42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 affords a private cause of action for deprivation of rights.

Howard S. v. Friendswood Independent School District · filed 1978-06-23

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794) do afford the plaintiffs a private cause of action.

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action.

Woodruff v. State · filed 2010-12-03

Brandon argues the crime-fraud exception applies because the district attorney conspired to deprive him of his civil rights, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section, however, only provides a civil cause of action.

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action for deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights by persons acting under color of state law.

Kohler v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2011-07-21

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which this complaint arises, creates a federal cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not establish a federal cause of action when a complaint merely cites it without alleging a claim arising under the statute.

Cote v. Town of St. Albans · filed 2011-12-13

Though she cited 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, she failed to allege a claim arising under either statute.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against an individual acting under color of state law who deprives a person of a federally protected statutory or constitutional right.

Whittington v. Maxwell · filed 2011-12-22

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against an individual who, acting under color of state law, has deprived a person of a federally protected statutory or constitutional right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for federal constitutional claims pleaded directly under the Constitution.

National Amusements, Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra · filed 2012-02-03

The Court will analyze the federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, because the United States Constitution itself does not provide a cause of action.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for constitutional claims but does not create a separate cause of action.

Goldblatt v. Geiger · filed 2012-04-02

There is no separate cause of action for a violation of § 1983. ... Rather, § 1983 is the vehicle through which an individual may bring suit for constitutional violations.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against people acting under color of state law who violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Collazo-Perez v. Rico · filed 2015-03-16

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against those who, acting under col- or of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory law.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action to enforce federal rights established elsewhere.

Acklin v. City of Inkster · filed 2015-03-20

By its terms, Section 1983 is limited as it does not itself create or establish any federally protected rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Instead, Section 1983 creates a cause of action for plaintiffs to enforce federal rights established elsewhere — be it the federal Constitution or, in some cases, other federal statutes.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivations of federally protected rights caused by persons acting under color of state law.

Waldron v. Roark · filed 2016-02-26

A civil remedy is provided under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of federally protected rights, statutory or constitutional, caused by persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action based solely on an unsupported claim that providing interpreters to people with limited English proficiency increases a taxpayer’s burden or impedes assimilation.

Bilbro v. Haley · filed 2017-01-19

Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that the provision of interpreters to those with limited proficiency in speaking the English language increases his tax burden or does not promote assimilation of refugees in America nor does he show how this allegation provides a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations, allowing a separate constitutional count to be treated as part of a Section 1983 claim.

Comley v. Town of Rowley · filed 2017-10-31

Count I alleges free speech violations under the First Amendment and/or the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and Count II invokes these same rights in stating a § 1983 violation. Because the latter is the appropriate cause of action for the former violations, I treat them as one claim under Count II.

Section 1983 does not support an independent count that merely repeats constitutional claims pleaded in other counts.

Investment Realty Services, LLC v. Garden City, City of · filed 2019-08-26

It also explained that the count styled as “Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983” simply alleged that the plaintiffs are entitled to relief for the ... alleged constitutional violations in the preceding counts and, as such, “is merely a repetition of those counts” and not an independent claim. Id. Thus, the district court dismissed those counts. The same is true of the Amended Complaint in this action. This Court shall dismiss Counts Six and Seven because they do not assert independent causes of action on behalf of Safevest or IRS.

Section 1983 permits abortion providers to seek preliminary relief on behalf of prospective patients.

Reproductive Health Services of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Parson · filed 2019-08-27

They challenge “third-party standing” to assert interests of patients, assert absence of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, lack of Article III standing and ripeness to challenge the anti- discrimination provisions. ... I defer the limited ripeness issue and conclude that settled law supports this case procedurally.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of constitutional rights but creates no substantive rights.

Hall v. Department of Human Services · filed 2019-08-27

However, § 1983 merely provides a cause of action when a plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated, and § 1983 does not create any substantive rights.

Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for alleged deprivations of federal constitutional rights by county actors.

Earles v. Cleveland · filed 2019-09-23

Here, § 1983 provides Plaintiff a private cause of action for the alleged deprivation of her federal constitutional rights by county actors.

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights but does not itself create a substantive right that can be violated.

Attar 2018, LLC v. Taylor, City of · filed 2020-02-03

The Court is dismissing Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment and injunction claim (Count Five) and “violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983” claim (Count Six) because these are not independent causes of action.

Section 1983 provides a way to seek relief for constitutional violations but cannot itself be violated.

Oberer Land Developers Ltd v. Sugarcreek Township, Ohio · filed 2020-03-26

Section 1983, however, is not itself a statute that can be violated.

National Guard officers are not liable for damages in actions under Section 1983.

Knutson v. Wisconsin Air National Guard and Gerald D. Slack · filed 1993-06-09

Consequently, Butz and Chappell compel the conclusion that National Guard officers are not liable for damages in section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 damages claims do not require proof of bad faith, but a law-enforcement officer acting in good faith with a reasonable belief in the validity and execution of a search has a defense; prosecuting attorneys acting as quasi-judicial officers are immune from civil actions for acts within their jurisdiction.

Boyd v. Huffman · filed 1972-04-28

Clearly then, Perez cannot stand for the principle that “bad faith” is a necessary element of an action under § 1983 for damages. Indeed, the opposite conclusion has been reached in most of the circuits. ... On the basis of the Bivens decision, a law enforcement officer who in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the validity of the search and in the necessity for carrying out the search in the way it was carried out has a defense to the violation of the plaintiff’s civil rights. ... Therefore defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the point of the defendant prosecutors’ immunity will be granted and the claim as it relates to the defendants Huffman and King will be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits defendants in some suits under it to assert common-law immunities and defenses, and federal courts may be guided but are not bound by state law in determining those protections.

Fidtler v. A. T. Rundle, Supt. State Correctional Inst. At Graterford Pa. And Edward T. Hendricks · filed 1974-05-24

Thus, we conclude that federal courts may be guided, but are not bound, by the vagaries of state law with respect to the immunities and defense available in section 1983 suits.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not permit a civil suit against a witness for words given in judicial proceedings because such testimony is absolutely immune.

Myers v. Bull · filed 1978-11-08

In a § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted "under color of law". ... It is the nature of the act performed by a state official, not the status of a state official as such, that is determinative of the applicability of § 1983. ... Moreover, the party against whom recovery is sought must not be cloaked with immunity. "For reasons of public policy, those who testify in the course of judicial proceedings have long enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suits based upon their words, whether perjurious or not." ... For the reasons stated above, it is the opinion of this Court that plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for which relief can be granted.

