42 U.S.C. § 1983

A supervisor’s alleged use of state authority to summon and harass an employee can satisfy § 1983’s under-color-of-law requirement.

Jones v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-08-18

Defendants correctly note that Ellison only acted under state law if he “exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state law.” ... There may be a lack of a genuine issue as to whether Ellison possessed the supervisory authority he purported to act under, but that question is not before the court at this time for reasons stated, so plaintiffs § 1983 claim must survive summary judgment.

Section 1983 covers harassment by a state supervisor when the supervisor uses state authority to make the conduct possible.

Jones v. Dc Dept of Corr · filed 2009-08-18

There is most certainly a genuine fact issue as to whether defendant Ellison purported to use his supervisory state authority over plaintiff to lure her to his office and harass her, such that his conduct was in fact made possible by the clothes of state authority per West.

Section 1983 does not cover Superior Court Marshals acting under color of federal law because they are not state actors.

Bame v. Dillard · filed 2009-08-25

As this Court already has recognized, however, Superior Court Marshals act under color of federal law, and thus do not qualify as state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover Superior Court Marshals acting under color of federal law because they are not state actors.

Bame v. Clark · filed 2009-08-25

As this Court already has recognized, however, Superior Court Marshals act under color of federal law, and thus do not qualify as state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A plaintiff sufficiently alleges action under color of state law by alleging that defendants acted as city officials or employees.

Srinivas v. Picard · filed 2009-08-26

The plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that at all relevant times, all of the defendants except McMahon were acting as City officials or employees. Thus the defendants, other than McMahon, were acting under the color of state law for that reason.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; a private organization’s withdrawal of legal representation did not meet that requirement here.

Sanchez v. Davila · filed 2009-08-31

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first element of a viable § 1983 claim, that is, that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; acting under tribal authority alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Pounds v. Killion · filed 2002-05-23

This allegation, however, is insufficient to bring plaintiff’s claims under the ambit of § 1983 which requires a putative defendant to act “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private parties to show that they acted under color of state law; using state adoption procedures alone does not make them state actors.

Johnson v. Monica Rodrigues (Orozco) Sealed Dft-98-550-1 Sealed Dft-98-550-2, and Adoption Center of Choice · filed 2002-06-18

Assuming that Johnson has alleged a deprivation of a federal right, we then proceed to decide whether he has fulfilled the second requirement, namely, a demonstration that either the adoption center or the adoptive parents acted under color of state law. ... Accordingly, because the rights assured by the Fourteenth Amendment refer to state action, and having determined that Appellees did not act under color of state law, we hold that Appellant may not prevail on his constitutional contentions.

Section 1983 requires a connection between a defendant’s governmental role and the alleged deprivation of rights for the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

S.J. Ex Rel. T.R. v. Kansas City Missouri Public School District · filed 2002-06-26

Since she fails to establish a violation "under color of law," as required by § 1983, her claims against the individual defendants also must fail.

An attorney appointed to represent a defendant in a post-conviction action is not a state actor subject to liability under § 1983 for claims about that representation.

Fuller v. Jolly · filed 2002-08-08

The district court properly found that these claims were unavailing because Fuller’s attorney is not a state actor who may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 covers a public school teacher’s abuse of a student when the teacher uses his position to carry out the abuse.

Hackett v. Fulton County School District · filed 2002-08-12

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Kreil was acting under color of state law when he committed the acts against the plaintiff that form the basis of this action.

A private person who acts jointly with a state official can act under color of law and be liable under § 1983.

Dohner v. Neff · filed 2002-12-11

This evidence would enable a reasonable jury to find that Neff and Smith conspired and worked jointly and in concert to constructively discharge the plaintiff. ... Because the defendants engaged in their actions under color of law, they come within § 1983.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Hooda v. Brookhaven National Laboratory · filed 2009-09-15

The Brookhaven Defendants argue that these claims must be dismissed because all of the Defendants are private parties, there are no allegations that any of them acted under the color of state law, and the individual Defendants could not aid and abet BSA’s non-violations. The Brookhaven Defendants are correct.

