42 U.S.C. § 1983

A local government does not cause a deprivation of life under § 1983 merely by grossly negligently training an employee who unsuccessfully attempts to rescue someone from a peril the government did not create.

Louella T. Bradberry, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Kenny Ray Thomas, Deceased v. Pinella · filed 1986-05-23

We simply hold that a local governmental body does not deprive a person of his right to life for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it grossly negligently trains one of its agents who then fails in an attempt to rescue that person from an existing peril not created by the governmental agency.

Section 1983 vindicates federal rights and does not provide a remedy for state-law torts unaccompanied by deprivation of a federally guaranteed right.

Brown v. King · filed 1986-07-17

Section 1983 was intended to vindicate only federal rights; it is not applicable to state law torts.

In a Section 1983 action challenging a search, legality under state law does not control; the question is whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

O'ROURKE v. City of Norman · filed 1986-07-18

But the question here is not whether the search was authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Just as a search authorized by state law may be an unreasonable one under that amendment, so may a search not expressly authorized by state law be justified as a constitutionally reasonable one.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right, not merely violation of state law; a private complainant becomes a state actor only by willfully participating in joint action with the state, not simply by reporting a crime or invoking legal process.

Gramenos v. Jewel Companies, Inc. · filed 1986-08-29

In a suit under § 1983 the plaintiff must show a violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, not just a violation of state law. The two are not the same. ... A private party comes within § 1983 only when “he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents____ Of course, merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the [state].”

Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of federal constitutional rights, not merely breaches of state tort duties; a plaintiff must show deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest.

Johnson v. Barker · filed 1986-09-18

It is well settled that section 1983 “imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.” ... In order to achieve constitutional import, there must be a deprivation of a protected interest.

A violation of state law, without an accompanying deprivation of a federal right, does not state a Section 1983 claim.

Dohm v. City of Rockford · filed 1986-09-22

Violations of state law, without more, are insufficient, however, to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A local land-use body's error or violation of state law does not by itself establish a federally actionable § 1983 claim.

James Chongris and George Chongris v. Board of Appeals of the Town of Andover · filed 1987-02-12

Error by a zoning board is regrettable, but not federally actionable in and of itself.

A municipality's failure to follow state law or its own procedures, without more, does not deprive a person of a federal right actionable under § 1983.

Christian v. Village of Maywood · filed 1987-03-04

A municipality’s failure to follow state law or its own codes or procedures, without more, does not constitute denial of a federal constitutional right.

A government official’s merely negligent injury to life, liberty, or property does not require a constitutional compensation procedure and therefore does not support Section 1983 liability.

Evans v. Clayton County · filed 1987-04-13

It follows that the plaintiff has no basis for any recovery pursuant to 42 USC § 1983. “Where a government official’s act causing injury to life, liberty or property is merely negligent, ‘no procedure for compensation is ... constitutionally ... required.’ ”

A § 1983 claim requires deprivation of a federally guaranteed right.

League of United Latin American Citizens v. Pasadena Independent School District · filed 1987-06-10

In any event, without a recognized right in continued employment, it is unlikely that Plaintiffs will be able to substantiate their § 1983 claim, since such a claim requires deprivation of a federally guaranteed right.

A violation of a state regulation-filing requirement, without otherwise deficient disciplinary proceedings, does not establish a federal due-process right actionable under § 1983.

Laboy v. Coughlin · filed 1987-06-23

Under these circumstances, we hold that Laboy has failed to assert a violation of a federal due process right.

Section 1983 does not create a right for a crime victim to compel state officials to prosecute the alleged offender.

Johnson v. Craft · filed 1987-09-23

The decision to prosecute a particular crime is within the authority of the state and there appears to be no federal constitutional right to have criminal wrongdoers brought to justice.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600.

MEDINA v. STAUFFER · filed 2021-01-19

Consistent with Ward and Brennan, the District Attorney is prosecutorially immune from his speedy trial claims, and we further find he does not have a civil rights claim for violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600.

Section 1983 authorizes a federal court to issue a mandatory injunction, writ of mandamus, or other remedy to safeguard civil and constitutional rights.

Palés De Méndez v. Aponte · filed 1969-01-08

Therefore, this Court is unquestionably empowered to issue a mandatory injunction, a writ of mandamus or any other remedy under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.A. 1651(a) in order to safeguard plaintiff’s civil and constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief for an established unconstitutional deprivation of rights.

Schnell v. City of Chicago · filed 1969-03-17

Viewing the plaintiffs’ allegations in a light most favorable to them and construing the pleadings so as to do substantial justice as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f), we are of the view that the complaint states a claim under section 1983 upon which relief can be granted. This is a suit for equitable relief only and it is apparent from the literal wording of section 1983 that injunctive relief is a proper remedy if the alleged unconstitutional deprivation of rights is established.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to grant injunctive relief against state-court proceedings despite 28 U.S.C. § 2283, but the action remains subject to federal abstention and deference to state courts.

Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Its Employees v. Nassau County · filed 1973-11-14

In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-243 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), the Supreme Court clearly held that the Civil Rights Act is within the “expressly authorized by Act of Congress” exception to § 2283, and that, therefore, in such eases injunctive relief may be granted even to the extent of enjoining state court proceedings. ... Thus, to the extent the individual plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin the criminal actions pending against them, Younger must control.

Section 1983 authorizes litigants to obtain injunctive relief against infringements of their rights.

Wall v. American Optometric Association, Inc. · filed 1974-10-21

On the other hand, if federal intervention were forbidden by the tiniest hint of any state action, the purpose of Congress in allowing litigants to obtain injunctive relief against infringements of their rights, as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, would be completely frustrated.

Section 1983 authorizes an action for redress of constitutional-rights violations, including injunctive or declaratory relief.

Helfant v. George F. Kugler, Attorney General of the State of New Jersey · filed 1974-11-18

Congress has afforded Hel-fant a remedy to bring “an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. And the Supreme Court has held that this may be by means of injunction, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S. Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), or by declaratory judgment, Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974).

