a government contract; their challenged conduct must be fairly attributable to the state.

Black ex rel. Black v. Indiana Area School District · filed 1993-01-29

If they were not, they can have no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... It is clear from Rendell-Baker that a state contractor and its employees are not state actors simply because they are carrying out a state sponsored program and the contractor is being compensated therefor by the state. ... We thus conclude that the actions of Myers, Claypoole, and Vernon O. Clay-poole, Inc. cannot fairly be attributed to the state and that summary judgment in their favor was required.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law, a requirement analyzed here together with the constitutional state action requirement.

Tynecki v. Tufts University School of Dental Medicine · filed 1994-12-26

Accordingly, the state action requirement under both the Massachusetts and Federal Constitutions and the "under color of state law" requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are essentially the same and may be collapsed into a single state action analysis in the present case.

Section 1983 treats contracted presenters who perform educational functions for a public school as acting under color of state law.

Wojcik v. Town of North Smithfield · filed 1995-01-04

As school presenters, Marceau and Costanza performed functions typically delegated to the state’s educators. They were hired to employ their educational expertise. Their presentation was required by the terms of a contract which the RCC entered into with the North Smithfield School system. Therefore, this Court concludes that the RCC defendants acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover school district representatives contesting an unemployment insurance claim when they act on the same footing as private employers rather than under color of state law.

West v. Wessels · filed 1995-07-19

In matters before the administrative agency that processes unemployment insurance claims, school district employers stand on the same footing as private employers. There is thus no special cloak of state law that attends the action of school district representatives in dealing with the agency on such matters. We do not believe that West’s claim, viewed most favorably to him, states a cause of action under § 1983 based on the unemployment insurance dispute.

Section 1983 allows individual-capacity claims against officers when a material factual dispute remains over whether they acted under color of law to violate civil rights.

G.W. McCoig and Margaret H. Darnell v. Jefferson City, Tennessee, Randy Holt and Todd Loveday · filed 1995-12-21

In light of the evidence that Holt and Loveday failed to arrest Derrick; failed to administer a breathalizer test to him; covered the surveillance camera in the police station; left Loveday's cruiser on the street and drove Derrick to Bronwen's apartment; failed to call for back-up assistance to restrain Derrick; and eventually decided to abandon the scene at the apartment complex, we hold that a material factual dispute remains with regard to whether the officers acted under color of law to violate Bronwen and/or Derrick's civil rights.

Section 1983 permits recovery against a private person who conspires with state police officials to violate federally protected rights because the conspiracy supplies action under color of law.

Tauss v. Rizzo · filed 1973-07-23

It is clear that if the plaintiffs proved that defendant Rizzo conspired with the police officials to violate the plaintiffs’ civil rights there would be sufficient color of law to permit recovery by the plaintiffs against Rizzo.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation caused by a person acting under color of state law; a private person’s false report to police, without more, does not satisfy that requirement.

Kahermanes v. Marchese · filed 1973-07-25

The deliberate giving of false information by an individual to a police officer to cause the arrest of another does not give rise to a cause of action under the Civil Rights Acts. ... Plaintiff’s action cannot be sustained under this section since there is no basis for a finding that any of Márchese, Jr.’s actions were under color of state law. Plaintiff did allege a conspiracy between Márchese, Jr. and the deputy sheriffs which probably does state a cause of action under § 1983, considered in combination with § 1985(3), ... but entry of summary judgment in Sergeant Fair’s favor, and the voluntary dismissal of the action against the other deputy sheriffs removed all possibility of establishing conspiracy as a possible ground of violation of these sections.

Section 1983 permits an action against local law-enforcement officers acting under color of state law for excessive force, and requires intentional participation by a state actor.

Beatrice J. Reilly and Foursome Inn Corp. v. John H. Doyle, Individually, and as Chief of Police of the Town of East Hampton · filed 1973-07-26

Without the intentional participation of these “public” defendants in the scheme, a § 1983 action must fail for lack of a person acting under color of state law. ... Finally parts of paragraphs 15 and 27 remain. In part the plaintiff, Beatrice Reilly, alleges that on two different occasions Officer Jarrett and Officer Lyon used force and violence to arrest her. An action pursuant to § 1983 is established when local law enforcement officers acting under color of state law use excessive force in the enforcement of state and local laws.

Section 1983 reaches police officers who act under color of law and deprive people of constitutional rights, even when they abuse official authority.

Binner v. Callahan · filed 1974-07-19

While recognizing that the policemen had abused the authority of their offices, the court held that they were acting “under color” of law. ... Having accepted those findings we agree with the court’s ... conclusions of law for the reasons stated in its memorandum decision of August 9, 1973.

Section 1983 permits a claim for unlawful arrest when the plaintiff proves deprivation of a federal right and action under color of state law; a store employee's detention may satisfy the state-action element when employees and police act in concert pursuant to a customary plan.

Lawrence J. Duriso, Cross-Appellant v. K-Mart No. 4195, Division of S. S. Kresge Company, Defendant- Cross-Appellee · filed 1977-09-28

In order to recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish both deprivation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and action by defendant under color of state law. ... Regarding the “under color of state law” requirement, this Court has held that a detention by store employees is under color of state law if it is demonstrated that the store employees and the police were acting in concert and that the store and the police had a customary plan which resulted in the detention.

Section 1983 reaches a private towing company acting under color of state law, but liability also requires a causal link between the state action and the alleged constitutional violation.

Mays v. Scranton City Police Department · filed 1980-08-15

It is precisely because Gallucci removed the car pursuant to state law, however, that exposes him to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The mere fact that a tower acts “under color of state law,” however, does not necessarily make him liable to a civil rights plaintiff. A causal link between the state action and the alleged constitutional violation must be established before liability attaches.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of law and play an affirmative part in depriving another of constitutional rights; a police director may be liable in an official capacity when he should have known of an officer's dangerous propensities and failed to act.

Brandon v. Allen · filed 1981-07-08

For one to be liable under this provision, he must act under “color of law,” and in doing so he must play an “affirmative part” in the deprivation of the constitutional rights of another. ... Mr. Chapman could not be held liable under any theory for the actions of the off duty officer Allen, as long as Officer Allen had failed to act under “color of law.” However, when Officer Allen displayed his official police identification and used his police revolver, he acted under “color of law.” ... Because Mr. Chapman, as Police Director, should have known of Officer Allen’s dangerous propensities the Court finds that he must be held liable, in his official capacity, to the plaintiffs.

Section 1983 does not reach acts by police officers undertaken in their personal, private pursuits; liability requires action under color of law.

King v. Ware · filed 1981-10-06

Acts of police officers in the ambit of their personal, private pursuits fall outside of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private defendant whose conduct was not under color of state law because he was not a willing participant in joint activity with the police.

