42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a criminal defense attorney performing a lawyer’s traditional functions does not meet that requirement.

Krueger v. Nagel · filed 2020-10-26

Even attorneys who are appointed are not acting under the color of state law. ... However, Krueger does not state a claim against Nagel under §1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services because it does not act under color of state law.

Gause v. Hooks · filed 2020-10-26

Because the NCPLS does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983, it is not subject to suit thereunder and Plaintiff’s claim against it fails initial review.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; activity on a sheriff’s private reelection campaign page managed by volunteer off-duty deputies does not meet that requirement.

Charudattan v. Darnell · filed 2020-10-29

A claim pursuant to § 1983 cannot succeed without some violation of rights committed “under color of state law.” ... As the district court concluded, the conduct at issue was not done under color of law because the Campaign Page was a private page for Sheriff Darnell’s reelection, paid for by Sheriff Darnell, and operated by volunteer off-duty deputies.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; attorneys appointed to represent criminal defendants in state proceedings are not state actors.

Hernandez v. Office of Public Advocacy · filed 2020-10-29

The district court properly dismissed Hernandez’s claims against defendants Office of Public Advocacy, Van Demark, Lowery, Kelley, and Corrigan because they are not state actors.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; an ordinary private individual cannot be sued under it.

Jones v. Jacob · filed 2020-10-30

Mr. Jones cannot sue a private individual under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because that statute only applies to government actors.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is plausibly met when police officers enter a home to conduct a welfare check.

CALI v. BOROUGH OF SEASIDE PARK · filed 2020-10-30

Here, Plaintiff alleges the Responding Officers entered his home for a welfare check and, therefore, plausibly alleges conduct under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a counsel substitute representing an inmate in prison disciplinary proceedings because the counsel substitute does not act under color of state law.

Priest v. Perez, Jr. · filed 2020-10-30

A counsel substitute representing an inmate in prison disciplinary proceedings does not act under color of state law for purposes of claims brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Roy v. Pioneer Human Resources Inc · filed 2020-11-02

Plaintiff satisfies the first requirement of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; however, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendants acted under color of the law.

Section 1983 permits claims against private jail healthcare providers when they act under color of state law.

Estate of Linda Miller v. County of Sutter · filed 2020-11-02

A private defendant can, however, be liable under § 1983 for actions under color of state law. ... The complaint thus allows the inference that HIG and Wellpath, but not Kuritzky, were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

McGill v. Buzzelli · filed 2020-11-03

McGill failed to state a § 1983 claim because he did not allege that any of the defendants “acted under color of state law.” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).

A public defender performing the traditional role of counsel in a criminal proceeding does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

HATTON v. BLACK · filed 2020-11-03

Because there was no action "under color of state law" when Mr. Black represented Mr. Hatton in the state criminal proceedings, there is no viable claim for relief pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a federal prosecutor who did not act under color of state law.

Michelson v. Beck · filed 2020-11-04

Third, as to Defendant Beck, an Assistant U.S. Attorney, he is not a state actor and, thus, not subject to liability under § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim against a private hospital needs facts showing that the hospital acted under color of state law, such as joint action with the state or a close nexus to it.

Simon v. City of Berkeley, Berkeley Mental Health Mobil Crisis Team · filed 2020-11-05

The Complaint is devoid of factual allegations that ABSMC and AHS acted jointly with the state or its agents or any factual allegations which would support the argument that their conduct had a close nexus with the state.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; public funding alone does not make a private hospital a state actor.

Thomas v. Mohawk Valley Health System · filed 2020-11-05

However, both Defendants are private institutions, and the law in this Circuit is clear that “the mere fact that an otherwise private institution receives public funding does not make it a state actor” for purposes of constitutional claims. ... Because Plaintiffs put forth no additional facts suggesting that, at any point, these private institutions acted under color of state law with respect to Ms. Frederick’s medical care, Plaintiffs have presented no serious question as to whether they may be able to assert successful constitutional claims against Defendants.

A private contractor that provides healthcare to inmates under a government contract acts under color of state law and is treated as a government entity for § 1983 claims.

PETRO v. TALBOT · filed 2020-11-06

Because Wexford acts under color of state law by contracting to perform a government function, i.e. providing healthcare services to inmates, it is treated as a government entity for purposes of Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor or to have acted under color of state law.

Jackson v. Citi Trends, Inc. · filed 2020-11-09

As noted in the June 2020 Order, plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Section 1983, including the Fourth Amendment claim, must be dismissed because, viewing the amended complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Citi Trends, a private retail establishment, is not a state actor and ... was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 governs claims against state officials acting under color of state law.

Womack v. Newsome · filed 2020-11-10

Any claim against California Governor Newsom would have to be pursued under § 1983, rather than under Bivens, because he acts under color of state law.

A private citizen does not act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes merely by making a police report.

Silva v. Mullen · filed 2020-11-10

Because Plaintiff fails to allege that Swift acted “under color of state law,” Carl, 763 F.3d at 595, the Section 1983 claims against Swift must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an inmate whose conduct is not chargeable to the state.

Cephas v. Booker · filed 2020-11-12

Accordingly, the court concludes that Hunter’s conduct is, in no way, chargeable to the state so as to make him a state actor subject to being sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover criminal defense attorneys performing traditional counsel functions because they are not state actors.

THOMAS v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2020-11-12

Because they are not state actors, the § 1983 constitutional claims against Haggerty and Phillips are dismissed.

Section 1983 does not subject private medical providers to suit merely because they participate in an involuntary commitment process; they may be state actors if the state compels them to commit a patient or contracts with them to provide detainee care.

Ferguson v. Cook County Correctional Facil · filed 2020-11-13

Dismissal was still proper because they did not act under the color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private actors do not expose themselves to suit under § 1983 simply by being involved in the involuntary commitment process, although a private actor may function as a state actor if compelled by the state to commit a mentally ill patient or if contracted by the state to provide detainees with medical care.

Section 1983 may reach a former public official’s conduct after retirement when he acts in concert with state officials.

