42 U.S.C. § 1983

A prisoner states a § 1983 claim by alleging that a disciplinary chair was personally biased because of the prisoner's involvement in a separate pending suit naming the chair as a defendant.

Malek v. Laurie Smith Camp, Bruce C. Kramer, Gene Hruza, Gary Grammer, Howard Ferguson, Neil Lindenbaum, Major L · filed 1987-08-06

All we hold today is that, if true, Malek’s claim that Chairman Ferguson was personally biased against him because of Malek’s involvement in a separate, pending action naming Ferguson as a defendant states a ground for relief under § 1983.

A prisoner who received the procedural protections required for a disciplinary hearing does not state a § 1983 claim merely by alleging that the misconduct charge was false.

Wilson v. Maben · filed 1987-09-04

... an allegation that he was falsely accused does not state a claim for a violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983.

A prison disciplinary proceeding that provides the process required by Wolff v. McDonnell does not support a § 1983 due-process claim.

Holland v. George Wilson, Al C. Parke, Kenneth Lyle, R.G. Hendricks, C. Ramey, and S. Talbott · filed 1987-12-15

This pro se Kentucky prisoner appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 complaint in which he alleged that his due process rights were violated by a prison disciplinary proceeding. We conclude that the dismissal was proper; the plaintiff received adequate due process protection as required under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).

Section 1983 does not provide relief for prison rule violations that do not violate constitutional rights.

Keeler v. Pea · filed 1992-01-09

Plaintiff completely misunderstands the scope of § 1983. This statute guarantees a person’s constitutional rights against violation by state actors. It does not provide any relief against prison rules violations assuming, arguendo, that such a violation occurred.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim based solely on a state actor’s threat to violate a citizen’s constitutional rights.

Flanigan v. Kent County Sheriff'd Department · filed 1993-03-30

Although defendants may have done so if they had carried out what they threatened to do, a state actor’s threat to violate a citizen’s constitutional rights is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 affords a remedy when a state actor violates a person's constitutional rights, including the right against an uncompensated taking.

Goss v. City of Little Rock · filed 1998-08-10

Goss proved that Little Rock, a state actor, violated his constitutional right not to have his property taken without just compensation. Section 1983 therefore afforded him a remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a threat to deprive someone of a constitutional right unless a deprivation occurs.

Barber v. Conradi · filed 1999-05-26

Threatening to deprive someone of a constitutional right is not the same thing as depriving someone of a constitutional right, and such threats do not, standing alone, support a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s retaliation claim when success would not necessarily invalidate the prisoner’s conviction, sentence, or disciplinary findings.

Johnson v. Litscher · filed 2001-08-15

Finding for Johnson would not "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence," see Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; nor would it necessarily imply the invalidity of the conduct reports, see Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-47. It also would not necessarily result in a revocation of his conduct reports or a restoration of the lost good time.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary sanction that does not affect the length of incarceration.

Cunningham v. Eyman · filed 2001-08-17

Cunningham argues, and the defendants concede, that the district court erred by dismissing his Eighth Amendment claims under Heck and Edwards. In' DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 617-18 (7th Cir.2000), decided after the district court’s order in this case, we held that a prisoner may challenge a prison disciplinary proceeding under § 1983 provided the punishment he received did not affect the length of his incarceration. Here, the prison's Adjustment Committee demoted Cunningham to “C” grade status, which eliminated his entitlement to certain institutional privileges, see 20 111. Admin. Code § 504.130, but did not affect the duration of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary sanction that revokes good-time credits and affects sentence duration while the sanction remains unexpunged.

Aldridge v. Gomez · filed 2002-07-29

Because the discipline imposed after the second hearing — revocation of thirty days’ ... good-time credit — affected the duration of Aldridge’s sentence, and the sanction has not been expunged, summary judgment was proper on Aldridge’s procedural due process claims related to his second hearing.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for alleged constitutional violations and is the proper avenue for bringing those claims against local government defendants.

SEACOAST SANITATION LIMITED, INC. v. Broward County, Florida · filed 2003-08-04

Section 1983, upon which Count III is predicated, is the proper avenue for the Plaintiffs to seek remedies for alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a claimed violation of constitutional rights.

ROBERT M., as Next Friend of Renee K., Appellant v. Dr. Robert D. BENTON · filed 1982-02-24

Since, in this case, § 1983 provides plaintiff with a remedy for the claimed violation of her constitutional rights, it is not necessary for us to determine whether it provides a remedy for a violation of the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of prison policy alone.

Burks-Bey v. Stevenson · filed 2004-07-12

The violation of a prison policy does not state a claim under § 1983.

An inmate must show a violation of constitutional rights to bring a Section 1983 claim; a violation of prison policy alone is insufficient.

Moore v. Schuetzle · filed 2005-02-02

In order to set forth a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an inmate must show a violation of his constitutional rights, not merely a violation of prison policy.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a violation of prison policy alone.

Moore v. Rowley · filed 2005-03-24

Assuming without deciding that Rowley violated the Missouri Department of Corrections mail procedures when he refused to mail Moore’s sealed bankruptcy petition, a violation of prison policy alone does not give rise to section 1983 liability, see Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997) (no § 1983 liability for violating prison policy).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of a prison department policy alone.

Rowe v. Davis · filed 2005-06-15

The violation of an IDOC policy does not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires more than any assault and battery by a police officer to establish liability for a constitutional violation.

Davis v. Hardy Wayne Forrest & Larry Marcus McNabb Police Officers of the Little Rock Police Dept. · filed 1985-07-17

This language is intended to make clear that not every assault and battery by a police officer is a violation of the Constitution. Something more is required to justify a finding of liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a violation of prison policy alone.

Tatum v. Wallace · filed 2010-11-29

Further, Tatum could not state a claim against Wallace ... for a violation of prison policy.

Section 1983 does not make a prison official’s breach of internal policy actionable unless it rises to a constitutional violation.

Jackson v. Doctor Donald Sampson · filed 2013-07-30

Moreover, prison officials’ failure to follow internal prison policies are not actionable under § 1983 unless the alleged breach of policy rises to the level of a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 provides the remedy for a Fourteenth Amendment claim against a state actor, so a plaintiff must bring the claim under that section.

