42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not treat a state judicial appellate division as a “person” subject to suit under the statute.

Landon Zuckerman and Sam Haber v. Appellate Division, Second Department, Supreme Court of the State of New York · filed 1970-01-29

However it is unnecessary for us to go into these problems since it is quite clear that the Appellate Division is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats the state university board and president sued for declaratory and injunctive relief as “persons” under the statute.

Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges · filed 1970-03-12

For the purposes of this action, defendants are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 applies only to a defendant that is a "person" within the meaning of the statute; the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its Board of Parole are not persons.

Brown v. Pennsylvania · filed 1970-03-16

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Board of Parole are not “persons” within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1983. United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84 (3 Cir., 1969) (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania) and Bennett v. California, 406 F.2d 36 (9 Cir. 1969) (Parole Boards).

Section 1983 allows a corporation to assert a due-process claim because the corporation is a “person” for that purpose.

Leslie Tobin Imports, Inc. v. Rizzo · filed 1969-11-24

It is a denial of due process that is asserted and the corporate plaintiff is a “person” for the purpose of that assertion.

Section 1983 covers civil-rights claims beyond those involving racial or religious discrimination, and an official sued individually and in his official capacity may be a proper person against whom such an action may be initiated.

Miller v. Parsons · filed 1970-06-05

In Scher the Third Circuit clearly rejects defendants’ suggestion that only cases involving “racial or religious overtones” are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The defendant Parsons, named individually and in his official capacity, is a proper “person” against whom a civil rights action may be initiated; however, the action against the Board of Trustees of Lock Haven State College is dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend the complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a).

Section 1983 does not allow suit against a state or other defendant that is not a statutory “person.”

Edwards v. New York · filed 1970-06-10

In the first place, defendant is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 protects United States citizen plaintiffs and provides a federal remedy against state administrative officials acting in the discharge of statutory functions.

Lipman v. Van Zant · filed 1971-08-05

There can be no doubt that plaintiffs who are citizens of the United States are the very persons 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted to protect, or that defendants who are state administrative, officials acting in the discharge of statutory functions are “persons” against whom the federal remedy is given.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against individual government officials who act under color of state law; identifying officials by their public positions does not turn the suit into one against the governmental entity.

Manfredonia v. Barry · filed 1971-12-02

Indeed, such a dismissal would directly contravene the Supreme Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape, supra. There, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for eight members of the Court, ruled that although a municipal corporation was not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, police officers who made arrests while acting under color of their official capacities were such persons and it was reversible error to have dismissed a civil rights complaint against them. Here there is no need for a partial granting of defendants’ motion as in Cecil, supra. No claim is asserted by these plaintiffs against Suffolk County, or any other governmental entity. The action is brought solely against individual officials who, under color of their respective positions in the County, are alleged to have engaged in acts which plaintiffs claim were in violation of their civil rights. The description in the complaint of defendants’ official positions does not transform the action into one against the County. Indeed, in order to establish that defendants were acting “under color of law”, a recitation of their governmental status would seem to be essential.

Section 1983 does not authorize a suit against a State because a State is not a “person” amenable to suit under the statute.

Shapiro v. State of Maryland · filed 1972-01-19

Nor has congressional enactment granted authority in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relied on by the plaintiff, for suit against the state since Maryland is a politic and not a “person” amenable to suit under that section.

Section 1983 does not make a State a suable person, and a damages suit against officials in their official capacities is treated as a suit against the State.

Francis v. Davidson · filed 1972-01-28

To the extent plaintiffs seek to hold defendants herein liable for damages under section 1983 in their official capacities as officers of the State of Maryland, “such a suit is in actuality one against the State, even though the State is not named as a defendant.” ... Approaching the case as one against the State, all claims herein for damages must fail. In the first place, the State is not a person within the meaning of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize an action against an entity that is not a statutory “person.”

Derby v. University of Wisconsin · filed 1972-01-28

However, the action may not be maintained against the University of Wisconsin or the University of Wisconsin-Parkside since they are not natural or corporate persons. They are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 permits a person adversely affected by state action to sue for an equal-protection violation, but the claim requires allegations of intentional or purposeful discrimination.

Shock v. M. L. Tester, Carl E. Miller and Lieutenant Floyd Weaver · filed 1969-01-10

It is proper for a person adversely affected to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that he has been denied his rights under the equal protection clause of the Constitution. ... However, it is not enough to determine that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under which the plaintiff brought this action encompasses the equal protection clause. We must also determine whether the plaintiff has alleged that he, in fact, has been denied his rights under the equal protection clause. We hold that he has not because he failed to allege that the acts of the patrolmen were ones of “intentional or purposeful discrimination.”

Section 1983 does not treat the named state courts and Colorado Bar Association as “persons” who may be sued under the statute.

William F. Coopersmith, and All Persons Similarly Situated v. Supreme Court, State of Colorado · filed 1972-08-30

The defendants are not proper defendants in view of the statement in the complaint that the action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. The defendants are not “persons” as therein contemplated.