Evans v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission · filed 2020-11-13

However, where Uhrig was undisputedly a government official during some portion of the relevant limitations period, see supra part II.C, and Evans has alleged that even afier his retirement Uhrig was engaging in discrimination and retaliation in concert with state officials by contributing to the investigations against Evans, the Court will not dismiss the claim against Uhrig at this early stage of the case.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

Acosta v. United States · filed 2020-11-16

The district court properly dismissed Acosta’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because defendants are not state actors.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; a private citizen who did not do so cannot be sued under the section.

MARTIN v. WILLIAMS · filed 2020-11-16

Thus, Ms. Williams cannot be said to have acted under “color of state law” as required by § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a private medical provider to act under color of state law; a provider with no ties to the state does not meet that requirement.

Lastovich v. Knisbeck · filed 2020-11-17

Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that Pro Health Urgent Care and Jane Doe Nurse #2 acted under the color of state law. Plaintiff does not allege that they provided medical care inside prison walls, that they voluntarily entered into a contract with the state to provide medical care for inmates, or that they replaced the state’s responsibility to provide medical care for inmates. They appear to have no ties to the state at all. The Court will dismiss defendants Pro Health Urgent Care and Jane Doe Nurse #2 from this lawsuit.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private actor who was not acting under color of state law.

Durham v. Arnold · filed 2020-11-18

Robert Arnold, a federal pretrial detainee, was a private actor at the time he allegedly attacked plaintiff in E Pod. Thus, he cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting an inference that the defendant acted under color of law.

Stewart Jr. v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. · filed 2020-11-19

While Plaintiff asserts that the Complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil rights action brought under that statute must be directed to unlawful conduct under color of law. ... Here, Stewart has not provided any facts giving rise to an inference that the Boy Scouts of America acted under color of law when the alleged conduct occurred.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that an officer acted under color of state law; private conduct does not qualify merely because the officer used a department-issued firearm.

Santana v. The City of New York · filed 2020-11-19

Because Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that Blake acted under the color of law, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against Blake must fail.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; federal employees acting pursuant to federal law do not satisfy that requirement.

Thomas v. Spencer · filed 2020-11-23

Because federal employees acting pursuant to federal law are not acting under the color of state law, Thomas has again failed to state a cognizable section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires facts connecting a private defendant’s conduct to state action; conclusory allegations of a conspiracy with a county do not suffice.

Gomes v. State of Hawaii · filed 2020-11-23

Plaintiffs advance general and conclusory allegations that certain private Defendants conspired with the County of Kauai but as currently pled, these allegations do not suggest state action.

Section 1983 claims against federal officers may survive dismissal when the complaint sufficiently alleges that they acted in concert with state officers in state proceedings.

Economan v. Cockrell · filed 2020-11-23

That said, the Court concludes that there is support for the Plaintiffs’ position, and they have pleaded sufficient facts to state viable claims against Cockrell and Whisenand under § 1983 based on their alleged actions and conduct in concert with state officers in state proceedings.

Section 1983 claims may not be asserted against private citizens who do not act under color of state law.

Remmele v. Hinkle · filed 2020-11-23

Rather, these Defendants all appear to be private citizens, and civil rights claims under § 1983 may not be asserted against private citizens because they do not act “under color of law,” meaning on behalf of the government.

A private hospital nurse does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely because public funds may pay for a prisoner’s care.

Pierson v. Grayson County Detention Center · filed 2020-11-23

Even if Defendant Mudd was paid from public resources for his services to the incarcerated Plaintiff, these allegations are insufficient to render him a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

A contract with state officials does not alone make a private party liable under § 1983 for joint action; the allegations must plausibly connect the agreement to the violation of rights.

Brown v. Fire Department of the City of New York · filed 2020-11-25

While Plaintiffs allege that the contract between the Building Defendants and the FDNY resulted in unlawful warrantless entries into tenants’ apartments, (id. ¶¶ 103-07), there are no allegations that such unconstitutional behavior was required by, contemplated, or the natural consequence of the contract.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private defendants to plead facts showing that the challenged conduct is attributable to the state.

Leonard v. General Motor Company · filed 2020-11-30

To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that he or she was injured by “a state actor or a private party acting under color of state law.” ... Moreover, the complaint does not suggest that the challenged conduct was attributable to the State of Connecticut.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Simmons v. Reich · filed 2020-11-30

Plaintiffs’ claim under Section 1983 fails because none of the Defendants is alleged to have engaged in the conduct at issue in the Complaint as a state official or otherwise acting under color of state law.

At the pleading stage, allegations that prison officials arranged treatment with an outside doctor as part of their duty to provide medical care suffice to resist dismissal of a § 1983 claim on color-of-law grounds.

HUNTER v. RIVERBEND CORRECTIONAL FACILITY · filed 2020-12-01

Liberally construed, Hunter’s complaint alleges that officials at Riverbend, in the exercise of their duty to provide Hunter with medical care, scheduled an appointment with Niergarth. As a factual matter, that is enough.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement can be met when an official uses a social media account tied to the office to perform official duties and blocks a user from it.

Felts v. Green · filed 2020-12-01

Finally, Plaintiff's complaint adequately alleges that Reed acted under color of law when he blocked her on Twitter.

Section 1983 treats a police officer as a state actor for purposes of liability.

Kuznetsova v. Medina · filed 2020-12-01

Plaintiff asserts claims against Police Officer Medina, who is a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a connection between an officer’s alleged use of force and the officer’s state-granted authority for the conduct to qualify as state action.

Ali v. Sneed · filed 2020-12-02

Because the district court did not determine whether the use of force was related to Sneed’s state-granted authority, the district court did not fulfill its obligation to determine if it had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; prison staff’s knowledge of a prisoner’s planned attack does not itself make that prisoner a state actor.

Keenan v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction · filed 2020-12-02

While Defendant Kennedy’s alleged knowledge of the planned attack may impact his liability on other claims, these allegations do not convert Defendant Settle into a state actor.

Section 1983 permits a claim to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges that the defendant acted as a state actor.

