42 U.S.C. § 1983

A section 1983 injunction concerning evidence in an ongoing state criminal case cannot require disclosure or preservation beyond the governing constitutional requirements.

Reuben Palmer, Subclass a and Edward Negron, Subclass B v. City of Chicago, Richard Brzeczek, Commander Milton Deas, and · filed 1985-04-09

For purposes of this section 1983 action, we could only require the defendants to turn over material, exculpatory evidence to the criminal defendant and to preserve all evidence that possesses an apparent exculpatory value.

Section 1983 actions are exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, but Younger abstention may still limit federal relief against pending state court proceedings.

Schroll v. Plunkett · filed 1990-11-15

“However, civil rights actions under section 1983 are among the exceptions to the Act that have been expressly authorized by Act of Congress.” ... Nonetheless, “[e]ven in section 1983 cases, ..., the Younger doctrine may require a federal court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction in certain actions when proceedings are pending in state court.” ... Nonetheless, under Younger and its Ninth Circuit progeny, defendant and interested parties make a persuasive argument for abstention.

Section 1983 plaintiffs may seek to enjoin state court proceedings despite the Anti-Injunction Act, but equity, comity, and federalism limit that relief.

Heldstab v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1990-11-20

However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply to Sec. 1983 plaintiffs. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151 (1982). Even so, Sec. 1983 plaintiffs are still governed by the principles of "equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding." Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243, 92 S.Ct. at 2162.

Section 1983 suits are expressly authorized exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act’s bar on federal injunctions against state court proceedings.

Westin v. McDaniel · filed 1991-04-01

A suit brought under Section 1983 is an "expressly authorized” exception to this statute.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal injunction that sidetracks an ongoing state civil or administrative enforcement proceeding.

Davis v. Robinson · filed 1991-11-19

The law is clear and well settled that a defendant in a civil or administrative enforcement proceeding may not enjoin or sidetrack that proceeding by resorting to a § 1983 action in federal court.

Section 1983 creates an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, but a federal court must consider federalism and comity before enjoining an ongoing state proceeding.

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation v. Moran · filed 1992-03-24

Although § 1983 creates an exception to the full force of § 2283, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), a federal court must consider principles of federalism and comity before issuing an injunction.

Section 1983 injunctive relief affecting a pending state criminal proceeding is constrained by equity, comity, and federalism.

Kelly v. Intermountain Planned Parenthood, Inc. · filed 1992-12-14

When an injunction against a state court criminal proceeding is sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the principles of equity, comity, and federalism” must restrain a federal court.

Section 1983 actions fall within the Anti-Injunction Act’s expressly authorized exception, allowing a federal court to enjoin state proceedings.

Mannings v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County, Fla. · filed 1993-03-02

Actions filed under this section constitute an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. The court in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2162, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an Act of Congress within the expressly authorized exceptions of the Anti-Injunction Act. Thus, this Court has the authority to issue an injunction against the State proceedings.

Section 1983 claims fall within the Anti-Injunction Statute’s expressly authorized exception, allowing federal courts to enjoin state proceedings.

Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Albany · filed 1993-04-16

Given the fact that plaintiffs cloak each of their causes of action in § 1983, the court finds sufficient reason to avoid the proscriptions of the anti-injunction statute.

Section 1983 authorizes federal courts to enjoin state proceedings despite the Anti-Injunction Statute.

Smith v. Gribetz · filed 1995-05-26

The Supreme Court has held that Section 1983 expressly authorizes federal courts to enjoin state proceedings. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2162, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972). We recognize, therefore, that the Anti-Injunction Statute does not prohibit us from enjoining the state’s prosecution of plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits injunctions against state court proceedings, but courts should grant them with utmost caution and only when clearly necessary.

Winslow v. Leh · filed 1984-01-16

State court proceedings may be enjoined under § 1983, but a federal court’s power to do so should only be exercised with the utmost caution and only if clearly necessary. ... Irrespective of the Younger doctrine, I am convinced that the issuance of any injunction in this case is not necessary and that to do so would exceed the bounds of caution.

Section 1983 expressly authorizes injunctions against state criminal proceedings under the Anti-Injunction Act.

Torries v. Hebert · filed 2000-08-28

Plaintiffs instituted this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As an Act of Congress, § 1983 expressly authorizes the enjoining of state criminal proceedings.

A state court’s decision to quash criminal charges does not automatically establish liability under § 1983.

Sours v. Loring · filed 2000-11-30

Initially we note that the fact that the state court quashed the information does not automatically mean that defendants committed an error which would subject them to liability in a later § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to enjoin a pending state prosecution when the challenged law is patently unconstitutional or is enforced in bad faith to discourage protected activity.

Gardner v. Ceci · filed 1970-04-30

I fully concur with Judge Doyle’s analysis. I only add that to limit 1983 to those cases where the plaintiff has instituted such a suit in federal court before formal charges were brought against him in the state courts would have little basis in logic. In a proper case, where the statute in question is either patently unconstitutional on its face, or is being applied in a bad faith attempt to discourage constitutionally protected activities, and particularly where First Amendment rights are involved, the federal courts should be available to fully vindicate the rights of the citizens of this country.

Section 1983 authorizes equitable relief for constitutional deprivations and permits a federal court to enjoin state proceedings under the express-authorization exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

Brown v. O'Brien · filed 1972-07-05

We find that either the first or third exception to § 2283 authorizes us to enjoin further prosecution by 'the plaintiffs of their Illinois state suit. ... The Party thus grounds the jurisdiction of its Counterclaim on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which authorizes a “suit in equity” to redress the deprivation “of any rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution.” In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), the Supreme Court expressly held that an action brought under § 1983 is one “expressly authorized by Act of Congress” and is thus within the first exception to § 2283’s prohibition against enjoining state proceedings.

Section 1983 authorizes equitable relief for deprivation of constitutional rights and can provide the express congressional authorization needed to enjoin a state court proceeding.

William Brown et al. v. Lawrence O'Brien et al.; Thomas E. Keane et al. v. National Democratic Party et al. · filed 1972-10-10

We find that either the first or third exception to Sec. 2283 authorizes us to enjoin further prosecution by the plaintiffs of their Illinois state suit. ... The Party thus grounds the jurisdiction of its Counterclaim on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 which authorizes a "suit in equity" to redress the deprivation "of any rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution." In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L. Ed.2d 705 (1972), the Supreme Court expressly held that an action brought under Sec. 1983 is one "expressly authorized by Act of Congress' and is thus within the first exception to Sec. 2283's prohibition against enjoining state proceedings.