Section 1983 does not authorize a damages action against a state because the state is not a "person" under the statute.

Herndon v. Superintendent, Virginia State Farm · filed 1972-12-13

Such an action does not lie against the State under § 1983, the State not being a “person” within the meaning of that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a State or against officials sued in their official capacities when the judgment is intended to be paid from the State treasury.

Hahn v. Ingram · filed 1973-08-20

The State, however, is not a “person” subject to suit within the meaning of § 1983. ... Under these circumstances, this Court is without jurisdiction to assess damages under § 1983 against the defendants in their official capacities which are intended to be satisfied out of the State treasury, and the action will be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits suits only against a person acting under color of state law, and a state is not a person for purposes of equitable or damages relief.

Frye v. Lukehard · filed 1973-09-19

First, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits may be maintained only against a “person” who under color of state law deprives another of his civil rights. ... It is clear that a state is not a person within the meaning of § 1983 where equitable relief is sought, any more than it is when damages are sought.

Section 1983 treats corporations, including an otherwise private hospital subject to state supervision, as a "person" capable of being sued under the statute.

Ozlu v. Lock Haven Hospital · filed 1973-12-12

However, the Court is aware of no case holding that an otherwise private hospital subject to state supervision under the Hill-Burton program is not a “person.” ... Finally it should be noted that corporations are considered “persons” for the purpose of bringing a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against entities that are not “persons,” including the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its Bureau of Corrections.

Curtis v. Everette · filed 1973-12-17

The district court order must also be affirmed insofar as it dismissed the complaint against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Bureau of Corrections of that Commonwealth, who are not “person[s] ” within the use of that term in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and hence not subject to suit under that section of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 permits a qualifying person, including a school superintendent, to invoke federal jurisdiction to seek relief for an alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation.

Akron Board of Education and Conrad C. Ott v. State Board of Education of Ohio · filed 1974-01-15

2) The District Court has jurisdiction of the ease under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 since (at least) plaintiff Conrad Ott is a “person” within the meaning of these sections.

Section 1983 covers corporations as “persons” for due-process and equal-protection deprivations.

Borreca v. Fasi · filed 1974-01-21

A corporation is a “person” within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, for due process and equal protection deprivations, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its agencies as a “person” subject to suit under the statute.

Taliaferro v. State Council of Higher Education · filed 1974-03-06

The State of Virginia is not a “person” under § 1983. ... Neither are its agencies or departments. ... As an agency of the state, the State Council of Higher Education is, therefore, not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a person subject to suit.

Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth of Pa. · filed 1974-03-08

To the extent that the present suit may be based on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and its jurisdictional counterparts, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4) we simply note that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is not a “person” subject to suit within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 applies only to a statutory “person,” and the court indicated that the North Carolina State Board of Education is not one.

Huntley v. The North Carolina State Board of Education · filed 1974-03-21

We note that the North Carolina State Board of Education apparently is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, upon which, in conjunction with 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3), the district court’s jurisdiction is founded.

Section 1983 does not treat a state superior court as a suable person, but permits official-capacity claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the court's individual officials.

Quadra v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CITY & CTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO · filed 1974-05-16

The Superior Court, however, is not a “person” under § 1983 and must be dismissed from this cause of action. ... This cause of action may proceed, however, as a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief against the individual defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not treat the College as a “person,” although it supports jurisdiction over claims against the individual defendants.

Dr. Joseph T. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College · filed 1974-06-11

Jurisdiction over the individual defendants is clear both under § 1331 and under § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the requisite jurisdictional amount for § 1331 is pleaded, the fact that the College is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not significant.

Section 1983 permits suit against a voluntary athletic association that qualifies as a “person” rather than a state agency immune from suit.

Wright v. Arkansas Activities Association (Aaa) · filed 1974-07-16

We find the district court’s characterization of the AAA correct and therefore conclude that the Association does qualify as a “person” under § 1983 and jurisdiction is vested under § 1343(3) as alleged.

Section 1983 does not make corporations or state boards statutory “persons,” while it permits damages against individual officers in their personal capacities when they violate constitutional rights without a reasonable good-faith belief that their actions were constitutional.

Ass'n v. Alabama State Board of Health · filed 1974-07-26

The fifth and sixth causes of action, alleging violation of the Plaintiffs’ civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, will be dismissed as to the Medical Association. A corporation is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As hereinbefore recognized, Defendants, other than individual “persons”, are not within the purview of § 1983. ... Damages, however, may be awarded against an officer in his individual capacity under § 1983 (the fifth and sixth causes of action) if the officer violated the constitutional right of the plaintiff without reasonably believing in good faith that the action was constitutional, Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra; Ex parte Young, supra.

Section 1983 permits a suit to proceed against officials named individually rather than being classified solely as an action against the county.

Gresham v. Chambers · filed 1974-08-13

This contention must be rejected, however, since the complaint names Dr. Chambers and Mr. Patterson individually, which for jurisdictional purposes is sufficient to preclude the action from being classified solely as one against the county.