Wilson v. Tuba City Unified School District · filed 2020-12-03

The allegations of the complaint thus plausibly allege that Defendant Woodie was a state actor. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the claim is denied.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a defense attorney acted under color of state law; ordinary representation by retained counsel does not suffice.

Cabrera v. Barrett · filed 2020-12-03

The cases plaintiff cites are examples of the limited circumstances where attorneys have been held to act under the color of state law. ... The findings and recommendations adequately and appropriately addressed why plaintiff's allegations in this case would not cause the claim asserted here to fall within any of those such circumstances. (Doc. No. 10 at4n.4.) The additional cases cited by the plaintiff do not call for a different result, and thus dismissal is required.

Section 1983 claims against private actors require facts showing that they acted under color of state law.

Scott v. Thompson · filed 2020-12-03

Nothing shows that these Defendants were acting with or on behalf of the government. Therefore, a civil rights cause of action does not lie.

A private company may act under color of state law for § 1983 when it willfully participates in joint activity with law enforcement.

Cooper v. Hutcheson · filed 2020-12-03

This Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that Securus was a willful participant in a joint activity with the department.

Section 1983 does not cover a federal agency or its employees when they act under color of federal law.

FREEMAN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-12-03

As a federal agency, the DLA and its employees act under the color of federal law. As a result, Ms. Freeman cannot maintain Section 1983 claim against DLA or any of its employees.

Section 1983 requires a state employee’s wrongdoing to involve the use or abuse of official authority; private conduct does not qualify.

Sivan Sheree Walker v. Tennison · filed 2020-12-07

Because the Walkers did not plausibly allege that Dixon’s official position had any bearing on his reprehensible actions, the district court did not err in dismissing their section 1983 claim against him.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an attorney appointed to represent a child in custody proceedings does not meet that requirement when acting as the child’s advocate.

Sardi v. Carfrae · filed 2020-12-07

In her role as advocate for M.S. she did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat court-appointed attorneys as state actors merely because the court appointed them.

Peterkin v. Carr · filed 2020-12-07

And, relevant here, as Jones is alleged to have worked for a public defender service, court-appointed attorneys do not become state actors by virtue of their appointment by the court.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; the private citizens accused here of lying to police did not meet that requirement.

Walker v. Ussey · filed 2020-12-07

After review of the pleadings, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report recommending that the lawsuit be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the Defendants did not act under color of state law as required by 42 U.S.C. §1983. ... The Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge as the findings and conclusions of this Court.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private property owners and their counsel were not state actors in this unlawful detainer dispute.

Mitchell v. Bikoba · filed 2020-12-08

Further, none of the named Defendants are state actors: Rutaganira and Bikoba are the property owners of the subject property; Banks is an attorney who represents the property owners; and Pakpour Banks, LLP is a private entity that represents the property owners.

Section 1983 ordinarily does not permit a claim against an attorney representing a criminal defendant because the attorney does not act under color of state law.

Harris v. Polansky · filed 2020-12-11

An attorney, whether retained, court-appointed, or a public defender, ordinarily does not act under color of state law. ... Therefore, Polanksy is not amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; an attorney’s work in a state courtroom alone does not establish that requirement.

Payne v. Marsteiner · filed 2020-12-14

Payne’s allegation that the attorneys are “working in a California courtroom,” dkt. 1 at 5, does not show they are acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an appointed defense attorney for acts taken while performing traditional defense counsel duties because those acts are not under color of state law.

Natoli v. Kelly · filed 2020-12-14

As noted above, when acting in that role, an attorney is not acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a mayor’s private assault when the alleged conduct is unrelated to his official duties.

Kaylor v. Damschroder · filed 2020-12-14

These allegations fail to plausibly assert Damschroder acted under color of law in assaulting Kaylor.

Section 1983 requires plausible facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Stubbs v. Bellevue Police Department · filed 2020-12-16

In order for Superior Tow to be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Stubbs must allege facts that plausibly support the inference that Superior Tow was acting under the color of state law. He has not done so here.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law.

NASH v. TODD · filed 2020-12-16

As to Defendant Todd, nothing in the Complaint reflects that Todd is a state actor subject to liability under § 1983.

A private attorney is not liable under Section 1983 without action under color of state law, such as joint action or a conspiracy with state actors.

White v. Corrigan · filed 2020-12-17

Here, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Schalk are implausible because he is a private attorney who does not act under color of state law. Nor has Plaintiff alleged any facts from which the Court could reasonably construe a plausible Section 1983 conspiracy or joint actor claim.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant acted under color of state law.

BROTHERS v. KRANER · filed 2020-12-17

To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims could be construed to assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court notes that the Complaint sets forth no allegations that would support a finding that any of the Defendants was a state actor acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Beckom v. Salawhite · filed 2020-12-17

On June 9, 2020, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report recommending the lawsuit be dismissed because there was no showing the sole named Defendant was acting under color of state law, as required for liability under the Civil Right Act. ... It is accordingly ORDERED that the Report of the Magistrate Judge (Docket No. 4) is ADOPTED as the opinion of the District Court.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private union when specific allegations show that it conspired with state actors to deprive someone of federally protected rights.

BEU v. CITY OF VINELAND · filed 2020-12-18

The Court finds that these allegations are enough to establish that PBA was acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; the court found that the private defendants did not.

Phippin v. Moore · filed 2020-12-21

Neither of these two defendants are state actors.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

FAISON v. WELLS FARGO BANK N.A. · filed 2020-12-21

Plaintiffs do not plead that either Defendant is a state actor, and in their opposition brief, concede that Wells Fargo and Ocwen are not state actors.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as a state actor merely because the party serves a subpoena through a state court.

Casavelli v. Johanson · filed 2020-12-23

Merely going through a state court to serve a subpoena, however, is not enough to transform a party into a state actor.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; public defenders performing traditional defense functions do not meet that requirement.