Section 1983 treats prison officials acting in their official capacities as acting under color of state law.

Mallory v. Marshall · filed 2009-09-22

There is no dispute that the Defendants were acting in their official capacities as prison officials at all relevant times and were therefore acting under color of state law.

A union acts under color of state law for a Section 1983 claim if it conspires with a school district to deprive someone of equal protection rights.

McIntyre v. LONGWOOD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2009-09-30

Moreover, in order to show that MIAA was acting “under color of state law,” plaintiff must show that they conspired with the school district to deprive plaintiff of his equal protection rights. ... Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence to suggest that MIAA conspired with LCSD to deprive plaintiff of his equal protection rights, in any event.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private party’s filing of a lis pendens does not satisfy that requirement when the state does not significantly contribute to the alleged deprivation.

Steele v. Richardson · filed 2009-10-01

Steele cannot establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because his Complaint does not allege facts that would establish that defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires defendants to act under color of state law, and private conduct alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Frank C. Johnson, Jr. v. Law Offices of Marshall · filed 2009-10-02

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendants must have acted “under color of state law.” This requirement excludes merely private conduct. ... We recognize three primary tests to determine whether a private party acted “under color of state law”: “(1) the public function test; (2) the state compulsion test; and (3) the nexus/joint action test.”

Section 1983 treats Puerto Rico as a state, so actions attributed to Puerto Rican officials can satisfy its state action requirement.

Del Toro-Pacheco v. Pereira-Castillo · filed 2009-10-07

This prong is easily satisfied. “Puerto Rico is considered a state for Section 1983 purposes” and the complaint alleges actions attributed to Puerto Rican officials.

Prison officials who order lockdown procedures act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.

Norwood v. Woodford · filed 2009-10-07

Here, there is no dispute that Defendants acted under color of state law when they ordered implementation of lock-down procedures at CAL which limited Plaintiffs access to outdoor exercise from November 8, 2005 to December 17, 2005.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a private actor’s conduct qualifies only if it is fairly attributable to the state.

Cassell v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2009-10-13

A § 1983 action may be maintained only against a defendant who acts under color of state law. ... Private actors, such as the non-governmental defendants named here, can be said to act under color of state law only if their conduct is fairly attributable to the state. ... Cassell makes no allegation that would even arguably support a claim that the private defendants acted under color of state law in their treatment of Cassell at hospitals and homeless shelters.

Section 1983 requires allegations supporting an inference that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Vasilopoulos v. Krovatin Klingman LLC · filed 2009-10-14

Nothing in the second amended complaint would allow an inference that appellees acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; the prestige of public office alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Hall v. Witteman · filed 2009-10-19

Exploiting the personal prestige of one’s public position is not state action absent at least some suggestion that the holder would exercise governmental power.

Private health care providers are not liable under § 1983 as state actors without evidence that they agreed with law enforcement to commit the alleged deprivation.

Gilbert v. French · filed 2009-10-19

In sum, Gilbert has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that either Dr. Mason, Dr. Williams, or St. Joseph’s Hospital knowingly entered into a conspiracy with law enforcement officials to delay the administration of pain medication in order to facilitate Anderson and Fry’s interview. As such, all three defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Gilbert § 1983 claims even if he had demonstrated a violation of his constitutional rights because they were not acting under color of state law when they treated him.

Section 1983 requires a private electric cooperative’s challenged conduct to be attributable to the state; eminent-domain authority alone does not establish state action.

Navo South Development Partners, Ltd. v. Denton County Electric Cooperative, Inc. · filed 2009-10-23

The power of eminent domain is not a perforce one of state action. There is simply no showing that CoServ has acted under the color of authority of state law.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege facts suggesting that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Davis v. California Western School of Law · filed 2009-10-23

The district court properly dismissed the claims against defendants Brooks and California Western School of Law because Davis’s complaint failed to allege facts suggesting that these defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal official because it requires action under color of state, territorial, or District of Columbia law.