Section 1983 permits injunctive or declaratory relief against state officials acting in their official capacities to challenge misconduct carried out under color of state law.

Gay Students Organization v. Bonner · filed 1974-12-30

We cannot accept the conclusion that § 1983, directed specifically and exclusively at misconduct carried out under the color of state law, is not available to challenge the actions of persons who are acting in their capacities as state officials.

Section 1983 treats state officials sued in either their individual or official capacities, and state agencies under the applicable circuit law, as persons subject to suit.

Stebbins v. Weaver · filed 1975-06-03

I hold that defendant Weaver is a “person” for the purpose of § 1983 regardless of whether he is being sued in an individual or official capacity. ... I follow the law of this circuit holding such agencies to be “persons” for the purpose of § 1983, Subject matter jurisdiction in this suit against the defendant Board of Regents exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

A state administrative agency is not a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Kaisa v. Chang · filed 1975-06-19

The rule in this circuit is that a state administrative agency is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sykes v. State of California (Department of Motor Vehicles), 497 F.2d 197, 201 (9th Cir. 1974). This court’s pendent jurisdiction allows the joinder of claims, not parties. Therefore, this judgment does not run against defendant, DSSH.

Section 1983 does not treat states, territories, or state agencies they control as “persons” subject to liability.

Dennis v. College of the Virgin Islands · filed 1975-07-31

It is clear that neither a state (see Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24, 29 (9th Cir. 1969)) nor a territory (see Ocasio v. Bryan, 374 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1967)) is a “person” within the meaning of that section. This immunity has been extended to agencies of the state or its governmental departments. See Whitner v. Davis, supra at 29-30. The question of whether the College of the Virgin Islands is an agency of the territorial government is determined by .the so-called “control test”, or whether the governmental entity can be fairly said to control the defendant’s activities. If that control is found to be present, the defendant is a state instrumentality and not a person under Section 1983. ... Following the factors outlined in those decisions, I find that the College of the Virgin Islands is not a person within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not treat a state instrumentality as a “person” subject to suit.

Nadal v. Puerto Rico Tourist Development Co. · filed 1975-09-12

Turning now to the main jurisdictional allegation, that the Civil Rights Act, Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, and its jurisdictional counterpart, Title 28, United States Code, Section 1343, empower this Court to entertain the complaint, we find that the Puerto Rico Tourist Development Company is not a “person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act and thus is not amenable to suit under said statute.

Officials sued in their official capacity can qualify as persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Pat Wright and Jack Lieberman v. Chief of Transit Police, and Chairman and Members of the Board of the New York City Tra · filed 1976-01-15

the named defendants, acting in their official capacity, are “persons” within § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make the Philadelphia County Board of Assistance a suable person.

White v. Beal · filed 1976-04-23

The Philadelphia County Board of Assistance is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 supports equitable reinstatement claims against individual officials who are “persons,” but it does not allow restitution or damages against officers of an entity that is a statutory “non-person.”

16 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1637, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,048 Witt Campbell, Cross v. Gadsden County District School Board, · filed 1976-07-02

While section 1983 would thus suffice as a basis of jurisdiction if Campbell’s claim was merely a request for equitable reinstatement in a principalship, it is not adequate with regard to his claims for back pay and attorneys’ fees. Relief in the form of restitution or damages is not available against officers of an entity which is a “non-person” under section 1983. ... Thus, Campbell would be unable to recover back pay under section 1983. ... Such a “final order” cannot be entered by a federal court acting under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state university as a statutory person that can be sued, but it permits an official-capacity suit against a state official for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.

Moreno v. University of Maryland · filed 1976-07-13

We are persuaded that the University of Maryland, like Morgan State College, is not a § 1983 “person” and cannot be sued under that section. ... With respect to the other defendant, Dr. Elkins, however, it is equally clear that when he is sued in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in a suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief only, he is a “person” for purposes of that section and amenable to suit thereunder.

A state court is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Pettit v. Gingerich · filed 1977-02-22

The Maryland Court of Appeals is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state hospital, as an arm of the state, is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Goodman v. Parwatikar · filed 1977-05-27

This Court agrees and concludes that the St. Louis State Hospital is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.

State officials sued in their official capacities are persons who may be sued under Section 1983.

Schmidt v. Schubert · filed 1977-07-28

The named defendant is not the state; it is an individual acting in his official capacity as superintendent of Central State Hospital. State officials sued in their official capacities are “persons” for purposes of suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to officers of the District of Columbia because the District is neither a state nor a territory within the statute's meaning.

Dellums v. Powell · filed 1977-08-04

We begin our analysis by noting that Section 1983 does not apply to officers of the District of Columbia.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state governmental entity that is not a "person" within the statute's meaning.

McKnight v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1977-10-04

That Act only imposes liability on “persons”, ... and it is now firmly established that a state governmental entity such as SEPTA ... is not a “person” within the meaning of the Act.

Section 1983 does not authorize damages suits against state agencies that are not persons within the statute.

Hoke v. BD. OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF STATE OF NC · filed 1978-02-23

Defendants correctly contend, therefore, that the Board is not a \"person\" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and cannot be subject to a suit for damages.