Morris v. Murray State University · filed 2019-06-21

Because there is not a cognizable cause of action under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment in this case and because Plaintiff has not brought a § 1983 claim, Count I must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of prison policy alone.

Hardman v. Hyatte · filed 2019-07-15

That the restrictions placed on Mr. Hardman violated the prison’s policy does not state a claim on which relief can be granted in federal court. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”).

Section 1983 remedies violations of federal law; failure to follow prison policy alone does not state a claim.

Quigley 934431 v. Trewiler · filed 2019-08-22

Section 1983 is addressed to remedying violations of federal law, not state law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of the U.S. Constitution or federal law, but a prison policy violation alone does not establish a claim.

Rademaker v. Paramo · filed 2019-09-26

However, § 1983 provides a cause of action only for violations of the U.S. Constitution and federal laws, and “a violation of a prison regulation or policy is not a per se constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violating prison policy without a constitutional violation.

Mayweather-Brown - RESTRICTED - ACCEPT NO FILINGS v. Biggler · filed 2019-09-30

To the extent, Mayweather-Brown claims Perry violated prison policy by condoning Dr. Mathew’s treatment plan, failure to follow policy is not a constitutional violation. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of prison policies without a constitutional violation.

Bradley v. Neal · filed 2019-11-01

At most, this is a violation of IDOC policy, and a policy violation does not state a claim. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”). Therefore, Bradley may not proceed against Officer Celes.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of prison policy alone.

Kirschke 384285 v. Chance · filed 2019-11-01

Insofar as Plaintiff alleges a violation of the policy, this claim is not cognizable as a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not make a prison policy violation actionable unless it also rises to the level of a constitutional violation.

Carter v. Tapp · filed 2019-11-14

“[P]rison officials’ failure to follow internal prison policies are not actionable under § 1983 unless the alleged breach of policy rises to the level of constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 provides the remedy for constitutional violations; pleading it avoids dismissal for asserting a direct constitutional claim.

Herman v. Ohio University · filed 2019-11-22

Hence, Kalyango, by incorporating § 1983 into these counts, avoids dismissal of Counts Two and Three on this ground. This portion of the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of prison policy or procedure that do not amount to a constitutional deprivation.

Lewis v. Errington · filed 2019-12-03

In addition, the Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff is claiming that MDOC policy and procedure was violated by the complained-of RVR and resulting disciplinary process, he is not entitled to relief under § 1983. These allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of a prison policy alone.

Moore v. Herr · filed 2019-12-04

The failure to follow policy is not a constitutional violation. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”). Accordingly, Moore cannot proceed on this policy claim against the defendants.

Section 1983 protects against constitutional violations; a prison policy violation alone does not establish liability.

KING v. GEO GROUP, INC. · filed 2019-12-06

But 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or . . . departmental regulations.” Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003); Mudd v. City of Fort Wayne, 732 Fed. App’x 471, 472 (7th Cir. 2018) (same). A mere policy violation is not enough to show deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of prison policies unless they amount to constitutional violations.

Robertson v. Deputy Commissioner · filed 2019-12-30

However, policy violations don’t equate to constitutional violations. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”).

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on prison staff’s failure to follow prison policy.

Martin v. Capron · filed 2020-01-02

Martin further alleges that prison staff did not follow the prison’s own policies, but a violation of the prison’s policy does not rise to the level of a Constitutional violation.

A violation of prison policy alone is not cognizable under § 1983.

Love v. Correctional Officer Beasley · filed 2020-01-06

We find no merit to Love’s contentions on appeal that an allegedly missing video reveals a coverup and that the alleged attacks violated prison policy. See White by White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 738 (4th Cir. 1997) (violations of state law or policy not cognizable under § 1983).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of prison policy alone.

Semons v. Wolf · filed 2020-03-13

The violation of a prison policy does not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to prison disciplinary sanctions when success would necessarily imply that the punishment is invalid.

Wright v. United States · filed 2020-04-06

Plaintiff’s challenge to the disciplinary actions and fines would necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment and therefore this claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal law, so violations of prison policies alone do not state a claim.

Wolf v. Idaho State Board of Correction · filed 2020-05-12

However, § 1983 provides a cause of action only for violations of federal law. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims based on violations of any IDOC Policies or SOPs are implausible.

A violation of prison policy alone does not establish a claim under Section 1983.

BENSON v. BROWN · filed 2020-05-18

A violation of IDOC policy, however, does not support a constitutional claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of prison policy alone.

Leiser v. Karschney · filed 2020-07-06

But the violation of prison policy does not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a prison dentist liable merely for failing to follow departmental policy.

Morales v. Rauch · filed 2020-07-28

To the extent Morales asserts that Dr. Rauch failed to follow DAI policy, Dr. Rauch may not be held liable for any such failure.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of prison policy alone.

Hardman v. Hyatte · filed 2020-08-10

That the restrictions placed on Mr. Hardman violated the prison’s policy does not state a claim on which relief can be granted in federal court.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for violating prison policy without a constitutional violation.

Semons v. Deblanc · filed 2020-08-25

To the extent Semons asserts that DeBlanc failed to follow institution policy for psychological visits, DeBlanc may not be held constitutionally liable.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of prison policy alone.

Floyd v. Ada County · filed 2020-10-13

Additionally, Plaintiff has no viable § 1983 claim based on the deputy’s violation of the Ada County written policy regarding legal mail. This is because violations of prison policies cannot support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of prison policies alone.

Pettis v. Everhart · filed 2020-10-29

The plaintiff’s non-constitutional personal-capacity claims concerning the violation of DOC policies are legally frivolous because they are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of prison policies alone.

Martin v. Gailpeau · filed 2020-11-02

As a preliminary matter, Martin indicates in his amended complaint that various Indiana Department of Correction policies have been violated by the defendants, but policy violations do not equate to constitutional violations. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”). Thus, his assertions that various polices were violated do not state claims and will not be addressed further.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a prison policy violation alone without a constitutional violation.