Section 1983 civil rights actions are an exception to the bar on federal injunctions against state court proceedings in 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

Hernandez v. Danaher · filed 1975-12-19

It is clear that this Court is empowered to enjoin state action under certain circumstances, notwithstanding the general prohibition against such injunctions found in 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), held that the anti-injunction rule of Section 2283 does not apply to civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 suits are outside the Anti-Injunction Act, but federal courts generally decline to enjoin ongoing prosecutions except in exceptional circumstances.

Lawson v. Hill · filed 2004-05-24

That is why federal courts refuse (it is not because of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which does not apply to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972)), other than in exceptional circumstances well illustrated by Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903-05 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc), to enjoin an ongoing prosecution even when it is contended to violate the federal Constitution.

Section 1983 civil rights actions fall within the express congressional authorization exception to the federal Anti-Injunction Act.

Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. The Superior Court Of California · filed 1984-08-03

However, civil rights action under section 1983 are among the exceptions to the Act that have been "expressly authorized by Act of Congress."

Section 1983 does not automatically permit a federal court to enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution; equitable limits still apply.

Horodner v. Cahn · filed 1973-06-15

Characterizing this action as one brought under § 1983, however, does not automatically exempt it from the prohibition of 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

Section 1983 permits an injunction against ongoing state judicial proceedings despite the Anti-Injunction Act, although Younger abstention may still prevent that relief.

Ebiza, Inc. v. City of Davenport · filed 2006-06-01

And because the statute purportedly violated is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, does not pose an independent barrier to enjoining any ongoing state judicial proceedings, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), but Younger abstention may, see id. at 243, 92 S.Ct. 2151 ("[W]e do not question or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.”).

Section 1983 permits an injunction against a pending state criminal prosecution when the prosecution itself suppresses speech in bad faith and causes irreparable injury.

Walter Sheridan and Richard Townley v. Jim Garrison, Individually and as a District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans, · filed 1969-09-16

In other words, the power of the federal courts to enjoin pending state criminal proceedings that deny civil rights is an essential part of the remedy provided by § 1983, at least in those cases in which the proceeding itself effects the denial.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to exercise equitable jurisdiction to enjoin state court proceedings under the express authorization exception to the anti-injunction statute.

De Vita v. Sills · filed 1970-03-09

The plaintiff relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an instance of an injunction "expressly authorized by Act of Congress." That reliance is, in this circuit at least, well placed, for Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3 Cir. 1950) so holds. ... We hold, therefore, that the district court has equity jurisdiction by virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes federal courts to enjoin state proceedings as an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283’s restriction on such injunctions.

National Land & Investment Co. v. Specter · filed 1970-06-25

As this court recently declared in DeVita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172 (3 Cir. 1970), appellants’ reliance on the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “as an instance of an injunction ‘expressly authorized by Act of Congress’ ”, and, therefore, as an exception to the anti-injunction provision of § 2283, “is, in this circuit at least, well-placed, for Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3 Cir. 1950) so holds.”

Section 1983 falls within the Anti-Injunction Act’s exception for injunctions expressly authorized by Congress.

Shaw v. Garrison · filed 1971-05-27

This court feels that it may not fairly and justly avoid this issue and, therefore, for the reasons assigned, determines that § 1983 does constitute an express exception to § 2283.

Section 1983 expressly authorizes federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings.

Miller v. Skumanick · filed 2009-03-30

The Supreme Court has found that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute under which plaintiff brought the instant action, expressly, authorizes such federal action. ... Thus, even if there were ongoing state criminal proceedings, this court could exercise its jurisdiction to enjoin them.

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal injunction against pending state prosecutions, according to this court.

Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary · filed 1969-07-01

The Supreme Court has expressly left open the question whether federal injunctive relief may be granted to restrain pending state prosecutions allegedly violating rights protected by the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The Second Circuit has however indicated its preference for the view of the majority of the Circuits that federal injunctive relief is unavailable to restrain pending state prosecutions (Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 697 (2d Cir. 1966)) and this Court so holds in respect of the question raised in this case.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to stop a state prosecution only when the prosecution itself is shown, at least prima facie, to invade a constitutionally protected interest.

Astro Cinema Corp. v. Mackell · filed 1969-08-19

Jurisdiction, here, is rested on the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and, indeed, the federal jurisdiction can be invoked to stop a proceeding in the state court only when the very maintenance cf. and the proceedings in, the state case are themselves shown, prima facie at least, to constitute an invasion of a constitutionally protected interest. No approach to such a showing is made in the present case.

Relief under § 1983 to stay pending state court proceedings is subject to the special-circumstances requirement.

Rivera v. The Honorable Marvin A. Freeman, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of California · filed 1972-11-17

The same policy requirement has been made for declaratory relief (Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971)), and for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972); and Kinney, supra, 447 F.2d 602-603)).

Section 1983 does not authorize an injunction against a pending state criminal prosecution without special circumstances such as bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury.

United States v. Schwartz · filed 1977-09-19

Here there was no evidence presented which could be characterized as irreparable injury, bad faith, or harassment. Dombrowski simply does not apply even though the intervenor’s claim is asserted under the provisions of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 claims fall within the Anti-Injunction Act’s exception for relief expressly authorized by Congress, permitting a federal court to enjoin state court proceedings.

Empire, Inc. v. Ashcroft · filed 1981-09-03

The Supreme Court, in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), has squarely held that claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fall within the statutory exception. Empire has asserted its constitutional claims under Section 1983, and the Anti-Injunction Statute does not bar this court’s issuance of the requested injunctive relief.

Section 1983 suits are exempt from the Anti-Injunction Act's flat bar on federal injunctions staying state court proceedings.

Brooks v. New Hampshire Supreme Court · filed 1995-09-07

However, plaintiff's counsel correctly points out in his third motion for temporary restraining order (document no. 24) that, because he invoked the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in his amended complaint, the Anti-Injunction Act does not strictly prevent this court from entering an injunction staying ongoing state court proceedings, because §1983 suits have been construed to be exempt from the flat bar of §2283.

Section 1983 authorizes equitable relief for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, including injunctions against state court proceedings.