Section 1983 treats state and municipal officials sued in their official capacities as persons when the action seeks injunctive or declaratory relief.

Swift v. Toia · filed 1978-05-01

It is well settled that “municipal and state officials, sued in their official capacities, are ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983 when they are sued for injunctive or declaratory relief.”

Section 1983 permits suits against persons acting under color of state law, but a state judicial-branch agency or instrumentality is not a person amenable to suit under the statute.

Silverton v. Department of the Treasury · filed 1978-05-05

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against defendant State Bar because it is an agency or instrumentality in the judicial branch of government of the State of California, functioning as an administrative arm of the Supreme Court of California in matters relating to the admission, discipline, and reinstatement of attorneys; and defendant State Bar therefore is not a “person” amenable to suit within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats local governing bodies and local government officials sued in their official capacities as “persons” subject to suit.

Kelly v. Richland School District 2 · filed 1978-07-21

Defendant, Richland School District 2, moves to dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim lodged against it on the ground that it is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983. The other defendants move for dismissal on the basis that, they, in their official capacities, are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. ... As such defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims is denied.

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of law, and a state agency is not a person subject to liability under the statute.

Metz v. West Virginia State Board of Probation & Parole · filed 1979-06-21

In any case, examination of those subjects by this Court appears to be wholly unnecessary because the Civil Rights Act applies only to “persons” who, acting under color of law, violate another’s Constitutional rights, and a superficial examination of authorities indicates that a state agency, such as those designated as respondents in this case, is not a “person” within the meaning of that act. See 42 U.S.C.A. §1983, Notes 129, 131 and 135.

Section 1983 does not treat a State as a person subject to suit under the statute.

Wiesenfeld v. State of NY · filed 1979-07-09

The State is not a proper defendant because it is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C., section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a State as a person subject to suit under the statute.

Wiesenfeld v. New York · filed 1979-07-09

The State is not a proper defendant because it is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C., section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat APSU and the Board as “persons” subject to suit under the statute.

Student Coalition for Gay Rights v. Austin Peay State University · filed 1979-10-12

Defendants, APSU and Board, move for dismissal as to them upon the ground that they are not “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. This position is correct and the suit will be dismissed as to these two defendants.

Section 1983's term "person" means a living human being and does not provide a cause of action on behalf of a deceased for alleged civil-rights violations occurring after death.

Guyton v. Phillips · filed 1979-10-29

There is no indication in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act that Congress meant to depart from this general meaning of the word "person" when it used the term in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor do we find any case law which would imply that the protection of the Civil Rights Act would extend to dead human beings.

Section 1983 covers Williamsport Area Community College as a person and does not give the college the state's sovereign immunity.

West v. Williamsport Area Community College · filed 1980-02-11

Third, after considering the arguments advanced by the parties and reviewing the pertinent authorities, I conclude that Williamsport Area Community College is a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and does not share the state’s sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 treats a public university as a suable person, and permits suit against its officials in their official capacities, when an official policy or custom causes the constitutional injury.

Gay Student Services v. Texas a & M University · filed 1980-02-20

Consequently, an institution of higher learning, such as the university here involved, no longer enjoys absolute § 1983 immunity. ... Of course, for a university to be suable under § 1983, the injury must be due to an official policy or custom. ... This “person” status applies to University officials when sued in their official capacity.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a “person” subject to suit by individuals, including for prospective relief, absent state consent.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES U. v. State of Tenn. · filed 1980-09-02

A state cannot be a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from federal lawsuits by individuals unless the state has consented to such actions. This prohibition applies even when the suit is only for prospective relief.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person subject to suit under the statute.

DeLuca v. Kahr Bros., Inc. (In re Kahr Bros., Inc.) · filed 1980-09-12

In addition, regardless of the Eleventh Amendment bar, the Court finds that a state is not a person for purposes of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Holladay v. State of Mont. · filed 1981-01-30

Thus, the state of Montana is not subject to suit under § 1983 because it is not a “person.”

Section 1983 does not treat the North Carolina Department of Corrections as a person subject to suit, and the department shares North Carolina's sovereign immunity.

Bennett v. Reed · filed 1981-09-23

The Department of Corrections is not a “person” within the meaning of the State of North Carolina and, therefore, shares the state’s sovereign immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide remedies for prenatal injuries sustained by a fetus that later becomes a living infant, absent legislation extending those remedies.

Harman v. Daniels · filed 1981-11-02

There is no indication in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act that Congress intended the remedies of Section 1983 to be available for vindication of prenatal injuries, or to lie dormant until a fetus can attain the status of a “person.” Therefore, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, this court refuses to extend those remedies to a living infant which sustained prenatal injuries.

Section 1983 treats the Arizona Board of Regents as a person and permits a cause of action against it for official action that deprives a person of federal rights.

Harris v. Arizona Board of Regents · filed 1981-12-23

The Court concludes that it has § 1331 jurisdiction over the Board and a cause of action is stated under § 1983 since the Board is a § 1983 “person.”