A state probation officer who mistakenly causes a probationer’s arrest and incarceration is entitled only to qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, in a § 1983 damages action.

Galvan v. Garmon · filed 1983-07-25

We are presented here with the narrow question of whether a state probation officer, who mistakenly causes the arrest and incarceration of a person on probation, may claim absolute or only qualified immunity in a § 1983 damage suit. ... Since we find that the probation officer in the immediate case was only entitled to qualified immunity, we vacate the district court’s order and remand.

A witness before a grand jury has absolute immunity from a Section 1983 suit based on allegedly false testimony.

Kincaid v. Daniel Eberle, Individually and in His Capacity as an Agent or Employee of the Lafayette, Indiana · filed 1983-08-08

This appeal presents a question of first impression but little difficulty: whether a witness before a grand jury has, as the district court held, absolute immunity from a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for giving false testimony to the damage of the plaintiff. ... we cannot see how a different result could be reached.

A state legislative leader has no absolute legislative immunity from a Section 1983 employment claim arising from hiring personnel because hiring is administrative rather than legislative activity.

Agromayor v. Colberg · filed 1983-10-13

The hiring of personnel cannot be qualified as an integral or necessary element of the deliberative and communicative process of the legislature protected by legislative immunity. When the Speaker is hiring personnel, he is neither legislating nor formulating legislation.

Under § 1983, a private physician engaged under statutory authority to perform official duties acts under color of state law and shares the immunity available to the coroner whose function the physician performs.

Lawyer v. Jefferson D. Kernodle and Upsher Laboratories, Inc., Charles Nall, James Lawson, James Carter · filed 1983-11-16

Whether Kernodle was a public official or not we find immaterial under § 1983. Lawyer alleges that Kernodle was acting under color of state law, which of course he was. Since he was engaged under the statute to perform official duties, he was performing those duties under color of state law and he clearly enjoyed the same immunity privilege the coroner could assert.

The Eleventh Amendment immunizes a state from § 1983 actions seeking retroactive monetary relief.

Glosen v. Barnes · filed 1984-02-02

Appellant invites us to deny to the State of Nevada its Eleventh Amendment immunity from § 1983 actions seeking retroactive relief. We decline the invitation and affirm the order of the district court.

The Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting relief on a § 1983 constitutional claim brought directly against a state or its immune instrumentality.

Morris v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1984-04-16

Similarly, if a § 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim.

Section 1983 did not abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from official-capacity damages claims.

Waller v. Butkovich · filed 1984-04-17

Congress did not force such a waiver on the states when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state is immune in federal court from a § 1983 action brought by one of its own citizens.

Riggs v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 1984-05-01

Thus, the state of Kentucky is immune from suit, and the district court was correct to conclude it had no jurisdiction over this matter.

Under the objective qualified-immunity standard in § 1983 cases, the court ordinarily decides before trial whether the allegedly violated law was clearly established.

Skevofilax v. Quigley · filed 1984-05-02

The jury will thus not be required to trouble itself with resolution of a legal issue that is beyond its responsibilities and its competence as triers-of-fact, i.e. whether those of plaintiff’s rights claimed to have been violated by defendants were clearly established at the time of the alleged violations.

Prison officials performing adjudicatory functions in an adequate inmate-grievance procedure are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages suits.

Burt v. Mitchell · filed 1984-05-10

I find that the defendants herein are entitled to absolute immunity to civil suits for damages.

A bar-examining board has absolute immunity from § 1983 damages for timing decisions functionally intertwined with its protected decision-making process.

Rosenfeld v. Clark · filed 1984-05-11

Thus, the Board is entitled to absolute immunity for plaintiff’s suit for damages.

An officer requesting a warrant receives qualified rather than absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim because requesting a warrant is an administrative, not judicial, act.

Krohn v. United States of America · filed 1984-09-28

We hold activities such as requesting a warrant not judicial, but administrative, and that absolute immunity does not apply. It is a fair “accommodation of competing values,” ... that the officer be granted a qualified immunity, only.

Individual defendants’ qualified immunity from § 1983 damages does not dispose of claims for declaratory or injunctive relief or compensatory damages against a county.

Zook v. Joseph T. Brown, William v. Mosher & Champaign County · filed 1984-11-14

Thereafter, Zook filed the instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming Brown, Mosher, and Champaign County as defendants and alleging that Standards 2.19 and 4.4 were overbroad, vague, and unconstitutional as applied to Zook. ... A finding that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity does not end the matter, however, because Zook also sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory damages from Champaign County.

A state official is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted federal right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Spencer v. King County · filed 1984-12-17

Therefore, if the constitutional right upon which the section 1983 claim is based was not "clearly established" at the time of the challenged conduct, summary judgment is proper.

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a § 1983 claim for prospective relief based on an individual state official’s unconstitutional conduct.

Emory v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1984-12-17

However, the eleventh amendment does not foreclose a plaintiff’s ... claims for prospective relief based on alleged unconstitutional actions of individual state officials.

Qualified immunity protects officials from insubstantial § 1983 claims but does not confer an absolute right to avoid trial, so a pretrial denial of qualified immunity is not immediately appealable.

Powers v. John T. Lightner, D/B/A Lightner Auto Sales, Third-Party v. Barry Jones and Bruce White, Third-Party · filed 1985-01-16

We conclude that the protection against insubstantial lawsuits embodied in the doctrine of qualified immunity is adequately afforded when the district court has determined that the suit should proceed to trial because the defendant official knew or reasonably should have known that the challenged conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights clearly established at the time the conduct occurred. Qualified immunity grants no absolute right not to be subjected to trial, and we conclude that the additional protection that would be afforded to government officials by the right to take an interlocutory appeal does not outweigh the need to avoid the delays and costs of piecemeal litigation. We hold that pretrial denials of qualified immunity are not immediately appealable.

Under § 1983 qualified immunity, if the court determines that the asserted right was not clearly established when the official acted, the inquiry ends and the official is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Finch v. Wemlinger · filed 1985-02-08

In other words, if the trial judge determines that the law was not clearly established at the time the conduct occurred, the inquiry ceases.

An officer is protected from § 1983 damages liability when the governing constitutional law was unsettled at the time of the arrest.

Chauncey L. Moore, Jr. v. The Marketplace Restaurant, Inc. · filed 1985-02-11

Even though an officer may be exposed to damages arising from a § 1983 violation, he or she will not be held liable where the law at the time of the arrest was unsettled.