Roberts v. American Bank & Trust Co. · filed 2011-12-21

As a result, although Plaintiffs claims under § 1983 are questionable, such a claim is not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.

Section 1983 authorizes federal courts to enjoin state proceedings to protect federal rights, subject to principles of equity, comity, and federalism.

Gates v. Strain · filed 2018-03-22

Section 1983 is an express authorization from Congress permitting federal courts to enjoin state proceedings in order to protect federal rights. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242–43 (1972). However, § 1983 does not “qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.”

Section 1983 provides an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act’s restriction on federal injunctions against state-court proceedings.

Vodicka v. Ermatinger · filed 2019-07-29

Both the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit have recognized that Section 1983 is an express exception to the Congressional policy that federal courts shall not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court. ... While the Court has not yet ruled on the City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 1983 claims, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims are sufficiently well-plead such that the Court may exercise jurisdiction here, despite the Anti-Injunction Act.

Section 1983 claims fall within the Anti-Injunction Act’s expressly authorized exception.

Thomas v. State of Tennesee · filed 2020-06-09

It is true that claims brought under § 1983 fall within the Anti-Injunction Act’s “expressly authorized” exception.

Section 1983 expressly authorizes injunctions against state court proceedings within an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, although Younger abstention may still prevent relief.

Bey v. Stingl · filed 2020-09-25

Because the plaintiff’s complaint appears to assert a variety of constitutional violations under §1983, the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar this court from enjoining the plaintiff’s state court criminal proceedings, but this court has determined that the Younger abstention doctrine does prevent it from enjoining the state criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 provides an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, but a plaintiff seeking to enjoin state court proceedings must show exceptional circumstances.

Surina v. Glanzer · filed 2020-11-20

The United States Supreme Court has held that Congress provided an exception under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242–43 (1972). And the Plaintiffs sued under Section 1983, though they fail to mention the statute in their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See ECF Nos. 1, 18. Even so, Plaintiffs must show “exceptional circumstances”: that “irreparable injury is both great and immediate,” the state action is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional provisions” or there is “a showing of bad faith, harassment, or other unusual circumstances. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added). No exceptional circumstances exist here.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to bring a civil rights claim even when the plaintiff’s purpose is to obtain attorneys’ fees if the claim succeeds.

Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed · filed 2004-11-17

The way a plaintiff ordinarily makes a claim for relief on account of abridgement of his civil rights in federal court is under the statute that furnishes the cause of action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. And there is nothing wrong with asserting a civil rights claim under that statute, with the purpose of obtaining attorneys’ fees if the claim succeeds.

Section 1983 permits a federal substantive-due-process claim against state school officials for corporal punishment that amounts to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience.

Hall v. Tawney · filed 1980-05-09

For reasons that follow we conclude that there may be circumstances under which specific corporal punishment administered by state school officials gives rise to an independent federal cause of action to vindicate substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As in the cognate police brutality cases, the substantive due process inquiry in school corporal punishment cases must be whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience.

Section 1983 medical-care claims alleging deliberate indifference cannot be resolved on summary judgment when genuine disputes of material fact remain.

Murrell v. Larry D. Bennett, Commissioner of Alabama Board of Corrections · filed 1980-04-10

Ralph Murrell, an inmate of the Alabama State prisons, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the State Board of Corrections and other defendants on his complaint that he was deprived of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). ... Whether Murrell can prove deliberate indifference is a question that can be answered only after further factual development.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal cause of action for violating a state jury-selection statute unless the violation involves systematic exclusion based on race or another ground forbidden by national policy.

Simmons v. W. M. Jones and Ernest Walker, Jury Commissioners for Long County, Georgia · filed 1973-05-14

The alleged failure of the defendants to comply with Section 59-106, Georgia Code Annotated, without a showing of systematic exclusion on the basis of race or some other ground forbidden by national policy, does not give rise to a federal cause of action under the federal civil rights statutes.

Section 1983 reaches both conduct taken pursuant to state law and misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law when the actor is clothed with state-law authority.

Morris A. Palmer, and Alice Taylor, Intervening v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. · filed 1973-05-22

This section of the Civil Rights Act not only prohibits action taken pursuant to state law, but also the misuse of power possessed by virtue, of state law when the actor is clothed with the authority of state law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for violations of rights created by the Federal Constitution or federal laws, not state law alone.

Carlisle v. Bensinger · filed 1973-02-22

It is well settled that a cause of action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when a right created by the Federal Constitution or laws has been violated. Violation of state law is not sufficient to state a cause of action.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal cause of action for claims that state officials exceeded their authority under state law.

California v. LaRue · filed 1973-02-20

As the District Court recognized, however, such a claim is not cognizable in the suit brought by these appellees under 42 ü. S. C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant acting under color of state or local law to deprive the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

Miller v. School District Number 167, Cook County, Ill. · filed 1973-02-09

It is well settled that the requirements for a sufficient complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are that the defendant, while acting under the color of state or local law subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and the laws of the United States.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a claim concerning only the adequacy of medical attention already received, without a sufficiently serious constitutional deprivation.

United States Ex Rel. Nelson v. Twomey · filed 1973-02-28

Plaintiff Lucien’s complaint about “wheals” and food allergies has been adequately answered by the affidavit of Dr. Venekus, dated August 23, 1972 and in any event fails to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it relates merely to the adequacy of the attention he has already received, a question which is generally beyond the competence of a district court.

Section 1983 reaches people who misuse authority granted by state law, including temporary law-enforcement officers summoned by a sheriff under state law or a custom with the force of law.

Scott v. Vandiver · filed 1973-03-16

The trial court’s findings and South Carolina law support the conclusion that Hunter and Ray McMahan were temporary state law enforcement officers when they assaulted Scott. Their status brings them squarely within § 1983.

Section 1983 relief cannot proceed when the asserted constitutional claims are insubstantial.

Pordum v. Board of Regents of State of New York · filed 1973-04-26

There remains the jurisdictional allegation of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) under which there is the requirement to state a substantial constitutional claim. ... The findings outlined herein that the allegations in the complaint are insubstantial for purposes of 28 U. S.C. § 2281 likewise require the dismissal of the complaint as it alleges jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), and the reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 gives state officials a qualified-immunity defense based on good faith, so unresolved good faith precludes summary judgment on individual-capacity liability.