A state circuit court is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983.

Bishop v. Circuit Court of Cole County · filed 1985-12-24

The Civil Rights Act imposes liability on “persons” who cause the deprivation of federally protected rights. Accordingly, case law supports a finding that the Circuit Court of Cole County is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State courts and their boards and commissions are not persons under § 1983, but individual state officials are persons who may be sued for prospective injunctive relief.

Rothstein v. Montana State Supreme Court · filed 1986-07-22

The Montana Supreme Court, the Board of Bar Examiners and the Commission on Practice, as agencies of the state of Montana, are not “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983 and must be dismissed. ... There can be no doubt that these individual defendants are “persons” for purposes of § 1983. Plaintiff may bring an action for prospective injunctive relief against officials of the state.

A state itself is not a “person” subject to § 1983 damages liability.

Ziccardi v. Commonwealth · filed 1987-06-08

Federal courts have held, however, that the Commonwealth is not a “person” subject to a suit for damages under section 1983. ... Consequently, we need not address the issue of sovereign immunity regarding Count 3 of the amended complaint because that count does not state a cause of action against the Commonwealth as a matter of law.

The Virginia Council of Higher Education is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Avins v. Virginia Council of Higher Education · filed 1988-02-26

The Council is not a person within the meaning of § 1983 and, despite Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, the individual members of the Council are not named as Defendants In this cause.

Whether an official is equivalent to the State for Section 1983 personhood purposes is determined under state law governing the State’s governmental structure.

Santiago v. Daley · filed 1990-08-07

Because the question whether a defendant other than the State itself should be equated with the State is entirely a matter of the State’s governmental structure, even though the direct issue is one of applying congressional intent under Section 1983 (who is a "person” for purposes of that statute?), the relevant inquiry must be made under state rather than federal law.

Section 1983 allows redress for rights deprivations under color of state law, but states and state arms are not persons subject to suit.

Barr v. Great Falls International Airport Authority · filed 2005-02-22

He cannot recover from the State because the United States Supreme Court has held states are not “persons” in the context of § 1983. ... The Department of Justice, as an entity within the executive branch of government in the State of Montana, see § 2-15-102(4), MCA, and § 2-15-2001, MCA, is a governmental entity which is considered an “arm of the state” and not a “person” for § 1983 and § 1985 purposes.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a suable “person” under the statute.

Pyne v. Meese · filed 1985-08-22

Moreover, this court has previously concluded that a state is not a “person” under section 1983 and we find no reason to reject that holding or reasoning.

A state agency is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Minor v. United States · filed 2008-09-22

The district court also properly dismissed Minors’ remaining claims because the defendant state agency is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985, see Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), and it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Board (In re Mitchell), 209 F.3d 1111, 1115-16 (9th Cir .2000).

Section 1983 authorizes a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of a federally protected right.

Penaranda v. Cato · filed 1990-06-29

Given the facts of the instant case, I find that defendant Palmer is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. ... Therefore, I conclude that neither defendant DHR nor defendant Cato, in her official capacity, is a “person” under §§ 1983 and 1985(3).

Section 1983 does not treat states as persons who can be sued under the section.

State v. Green · filed 1981-10-02

We interpret Quern v. Jordan as holding not only that section 1983 does not abrogate the state’s eleventh amendment immunity, but as holding that states are not “persons” within the meaning of the section.

A municipal authority may be a person under § 1983; its status requires a record sufficient to assess whether it is an arm of the State.

Independent Enterprises Inc. Thomas Lozecki v. Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority City of Pittsburgh · filed 1997-01-09

We hold only that the Authority may be a person within the meaning of § 1983 and that the district court erred in ruling to the contrary on the present record.

Section 1983 permits a tribe to sue as a person when its claimed rights arise from providing social services rather than from sovereign status, if private nonsovereign entities could likewise sue.

Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Rising · filed 2009-06-26

We, therefore, remand this case to the District Court to determine whether the Community was entitled to the federal funds (a) only as a result of its sovereignty, or (b) simply because it provides certain social services. If it is the latter, then Community’s § 1983 suit would not be in any way dependent on its status as a sovereign, and it should be considered a “person” within the meaning of that statute, so long as other private, nonsovereign entities could likewise sue under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons within its meaning.

Heike v. Guevara · filed 2009-09-02

However, whether CMU or the individual Defendants in their official capacities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 is a separate issue from whether Defendants have waived their sovereign immunity. Even if sovereign immunity had been waived, CMU and the individual Defendants in their official capacities would not be amenable to á suit for monetary damages under § 1983 because they are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 does not treat states and their departments as persons subject to suit.

Hogg's v. New Jersey · filed 2009-09-09

Moreover, the defendants were properly dismissed from Hogg’s’ suit because New Jersey, its Department of Labor and that Department’s Division of Workers’ Compensation are not recognized as “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against a local official because a local official is a “person” under the section.

Mercado v. Dart · filed 2010-04-28

The Sheriff of Cook County, a local official, is not “the state” for the purpose of either Illinois or federal law, and therefore the Sheriff is a “person” as §1983 uses that word.