Section 1983 permits a federal district court to remedy unconstitutional conditions through an injunction, including onerous affirmative requirements that may require public expenditures.

Welsch v. Likins · filed 1977-03-09

In attacking the order of April 15, 1976 the defendants do not argue, nor could they argue successfully, that a federal district court acting within the framework of a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not have the power to correct unconstitutionalities by means of an injunction and to include in its decree affirmative requirements which may be onerous and which may require the expenditure of public money that otherwise would not have been spent or would have been spent for something else.

Section 1983 permits courts to enjoin defendants’ actions that may violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Ahrens v. Thomas · filed 1977-06-24

The actions of the defendants, which may contravene the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, may be enjoined under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits broad injunctive relief against state or local executive officials when a clear pattern of unconstitutional conduct has been established, despite federalism concerns.

Bolding v. Holshouser · filed 1978-04-26

While Rizzo states that the principles of federalism militate against injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the executive branch of state or local governments, Rizzo does not preclude recourse to broad injunctions when a clear pattern of unconstitutional conduct has been established.

Section 1983 authorizes equitable relief against local law-enforcement officials acting under color of state law when they use excessive force, make illegal arrests or searches, or otherwise deprive citizens of constitutional rights.

Pennsylvania v. Porter · filed 1979-11-16

Local law enforcement officials who act under color of state law and who use excessive force or who make illegal arrests or who otherwise deny citizens their constitutional rights are subject to the equity powers of this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants, under color of state law, have engaged in a course of illegal and unconstitutional conduct by using wrongful and excessive physical force on numerous occasions, making illegal arrests, conducting illegal searches, by intimidating and harassing citizens, and by retaliating against those who would complain of such illegal and unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against a responsible state official, rather than directly against the State itself.

Spicer v. Hilton · filed 1980-02-28

Appellant can achieve the same relief he seeks under the Fourteenth Amendment if he is permitted to amend his complaint to substitute the proper responsible state official in a suit pursuant to section 1983 seeking prospective injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a state-court judge only when the judge is directly and personally responsible for the alleged unconstitutional conduct or conditions.

Inmates of Middlesex County v. Demos · filed 1981-08-05

From these cases it can be concluded that injunctive relief can only be ordered against a judge if he or she is directly and personally responsible for the complained of unconstitutional actions or conditions.

Section 1983 permits a federal district court to grant injunctive relief for a deprivation of civil rights only when plaintiffs show likely immediate, irreparable harm from the defendant’s conduct.

McDowell v. Edmisten · filed 1981-09-30

This Court may only grant injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of immediate, irreparable harm flowing from defendant’s proposed conduct.

Prospective injunctive relief under § 1983 may run against a successor governmental office when facts show the successor will continue its predecessor's practices.

Lodestar Co. v. County of Mono · filed 1986-07-24

The ... Mayor of City of Philadelphia ... case teaches that prospective injunctive relief against a successor under section 1983 is appropriate when the court makes factual findings that the successor will continue the predecessor’s practices.

Military personnel generally may not recover Section 1983 damages from superior state military officers for constitutional violations arising from military orders, but may pursue injunctive reinstatement for an unconstitutional discharge.

Jorden v. National Guard Bureau · filed 1986-08-27

We thus believe that the Supreme Court was laying down a general rule barring damages actions by military personnel against superior officers for constitutional violations, rather than authorizing a fact-specific inquiry. ... For the reasons stated above, we hold that the district court was correct in dismissing Jorden’s damages claims, but incorrect in dismissing his claims for reinstatement. Thus, on remand, if Jorden can demonstrate that the discharges violated his constitutional rights, he is entitled to reinstatement.

A Section 1983 action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief is not an action in the nature of trespass.

Fawber v. Cohen · filed 1987-10-15

When a party seeks injunctive and declaratory relief through a Section 1983 action, it is not in the “nature of trespass.”

Section 1983 does not justify injunctive relief to bypass available administrative remedies when an adequate legal remedy exists.

Pet v. Department of Health Services · filed 1988-05-10

As we explain below, the available legal remedy is adequate and no form of injunctive relief, under § 1983 or otherwise, is justified as an exception to the exhaustion requirement in this case even if we assume, arguendo, that the trial court ever considered the § 1983 count.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief in addition to damages.

Neal v. Camper · filed 1983-02-22

It was held, however, in ... that under § 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that injunctive relief is equally applicable in addition to damages. ... Injunctive relief is a proper remedy.

An immunity defense that would bar damages under Section 1983 does not prevent consideration of a request for injunctive relief.

Sisson v. Triplett · filed 1988-08-26

Respondents raise an immunity defense in their answer, which if successful, would ordinarily bar only damages. ... Therefore, this court will consider that portion of Sisson’s complaint which prays for injunctive relief based on the statute’s constitutionality.

Section 1983 falls within the Anti-Injunction Act’s expressly authorized exception, but equity, comity, and federalism still constrain federal injunctions of state court proceedings.

Liedel v. Juvenile Court of Madison County · filed 1989-03-02

While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an Act of Congress that falls within the “expressly authorized” exception of the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283,... this acknowledged exception does not cause this Court to question or qualify the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.

Section 1983 empowers and obliges a court to enjoin a threatened deprivation of federal constitutional rights.

Arkansas State Medical Board v. Leipzig · filed 1989-05-30

It is equally well established that in a suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a court has not only the power but the duty to enjoin the threatened deprivation of rights guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials to undo discipline imposed under an unconstitutional rule.

Sexton v. Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct · filed 1989-11-22

As the plaintiff in this case, like those in Schneider, has done exactly that, the court finds that Nix and Darlak are on point, and that this action is one for prospective rather than retroactive injunctive relief within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek a future injunction against a racially discriminatory state parole scheme.

Murray v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority Raymond E. Capots, Chairman · filed 1990-10-17

But to the extent he seeks a future injunction to cease a racially discriminatory state parole scheme, Murray's claim is cognizable under Sec. 1983 and survives judgment on the pleadings.

Section 1983 does not permit an injunction concerning prison practices when the plaintiffs have not established that those practices violate their rights.