Adamian v. University of Nevada · filed 1973-04-16

Therefore, this Court adopts the good faith test for qualified governmental immunity as most recent courts have, and therefore denies the Regents’ motion for summary judgment as to their individual liability because of the unresolved genuine issue of material fact.

Section 1983 permits a negligence claim only when the negligence is accompanied by a bad-faith oppressive motive.

Mitchell v. Boslow · filed 1973-03-30

Negligence is actionable under § 1983 only if “bad faith oppressive motive” is shown.

Section 1983 does not support a claim absent facts showing that the challenged statute's particular application abridged the plaintiff's rights.

Stokes v. INSTITUTIONAL BOARD OF PATUXENT, STATE OF MD. · filed 1973-04-25

On carefully viewing the complaint, the court finds no facts alleged which, if true, would show any of Stokes’ rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have been abridged by the statute’s particular application to him.

Section 1983 authorizes both an action at law and a suit in equity.

Rogers v. Loether · filed 1972-09-29

This reasoning is applicable to 42 U. S.C. § 1983 as well since that statute authorizes not only '‘an action at law” but also a “suit in equity.”

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim for officials' good-faith, ordinary exercise of their duties, but may apply when they use their official powers to injure a plaintiff.

Moran v. Bench · filed 1965-12-01

It does not appear that the defendants’ acts were beyond their authority, or that their conduct was arbitrary or unreasonable. If they acted in good faith, treating the suspension as a matter of ordinary procedure, even if they might be thought to have been over-demanding, plaintiff has no federal claim. Cf. Wall v. King, 1 Cir., 1953, 206 F.2d 878, 884, cert. den. 346 U.S. 915, 74 S.Ct. 275, 98 L.Ed. 411. However, if defendants employed their official powers for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, rather than to serve the proper ends of their governmental duties, plaintiff might well have a claim under the civil rights statutes. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1886, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220; People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96, 200 N.E.2d 779 (1964).

Section 1983 civil liability does not require specific intent or a purpose to deprive someone of civil rights.

Anderson v. Haas · filed 1965-02-12

While a specific intent to deprive a person of his constitutional rights is required under criminal sections of the Civil Rights Acts, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, neither specific intent nor purpose to deprive an individual of his civil rights is a prerequisite to civil liability under the civil provisions of the Civil Rights Act.

Allegations that arrests and prosecutions were undertaken without probable cause and discriminatorily to deter constitutionally protected freedoms, including through unreasonable bail, state a claim for relief under § 1983 when accepted as true on a motion to dismiss.

Landry v. Daley · filed 1968-07-03

If true, they constitute grounds for relief under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state official sued in his official capacity when the State is the real party in interest.

King v. McGinnis · filed 1968-09-24

Additionally, the defendant Mc-Ginnis, sued in his official capacity, is not liable under the civil rights statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983), the State being the real party in interest.

Section 1983 generally does not cover mere negligence, but allegations of repeated denial or inadequate provision of medical care for serious injuries may constitute exceptional circumstances supporting a federal claim.

Wood v. Maryland Casualty Company · filed 1971-02-10

Section 1983 protects only federal rights that are violated under color of state law. Complainant alleges he was denied protections afforded by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It is plain, however, that mere negligence does not support a claim under Section 1983. ... Claims of unavailable and inadequate medical treatment can give rise to federal protections under Section 1983. ... While a claim of inadequate medical care alone generally will not support a Section 1983 action, where as here, there is a claimed failure initially to promptly provide medical care and a claim of repeated attempts to gain treatment for very serious injuries, we think this constitutes “exceptional circumstances” which forecloses summary dismissal.

Section 1983 requires more than an isolated incident of negligent failure to protect; mere negligent failure to act, standing alone, is insufficient.

Williams v. Harold v. Field, Etc. · filed 1969-11-14

In order to be actionable under section 1983, however, we believe that more than an isolated incident of negligent failure to protect must be alleged.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for acts done under color of state or local law that deprive a person of a constitutionally protected right.

Bethea v. Sherman H. Crouse, Warden, Kansas State Penitentiary, James Townsend v. Sherman H. Crouse, Warden, Kansa · filed 1969-12-03

To be actionable under § 1983 the acts complained of must be done (a) under color of state or local law and (b) must amount to a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, in this case freedom from the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 1983 reaches conduct by a private corporation’s security guards when they exercise full police authority from a city to cause a person to leave.

Tanner v. Lloyd Corporation · filed 1970-01-15

The Corporation’s Security Guards had full police authority from the City of Portland and exercised that authority to cause Plaintiffs to leave the Mall. This constituted action under col- or of state law.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on an equal-protection infringement of a property right rather than a right of personal liberty.

Bourque ex rel. Bourque v. Shapiro · filed 1970-01-28

The particular right of the plaintiffs which is allegedly infringed by a denial of equal protection, not being “one of personal liberty,” is insufficient to support a cause of action under § 1983 or jurisdiction under § 1343(3) or (4), and does not qualify monetarily under 28 U. S. C. § 1331.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a claim that public officials violated no right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Williams v. Page · filed 1970-02-27

The nub of the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under the Declaratory Judgment Act is that one of the plaintiffs’ protected rights, privileges or immunities is being transgressed by certain public officials. The defendants argue that the specific claim asserted by the plaintiffs, the right to the extra items and activities attendant to graduation, is not guaranteed by either the federal Constitution or by federal law. Accordingly, the defendants submit that this action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court finds this position to be well taken.

Section 1983 does not authorize an action against an entity that is not a “person” within the statute’s meaning.

Wilson v. Post Conviction Hearing Act of Pennsylvania · filed 1971-01-06

The defendant is not. a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and is otherwise an improper defendant under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 1983 permits, when appropriate, state-law vicarious or statutory liability for a person's civil-rights violation by another, so long as the state liability rule is not inconsistent with federal law.

Hesselgesser v. William J. Reilly, Sheriff of Spokane County, Washington, E. Byron Franz, and Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland · filed 1971-04-08

The Civil Rights Act does not itself specifically establish a basis for liability, vicarious or otherwise, against persons who do not participate in a civil rights violation. ... We think the Civil Rights Act does authorize the application, under appropriate circumstances, of state laws pertaining to vicarious liability and liability created by statute. ... State statutes making sheriffs liable for the misconduct of their deputies, if applied to civil rights deprivations by deputies, are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 does not provide relief where the record shows no deprivation of civil rights by the state officials sued.