A government official does not lose qualified immunity in a § 1983 action merely because the challenged conduct violated a state statutory or administrative provision.

Franceski v. Plaquemines Parish School Board · filed 1985-02-07

Officials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violated some statutory or administrative provisions.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense in a § 1983 damages action, so the complaint need not anticipate and plead around it.

Harris v. Pernsley · filed 1985-02-22

Initially we note that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense. There is no pleading requirement that a plaintiff must anticipate such a defense.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar, and an official may waive its protections against liability, discovery, trial, or interlocutory review by failing to assert them at the appropriate time.

Robert E. Kennedy, Jr. Joyce Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, William T. Hanton (85-3819), Frank Wszelaki (85-3827) · filed 1986-08-27

We also note that immunity, whether qualified or absolute, is an affirmative defense which must be affirmatively pleaded; it is not a doctrine of jurisdictional nature that deprives a court of the power to adjudicate a claim. ... Since immunity must be affirmatively pleaded, it follows that failure to do so can work a waiver of the defense. And since certain of the interests protected by the doctrines of immunity are conceptually distinct, and all of them are procedurally distinct, the failure to plead immunity may, at different stages of the litigation, work either a partial or complete waiver.

Noerr-Pennington immunity from liability for protected petitioning activity extends to § 1983 claims as well as antitrust claims.

Pendleton Construction Corp. v. Rockbridge County · filed 1987-01-06

Insofar as Pendleton Construction has alleged, if at all, that the Barger Defendants violated Pendleton Construction's civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, I hold that ... Noerr-Pennington ... immunity extends to this § 1983 claim, as well as the antitrust claim.

A state retains power to decide whether it may be sued in its own courts on a § 1983 claim, so a Texas state agency is immune absent permission to sue.

Bagg v. University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston · filed 1987-01-08

Courts of several states have decided that, although the United States Congress has created a “constitutional tort,” the states retain the power to determine whether a plaintiff may sue a state in state court on claims arising out of that tort. ... We agree with these holdings. Appellant does not contend that he has obtained permission to sue the state. UTMB was properly dismissed because it is immune from suit.

A prosecutor has absolute § 1983 immunity for quasi-judicial acts but only qualified immunity for investigative or administrative acts.

McDonald v. Doe · filed 1986-12-31

Section 1983 immunity law has recognized the functionally diverse tasks which fall to prosecutors by creating two distinct types of immunity: when a prosecutor performs “quasi-judicial” acts, he enjoys ... absolute ... immunity, but when he performs “investigative” or “administrative” acts, he enjoys only ... qualified ... immunity.

State parole-board members are absolutely immune from damages in § 1983 actions for their parole adjudications.

Urban v. Henley · filed 1987-01-20

Therefore, we hold that members of the KAA are absolutely immune from damages in § 1983 actions.

Social workers are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages for substantiating a child-abuse report when that determination is a step intimately associated with possible judicial proceedings rather than an investigative act.

DONALD M v. Matava · filed 1987-01-30

This court finds that defendant Mancusi and any supervisory officials allegedly responsible for his actions are absolutely immune from liability for substantiating the second child abuse report. ... As such, it was intimately associated with the judicial phase of the legal process and, therefore, protected by absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not abrogate state sovereign immunity, but state officials may be sued for prospective injunctive relief to prevent constitutional or federal-law violations.

B.J.R.L. v. State of Utah · filed 1987-01-28

the Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or its accompanying legislative history demonstrates a Congressional intent to abrogate sovereign immunity. ... Based upon the foregoing analysis of sovereign immunity we hold that plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief from alleged constitutional violations and violations of federal law should be allowed to proceed against all named state officials.

Members of a prison disciplinary committee have only qualified, not absolute, immunity from § 1983 damages.

Munnings v. Spickler · filed 1987-02-05

the Supreme Court held that members of a prison's disciplinary committee are entitled only to qualified rather than absolute immunity. ... Thus Barthlow and Dussen would be liable for damages if it were shown that their conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.

The Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 damages and injunctive claims brought directly against a state court as a state instrumentality; prospective relief must instead be sought against an appropriate state official.

Shoultes v. Szekely · filed 1987-02-05

Consequently, as immunity to suit has not been waived in this instance, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any claims for damages against the 8th Judicial District Court. ... On the contrary, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the state or its agencies regardless of the nature of the relief sought. ... In this instance, the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against an instrumentality of the state as opposed to a particular individual, therefore, this claim is also barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

A parole hearing officer performing a function comparable to a judge is absolutely immune from § 1983 liability, while a parole officer performing a police-like role receives qualified immunity.

Wright v. Robin Rockett and Stephen Betts · filed 1987-02-17

defendant Rockett in his official capacity as a hearing officer acted in a capacity functionally comparable to a judge. Thus, defendant is absolutely immune from Section 1983 liability ... Defendant Betts as a parole officer acted in a capacity functionally comparable to a police officer and therefore was entitled to qualified immunity.

State parole-board members are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages when granting, denying, or revoking parole or setting parole conditions because those are quasi-judicial functions.

Small v. Sutton · filed 1987-02-18

When parole board members decide whether to deny, grant, or revoke, as well as set parole conditions, they are performing a function that is judi-ciál in nature. ... defendants as parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity from civil suit for damages where, as here, their challenged activity is intimately associated and involves performance of quasi-judicial functions.

Common-law official immunity is not an absolute bar to § 1983 liability for a public officer performing executive functions.

Southern Alliance Corp. v. City of Winter Haven · filed 1987-03-18

But the common-law doctrine of "official immunity" no longer acts as an absolute bar to the individual liability of a public officer exercising executive power.

Qualified immunity is available as a defense in a § 1983 unlawful-arrest case.

Heath v. Douglas Cast, Robert Hardy, Joseph Brown and Peter Perrin · filed 1987-03-24

We have recently held that “[t]he qualified immunity defense is available in cases of unlawful arrest.”

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are not personally liable for a prison-visitor body-cavity search when the asserted Fourth Amendment right was neither clearly established nor self-evident at the time.

Dixon v. Parke · filed 1987-04-03

We neither reject nor accept the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that prison visitors have at least the same fourth amendment rights as prisoners. Rather, we hold that this conclusion is not self-evident and that these prison officials cannot be held personally responsible in money damages for not having reached it on their own in 1982.

Officials who prepare a parole report at a parole board's direction receive absolute § 1983 immunity when the report is integral to the board's quasi-judicial adjudication of parole.