Section 1983 does not authorize a claim against a state because a state is not a person under the section.

Wilson v. State · filed 2012-05-11

We agree that the decision in Will required dismissal of Wilson’s action against the State of Ohio, because a State is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Section 1983 lets a person sue someone acting under state law for depriving them of a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Schiffbauer v. Schmidt · filed 2015-03-24

It is well established that county school boards in Maryland are considered state agencies and that, as state agencies, school boards are not considered “persons” under § 1983. ... Here, they cannot do so because the Board is not a person subject to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits claims against persons acting under color of state law, subject to limits including state arm immunity.

Johnson v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2006-03-29

We rejected defendants’ contention. We explained that the cases on which they relied failed to examine the issue in light of the analysis required by United States Supreme Court case law, which we concluded placed particular emphasis on how an entity has been characterized as a matter of state law and whether the state treasury is vulnerable to satisfy that entity’s obligations.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a New Jersey county prosecutor’s office acting in its law enforcement and investigative capacity because it is not a “person” under the statute.

DESSOURCES v. MANNING · filed 2020-10-16

Thus, for the same reasons as above, ECPO is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 or the NJCRA and may not be sued under either.

Section 1983 permits a federal injunction against state proceedings because it is an expressly authorized exception to the federal anti-injunction statute.

Sandy Ealy v. Littlejohn · filed 1978-03-08

Third, to the extent that the District Court relied on 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 to stay its hand, such reliance in a § 1983 action was misplaced in view of the Supreme Court’s clear holding in Mitchum v. Foster, 1972, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705, that § 1983 is an expressly authorized exception to the anti-injunction statute.

Section 1983 permits a properly stated civil-rights claim to seek equitable relief, but principles of comity and federalism foreclose such relief when it would interfere with pending state proceedings.

Kinney v. Lenon · filed 1971-08-13

On the similarity of facts between Younger v. Harris and its companion cases12 and the case at bench we must hold that equitable relief under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 is foreclosed by the same policy reasons of comity inherent in our government’s federalism outlined there.

Section 1983 does not create an exception to § 2283's prohibition on federal injunctions against state criminal prosecutions.

Chinn v. Johnson · filed 1969-01-10

The Court there also pointed out that the Fourth Circuit had emphatically held, in Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (1964), that 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 does not, contrary to the position taken by the plaintiffs here, create an exception to Section 2283. We are of a like opinion and hold that Section 2283 prohibits this Court from enjoining the State criminal prosecutions instituted against these plaintiffs.

Section 1983 authorizes suits in equity to redress constitutional deprivations committed under state law and places those suits within the expressly authorized exception to the federal anti-injunction statute.

Schneider v. Margossian · filed 1972-10-26

The Court there held that because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes suits in equity to redress the deprivation under state law of any constitutional rights, that statute falls within the “expressly authorized” exception to the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Since the instant actions were brought in reliance on § 1983, the anti-injunction statute does not apply to them, and the determination of whether trustee process constitutes a state court proceeding is not dispositive of the question whether we may grant the relief sought here.

Section 1983 is an express exception to the federal anti-injunction statute, permitting federal injunctive relief against state proceedings when the action is brought under § 1983.

Shaw v. Jim Garrison, Individually, and as District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana · filed 1972-11-20

The district court held also that Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was an express exception to the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Supreme Court has now confirmed the correctness of this view. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705, 1972.

Section 1983 allows a federal civil-rights action to proceed without exhaustion of available state remedies and provides an exception to the federal anti-injunction statute.

Concerned Consumers League v. O'NEILL · filed 1974-02-25

Since this action was initiated under the Federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983); the rights allegedly being violated are clearly federal in nature; no state law can control the outcome, and there is no tangle of state laws involved which requires interpretation by state courts; the plaintiffs need not exhaust available state remedies. ... Nor is this court restricted from enjoining the enforcement of a state court’s injunction by the federal “anti-injunction” statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Actions initiated under § 1983 are excepted from that limiting statute. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972).

Section 1983 claims are exempt from the Anti-Injunction Statute’s bar on federal injunctions against state-court proceedings.

Niles v. Lowe · filed 1976-02-02

The Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, poses no statutory bar to the issuance of the requested injunction in this case since plaintiff’s claim is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is an expressly authorized exception to the federal anti-injunction statute, permitting federal courts to enjoin state-court proceedings.

M P I, Inc. v. McCullough · filed 1978-12-14

Since this suit is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an “expressly authorized” exception to the federal anti-injunction statute, ... we need not be concerned with that statute’s absolute ban on federal court injunctions against state court proceedings.

Section 1983 authorizes an action for injunctive relief against a state official that falls within the federal anti-injunction statute’s exception for injunctions expressly authorized by Congress.

Wilson v. Thompson · filed 1981-03-02

The federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, posed no bar to appellants’ action in the district court for injunctive relief against a state official because section 1983 falls within the exception in the anti-injunction statute for injunctions “expressly authorized by Act of Congress.”