CRYMES v. OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER · filed 2020-12-28

Plaintiff’s allegations against Ms. Linhan and Mr. Bjorkland concern their representation of him during a criminal proceeding. Therefore, he has failed to meet the “under color of state law” element of a § 1983 claim for his allegations against Ms. Linhan and Mr. Bjorkland.

Section 1983 requires plausible allegations that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Avent v. Reardon · filed 2020-12-28

The Amended Complaint fails to adequately allege that Target acted under color of state law, and plaintiff fails to proffer any specific facts or arguments in support of his contention that Target failed to train its employees.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a fellow inmate’s theft of money does not satisfy that requirement.

Livingston v. Doe Crawford County Detention Staff Members · filed 2020-12-29

Inmate David did not act under color of state law when he allegedly took money from Livingston. No plausible claim is stated against him.

Section 1983 reaches state action and does not provide a cause of action against federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Pessima v. The Field Officer · filed 2020-12-29

Thus, because defendants are not state actors acting under color of state law, Pessima’s complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches private parties who act under color of law when court officials actively participate in directing their conduct.

Hailey v. Tropic Leisure Corp. · filed 2020-12-31

Thus, even setting aside Lugar’s “fair attribution test” as Defendants contend we must, Jureidini’s testimony establishes, under the standards set forth in Adickes, Dennis, and more recently Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, that Defendants were acting under color of law.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against private supervisors who are not state actors.

Williams v. Brown · filed 2021-01-04

Neither Crabtree nor Hampton are subject to suit under § 1983. ... Crabtree and Hampton are not state actors.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Perez v. Rentals · filed 2021-01-04

For example, no defendant is alleged to have been acting under color of state law so as to give rise to a potential claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts plausibly showing that a person acted under color of state law.

CULMER v. WARNER BROS. RECORDS INC. · filed 2021-01-04

There are no facts upon which the Court could plausibly infer that the alleged deprivation of royalties was committed by a person acting under the color of state law sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party who acts with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights, but the plaintiff must allege facts supporting that joint action.

Sukowatey, Gary v. St. Croix County · filed 2021-01-05

To start, since the Buffalo Storage defendants are private individuals, plaintiffs must establish that they acted “under color of state law” to pursue any relief under § 1983. ... Plaintiffs have alleged no facts that begin to support their assertion that the Buffalo Storage defendants conspired with any state defendants to take away their property located at Nike Storage.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private citizen who merely swears out criminal charges, because that conduct is not under color of law.

Gellert, Jr. v. District Court of Maryland · filed 2021-01-05

Section 1983 is designed to prohibit unlawful conduct of persons acting under color of law. ... As a private citizen who swore out criminal charges, Banks did not act under color of law.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement can be met when a public work-program supervisor uses his authority to facilitate an assault.

Sexton v. Cernuto · filed 2021-01-05

Cernuto could not have taken the affirmative actions to assist Dunn’s alleged sexual assault without being clothed with the authority of the Redford 17th District Court work program. ... Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Sexton, she has raised a triable issue that Cernuto acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

PISKANIN v. PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2021-01-05

As there is no allegation that either Defendant is a “state actor” the civil rights claims are not plausible and will be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an attorney for actions taken while representing a client because the attorney is not acting under color of state law.

Stine v. Maddox · filed 2021-01-05

First, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Maddox fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983, as this Defendant is not a state actor in his capacity as Plaintiff’s attorney.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of law; a private employer who does not do so cannot be sued under it for a constitutional violation.

Ward Jr, Joshua v. Diacker, Dan · filed 2021-01-06

Diacker isn’t a public official acting under color of law, so he cannot be sued for violating Ward’s civil rights in an equal protection claim or other constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Private peer-review actions do not satisfy § 1983’s requirement that defendants act under color of state law.

(PS) Pierson v. Sutter Health · filed 2021-01-06

Put simply, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims fail because he does not satisfy the requirement that Defendants’ actions constituted “state action under color of law,” and no amendment would cure this defect.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private entity’s reliance on a federal statute does not satisfy that requirement.

Divino Group LLC v. Google LLC · filed 2021-01-06

However, § 1983 applies only to action taken under color of state law—not federal law.

Section 1983 applies only when a defendant acts under color of state law.

Price v. Irons · filed 2021-01-07

However, as the district court noted, § 1983 applies only where an individual acts under color of state law. See Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005). We agree with the district court that these defendants did not act with state authority or under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Beckman v. Aetna Health Insurance · filed 2021-01-11

For example, although she asserts that the basis for this court’s jurisdiction is “195.00 official misconduct by public officials acting under [42 U.S.C. §] 1983”1, (ECF No. 1 at 4), none of the defendants are state actors as would be required to assert a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private individual whose conduct is not fairly attributable to the state.

Huddlestone v. Chambers · filed 2021-01-12

Plaintiff’s complaint against Joseph Chambers, a fellow prisoner, must be dismissed because Chambers is a private individual and not a state actor subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private person or business as acting under color of law merely because it reports conduct to police.

Wilson v. McLarty Daniel Dealership, Service Department · filed 2021-01-13

A private individual who complains of criminal conduct does not act under color of law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Maurer v. Lincoln Memorial University (TV1) · filed 2021-01-13

To the extent that Maurer’s claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process can be interpreted as allegations under § 1983, they cannot succeed because Maurer has not alleged facts to support that any Defendant is a state actor or acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on court-appointed defense attorneys for their representation because they do not act under color of state law.

Gannaway v. Stroumbakis · filed 2021-01-14

Because these court-appointed attorneys are not state actors under § 1983, the District Court’s dismissal was correct.

Section 1983 covers school board members who act under color of state law by blocking constituents from social media pages used through their official positions.

Garnier v. Poway Unified School District · filed 2021-01-14

To formalize those rulings, the Court finds Defendants: (1) are entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiffs’ damages claims; (2) acted under color of state law in blocking Plaintiffs from their social media pages; and (3) created designated public forums on their social media pages.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 for joint activity with a state actor only if the complaint alleges a mutual understanding or meeting of the minds between them.