Chitty v. Walton · filed 1987-04-15

Thus we find that defendants’ role in preparing the parole report was so closely associated with the Parole Board’s quasi-judicial function in adjudicating parole requests that defendants must be accorded absolute immunity to protect the integrity of the parole review process.

Officials performing discretionary functions are immune from Section 1983 damages unless their conduct violated law that was clearly established at the time.

Bennett v. Coffman · filed 1987-04-14

The appellees in this case are therefore immune from damages ... unless ... they acted contrary to ... clearly established ... law as it existed at the time they entered Mr. Bennett’s home without a warrant to arrest him for driving under the influence of alcohol.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 turns on the objective reasonableness of official conduct, not the defendant's particular legal knowledge or ability to predict future doctrine.

Alvarado v. Carmen Sonia Zayas, Digno C. Giraud Rivera v. Carmen Sonia Zayas, Etc. · filed 1987-04-24

The standard to be applied in reviewing a qualified immunity claim, however, is not affected by the defendant’s particular state of knowledge about the law; the test is “the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct.” ... If the law was not clearly established when Raffucci Alvarado and Giraud Rivera were removed, it does not matter that Sonia Zayas may have had superior skills for predicting its future contours.

Officials were qualifiedly immune from § 1983 damages for considering political support in promotion decisions when no clearly established constitutional right prohibited that consideration at the time.

Danenberger v. J. Thomas Johnson, Mark Frech and Bill Fleischli · filed 1987-05-04

In light of the existing case law, we hold that Danenberger had no clearly established constitutional right that prohibited the defendants from considering her failure to support the Republican Party in making their decisions regarding promotions. The district court thus properly dismissed Danenberger’s complaint since the defendants were immune from her suit.

Public officials exercising discretion have qualified immunity in § 1983 actions, and once they assert it the plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting the defense.

Whatley v. Philo · filed 1987-05-18

Public officials whose positions entail the exercise of discretion enjoy the defense of qualified immunity in § 1983 actions.... Once the defendant asserts this affirmative defense the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut it.

Qualified immunity does not protect a public official who violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable person should know.

Jefferson v. Ysleta Independent School District · filed 1987-05-20

The defense of qualified immunity protects a public official from liability in the performance of his duties unless he violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of another known to or knowable by a reasonable person.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 is available only to government officials sued in their individual capacities, not to officials sued in their official capacities.

Justice v. Town of Blackwell · filed 1987-05-29

It is now clear beyond debate that ... qualified immunity is available only to government officials sued in their individual capacity. Where the suit is against the named party in his official capacity, the suit is one against the government that employs him.

Qualified immunity protects discretionary official conduct unless the allegedly violated constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Walentas v. Lipper · filed 1987-06-17

a public official’s discretionary actions are immune, regardless of what he actually believed to be the law, if the constitutional right that he is accused of having violated was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Qualified immunity applies when existing law did not clearly establish that a prisoner conditionally returned from a mental facility was entitled to another hearing before forced medication.

Lappe v. Paul Loeffelholz, Dr. Wiedershine and Harlem Brady · filed 1987-06-25

Even using this flexible approach, however, we conclude that the legal principles enunciated in ... did not clearly establish that Lappe, after his transfer back to the penitentiary, was entitled to another due process hearing before he could be forcibly injected with the prescribed medication.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for deprivation of a constitutional right under color of state law, subject to applicable immunity.

Nicholson v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. Oakland County of Michigan Office of Prosecuting Attorney Michiga · filed 1985-10-11

To sustain such an action, it is incumbent upon appellee to plead and demonstrate that appellees deprived her of a constitutional right guaranteed by the United States Constitution while acting under color of state law. ... Moreover, appellant must overcome any allegations of immunity asserted by appellees.

In a § 1983 suit, a city ordinance assigning control of municipal prisoners to the police chief does not by itself establish that the sheriff is a city agent for immunity purposes.

Scott v. City Of Mobile · filed 2018-03-06

Further, the ordinance, while describing that the chief of police is to have control over the jail designated for use by the city, does not go so far as to clearly establish that the sheriff, somehow becomes an agent of the city for purposes of immunity.

Section 1983 provides a basis for a civil-rights claim when prison guards inflict an unjustified brutal beating.

Aulds v. Foster · filed 1973-09-24

An unjustified brutal beating by prison guards is sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). We do not make the slightest intimation that such misconduct can be proved at trial. All we hold is that the existence of genuine issues of material fact make summary judgment inappropriate.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to state a civil-rights claim against state prison officials by alleging that they beat him under color of state law.

Wiltsie v. California Department of Corrections · filed 1968-12-31

We first consider whether a claim under the Civil Rights Act was stated against the named personal defendants, or any of them, by reason of their alleged participation in the asserted beating, or their alleged supervisory or conspiratorial connection therewith. We hold that the complaint, as amended, does state such a claim against the named personal defendants sufficient to give Wiltsie an opportunity to prove his allegations.

Section 1983 does not make every state-law assault on a prisoner actionable merely because the victim is in custody and the assailant is a prison guard.

Johnson v. Glick · filed 1972-11-27

The case therefore seems to present the question whether every assault upon a prisoner giving rise to a tort action under state law becomes actionable under Section 1983 simply because the person assaulted was in custody and the tortfeasor was a prison guard. ... So far as I am aware no decision in this circuit requires such a conclusion, and it is one at which I would arrive only under constraint. Having ruled that plaintiff has stated no cause of action under Section 1983 against the unserved officer, it is not necessary to consider the further question of whether the Warden, Glick, would be answerable for the act of his subordinate.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials, but the court held that prosecutors are immune for acts performed in their duties and that the complaint alleged no acts supporting individual damages liability for the other named officials.

Modern Social Education, Inc. v. Preller · filed 1973-01-12

In any event, under Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiffs have not alleged facts which state a cause of action for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against any of the four named defendants. A State’s Attorney and a State Attorney General are immune from liability for damages allegedly flowing from acts committed in the performance of their duties. Scolnick v. Lefkowitz, 329 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. den. 379 U.S. 825, 85 S.Ct. 49, 13 L.Ed.2d 35 (1964); Dixon v. State of Maryland, 261 F.Supp. 746 (D.Md.1966). Furthermore, no facts have been alleged in the complaint which would indicate that the Baltimore City Police Commissioner or the members of the State Board of Censors engaged in any acts which would subject them to individual damage claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Runnels v. Parker, 263 F.Supp. 271 (C.D.Cal.1967); Jordan v. Kelly, 223 F.Supp. 731 (W.D.Mo.1963).

Section 1983 does not provide a civil-rights action against a federal official such as a federal prison warden.