Schumacher v. Lowell Schmidt, Commissioner of Revenue, State of South Dakota · filed 1973-07-05

In any event there is no showing of a deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of rights secured elsewhere; standing alone, it creates no independent substantive rights.

Hadley v. Moffat County School District RE-1 · filed 1982-03-01

Standing alone, § 1983 creates no independent substantive rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for state extradition-procedure violations when they also violate the Constitution's extradition requirements and 18 U.S.C. § 3182.

United States v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 1982-03-04

Thus, where violations of the UCEA also violate the minimal requirements of the Constitution and 18 U.S.C. § 3182, a section 1983 cause of action is stated. ... Based on the above authority, I hold that to the extent that plaintiff has alleged facts which are in dispute and which, if proved, would constitute a violation of state extradition statutes, as well as a violation of the extradition clause and its implementing federal statute, he has stated a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not protect a claimed property interest when a city merely competes with a plaintiff and affects his business only indirectly, and an equal-protection claim requires impermissible discrimination.

Gordon A. Heille, Individually and D/B/A Trashmasters v. The City of St. Paul, Minnesota, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1982-02-26

However, as stated by the district court, the City did not prohibit plaintiff from engaging in his business but only competed with him, thus affecting his right to engage in business only indirectly. ... We also find plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on equal protection without merit. Plaintiff has failed to show any impermissible discrimination.

Section 1983 provides an appropriate vehicle for challenging prison conditions, rather than the duration or fact of confinement.

Rissler v. Giardina · filed 1982-03-18

Clearly this suit bears the hallmark of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since it challenges the conditions of confinement in the Jefferson County Jail and does not seek a determination that the petitioners are entitled to release from confinement.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a doctor's misdiagnosis or faulty judgment alone when no facts show deliberate indifference.

Tomarkin v. Ward · filed 1982-03-11

Thus, a claim based solely on a doctor’s misdiagnosis or faulty judgment, with no facts to support a charge of deliberate indifference on his part, is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for litigating every simple state-law tort against a governmental body as a federal constitutional violation; the claim must involve a sufficient abuse of governmental power.

Baranan v. Fulton County · filed 1983-02-03

While the broad purpose of 42 USC § 1983 is to guarantee protection of federal rights, the federal courts have not read it as a vehicle for plaintiffs to litigate all simple tort suits (traditionally state protected rights) as federal constitutional violations. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (101 SC 1908, 68 LE2d 420) (1981). We do not intend to expand the scope of § 1983 actions beyond the limits set forth by the federal courts. Here York v. City of Cedartown, supra, delineates that scope.

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for a federal district-court suit seeking review of a disciplinary order issued by a state's highest court.

Berberian v. Carter · filed 1983-02-11

The settled law, with which we agree, is “that disciplinary orders of the highest court of a state may be reviewed federally only in the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and not by suits in the district courts ...” ... It is fully applicable here, and defeats plaintiff’s claim for federal relief from the order of November 2, 1960. ... In the same vein, plaintiff takes nothing by his claim of jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only when the challenged conduct deprives a person of a right or immunity protected by the federal Constitution.

Nelson v. Herdzik · filed 1983-02-09

A § 1983 complaint must allege a deprivation of a right or immunity protected by the federal Constitution. ... While the lack of an opportunity to exercise for long periods of time has been held to constitute cruel and unusual punishment, plaintiff’s singular allegation that he was denied one hour’s exercise does not amount to a constitutional violation. ... Even assuming that the actions of Correction Officer Herdzik constituted an assault, it does not amount to a constitutional violation. “[A] simple assault which does not result in physical touching and which produces no physical injury is not actionable under § 1983.” Furthermore, “[t]he use of words, however violent cannot constitute an assault actionable under § 1983.”

Section 1983's good-faith qualified-immunity defense requires both an officer's actual good-faith belief and an objectively reasonable basis for that belief.

Pazie Connors, Etc. v. Patrolman Joseph McNulty · filed 1983-02-08

The test established is two-fold: one prong is subjective and focuses on the actual belief of the officer; the other prong is objective and focuses on whether the officer’s belief is objectively reasonable.

Section 1983 does not afford a federal cause of action for a salary-reduction claim when the plaintiff lacks a constitutionally protected property interest in the salary.

Ash v. Board of Education of the Woodhaven School District · filed 1983-02-07

Having considered the plaintiffs’ statutory arguments, we hold that these three statutes, either individually or collectively, do not vest the plaintiffs with a constitutionally protected property interest in receiving the full salary stated in their employment contracts. ... We have previously ruled, however, that the plaintiffs are unable to establish a federal cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes civil rights actions for violations of state or federal rights under color of law, but supplies no independent ground for relief.

Roloff v. Sullivan · filed 1991-07-24

42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes parties to bring civil rights actions against individuals who have allegedly violated their state or federal rights “under color of law”. Accordingly, § 1983 offers no independent grounds for relief for a party bringing an action pursuant to that statute.

Section 1983 does not provide a bona fide civil rights cause of action for a claim essentially seeking prompt compliance with a decision made after a hearing.

Ferraro v. Perales · filed 1990-10-01

The petitioner’s cause of action, essentially to compel prompt compliance with a decision after a hearing, was not a bona fide civil rights cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see, Matter of Rashid v Perales, 156 AD2d 692; see also, Matter of Ehrman v Perales, 162 AD2d 598; Matter of Middleton v Perales, 160 AD2d 800).

Section 1983 creates tort liability for depriving a person of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities.

Reyes v. Edmunds · filed 1979-07-17

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a statutory species of tort liability for the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for indigent prisoners seeking free transcripts merely to search for flaws before pursuing possible collateral relief.

Harlow v. Supreme Court of Appeals · filed 1971-06-22

The court finds, accordingly, that the petitioners have failed to state a cause of action, under 42 U.S.C., § 1983 or otherwise, and that their petitions must be dismissed.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to sue state prison officials when specific allegations show that they denied his religious rights.

Wilson v. Prasse · filed 1968-12-16

The allegations on page 4 of plaintiff’s Complaint that he was denied permission to exercise his religious beliefs in any manner, giving specific examples of such denial,3 state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, of which the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for violations of federal rights but is not itself a jurisdictional statute.

Tyler v. Russel · filed 1969-05-02

Federal jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The latter is not a jurisdictional statute and is significant only to the extent that it creates a cause of action.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action when the claimed personal freedom is impaired only through an infringement of a property right.