The Anti-Injunction Act does not bar a temporary stay of a state criminal trial sought as injunctive relief in a Section 1983 action.

Allen v. Johnston · filed 1983-11-10

The Court also notes that, because plaintiff seeks injunctive relief as part of an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 does not bar the issuance of a temporary stay.

The Anti-Injunction Act does not categorically bar a federal court from staying a state proceeding in a § 1983 suit, although equity, comity, and federalism sharply constrain such relief.

Breads v. Ellis · filed 1985-05-08

It is .now settled that the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 2283, does not absolutely foreclose a federal court in a Section 1983 suit from granting an injunction to stay a proceeding pending in a state court.

Section 1983 is an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibition against enjoining pending state-court proceedings.

Icahn v. Blunt · filed 1985-06-24

Section 1983 is an “expressly authorized” statutory exception to the Anti-Injunction Act’s absolute prohibition against enjoining pending state court proceedings.

Section 1983 does not expressly authorize a federal injunction based on federal statutory rights against pending litigation in state court.

Hickey v. Duffy · filed 1987-08-24

We hold that Sec. 1983 does not "expressly authorize" injunctions, based on federal statutes, against litigation in state courts.

Section 1983 permits civil damages actions for constitutional deprivations, but did not authorize a stay of execution under the facts of this case.

Faulder v. Johnson · filed 1999-06-15

Section § 1983 allows plaintiffs to challenge the deprivation of constitutional rights through a civil action for damages. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that it is prohibited from entering a stay by the Anti-Injunction Act.

Section 1983 does not create an express exception to the anti-injunction statute for suits seeking to interfere with pending state proceedings.

Geiger v. Jenkins · filed 1970-07-16

However, since in Brooks both declaratory and injunctive relief were denied, it is evident that the Supreme Court in Brooks affirmed the three-judge court’s holding that § 1983 does not create an express exception to the anti-injunction statute, and the further holding that the anti-injunction statute prohibits both declaratory and injunctive relief, for otherwise the three Brooks plaintiffs against whom prosecutions were pending, like those in Cameron, would have been entitled to declaratory relief.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for false disciplinary charges when the inmate receives a hearing and an opportunity to defend.

Sweeney v. Norris · filed 1988-01-19

In the case before the Court, as in Freeman, the plaintiff received a hearing before the disciplinary board and had an opportunity to speak in his defense, so even if we assume that defendant Stinnett filed the charges in bad faith, the plaintiff does not have a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to pursue a due process claim based on a disciplinary hearing despite the later administrative reversal of the disciplinary decision.

Porter v. Novak · filed 1995-09-22

In sum, the Court holds that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 on plaintiffs § 1983 action based solely on the fact that a disciplinary decision that allegedly deprived plaintiff of his constitutional due process rights was administratively reversed.

A prisoner’s disciplinary conviction does not automatically bar a Section 1983 claim that a guard used constitutionally unreasonable force during the incident.

Shaw v. Thompson · filed 1989-10-20

The district court's reasoning that Shaw's conviction absolved Thompson of liability under Sec. 1983 and rendered the lawsuit frivolous is flawed. That an inmate is convicted of certain disciplinary violations does not automatically preclude the possibility that the guard involved in the incident reacted to those violations with constitutionally unreasonable force.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a student subjected to corporal punishment administered under Ohio law with parental consent unless additional facts establish a constitutional violation.

Sims v. Waln · filed 1974-12-16

A student to whom corporal punishment had once been administered in accordance with Ohio Rev.Code § 3319.41 with consent of her parent and who is threatened with a second administration of such corporal punishment does not establish, without more, a violation of 42 U.S.C.-,§ 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a state-prison disciplinary matter that does not rise to the constitutional level.

Startti v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1969-01-13

The district court dismissed the petition on grounds that it dealt with matters of prison discipline which are the sole concern of the state unless exceptional circumstances are present, and that the petition stated no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We concur.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for a Miranda-violating interrogation standing alone because such an interrogation is not itself a constitutional tort.

Allen v. Eicher · filed 1969-02-03

Thus, Miranda provides that statements which fail to comply with its requirements are inadmissible at trial. However, Miranda does not per se make an interrogation which violates its precepts into an actionable tort. Unlike an illegal arrest, or an illegal search or seizure, an improper interrogation is not itself a tort. Nor does an interrogation, in and of itself, constitute a denial of the constitutional rights of the person being interrogated.

Section 1983 liability is governed by general tort-liability principles, and a jury may find a technical violation but award no damages when the evidence supports no compensable injury.

David L. Joseph, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross v. James H. Rowlen, Defendant-Appellee-Cross · filed 1970-05-01

This action is brought by plaintiff under the Federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and charges defendant, a city police officer, with the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights while acting under color of state law, by reason of the false arrest arid detention of plaintiff. ... In effect, the jury found that plaintiff experienced a technical violation of his rights, but suffered no damages. ... Further, we see no real distinction between damage principles in civil rights cases and those in tort or other cases. The liability imposed under the Civil Rights Act must be read against the background and general principles of tort liability. Pierson v. Ray, 886 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). Against that background, the verdict and judgment entered herein should not be disturbed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on mere verbal abuse by prison personnel.