Robert Wayne Grant, 38013. v. Marvin Hogan, Warden, U.S. N.E.P. · filed 1974-11-20

Since the warden at Lewis-burg is a federal official, the Petitioner cannot obtain jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1343(3) for a Civil Rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an action for damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief against a state official alleged to have violated constitutional rights.

Patterson v. Ellis C. MacDougall Director, Georgia State Board of Corrections, Atlanta, Georgia · filed 1975-01-08

These allegations and there are many others we do not catalogue — state a claim for relief under §§ 1983 and 1985 against the defendant MaeDougall, both in damages and for injunctive or declaratory relief.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action to challenge a state governor's veto when it allegedly deprives a person of federally protected rights.

Saffioti v. Wilson · filed 1975-03-24

While we find that the review of a governor’s exercise of the veto power may properly be had in a civil rights action of the instant nature (42 U.S.C. § 1983), we conclude that Governor Wilson acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously in vetoing the private bill which had been passed for Mr. Saffioti’s benefit.

Intentional, unjustified, unprovoked, and brutal prison beatings that shock the conscience state a claim under § 1983.

Gaut v. Franklin Sunn, Director of Social Services and Housing · filed 1987-02-20

The complaint alleges the type of intentional, unjustified, unprovoked, and brutal conduct we have found to constitute a section 1983 claim in previous cases.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against officials based solely on an unsupported belief that they were responsible for alleged constitutional violations.

Smith v. Thompson · filed 1988-05-20

Even with the already-described favorable standards applicable to such pro se pleadings, Smith’s subjective thought (which, on Smith’s own statement, is wholly unrelated to any information or to any rational inference that would support it) cannot suffice to draw the Governor and Director Lane into the net as defendants (see Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1005-06 (7th Cir.1982); Stringer v. Thompson, 537 F.Supp. 133, 138-39 (N.D.Ill.1982)). Thus the Complaint must be viewed as “frivolous” as to those defendants even under the Williams-Smith-Bey standards.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages from a state official personally must clearly state in the complaint that she sues the official in a personal capacity; a hint in the complaint or a statement in response to a motion to dismiss is insufficient.

Egerdahl v. Hibbing Com. College · filed 1995-12-18

We reject both arguments. Nix requires that a plaintiff's complaint contain a clear statement of her wish to sue defendants in their personal capacities. Neither a cryptic hint in a plaintiff's complaint nor a statement made in response to a motion to dismiss is sufficient.

Section 1983 damages claims against a state or state officials in their official capacities are barred.

Wideman v. MacDonald · filed 1996-03-05

The district court also properly ruled that Wideman's lawsuit is barred to the extent that it states a cause of action for damages against either the State of Hawaii or the defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 requires a personal-capacity claim against state officials when the complaint seeks to hold them personally liable; identifying them only as supervisory employees does not plead such a claim.

Porter v. STATE OF ILL., DEPT. OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES · filed 1997-12-16

The court also notes defendants Jess McDonald, John Goad, Mary Ellen Eads, and Kathy Glenney are entitled to summary judgment for the additional reason that the complaint refers to them only as supervisory employees of DCFS and does not indicate that they are sued in their personal capacities.

Section 1983 permits a suit alleging that U.S. officials provided material support to people who detained, tortured, and killed American citizens within the United States.

Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran · filed 2002-04-19

This Court, however, has no difficulty concluding that a suit alleging that United States officials provided material support to individuals who detained and tortured American citizens within the United States, killing one in the process, could be maintained pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires specific factual allegations about individual officials to state a claim against them.

Bennett v. LA Dept Pub Safety · filed 2003-02-19

Similarly, Bennett fails to allege specific facts with respect to individual prison officials to raise a successful 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 provides the basis for claims against state officials and governmental bodies for violations of the federal Constitution.

The COUNTY OF DURHAM v. Daye · filed 2008-08-05

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the sole basis for asserting claims against state officials and governmental bodies for violations of the federal constitution.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity action against a state official, and state sovereign immunity cannot be extended to bar that action.

Harrington v. Schossow · filed 1990-06-20

We conclude that Harrington’s section 1983 action against Schossow in his individual capacity is not barred by the Supreme Court’s holding in Will, nor can the State’s sovereign immunity be extended unilaterally to embrace Schossow’s individual actions.

Section 1983 permits money damages against state officials sued in their individual capacities and prospective equitable relief against an official sued in an official capacity.

Murray v. Fischer · filed 2011-10-24

As explained in the Court’s May 31 decision, however, plaintiffs claims for prospective equitable relief can effectively be prosecuted against defendant Fischer in his official capacity. Wfiiile plaintiffs claims against the other defendants will be reinstated, then, those defendants may only be sued in their individual capacities, for money damages.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against officials in their individual capacities only when they were personally involved in the constitutional violation, and it does not impose supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

American Tradition Institute v. Colorado · filed 2012-07-17

Accordingly, Plaintiffs will only be allowed to pursue their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for damages against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim is dismissed to the extent it is being pursued against the individual Defendants in their official capacities. ... For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs have not plead or otherwise shown how Defendants Hickenlooper and Kelley have had any personal involvement in the enforcement of the RES. ... For the same reasons that the Court has held that the claims against Hickenlooper and Kelley seeking injunctive and declaratory relief are properly dismissed, Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim seeking damages against Hickenlooper and Kelley also fails.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for constitutional violations caused by state officials, but the conduct must meet the applicable constitutional standard.

Savoy v. CHARLES COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS · filed 2011-07-26

Based on this evidence, a reasonable fact-finder might very well conclude that Aglio and Pascarella’s restraint methods were excessive and unwise. However, there can be no genuine dispute that Aglio and Pascarella’s actions were “good faith effort[s] to maintain or restore discipline,” not “maliciously and sadistically [performed] for the very purpose of causing harm.” ... Consequently, Aglio and Pascarella are entitled to summary judgment on the remaining federal claims.

Section 1983 requires evidence connecting an official to the alleged violation or showing that the official can provide the requested injunctive relief.

Barber v. Hood · filed 2019-08-23

As a result, as Barber himself admits, Barber adduced no evidence to support Dunn’s involvement in, responsibility for, or authority to remedy any Eighth Amendment violations.

Section 1983 addresses constitutional claims against state officials; claims against federal prison officials fall under Bivens.

Moreira v. Bradley · filed 2020-08-17

Because Petitioner claims federal prison officials violated her constitutional rights, her claims would fall under Bivens, not 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which addresses claims against state officials.

