42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a damages plaintiff to show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Capers v. Wayne County Probate · filed 2013-08-02

To recover damages under § 1983, "a plaintiff must generally show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Jordan v. Distrz`ct of Columbia, __ F. Supp. 2d _, _, 2013 WL 2458282, at *5 (D.D.C. June 7, 2013), and plaintiff identifies no state actor.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Turner v. Larsen · filed 2013-08-05

The district court properly dismissed Turner’s § 1983 claim because Turner failed to allege facts showing that defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations showing that a defendant acted under color of state law; a bare assertion does not suffice.

Frost v. Catholic University of America · filed 2013-08-15

However, Frost merely asserts that they were “acting under the color of state law” without properly supporting facts. ... Therefore, the Court likely cannot find defendants Wuerl, Knestout, Garvey, Miles, Johnson, or Catholic University to have acted under color of state law and their motions to dismiss are GRANTED.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a suit against only private actors does not raise a substantial federal question.

Piscopo v. State Farm Insurance · filed 2013-08-15

A § 1983 suit against only private actors does not raise a substantial federal question, and therefore the suit was properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that a defendant acted under color of state law; private medical providers cannot be sued under it without such an allegation.

Jones v. Nickens · filed 2013-08-20

The Southampton Hospital defendants, Hollywood Nursery defendants, and Rubin are private actors, and plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that they were acting under color of state law at the time of the events in question. Accordingly, the Section 1983 due process claims brought against them cannot survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Dogbe v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2013-08-27

Furthermore, plaintiff does not allege, and cannot in good faith allege, that John Doe’s conduct was undertaken under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Basile v. Connolly · filed 2013-09-03

As for the other defendants, all of them are private individuals who cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 absent a plausible allegation that they acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 can cover an off-duty officer’s conduct when he invokes police authority during an encounter that began as a personal dispute.

Llanos-Morales v. Municipality of Carolina · filed 2013-09-06

Thus, while the interchange began as personal one, like in Otero-Rivera, it transformed into an action colored by state law when Agosto invoked his authority as a police officer to stop a suspect from fleeing the scene.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party alleged to have jointly conspired with state actors to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc. · filed 2013-09-11

The Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged that Tyson was a joint participant in a conspiracy under Section 1983 to deprive him of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and that Plaintiff has alleged that such constitutional deprivations did occur. This claim thus survives Tyson’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 can reach a private union when the complaint alleges sufficient facts that it acted jointly with state officials.

Perkins v. City of Attleboro · filed 2013-09-17

However, this court finds that Perkins has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that the Union was acting in concert with the state actors. Therefore, this is not a basis to dismiss the federal constitutional claims against the Union.

Section 1983 requires the person who caused the alleged deprivation of a federal right to have acted under color of state law.

Carroll v. ABM Janitorial Services-Mid Atlantic, Inc. · filed 2013-09-17

When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law. ... Defendant is not a state actor and is not “clothed with the authority of state law.”

Section 1983 can reach private parties who conspire with state officials to violate constitutional rights, but the complaint must allege facts supporting that conspiracy.

Huff v. Firstenergy Corp. · filed 2013-09-17

Plaintiffs allege no facts that, if viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, would support a finding that FirstEnergy defendants entered into a conspiracy with the judicial defendants to deprive plaintiffs of their civil rights through bribery. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is also subject to dismissal.

A private party may be sued under Section 1983 when allegations that it paid a police officer to arrest and ticket someone sufficiently plead action under color of state law.

Naples v. Stefanelli · filed 2013-09-18

Here, the Amended Complaint contains allegations plausibly suggesting that the ESI Defendants paid Defendant Stefanelli to pull Jimmy over and arrest and ticket him. Such allegations go beyond merely providing information to the police, and the Court finds them sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant acted under color of state law to support summary judgment for the plaintiff.

Lowe v. Viewpoint Bank · filed 2013-09-18

She has brought forward no evidence showing Defendant acted “under color of state law” when it closed her bank accounts. Plaintiff has therefore failed to show that she is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of law; a private person does not meet that requirement merely by taking action authorized by state law.

Murphy v. Dulay · filed 2013-09-25

A § 1983 action may proceed only against a person acting under color of law. Private parties sometimes act under color of law, but here Dr. Dulay has not done so. All Dr. Dulay proposes to do is take an action that he and countless others are authorized to take by state law. A person does not act under color of law merely by taking action authorized by state law.

Section 1983 does not cover a police officer’s assault motivated by personal animus when the officer does not use official authority to carry it out.

Weinstein v. City of North Bay Village · filed 2013-09-26

Because McVay was not acting under “color of state law” when allegedly attacking Weinstein, Weinstein cannot state a claim for excessive force against McVay or failure to stop excessive force against Cruz, much less violation of a clearly established right.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; the court found that requirement satisfied for the claims against the county animal shelter.

SouthBARK, Inc. v. Mobile County Commission · filed 2013-09-27

The first question to be asked, in examining a § 1983 claim, is “whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” ... The Court finds state action for purposes of continued examination of these claims, noting that while Defendants have cast doubt on Plaintiffs ability to prove this claim, they have not challenged the assertion that the action was State action (see Docs. 30, 36).

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement can be met when police officers abuse access available only through their official positions to obtain information.

Miron v. Town of Stratford · filed 2013-09-30

Therefore, to the extent that the Defendants were responsible for its dissemination, the Defendants acted under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes because they were only able to access Miron’s background investigation report through abuse of their official power.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a private attorney acted under color of state law; representing a defendant in a criminal trial alone does not establish state action.