Green v. Donroe · filed 1982-02-16

Since he was not a willing participant in the deprivation of the constitutional rights claimed by the plaintiff, his wrongful conduct was not “under color” of state law and he is not liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a police officer’s acts when the officer acts as a private individual rather than under color of state law.

Lawson v. Wiggins · filed 1983-02-23

As indicated by the case authorities discussed above, police officers may act as private individuals just as any other individual may, and such individual actions do not fall within the coverage of § 1983.

A court-appointed attorney and a police officer acting as a private individual do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Harrison v. Paul v. Rahaley Charles Bardon · filed 1986-08-04

The police officer in this case was allegedly acting as a private individual and not as a public servant of the state when he charged the plaintiff with committing a robbery against the officer. See Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 1975). A court appointed attorney likewise does not act under color of state law. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Ellison v. Dela Rosa, 685 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1982). The lack of state action, therefore, properly defeated the maintenance of plaintiff's Sec. 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 does not cover a police officer’s private conduct when the officer does not invoke official authority; later police discipline does not make that conduct action under color of state law.

Manning v. Jones · filed 1988-08-16

However, when a police officer acts as a private individual, without invoking the authority of his position, his acts are not within the purview of § 1983, and any discipline imposed later on the officer for such act does not clothe the act with “color of state law” for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on a private person’s use of force or search when the complaint does not allege that the person was a state agent or that state officials ratified, condoned, or instigated his acts.

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department Al Olsen, Police Chief, Individually and as a Police Agent · filed 1988-08-23

Balistreri’s complaint alleges no facts at all suggesting that defendants subjected her to any search, seizure, or use of force, lawful or otherwise. There is no allegation tending to show that Balistreri’s husband was a state agent, or that his acts were ratified, condoned or instigated by the state. Accordingly, dismissal of these claims was proper.

Section 1983’s state-action element is satisfied when municipal police enforce a state statute.

News and Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Cox · filed 1988-12-19

Here, the enforcement of Fla.Stat. sec. 337.406 by the Fort Lauder-dale police establishes the requisite element of state action to establish a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against city police who execute tribal court orders when the complaint sufficiently alleges that they also acted under color of state law.

Evans v. McKay · filed 1989-03-16

While these law enforcement officers may be said to have been acting pursuant to Tribal Court orders during the incidents in question, they were also allegedly and arguably acting in their capacity as City of Browning police officers. ... Given this explicit allegation of official state authority, coupled with the “peculiar” law enforcement situation as it exists on the reservation, we conclude that the appellants have sufficiently pleaded action under color of state law to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is satisfied when city officials exercise their authority over police personnel decisions.

Perez v. Cucci · filed 1989-05-02

Clearly, defendants are all public employees who had positions that influence city personnel decisions. Thus, consistent with the general rule, I find, and defendants do not dispute, that they are state actors. Hence, plaintiff has satisfied the first element of a claim under § 1983.

A private merchant acts under color of state law for section 1983 when it works in concert with police to detain and prosecute a suspected shoplifter, supported by a state statute authorizing merchant detention.

Murray v. Wal-Mart, Inc. · filed 1989-05-11

This state statute, combined with the concerted actions of Wal-Mart and the local police department, afford ample evidence of willful, joint activity which supports a claim against Wal-Mart under section 1983.

Police issuing citations based on a private citizen’s arrest, without substantial cooperation, does not make the private party a state actor under § 1983.

Collins v. Womancare · filed 1989-06-23

In light of the foregoing cases, we hold that the facts alleged by the Collins group fail as a matter of law to satisfy the joint activity test for state action under section 1983. ... The police officer's issuance of citations based on the citizen's arrests does not constitute joint action.

Section 1983 does not treat a state official’s report of an alleged crime to police as action under color of state law when the official uses no state authority to make the report.

Raymond J. Hughes, Jr. v. Dale Meyer, John Buss and Robert Combs · filed 1990-01-10

In any case, Buss’s acts of describing his encounter with the Hughes brothers was functionally equivalent to that of any private citizen reporting to the police the details of an alleged criminal act. His status as a DNR official did not clothe him with greater authority to make statements to the police about the occurrence than any other citizen would possess. Thus, we conclude that Buss did not act under color of state law by virtue of his employment by the DNR.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; claims based on a private person’s force, search, or seizure need allegations connecting that conduct to the state.

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department Al Olsen, Police Chief, Individually and as a Police Agent · filed 1990-05-11

To sustain an action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. ... There is no allegation tending to show that Balistreri’s husband was a state agent, or that his acts were ratified, condoned or instigated by the state. Accordingly, dismissal of these claims was proper.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when police officers allegedly deprive a person of constitutional rights while executing a search warrant.

Hernandez v. Phillip Maxwell and Midland Police Department · filed 1990-07-10

The second requirement is manifest-the officers were acting under color of state law when they allegedly deprived Hernandez of his constitutional rights. Hernandez adequately alleges such.

Section 1983 requires a complaint against private store security personnel to allege with specificity a pre-arranged plan under which police substitute the store’s judgment for their own authority.

Vassallo v. Clover, Division of Strawbridge & Clothier · filed 1990-07-24

As required under Cruz, “the existence of a pre-arranged plan by which the police substituted the judgment of private parties for their own official authority” has not been spelled out with requisite specificity even superimposing plaintiff’s argument on the facts that appear in the complaint.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private citizen’s mere participation in a police investigation does not satisfy that requirement.

MacK v. Butler · filed 1990-08-23

Second, as private citizens, these defendants’ mere participation in the investigation of possible criminal misconduct on the part of Mack does not meet the color of state law requirement essential to a viable claim under § 1983.

A private physician acts under color of state law for § 1983 when performing a body cavity search under a police warrant, even without a state contract.

Rodriquez v. Furtado · filed 1991-02-11

In the instant case, Dr. Falkoff, though not under contract to the state, clearly functioned as a state actor when performing the vaginal search of plaintiff.

A railroad police officer acting in his police capacity under authority conferred by the state acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Roby v. Skupien · filed 1991-03-07

From these allegations, the court can conclude that Officer Skupien performed the claimed actions in his railroad police capacity and, therefore, under color of state law.

A police officer who abuses his official position to detain a person and seize property can act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

McClendon v. Turner · filed 1991-05-30

It is quite clear then, that plaintiff charges Detective Turner with abusing his position to enjoin Ms. Phillips from cashing the check and then to confiscate it. Although plaintiff may fail to prove these allegations, we cannot agree with the Magistrate that, if proved, such facts would not support a finding of state action.

Section 1983 does not make a private eyewitness a state actor merely because the eyewitness reports an incident to police and testifies in court.