Section 1983 does not provide federal equitable relief for a challenge to municipal property tax assessments based solely on allegedly excessive taxes.

Jones v. Township of North Bergen · filed 1971-09-30

As of this time, however, the weight of authority is to the effect that equitable jurisdiction in a federal court in a ease of this kind does not exist pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 does not provide relief in state fee collection cases when an adequate state remedy is available.

Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Michigan · filed 1998-11-02

On the basis of the principles of comity and federalism, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress did not intend § 1983 claims to be brought in state tax cases when an adequate state remedy is available. Those principles apply equally well when the revenue collection is in the form of a fee.

Section 1983 does not permit a taxpayer to challenge a state tax system in federal court when an adequate state remedy is available.

Darne v. Wisconsin, Department of Revenue · filed 1998-02-23

To the extent that Ms. Dame’s complaint coMd.be construed liberally as asserting a § 1983 claim that would not he barred under the other grounds of decision, ... it would be barred by the principle of comity. ... Because we have just determined that there is an adequate state remedy, we hold that Ms. Dame’s claims are not properly in federal court.

Section 1983 does not require state courts to provide relief in state tax cases when an adequate state law remedy exists.

Campbell v. Hilton Head No. 1 Public Service District · filed 1999-10-06

As state courts need not, and even must not, provide relief under § 1983 in state tax cases where an adequate remedy exists, id. at 592, 115 S.Ct. 2351, there can be no basis for the argument that South Carolina’s remedies are inadequate due to any unwillingness, as foreshadowed in Spencer, to award such relief.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging state taxes cannot proceed in federal court when the state provides a plain, adequate, and complete remedy.

Lawyer v. Hilton Head Public Service District No. 1 · filed 2000-07-21

In addition, principles of comity preclude the district court from exercising juris- diction over the appellants' claims for damages under § 1983, § 1985, and the Takings Clause.

Comity bars a federal § 1983 damages suit challenging the administration of a state tax system when an adequate state remedy is available.

Hoffer v. Ancel · filed 2002-03-14

It follows that, if a sufficient remedy is available at state law, Hoffer’s suit must be dismissed. ... In this case, Hoffer is free to bring his § 1983 suit against Ancel and Merriman in state court.

Section 1983 actions challenging a state tax system are barred in federal court by comity when the state provides plain, adequate, and complete remedies.

Reagle v. Elliott · filed 2003-11-05

The Supreme Court held that “taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting section 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts. Such taxpayers must seek protection of their federal rights by state remedies, provided of course that those remedies are plain, adequate and complete, and may ultimately seek review of the state decisions in this Court.” Id. at 116. In the case before us, the District Court found, and we agree, that New Jersey law provides judicial process and adequate remedies through appeal to its Tax Court, and from there to the Appellate Division of its Superior Court.

Principles of comity bar § 1983 damages suits challenging state tax collection when the state provides a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.

Smith v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance · filed 2003-11-06

While the TIA specifically prohibits injunctions, the Supreme Court has held that principles of comity similarly bar suits for damages under § 1983. ... Under the TIA and principles of comity, therefore, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs action.

Section 1983 does not allow Nebraska courts to award damages for a challenge to a state or local tax when state law provides an adequate legal remedy.

Francis v. v. City of Columbus · filed 2004-03-12

We conclude that when a litigant seeks damages in a § 1983 claim challenging a state or local tax, Nebraska courts must refrain from granting such relief, so long as state law offers an adequate legal remedy.

Section 1983 tax claims cannot proceed in federal court when an adequate state remedy was available, even if the time to use that remedy has expired.

Sappington v. Pennsylvania · filed 1982-01-29

The fact that it is not available under state law because of the passage of time does not render the remedy insufficient. ... The decision in Fair Assessment deprives him of the jurisdictional right to proceed in federal court when, as here, an adequate state remedy is or has been available.

Comity bars a § 1983 damages suit challenging a state tax law in federal court, including a facial challenge, when state remedies are plain, adequate, and complete.

Winicki v. Mallard · filed 1985-08-16

The focus of whether comity bars federal court jurisdiction rests not on whether the state tax law is constitutionally challenged on its face or as applied, but rather on the concomitant respect that should be accorded state tax laws in federal court. ... Accordingly, based on the principles of comity as expressed in Fair Assessment, supra, and on 28 U.S.C. § 1341, this cause shall be dismissed.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging state taxes are barred by comity when a plain, adequate, and complete state remedy exists.

Macnaughton v. Warren County · filed 2005-01-27

Although the Tax Injunction Act only prohibits injunctions, the Supreme Court has explained that the principle of comity similarly bars a taxpayer from seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so long as an individual can seek a state remedy that is “plain, adequate and complete.” ... Thus, because an adequate state remedy exists, the principle of comity precludes this Court from maintaining jurisdiction, and the district court’s decision should be upheld, but for the reasons provided herein.

Section 1983 claims challenging state tax collection must be dismissed when state law remedies are available.

Ran-Mar, Inc. v. Town of Berlin · filed 2005-11-30

Based upon National Truck Council, it is clear that the federal claim brought in this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed, because there are state law remedies that Plaintiffs can assert, and have asserted.

Principles of comity bar a § 1983 damages claim challenging a state tax system when a plain, adequate, and complete state remedy is available.

Gibson v. Cleophus Gains, Jr. · filed 2006-04-04

Again, because Gibson failed to argue that there was not a “plain, adequate, and complete” state remedy, to the extent that he seeks monetary damages against the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court correctly concluded that principles of comity preclude it from entertaining the claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a taxpayer a damages action in state court over a state property tax assessment when state remedies offer plain, adequate and complete relief.

Murtagh v. County of Berks · filed 1998-07-24

The holding in National Private Truck Council removes the limitation to federal courts present in Fair Assessment and precludes a Section 1983 action for monetary damages in state courts when state remedies afford the taxpayer an opportunity for plain, adequate and complete relief.

Section 1983 is unavailable to challenge state taxes when state law provides an adequate remedy.

Brown v. Montgomery County · filed 2007-02-21

In sum, Pennsylvania law provides a full panoply of remedies to a taxpayer aggrieved by a tax imposed under the Assessment Law, and, thus, a Section 1983 action is not available to challenge taxes imposed thereunder.

Section 1983 treats an Indiana prosecuting attorney as a state official when making employment decisions about deputy prosecuting attorneys.

Bibbs v. Newman · filed 1998-02-27

As explained below, the court concludes that when an Indiana prosecuting attorney makes employment decisions concerning deputy prosecuting attorneys, the prosecuting attorney acts as a state official for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat attorneys performing traditional legal functions as state actors solely because they are officers of the court.