Cyprian v. Givens · filed 2013-10-04

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Cyprian’s claims against defendant Newman because Cyprian failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Newman, a private attorney who successfully defended Cyprian in a felony criminal trial, acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts sufficient to show that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Borecki v. Safeguard Security & Communications Inc. · filed 2013-10-04

The district court properly dismissed Borecki’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because Borecki failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private party may qualify when its conduct is attributable to the state.

Trazell v. Wilmers · filed 2013-10-11

In other words, it only applies to those individuals working in their official state governmental capacity or to private parties that are deemed to be acting under color of state law. ... Consequently, the Court concludes that plaintiff failed to state a claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and section 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a police officer’s private threat to a fellow officer when the officer does not act under color of state law.

Washington-Pope v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2013-10-22

Because Officer Bailey did not act under color of law for purposes of § 1983, Ms. Washington-Pope cannot pursue her federal constitutional claims against him, and so the Court’s inquiry vis-á-vis Mr. Bailey is at an end.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law while depriving the plaintiff of federal rights.

Ruiz v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 2013-10-28

To make a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute provides that the defendant must be a person “acting under color of state law” in subjecting the plaintiff to a deprivation of any laws, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of law; private individuals’ false criminal charges and perjury do not satisfy that requirement without state authority or significant state encouragement.

Robert Ray, Sr. v. GEO Group, Incorporated · filed 2013-11-01

Ray’s § 1983 claim also fails. ... Here, the misconduct Ray alleges—perjury and the false filing of criminal charges—are not made possible by state authority, but could readily be committed by any private individual. Nor has Ray presented any evidence that the state “exerted coercive power [over] or provided significant encouragement” to the actors.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when a state attorney is charged with enforcing the challenged state statutes.

Incredible Investments, LLC v. Fernandez-Rundle · filed 2013-11-13

The “under color of state law” requirement is satisfied here because Fla. Stat. §§ 849.16 & 849.094 were enacted and amended by the Florida Legislature and as the State Attorney for Miami-Dade County, the Defendant is charged with enforcing the statute.

Section 1983 permits claims against prison authorities acting under color of state law for alleged deprivations of federal rights.

Stoner v. Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 2013-11-18

As to the second requirement, “[pjrison authorities are clearly person[s] acting under color of state law.” ... Thus, Ms. Stoner may bring her claims under § 1983 and the ACRA.

Section 1983 requires the defendant’s conduct to be fairly attributable to the state and taken under color of state law.

Blankenship v. Gulf Power Company · filed 2013-11-20

Furthermore, nothing in the complaint indicates that Gulf Power’s alleged actions in attempting to collect the outstanding payment could be “fairly attributable” to the state and thus were taken “under color of state law,” which is necessary to obtain relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; private parties whose conduct involves no state action are not liable under it.

Caldwell v. Obama · filed 2013-11-20

Just as the Fourteenth Amendment requires state action, § 1983 requires that officials act “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not cover federal employees acting under color of federal law.

Anderson v. Gates · filed 2013-12-06

Defendants are all federal employees, and although Anderson claims that they "acted under color of state law," Compl. ¶¶ 22, 52, all of his allegations entail actions by defendants acting under color of federal law. Accordingly, Anderson fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private security guard’s claimed identity as a police officer does not suffice when his authority derives solely from his private employment.

Cancel v. City of New York · filed 2013-12-26

Here, even crediting Cancel’s allegation that Gibson identified himself as a police officer, Cancel’s theory of the City’s delegation of police powers to private businesses is insufficient by itself plausibly to allege that Gibson was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Posy v. HSBC Bank USA · filed 2013-12-30

To state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law; incorporation under state law and use of state eviction laws do not alone make a private apartment association a state actor.

Francis Thomas Greiser, Jr. v. Whittier Towers Apts. Assoc. Inc. · filed 2014-01-03

Greiser failed to allege that the Association acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires state action; claims against a private hospital and its employee fail when the record contains no evidence of it.

Grant v. Alperovich · filed 2014-01-03

It is undisputed that VMMC is a private, non-profit corporation and Dr. Thirlby is a VMMC employee, and there is no evidence in the record suggesting state action for purposes of § 1983. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims under § 1983 against Defendants fail as a matter of law and are DISMISSED.

Section 1983 requires evidence that an off-duty public employee’s conduct at a private party was connected to official duties before it can be treated as action under color of state law.

Peterson v. Miranda · filed 2014-01-10

Generally, a private, non-sponsored party held by a state employee does not immediately transform into a state-sponsored event if other state employees are invited and present. Rather, there must be some additional evidence of conduct by the off-duty CCSD employees attending the party that would constitute the performance of official duties.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private person to show that the person acted under color of state law; cooperation with a parole officer does not suffice without facts showing concerted action.

Boyer v. Mohring · filed 2014-01-10

To establish a claim for illegal search and seizure against Defendant Mohring, a private citizen, Plaintiff must show that she acted under color of state law. To do so, Plaintiff must allege plausible facts to show that Defendant Mohring was involved in conspiratorial or concerted action with Defendant Rice, a law enforcement agent. The facts alleged in the Complaint, however, do not establish that Defendant Mohring engaged in any concerted action with Defendant Rice.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; pervasive gaming regulation does not make a casino or its employees state actors.

Arabo v. Greektown Casino, LLC · filed 2014-01-15

The district court properly dismissed Arabo’s constitutional claims against MGM Grand and its employees because they did not act under color of state law. “To survive a motion to dismiss a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: 1) the defendant acted under color of state law; and 2) the defendant’s conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured under federal law.” Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010). This court has rejected Arabo’s argument that pervasive gaming regulation transforms casinos and their employees into state actors.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; action under federal authority does not satisfy that requirement.

Davis v. Holder · filed 2014-01-16

Because Davis has not alleged that Rite Aid is a state actor, rather than a federal actor, the Court will grant Rite Aid’s motion to dismiss Count Three.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of federal rights under color of state law; the private defendants operating this private-pay residence were not state actors.