Alston v. Herring · filed 2020-11-09

His allegation that Defendants violated prison policy, by itself, fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of prison policy alone.

Fultz v. Knocke · filed 2020-11-25

To the extent that Fultz is alleging that Officer Smiley failed to follow the prison’s policy, he cannot state a claim. Policy violations do not amount to constitutional violations. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”).

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on prison officials’ failure to follow prison policies.

Muhammed v. Ponds · filed 2020-12-08

However, inmates cannot state a Section 1983 claim based solely on the failure to follow prison policies.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of prison policy alone.

Wilcox 223862 v. Lancour · filed 2021-01-22

Thus, alleged violations of prison policy governing grievances and rights to deny medical services do not state a cognizable § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 claim is not barred by a criminal conviction merely because both arise from the same facts, if the claim and conviction are consistent.

Schreiber v. Moe · filed 2010-03-04

The mere fact that the conviction and the § 1983 claim arise from the same set of facts is irrelevant if the two are consistent with one another.

A § 1983 excessive-force claim may proceed after a criminal conviction if success on the claim would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Schreiber v. City of Grand Rapids · filed 2010-03-04

We conclude that under these circumstances, Schreiber’s § 1983 excessive-force claim does not challenge his conviction for attempting to resist his arrest.

A plaintiff convicted of resisting arrest under Ohio law may pursue a § 1983 excessive-force claim if a material factual dispute permits separating the alleged force from the arrest and resistance.

Michaels v. City of Vermillion · filed 2008-02-22

Therefore, in order to avoid the Heck bar, a § 1983 plaintiff asserting an excessive force claim who was found guilty of resisting arrest under Ohio law must, at the very least, raise a material issue of fact with respect to whether it is possible to draw a temporal line between pre-arrest and post-arrest conduct.

Section 1983 does not permit relief challenging a conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated.

Hider v. City of Portland · filed 2006-03-16

Furthermore, because Mr. Hider has not demonstrated that h s conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid in a habeas proceeding, he cannot seek relief under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983.

Section 1983 damages are unavailable when a favorable judgment would imply that ongoing confinement is invalid and that confinement has not otherwise been invalidated.

Merchant v. Patton · filed 2002-08-02

Merchant’s request for monetary damages ... under § 1983 is not cognizable, as a verdict in his favor would imply that his continuing confinement is invalid, and that confinement has not been held to be invalid by some other process.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment to prove that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Lett v. Antwine · filed 1999-09-17

To recover damages in a § 1983 action for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, the plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

A § 1983 false arrest claim is barred when it is fundamentally inconsistent with an outstanding criminal conviction.

Rosales v. City of Phoenix · filed 1999-09-09

Plaintiffs conviction for disorderly conduct necessarily implies the existence of probable cause. Because the existence of probable cause is “fundamentally inconsistent” with Plaintiffs false arrest claim, this portion of his § 1983 action is barred.

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to challenge the lawfulness of an arrest while an undisturbed conviction for obstructing that arrest precludes the challenge.

Palmer v. Unified Government of Wyandotte · filed 1999-09-15

On the contrary, the court finds that because plaintiffs obstruction conviction is currently undisturbed, plaintiff is precluded from challenging the lawfulness of his arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s excessive force claim when success would necessarily implicate an outstanding criminal conviction, unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Scott v. Dan Lindsey Karen Dieter Benner, Sheriff Deputy, Lassen County City and County of Lassen Atkinson · filed 1997-11-06

Heck precludes a prisoner's section 1983 claim that, if successful, would invalidate a conviction where that conviction has not been reversed, expunged, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ... Unless Scott shows that his conviction is invalid, which he has not, Heck bars his section 1983 claim for excessive force.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to recover damages for wrongful imprisonment only after the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Bennett v. Cambra · filed 1997-09-26

In order to recover damages for wrongful imprisonment, a prisoner must first establish that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or undermined by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits an excessive-force claim despite an unimpaired resisting-arrest conviction when success on the claim would not imply that the conviction was invalid.

Nelson v. George Jashurek, Patrolman · filed 1997-03-18

Yet a finding that Jashurek used excessive “substantial force” would not imply that the arrest was unlawful and thus the Supreme Court’s example of how Heck v. Humphrey can bar a civil action is not applicable here. ... Consequently, Heck v. Humphrey does not bar this case, and we cannot affirm the order of the district court on the authority of that case.

A § 1983 damages claim is not cognizable under Heck when it necessarily implicates the validity of an outstanding criminal conviction.

Harmon v. J. Cohee Georgia Sullivan-Huerta · filed 1997-03-14

We agree with the district court that Harmon's claims against Sullivan-Huerta necessarily implicate the validity of his criminal conviction. Heck, 114 S.Ct. at 2374. Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing Harmon's action against Sullivan-Huerta.

A claim under § 1983 alleging unlawful interrogation after arrest may be dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey.

Lesley L. Staples v. Mike Hatcher Ronnie Minter Lee Stone Sargeant Taylor Patsy Scarces, Nurse · filed 1996-04-25

Lesley Staples appeals from the magistrate judge's orders denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. * Staples' claim that he was unlawfully interrogated following his arrest was properly dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, --- U.S. ---, 62 U.S.L.W. 4594 (U.S. June 24, 1994) (No. 93-6188). Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of this claim on the reasoning of the magistrate judge.

A § 1983 action seeking damages for wrongful conviction may be stayed pending resolution of a habeas petition when success would call the conviction’s validity into question.

Chamberlain v. Lishansky · filed 1995-10-05

This necessarily calls into question the validity of his conviction. ... However, under the circumstances, dismissal, even without prejudice, would be a significant waste of judicial and other resources. The court will reserve decision on the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and stay all proceedings in this action pending the final resolution of the habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 permits a fair-trial due process claim despite an acquittal; the acquittal affects damages but does not defeat the cause of action.

Haupt v. T.D. Dillard, Robert Leonard Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department City of Las Vegas, Nevada and C · filed 1994-04-15

The fact that Haupt ultimately was acquitted speaks only to the amount of damages he suffered; it is irrelevant to whether he has a cause of action.