SHABAZZ v. NORRIS · filed 1991-05-31

In the case at bar, the district court expressly found that "the plaintiffs have not established any right to relief based upon their claims that their rights have been violated by the [prison's] food and menu practices...." Accordingly, the district court was without authority to issue injunctive relief with respect to those practices.

Section 1983 permits expungement of a prison disciplinary report as injunctive relief if the prisoner proves a due process violation.

Alexander v. Howard A. Peters, III · filed 1991-07-11

The claim can nevertheless proceed because the complaint adequately alleges other bases on which this court may grant him some relief. First, if Alexander proves a violation of his right to due process, he may be granted the injunctive relief of getting the disciplinary report expunged from his record.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Abdul-Akbar v. Watson · filed 1991-10-07

When state officials are sued in their official capacities under Section 1983, a court may grant prospective injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits an injunction for a valid civil rights claim, but relief in such an action generally cannot affect criminal proceedings, including the imposition of punishment.

Maynard v. Layden · filed 1992-04-22

Brewer has the right to file a civil rights action and, if his complaints are valid, to obtain an injunction in such an action. However, the breadth of such an action, including the remedies available thereunder, is not unlimited and, as a general rule, cannot affect or apply to criminal actions, including the imposition of criminal punishment.

Section 1983 allows a district court to use its full injunctive and equitable powers to remedy violations, including reinstatement.

McCann v. Ruiz · filed 1992-07-30

The Court has the ability to award such relief since the full range of a district court’s injunctive and equitable powers is available to remedy violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 injunctive relief may be denied when plaintiffs fail to show irreparable harm.

Estate of Bohn v. Waddell · filed 1992-09-29

We hold that the tax court did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue injunctive relief to the taxpayers under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. ... The tax court correctly found that the taxpayers had failed to demonstrate they would suffer irreparable harm unless injunctive relief was granted.

A preliminary injunction against a law enforcement department under Section 1983 requires a record supporting likely proof of a pervasive pattern of misconduct reflecting departmental policy.

Thomas v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1992-10-21

The record in this case does not yet contain a sufficient basis on which to evaluate the likelihood of the plaintiffs’ succeeding on the merits in establishing, not merely misconduct, but a pervasive pattern of misconduct reflecting departmental policy.

Section 1983 injunctive relief requires a continuing constitutional violation.

Floyd J. Spruytte, Jr. v. Terri Feighner Michael Kosequat · filed 1994-02-04

Finally, in order to obtain injunctive relief, there must be a continuous constitutional violation. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 71 (1985). There was no continuing constitutional violation in this case. Thus, Spruytte was not entitled to injunctive relief.

Section 1983 does not warrant a permanent injunction when damages adequately remedy the injury and there is no threat of continuing or future injury.

Jade Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1994-03-01

Notwithstanding the violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights, the circumstances of this ease do not warrant the issuance of a permanent injunction. The jury’s award of $2 million constitutes an adequate legal remedy. ... Absent a threat of continuing or future injury, a permanent injunction is unwarranted.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against judges in extraordinary cases, but relief is unwarranted when the challenged judicial acts cannot be reviewed and the applicable court procedures are constitutionally sound.

Hill v. J. Gary Hastings, Douglas A. McKee Abraham Gorenfeld, James H. Dempsey, Mildred L. Lillie, N. Frederic · filed 1994-04-28

In Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 538 & 541 (1984) the Supreme Court concluded that judges could be sued for injunctive relief in extraordinary cases. Hill bases his contention that the action is sufficiently extraordinary to merit injunctive relief on 1) the facial unconstitutionality of California's practices for the treatment of pro per litigants; and 2) the transparency of defendants' actions which resulted in Hill's denial of process guaranteed by state law. The district court concluded that Hill's action is not sufficiently extraordinary to merit granting injunctive relief and we agree. We are without authority to review the judicial actions taken by defendants and have no basis for finding the procedures applied in California with regard to pro per litigants constitutionally deficient.

Section 1983 injunctive relief must address a specific established constitutional violation.

Barbara Doty, and All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. County of Lassen, and Ronald D. Jarrell as Sheriff, and Indivi · filed 1994-10-06

In fashioning a remedy, the District Court must focus on the specific constitutional violations found.

Section 1983 allows injunctive relief against a state judge, but equity and comity can bar that relief when the circumstances do not warrant it.

Hoover v. Wagner · filed 1995-02-02

Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529-36, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 1974-78, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984), held that such relief may be sought against a state judge in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... O’Shea is strong support for affirming the rejection of the relief sought by our plaintiffs against the state court judge.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to enjoin unconstitutional enforcement methods of a state law enforcement agency.

Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan · filed 1995-05-25

Ample authority exists allowing a federal court to issue an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prohibiting the current enforcement methods of a state law enforcement agency when those enforcement methods violate the federal constitution.

Section 1983, together with the Declaratory Judgment Act, authorizes declaratory and injunctive relief to bring state agencies or officials into compliance with the Constitution.

Schwartz v. Welch · filed 1995-06-20

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, authorize entry of declaratory and injunctive relief necessary to bring state agencies or officials into compliance with the Constitution.

Section 1983 empowers a court of equity to enjoin governmental agencies and officials from depriving people of constitutional rights.

Villines v. Lee · filed 1995-07-17

In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 gives a court of equity the power to enjoin governmental agencies and officials from depriving people of constitutional rights. Arkansas State Medical Bd. v. Leipzig, 299 Ark. 71, 770 S.W.2d 661 (1989). There is no allegation in this case that the County Judge and County Comptroller are about to act ultra vires, in bad faith, or arbitrarily, or to deprive the employees of constitutional rights.

Absolute and qualified immunity do not bar suits for injunctive or declaratory relief under § 1983.

Orellana v. Kyle · filed 1995-08-14

Although the district court relied on established law regarding damages suits, Orellana sued for injunctive relief. "Neither absolute nor qualified immunity extends to suits for injunctive or declaratory relief under § 1983." Chrissy F. by Medley v. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1991). The district court therefore erred as a matter of law in finding the defendant immune from this injunctive suit.