Boykin ex rel. Estate of Phillips v. 1 Prospect Park ALF, LLC · filed 2014-01-23

Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims would still require proof that the deprivation of their federal rights occurred “under color of [State] law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants here are private parties, not state actors, and it is undisputed that at all relevant times the Residence “was private pay — not Medicaid.”

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on co-workers who lack supervisory authority and were not acting under color of state law.

Kohutka v. Town of Hempstead · filed 2014-01-29

Therefore, the Court concludes that Allback, Reeke, Bove, and Braccio were not acting under color of state law, and grants summary judgment to these Defendants as to the Section 1983 claims against them.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Rickmyer v. Browne · filed 2014-02-05

With respect to his Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff has not shown that the JACC was acting under color of state law. As a non-profit organization, the JACC is not a governmental entity. On this ground alone, Plaintiffs Section 1983 claim against Defendant JACC fails.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action only against persons acting under color of state law.

McCarty v. Roos · filed 2014-02-10

To the extent that plaintiff seeks damages against the United States pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that statute only creates a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law.

A private individual can act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes by corruptly conspiring with a state actor.

A.J. Adams v. County of Erie · filed 2014-02-18

While it is true that private individuals can act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when they “‘corruptly conspire’” with a state actor, Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 176 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980)), there was no evidence of such a conspiracy here.

Section 1983 does not cover a municipal employee’s personal conduct unrelated to the authority of the employee’s position.

Burns v. City of Utica · filed 2014-02-20

For these reasons, the Court grants Defendant Knapp’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against him because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that plausibly suggest that Defendant was acting under color of state law when he sexually assaulted her.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right.

Incredible Investments, LLC v. Fernandez-Rundle · filed 2014-03-03

To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right.

Section 1983 requires plausible facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law or conspired with a state actor to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Coulter v. Extended Stay America · filed 2014-03-17

We agree with the District Court that the complaint wholly failed to state any facts giving rise to a plausible inference that Extended Stay defendants, a private corporation and its employee, acted under color of state law or conspired with Unknown Officer, an alleged state actor, to deprive Coulter of her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires an abuse of state-given authority; conduct within a defendant’s personal pursuits does not satisfy its color of law requirement.

Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. Waraksa · filed 2014-03-25

To be properly considered as an act taken under color of law, the defendant must have “abuse[d] the position given to him by the State,” but “acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded.” ... Based on our review of the record and the relevant case law, including the cases described above and relied on by Doe I, we conclude that the District Court did not err in its color of law analysis.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is sufficiently pleaded when the alleged acts occurred while state corrections officers performed their duties.

Cash v. Wetzel · filed 2014-03-26

Because plaintiff alleges that the acts complained of were committed by defendants Lewis, Aguiar, Curran, and Krye-ski during the performance of their duties as state corrections officers, plaintiff has sufficiently pled that defendants acted under color of state law.

A police officer’s conduct falls under § 1983 only when it is linked to the officer’s official authority or duties.

Magee v. Trustees of Hamline University · filed 2014-03-27

Nothing in Magee’s complaint indicates that Titus’s actions were made possible by, or undertaken in, his position as a police officer.

Section 1983 excludes private conduct from a due process claim because the challenged deprivation must involve action under color of state law.

Nb v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-03-31

Private conduct thus falls outside the scope of a due process claim brought under Section 1983.

A private party acts under color of state law under § 1983 only when its joint action with government officials involves a substantial degree of cooperation.

Ghosh v. Uniti Bank · filed 2014-03-31

Because Datta did not demonstrate a substantial degree of cooperative action between Uniti employees and government officials, she failed to establish that Uniti acted under color of state law when it summoned city personnel to the premises, or when Datta was subsequently denied permits from the city.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private parties to allege facts showing that they acted under color of state law.

Tanasescu v. the State Bar of California · filed 2014-04-14

The district court properly dismissed Tanasescu’s claims against the private parties because Tanasescu failed to allege facts showing that these defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as a state actor merely because it contracts with the government.

Business Realty Investment Company, Inc. v. Insituform Technologies, Inc. · filed 2014-05-01

A private party does not become a state actor simply because it contracts with the government. ... Accordingly, the district court’s holding that Insituform is not a state actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is affirmed.

Section 1983 does not reach officers acting solely under federal authority because they are not acting under color of state law.

Adams v. Springmeyer · filed 2014-05-05

Since it is undisputed that Sciulli was attempting to execute federal arrest warrants in his capacity as a federal Task Force Officer, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted with respect to the § 1983 claims brought against him.

A § 1983 complaint can sufficiently allege that private defendants acted under color of state law by alleging an arrangement for police to make arrests based on their representations without an independent investigation.

West-Anderson v. The Missouri Gaming Company · filed 2014-05-07

With respect to Argosy and Kirby, we find that the complaint allegations also were sufficient to raise an inference that an arrangement existed whereby Chenoweth made arrests based on Kirby’s representations, without conducting an independent investigation, and thus that Argosy and Kirby acted under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a state-appointed guardian ad litem as a state actor merely because a state rule regulates her conduct.

Ales Higdon v. Dawn R. Smith, Esq. · filed 2014-05-08

However, contrary to Higdon’s assertions, the fact this regulatory rule exists is not sufficient to render Smith a state actor for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 applies to conduct under color of state law, not federal law.

Harris v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2014-05-08

Similarly, a § 1983 claim is properly brought against only those who act under color of state, not federal, law.

Section 1983 permits suits against directors and employees of a quasiprivate entity when they act under color of state law.

Cornavaca v. Rios-Mena · filed 2014-05-09

The upshot is that the Trust is, at most, a quasiprivate entity, whose directors and employees can be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations showing that private defendants acted under color of state law, such as by performing a public function, acting under state compulsion, or jointly acting with the state.