Kenneth W. Melton, Sharon J. Melton v. Michelle R. Dermota, Neil L. Benson, Anne Arundel County · filed 1991-08-06

Certainly, an eye-witness's mere reporting of an incident to the police and testifying thereon in court is insufficient to constitute such liability.

Special police officers act under color of state law for § 1983 when they exercise state-conferred arrest powers to arrest and search a person.

Woodward & Lothrop v. Hillary · filed 1991-09-26

Sellers and Wigfall acted under color of this authority in forcibly arresting Hillary, searching him incident to the arrest, and seizing the allegedly converted two hundred dollars.

Section 1983 treats a police chief acting as an officer during an arrest as acting under color of law.

Williams v. Adams · filed 1991-10-31

Defendant was, in fact, acting under color of law as that phrase is relevant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A private party making a citizen's arrest may act under color of law for Section 1983 purposes when police officers substantially cooperate in the arrest.

Robert Zimmerman, Michael Secter v. Nakatani · filed 1991-12-19

We conclude that a reasonable jury could find that state action was present in the citizen's arrests because the police officers substantially cooperated with the Bureau officials in removing Zimmerman and Secter from the Fair.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against tribal police executing a tribal order because they are not acting under color of state law.

Marilyn Evans and Carl Evans v. City of Browning · filed 1992-03-24

If the appellees were acting as tribal police executing a tribal order, they were not acting under the color of state law and cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; police and mall security officers who take no action pursuant to statutory authority do not satisfy that requirement.

Charleston Joint Venture v. McPherson · filed 1992-04-06

Moreover, the police and security officers, having taken no action pursuant to their statutory authority, did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to police officers' taking custody of someone after a private citizen's arrest; the citizen's earlier actions do not shield the officers.

Browning v. City of Hawthorne Hawthorne Police Department Stephen Port, Police Chief Michael Effler, Hawthorne P. · filed 1992-09-28

In this case, defendants assert that the City and the police officers cannot be held liable because Browning's wife, and not the police officers, arrested Browning. Although this is technically correct, the police officers did take custody of Browning subsequent to his wife's arresting him. We will not insulate the officers' actions from challenge merely because they were preceded or induced by the actions of a private citizen.

Section 1983 requires the person who deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right to have acted under color of state law.

Knight v. Jeff Sanders, Detective Walter Spalding and Timothy Rupel (Officers), Tucson Police Department · filed 1993-02-24

To state a claim under § 1983, Knight must show that the actor depriving him of a constitutional right was acting under color of state law. ... Because we affirm the district court's determination that neither TPD nor the named officers were responsible for the towing of Knight's vehicle, Knight cannot allege that Gary's Towing acted under color of state law.

A private towing operator acts under color of state law when it takes possession of a vehicle at the police's direction and for their mutual benefit.

Johnson v. Bradshaw · filed 1993-08-23

The court held that because Casselli had taken possession of the car at the direction and to the mutual benefit of the police, his actions with respect to the car were sufficiently connected to the state to sustain section 1983 liability. The court also held, however, that Casselli had established by uncontroverted evidence that he had provided notice sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. We agree.

Section 1983 treats an active-duty police officer performing police functions as acting under color of state law even when the officer lacks authority for the specific arrest outside the officer’s jurisdiction.

Rambo v. Daley · filed 1994-05-10

Thus, reconciling Gibson with Monroe suggests the following rule: If you are an active-duty police officer, specially authorized by virtue of that status to carry a badge and a gun and to act like a police officer, then if you do act like a police officer you may well be acting under color of state law even if you lack actual authority for your specific actions, no matter how, why, or where you act.

Section 1983 requires proof that a private defendant acted jointly or in concert with police officers to hold that defendant liable.

Beck v. Peggy Wheeler S. Solis S. Martin v. Terrian N. Green City of Seattle Seattle Municipal Court · filed 1994-05-13

Moreover, he has failed to make any evidentiary showing regarding his allegation that Wheeler acted jointly or in concert with the officers, an element essential to his case against her and one on which Beck would bear the burden of proof at trial.

Section 1983 can reach federal agents when allegations that they jointly executed a state warrant with local police support an inference that they acted under color of state law.

Maravilla v. United States · filed 1994-10-17

The Amended Complaint does allege that ATF agents and ECPD officers worked together to plan the execution of the warrant for the arrest of Jesus, which was a state warrant, and that both ATF agents and ECPD officers participated in the initial entry into the Maravilla residence. Thus, the face of the Amended Complaint here alleges facts that could support a claim that the ATF agents, although federal agents, were acting under color of state law in- executing the warrant. Therefore, the ATF agents’ motion to dismiss the 1983 claims against them for failure to plead state action is denied.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is met when a police chief suspends an officer, even if the dispute leading to the suspension concerns a private bank’s policy.

Harper v. Crockett · filed 1994-10-26

It is obvious that the state action was the suspension, not the bank’s fee policy. Thus, it is clear that the “under color of state law” requirement was met.

Police officers acting in their official capacity act under color of law for purposes of Section 1983.

Carnell v. Grimm · filed 1994-12-27

They therefore acted “under color of law” for the purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat mere knowledge that a person is a police officer as sufficient to show action under color of state law.

Hunte v. Darby Borough · filed 1995-02-10

Mere knowledge that an actor is a police officer is not enough to show action under color of state law.

A private person who reports conduct to police does not act under color of law for purposes of § 1983 when the police independently decide to arrest.

Sanders v. Howlett · filed 1995-03-30

A private party who reports conduct to the police has not acted under color of law where the police make an independent decision to arrest. See id.

A private person making a citizens’ arrest may act under color of state law for § 1983 when police jointly participate in the arrest; evidence that officers asked the person to make the arrest can create a triable issue.

Baugus v. Brunson · filed 1995-06-13

Were Baugus to credibly testify to this version of events, a jury could reasonably find that Longshore and the Highway Patrol officers jointly participated in Baugus’ arrest. ... The court cannot determine on a motion for summary judgment that Longshore was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on police officers for conduct that was not under color of law.

Cronin v. Town of Amesbury · filed 1995-07-25

Under this analysis, defendant police officers would not be liable under any section 1983 claim based upon their supposed retrieval and dissemination of the letter as there is no evidence that their conduct was under color of law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an officer’s advice to a private person to file criminal charges on her own behalf does not satisfy that requirement.

Heinfling v. Colapinto · filed 1996-10-22

Soltis did not file the criminal charges against Plaintiff in New York; at most, Soltis advised Colapinto to file criminal charges on her own behalf. Plaintiff has therefore failed to show that Soltis’ alleged involvement with the filing of the criminal complaint in New York was an action taken under color of state law.