A Section 1983 plaintiff seeking injunctive or declaratory relief must have a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.

Ridderbush v. Peter Naze, Circuit Judge of Brown County, Wisconsin, Donna Kelsey, Donna Cornelisen · filed 1995-08-17

As a Sec. 1983 plaintiff, Ridderbush is entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief only if he has a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.

Section 1983 excludes states and state agencies from suit, but permits claims for injunctive relief against state officials for alleged constitutional violations.

Y.A. Ex Rel. Fleener v. Bayh · filed 1995-11-08

States, state entities and state officials sued in their official capacities are not "persons" and therefore are not subject to suit under § 1983. ... An exception to this rule exists in the case of a state official sued for injunctive relief based on alleged constitutional violations Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159, 28 S.Ct. 441, 453, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). ... The due process claim in this case thus may be asserted only against the named individual defendants and not against the state or its agencies.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a state official only when the official’s authorization or approval of a policy has a causal link to the constitutional deprivation.

Tyson v. Ratelle · filed 1996-04-11

To warrant injunctive relief under Section 1983, however, there must be an affirmative link or a causal relationship between the constitutional deprivation and the adoption of a policy, express or implied, showing the official’s authorization or approval of the conduct leading to the constitutional deprivation.

In § 1983 actions against local officials, an injunction requires a pervasive pattern of unconstitutional conduct flowing from a deliberate plan by the named defendants.

Michael Ellis, Appellees/cross-Appellants v. District of Columbia, Appellants/cross-Appellees · filed 1996-05-28

Injunctive relief is warranted in this type of § 1983 action only if there is “a pervasive pattern ... flowing from a deliberate plan by the named defendants.”

Section 1983 authorizes injunctive relief when a plaintiff shows threatened future injury.

Barrett v. Fields · filed 1996-08-29

Both 15 U.S.C. § 26 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorize injunctive relief upon demonstration of threatened future injury.

Section 1983 authorizes injunctive relief for violations of federal rights.

Donrey Media Group v. Ikeda · filed 1996-12-16

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes in-junctive relief.

Qualified and absolute immunity do not bar suits for injunctive relief under § 1983.

Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board · filed 1997-07-24

Second, the appellants' argument of qualified immunity is without merit. It is well established law in this Circuit that the defenses of qualified and absolute immunity do not extend to suits for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an injunction against state court proceedings under the Anti-Injunction Act’s express-authorization exception, but relief still depends on a viable claim and equitable considerations.

Caughorn v. Phillips · filed 1997-08-14

While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 falls within the “expressly authorized by Act of Congress” exception provided in the Anti-Injunction Act, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), the plaintiff here has neither pleaded with clarity a cause of action under § 1983 nor made a showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of a § 1983 claim against either the defendant assistant district attorney general or the defendant chancellor.

Section 1983 injunctive relief requires irreparable injury, including the absence of an adequate remedy at law.

Freedom Comm v. Mancias · filed 1997-10-10

To obtain an injunction, a plaintiff must show irreparable harm. “The equitable remedy [under 42 U.S.C. § 1983] is unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury . . . .” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). Part of showing irreparable injury is demonstrating that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.

Section 1983 permits claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief challenging prison disciplinary procedures.

Whitlock v. Johnson · filed 1997-11-24

It should be repeated at the outset that, as this Court has previously held (Opinion at 502), the remaining claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief are indeed actionable under Section 1983 (see Edwards v. Balisok, — U.S. —,—-—, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1588-89, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997)).

Injunctive relief under § 1983 requires a showing that legal remedies are inadequate and irreparable harm will result.

Smith v. State · filed 1998-03-13

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs have failed to allege grounds for equitable jurisdiction. They have failed to show either lack of adequate legal remedies or irreparable harm.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Ackermann v. Doyle · filed 1999-04-20

However, in October 1996, Congress amended Section 1983 to bar injunctive relief “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853; see also Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir.1999); Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir.1998). Because Ackerman does not allege, and the record does not suggest, that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable, the claim against Justices Doyle and Werner must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a court to grant injunctive relief for an underlying constitutional violation.

Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools · filed 1999-09-09

On the other hand, the Court is not precluded from granting injunctive relief as to the underlying § 1983 action.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Nollet v. Justices of the Trial Court of Massachusetts · filed 2000-01-27

Count II is dismissed because it constitutes as an action for injunctive relief which is barred by the express language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek injunctive relief concerning the place of confinement.

Koch v. Schuylkill County Prison · filed 2000-04-26

That form of relief is appropriate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not the habeas statutes.

Section 1983 authorizes injunctive relief within the express-authorization exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.

Yankee v. Bonsey, et al. · filed 2000-05-04

Moreover, plaintiff’s complaint alleges a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which brings the action within the Anti-Injunction Act’s exception for injunctions “expressly authorized by Act of Congress.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 (West 1994); see Gibson v . Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973)(noting that § 1983 actions are exempt under the Anti-Injunction A c t ) .

The prospect of Section 1983 damages for an unlawful home search does not necessarily make the threatened injury reparable or bar preliminary injunctive relief.

Noble v. Tooley · filed 2000-11-21

This Court also concludes that the Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing as to the substantial threat of an irreparable injury. The Defendants argue that the exclusionary rule and the prospect of monetary damages in a Bivens or § 1983 action nullifies the irreparability of the injury. This Court disagrees.

Section 1983 does not provide injunctive relief for a claimed constitutional violation unless the plaintiff shows a constitutional violation.

Vann v. Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation · filed 2001-11-29

By definition, the injunctive relief that Vann seeks here cannot be obtained in a § 1983 proceeding unless he has first shown a constitutional violation. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (stating that a plaintiff who alleges a “deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States may seek injunctive relief). Vann has failed to allege a constitutional violation and is therefore not entitled to injunctive relief pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 injunctive relief cannot substitute for an appeal from the denial of a federal habeas corpus petition.