Boles v. Riva · filed 2014-05-13

Moreover, the complaint did not allege a sufficient factual basis for the court to proceed toward a finding that defendants acted under color of state law. First, the complaint did not allege that any of the defendants performed functions traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state, were coerced or significantly encouraged by the government, or joined the government as participants in a common enterprise.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement can be met when public employees misuse access available to them through their government positions.

Gleason v. Scoppetta · filed 2014-05-19

Properly drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Gleason, he plausibly alleges that Grogan, Belnavis, Boles, and Reynolds acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a private prison food contractor to be sued when providing inmates’ meals makes it an actor under color of state law.

Sutton v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2014-05-20

Accordingly, the Court holds that Ara-mark acted under color of state law and can be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Brecheen v. Lofaro · filed 2014-05-21

We also conclude that Brecheen failed to present sufficient evidence to allow a jury to reasonably find that Lofaro acted under color of state law in making the purported defamatory statements.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Avila v. Citimortgage, Inc. · filed 2014-05-29

As discussed above, none of the defendants are state actors, and the plaintiffs have not alleged that they were acting under color of state law, and have thus failed to state a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of law.

Lavergne v. Higgingbottom · filed 2014-05-29

As the district court correctly observed, Higgingbottom is not a state actor or otherwise acted “under color of law” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of law when depriving the plaintiff of a federal right.

Lavergne v. Higgingbottom · filed 2014-06-09

As the district court correctly observed, Higgingbottom is not a state actor or otherwise acted “under color of law” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Kungle v. Executive Officers, State Farm Insurance · filed 2014-06-16

Nowhere in any of the plaintiff’s numerous filings does he allege that State Farm is a state actor, nor has he alleged that it was acting under color of state law, and he has thus failed to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; a private lender's use of a contractual power of sale does not become state action merely because state law permits it.

Grapentine v. Pawtucket Credit Union · filed 2014-06-16

Without a showing of state action, the district court had no jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and properly dismissed Grapentine's complaint.

Section 1983 reaches private conduct only when it is sufficiently entwined with state action to be fairly treated as conduct of the state.

Wieder v. New York City Police Dep't, Home Depot USA Inc. · filed 2014-06-17

No factfinder could find Marrugo’s actions so entwined with those of the City Defendants “that [Marrugo’s] seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Tancredi v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A § 1983 claim against a private company executive requires allegations showing that the executive was a state actor.

Credico v. Guthrie · filed 2014-06-25

Credico did not set forth allegations that would allow for the conclusion that the CEO of the Matthew Bender Company was a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Sui v. Southside Towing · filed 2014-07-07

The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims because plaintiffs failed to allege facts in their amended complaint sufficient to show that defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a police officer’s purely private acts that do not use actual or purported state authority.

Kundratic v. Thomas · filed 2014-07-11

Rather, the record reflects that Thomas took these actions for purely private reasons, and this is insufficient to satisfy the “state actor” requirement for liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Nathalie Van v. Wal-Mart Stores · filed 2014-07-24

Van did not sufficiently allege facts showing that Wal-Mart acted under color of state law, which means Van failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; private foreclosure activity and use of state eviction proceedings alone do not satisfy that requirement.

Kropek v. Sullivan · filed 2014-07-31

The magistrate judge then recommended that Kropek’s constitutional claims against the moving defendants, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, be dismissed because he failed to make the prerequisite showing that the moving defendants engaged in state action when conducting the foreclosure proceedings and the sheriffs sale; or that they acted under color of state law in subsequently seeking a judgment of possession in the state courts. ... Having reviewed the Report’s analysis, in light of the record, the Court finds that its conclusions are factually based and legally sound. Accordingly, it will adopt the Report’s findings and grant the motions.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law; holding public office alone does not establish that the challenged conduct used state authority.

Hogan v. Winder · filed 2014-08-05

As to the mayor, Hogan’s claims fail because the complaint does not sufficiently allege the drafting or publication of the article was made possible because of Winder’s authority under state law.

Section 1983 requires state action or conduct under color of state law; a religious organization’s decision to terminate a priest does not satisfy that requirement.

In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee · filed 2014-08-06

The actions of the Debtor, a religious organization, cannot constitute state action, and the Debtor does not act under color of law for purposes of this statute.

Section 1983 does not apply to defendants who are neither state actors nor acting under color of law.

Galle v. Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc. · filed 2014-08-19

Unfortunately, Galle devotes most of his considerable energy trying to frame this as a violation of his constitutional rights or as wrongful state conduct under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Galle clearly was not a public employee, nor were the defendants state actors or acting under color of law; these lines of authority have no application to his case.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement can be satisfied when a state employee uses authority connected to official duties to commit abuse, even if the employee exceeds that authority.

Lee v. Borders · filed 2014-08-25

“The element is satisfied if the defendant acts or purports to act in the performance of official duties, even if he oversteps his authority and misuses power.” ... Borders was in charge of the kitchen at the time, so he controlled who entered it and remained there. ... Since Borders “largely reargues [his] version of the facts,” and there was “sufficient evidence to reject [Borders’] position,” Weitz, 665 F.3d at 977, we affirm the district court’s denial of Borders’ motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law; private treatment providers are not state actors merely because they provide services to a probation department.

Reinhardt v. Kopcow · filed 2014-08-28

As the Court has found Defendants to be private actors under all four tests for state action, it concludes that Plaintiffs has failed to plead sufficient facts showing that Defendants were acting under color of law when they committed the challenged conduct.

State prison officials act under color of state law for § 1983 when they follow state procedures in deciding a prisoner’s release.