A conservator’s appointment by a probate court does not, by itself, satisfy § 1983’s requirement that the defendant act under color of state law.

Darlow v. Shawmut Bank, No. Cv 95 0551354 (Nov. 5, 1996) · filed 1996-11-05

In count five, the plaintiff alleges that Shawmut, as an agent of the Probate Court and acting under color of state law, deprived him of his due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , 1985 (3), 1986 and 1988 . The defendant moves to strike this count on the grounds that the defendant, as the plaintiff's conservator, was not a state actor and did not act "under color of state law." The Court finds Shawmut's claim to be persuasive.

Section 1983 treats a police informant as a state actor at the pleading stage when allegations show that officers recruited him to provide false statements for a prosecution.

DiNicola v. DiPaolo · filed 1996-11-06

We next consider the “state actor” status of Defendant Edwards, whom Plaintiff avers was recruited by DiPaolo and Gunter to provide false statements in connection with Plaintiffs prosecution. Upon review of the complaint, we find the allegations as to Edwards sufficient to establish state action under either the “public function” analysis or the “conspiracy” analysis.

Section 1983 does not reach a private employer’s firing decision without a sufficient connection to state action; government contracts and use of government equipment do not establish that connection when the government does not participate in employment decisions.

Emerick v. United Technologies Corp. · filed 1996-11-22

UTC's firing of Emerick did not constitute state action, and therefore, dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim was appropriate. UTC is a private corporation. Although it has numerous government contracts, and uses some government owned equipment, its facilities and land are privately owned. Additionally, the government does not participate in its employment decisions. There is an insufficient connection between UTC and the government to find state action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against private citizens for violations of state law.

Porchia v. Century 21 · filed 1996-12-20

Porchia has failed to state a cognizable § 1983 complaint because he alleged violations of state law by private citizens.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a nonsupervisory official’s failure to act to identify a cognizable duty imposed by state or federal law; without that duty, the omission is not under color of law.

Doe v. Claiborne County, Tennessee · filed 1996-12-26

We conclude that to state a claim for a failure to act when the alleged wrongdoer is not a supervisory government official, a plaintiff must separately establish the "color of law" requirement of section 1983 by identifying some cognizable duty that state or federal law imposes upon the alleged "enactor." In the absence of a duty there is no section 1983 liability because the failure to act cannot be said to have occurred under color of law.

A public official making a personal police complaint unrelated to official duties does not act under color of law for § 1983.

Marion v. Groh · filed 1997-01-17

Plaintiffs § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Groh is legally insufficient because, even if Groh’s statement to Roy concerning the plaintiffs conduct in the parking lot was false, Groh did not act under color of law. Groh did not complain to Roy in her capacity as first seleetwoman; the complaint was unrelated to her duties as first seleetwoman. Her conduct in telling Roy that the plaintiff had cursed at her and tried to hit her with his car was like that of any private citizen making a complaint to the police.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is not met merely because a private nonprofit association is created under state law when the state does not establish or enforce its deed restrictions.

Anelli v. Arrowhead Lakes Community Ass'n · filed 1997-02-13

Consequently, we reject the Anellis’ argument that the Commonwealth plays a part in establishing or enforcing the deed restrictions or covenants of the Association because the Association is a private nonprofit corporation created and organized under the Nonprofit Corporation Law. Therefore, we cannot hold that the Association’s alleged discriminatory actions, with respect to the enforcement of the deed restriction prohibiting signs, were taken under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the wrongdoer to exercise authority conferred by the state; private corporate misconduct alone does not qualify.

Angela C.R. Deserrato v. State Farm Insurance Company, Bloomington, Illinois · filed 1997-03-07

Thus, § 1983 affords no remedy even for the violation of federal rights unless the wrongdoer exercised some authority conferred by the state--typically by acting within the scope of government employment or agency. Plaintiff's allegations, which assert private corporate misconduct, do not satisfy this condition.

A separate instruction defining action under color of law is unnecessary when the defendant concedes that element of a § 1983 claim and the jury is told of the concession.

Kelley v. Watson · filed 1997-03-14

Kelley’s Proposed Instruction No. 8 defining “color of law” was not covered by the court’s instructions. However, this element of Kelley’s § 1983 action was conceded by Watson and the court so advised the jury in Final Instruction Nos. 10 and 18. The trial court’s instructions adequately covered the issues presented by Kelley and thus the court’s refusal of the proposed instructions did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-law requirement is not satisfied by an officer’s peacekeeping presence at a private repossession when the officer neither helps carry it out nor intimidates the debtor into foregoing resistance.

Barrett v. Harwood · filed 1997-07-03

Moreover, the “under color of law” requirement of § 1983 is virtually identical to the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... On the present facts, Officer Durant neither assisted in effectuating the repossession nor intimidated John Barrett so as to cause him to refrain from exercising his legal right to resist the repossession. ... In sum, the Court finds that because no state action is present, plaintiffs have failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not impose liability for conduct attributable only to the federal government.

Mary E. MORSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTH COAST OPPORTUNITIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1997-07-08

Lest there be any continuing confusion, we take this opportunity to remind the Bar that by its very terms, § 1983 precludes liability in federal government actors.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not cover federal officials or employees acting under federal law.

Weiss v. Sawyer · filed 1997-09-19

To state a claim for relief under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has acted under color of state law; Section 1983 does not apply to wrongdoing by federal officials and employees acting under federal law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private parties who conduct a private investigation and give its results to police absent facts showing a sufficiently close nexus to the state.

McClinton v. Delta Pride Catfish, Inc. · filed 1997-09-29

On their face, the defendants are private parties whose actions are not considered to be under color of state law. The plaintiff has failed to allege facts which, if true, would show that there existed a sufficiently close nexus between the defendants and the state such that the defendants’ actions could be considered that of the state itself. The alleged facts show that the defendant Delta Pride suspected that it was the victim of criminal activity and hired the defendant Pendleton to conduct a private investigation. Upon completing the investigation, Delta Pride and Pendleton turned over the information they had discovered to the local law enforcement officials. The court, finding no state action from which to hold the defendants liable, finds that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim should be dismissed.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law element can be satisfied when a judge’s official status enables the alleged misconduct in a courthouse.

Barbara Monsky, for Herself and on Behalf of All Women Similarly Situated v. Honorable Howard J. Moraghan · filed 1997-10-02

The allegations of the complaint would permit the plaintiff to prove that ordinary citizens were not permitted to bring their dogs into the Clerk’s office (except for blind persons using seeing-eye dogs), that Judge Moraghan was known to, and deferred to by, personnel of the office, and that he was allowed to enter the office with his dog and remain there during the alleged episodes because he was a judge. Such proof would permit a finding that the Judge’s alleged actions were taken under color of state law or authority.