Ocasio v. Duff · filed 2009-10-28

Plaintiff’s claim is set forth on a form for actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but such a claim is predicated on the deprivation of constitutional rights by a person acting under color of state, territorial or District of Columbia law; it is not cognizable against the named federal defendant.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a bare assertion that a hospital did so is insufficient.

McCain v. Episcopal Hospital · filed 2009-10-29

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, McCain must show that the Episcopal Hospital and the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (1) violated his federal or Constitutional rights, and (2) that they did so while acting under color of state law. ... Furthermore, even assuming that withholding information under these circumstances somehow violated a cognizable federal right, McCain makes no allegations to support his claim that the hospitals were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law and excludes merely private conduct.

Wojtczak v. Safeco Property & Casualty Insurance Companies · filed 2009-11-05

Plaintiff also lacks a basis to pursue constitutional claims against Defendants, since they were not acting under color of state law. In that regard, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires “(a) that the defendant is a ‘person’ acting ‘under the color of state law,’ and (b) that the defendant caused the plaintiff to be deprived of a federal right.”

Section 1983 requires specific facts showing that a private party acted jointly with state actors; merely giving information to police is insufficient.

Johnson v. City of New York · filed 2009-11-12

Absent additional specific factual allegations in support of a finding that the NYU defendants acted in concert with state actors, Johnson cannot establish that the NYU defendants were acting under color of law — a critical element of a section 1983 action.

Private defendants can act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when they collaborate with a government actor in the challenged conduct.

McGrath v. Dominican College of Blauvelt, New York · filed 2009-11-25

These allegations of collaboration with a government actor are sufficient to allege that the Individual Defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires proof that a deprivation of rights was caused by someone acting under color of state law; an exclusive county ambulance contract alone does not make a private provider a state actor.

Osler Ex Rel. Osler v. Huron Valley Ambulance Inc. · filed 2009-11-30

Consequently, to establish liability under section 1983, the plaintiff must prove that the deprivation of rights was caused by a person acting under color of state law. ... Based on the undisputed facts in the record, the Court cannot conclude that the state or local government affirmatively authorized, encouraged, or facilitated HVA’s private conduct or otherwise clothed HVA with the authority of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; actions performed on behalf of a federal agency distributing federal benefits do not qualify.

Shell v. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 2009-12-02

Shell has also failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because neither of the defendants were acting under color of state law, since their actions were performed on behalf of a federal agency distributing federal benefits.

A state supervisor acts under color of state law for § 1983 when the supervisor uses state authority to continue sexual harassment.

Larkin v. Martin · filed 2009-12-08

Martin, as Larkin’s supervisor, eoncededly possessed power with respect to her by virtue of state law. ... Once that line was crossed, Martin was able to continue because he was Larkin’s boss and she needed the job. While I fully respect the jury’s conscientious weighing of a difficult issue, I am persuaded that the verdict on this issue was seriously erroneous.

A § 1983 claim requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Jenkins v. Murphy · filed 2009-12-15

Jenkins’s complaint suggests no basis for federal question jurisdiction, as the defendant is a private party and there is no allegation that he was acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 generally does not cover claims against private parties who do not act under color of state law.

Crain v. Clark County Public Defender · filed 2009-12-16

The district court properly dismissed Crain’s claims against psychotherapists Williams and Pacult because Crain did not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 18 U.S.C. § 241. See Price, 939 F.2d at 707-08 (stating that “private parties are not generally acting under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983); Peabody v. United States, 394 F.2d 175, 177 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating that § 241 does not provide a private right of action).

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private school security guard’s personal misconduct did not satisfy that requirement here.

Kach v. Hose ex rel. St. Moritz Security Services, Inc. · filed 2009-12-23

Because Hose was not acting under color of state law when he committed the acts that form the basis of Each’s § 1983 claim against him, we need not decide if Each’s constitutional rights were violated.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a defendant acting under color of state law.