Armato v. Grounds · filed 2014-09-04

The defendants here clearly acted under state law since they are employed by the IDOC and were following state law procedures when making decisions about Armato’s release.

Section 1983 permits claims against U.S. Parole Commission employees in their individual capacities for actions taken under color of D.C. law.

Stoddard v. Wynn · filed 2014-09-19

The § 1983 claims remain because Mr. Stoddard brought his Fifth Amendment claims against Defendants in their individual capacities based on actions taken under color of D.C. law.

Section 1983 permits civil suits against defendants acting under color of state law.

Lasko v. American Board of Surgery · filed 2014-09-19

Section 1983 is a civil statute permitting suits for acts performed by a state actor under color of law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on federal officials acting solely in their federal capacities when the complaint alleges no joint action with state officials.

Bibicheff v. Holder · filed 2014-09-23

Given that Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against Defendants solely in their official federal capacities as Attorney General of the United States, Secretary of the DHS, Deputy Commissioner of the CBP, Director of ICE, and Administrator for the TSA, it appears that these federal officials are exempt from the liability that § 1983 seeks to impose. ... Moreover, nothing in the Complaint supports a claim that defendants acted jointly with state officials. As a result, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims are dismissed.

A Section 1983 claim against private attorneys requires facts supporting that they acted under color of state law.

Ponzar v. Layfield · filed 2014-09-29

Having carefully reviewed the record, see Minn. Majority v. Mansky, 708 F.3d 1051, 1055 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard of review), we conclude that the claim was properly dismissed because Ponzar failed to allege facts which would support a conclusion that defendants--private attorneys--acted under color of state law while representing their client, a lender, in judicial proceedings against Ponzar.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting action under color of state law.

Tucker v. Wyckoff Heights Medical Center · filed 2014-09-30

The Court construes these references as an attempt to plead claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs Complaint and supplemental submission fail, however, to allege any facts that could support findings of action under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a fellow teacher with no supervisory authority over the plaintiffs did not meet that requirement.

Yarnall v. Philadelphia School District · filed 2014-09-30

Ishmael acting “as if’ does not equal Ishmael acting under color of state law.

A private person may face a § 1983 claim when a sufficient nexus between that person’s conduct and a state actor’s conduct makes the private conduct attributable to the state.

Hillman v. City of McKinney · filed 2014-10-02

With regards to McCrorey, who was at the building on the night of the events in question, there is evidence offered by Plaintiffs sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue as to material fact that McCrorey’s actions may have' had a nexus to those of the state actor, Shropshire. ... Thus, summary judgment as to McCrorey is denied.

A Section 1983 claim against a private hospital requires facts showing that the hospital acted under color of state law.

Hubbard v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation · filed 2014-10-10

The district court properly dismissed Hubbard’s claims against Memorial Hospital because Hubbard failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the hospital acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires wrongdoing by persons acting under color of state law; alleged wrongdoing at a federal prison was treated as a Bivens claim.

Valdovinos-Blanco v. Adler · filed 2014-10-27

Because Valdovinos-Blanco alleged wrongdoing at a federal prison rather than wrongdoing by persons acting under color of state law, the magistrate judge properly characterized Valdovinos-Blanco’s claims as an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), not an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach private parties without facts showing they acted as state actors.

Beepot v. J.P. Morgan Chase National Corporate Services, Inc. · filed 2014-10-30

The Beepots fail to state a claim for relief under § 1983 against those entities and individuals because they are private actors and the allegations do not present one of the “rare circumstances” where a private party may be considered a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a public employee’s personal conduct unrelated to official duties merely because it occurred at work.

Burns v. City of Utica · filed 2014-11-07

Here, Knapp’s alleged sexual assault of Burns, if proven, was palpably a personal pursuit entirely unrelated to his duties as a firefighter.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Xia v. Kerry · filed 2014-11-12

However, plaintiffs do not adequately state a cause of action under Section 1983 because they have not alleged that Defendants acted “under color of state law.”

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when an on-duty sheriff’s deputy acts in his official capacity.

Nagle v. Gusman · filed 2014-11-18

Thompson was a commissioned deputy of the Orleans Parish Sheriffs Office and on duty at the time of the alleged violation. Therefore, the under color of state law prong of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is satisfied.

Section 1983 imposes liability only on individuals acting under color of state law.

Robles v. Kerry · filed 2014-11-21

At the outset, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are not entitled to a declaratory judgment that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute imposes liability only on individuals “acting under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a federal right by a defendant acting under color of state law.

Faiaz v. Colgate University · filed 2014-11-24

To state a claim under section 1983, the plaintiff must allege both that the defendant has violated plaintiffs rights under either the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the defendant acted “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 can reach federal officials in limited circumstances when they act under color of state law, but a complaint must allege that they took some action.

Proctor v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-11-25

Although it is possible, in certain limited circumstances, for federal officials to operate under state law, see Williams, 396 F.3d at 414–15, the defendant has alleged no such facts in the present case. Indeed, the plaintiff has failed to allege that the Federal Defendants took any action whatsoever. The plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the Federal Defendants fails for this additional reason.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Giampa v. Duckworth · filed 2014-12-01

The district court properly dismissed the claims against Giampa’s ex-husband, his attorney, the attorney’s firm, and the psychiatrist because Giampa failed to allege facts sufficient to show that they are private parties acting under color of state law, and thus subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private party to plausibly allege that the party acted under color of state law.

Walsh v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, Na · filed 2014-12-04

As an initial matter, plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that any of the private party defendants – the three banks and BWW – has acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts sufficient to show that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Castaneda v. Burton-Cahill · filed 2014-12-04

The district court properly dismissed Castaneda’s federal claims against defendant Hunter because Castaneda failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Hunter acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits suits against federal officials who act under color of state law.