Pollock v. Potter · filed 2001-12-14

He cannot use a § 1983 request for injunctive relief as a substitute for the appeal which he failed to take from the denial of that first federal habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 limits injunctive relief against judges to cases where a declaratory decree was violated, declaratory relief was unavailable, or the judge clearly exceeded jurisdiction.

Hodges v. Mangano · filed 2002-01-28

Moreover, under the 1996 Federal Courts Improvement Act, injunctive relief cannot be granted against a judicial actor “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable” or unless the judge’s conduct was “clearly in excess” of the judge’s jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to seek prospective injunctive relief for adequate process in future transfer and retention decisions without invalidating past decisions.

Austin v. Wilkinson · filed 2002-02-25

The defendants’ argument does not persuade. The plaintiffs are not seeking money damages or judicial invalidation of their initial transfers to the OSP. The plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief for adequate due process in the Department’s transfer and retention decisions concerning the OSP. In fact, Edwards specifically states that seeking prospective injunctive relief under § 1983 is proper.

Section 1983 does not provide injunctive relief that is intrusive and unworkable when adequate state remedies are available.

Garfield v. Daly · filed 2002-05-28

The district court properly dismissed Garfield’s action because the proposed injunctive relief is intrusive and unworkable, and Garfield has adequate state remedies to address any violations of law that state officials may commit in denying him parole.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Arena v. Department of Social Services of Nassau County · filed 2002-08-23

In October of 1996, Congress amended Section 1983 to bar injunctive relief “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

L.B. v. Town of Chester · filed 2002-11-19

FCIA amended § 1983 to state that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (amended Oct. 19, 1996 by Pub.L. 104r-317, Title III, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3853.) As Plaintiff does not allege that there is any violation of a declaratory decree or that such relief would be unavailable, the claims against Magistrate Masella for injunctive relief are also dismissed.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Jarrett v. Alexander · filed 2002-11-25

State agents in their official capacities also may be properly subject to prospective injunctive relief under § 1983 because such actions are not treated as actions against the State.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judges for actions within their judicial roles unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Thurgood v. Burton · filed 2003-01-09

Judges Young and Burton are not subject to injunctive relief for actions taken within their judicial roles unless "a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief [is] unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nothing in the record suggests that such are the circumstances here.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable; the court applies that limit to federal judges in Bivens actions.

Johnson v. McCuskey · filed 2003-08-05

But our doubt is now irrelevant because Congress has since amended § 1983 to provide that “injunctive relief shall not be granted” in an action brought against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” This amendment bars injunctive relief against both state and federal judges because “federal courts incorporate § 1983 law into Bivens actions.”

Section 1983 bars the claims for injunctive relief against the judge in this case.

Salem v. Paroli · filed 2003-10-28

(3) All claims for damages against Acting Supreme Court Justice James D. Pagones are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), and all claims against Justice Pagones for injunctive relief are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Sharp v. Bivona · filed 2004-01-26

In October of 1996, Congress amended Section 1983 to bar injunctive relief “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” ... Because Sharp does not allege and the record does not suggest that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable, the claims for injunctive relief against Justice Bivona must also be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief under the express-authorization exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

Rapp v. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct · filed 1980-12-31

As plaintiffs brought this action under section 1983, section 2283 would not bar the injunctive relief sought.

Section 1983 permits equitable relief against officials who know of their subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct and fail to prevent its recurrence.

Schnell v. City of Chicago · filed 1969-03-17

Under section 1983, equitable relief is appropriate in a situation where governmental officials have notice of the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates and fail to prevent a recurrence of such misconduct.

Section 1983 damages can adequately remedy an improper search or seizure, supporting denial of preliminary injunctive relief.

Campbell, James v. Miller, Frank · filed 2004-06-28

Damages are a normal, and adequate, response to an improper search or seizure, which as a constitutional tort often is analogized to (other) personal-injury litigation.

Section 1983 damages can be an adequate remedy for an improper search or seizure, supporting denial of preliminary injunctive relief.

Campbell v. Miller · filed 2004-08-20

Damages are a normal, and adequate, response to an improper search or seizure, which as a constitutional tort often is analogized to (other) personal-injury litigation.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable; the absence of a damages remedy does not make declaratory relief unavailable.

Smith v. City of Hammond, Indiana · filed 2004-11-03

Smith also seeks injunctive relief against the judge, but here he runs up against a 1996 amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that provides “that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” ... Setting bail is a judicial act, as we said, and the exception involving declaratory relief is inapplicable to this case. Declaratory relief is not unavailable just because it is not an award of damages — yet that is Smith’s argument.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Heghmann v. Rye, N H , et al. · filed 2004-11-08

To the extent he seeks injunctive relief, it is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides: ... Heghmann’s complaint fails to allege that the due process and equal protection violations of which he complains (i.e., the state court’s order directing him to make rent payments to Hafiani by a date certain) were the product of Judge DeVries having violated a previously issued declaratory decree. Nor does he allege that declaratory relief is unavailable to him.

Section 1983 injunctive relief requires a showing of an inadequate remedy at law and a serious risk of irreparable harm.

Lezama v. Justice Court · filed 1987-03-11

Nevertheless, Lezama’s claims necessarily rest on the ability to obtain injunctive relief (Pulliam v. Allen, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 537-538 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 576-577]; Ashelman v. Pope (9th Cir. 1986) 793 F.2d 1072, 1075), the prerequisites of which are “a showing of an inadequate remedy at law and of a serious risk of irreparable harm.” (436 U.S. at p. 537 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 576]; Beacon Theatres v. Westover (1959) 359 U.S. 500, 506-507 [3 L.Ed.2d 988, 994-995, 79 S.Ct. 948].)

A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under § 1983 must show that future violations of their constitutional rights are likely.

National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Brackett · filed 2005-05-16

These disputes need not be resolved, however, because the NAACP has not proffered evidence to demonstrate that future violations of the constitutional rights of the organization and its members are likely to occur, and such a showing is a prerequisite for obtaining injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits an injunction against defendants enforcing a state statute that violates constitutional rights.