Section 1983 authorizes a damages action for constitutional deprivations under color of state law, but a prior conviction can preclude claims that depend solely on the validity of the arrest or conviction while not barring distinct excessive-force or illegal-detention claims.

Palma v. Powers · filed 1969-01-16

Section 1983 provides a broad civil remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). ... There is no question that he has presented a claim upon which relief might be granted under section 1983' of the Civil Rights Act. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). ... To summarize the conclusions reached herein, we hold that since the state court criminal proceedings necessarily determine that the phones in question were being used for an illegal purpose, no cause of action under the Civil Rights Act may be maintained by any of the plaintiffs based on their removal. Further, we hold that Frank Mamolella’s conviction precludes him from maintaining any action under the Act based solely on the fact that he was arrested. ... We do not hold that a conviction bars any and all civil rights actions in connection therewith. If the contention is, for example, that excessive force was used in his arrest or he was illegally detained, etc., the person convicted may nevertheless seek redress for any such deprivation. No such claim is here made. The final state court adjudication of guilt does, however, preclude relitigation of that question and any claim of deprivation of civil rights predicated solely on the alleged falsity of the arrest or impropriety of the conviction.

A claim against an individual under § 1983 must fail when it is barred by a prior adjudication.

Spampinato v. The City of New York and Guenther E. Winkler · filed 1962-12-04

The action against the individual defendant, so far as it is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must fail by reason of prior adjudication ... (1960)).

Prior state habeas corpus petitions do not constitute a statutory election that precludes federal jurisdiction under § 1983.

LaReau v. MacDougall · filed 1971-05-20

The petitioner’s prior state habeas corpus petitions which were unfavorably acted upon do not constitute a statutory election precluding federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a federal suit notwithstanding a plaintiff’s participation in collective-bargaining-agreement arbitration procedures.

Doe v. Anker · filed 1978-05-10

This reasoning is equally appropriate in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff’s participation in the arbitration procedures of the collective bargaining agreement does not bar his suit in federal court.

A state conviction based on a guilty plea does not preclude a § 1983 damages claim for a Fourth Amendment violation that was never considered in the state proceedings.

Haring v. Prosise · filed 1983-06-13

We conclude that respondent’s conviction m state court does not preclude him from now seeking to recover damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation that was never considered in the state proceedings.

A state court's final resolution of a Fourth Amendment suppression issue receives the same collateral-estoppel effect in a later § 1983 action that the forum state's law would give it.

Sanders v. Frisby · filed 1984-06-12

In these circumstances, we believe the courts of Missouri would give collateral estoppel effect to the trial court's ruling on the fourth amendment claims in a subsequent Sec. 1983 action based on the same claims.

A § 1983 claim based on allegedly improper extradition is barred when the fugitive later waives extradition and is convicted with due process of the offense for which he was returned.

Martin v. Sams · filed 1984-11-30

Thus, under the law of this Circuit, it is apparent that this Court is required to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, even if plaintiff had stated a cognizable cause of action under Section 1983, this action is barred by his subsequent waiver and his subsequent conviction.

Issues of probable cause and excessive force actually resolved in a prior criminal proceeding may not be relitigated in a Section 1983 action.

Mink v. Weglage · filed 1985-03-28

In sum, the Court finds that the issues of excessive force and probable cause to arrest were actually litigated in Plaintiff’s prior criminal proceedings, and that these issues were resolved against Plaintiff both at trial and on appeal.

A § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim is precluded when a prior state conviction for resisting arrest necessarily determined that the arrest was lawful.

Pastre v. Weber · filed 1988-07-26

We turn to the implications of plaintiff’s conviction for resisting arrest. In the first instance, this conviction has full res judicata effect with respect to plaintiff’s claim of unlawful arrest. Under New York law, a lawful arrest is a pre-requisite for any conviction for resisting arrest. People v. Stevenson (1972), 31 N.Y.2d 108, 111, 335 N.Y.S.2d 52, 56, 286 N.E.2d 445, 449. The issue of the lawfulness of the arrest was thus “necessarily decided” against plaintiff in the state trial, and he cannot re-litigate that issue here.

A conviction following a no-contest plea can bar a § 1983 false arrest or detention claim by estopping the plaintiff from denying probable cause.

Doak Walker and Maurice Turner v. R. Schaeffer, Patrolman, and J. Sheridan, Patrolman · filed 1988-08-12

Insofar, then, as the cause of action under § 1983 is based on claims of false arrest and/or false imprisonment, or unlawful detention, plaintiffs are estopped from pursuing these claims for the reasons indicated.

A criminal conviction procured by fraud does not bar a § 1983 suit against police officers under the common law rule that a conviction precludes certain tort claims.

King v. Goldsmith · filed 1990-04-10

Nothing in the formulation or rationale of the common law rule bars relitigation of the issue of the plaintiffs criminal guilt if the prosecution in the criminal proceeding had procured the plaintiffs conviction by fraud, as the plaintiff in this case charges. Otherwise police officers could procure a conviction by fraud and then — irrespective of whatever exceptions a state’s law of res judicata and collateral estoppel had created for just such cases — use that conviction to bar their victim’s effort to redress the fraud by means of a tort action, whether for false imprisonment, or for malicious prosecution, or for violation of civil rights.

A conviction for the offense for which a person was arrested is a complete defense to a § 1983 claim that the arrest lacked probable cause.

Tisdale v. Larry Winn, Detective, Little Rock Police Department · filed 1993-10-04

Tisdale's conviction of the offense for which he was arrested is a complete defense to a section 1983 action asserting that the arrest was made without probable cause.

Section 1983 claims for false arrest or malicious prosecution are not cognizable while an undisturbed conviction stands if success on those claims would imply that the conviction is invalid.

Wells v. Bonner · filed 1995-02-17

We have held that Wells's § 1983 claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution are not cognizable under Heck because each of these claims imply the invalidity of his conviction, which was upheld on appeal and which has not been successfully challenged.