GUEVERA v. Brooks · filed 2000-02-18

Attorneys performing their traditional functions will not be considered state actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the Court.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing his attorneys to prove that they conspired with state actors.

Holly v. Boudreau · filed 2004-06-25

In any event, Holly would have to prove that his attorneys conspired with state actors in order to sue them under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a criminal defense attorney because the attorney is not a state actor.

Small v. Dallas County Texas · filed 2006-04-10

Small’s claim against Moore is not cognizable under § 1983 because a defense attorney in a criminal proceeding is not a state actor.

A defense attorney generally is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Brown v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2006-06-21

With respect to the Attorney Defendants, generally, a defense attorney is not a state actor for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; defense lawyers performing traditional defense functions do not qualify.

Allen v. Briggs · filed 2009-06-19

Among many other problems, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only authorizes relief against those who violate a person’s civil rights while acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a criminal defense attorney who is not a state actor.

Martinez v. Sullivan · filed 2019-09-18

The Magistrate Judge found that defense attorneys are not state actors and thus cannot be sued under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... ORDERED the Report of the Magistrate Judge (Docket No. 3) is ADOPTED as the opinion of the District Court.

Attorneys representing a criminal defendant are not state actors under § 1983, so claims against them for that representation fail.

Greene v. Young · filed 2019-11-18

Attorneys are not state actors under § 1983, and thus, Greene’s claim fails to state a claim for relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an attorney for actions taken in the attorney’s role as counsel because the attorney is not a state actor.

Cormier v. Comey · filed 2019-11-19

Accordingly, the namedattorneys are not state actors, and plaintiff may not raise a claim pursuant to § 1983 against such defendants.

A defense attorney, whether public or private, is not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations.

Midgett v. Robinson · filed 2020-05-01

A defense attorney, regardless of whether he is a public defender or a private attorney, is not a state actor subject to suit for alleged constitutional rights violations under § 1983.

Criminal defense attorneys performing their role as counsel are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.

GANNAWAY v. STROUMBAKIS · filed 2020-08-24

Gannaway’s claims against his former and current criminal defense attorneys are based on their performance as Gannaway’s defense counsel, but the law is settled that criminal defense attorneys are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not permit suits against private attorneys or public defenders because they do not act under color of state law.

Nivens v. Henslee · filed 2020-10-13

An attorney, whether retained, court-appointed, or a public defender, ordinarily does not act under color of state law, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, Defendants are not amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a prison official’s failure to follow prison policy.

Phillips v. Kerestes · filed 2019-08-20

Moreover, “[a]n inmate does not have a viable Section 1983 claim based solely upon a prison official's failure to adhere to a prison regulation, directive, or policy statement.” ... As such, Phillips’ claim based solely upon the alleged failure to follow prison policies fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of state regulations alone.

Aguirre v. Kendra · filed 2015-08-24

That the delay may have violated New York state regulations is not enough to state a federal claim' actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violating agency policy unless the conduct also violates federal law.

Glover v. Mabrey · filed 2010-06-28

Allegations of policy violations are irrelevant because Section 1983 “does not provide a remedy for abuses that do not violate federal laws.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 119 (1992).

Section 1983 does not impose liability merely for violating prison policy.

Island v. Norris · filed 2000-11-16

Although Island claims that medical defendants failed to follow protocol, “there is no § 1983 liability for violating prison policy.” Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of a municipal administrative directive alone.

Benavidez v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1996-11-14

We need not decide whether Administrative Instruction No. 123 imposed upon the City a ... higher standard than the Fourth Amendment, because a violation of a municipal administrative directive does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official merely for violating prison policy.

Gardner v. Howard · filed 1997-03-12

But there is no § 1983 liability for violating prison policy.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of a municipal administrative directive.

1996-11-14 · filed 1996-11-14

We need not decide whether Administrative Instruction No. 123 imposed upon the City a higher standard than the Fourth Amendment, because a violation of a municipal administrative directive does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 imposes liability only for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights and does not automatically convert state-law contract or tort claims into federal claims merely because the defendant is a state official.

Stewart v. Hunt · filed 1984-11-28

The problem with plaintiffs’ argument is that § 1983 imposes liability solely for violations of rights protected by the Constitution and federal law, not for violations arising simply out of state tort and contract law principles. ... Section 1983 does not automatically convert potential contract and tort liability under state law into contract and tort liability under federal law whenever the defendant is the state.

A prison's late notice in violation of its own regulation does not support section 1983 relief when adequate due-process procedures follow.

Alvaro L. Hernandez, Jr. v. W.J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1986-05-09

Whatever remedies by way of damages appellant might have against the state in state court, the controlling factor is that we have jurisdiction only over claims of constitutional violations, and the mere failure to give notice in time, but with complete and adequate due process procedures after the notice actually was given, cannot be taken as establishing a violation of the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for a bare violation of state law or a generalized due-process claim where no federal right is shown.

Hawkins v. James · filed 1981-01-14

A right to have state (or city) laws obeyed is a state, not a federal right. Mere violation of a state statute does not infringe the federal constitution. ... it is equally axiomatic that federal jurisdiction under § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 cannot be extended to that purely ... local squabble by the mere invocation of the generalized protection which these words of the amendment confer.

Section 1983 provides no basis for a claim when the plaintiff establishes no underlying federal statutory or constitutional violation.

Brown v. New Haven Civil Service Board · filed 1979-07-27

The disposition of the federal statutory and constitutional claims leaves no basis for a claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 applies only when action under color of law deprives someone of a federal right; a mere violation of state law is insufficient.

Sigler v. Lowrie · filed 1969-01-08

And assuming the prisoner’s cancellation of a future credit is in violation of the statute, this does not properly state a claim for relief under the Civil Rights Act. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not concerned with mere violations of state law. As stated by Mr. Justice Douglas in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1038, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945), a case construing 18 U.S.C. § 242, a civil rights statute in pari materia: ... “The problem is not whether state law has been violated but whether an inhabitant of a State has been deprived of a federal right by one who acts under ‘color of any law.’ He who acts under ‘color’ of law may be a federal officer or a state officer. He may act under ‘color’ of federal law or of state law. The statute does not come into play merely because the federal law or the state law under which the officer purports to act is violated. It is applicable when and only when someone is deprived of a federal right by that action.”

Section 1983 does not provide a federal cause of action for a state official's failure to follow state-law procedures, without more.