Section 1983 requires significant state involvement to hold a private party liable for alleged misconduct.

Alva L. TURNER v. DRANE · filed 1997-10-24

Because Turner failed to allege significant state involvement in any of the private parties' alleged misconduct, the above claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against defendants when the plaintiff fails to allege that they acted under color of law.

Armond v. Carney · filed 1997-12-11

Armond has failed to allege that the defendants acted under the color of law, and his claim is therefore not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983’s color of law requirement is satisfied when a state official uses authority to supervise and give binding orders to a subordinate, even without a formal supervisory title.

Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township · filed 1997-12-17

If a state entity places an official in the position of supervising a lesser-ranking employee and empowers him or her to give orders which the subordinate may not disobey without fear of formal reprisal, that official wields sufficient authority to satisfy the color of law requirement of 42 U.S.C. S 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor or act under color of state law.

Azzun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc · filed 1998-02-11

As for the claims raised below, the district court thoroughly and properly considered the Azzuns’ claims, and we affirm for substantially the same reasons stated in the district court’s order granting summary judgment: 1 Wal-Mart is not a state actor or acting under color of state law; ... and the ... Azzuns were never detained by Wal-Mart employees, but rather chose to stay at the store and argue.

Section 1983 does not treat an officer’s mere presence or moral support during a private party’s removal of property as action under color of state law without assistance or intervention.

Hall v. Doering · filed 1998-02-25

The Court is unconvinced, however, that mere moral support — absent affirmative acts of assistance or intervention on behalf of private wrongdoers — rises to the level of state action under Section 1983. Accordingly, the Court holds that Bair’s presence at the Hall farm on April 22, 1995, was insufficient to establish action under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not cover private conduct without significant affirmative state support or the exercise of official power.

Hughes v. Marc's Big Boy · filed 1979-11-20

Applying the Lucas standard to plaintiff’s allegations, I find that there is no claim of “significant” or “affirmative” State support for defendant’s actions. There is no claim that defendant or any of its employees were clothed with official power or that any official action contributed to plaintiff’s treatment at the restaurant.

Section 1983 requires a state actor; Fourth Amendment claims cannot proceed without an allegation that a defendant acted under color of law.

Toms v. Pizzo · filed 1998-04-09

These federal claims cannot be sustained because they are actionable only against a state actor, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Toms does not allege participation by any individual acting under color of local, state or national law. Thus, these claims must be dismissed, as well.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement is not met when an officer engages in a personal confrontation unrelated to law enforcement without purporting to act as an officer.

Gerald A. Huffman Gunilla Lukse v. County of Los Angeles Sherman Block · filed 1998-06-23

Officers who engage in confrontations for personal reasons unrelated to law enforcement, and do not “purport[ ] or pretend[ ]” to be officers, do not act under color of law.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is satisfied when a complaint alleges that private defendants conspired with a state official to deprive someone of civil rights.

Fadjo v. Coon · filed 1981-01-09

Fadjo has alleged the requisite state action on the part of all the defendants in charging them with conspiring to deprive him of his civil rights.

Section 1983 does not treat a private person as acting under color of state law merely because the person files a sworn complaint for an arrest warrant and a magistrate issues the warrant.

Lee v. Patel · filed 1983-06-03

Similarly, the unilateral action by a private person of filing a sworn complaint for an arrest warrant of another person suspected to have committed a crime does not constitute State action or action under color of State law. Nor does a State magistrate’s issuance of an arrest warrant in response to the filing of the sworn complaint convert the complaining private person’s actions into State action or action under color of State law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private public service agency as a state actor merely because it receives government funding.

Archer v. Economic Opportunity Commission of Nassau County Inc. · filed 1998-12-23

The operation of a not-for-profit public service agency, even with the use of government funds, does not constitute state action.

A contention that a defendant did not act under color of state law in a Section 1983 suit is addressed under Rule 12(b)(6), rather than as a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).

Rene v. NA · filed 1999-01-11

In any event, to the extent the defendants contend that they are not amenable to a Section 1983 suit because they did not act under color of state law, such arguments are more appropriately raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private medical center that did not do so cannot be held liable under the section.

Davis v. Dorsey · filed 1999-01-21

Among other reasons, Davis's allegations against Gilmore focused on the faulty shower and amounted to a claim of no more than negligence on Gilmore's part, cf. Stephens v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 198, 200-01 (8th Cir.1996) (prison official's knowledge of but failure to correct prison work-place safety problem may have constituted negligence, but did not establish constitutional violation), and Davis failed to rebut Regional's evidence that it was a private entity and did not act under color of state law in treating him, see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982).

A private merchant does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely by exercising a state statutory privilege to detain a suspected shoplifter.

Allen v. Columbia Mall, Inc. · filed 1999-03-18

Although the Learningsmith defendants acted pursuant to a state statute, this is not enough to make them state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party’s misuse of state legal procedures as action under color of state law when the procedures themselves are not challenged as unconstitutional.

Dahlberg v. Becker · filed 1984-01-03

Because plaintiff has raised no objection here to the constitutional validity of New York’s contempt procedures, but rather has challenged only the misuse or abuse of those procedures by these defendants, defendants’ actions cannot be said to have been taken under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private party merely for filing a police complaint, because that act is not under color of state law.

Anderson v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1984-01-10

Continental cannot be liable to Anderson, moreover, since the mere filing of a complaint with the police does not constitute action by Continental under col- or of state law.

Section 1983 requires significant state involvement for a privately owned Carey Act operating company to act under color of state law.

Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper · filed 1999-05-26

Operating companies like ASCC, however, are privately owned corporations, and as such act under color of state law only where there is significant state involvement in the action.

Section 1983 requires allegations that defendants acted under color of state law or conspired with state actors.

Kellett v. Dolin, et al. · filed 1999-05-28

More importantly, however, plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim is deficient on its face. Among other notable defects, the complaint nowhere alleges that defendants were state actors, that they were acting under color of state law, or even that they conspired with state actors when they allegedly violated plaintiffs’ civil rights.

Section 1983's color-of-law requirement is met when a territorial commissioner enforces territorial law.

St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass'n v. Government of the United States Virgin Islands ex rel. Virgin Islands Depar · filed 1999-06-02

As for the first prong, the acting commissioner is, of course, acting under color of territorial law, namely, the WDA.

An officer can act under color of law for a Section 1983 claim while serving a warrant outside the officer's county; county boundaries do not determine that status.

Deering v. Reich · filed 1999-07-01

For Fourth Amendment purposes, however, Reich was acting as a law enforcement officer (i.e., under color of law) when he was at Deering's farm, and it is the reasonableness of his conduct, not compliance with whatever geographical boundaries Wisconsin sets for its counties, that determines violations.