Jackson v. Brock · filed 2021-01-14

In order to state a claim against a private party under § 1983, the plaintiff “must allege, at the very least, that there was a mutual understanding, or a meeting of the minds, between the private party and the state actor.” Mershon v. Beasley, 994 F.2d 449, 451 (8th Cir. 1993).

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; an appointed attorney’s representation of a client does not qualify.

Ortiz v. Webering · filed 2021-01-14

To state a claimunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the alleged violation of Plaintiff’ s rights must have been caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law.

Issuing municipal summonses can satisfy Section 1983’s requirement that a defendant act under color of state law.

SINGH v. DROPPA · filed 2021-01-14

The Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendants acted under the color of state law by issuing these summonses.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Romeo Righteous Hicks v. Raven Gretchen Lee · filed 2021-01-19

Absent any allegations that Defendant Lee was a state actor, Plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not reach a private attorney’s traditional representation of a client, even when the court appointed the attorney.

Hyde-Rhodes v. Jefferson County · filed 2021-01-19

A private attorney, even one appointed by the court, does not act under the color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing the traditional role of a private attorney, such as representing a conservatee or minor.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; allegations against a landlord without state action do not state a claim.

LITTLE v. PENUEL · filed 2021-01-19

However, Defendant Penuel is described only as Little’s landlord. There is no allegation that Defendant Penuel was acting under color of state law. Accordingly, Little cannot state a § 1983 claim against Penuel based on the allegations in the Complaint, and the claims against Penuel must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Cruz v. Federal Court · filed 2021-01-19

Cruz pleads nothing as to how the defendants acted under color of state law; thus, we read his complaint as attempting to state only a Bivens claim.

Section 1983 does not reach a prison religious consultant’s inherently ecclesiastical decisions when the consultant is not acting under color of state law.

Tyndall v. Iowa, State of · filed 2021-01-20

I agree with defendants that Morrison’s decision regarding headbands/bandannas falls within the class of an “inherently ecclesiastical function” and that Morrison was not acting under color of state law in making such a decision.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Peet-Williams v. Hamilton · filed 2021-01-21

Because the plaintiff has not alleged that Hamilton was a state actor acting under color of state law, the court will dismiss Hamilton as a defendant.

Section 1983 treats a private contractor that provides medical care in a correctional facility as acting under color of state law.

CHAPMAN v. TALBOT · filed 2021-01-21

Because Wexford acts under color of state law by contracting to perform a government function, i.e. providing medical care to correctional facilities, Wexford is treated as a government entity for purposes of Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Wilson v. Wolf · filed 2021-01-22

While plaintiff did not respond to this aspect of the motion to dismiss, and under the Local Rules of this court those objections could be deemed to be conceded, 4 it is clear from the plain language of the statute that section 1983 does not apply to federal officials.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Dennis v. Google/Google Plus · filed 2021-01-25

However, he again does not suggest a basis to find the named defendants subject to suit under § 1983, and the Court agrees with the R&R that this is fatal to his claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Chagolla v. Vullo · filed 2021-01-25

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Chagolla’s § 1983 claims against defendant Vullo because Chagolla failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether Vullo acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats a private judgment creditor as acting under color of state law when it enforces a judgment through garnishment with the help of court officers.

Christopher LaSalle & Co.v. Heller Financial, Inc. · filed 1990-01-16

With the under-color-of-state-law inquiry having been answered in the affirmative, the sole remaining question is whether Christopher can show that it was deprived of some federally protected right by Heller’s action.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a district court clerk’s acceptance of C.R.C.P. 120 filings and setting of hearings does not satisfy that requirement.

Zartman v. Shapiro and Meinhold · filed 1991-05-20

We choose to follow the majority rule and hold, as a matter of law, that the actions of a district court clerk in accepting C.R.C.P. 120 filings and setting hearings under that rule do not constitute action “under color of state law” as required for an action to be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach a private lien claimant when a county clerk merely records the claimant’s lien materials and issues filing notices.

Matthew Cobb, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Saturn Land Company, Inc., Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant · filed 1992-05-22

We agree with the district court that the actions of the county clerk, who merely accepted and recorded the required lien materials prepared by Defendant and then issued filing notices to Plaintiff, were not substantial enough to bring Plaintiff’s claim within the ambit of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make Legal Aid or its attorneys state actors merely because they serve as court-appointed counsel and receive state funds.

Smith v. City of New York · filed 1996-12-09

Legal Aid correctly notes that the § 1983 claim may not be maintained on a theory that Legal Aid is a state actor. Legal Aid and its attorneys are not state actors when acting as court-appointed attorneys even though they receive state funds.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a court-appointed psychiatrist merely for performing a custody evaluation; the appointment alone does not make the psychiatrist’s conduct state action.

Anderson v. Glismann · filed 1984-01-18

The mere fact that Dr. Glismann acted as a court-appointed psychiatrist will not sustain a cause of action under section 1983. A court-appointed expert acts under the authority of a state, but not on behalf of the state.

Section 1983 does not reach private conduct merely because a state statute permits or regulates it; the deprivation must occur under color of state law.

Western v. Hodgson · filed 1973-05-14

State involvement of this character, however, is not the type contemplated by § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat every act of a state-regulated private corporation as action under color of state law; the State must be involved in the activity that caused the plaintiff's injury.

Martin v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1971-04-27

The fact that a private corporation, such as Pacific Bell, enjoys an economic monopoly which is protected and regulated by the state does not necessarily bring its every act within the purview of Section 1983. Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1969), Cert. denied 396 U.S. 846, 90 S.Ct. 90, 24 L.Ed.2d 95, for as well stated in Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2nd Cir. 1968), “the state must be involved not simply with some activity of the institution alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the injury.” In this case, plaintiff’s allegations at most concern Pacific Bell’s public service functions; they neither show nor tend to show an intrusion by the State into matters of Pacific Bell’s internal management. Plaintiff’s discharge, of course, comes under the latter head.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a nominally private party to show that the challenged conduct was taken under color of state law; a hospital's mere receipt of Hill-Burton funds is insufficient.