Dale v. Hahn · filed 1970-03-26

First, her complaint asserts no cause of action cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action only for confinements that deny federally protected rights, not for every confinement.

Beaumont v. Alexander C. Morgan, Susan Beaumont v. Christian W. Aussenheimer · filed 1970-06-08

However, § 1983 does not create a federal cause of action for all confinements, but only those confinements which deny federally protected rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for challenging state enforcement that allegedly violates federal constitutional rights.

Reichenberger v. Warren · filed 1970-11-24

The complaint states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action in federal court for a state’s alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, and a plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing the action.

Rainey v. Jackson State College · filed 1970-12-22

The complaint alleged that the defendants are shutting off from Dr. Rainey an opportunity for employment by the State of Mississippi on constitutionally-impermissible grounds. It follows that the plaintiff stated a cause of action under Title 42, U.S.C. Section 1983, and that jurisdiction was vested in the district court to hear the case. ... Initial decision of the issues presented is properly for the court of original jurisdiction, the district court, upon full hearing and appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Our decision is simply that the facts pleaded by the complaint were adequate to bring the case under the Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 jurisdiction of a federal district court. ... Dr. Rainey’s failure to pursue administrative remedies does not preclude him from bringing this action. In ... Moreno, ... supra, we had occasion to reiterate that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a pre-requisite to the bringing of an action under Section 1983. See Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647, 648 (1967). .

Section 1983 allows all parties alleging the described racial discrimination to state a sufficient cause of action.

Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of Woods v. City of Evanston · filed 1971-10-28

All parties allege a sufficient cause of action to fall within the statute.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show both a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and action under color of state law.

Mayberry v. Maroney · filed 1971-12-06

“First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the ‘Constitution and laws’ of the United States. Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory’.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for redress when a person acting under color of state law deprives another of constitutional or federal rights.

Wood v. Breier · filed 1972-01-04

I find that the complaint on its face states a cause of action under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 the civil rights statute.

Section 1983 provides an appropriate vehicle for asserting that state constitutional and election-law provisions unconstitutionally discriminate against convicted felons.

Hayes v. Williams · filed 1972-04-05

Furthermore, Section 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for maintaining the assertion that the Texas Constitution and the Texas Election Code unconstitutionally discriminate against convicted felons.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for claims that welfare officials' failure to implement fair-hearing decisions within a reasonable time denies due process.

Nelson v. Sugarman · filed 1972-11-15

Furthermore, the claim that defendants are failing to implement, within a reasonable time, fair hearing decisions on the eligibility of new applicants for public assistance itself presents a colorable cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supplies a cause of action for individuals seeking redress against state welfare officials for violations of federal law.

Jordan v. Weaver · filed 1973-01-18

Although the statutes establishing the federal assistance program do not create a cause of action for these individuals, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 supplies the cause of action against state welfare officials and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343(3) vests the district courts with jurisdiction to grant redress.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws.

Beishir v. Swenson · filed 1971-06-28

The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a cause of action for deprivations, by persons acting under color of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for constitutional rights allegedly violated during a civil departmental disciplinary investigation when those rights are constitutionally required in criminal proceedings.

Boulware v. Battaglia · filed 1972-06-26

The Court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs’ contentions in light of the facts of this case fail to establish a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations by state actors, including unreasonable police interference with a person's physical integrity.

Lucas v. Kale · filed 1973-10-03

Plaintiff has stated a cause of action cognizable under § 1983 against defendants Cale and Thurston. Plaintiff has a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable interference by police officers and this protection includes his physical integrity.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for alleged violations of constitutional rights and federal statutory rights by state officials.

Raner v. Edelman · filed 1973-11-02

We find the allegations of this complaint actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Having so concluded, the court also finds it clear without elaboration that the alleged violation of 42 U. S.C. § 1396 et seq. is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the court may invoke its jurisdiction over the related state claim.

Section 1983 requires an act or action repugnant to the Federal Constitution before federal-court jurisdiction will attach.

Zucker v. Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania · filed 1974-03-29

The complaint alleges that jurisdiction arises under “The Civil Rights Acts and the United States Constitution.” Plaintiff apparently is asserting jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The aforesaid statutes require the presence of an act or action which is repugnant to the Federal Constitution before federal court jurisdiction will attach. Here, the first condition is satisfied since jurisdiction is premised on the Constitutional repugnance of the Commission’s order authorizing the 50 cent private number surcharge.

Section 1983 authorizes federal courts to entertain suits seeking redress for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, while § 1343(3) supplies jurisdiction.

Hagans v. Lavine · filed 1974-03-25

Here, §§ 1343 (3) and 1983 unquestionably authorized federal courts to entertain suits to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides an independent, supplementary federal cause of action for constitutional due-process claims, so a plaintiff need not raise that claim in a state Article 78 proceeding first.

Lombard v. The Board of Education of the City of New York, and John A. Murphy,defendants-Appellees · filed 1974-07-22

Nor is the plaintiff required to make the attack in an Article 78 proceeding in the state court, for section 1983 gives him an independent supplementary cause of action, and he may choose the federal court as the preferred forum for the assertion of constitutional claims of violation of due process.

Section 1983 provides an independent supplementary cause of action for constitutional claims, allowing a plaintiff to choose federal court without first raising those claims in a state judicial proceeding.

Aktiengesellschaft v. Brennan · filed 1974-10-29

[Pjlaintiff [is not] required to make [his constitutional] attack in an Article 78 proceeding in the state court, for section 1983 gives him an independent supplementary cause of action, and he may choose the federal court as the preferred forum for the assertion of constitutional claims . Indeed, if waiver is treated as a modality of exhaustion of remedy, the exhaustion, similarly, need not be of the state judicial remedy, but only of the administrative remedy.

Section 1983 provides an independent supplementary cause of action that allows a plaintiff to choose federal court to assert constitutional due-process claims.

Vega v. Civil Service Commission, City of New York · filed 1974-12-03

“. . . section 1983 gives him [plaintiff] an independent supplementary cause of action, and he may choose the federal court as the preferred forum for the assertion of constitutional claims of violation of due process.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against state officials when their actions have the effect of penalizing a plaintiff for pursuing a constitutional right.

Roselli v. Noel · filed 1976-05-25

Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that plaintiff has stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 whose constitutional underpinnings are not entirely frivolous.

Section 1983 does not itself confer jurisdiction and does not provide a cause of action for defamation or abuse or misuse of process when the challenged conduct is not state action.