Durham v. Rapp · filed 2014-12-09

The statute does not provide an exemption for federal officials acting under color of state law.

A Section 1983 claim against private parties requires facts showing they acted under color of state law.

Nguyen v. Ridgewood Savings Bank · filed 2014-12-17

Plaintiff has not stated a claim under Section 1983 against either Defendant. Plaintiff has acknowledged that Ridgewood is a private corporation and Boger is a private individual, acting as Ridgewood’s CEO. (Compl. 2 ¶ II.) Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants were, in any way, acting under color of state law, nor has he provided any facts which would support such an allegation.

Section 1983 does not cover a private prison or its employees when they operate the prison for the federal government rather than on behalf of a state.

Bishawi v. Northeast Ohio Correctional Center · filed 2014-12-17

Because NEOCC does not px'ovide sex-vices on behalf of the state, neither NEOCC nor CCA were acting under the color of state law for the purposes of § 1983. Further, NEOCC’s employees cannot be considered state actors because they are employees of a pxivately operated prison, operated for the federal government.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Hamilton v. Home Sales Inc. · filed 2014-12-18

The district court properly dismissed the Hamiltons’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because the Hamiltons failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants were ... acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Sepehry-Fard v. the Bank of New York Mellon, N · filed 2014-12-18

The district court properly dismissed Sepehry-Fard’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims because Sepehry-Fard failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the person sued to have acted under color of law.

Althiabat v. Howard University, et.al · filed 2014-12-24

But, the person sued must have acted “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia…” Id. Clearly Dean Harris never acted under color of any statute when he took the actions about which Plaintiff complains. Thus, an action under 42. U.S.C. section 1983 would fail as well.

A defense attorney may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with state officials, but ordinary representation of a criminal defendant does not amount to acting under color of state law.

Hamil v. Nader · filed 2015-01-06

However, a defense attorney may be held liable under § 1983 if the attorney conspired with state officials in the criminal case. ... Hamil’s allegations against Nader do not support such a conspiracy.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Daniels v. Cynkin · filed 2015-01-22

To obtain relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the defendant(s) acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; county election commissioners meet that requirement when terminating election administrators.

Peterson v. Dean · filed 2015-01-28

It is clear that defendants acted under the color of state law in terminating plaintiffs; thus, the key question is whether plaintiffs’ discharge involved the deprivation of a First Amendment right.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a contract with a federal agency alone does not meet that requirement.

Wiley v. Vachhani · filed 2015-02-02

Section 1983 provides a right of action against persons who act “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State.” (Emphasis added). The Social Security Administration, however, is a part of the federal government, not the state. There is no allegation in this case that the appellee acted under color of state law. The district court was correct to dismiss the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires that the person who deprived the plaintiff of a federal right acted under color of state law.

Gerald Lepre, Jr. v. Paul s. Lukus · filed 2015-02-10

Accordingly, Lepre cannot sustain any cause of action under § 1983, because he cannot show that the person who deprived him of his parental rights acted under color of state law.

Merely summoning police or giving them information does not make a private party a state actor under Section 1983.

Carrillos v. Incorporated Village · filed 2015-02-20

Merely summoning or providing information to state actors, without more, does not constitute joint action for the purposes of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against IRS employees acting under federal law because they are not acting under color of state law.

Polsky v. Werfel · filed 2015-02-23

Because IRS employees acting within the course of their employment act under federal law, they cannot be sued as state actors under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires proof that the person responsible for a constitutional deprivation acted under color of state law.

Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2015-02-26

The plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the individual deputies acted under color of state law during an altercation at a holiday party at a private restaurant.

Section 1983 requires a public employee’s conduct to be related to official duties to qualify as action under color of state law.

Sanchez v. California · filed 2015-02-27

However, action that is not in any way related to the duties of the official is not under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; the private corporation’s termination of the plaintiff’s employment did not meet that requirement.

Lewis v. PSCH, Inc. · filed 2015-03-04

The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and established, prima facie, that it was not acting under color of state law when it terminated the plaintiffs employment (see 42 USC § 1983; Brentwood Academy v Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn., 531 US 288, 295 [2001]; United States v Price, 383 US 787, 794 n 7 [1966]; Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344, 361 [1985]).

Section 1983 claims against private defendants require an allegation that they acted under color of law.

Barth v. Starlet McNeely · filed 2015-03-10

The District Court properly dismissed Barth’s § 1983 claims because Counts II, III, and IV fail to allege that McNeely or Buck acted under color of any such law.

Section 1983 can cover a township official’s conduct while presiding over township meetings as action under color of state law.

Willson v. Yerke · filed 2015-03-11

Because some of Yerke’s alleged conduct occurred while he was presiding over township meetings, we reject Appellees’ argument that none of their alleged conduct occurred under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal officials acting under federal rather than state law, whether sued in their official or individual capacities.

Rush v. Samuels · filed 2015-03-12

The BOP is a federal government entity and its Director necessarily acts under color of federal, not state, law. The plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 against the defendant in both his official and individual capacities, therefore, “must be dismissed for failing to state a claim . . . because [§] 1983 only applies to state officials acting under state law.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

Taylor v. Tulsa Welding School · filed 2015-03-17

Second, Mr. Taylor has not alleged the defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits claims against private persons who act under color of state law, including through a qualifying conspiracy with state officials.

Gorman v. Rensselaer County · filed 2015-03-19

Accordingly, PSP is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983, and Plaintiffs retaliation claims against PSP pursuant to § 1983 must be dismissed.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek relief when someone acting under color of state law causes the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. v. Vilsack · filed 2015-03-25

Moreover, I concur with her conclusion that a Bivens remedy is cognizable on the facts alleged here, as well as her recommendation that plaintiffs may assert, as an alternative theory, a violation of section 1983 premised on the federal officials alleged enlistment of state law enforcement officers in their attempt to forcibly enter plaintiffs’ premises without a warrant.