Hodge v. Paoli Memorial Hospital · filed 1977-06-24

Finally, the above-cited cases represent a distinct minority view. We choose not to follow that view but rather to follow the view held by the overwhelming majority of courts, that the mere receipt of Hill-Burton funds by a hospital does not convert all of its actions into actions taken “under color of” state law.

Section 1983 requires state action for claims against private entities, and governmental funding and general regulation alone do not establish it.

Musso v. Suriano · filed 1978-11-02

The allegations of governmental funding and general regulation, standing alone, however, cannot support a finding of state action.

Section 1983 reaches conduct taken under color of state law, and private social-service activity is not covered merely because it receives state funding or referrals without a sufficient connection to the challenged conduct.

Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc. · filed 1981-03-13

By its terms Section 1983 only applies to actions taken “under color” of state law. ... Such linkages are insufficient to invoke the “under color” of state law doctrine.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private entity's public funding, government endorsements, and cooperation with public officials are insufficient by themselves to establish that requirement.

Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v. City of Boston · filed 1982-02-16

None of these factors, however, singly or in combination, justify finding “state action” on the part of CEDC.

Section 1983 requires a connection between the challenged conduct and the state; public funding, regulation, leased public facilities, and public officials on a private entity’s board did not make its employee discharges state action without a sufficient link to those discharges.

Adams v. Vandemark · filed 1988-08-24

Given the holding of Crowder that public representation on the board, even when taken with public funding, government regulation, and facilities leased from a public entity, did not establish the requisite relationship necessary to find color of state law, we find that the facts of this case likewise do not support such a finding. Consequently, we hold that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under section 1983 and that the District Court properly dismissed the suits.

Section 1983 requires a link between governmental involvement with a private entity and the challenged action; public funding, regulation, leased facilities, and public officials on its board did not make these employee discharges state action.

Adams v. Vandemark · filed 1988-08-24

Under this analysis, the mere fact that HDC leases, at a nominal rent, office space from Caro, is insufficient to establish that HDC acted under color of state law when it discharged him. Similarly, Caro’s funding of the building’s renovation is not in itself a basis for finding a link between the state and the plaintiffs’ discharge. Rather, the plaintiffs must show that the lease or the funding affected the challenged acts, their discharges. They have not shown any such relationship.

Section 1983 does not treat a private provider’s conduct as state action merely because the provider receives substantial public funding and is extensively regulated by the state.

Faulk v. Ludwig · filed 1990-01-30

It is clear that considerable public funding and extensive regulation by the State is insufficient to turn the conduct of private parties into state action.

Section 1983 does not reach a private racetrack’s independent decision to exclude a licensed participant when the decision is not attributable to the state.

Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp. · filed 1990-03-19

Based on the facts presented before us, YRC’s actions cannot be considered state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private daycare did not meet that requirement through its workfare contract, state regulation, and lease from a public college.

Simescu v. Emmet County Department Of Social Services · filed 1991-08-19

Thus, examining the above factors individually and in the aggregate, we conclude that the district court correctly concluded that WRC was not acting under color of state law. Therefore, Appellants have failed to make a showing of an essential element of their § 1983 claim and it must fail.

Section 1983 requires a nexus between a private defendant’s challenged act and the state to establish action under color of state law; funding and regulatory ties alone do not establish that nexus.

Kraft v. Memorial Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1992-09-14

Despite the funding and regulatory connections, Kraft has failed to demonstrate an actual connection between her dismissal, the challenged action, and the state. ... This nexus is necessary to establish action under color of state law, an essential element of Kraft’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private ambulance association’s regulation, receipt of government service fees, and use of a county 911 system do not make its alleged discrimination state action.

McKinney v. West End Voluntary Ambulance Ass'n · filed 1992-11-13

The plaintiff has failed to establish “state action” in the Ambulance Association’s alleged discriminatory conduct under the applicable public function, symbiotic relationship, and close nexus tests. Therefore, the Ambulance Association was not acting under color of state law as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against defendants who are private actors.

Northrup v. Whetstone · filed 1998-05-01

Similarly, because all Defendants are private actors, Plaintiff states no claim under Sections 1983,1985 or 1986.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation committed under color of state law; using state legal process alone is not enough, and a private-party conspiracy requires active state cooperation.

Hohensee v. Dailey · filed 1974-10-16

§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act guarantees to every person who is a citizen of the United States and within the jurisdiction thereof the “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Suit against one said to be depriving a person of his rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States may only proceed against a defendant said to be acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” of any state. Reading Plaintiff’s complaint as liberally as possible the Plaintiff does not allege that the State of Pennsylvania was in any way involved in the supposed deprivation of his Constitutional rights by the Defendants. At most'Hohensee may be interpreted as claiming that the Defendants have utilized the State law to his detriment. The mere fact that an individual utilizes state process against another does not make the actor’s conduct cognizable as state action. Gibbs et al. v. Titelman et al., 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir., filed August 1, 1974). A private party may be brought under the purview of § 1983 when a plaintiff alleges a conspiracy between that private party and one acting under color of state law. At the least a Petitioner must allege active cooperation by the state in the private party’s conduct in order for state action to be present. Gilmore et al. v. City of Montgomery, Ala. et al., 417 U.S. 556, 94 S.Ct. 2416, 41 L.Ed.2d 304 (decided June 17, 1974); Phillips et al. v. Trello et al., 502 F.2d 1000 (3d Cir., filed July 26, 1974).

A private party's act of serving as a plaintiff in a state-court action, without more, is not action under color of state law sufficient for § 1983.

Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Division, County Court, Milwaukee County, State Of Wisconsin · filed 1975-02-06

Finally, the only activity of the insurance company which could be considered as being 'under color of state law' for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would be its character as plaintiff in the state court action and this would not be sufficient.

Section 1983 requires that the defendant act under color of state law, and private persons who use state judicial processes are not thereby transformed into state actors.