Weisser v. Medical Care Systems, Inc. · filed 1977-06-15

It is elementary that § 1983 does not give rise to a cause of action for defamation. ... Section 1983 affords plaintiff no cause of action for alleged abuse or misuse of process since it relates to state action and not that of individual persons or corporations. ... Furthermore, § 1983 does not confer jurisdiction.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action only for deprivations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, not for every wrong committed under color of state law.

Studen v. Beebe · filed 1978-12-11

Section 1983 does not create a federal cause of action for every wrong committed under color of State law. ... Only deprivations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States are actionable.

Section 1983 expressly authorizes suits asserting constitutional claims.

Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital · filed 1979-12-19

Moreover, in its constitutional dimensions the suit was expressly authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations by local governmental bodies and other state officials.

Rogin v. Bensalem Township · filed 1980-02-21

Indeed, § 1983 was designed to afford plaintiffs a cause of action for constitutional violations on the part of local governmental bodies and other state officials.

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights action for redress of constitutional-rights deprivations committed under color of state law.

Progresista v. PEREZ · filed 1980-12-24

There is no question but that Plaintiffs’ allegations fall within the purview of 42 U'.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and (4) and thus the Court has jurisdiction to hear this action.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of rights secured elsewhere but does not itself create substantive rights.

Schuster v. Thraen · filed 1982-02-10

Section 1983, governing deprivation of civil rights by a person acting under color of state law, does not in and of itself create or secure any substantive rights, but merely authorizes a cause of action when rights secured by another source have been infringed.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action to remedy rights violations but does not itself confer subject-matter jurisdiction on federal district courts.

T. J. Fountain, Jr., Individually and Doing Business as Fountain Oil Company v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Autho · filed 1982-06-18

Appellant predicates jurisdiction over this cause of action upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but that statute is only remedial. It creates a cause of action but does not itself bestow jurisdiction upon the district court.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action but does not itself confer federal-court jurisdiction.

Bruce Hanson and Irene C. Hanson v. Town of Flower Mound · filed 1982-07-02

Section 1983 is not itself a jurisdictional statute; it merely creates a cause of action.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action challenging state-compelled membership and financial contributions for ideological purposes.

Schneider v. Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico · filed 1982-09-13

The factual allegations in the complaints, challenging the use of mandatory Colegio membership and financial contributions for ideological purposes, state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes a cause of action when rights secured by other federal laws have been infringed, but does not create substantive rights.

Williams v. Arkansas Social Services · filed 1982-12-03

The Civil Rights Act of 1871 did not create any substantive rights, but merely authorizes a cause of action when rights secured by other federal laws have been infringed.

Section 1983 is the statutory vehicle for constitutional claims seeking injunctive relief against state officials and local governmental entities.

Student Doe v. Pennsylvania · filed 1984-03-30

However, the claim against Wilburn and the Township School District should have been brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather' than under the Fourteenth Amendment. When a statutory vehicle for asserting one’s constitutional rights exists, that vehicle should be used.

When § 1983 supplies a viable remedy for identified constitutional violations, a court need not imply a separate direct constitutional cause of action for the same injuries.

Lindenbaum v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1984-04-18

Of course, to the extent that plaintiffs have stated viable claims under § 1983, there is no need to imply a remedy directly under the Constitution for the same injuries.

A section 1983 claim requires proof that the defendant acted under color of state law and that this conduct deprived a person of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Mother Goose Nursery Schools, Inc. v. Sendak · filed 1984-06-29

Accordingly, in any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States.

Because § 1983 supplies a cause of action against municipalities, no separate direct cause of action lies against them under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.

Clayton v. City of New York · filed 1984-10-25

Plaintiff argues that his claim is also based independently upon the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Since a right of action against municipalities lies directly under section 1983, there is no direct right of action against municipalities under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Section 1983 is procedural: it creates a cause of action but grants no substantive rights, so liability must rest on rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Jackson v. Grider · filed 1984-11-29

Although section 1983 creates a cause of action for violations of constitutional rights, it is solely a procedural statute which does not in itself grant any substantive rights. ... While the remedies provided by the Civil Rights Acts are statutory in nature, the underlying liability is based on the rights of each citizen secured by the Constitution or federal law.

For Pennsylvania jurisdictional purposes, claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 create tort liability and therefore sound in trespass.

Balshy v. Rank · filed 1985-04-02

As such, these claims are pressed in a civil action, sounding in trespass, and the parties’ argument that actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 are not actions in the nature of a trespass is totally without merit.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights and supplies only a remedy for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Pleasant View Elementary School PTA v. Group 1 · filed 1985-06-06

The district court had dismissed plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims, and Sec. 1983 does not create any substantive rights, it only provides a remedy for the deprivation of constitutional and federal rights.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for violations of federal constitutional rights but supplies no substantive rights of its own.

Ferry v. Bergbigler · filed 1985-08-26

Since 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not itself contain any substantive provisions, but provides a cause of action against certain violations of federal constitutional rights, we must examine the facts alleged to determine whether any federally protected right of plaintiff has been violated.

Section 1983 supplies no substantive protection beyond the rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws.

Willocks v. Dodenhoff · filed 1986-06-24

Moreover, the language of section 1983 provides no more protections than what the Constitution itself provides.

A § 1983 wrongful-termination claim seeking constitutional redress and damages is an original action, not merely judicial review of an administrative decision.

Rosow v. City of San Antonio · filed 1987-07-08

Her pleadings frame the cause of action as an original action based on an unconstitutional deprivation actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Thus, the court of appeals erred in characterizing Rosow’s suit as an administrative appeal and in failing to review this case as a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 supplies a cause of action for violations of the Constitution and federal laws but creates no enforceable rights of its own.

Woolsey v. Department of Corrections · filed 1991-08-01

Section 1983 does not exist to right every wrong--it creates no enforceable rights. Section 1983 serves only to ensure an individual has a cause of action for violation of the Constitution and federal laws.

A successful state-law challenge to a Medicaid eligibility regulation does not, by itself, establish a cause of action under Section 1983.

Glosenger v. Perales · filed 1993-06-24

We do find, however, that notwithstanding the fact that petitioner has prevailed on his State claim, he was not successful on his Federal claim under 42 USC § 1983. Supreme Court specifically held that he did not have a 42 USC § 1983 cause of action. We agree. Accordingly, he cannot recover counsel fees under 42 USC § 1988.