Section 1983 treats Temple University as acting under color of state law because it is an instrumentality of Pennsylvania.

Schier v. Temple University · filed 1984-01-13

I reject that conclusion because it is my constitutional determination that Temple University is, for the purposes of § 1983, an “instrumentality” of the state as substantially as Pennsylvania State University and the state colleges.

For a § 1983 claim that a police officer failed to intervene, the color-of-law inquiry turns on whether the violence was private or public, rather than the officer’s duty status.

Pitchell v. Williams · filed 1999-11-02

For § 1983 purposes, the determinative “color of law” factor with respect to a claim that a police officer should have intervened to protect a person from violence is not the officer’s duty status, but rather, whether the violent act was private or public.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Norton v. Curtis · filed 2000-03-20

One of the elements a plaintiff must prove to establish a § 1983 claim is that the defendant acted under color of state law.

A city denying use of a public library meeting room acts under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.

Pfeifer v. City of West Allis · filed 2000-04-10

In the present case it is undisputed that when defendant denied plaintiff the use of the Constitution Room, defendant was acting as a person under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats a volunteer fire company as acting under color of law when the totality of the circumstances makes it a state actor.

Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co. · filed 2000-07-12

With respect to the first question, we hold that Chestnut Ridge, a volunteer fire department in Maryland, is a state actor.

Section 1983 does not apply to private entities or citizens who do not act under color of law.

Mamer v. Collie Club · filed 2000-08-08

As the district court pointed out, a § 1983 action is inapplicable in cases where the defendants are private entities or citizens not acting under the color of law.

An agency that revokes a license pursuant to municipal regulations acts under color of law for § 1983.

Padberg v. McGrath-McKechnie · filed 2000-08-14

Since TLC claims it revoked Padberg’s license pursuant to Title 35 and Title 19, Padberg will clearly succeed in proving that TLC acted “under color of law.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against journalists for publishing an article when they did not act under color of state law.

Idema v. Wager · filed 2000-11-02

Thus, the complaint is devoid of any facts that would render defendants amenable to suit for an alleged civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; federal action alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Island Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc. · filed 2000-11-06

But, as a threshold matter, § 1983 requires action by the state, not by the federal government.

A § 1983 claim requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Plonka v. Brown · filed 2001-02-02

The district court dismissed Plonka’s § 1983 claim for defamation against defendant Linda Jump on the ground that action under color of state law is a necessary component of any § 1983 claim, see, e.g., Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 628 (2d Cir.1994), and that Plonka has not alleged that Jump acted under color of law. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim.

Section 1983 claims against a private defendant fail when the defendant is not a state actor and did not act under color of state law.

Eisenstein v. Whitman · filed 2001-02-14

We also agree with the district court that because PSI is not a state actor and did not act under color of state law or as part of a conspiracy, Eisenstein’s claims under §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988 must fail.

Section 1983 covers an officer’s alleged misconduct while on duty and transporting an arrestee to jail because the officer acts under color of law.

Fontana v. D.E. Haskin · filed 2001-08-22

Haskin — having allegedly committed these acts while on duty, after having arrested Fontana and in the process of accompanying her to jail to be processed — acted under color of law.

A private person's alleged conspiracy with police needs factual support to establish action under color of law for § 1983.

Harmon v. Bullock · filed 2001-11-09

In turn, plaintiff has provided no factual support for his suggestion that Bullock, by conspiring with the arresting officers, was herself acting "under color" of law for § 1983 purposes.

Court-appointed attorneys do not act under color of state or federal law when representing a criminal defendant and therefore are not liable under § 1983 for that representation.

Knight v. Rosenberg · filed 2001-11-20

In support of its ruling, the District Court concluded that (1) court-appointed attorneys do not act under color of state or federal law, and hence are not liable under § 1983; (2) the conspiracy claim against the private attorney was vague and conclusory, and hence was insufficient to allege a violation of § 1983; and (3) there is no private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. ... For substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court opinion dismissing Knight’s amended complaint, we agree that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not reach a private medical contractor’s employability assessments based on independent professional judgment merely because the contractor works for a city.

Fridman v. City of New York · filed 2002-01-28

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the conduct of Salon and HSS is private action, and consequently Fridman’s claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against HSS and Salon is dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private college is not liable without facts supporting state action.

Rose v. Kenyon College · filed 2002-03-29

Isreal has conceded, in his complaint, that Kenyon is not a state actor, and he makes no allegations or pleads any facts that any of the other individual defendants acted under order of state law.

A § 1983 complaint need not recite “under color of state law” when allegations about the defendants’ public offices sufficiently support an inference of state action.

Freedom Bapt. Church of Del. v. Tp. of Middletown · filed 2002-05-08

Although it is true the complaint does not incant “under color of state law,” it alleges that defendants are the Township of Middle-town, the Township of Middletown Planning Commission, the Zoning Officer, and other local officials, who allegedly played a part in denying plaintiffs the land use they sought under local law. Given those allegations about these defendants’ public offices, the complaint suffices to plead enough state action at this procedural juncture.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of law; a private citizen may be sued if alleged to act jointly with state officials.

Collins v. McClain · filed 2002-06-10

In order to state a claim under section 1983, a complaint must allege that a defendant acted “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.” ... The complaint does not allege that the private citizen defendants were acting under the color of law or jointly with state officials.

Section 1983 does not apply to actions taken under color of federal law.

Cheves v. Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2002-08-16

However, § 1983 does not apply to actions taken under color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not allow a suit based on actions taken under color of federal law.

Flamingo Industries (Usa) Ltd. And Arthur Wah v. United States Postal Service, an Entity Created Pursuant to the Postal · filed 2002-08-23

The Postal Service acts under federal law, and § 1983 does not allow for a suit based upon actions taken under color of federal law.

Section 1983 requires more than a judge’s use of judicial stationery to treat a personal letter as action under color of state law.

Tierney v. Chet W. Vahle and Debbie Olson · filed 2002-09-18

But the fact that a personal letter is written on judicial stationery cannot reasonably be thought to show, all by itself, that the sending of the letter was an act done under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a deprivation of constitutional rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Murray v. Gilmore · filed 2002-10-30

To assert a claim under Section 1983, plaintiff must show a deprivation of her constitutional rights by a person acting under color of state law.

An officer acts under color of law for § 1983 when he identifies himself as a police officer and uses his service pistol.

Jocks v. Tavernier · filed 2003-01-08

We have no doubt that when an officer identifies himself as a police officer and uses his service pistol, he acts under color of law.

An officer who identifies himself as a police officer and uses his service pistol acts under color of law for § 1983 purposes.