Perrotta v. Swift · filed 1977-07-05

The defendants named in these complaints, however, are not subject to suit under § 1983 because they were not acting “under color” of State law. ... Attorneys are private persons for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and a private parent’s conduct does not become state action merely because it is pursuant to state-court custody orders.

Nouse v. Nouse · filed 1978-03-30

We start with 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It does not apply because plaintiff has not alleged, or suggested any facts to show, that defendants acted under color of state law. Assuming that defendant Nouse’s custody of the children derives from orders or decrees of one or more Maryland state courts, her actions, whether pursuant to those orders or decrees or otherwise, do not constitute state action for section 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not reach a private party’s use of a state court absent a conspiracy with a state official, and attorneys are not under color of State law merely because they are officers of the court.

Executive Commercial Services, Ltd. v. Daskalakis · filed 1979-08-30

Thus the majority holding in Adickes does not waive the requirement of proving a conspiracy between a private party and a State official. And thus the complaint at bar, which contained no conspiracy allegation, failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983. ... It is well settled that attorneys, while “officers of the court,” are not thereby clothed with color of State law for section 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not treat an otherwise private entity as acting under color of state law merely because it resorts to state judicial process in these circumstances.

District 28, United Mine Workers of America, Inc. v. Wellmore Coal Corporation · filed 1979-11-15

We hold that resort to state judicial process does not, in the circumstances before us, transform an otherwise private entity into an arm of the state for purposes of 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation of a federal right to be attributable to the state, so it does not remedy a state court’s violation of state law when only a private party is charged.

Taylor v. Gilmartin · filed 1982-07-30

Therefore, even though a private party's joint participation with state officials can label one as a state actor, a state court's action in violation of state law cannot be remedied by § 1983 where only a private party is charged. In the case before us, we do not read Taylor's complaint to allege that Oklahoma's guardianship statute is constitutionally defective. Rather, the gravamen here is that Judge Benson acted in contradiction to state procedures. Under the recent ruling in Lugar our views on § 1983's applicability in this situation are unchanged.

Section 1983 does not reach private conduct absent action under color of state law; using a state court as a forum does not by itself supply that state action.

Linda Miller and Roger Miller v. Hartwood Apartments, Ltd. · filed 1982-10-28

As to the Millers’ § 1983 claim, there has been no implication of state law. No state officials or state laws are involved in the day-to-day operation of the Hartwood Apartments. The appellants merely make broad assertions of “governmental action” as though that suffices to establish a § 1983 claim. It does not. ... Nor is there merit in appellants’ argument that the use of the state court process constitutes sufficient state action to support their § 1983 claim. The appellants make no showing of any constitutional infirmity in the state law or procedure under which they were evicted. Nor is there any claim of any conspiracy between the court and the appellees. This claim therefore fails.

A private creditor acts under color of state law when a state court order delegates the state's power to dispossess a debtor, even if the sheriff remains in the background.

Del's Big Saver Foods, Inc., Burdell Robish, and Janis Robish v. Carpenter Cook, Inc. · filed 1986-07-15

A state cannot avoid its obligations under the due process clause by delegating to private persons the authority to deprive people of their property without due process of law. If as Del’s alleges the effect of Wisconsin’s law of repossession is to arm creditors with the state’s power to dispossess debtors of their property, Del’s can challenge the law in a suit against the creditor under section 1983. The ex parte order instructed the sheriff to assist Carpenter Cook if need be to carry out the order. The fact that the sheriff remained in the background and hence could not be joined as a defendant does not deprive Carpenter Cook’s action in enforcing a judicial order of its character as state action.

Section 1983 can reach private parties who knowingly make false abuse accusations that become the sole basis for state intervention and a court proceeding depriving others of their rights.

Reynolds Ex Rel. Reynolds v. Strunk · filed 1988-06-23

Therefore, if it is proven, as alleged, that the Strunks willfully accused the grandparents falsely of the abuse and those false accusations became the sole basis for the recommendation to remove the infant from the plaintiffs’ home and for the state court proceeding which required Mr. and Mrs. Reynolds to rebut the prima facie case against them, then the Strunks could be said to have acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private litigant or attorney does not meet that requirement merely by using state court procedures in a civil dispute.

Dempsey v. Sears Roebuck and Co. · filed 1992-06-05

Normally, the activities of a private entity (or its attorney), in litigating (or, as here, defending against) a civil dispute, are not conduct "under color of state law", an essential ingredient of an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat private physicians and hospitals as acting under color of state law merely because they honor a court order directing a patient’s detention under Indiana mental health law.

Ridlen v. Four County Counseling Center · filed 1992-11-24

Therefore, based on the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Spencer as applied to the voluntary commitment provisions, as well as the similar provisions examined in the other cited cases, this court concludes that the voluntary commitment of a person to a mental hospital pursuant to Indiana law and under the directive of a court order commanding that person’s detention does not extend the color of law to actions of private physicians and private hospitals in respecting and acknowledging that order.

An attorney's representation of a claimant in state court does not itself constitute action under color of state law under § 1983, but conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of federal rights can qualify, and vague and conclusory conspiracy allegations are insufficient to state a claim.

Robinson v. Gerber · filed 1993-06-18

As to the attorney defendants, an attorney representing a claimant in state court is not acting under color of state law as is required if liability is to attach under § 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). However, an attorney is acting under color of state law "when engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of federal rights." Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984). Robinson's allegations of conspiracy are vague and conclusory and are thus insufficient to state a claim. Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir.1987).

Section 1983's under-color-of-state-law requirement is not satisfied when private parties seek to enforce a facially neutral restrictive covenant without a state court decision, or merely because the covenant was recorded under state regulations.

Martin v. Constance · filed 1994-02-10

Plaintiffs argue that Shelley encompasses judicial action to enforce a facially neutral covenant in a discriminatory manner. This position was rejected in Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court, 988 F.2d 252, 259-60 (1st Cir.1993). The Court agrees with this holding in Casa Marie, at least where, as here, there has been no state court decision on the matter. Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that state action arises from the fact that the covenant the private defendants seek to enforce is recorded in accordance with state regulations. No case law is cited in support of this position, and this Court concludes that it is without merit.