A § 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Stephen v. Jackie Lacy · filed 1995-02-22

A section 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence therefore does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would invalidate a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

James Earl Hines, AKA Farda Abdul Ahad Sheheed v. David G. Brown, District Attorney, Martinez Richard K. Rainey, Sheriff · filed 1995-02-22

In order to recover damages in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for "other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid," a prisoner must show that the conviction or sentence has been "reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994). ... Accordingly, Hines's Sixth Amendment claim is not cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply confinement is unlawful cannot proceed unless the sentence or fact of confinement has been invalidated.

Watts v. Santos · filed 1995-02-22

In Heck, the Court held a prisoner's 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to unlawful imprisonment does not accrue until the sentence or fact of imprisonment has been invalidated. ... Thus, because Watts's allegations necessarily imply that his incarceration is unlawful and because Watts did not show that his sentence has been invalidated by a state or federal court, the district court was required to dismiss his claim for damages.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction do not accrue until the conviction has been invalidated or otherwise called into question.

Mendenhall v. State of Alaska, Attorney General Charles Cole City of Kotzebue, Alaska Larry Wallace, Chief of Po · filed 1995-03-01

The district court properly dismissed those portions of Mendenhall's section 1983 action relating to the constitutionality of his criminal trial and grand jury proceedings because a judgment in Mendenhall's favor on those claims "would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction." Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994). Because there is no indication that Mendenhall's conviction has been invalidated or otherwise called into question, Mendenhall's section 1983 claims have not accrued at this time.

For purposes of the rule barring a § 1983 claim that would undermine an outstanding conviction, a conviction based on a nolo contendere plea is treated the same as one based on a guilty plea.

Moser v. Bascelli · filed 1995-03-15

As discussed above, the distinction between the nolo contendere plea and the guilty plea is meaningless in the context of the § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 claim that would imply the invalidity of a probation or parole revocation is not cognizable until the revocation has been invalidated.

Jackson v. Vannoy · filed 1995-04-11

It logically follows that Heck applies to Jackson's probation and parole revocation proceedings. Jackson has not demonstrated that his current sentence has already been invalidated. He does not allege that any revocation proceeding has been reversed, expunged, set aside by a state court, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, Jackson's action is not cognizable under § 1983 at this time, and we need not address the arguments Jackson has raised on appeal.

A § 1983 claim challenging an unlawful search generally does not require the plaintiff to first set aside a conviction, because success on the search claim need not invalidate the conviction.

Moses v. John McGrath James Walton, Robert Harris · filed 1995-05-01

Because an illegal search and seizure may be followed by a valid conviction, it is generally not necessary to have a conviction set aside to pursue a Sec. 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment.

A Fourth Amendment search claim under § 1983 is not barred by Heck when the conviction could remain valid despite an unconstitutional search.

Richard Ronald Datz, Jr. v. Gordy Kilgore, Detective Dennis Kirkland, Detective Cobb County Police Department · filed 1995-05-02

Heck v. Humphrey, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), is no bar to Datz' civil action because, even if the pertinent search did violate the Federal Constitution, Datz’ conviction might stiE be valid considering such doctrines as inevitable discovery, independent source, and harmless error.

A § 1983 damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction must be dismissed without prejudice until the conviction is legally invalidated.

Shelton v. MacEy · filed 1995-05-05

Given the particular circumstances apparent from the uncontroverted record presented in this case, however, Heck mandates a dismissal of plaintiffs claim without prejudice to renew if and when his state court conviction is legally invalidated.

A conviction for resisting arrest does not necessarily bar a § 1983 excessive-force claim, because the conviction can coexist with a finding that officers used excessive force.

Simpson v. City of Pickens, Miss. · filed 1995-06-06

Even if the conviction for resisting arrest should ultimately prove to be valid, such a result does not necessarily bar a claim for use of excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Put more directly, it is possible for a finding that Simpson was resisting arrest to coexist with a finding that the police used excessive force to subdue him.

A Section 1983 claim for an unreasonable search may proceed despite an outstanding conviction if the plaintiff alleges an injury apart from the conviction and sentence.

Birdwell v. Flanagan · filed 1995-07-03

If the plaintiff alleges injury apart from his conviction and sentence, a section 1983 action alleging an unreasonable search can proceed, regardless of whether the underlying conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 remains available to enforce § 1981 rights against state actors alongside Title VII after the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments.

Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla. · filed 1995-09-20

In conclusion, the Court holds that the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act do not preclude an aggrieved party from concurrently bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment damages claim despite a related conviction when success would not undermine the conviction and the plaintiff alleges a compensable injury apart from the conviction.

Braxton v. Scott · filed 1995-11-08

In other words, fourth amendment claims under § 1983 may be brought without setting aside the conviction only if success would not undermine the conviction and if the plaintiff alleges a com-pensable injury other than the conviction.

A plaintiff generally may pursue a § 1983 claim for an illegal search or arrest without first setting aside a conviction, because that claim need not invalidate the conviction.

Simpson v. Rowan · filed 1995-12-29

Because an illegal search or arrest may be followed by a valid conviction, a conviction generally need not be set aside in order for a plaintiff to pursue a § 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 remains available to enforce independent substantive due process rights despite Title IX’s separate remedy.

Lillard v. Shelby County Board of Education · filed 1996-02-21

Plainly, National Sea Clammers does not, on its face, stand for the proposition that a federal statutory scheme can preempt independently existing constitutional rights, which have contours distinct from the statutory claim, thus prohibiting a section 1983 action grounded in substantive due process.

Section 1983 permits an excessive-force claim arising from an arrest despite an outstanding conviction when success would not necessarily imply the conviction’s invalidity.

John Wesley SMITHART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert TOWERY; John A. Knight; Scott McGregor, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1996-04-01

To the extent that Smithart seeks to recover for defendants’ alleged use of excessive force during the course of his arrest, his section 1983 action may proceed despite the fact that his conviction has not been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by a federal court.

A § 1983 damages claim does not accrue if deciding it would call into question the validity of a criminal conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Jackson v. Vernie Edward Bradley Virgil Conn City of Allen · filed 1996-11-25

Generally, no § 1983 claim for damages has accrued where adjudication of a claim would call into question the validity of a criminal conviction.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment damages claim despite a criminal conviction when the alleged violation is not logically inconsistent with the conviction.