Jocks v. Taverner · filed 2003-01-08

We have no doubt that when an officer identifies himself as a police officer and uses his service pistol, he acts under color of law.

A § 1983 claim against a private person or corporation requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of law.

Smartt v. First Union National Bank · filed 2003-01-29

Smartt has not alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or related statutes. ... Even had he made this crucial allegation, however, Smartt’s case would still lack federal jurisdiction, as Smartt has failed to allege that either First Union or Thompson were government actors or acting under color of state or federal law. Constitutional violations do not apply to private citizens or corporations unless they act under color of law.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement can be met when a defendant uses connections with police to manipulate an investigation.

Stack v. Perez · filed 2003-02-26

This underhanded use of the Hartford Police Department demonstrates that Perez did, indeed, act under “color of law” for purposes of Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of law and to violate a federal constitutional or statutory right.

Single Moms, Inc. v. Montana Power Company · filed 2003-06-10

Moreover, to the extent the plaintiffs' claims against PPL and Encana were brought under § 1983, the district court properly dismissed them because the plaintiffs failed to allege that the companies violated the single mothers' federal constitutional or statutory rights and because the companies were not acting "under color of law."

Section 1983 does not support a state-created danger claim against defendants acting as federal officials.

Sadowski v. Bush · filed 2003-06-19

In a supplemental filing the plaintiff alleged that the defendants are liable under a state-created danger theory which subjects a State or municipality to liability for danger created by a State or municipality actor's deliberate indifference to a risk to the victim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The Court finds this argument inapplicable not only because the defendants are federal actors, see District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423, 93 S.Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973), but also because the plaintiff has not alleged any particularized injury to himself as a result of defendant’s alleged actions or omissions.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private school employee who did not act under color of state law.

P.N. v. Greco · filed 2003-09-23

It is self-evident that Greco cannot have been acting under color of state law if Windsor was not; accordingly, § 1983 does not operate to impose liability on Greco.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation to plead injury by a state actor or a private party acting under color of state law.

Phillips v. Colleges · filed 2003-11-06

Thus, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights under the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause, Phillips must allege that he was injured by a state actor or by a private party acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not cover a federal officer acting under color of federal law.

Chin v. Wilhelm · filed 2003-11-13

In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies only to state officers acting under color of state law. ... Because Wilhelm was a federal officer acting under color of federal law, summary judgment for the defendant will also be granted on the section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the challenged conduct was under color of state law; a private victim advocate’s conduct is not attributable to the state without a sufficient connection between the state and that conduct.

Szekeres v. Schaeffer · filed 2004-01-23

Because plaintiffs have failed to establish the threshold requirement for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — that Ms. Schaeffer acted under color of state law— the Court will grant Ms. Schaeffer judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims require state action and action under color of state law.

McCallup v. Weyerhaeuser Co · filed 2004-03-16

Further, the factual allegations of the complaint do not suffice to suggest any likelihood of the presence of state action and action under color of state law as required for all claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of rights under color of law; summary judgment is appropriate when the plaintiff concedes that requirement is absent.

Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel · filed 1981-11-13

The plaintiff has stated in her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that she will not pursue her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, agreeing that her rights were not assailed under color of state, local or other law. Memorandum at 8. Summary judgment will, therefore, be granted as to this issue.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when state employees commit the alleged deprivation while acting in their official capacities and exercising responsibilities under state law.

Feingold v. New York · filed 2004-04-30

Here, Feingold has shown that the deprivations he alleges were under color of state law because they were committed by state employees acting in their official capacities as MNO employees and exercising their responsibilities pursuant to state law.

A utility acts under color of law for § 1983 when its city granted monopoly, municipal oversight, and payments to the city sufficiently connect its conduct to the city.

Robert J. Ihrke and Mary E. Ihrke v. Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation · filed 1972-05-25

Under these circumstances, we think it is abundantly clear that the action of Northern in threatening to terminate the service to the Ihrkes was under “color of law” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the trial court’s determination to the contrary was erroneous.

Section 1983 does not reach a creditor’s private repossession of collateral merely because state law permits self-help repossession.

Kinch v. Chrysler Credit Corporation · filed 1973-06-20

It is the opinion of this Court that there was no “state action” involved here nor does T.C.A. § 47-9-503 clothe the defendant with “color of authority” to bring this action within the purview of either the Fourteenth Amendment or Title 42 U.S. C. § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint against a private entity must allege facts showing that it acted under color of state law; broad conclusions alone are insufficient.

Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology · filed 1978-08-28

Hence, Cohen's repetition of broad conclusions without additional facts establishing that the defendants acted under color of state law in their discrimination against her is insufficient. Nothing more than general categorizations are to be found in the proposed amendment; a mere recitation of broad conclusory language misses the mark. As we fail to see how the proposed amendment escapes the deficiencies of its precursor, we hold that the amended complaint, like the original, fails to state a federal cause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private litigant’s mere use of state judicial process as action under color of state law when officials independently conduct and enforce that process.

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, Inc. Ronald L. Barbour · filed 1981-01-09

Judged by this test it is plain that merely invoking a state’s judicial process and thereafter participating in it solely as private litigant does not constitute joint engagement or participation by the private litigant with the state officials who then independently conduct and enforce that process.

Section 1983 can treat a federal official as a state actor when the official plays an instrumental role in a joint federal and state deprivation of rights.

Tongol v. Usery · filed 1983-03-29

Such an instrumental role in the illegal recoupment of overpaid benefits should qualify the federal defendant as a state actor according to the rationale expressed in Kletschka.

Section 1983 does not treat appointed private counsel’s traditional representation of a client as action under color of law.

Holsey v. Chandler · filed 1984-12-06

Chandler's actions in this case were those of private counsel performing a traditional function. The fact that Chandler was appointed to represent the plaintiff does not mean that his acts were “under color of law.”

Section 1983 permits private persons jointly engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to satisfy the statute’s under-color-of-law requirement.

Mark v. Furay · filed 1985-08-08

Because Mark’s complaint in clear and specific terms alleges that Rita, Petta, and Maly (who the district court held were acting as private parties rather than as state officials) were engaged jointly in a conspiracy with Furay and Kooyenga (who were acting under color of law, at least as to their involvement in the procuring and service of the theft warrant), the complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground that it fails to meet the “under color of law” requirement of section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of federal rights.

Chamberlain v. Krysztof · filed 1985-08-20

Absent allegations of any action by IRS employees that they have acted under color of state law, plaintiff's cause of action under § 1983 is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor or to act under color of state law.

Dailey v. Bank of America · filed 2004-06-22

We conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that the Bank was neither a state actor nor acting under color of state law, and in dismissing Dailey’s 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public official for filing a private defamation suit without exercising state-conferred power.