Pruett v. Harris County Bail Bond Board · filed 2005-05-20

Having concluded that the statute is unconstitutional, the defendants in this case are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. ... The appropriate remedy however is not damages but injunctive relief. Therefore, the Court holds that the defendants should be enjoined from enforcing the statute.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Bliven v. Hunt · filed 2005-12-12

Plaintiff has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable, and thus the 1996 amendments to § 1983 bar plaintiffs claim against the judicial defendants and their assistants.

Section 1983 claims seeking only injunctive relief from conditions at a detention center become moot when the plaintiff is transferred from that center.

Kabia v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service, John W. Welch, Jr. · filed 1989-09-13

The district court rejected Kabia's Sec. 1983 claims relating to denial of access to the courts while an inmate at Wicomico County Detention Center. Because Kabia sought only injunctive relief, the claims were mooted upon his transfer from Wicomico.

Section 1983 permits a claim for relief against state bar officials who allegedly use disciplinary proceedings under color of state law to suppress First Amendment activity.

Daniel T. Taylor, III v. Kentucky State Bar Association · filed 1970-03-26

Nor is it technically necessary that the vehicle be a criminal prosecution by the state — disbarment proceedings having been described as “proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature,” In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 177 (1968) — where, under color of state law or court rule, the effect is to chill the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. ... We find that the Appellants have properly invoked federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964) and have stated a claim for which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).

Section 1983 permits a court hearing a challenge to an execution protocol to grant or deny injunctive relief, including conditionally.

Taylor v. Crawford · filed 2006-08-09

The district court also had jurisdiction to grant Taylor the remedy of injunction or, in the alternative, to deny such relief, totally or conditionally.

A court may dismiss a death row inmate’s § 1983 method-of-execution suit seeking injunctive relief because of unnecessary delay in filing.

Grayson v. Allen · filed 2007-07-16

Given the strong presumption against the grant of dilatory equitable relief, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Grayson’s § 1983 action due to his unnecessary delay.

Section 1983 injunctions against local executive officials are constrained by principles of equity, comity, and federalism.

Koger v. Guarino · filed 1976-05-03

Where an injunction is sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the principles of equity, comity and federalism must restrain a federal court where the injunctive relief is sought against those in charge of the executive branch of local government such as the defendants in this case.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Cortes v. Jordan · filed 2007-08-21

In 1996, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub.L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996), amending § 1983 and protecting judges from in-junctive relief, providing that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, the Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief is dismissed.

Section 1983 method-of-execution claims seeking injunctive relief may be dismissed for unreasonable delay when deciding the merits would require a stay or an expedited litigation schedule.

Hallford v. Allen · filed 2007-09-06

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Hallford has unreasonably delayed in bringing this §§ 1983 action, and that a consequence of his unreasonable delay is that a final decision on the merits is not reasonably possible without entry of a stay ... of execution and/or an expedited litigation schedule.

Section 1983 permits declaratory and prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities.

Mayfield v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2008-05-30

Both § 1983 and RLUIPA allow for declaratory and injunctive relief. ... Mayfield’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Johnson and Pierce in their official capacity are not barred by sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 permits claims for declaratory or injunctive relief challenging a state parole board’s policies and procedures.

Brown v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles · filed 2008-07-07

Claims for declaratory or injunctive relief challenging a state parole board’s policies and procedures are cognizable in a § 1983 proceeding.

Section 1983’s general availability of equitable relief does not, by itself, establish entitlement to an injunction concerning a dismissed criminal charge.

Hay v. CITY OF MILES CITY · filed 2008-11-10

Hay’s overarching assertions on this point are that a court may grant equitable relief in a § 1983 action, case circumstances dictate whether a particular type of relief is appropriate, and injunctive relief differs from—but may relate to—a declaratory judgment. Hay advances no cases involving a dismissed criminal charge, a prosecutor’s statement in a motion to dismiss a criminal charge, or a request to reopen a closed case. Nor does he analogize this case to the circumstances of any case in which injunctive relief was deemed available or appropriate. We conclude Hay has not established error in the District Court’s determination that it could not grant injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits injunctive or declaratory relief even when a state official may be immune from individual damages liability.

Huber Pontiac, Inc. v. Allphin · filed 1977-05-02

This of course does not render injunctive or declaratory relief any less appropriate.

Section 1983 permits an injunction requiring prison officials to credit pretrial custody toward eligibility for privileges other than parole.

Carey v. Garrison · filed 1978-06-13

Insofar as this order requires credit to be given toward eligibility for privileges other than parole it shall be treated as an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 binding upon respondent Garrison and the custodians of petitioner’s records in the North Carolina Department of Correction.

Section 1983 does not allow injunctive relief for acts a judge took in a judicial capacity.

Blakeney v. Marsico · filed 2009-08-11

Injunctive relief is not available for acts that Judge Lewis took in his judicial capacity. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against officials responsible for policies or practices that cause constitutional violations without requiring their personal participation in every act.

Rouser v. White · filed 2010-04-15

The Ninth Circuit applies a less stringent standard for causation where plaintiffs seek injunctive relief as opposed to damages. ... Accordingly, plaintiff has met his burden of alleging a causal connection sufficient to entitle him to injunctive relief against Cate and Haws.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

McKeown v. N.Y. State Commission on Judicial Conduct · filed 2010-05-18

Section 1983 provides, however, that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” ... To the extent that Appellant seeks injunctive relief against Judge Scarpino, moreover, Appellant does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable, and so § 1983 relief is not available.

Section 1983 does not authorize mandamus relief against state officials when no other relief is sought.

Johnson v. Morrell · filed 2010-07-26

Johnson’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief amounts to a request for a writ of mandamus against state officials, which is not authorized by § 1983 if no other relief is sought.

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity, subject to exceptions.