Cleveland Seamon, Jr. v. Rokosik · filed 1996-12-31

Despite Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the conviction does not prevent the adjudication of Seamon's claims, for a violation of the fourth amendment is not logically inconsistent with the validity of the conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Dill v. Village of Gowanda · filed 1997-01-21

Thus, in order to succeed on.their § 1983 claims based on the allegedly unlawful conduct of defendants Rupp and Castellano, plaintiffs must show that James Dill’s conviction has been reversed, expunged or somehow otherwise invalidated. Because they cannot make such a showing, summary judgment is appropriate dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Gregory v. Smith v. Maurice C. O'COnnOr · filed 1997-01-28

We find it perfectly clear, as did the district court, that Smith's request for damages is exactly the type of claim precluded by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). "[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid," the plaintiff must show that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated, by a direct appeal, habeas corpus proceeding, or the equivalent. Id. at 486-87. This Smith has not done. Thus, he lacks a cause of action for damages against the official who allegedly wrongfully confined him.

Section 1983 does not permit relief on a claim fundamentally inconsistent with an outstanding criminal conviction.

Helmet Law Defense League v. California Highway Patrol · filed 1997-09-05

Under Heck v. Humphrey, plaintiffs Prince, Marcillet, and Carlin cannot seek relief under Section 1983 since their claims are fundamentally inconsistent with their criminal convictions.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would invalidate a guilty plea that has not been challenged or modified.

Johnston v. Town of Greece · filed 1997-11-12

Moreover, because the validity of his guilty plea has never been challenged or modified in any way, I find that Johnston is barred pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), from bringing a Section 1983 claim for damages.

Section 1983 cannot be used to revisit an arbitrator’s interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement when the constitutional claim depends on the same issue resolved in arbitration.

Brownlee v. City of Chicago · filed 1997-11-17

In Brownlee’s case, the arbitral determination and the property interest issue turned on the very same question — whether Brownlee attained career service status. Under these circumstances, giving credence to Brownlee’s section 1983 claim would condone circumventing the required mechanism for reviewing an arbitrator’s decision — an action in Illinois Circuit Court to vacate the arbitration award.

A § 1983 claim is not barred by an outstanding criminal conviction when success on the claim would not necessarily invalidate the conviction or sentence.

Jackson v. Suffolk County Homicide Bureau, Thomas P. Hughes · filed 1998-01-20

Heck v. Humphrey does not require dismissal of any claim whose adjudication in favor of the plaintiff would not necessarily invalidate his conviction or sentence.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for an unlawful search or arrest despite an outstanding conviction when success would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Copus v. City of Edgerton, Kenneth Burdick, Randal Meehan · filed 1998-08-04

The point is that it is possible for an individual to be properly convicted though he is unlawfully arrested, or his home unlawfully searched. The remedy for those constitutional violations is a civil action under § 1983 for money damages, which in a nutshell describes Copus’ suit.

Title IX does not preclude a § 1983 claim based on an independent constitutional right, even when the same facts also violate Title IX.

Carroll K. v. Fayette County Bd. of Education · filed 1998-08-25

After careful review of the case law, and without guidance from the Fourth Circuit, the Court holds Title IX does not preempt suit under § 1983 when the underlying set of facts not only violates Title IX but also violates independent constitutional rights, as alleged here.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when they would undermine outstanding criminal convictions, until those convictions are overturned.

Thomas v. Richard · filed 1999-01-28

Because evidence obtained by Richard during his search of Thomas was essential to Thomas’s convictions of driving while intoxicated and improper lane usage, Heck bars this action until such time as Thomas succeeds in having his convictions for these offenses overturned.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would invalidate an outstanding conviction unless that conviction has first been invalidated.

Garrick v. Thibodeaux · filed 1999-02-24

Otherwise, such a claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits an excessive-force claim after a resisting-arrest conviction when success on the claim would not necessarily imply the conviction’s invalidity.

Martinez v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1999-06-15

Similarly, careful comparison between Heck and the facts of this case demonstrates that to the extent Martinez’ federal suit does not challenge the lawfulness of his arrest and conviction (a challenge Heck would prohibit at this point), Heck does not bar him from pursuing his civil rights claims in federal court.

A conviction entered after a no-contest plea can bar a § 1983 claim under Heck if the claim would necessarily imply the conviction’s invalidity.

Hernandez v. Boles · filed 1999-06-18

Whether the conviction was obtained at trial, by a guilty plea, or by a nolo plea is irrelevant to this inquiry.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction, even when the conviction rests on a California nolo contendere plea.

Nuno v. County of San Bernardino · filed 1999-07-28

Although it is clear that plaintiffs section 1983 excessive force claims would not be cognizable if his obstruction conviction had resulted from a jury verdict or a guilty plea, the question remains whether the fact that plaintiff was convicted pursuant to a negotiated plea of nolo contendere alters this result. The Court concludes that, for purposes of the Heck analysis, a plea of nolo contendere in a California criminal action has the same effect as a guilty plea or jury verdict of guilty.

A § 1983 excessive force claim is barred when success on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction.

Sappington v. Bartee · filed 1999-11-24

Accepting his version of events, his claim is necessarily inconsistent with his criminal conviction.

A § 1983 unlawful-seizure claim may proceed despite an outstanding conviction when success would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Moore v. Sims · filed 2000-01-24

If Moore successfully demonstrates that his initial seizure and detention by officers was without probable cause, such a result does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his drug-possession conviction. We therefore reverse the dismissal of this claim.

A § 1983 claim against arresting officers is barred if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, unless the conviction has been reversed or declared invalid.

Hainze v. Richards · filed 2000-04-26

Heck dictates that when a person such as Hainze brings a section 1983 claim against the arresting officers the district court must first “consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”8 If so, the claim is barred unless the conviction has been reversed or declared invalid.

A § 1983 damages claim cannot proceed if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction, unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Holder v. Ivanjack · filed 2000-04-28

Thus, Heck bars Holder’s § 1983 claim because a successful prosecution of Holder’s excessive force claim would necessarily imply that the police officers used unreasonable force and, therefore, Holder’s criminal conviction for resisting or obstructing a peace officer was wrongful.