O'BRADOVICH v. Village of Tuckahoe · filed 2004-07-19

Because Maron’s filing of the defamation lawsuit did not constitute state action, it is not actionable under § 1983.

State authorization to prevent animal cruelty does not, by itself, make a private organization a state actor under § 1983.

Fabrikant v. French · filed 2004-07-30

Therefore, the U.C.S.P.C.A. is not a state actor and the requisite element of acting under color of law in order to establish a § 1983 claim is not met.

A § 1983 claim against a private physician treating a state prisoner is not patently meritless on the ground that the physician did not act under color of law.

Abney v. Mcginnis · filed 2004-08-18

The claim is not, however, "patently without merit." See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55-57, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (explaining that a private physician providing medical services to state prisoners acts under color of law because a state has a constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody and the prisoner had no other options for medical care other than what the state provides).

Section 1983 covers conduct by public officials and employees acting under color of law.

Wallace v. Town of Palm Beach · filed 1985-12-16

At all material times, and in all their actions involved in this case, Defendants were acting under color of law and under color of their authority as public officials and public employees.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; the plaintiff did not show that the private lenders met that requirement.

Elliott v. May · filed 2004-12-20

First, Mr. Elliott has not shown in either his complaint or his filings on appeal that defendants, who are private entities, were acting under “color of state law.”

Section 1983’s color of law requirement is not met merely because a police officer’s job gave him membership in a union through which he acted.

Chernavsky v. Township of Holmdel Police Department · filed 2005-06-14

Although it was Smythe’s position as a police officer that earned him membership in the PBA, this hardly means his actions as a member of this union were in his official capacity as a police officer. We agree with the District Court that Chernavsky has not shown that Smythe abused the power of his office.

A police volunteer authorized to assist with arrests may act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when he actively participates in an arrest with an officer.

Johnson v. Wright · filed 2005-10-17

Thus, Ogilvie was a willful participant in joint action with the City of Clanton Police Department and Wright, an on-duty officer of the City of Clanton Police Department. Accordingly, sufficient evidence exists that, if credited, would establish that Ogilvie engaged in conduct for which he may be subjected to liability under § 1983. This finding precludes the entry of summary judgment in Ogilvie’s favor on all claims against him pursuant to § 1983 to the extent that his motion is premised on a contention that he was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not reach co-worker harassment unless it is substantial and is instigated or knowingly tolerated by superiors.

Rosario-Urdaz v. Velazco · filed 2006-01-06

Unless they carried on a substantial campaign of harassment, instigated or knowingly tolerated by superiors, their acts would not constitute the mis-exercise of government power at which section 1983 is aimed.

Section 1983 does not cover federal agency employees acting under federal law because they are not acting under color of state or District of Columbia law.

Myvett v. Williams · filed 2009-08-03

Because § 1983 does not apply to persons that are operating under color of statutes of the United States, see Hohri, 782 F.2d at 245 n. 43, and the defendants, as employees of CSOSA, are operating under federal statute, see Defs.’ Mot. at 1 n. 1, the plaintiff cannot assert his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the defendants through the lens of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that a constitutional right was infringed and that the defendant acted under color of law.

Washington v. Lowe's HIW Inc. · filed 2014-12-16

These claims are also legally defective in their own right: ... the section 1983 claim neither alleges any constitutional right that was infringed nor any plausible argument that Lowe’s employees were acting under color of law.

A § 1983 complaint can allege action under color of law by describing a defendant’s state-vested authority over employment decisions without using that exact phrase.

McGuire v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2018-02-15

While Plaintiffs did not include the specific phrase “under the color of the law” in Count II, they did allege that Bonds was the Vice President of Vehicle Maintenance for CTA, a position of authority vested by the state that permitted him to make consequential decisions about Plaintiffs’ employment.

A private contractor can act under color of law for § 1983 when it exercises licensing authority delegated by the government.

Shume v. Pearson Education Inc. · filed 2018-03-29

Drawing all inferences in favor of Shume, as the Court must at this stage, she has plausibly alleged that the District of Columbia delegated to Pearson some of its power to license applicants and to decide what procedures to afford them, and that Pearson exercised that power in declining to renew Shume’s certificate. Thus, she has plausibly alleged that Pearson “acted as the District’s agent” in denying her renewal application.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for constitutional deprivations committed by someone acting under color of federal law.

Kerr v. Trump · filed 2020-01-22

Additionally, section 1983 does not provide a remedy for constitutional deprivations committed by an individual acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for deprivations committed under color of tribal law.

Debraska v. Oneida Business Committee · filed 2020-10-22

Defendants were acting under color of tribal law in deciding to cancel the primary election. Therefore, § 1983 does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction.

A police officer acts under color of state law for § 1983 when he uses his official authority to stop a driver outside his territorial jurisdiction.

Brewer v. Trimble · filed 1995-06-23

Although he was outside his jurisdiction, defendant’s actions were undertaken in his capacity as a police officer. He misused the power state law grants city policemen in fourth class cities. As such, for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he acted “under color of’ state law.

A state employee acts under color of law only when the challenged conduct relates to authority conferred by the state; mere state employment or occurrence at the workplace is insufficient.

Murphy v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 1986-03-11

Here, however, the abusive conduct was not in any way related to the duties and powers incidental to the job of CTA staff attorney.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act with state authority; a public employee’s tort does not become state action merely because it occurs at work.

Chandler Nelson Hughes v. Halifax County School Board James Gregory Herbert Lloyd Julian Harrison, and Tommy Lacks · filed 1988-08-26

To obtain such relief, he must show that his co-workers deprived him of a constitutional or federal right, and that they were clothed with state authority in so acting. ... Furthermore, if the actions of Gregory and Lloyd amount to state action, any employee of any state who commits a tort has potentially violated § 1983. We cannot endorse such a result.

Section 1983 does not treat a public employee as acting under color of state law merely because the employee reports an incident to police and pursues a criminal complaint using powers available to any citizen.

Lord v. Richard Riley, Warren E. Isman, John Pennington, John E. Granfield, Board of Supervisors, Fairfax Cou · filed 1991-01-23

In the present case, Riley was exercising no greater power than that available to any other citizen when he provided information to the police and pursued a criminal complaint. Such actions are those of a private person not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not cover an off-duty teacher’s private conduct when the school district has no control over, involvement in, or responsibility for that conduct.

Wentz v. Park County School Dist. No. 16 · filed 1992-06-26

The off-duty police officer cases illustrate that it is not an actor's employment status, but rather whether the employer has control over, involvement in, or responsibility for the actor's actions that determines whether state action is involved. Here there is no evidence of such control, involvement, or responsibility. Barrus was not acting under color of state law when the alleged sexual assault occurred.