Section 1983 requires an infringement of a person’s civil rights before a cause of action accrues.

Soundgarden v. Eikenberry · filed 1994-04-14

However, § 1983 requires infringement of a person’s civil rights before a cause of action accrues.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a litigant alleging a constitutional violation by municipal officials.

Quality Refrigerated Services, Inc. v. City of Spencer · filed 1995-11-02

Rather courts have held that a litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for violations of federal rights under color of state law, but does not itself confer federal court jurisdiction.

Greene v. Hawes · filed 1996-01-17

Section 1983, despite plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, “does not create federal court jurisdiction. Rather, it creates a cause of action, a legal entitlement to relief, against those who violate federal law while acting pursuant to state government authority.”

Section 1983 provides a statutory vehicle for constitutional claims but does not establish an independent federal cause of action.

Brewer v. D.C. Financial Responsibility & Management Assistance Authority · filed 1997-01-17

Section 1983 does not establish an independent federal cause of action but instead operates as a statutory vehicle for complaints based on constitutional violations.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for alleged deprivations of federal rights by persons acting under color of state law.

Sylvester Strong v. Don Ford J. Gatio W.S. Riggs Ralph Mineau L. Linnes · filed 1997-03-17

The district court, therefore, was correct to treat Strong's allegation that a prison guard manufactured evidence against him as a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because that allegation, properly understood, alleges that the prison guard, acting under color of state law, deprived Strong of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law but creates no substantive rights itself.

Eastridge v. Rhode Island College · filed 1998-03-02

42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the other hand, establishes no substantive rights itself but it does create a cause of action for deprivation of federal rights committed under color of state law.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights by a person acting under color of state law; it does not itself provide substantive rights.

Johnson v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1998-08-13

As the district court correctly pointed out, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide substantive rights, but rather creates a cause of action for deprivation of a claimant’s constitutional rights by any person under color of state law.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law but does not itself provide substantive rights.

Johnson v. City Of Minneapolis · filed 1998-09-14

As the district court correctly pointed out, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide substantive rights, but rather creates a cause of action for deprivation of a claimant's constitutional rights by any person under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of specific constitutional rights but creates no substantive rights itself.

Conley v. Kentucky · filed 1999-08-30

The Court will first determine whether § 1983 provides the plaintiff with an avenue for relief. Said statute does not ... establish any substantive rights, but rather it provides a claimant with a cause of action if a specific portion of the United States Constitution has been violated.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action in law or equity for deprivation of a constitutional right under color of law.

Neary v. Frantz · filed 1984-03-06

The appellant had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. A cause of action is conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on anyone who has been deprived of a constitutional right under color of law. The action may be brought in law or in equity.

Section 1983 may be pleaded as a theory of relief for a county’s alleged actions alongside other theories of relief.

Neumont v. Monroe County Florida · filed 2000-06-21

Moreover, aside from its bare assertion that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, the County has not persuaded this Court that Plaintiffs have improperly requested relief for the County’s actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the absence of any authority in support of the proposition that Plaintiffs are not entitled to raise claims on several theories of relief, the Court must uphold the liberal pleading requirements and deny the County’s request to dismiss Counts I, III, and V of the Amended Complaint.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Michigan Wolfdog Ass'n, Inc. v. St. Clair County · filed 2000-11-30

Section 1983 grants a right of action to persons claiming to have been deprived of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution” or federal law, but it does not grant or create a substantive right.

Section 1983 provides the cause of action a plaintiff must allege to pursue a First Amendment violation.

Orell v. UMass Memorial Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2002-04-29

To bring a claim of a violation of the former, a plaintiff must allege a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides the cause of action to vindicate rights granted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Anderson v. Edwards · filed 1981-01-22

Likewise, the Court noted that no claim exists under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution because no implied cause of action exists under those amendments. Instead, where rights granted by the first or fourteenth amendments are violated a plaintiff must vindicate those rights through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims accrue under federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury, while state law supplies the limitations period.

Ivey v. DeKalb County Department of Public Safety · filed 1987-08-26

The question of when a § 1983 action accrues is one of federal, rather than state, law.

Section 1983 lets a person sue a state official for depriving the person of a constitutional or statutory right under color of state law.

Williams v. Bitner · filed 2005-02-22

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers private citizens a cause of action for violations of federal law by state officials.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of a constitutional right by persons acting under color of state law.

Jack R. Gamble, Jr. v. C.L. Webb · filed 1986-12-31

The plaintiff’s suit successfully states a cause of action under § 1983: deprivation ... of a constitutional right caused by persons acting under color of state law.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 access-to-courts claim must show that the defendant, acting under color of state law, caused an actual injury.

Marange v. Fontenot · filed 1995-03-16

Second, he must show defendant, under color of state law, caused him an actual injury.

Section 1983 supplies the cause of action for constitutional claims against state officials; a duplicative claim brought directly under the Constitution is improper.

Wilson v. Moreau · filed 2006-08-03

Wilson cannot bring a claim directly under the United States Constitution. Therefore, Count I, as a matter of law, is improper and duplicative.

Section 1983 can provide a cause of action even when the executive orders at issue provide no independent private cause of action.

Rackin v. University of Pennsylvania · filed 1974-12-18

In essence, the plaintiff is arguing that she has a cause of action under Section 1983. We agree. However, this is not responsive to whether she has an independent, private cause of action pursuant to these Executive Orders.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only when a plaintiff's federally protected rights have been violated.

R. O. Givens, Inc. v. Town of Nags Head · filed 1982-09-07

Our review of 23 U.S.C. § 131, however, reveals no creation of individual rights thereunder since the federal act does not impose regulation, but only authorizes federal-state agreements pursuant to which state regulatory statutes may be adopted. We can find no basis for a § 1983 cause of action and hold that plaintiffs motion to amend, therefore, was properly denied.

Section 1983 provides only a civil cause of action.

Shannon v. State · filed 2008-05-12

This section, however, only provides a civil cause of action.

Section 1983 lets a person sue government officials who deprive them of constitutional rights.

Nelson v. Norris · filed 2008-07-18

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against government officials who deprive persons of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Contrary to the district court’s determination, Nelson’s allegations and undisputed facts do not amount to a constitutional violation. Therefore, we do not need to inquire further regarding qualified immunity. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.