A conviction forecloses a § 1983 claim for arrest without probable cause.

Antonio v. Zamarripa v. Michael Busalaki etc · filed 2000-09-25

We agree with the district court that Mr. Zamarripa’s conviction forecloses any section 1983 or Bivens claim for an arrest without probable cause.

A § 1983 excessive-force claim is not barred by a prior conviction when success on the claim would not invalidate that conviction.

Sanford v. Motts · filed 2001-07-31

Hence, if Motts used excessive force subsequent to the time Sanford interfered with his duty, success in her section 1983 claim will not invalidate her conviction.

A § 1983 claim is not barred by an outstanding conviction when success would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Ove v. Gwinn · filed 2001-09-04

Even if the plaintiffs prove everything they allege about the blood draws, a judgment in their favor will not imply the invalidity of their DUI convictions because the convictions do not depend upon the blood draws. We therefore hold that the district court erred in ruling that Heck barred Ove and Forest’s § 1983 claims.

A conviction involving one officer does not bar a § 1983 claim against other officers under Heck when the conviction does not relate to them.

Hill v. Moore · filed 2001-09-20

Our examination of the record, however, reveals that Hill’s battery conviction relates to Deputy Moore only. Accordingly, Heck does not bar Hill’s civil rights action against the other defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Nicholson v. City of Westlake · filed 2001-09-24

Nicholson’s Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable because a ruling in Nicholson’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

A § 1983 excessive force claim is barred under Heck when success on the claim would call into question an outstanding conviction.

Watson v. New Orleans City · filed 2001-10-17

In light of Watson’s inability to provide any support for her conclusory assertion that her excessive force claim does not call into question the validity of her battery conviction, we hold that Heck bars her § 1983 excessive force claim against Officer Garrett.

Section 1983 search-and-seizure claims may proceed despite a conviction and a denied suppression motion when the state court did not decide that the search and arrest were lawful.

Hill v. Jones · filed 2001-11-01

None of these claims is foreclosed by HE’s conviction, or by the issuepreclusive effect of the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, because the state courts did not find that the search and arrest was proper; instead they concluded that any improper conduct did not justify the exclusion of evidence because its lawful discovery was inevitable.

An excessive-force claim under § 1983 is not barred by a conviction that rested partly on a finding that the arrest was lawful.

Robinson, Ronald v. Doe, John · filed 2001-11-26

And so a claim of excessive force in making an arrest does not require overturning the plaintiff’s conviction even though the conviction was based in part on a determination that the arrest itself was lawful.

A plaintiff with an undisturbed conviction for resisting an officer must provide evidence that a § 1983 excessive force claim would not necessarily imply the conviction’s invalidity.

Susag v. City of Lake Forest · filed 2002-01-08

Once the defendants met their burden of proving Cory had an undisturbed conviction under Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a), the burden shifted to him to provide evidence of excessive force that would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. Since he failed to provide such evidence, the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits an excessive-force claim concerning how evidence was seized when the claim cannot undermine the plaintiff’s conviction.

McFarland v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2002-08-05

We conclude that neither Heck nor Harvey are implicated in McFarland’s case because her conviction was based on a guilty plea. ... Based on Ove, we hold that the present action does not have the possibility of undermining McFarland’s conviction.

A § 1983 claim that calls a criminal conviction into question is barred unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid.

Allen v. City of Clarksdale · filed 2002-11-21

Thus, in order for those claims to be cognizable under § 1983, Allen was required to prove that her conviction had been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid.

A Section 1983 false arrest claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction must be dismissed without prejudice and may be reasserted if the conviction is invalidated.

Wewee v. Marroquin · filed 2002-11-21

Because Wewee may reassert his Section 1983 claim if he succeeds in invalidating his conviction, the district court should have dismissed his false arrest claim without prejudice.

A § 1983 claim is barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the claimant’s outstanding criminal conviction.

Cunningham v. Gates · filed 2002-12-13

Cunningham’s § 1983 claims, in each of their incarnations, are barred under Heck because they would necessarily imply the invalidity of his state convictions, for felony murder and attempted murder.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction.

Cunningham v. Gates · filed 2003-01-14

Cunningham's § 1983 claims, in each of their incarnations, are barred under Heck because they would necessarily imply the invalidity of his state convictions for felony murder and attempted murder.

A § 1983 claim is not barred by a prior conviction when success on the claim would not invalidate that conviction.

Penn v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office · filed 2003-04-02

Applying the analysis established in Heck and its progeny, if Mr. Penn were to successfully prove the existence of a section 1983 violation by the Parish officer, such an action would not per se result in an invalidation of the judgment against Mr. Penn for the battery committed on the Covington police officer.

A § 1983 claim is barred by Heck when success on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Rogers v. Jones · filed 2003-06-09

Because we find that, on the facts of this case, success on his claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that his § 1983 claim is barred.

Section 1983 does not bar an excessive force claim under Heck v. Humphrey merely because the plaintiff was convicted of assaulting the officer.

Packer v. Hayes · filed 2003-10-29

We also find no merit in Defendants’ contention that Packer is barred from bringing an excessive force claim based on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply that a conviction or sentence is invalid unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Encarnacion v. Dann · filed 2003-11-07

Heck bars § 1983 damages actions in which a judgment in the plaintiffs favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, where, as here, such conviction or sentence has not yet been invalidated, reversed on direct appeal, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

A § 1983 excessive force claim is not barred by a disorderly conduct conviction when success on the claim would not necessarily imply the conviction’s invalidity.

Rainey v. City of San Bernardino · filed 2004-01-16

We are not persuaded by defendants’ contention that Rainey’s conviction under Penal Code § 415 nonetheless bars his excessive force claim.

Section 1983 claims challenging a pending state prosecution may be stayed and, after conviction, may be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Heck.

Hill v. Schwartz · filed 2004-04-19

At the time Hill filed his original 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, his claims were subject to being stayed because Hill had not yet been convicted in Mississippi state court. ... Following Hill’s conviction, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 incorporates the common-law rule that a conviction for the offense underlying an arrest bars a civil claim alleging the arrest lacked probable cause.