Lazaridis v. Wehmer · filed 2010-01-07

A claim brought under § 1983 can only be sustained if the defendant has deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right while acting under color of state law.

A § 1983 complaint must allege that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Lugo v. Carter · filed 2010-01-12

The district court correctly dismissed Lugo’s complaint because he failed to allege that the defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Brown v. Lewis · filed 2010-01-12

Because Brown’s complaint failed to allege facts showing that Hagler acted under color of state law, the district court properly dismissed Brown’s § 1983 claim against Hagler.

Section 1983 requires a sexual harasser to be a supervisor or to have exercised state authority over the victim.

McCans v. City of Truth or Consequences · filed 2010-01-13

To satisfy “§ 1983’s ‘color of law’ requirement,” Johnson v. Martin, 195 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 1999), the harasser must be a supervisor or a person who “exercised state authority over [the victim],” Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1012 (10th Cir. 2003).

Section 1983 permits a person to sue a private party acting under color of state law for a constitutional deprivation.

Frederick v. BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL · filed 2010-02-04

But that narrow reading of the scope of Section 1983 is excessively myopic — after all, it was almost a half-century ago that the seminal opinion in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961) established the principle, adhered to ever since in a host of cases, that a symbiotic relationship between a governmental body and a private party can place the private party squarely in the crosshairs of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the circumstances of this case, that principle clearly draws these Media Defendants within the ambit of Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue when someone acting under color of state law deprives the person of a federal constitutional or statutory right.

Bryant v. Military Department of Mississippi · filed 2010-02-18

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that a person, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the United Sates Constitution or the laws of the United States. ... Bryant has failed to point to specific facts showing there is a genuine issue whether the Individual Appellees acted under color of state law. ... It does not follow from a desire to protect their military careers that any of these individuals’ actions were achieved through the use or misuse of power granted by the state. ... No reasonable jury could render a verdict in Bryant’s favor based on allegations of motive alone, and accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Bryant’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action only against persons acting under color of state law.

Brown v. Legal Aid Society · filed 2010-02-23

Section 1983 creates a cause of action only against persons acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 1995). A “public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); accord Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1997). To the extent Brown attempts to avoid Dodson’s limitation by alleging that the public defenders in his case conspired with a state court judge to pursue his illegal prosecution, see Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984), this conspiracy allegation is wholly conclusory and, as such, insufficient even at the pleading stage to establish that the public defenders were acting under color of state law. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Brown’s complaint.

Section 1983 does not treat attorneys representing prisoners against the state as state actors when they perform the private function of counsel.

Percival v. Girard · filed 2010-02-26

Thus, Defendants were filling an “essentially private function” and cannot be deemed state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a public defender acted under color of state law when representing a client.

French v. Carlson · filed 2010-03-03

The district court properly dismissed the claims against the public defender because French alleged no facts demonstrating the public defender was acting under color of state law when he represented French.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police officer who acts as a civilian complainant rather than under color of state law.

Rae v. County of Suffolk · filed 2010-03-05

Here, based on the evidence, which Plaintiff has failed to adequately controvert, the Court finds that Defendant Barry-Rae was not acting under color of state law in complaining that Plaintiff raped her. Accordingly, a § 1983 claim against her cannot lie, and she must be granted summary judgment as to Plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity suits for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against federal parole officials acting under the D.C. Revitalization Act because they act under color of District of Columbia law.

Anderson v. Reilly · filed 2010-03-05

When a Commissioner or Examiner of the United States Parole Commission is acting pursuant to his or her authority under the D.C. Revitalization Act, he or she is acting under color of a statute of the District of Columbia and, therefore, is subject to suit in his official capacity for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an officer’s conduct to involve misuse of official power to satisfy the color-of-state-law requirement.

Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc. · filed 2010-03-05

But because he asserts no facts that would suggest that the use of force by Officers Goodwin and Cantu was a misuse of their power as state officers, he has not sufficiently alleged that their actions were under color of state law.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a private corporation to proceed when evidence raises a genuine dispute about whether it acted under color of state law.