Section 1983 imposes liability only for conduct attributable to the state, excluding purely private conduct by government employees.

LaPierre v. City of Lawrence · filed 2015-03-26

On the record before me, even if Sledge was acting “under color of law” when he took a drunk citizen, Ms. La-Pierre, to the police station in his personal car, there is no evidence that his purpose was “to act in an official capacity or to exercise official responsibilities,” Zambrana-Marrero, 172 F.3d at 128, when he repeatedly returned to his car to assault and rape the plaintiff.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law for a viable claim.

Reed v. Columbia St. Mary's Hospital · filed 2015-03-30

We agree with Judge Randa that Reed failed to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The hospital is a private entity, and nothing in the complaint suggests that it was acting under the color of state law. Judge Randa properly dismissed Reed’s claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Peli Hunt v. Horwitz Cron and Armstrong LLP · filed 2015-03-30

The district court properly dismissed Hunt’s § 1983 claims against all defendants because Hunt failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any defendant acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires defendants to act under color of state law and imposes liability based on personal participation rather than a supervisor's position alone.

Archer v. Captain Myron Logan · filed 2015-04-06

We also point out that the district court correctly rejected plaintiff Archer’s argument that defendant Captain Logan was acting “under color of state law” simply because his position in the Police Department may have gained him some preferential treatment by the District Attorney’s Office investigator or allowed him a measure of influence in the initiation of a criminal prosecution. We agree with the district court that Archer has cited no authority indicating that a state official acting purely in his private capacity acts under color of state law simply “because he may have gained an indirect advantage by virtue of his official post.” ... We additionally address, and find unpersuasive, plaintiff Archer’s contention that the district court—in finding no supervisory liability as to defendant Major Ellison—erred in failing to address her claim that Ellison directly participated in the alleged First and Fourth Amendment violations. Archer has pointed to no evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Ellison personally participated in the investigation that culminated in her indictment and arrest.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law who deprive others of constitutional rights.

Goodhue v. County of Maui · filed 2015-04-06

Thus, when Ramos directed Plaintiffs to move the location of their proselytizing activities, he was doing so pursuant to his responsibilities as a police officer with the Maui Police Department and, thus, was acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private party only when it acts under color of state law.

Montgomery v. Aparatis Dist Co · filed 2015-04-10

A private party is subject to liability under § 1983 only when it acts under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant who did not act under color of state law.

Coler v. Kemp · filed 2015-04-10

The court also did not err in determining that Rice could not be held liable under § 1983 because Coler did not show that she acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for rights violations by state actors and requires the defendant to act under color of state law.

Diaz-Garcia v. Surillo-Ruiz · filed 2015-04-15

Although he did not work at the hospital during the time that the adverse actions at issue occurred, Dr. Laborde’s testimony regarding his experiences as a CDT employee is relevant to understanding whether certain defendants acted under color of state law. For instance, Dr. Laborde’s interactions with defendant Simmons, who informed him that he (Dr. Laborde) was terminated at Mayor Surillo’s behest, make it more probable that defendant Simmons was acting under color of state law when he took the adverse actions at issue against plaintiffs.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action when a person acting under color of state law deprives another of federal rights.

Powell v. Miller · filed 2015-04-21

There are genuine issues of material fact, however, regarding whether Miller’s actions as a private attorney support Plaintiffs’ contention he exerted influence over and/or acted jointly with state actors as required to show Miller acted under color of law. The existence of these fact disputes warrant consideration of these § 1983 claims by a jury and render summary judgment in favor of Powell inappropriate.

Section 1983 does not apply to a criminal defense attorney who is not acting under color of state law.

Maddox v. Williams · filed 2015-05-06

The complaint does not present a viable federal question under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because “[a] criminal defense attorney. whether public or private. does not act under color of state . . . law in providing a criminal defense.”

Section 1983 creates a civil action for damages against a person acting under color of state law who violates the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Loya v. Gutierrez · filed 2015-05-11

Section 1983 creates a civil action for damages under federal law against any person acting under color of state law who violates the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... In this case, the very reason Officer Gutierrez, a tribal police officer, is subject to a Section 1983 claim for actions taken under color of state law, is because he was acting under his state authority as a deputy sheriff, not tribal authority, when he charged, detained, and prosecuted Loya under state law. ... Therefore, showing waiver of tort liability is not required before a governmental entity is obligated to provide its employee with a defense in a Section 1983 action where there are no tort claims asserted.

Section 1983 treats private parties who jointly act with state officials as acting under color of state law.

Bolet v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority · filed 2015-05-19

It is clear from Plaintiffs complaint that Pérez Soler and Figueroa Jaramillo, both private actors, met with Oppenheimer, an undisputed state actor, and agreed to reinstate the employees in exchange for their signature in sworn statements against Plaintiff. ... When construing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the joint action/nexus test, i.e., the finding of a civil rights conspiracy, is met here. Thus, for Section 1983 purposes, these defendants can be fairly characterized as state actors do to their joint activity with PREPA officials. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to support a determination that the alleged conduct of these defendants has been committed under color of state law, and has resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Accordingly, for these reasons, this court DENIES the UTIER Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to defendants Pérez Soler and Figueroa Jaramillo.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement can be adequately pleaded against defendants alleged to have acted in complicity with state officials.

Hicks v. Clark · filed 2015-06-04

On- that score it is only necessary to say that the TAC’s allegations — once again credited for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes in accordance with the “plausibility” standard established by the Twombly-Iqbal dichotomy — are adequate to tar those defendants with the same “color of law” brush as Department and its cohorts,' and that the related state law claims are sustainable on the premise of those defendants’ asserted complicity in the wrongs suffered by Hicks (a subject that clearly calls for factual development).