Cameron v. Matthew Fogarty and John Halbig · filed 1986-12-01

The parties have given us no basis for inferring that Congress intended that § 1983 not incorporate the common-law rule, and our own efforts have turned up no such evidence.

A § 1983 false arrest claim is precluded by an underlying conviction that remains valid while an appeal is pending.

Burch v. Naron · filed 2004-08-16

Allowing Plaintiffs § 1983 claim to go forward while his underlying conviction is still on appeal in the state court system, effectively allows him a collateral means of challenging his conviction through a civil torts action. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs false arrest claim for the October 4, 2002 arrest is precluded by his underlying conviction.

A conviction on the arrest charge can establish probable cause and defeat a § 1983 arrest claim even if the charge is later dismissed for lack of a speedy trial.

Brown v. Willey · filed 2004-12-15

We agree with the district court that the initial convictions were sufficient in this case to prove probable cause, see Sundeen v. Kroger, 133 S.W.3d 393, 394, 398 (Ark. 2003) (plaintiff’s conviction in state district court, even though later reversed when prosecutor nolle prossed charges on appeal to circuit court, was conclusive proof of existence of probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings), because the initial convictions were not “subsequently overturned upon a finding of innocence following a trial on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction,” Rogers v. Carter, 133 F.3d 1114, 1117 (8th Cir. 1998).

An excessive force claim under Section 1983 is not barred by Heck when success would not necessarily imply that an earlier conviction was invalid.

Driessen v. Tehama County · filed 2005-04-04

However, the district court improperly dismissed Driessen’s excessive force claim because success on the merits of this claim would not necessarily imply or demonstrate that Driessen’s earlier conviction was invalid.

A criminal conviction is not necessarily a complete defense to a Section 1983 action at the pleading stage.

Thurmond-Green v. Hodges · filed 2005-04-07

Based on the pleadings, we cannot say Green’s conviction was a complete defense to his section 1983 action.

A § 1983 excessive force claim may proceed despite an assault conviction when success on the claim would not invalidate the conviction.

Jeanty v. County of Orange · filed 2005-07-27

In the case at bar, a judgment in favor of plaintiff on his § 1983 action would not establish the invalidity of his conviction for Assault in the Third Degree.

Section 1983 permits a Fourth Amendment claim after a conviction when success on the claim would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Wallace v. D.L. Smith · filed 2005-08-04

Because it does not necessarily imply that his conviction was invalid, Wallace’s Fourth Amendment claim is not barred by Heck as the district court found.

Section 1983 permits an excessive force claim despite a related battery conviction when the claim does not undermine the conviction or punishment.

Brengettcy, David v. Horton, William · filed 2005-09-08

As Judge Bucklo recognized, Brengettcy is not barred by Heck because his challenge that Horton used excessive force after he hit Horton does not undermine Brengettcy’s conviction or punishment for his own acts of aggravated battery.

A conviction for assault on a police officer does not necessarily bar a § 1983 excessive force claim arising from the arrest.

Powell v. Scanlon · filed 2005-09-30

The Court believes that the reasoning in Smith applies here, and that a conviction for assault on a police officer would not necessarily be impugned by a finding of excessive force.

An outstanding conviction bars a § 1983 damages claim under Heck only if success on the claim would necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

VanGilder, Bill v. Baker, Brian · filed 2006-01-13

Contrary to the district court’s view in this case, Heck does not automatically bar a § 1983 claim simply because “the processes of the criminal justice system did not end up in [the] plaintiff’s favor.” A plaintiff need not prove that any conviction stemming from an incident with the police has been invalidated, only a conviction that could not be reconciled with the claims of his civil action.

An ambiguous guilty plea does not bar a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the least serious conduct supporting the conviction is consistent with the claim.

Portillo v. Montoya · filed 2006-03-01

As applied here, Humphrey dictates we assume that Pedro Portillo admitted to the least serious conduct that violates § 13-2904, unreasonable noise, which is not necessarily inconsistent with a § 1983 claim for excessive force.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred when a standing criminal conviction arising from the same facts is fundamentally inconsistent with the alleged unlawful conduct.

Stuter v. Stevens County Sheriff's Department · filed 2006-05-12

The Stuters’ claims as they relate to the criminal prosecution of Lynn Stuter are foreclosed by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). See Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (“[I]f a criminal conviction arising out of the same facts stands and is fundamentally inconsistent with the unlawful behavior for which section 1983 damages are sought, the 1983 action must be dismissed”).

A resisting-arrest conviction does not preclude a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the officers’ use of force was not litigated in the criminal trial.

Donovan v. Timothy Thames and Patrick Collura · filed 1997-01-27

Similarly, in the instant case, because the issue whether the officers used excessive force was not litigated in Donovan’s state-court criminal trial, his conviction for resisting arrest does not preclude his § 1983 excessive force claim.

A § 1983 damages claim must be dismissed if a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Jennings v. Fetterman · filed 2006-08-15

Under Heck, if a favorable judgment on a § 1983 damages claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, the claim must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. ... As Jennings did not demonstrate that this conviction had already been invalidated, we agree with the District Court that Jennings’ claims were barred under Heck.

Section 1983 permits an unreasonable-search damages claim to proceed when success would not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction.

Moore v. Inman · filed 2006-10-17

It is not apparent on this record that success on Moore’s claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of any state court conviction.

A § 1983 excessive force claim may proceed despite convictions arising from the same arrest when the claim can be read consistently with those convictions.

McCann, Patrick J. v. Neilsen, Ken · filed 2006-10-26

Given our obligation at this stage of the proceedings to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we give the complaint this construction and hold that McCann’s claim is not barred by Heck.

A criminal-trespass conviction does not bar a § 1983 excessive-force claim that does not necessarily imply the conviction is invalid.

Smith v. Jackson · filed 2006-11-28

Here, as in Thore, Mr. Smith’s excessive force claim does not carry a “necessary implication of the invalidity of the [criminal trespass] conviction.”