Shields v. Joseph S. Hopper, Warden, Georgia State Prison, State of Georgia · filed 1975-09-24

The claim that state officials have failed to follow the procedural provisions of state law, without more, does not aver a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes damages only when the defendant's conduct violates federal law; a violation of state law alone is insufficient.

Cabrera v. Municipality of Bayamon · filed 1977-09-09

Both the district court below and the plaintiffs on appeal appear to have taken the position that a federal constitutional violation follows necessarily from the fact that the individual defendants authorized municipal actions that were contrary to state law. Such a position is, quite simply, wrong. The illegality of official conduct under local law “can neither add to nor subtract from its constitutional validity”. ... A violation of a federal constitutional provision must be shown.

Section 1983 requires proof of a deprivation of a federal right and that the deprivation occurred under color of state law.

Gresham Park Community Organization, Simon E. Parker, MacY B. Lee and Calvin E. Sims v. Gary Howell D/B/A Southeast Pack · filed 1981-08-10

A plaintiff must prove a deprivation of a “right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States” and that the deprivation was under color of state law.

Section 1983 affords no relief without a deprivation of a protected federal right under color of state law.

Fontana v. Barham · filed 1983-06-17

We need not venture further than to say that here there has been no deprivation, without which there can be no section 1983 relief.

Violating a jail’s own operating procedure does not alone create a Section 1983 claim; the challenged conduct must itself violate the Constitution.

Mawby v. Ambroyer · filed 1983-06-30

Although the jail’s staff apparently violated the Standard Operating Procedure, this alone cannot amount to a constitutional deprivation actionable under § 1983. The challenged conduct must constitute a constitutional violation on their own; the procedures themselves cannot constitute a separate constitutional interest the violation of which is actionable.

Section 1983 does not provide relief when official conduct under color of state law did not itself cause a constitutional deprivation and an unpredictable private act is redressable through state tort law.

Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tenn. · filed 1983-09-15

To summarize, the action taken by the defendants to further their personal objectives were not under color of state law. Those actions taken by the defendants which were under color of state law did not deprive the plaintiffs’ decedent of her life in the constitutional sense. Even if we were to hold that the defendants’ actions were under color of state law and that they did deprive the decedent of her life, the deprivation was not without due process, given the remedy available in the state courts.

A state-law claim does not raise a substantial federal question under § 1983 merely because it is labeled as a due-process or equal-protection claim.

Cloutier v. Town of Epping · filed 1983-08-05

It is not enough simply to give these state law claims constitutional labels such as "due process" or "equal protection" in order to raise a substantial federal question under section 1983.

A bare constitutional label cannot transform an ordinary contract dispute with a state actor into a § 1983 claim.

Pete Thoesen Tractor & Equipment Repair Co. v. City of Chicago · filed 1984-04-27

Again its bare recitation of a talismanic phrase cannot transmute the base metal of a garden-variety contract claim into the gold of a Section 1983 action.

A violation of state procedural rules governing a prisoner's confinement does not by itself deprive the prisoner of a federally protected liberty interest, so it does not support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Smallwood-El v. Coughlin · filed 1984-07-06

Violations of state procedural rules, however, do not of their own accord deprive an individual of a federally protected liberty interest, and therefore do not give rise to an actionable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of state law.

White v. Booker · filed 1984-12-07

To the extent that plaintiff seeks to state a claim based specifically on State law, such claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must show deprivation of a federally protected right; conduct actionable only under state law is insufficient.

Freeman v. Hittle · filed 1985-01-08

Although this contention may be actionable under state law, we find that Freeman does not show, as he must under Sec. 1983, that he has been deprived of a federally protected right by reason of the officers' alleged conduct.

A complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim when the challenged conduct does not deprive the plaintiffs of a federal right.

Pastan v. City of Melrose · filed 1985-01-29

Because plaintiffs have not been denied a federal right, their complaint fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A violation of state law does not by itself establish the constitutional violation required for a Section 1983 claim.

Robert K. Bell Enterprises, Inc. v. Tulsa County Fairgrounds Trust Authority · filed 1985-02-05

However, even if they had been pled, it is well-settled that a violation of state law does not in and of itself establish a constitutional violation, which would be required to state a cause of action under section 1983.

A legally cognizable injury by a state official acting under color of law is not actionable under § 1983 unless it rises to a constitutional deprivation.

Rodrigues v. Village of Larchmont, New York · filed 1985-05-07

The mere fact that a legally cognizable injury is inflicted by a state official acting under color of state law does not establish a constitutional violation so as to authorize a claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 applies only to violations of federal rights, so transferring a prisoner contrary to state law alone is not actionable.

Bannister v. Ponte · filed 1985-05-30

It is well established that § 1983 applies only where federal rights are violated.

Failure to follow state statutes is not by itself a federal due-process violation actionable under section 1983.

Johnson v. Clinton · filed 1985-05-30

In the first place, Johnson claims only that certain state statutes are not being followed. Such a claim, even if true, is not the equivalent of a violation of federal constitutional rights to due process of law.

A violation of state or local law by a government actor is not actionable under § 1983 unless it also violates a federally protected right.

Gary Lee Rymer and Deborah Ann Rymer v. Douglas County · filed 1985-07-02

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a species of tort law, not every violation of state or local law by a governmental body or governmental actor constitutes an invasion of federally protected rights. Plaintiff in order to prevail must show a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 creates no new substantive rights and supplies a remedy only when state action causes an independently established constitutional or federal-law violation.

Boren by & Through Boren v. City of Colo. Springs · filed 1985-12-31

First, the threshold question in § 1983 cases is whether a Fourteenth Amendment violation exists. Second, § 1983 creates no new substantive rights; it simply augments the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not supply a remedy for a violation of state tax-confidentiality law that falls short of a federal constitutional violation.

Willis v. Department of Revenue · filed 1986-03-04

Since the appellants could conceivably establish a case showing a violation of OCGA § 48-7-60 which falls short of a violation of the United States Constitution, the possibility of a 1983 action cannot be considered adequate for the purposes of a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 is a procedural vehicle for redressing violations of an underlying federal constitutional or statutory right.

De La Cruz LaChapel v. Ortiz · filed 1986-05-12

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code is a procedural vehicle to seek redress for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights. ... Plaintiff must prove a violation of the underlying right at stake.

A § 1983 excessive-force violation requires conduct at least sufficient to constitute common-law assault and battery because the constitutional standard is higher than the state-tort standard.

Olson v. City of Austin · filed 1986-05-13

Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that the jury could not find a violation of section 1983 without finding a common law assault and battery.