Batton v. State Government of North Carolina · filed 1980-11-26

Finally, as to plaintiffs’ claim that NCCCW personnel generally, and Kenneth Harris and Sister Teresa Floyd specifically, are poorly trained and/or insensitive, the court notes that mere verbal abuse by prison personnel does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs, permits supervisory liability when an affirmative link connects a supervisor’s acts or omissions to the constitutional violation, and permits municipal damages liability for unconstitutional action implementing official policy or reflecting unofficial custom.

Wright v. Stickler · filed 1981-09-14

Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983. ... In order to establish liability under § 1983 of supervisory officials for deprivation of constitutional rights through the acts of their subordinates, an affirmative link must be proven between the officials’ acts or omissions and the actions directly causing the alleged violation, so that they can be said to have encouraged, approved of, or acquiesced in the violation. ... Municipalities can be sued for damages under § 1983 when “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers” or is “visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.”

In a prisoner's § 1983 action, the court must identify the precise constitutional deprivation proved before deciding what effect to give the prison disciplinary proceeding.

Edward J. Armstead, Jr. v. State of Louisiana Thru the Louisiana Department of Corrections · filed 1983-08-05

After finding the facts, he will identify precisely any found constitutional deprivation and then decide what effect if any he will give to the prison disciplinary proceedings.

A prisoner cannot recover under § 1983 when the disciplinary procedure satisfies due process and no named defendant committed a constitutional violation.

Tyra v. Harger · filed 1984-05-25

Because plaintiff has shown no violation of any constitutional right in the disciplinary proceeding by any of these defendants, summary judgment is appropriate.

A prison disciplinary hearing does not trigger criminal-trial self-incrimination standards, so a challenge to allegedly coerced statements on that basis does not state a § 1983 claim.

Lippert v. Penfold · filed 1984-10-12

The plaintiff has not presented an issue which gives rise to a constitutional level claim. The claim against the prison disciplinary procedure does not state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The prison disciplinary hearing does not give rise to the constitutional standard of self-incrimination as does a full fledged criminal trial.

A Section 1983 prison-discipline claim is stated when the adjustment committee fails to provide the inmate a written statement of the evidence supporting guilt.

Hanrahan v. Lane · filed 1984-10-30

An Adjustment Committee summary helps to insure that prison administrators will act fairly. A written statement is required to protect an inmate from constitutional violations. ... Plaintiff, in the papers submitted to the district court, states that he never received such a summary. This allegation states a claim for which relief can be granted.

Violation of a prison procedural regulation does not support Section 1983 liability when the regulation does not significantly limit official discretion or create a constitutionally protected interest.

Nelson v. Bryan · filed 1985-03-27

As a consequence, any violation of the regulation would not serve as the basis for a § 1983 action in a federal court.

A prisoner does not state a § 1983 claim merely because prison disciplinary proceedings provide fewer protections than the prisoner's home state would provide, so long as constitutional minimums are met.

Stewart v. McManus · filed 1986-06-13

Thus the mere fact that plaintiff has not been afforded the same procedural protections at ISP as he would in a Kansas prison does not constitute a colorable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A false prison-disciplinary charge does not state a § 1983 claim when the inmate receives the required procedural protections, but it may state a claim when those protections were denied.

Vines v. Howard · filed 1987-01-28

An allegation that a corrections officer falsely charged an inmate with a misconduct fails to state a claim under § 1983 where the procedural due process protections set forth in ... Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, ... have been provided at the inmate’s disciplinary hearing. ... Conversely, where due process protections may not have been provided, as is the case with the misconduct charge filed by defendant Howard, Jr., such an allegation may state a claim under § 1983.

A false prison disciplinary report does not state a Section 1983 claim when the required procedural due-process protections are provided.

Bell v. Lane · filed 1987-03-18

But an allegation of false DRs “fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted where the procedural due process protections required in ... are provided.”

Section 1983 does not require a prison to offer educational programs or permit requested personal property when its restrictions rationally relate to prison administration and treat similarly situated inmates alike.

Gabel v. Estelle · filed 1987-03-23

The state has no obligation to provide prisoners with educational programs. ... Similarly, decisions concerning an inmate’s requests for certain items of property must be left to the discretion of the prison officials. Prison conditions may be restrictive and even harsh without violating an inmate’s constitutional rights as long as they treat similarly situated inmates similarly and have a rational, if occasionally implausible, reason related to prison administration. ... The plaintiffs’ complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim under § 1983 that survives the threshold requirement of presenting a plausible federal question of substance.

A mere threat to violate a protected interest does not create a Section 1983 cause of action when the threatened violation never occurs.

Earnest Napier, and Dwight Coomer v. Dewey Sowders, Warden Phil Parker, Deputy Warden and W. Thorton, Internal Affairs · filed 1987-04-29

A mere threat to a person's enjoyment of a protected interest, however, will not give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.