Koorsen v. Dolehanty · filed 2010-10-29

With exceptions not applicable here, a federal court may not grant injunctive relief in a suit brought against a judge for acts taken in his judicial capacity.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Knox v. Bland · filed 2011-02-14

Likewise, he cannot obtain injunctive relief against Defendants. Although we have previously said that a plaintiff may obtain an injunction against a state judge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Harris v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 905 (10th Cir. 1995); Olson, 965 F.2d at 943, those statements were abrogated by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, which provides that “injunctive relief [against a judicial officer] shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has not shown that either condition was satisfied here.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

McCluskey v. New York State Unified Court System · filed 2011-09-07

In addition, McCluskey's claims for injunctive relief against Judge Lippman are barred by statutory judicial immunity because McCluskey did not allege that "a declaratory decree was violated" or that "declaratory relief was unavailable."

Section 1983 permits a warden to be named as a defendant for injunctive relief even without personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Gonzalez v. Feinerman · filed 2011-12-02

Though Gonzalez does not allege any specific involve- ment by Gaetz in the treatment of his hernia, the warden of Menard is a proper defendant since Gonzalez seeks injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief for the continued use of election districts that violate voters’ equal protection rights.

Crumly v. Cobb County Board of Elections & Voter Registration · filed 2012-05-09

The Court specifically finds that the continued use of the existing malapportioned districts to elect members of the County Commission violates Plaintiffs constitutional rights under the Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of the Constitution of the State of Georgia — and also results in liability for which injunctive relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits declaratory or injunctive relief only when a violation of federal law is continuing.

Kress v. CCA of Tennessee, LL · filed 2012-09-14

As the district court properly stated, under § 1983, declaratory or injunctive relief is only proper if there is a continuing violation of federal law.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against an official sued in her personal capacity for allegedly unconstitutional actions taken within her official authority.

Hatcher ex rel. Hatcher v. Desoto County School District Board of Education · filed 2013-04-05

Personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is available when an official’s allegedly unconstitutional actions are “within the official’s authority and necessary to the performance of governmental functions.” ... The Court sees no reason why such personal liability cannot be remedied by injunctive relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Michael Long, Jr. v. Reynolds · filed 2013-05-28

Upon careful review, we conclude that Long’s complaint was subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, because the allegedly improper actions were taken within the judge’s judicial capacity, and because Long did not allege that the judge had violated a declaratory decree, that declaratory relief against the judge was unavailable, or that there was any indication that the judge intended to continue his purportedly unconstitutional practices.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Jimi Rose v. County of York · filed 2014-07-08

The injunctive relief that he requested is not available. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity, subject to exceptions.

Smith v. Wagner · filed 2014-08-13

However, as the District Court correctly determined, this claim is barred because section 1983 provides that injunctive relief shall not be granted, with certain exceptions not relevant here, in an action brought against a judge who has acted in his judicial capacity.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for injunctive relief against state officials enforcing an unconstitutional restriction on benefits.

Harris v. Cantu · filed 2015-01-26

Plaintiff applied for and was denied benefits under the Act based on the unconstitutional restriction, and therefore has a valid cause of action against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pursuant to which he seeks injunctive relief.

Section 1983 limits injunctive relief against a judicial officer when the plaintiff has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated.

Moore v. Fruin · filed 2015-05-01

The district court properly dismissed Moore’s claims for injunctive relief because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to show that a declaratory decree was violated.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a sitting state court judge for actions taken in a judicial capacity.

Robert Lepelletier, Jr. v. Tran · filed 2016-02-11

His claims seeking injunctive relief against a sitting state court judge for actions taken in his judicial capacity also were barred by the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).

Section 1983 permits equitable relief and damages, but equitable relief is available only in proper cases.

Yount v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2009-03-20

Further, although suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce constitutional rights typically contemplate injunctive relief as well as monetary relief, the United States Supreme Court has noted that the availability of this relief is quite circumscribed: ... Section 1983 by its terms confers authority to grant equitable relief as well as damages, but its words allow a suit in equity only when that is the proper proceeding for redress, and they refer to existing standards to determine what is a proper proceeding. Even in an action between private individuals, it has long been held that an injunction is to be used sparingly, and only in a clear and plain case. When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the activity of a government agency, even within a unitary court system, his case must contend with the well-established rule that the Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs. ... Therefore, I would hold that re-transfer is not a cognizable remedy when a prisoner alleges that he was transferred from one prison to another in retaliation for having exercised a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for acts in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Owens v. Armstrong · filed 2016-03-22

Plaintiffs request for an injunction is based on actions taken by the judges in their judicial capacity, and he has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff requests an injunction against Defendants Armstrong and Marino, the requested relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Pledger v. Russell · filed 2017-07-19

Although Ms. Pledger’s suit is not only for money damages, the injunctive relief she seeks—the termination of her state criminal case and the sanction and removal of Judge Russell—is not available in this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”).

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for judicial acts unless the officer violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Cooper v. Rapp · filed 2017-07-25

In any event, suits for injunctive relief against judicial officers are barred “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court correctly noted that Cooper and Moses failed to allege that Judge Rapp violated a declaratory judgment. Nor did they demonstrate that declaratory relief was “unavailable,” albeit, as explained above, they are not entitled to such relief. The court therefore did not err in holding that Judge Rapp was immune from Cooper’s and Moses’s claims for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Martin v. Brehe-Krueger · filed 2017-10-26

Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against Judge Brehe-Krueger pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such relief is not available because Plaintiff failed to plead a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Farmer v. Duncan · filed 2018-01-04

Section 1983 precludes injunctive relief against a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is clear from the allegations of the Complaint that neither situation applies here.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Lyman v. Phila Court of Common Pleas · filed 2018-09-24

Since Lyman has not alleged that the judges violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable, and because the injunctive relief sought by Lyman only addresses actions taken by the judges in their judicial capacities, his claims for injunctive relief are barred.

Section 1983 does not permit an injunction against a defendant whom the court found not to have violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Farabee v. Yaratha · filed 2020-02-06

First, the district court didn’t find Vauter liable on any counts; i.e., the court didn’t find that she violated Farabee’s rights. A defendant who has not violated a plaintiff’s rights cannot be ... enjoined.

Section 1983 authorizes money damages for constitutional violations by state actors even when prosecutorial immunity prevents recovery from a particular defendant.