Section 1983 does not make private parties state actors merely because they seek a court order through state procedures with knowledge of a state statute.

Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hospital Authority · filed 1994-02-28

However, these private defendants who sought a court order to appoint a temporary guardian pursuant to state legal processes do not become state actors subject to § 1983 liability merely because they did so “with knowledge of and pursuant to” a Georgia statute.

Section 1983 does not treat a private litigant’s use of state courts as state action unless the litigant corrupts judicial power.

Eidson v. Arenas · filed 1994-03-25

If a state merely allows private litigants to use its court, there is no “state action” within the meaning of section 1983, unless there is some corruption of judicial power by the private litigant.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party’s use of state courts as action under color of state law.

Shuttlesworth v. Housing Opportunities Made Equal · filed 1994-12-08

Similarly, a private party’s use of the state judicial system does not constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat lawyers participating in private state court litigation as acting under color of state law.

M.W. Farmer & Co. v. Runner · filed 1995-03-23

This court is satisfied that lawyers who participate in the trial of private state court litigation are not state functionaries acting under color of state law, and that although an attorney is an “officer of the court” he is not an official of any state.

A private party's effort to assert rights in state court does not satisfy § 1983's under-color-of-state-law requirement without joint action with state officials or conduct chargeable to the state.

Rullan v. Council of Co-Owners of McKinley Court Condominium · filed 1995-09-12

In the instant case, the complaint does not contain any allegations supporting plaintiffs' claim that Co-owners acted under color of law. The complaint merely rambles on about the Co-owners' efforts to assert their rights in state court. There is not one allegation that the Co-owners acted as private persons jointly engaged with state officials or that their conduct is otherwise chargeable to the state. Thus, we find that plaintiffs' have failed to allege an essential element of their § 1983 claim against the Co-owners.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations of constitutional rights committed under color of state law, including by public-school actors whose conduct is materially entwined with the school system.

Warren v. National Ass'n of Secondary School Principals · filed 1974-05-21

First, was the act of the individual defendants and as members of the council of the Tahoka chapter of the National Honor Society done under color of law, as is required to state a cause of action under § 1983? ... These factors convince the court that when a member of the faculty council of such an honor society is acting as a member of such council that he is acting under col- or of law, as his action is materially entwined with the operation of the public school system.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1974-05-22

There are two essential elements to a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871: (1) that the conduct complained of was by a person acting under color of state statutes or local law, custom or usage; who (2) while so acting, deprived another of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... In light of this pervasive influence and control exercised by the Association over the state’s athletic programs, it is clear that the Association acts under color of state law, and that its actions are subject to judicial scrutiny under the purview of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 applies to actions taken under color of state law, including qualifying state action by a nominally private organization such as the NCAA.

Robert L. Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Association · filed 1975-01-09

In view of these circumstances we hold that the district court correctly determined that it possessed jurisdiction to hear this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 does not reach a private athletic association’s transfer rule when the state did not control or coerce its adoption.

Anderson Ex Rel. Anderson v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n · filed 1988-09-26

The adoption of this transfer rule was private conduct, exclusive of the association, and not state action.

Section 1983 does not treat a private association as acting under color of state law merely because a state university adopts its standards or plays a minor role in formulating them.

National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Tarkanian · filed 1988-12-12

Neither UNLV’s decision to adopt the NCAA’s standards nor its minor role in their formulation is a sufficient reason for concluding that the NCAA was acting under color of Nevada law when it promulgated standards governing athlete recruitment, eligibility, and academic performance.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as acting under color of state law merely because the party gives information to a police officer who then acts on his own initiative.

Jennings v. Joshua Independent School District · filed 1989-04-12

Raines did not contact the police, and when the police arrived, only responded to Stevens’ questions; the furnishing of information by a private party to a police officer who then acts on his own initiative is not action taken under color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law element is satisfied at the pleading stage by allegations that defendants acted under state statutes, regulations, customs, or usages.

Pagano Ex Rel. Pagano v. Massapequa Public Schools · filed 1989-06-19

Conduct is considered to be under color of state law if it is committed pursuant to the execution of official policy or state custom. ... Thus, assuming all allegations made by plaintiff are true for the purposes of this motion, the first part of the test for § 1983 liability has been met.

Section 1983 provides no claim against a private law school or its professor when neither acted under color of state law.

Radcliff v. Bruce G. Landau University of West Los Angeles Perry M. Polski Henry Blunt, Jr. Lanny Wong · filed 1989-08-31

The district court correctly ruled that because neither the school nor the professor were acting under color of state law, no redressable claim under that statute could be maintained.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement is satisfied when school officials take the challenged personnel actions in their official capacities.

Bundren v. Peters · filed 1989-12-12

The defendants were undoubtedly acting under color of law at the time of these alleged violations as all actions regarding these plaintiffs were taken in the defendants’ official capacities.

Section 1983 treats an athletic association delegated state authority to regulate public high school sports as acting under color of state law.

Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n · filed 1990-04-20

This Court concludes that TSSAA is a state actor for two primary reasons. First, the State of Tennessee has delegated to the TSSAA its authority to regulate the eligibility of public high school students to participate in interscholastic athletics.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a person who caused the injury while acting under color of state law; alleging a public employee’s official capacity and motive alone does not establish that connection.

Johnstone v. Val Just, in Her Official and Individual Capacities, and McMinnville School District No. 40 · filed 1992-03-03

In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must identify a person acting under color of state law as the perpetrator of her injury. Alleging that Just, acting in her official capacity as Personnel Director, "consciously chose to drive in this dangerous manner because of the picketing and emergency resolutions adopted by the District and defendant's desire to intimidate and harass teachers engaged in labor picketing," is not enough.

Section 1983 does not treat a foster child in state custody as a state actor merely because of that custody.

Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School District · filed 1992-05-28

But this did not transform Louis C. himself into a state actor. The Court is unaware of a single case (and does not wish to conceive one here) in which a foster child in legal custody of the state was deemed to be acting under color of state-law.