Section 1983 does not cover a prosecutor’s personal online speech when it is unrelated to official duties and does not involve an exercise of state authority.

Naffe v. Frey · filed 2015-06-15

Rather, the factual allegations—taken as true—compel the conclusion that Frey did not act under color of state law when he blogged and Tweeted about Naffe because he did so for purely personal reasons, and the communications were unrelated to his work as a county prosecutor.

A § 1983 claim against a private medical provider requires an allegation that the provider acted under color of state law.

Wideman v. Watson · filed 2015-06-17

Absent an allegation of action under color of state law, Wideman’s § 1983 cause of action is “so patently without merit as to justify the court’s dismissal ... for want of jurisdiction.” McKenzie, 761 F.3d at 1156 (internal quotation mark omitted).

An officer’s off-duty status and location outside his jurisdiction do not alone defeat § 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement when the complaint plausibly alleges an exercise of official authority.

Moss ex rel. Moss v. Singleton · filed 2015-06-18

But for now, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to survive Singleton’s motion to dismiss based on § 1983’s “under color of state law” requirement, despite the fact that the shooting took place in Hammond, Indiana.

A police officer does not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes merely by using a department computer to access public information; the officer must use or invoke official authority.

Luce v. Town of Campbell · filed 2015-07-02

Of course, this does not mean that what Kelemen did was legal, simply that what he did is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make private defendants governmental actors merely because they use state judicial proceedings to foreclose on a home.

Luft v. Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corporation · filed 2015-07-07

To be more specific about the district court’s alternative ground for dismissing Count 4, we agree with the district court’s determination that Luft failed to allege sufficiently that Citi Defendants were governmental actors or that a conspiracy existed. Luft’s argument that Citi Defendants acted under color of law by using the state judicial system to effectuate the foreclosure proceedings is without merit.

Section 1983 permits claims against municipal officials acting under color of state law for alleged violations of federal rights.

García-Díaz v. Cintrón-Suárez · filed 2015-07-23

Thus, the individual Defendants were acting under color of state law at all relevant times when the purported discriminatory conduct transpired. Therefore, Section 1983 is an appropriate avenue to remedy the alleged conduct that supposedly deprived Plaintiffs of their “rights, privileges, and immunities” protected by law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; state funding and regulation alone do not make a private healthcare provider a state actor.

DeRome Seals v. Superior Options of LA, Inc · filed 2015-07-29

To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiffs must allege that (1) they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the Defendants deprived them of this right acting under color of state law. ... We agree with the district court that Plaintiffs “make[] no allegation of any nexus between state funding and the incident at issue in this case” and that “it is unlikely that Plaintiffs can allege such given the nature of their complaints.”

An attorney representing a client does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Adams v. Schmidt · filed 2015-08-14

An attorney is not acting under color of state law when representing a client.

Private security guards act under color of state law for § 1983 when they regulate speech in a public forum.

Pindak v. Dart · filed 2015-08-27

As explained in detail below, the court concludes that Securitas guards do act under color of state law when they regulate speech activities on Daley Plaza, a public forum, and that the undisputed evidence establishes that Truman and Kelly interfered with Plaintiffs’ attempts, to panhandle on the Plaza.

Federal actors may be liable under § 1983 if they conspire or act jointly with state actors to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

West v. City of Mesa · filed 2015-09-08

Individuals acting under color of federal law may be held liable under § 1983 only if “they conspired or acted jointly with state actors to deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.” Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 783 (9th Cir.2001).

Section 1983 claims against private defendants require plausible allegations that they acted under color of state law.

Carris v. First Student, Inc. · filed 2015-09-18

Therefore, because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant and Local 182 are state actors, or were acting under color of state law when her employment was terminated, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against these parties under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

McKee v. Pittsburgh National Bank · filed 2015-09-23

To obtain relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Acting under color of state law is an element of a Section 1983 claim, not a separate cause of action.

Gersbacher v. City of New York · filed 2015-09-25

Therefore, plaintiff's first cause of action is actually just pleading the first element of a section 1983 claim for his six subsequent claims.

A complaint plausibly alleges that a private jail medical provider acted under color of state law under § 1983 when it alleges the provider supplied jail medical services and helped create and implement policies governing inmate care.

Sanders ex rel. Ray v. Glanz · filed 2015-09-30

The Complaint specifically alleges that CHC was responsible for Jail medical services, and was in part responsible for creating and implementing policies, practices, and protocols that govern the provision of medical and mental health care to inmates at the Jail. (Doe. 2 at ¶¶ 9). Those allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege that CHC was acting under color of law for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not cover a public official’s private legal threat made to protect a personal reputation because that act is not under color of state law.

Meadows v. Enyeart · filed 2015-10-01

Therefore, the Defendants did not act under color of state law in sending the cease-and-desist letter, and the Meadows-es cannot recover in a § 1983 action on the basis of that letter.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of law; employment by a private security company alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Haddad v. Baker · filed 2015-10-06

At the time of the incident, Galaz, Fagan and Florestal each worked for Securitas, a private security company, and nowhere in the Complaint does Haddad allege that any of these three Defendants acted under color of law.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private hospital and doctor do not become state actors merely because state law authorizes them to involuntarily detain a patient.

Hicks v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center CA2/3 · filed 2015-10-19

For all of these reasons, we conclude the FAC did not plead that the Hospital and Dr. Calica were state actors. The trial court thus did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the second cause of action for federal civil rights violations.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as a state actor merely because the state delegates authority to it; the conduct must satisfy a state-action test.

Gross v. Samudio · filed 2015-10-27

Delegation of authority to a private actor is insufficient to create state action under § 1983 without meeting one of these tests.