WEBER v. ERIE COUNTY · filed 2020-02-06

Further, it is irrelevant that defendants may effectively negate this remedy by raising the affirmative defense of prosecutorial immunity because damages remain an authorized remedy at law under §1983.

Section 1983 claims for injunctive relief concerning prison conditions become moot when the prisoner leaves the facility.

Sandoval v. Valle · filed 2020-03-27

A prisoner plaintiff may not maintain § 1983 claims for temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunctive relief based on conditions of incarceration if the plaintiff is no longer housed at the facility.

Section 1983 claims seeking injunctive relief may proceed against a state corrections agency at screening when the plaintiff alleges unconstitutional agency policies.

Alvarado-Gonzalez v. Thompson · filed 2020-05-12

Because Plaintiff requests injunctive relief and alleges unconstitutional policies attributable to IDOC, he will be allowed to proceed with Counts 1 and 2 against IDOC at this early stage.

A prisoner’s release moots § 1983 claims for declaratory and injunctive relief concerning prison conditions.

Shabazz v. Schofield · filed 2020-05-28

Due to his release, Shabazz’s official capacity claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983 are moot.

Section 1983 permits injunctions against public entities and public officers sued in their official capacities.

Grove v. Groome · filed 2020-06-02

Injunctions are available under § 1983 only against public entities and public officers sued in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff seeking an injunction against parole conditions to pursue an available New York Article 78 proceeding first.

Newman v. Annucci · filed 2020-07-27

Although Plaintiff may pursue an Article 78 proceeding in New York to review parole conditions and obtain an injunction, he is not required to do so.

Section 1983 does not authorize a court to remove a jailer from his position as injunctive relief.

Vaughn v. Underwood · filed 2020-07-31

As relief, Plaintiff requests that Defendant Underwood be “removed from position of authority.” The Court, however, does not have the authority to grant this type of relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages require a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; injunctive relief requires authority to carry out the requested order.

Myers v. Saxton · filed 2020-08-27

While personal involvement is a prerequisite to an award of damages under Section 1983, plaintiff's medical indifference claim against defendant Wilkinson seeking injunctive relief also must be dismissed at this juncture because there are no allegations in the amended complaint that defendant Wilkinson has the relevant authority at CNYPC to carry out the injunctive relief plaintiff seeks.

Section 1983 does not provide injunctive relief against defendants sued only in their individual capacities.

Braswell v. Norton · filed 2020-09-30

Braswell sues the defendants only in their individual capacities. Injunctive relief is not available from defendants in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits a prison warden to be named in an official capacity when the warden would carry out the requested injunctive relief.

Abuharba v. Asselmeier · filed 2020-10-30

Because the Complaint includes a request for injunctive relief, the Warden of Menard Correctional Center, in his/her official capacity, will be added to the docket with regard to the request for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 can provide injunctive relief for a civil rights violation by a corrections department.

Burr v. Department of Corrections · filed 2020-11-05

Bates, like Department of Corrections, supports the conclusion that injunctive relief can be an appropriate remedy for a civil rights violation in a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983’s requirement that the defendant be a person is a nonjurisdictional element that a defendant can waive.

Baca v. Colo. Dep't of State · filed 2019-08-20

The Department has expressly waived the failure of this element, and the issue of whether the Department is a person under § 1983 is not a jurisdictional issue that this court must raise sua sponte.

Section 1983 treats a city official as a person who may be sued to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.

Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills · filed 1974-09-06

We hold that a city official is a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983 and that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 in an action to enjoin him from enforcing an unconstitutional statute.

Section 1983 claims against an entity cannot be dismissed at the pleading stage when the record is too sparse to determine whether the entity is a statutory “person” or whether damages against officials would be paid from public funds.

Trivits v. Wilmington Institute · filed 1974-10-04

With respect to these issues the present record is simply too sparse and contradictory to make a definitive determination. Whether the State, New Castle County and the City of Wilmington have become so intrinsically involved in the affairs of the Institute, a private corporation, through the functions it performs, the control exercised over it or the funding given, as to it to make it a “person” not amenable to suit under § 1983 will have to await a fuller development of the facts. The same is true with respect to the question whether the Institute is financed solely from public funds so that any award of damages against the individual defendants would be satisfied from the public Treasury or whether the Institute has private funds from which such damages could be awarded. This too is a question which cannot be determined on the present record. The defendants’ motion to dismiss on these grounds will therefore be denied.

Section 1983 reaches entities that act under color of state law when they are persons rather than state instrumentalities; a university remains a person when the state does not control its operations.

Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1974-05-14

Close and conscientious scrutiny of the above figures, and of the other indicia of state control or lack thereof set out above, make it clear that Pitt and Temple are actually and statutorily possessed of sufficient independence from the control of the Commonwealth to constitute persons within the meaning of Section 1983. ... Under this state of facts, this Court finds that the Commonwealth does not exercise such actual or potential control over the operations of Penn State as to render that institution a state instrumentality as that term is meant in a Section 1983 context. ... Pitt, Temple and Penn State are persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a suit against a state because a state is not a person within the statute’s meaning.

Pennsylvania v. Powers · filed 1970-03-31

For it has been held that states are not persons within the meaning of Section 1983 and thus not amenable to suit.

Section 1983 does not treat a state parole board as a “person” subject to suit.

Simmons v. Maslysnky · filed 1968-08-23

Initially, the action would be subject to summary dismissal to the extent that it is directed to the Parole Board per se because that institution is not a “person” within the meaning of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state court remedies, but refusal to use an adequate state administrative hearing designed to prevent a threatened deprivation can bar the claim; states and state agencies are not “persons” liable under § 1983.

Whitner v. Davis · filed 1969-04-03

This being the case, her failure to allege exhaustion of state court remedies neither defeated subject-matter jurisdiction under that Act, nor constituted a failure to state a claim thereunder. ... If the administrative remedy designed to forestall a threatened discharge was adequate, Mrs. Whitner’s refusal to make use of it constituted an acceptance of the discharge and prevents her from establishing a claim under the Civil Rights Act. ... A state is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... However, as a state agency, it is not subject to liability under the Civil Rights Act because it is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.