Kerr v. Hurd · filed 2010-03-15

42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability only on those persons who act under color of state law. ... Thus there remain genuine issues of material fact on the question whether UMSA was acting under color of state law and it is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that issue.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Strunk v. United States Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census · filed 2010-03-17

Assuming without deciding that plaintiff adequately alleges the violation of constitutional rights, his civil rights claim fails because the complaint does not allege that these defendants are as state actors. This pleading alone is fatal.

Section 1983 permits suit against a private entity when it exercises eminent domain power delegated by the state.

Sprint Communications Co., LP v. Leggett · filed 2010-03-18

Even though Sprint is a private entity, when it exercises the power of eminent domain delegated to it by the state, it is deemed to be a state actor subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

DiPietro v. New Jersey Family Support Payment Center · filed 2010-03-18

DiPietro has not alleged any facts supporting the conclusion that Vassallo, who is the recipient of the child support award, acted under color of state law. He thus fails to state a claim against her under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A public school principal acts under color of state law when acting in his capacity as principal.

Stokes v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago · filed 2010-03-19

Banks was acting under color of state law in his capacity as principal.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against federal officials acting under color of federal law rather than state law.

Frank Banks v. Federal Deposit Insurance Co · filed 2010-03-24

As for the § 1983 claim, it is well established that “federal officials, acting under color of federal law rather than state law, are not subject to suit under § 1983.” Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 980 F.2d 1043, 1053 (5th Cir. 1993).

A private corporation is a proper § 1983 defendant only if it acted under color of state law when violating federal rights.

Jacobowitz v. M & T Mortgage Corp. · filed 2010-03-24

The complaint does not, however, contain any allegations suggesting that M & T was acting under color of state law in effectuating the foreclosure judgment. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that M & T was not a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the District Court’s dismissal of the Jacobowitzes’s due process claims was proper.

Section 1983 does not reach a due process claim against a private person who was not alleged to be acting under color of state law.

Hammer v. Ernest B. Haire, III · filed 2010-03-25

Therefore, we also affirm on the basis that Hammer improperly alleged due process violations against a private party, even though the district court did not rely on this ground.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations connecting private attorneys to state action; a conclusory allegation of conspiracy is insufficient.

McKnight v. Middleton · filed 2010-03-29

Plaintiffs § 1983 claim appears to allege that the Mayerson attorneys acted under color of state law by conspiring with the Family Court to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Once again, Plaintiff asserts no factual basis for his conclusory conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 does not cover an inmate’s use of force when the inmate did not act under color of state law.

Jacson v. Foster · filed 2010-03-30

The district court properly dismissed Jackson’s excessive force claim because inmate Doakes did not act under color of state law under any formulation of the governmental actor tests.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting an inference that the defendant acted under color of state law.

STOECKLEY v. City of New York · filed 2010-03-31

As I conclude that the amended complaint fails to allege facts which, if credited, would permit a finding that defendant Velazquez acted under color of state law, it is unnecessary to address the question whether plaintiffs have alleged a deprivation of any federally protected right, privilege or immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private bank for freezing funds when that conduct was contrary to the state citation and was not taken under color of state law.

London v. RBS Citizens, N.A. · filed 2010-04-01

Therefore, because the Londons did not allege any action by Charter One that was taken under color of state law, Charter One may not be held liable under § 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff alleging misuse of police authority must prove the defendant’s police employment.

Zaken v. Will Kelley · filed 2010-04-01

Moreover, Zaken cannot show substantial prejudice because Kelley’s employment as a police officer was an essential element that Zaken had to prove to succeed on his § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private actor is liable only when the state is responsible for the challenged conduct.

Nieman v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2010-04-08

He does not allege in the Complaint that the Defendants, collectively or individually, acted under color of state law, nor does he aver that the state is in some way responsible for his termination. The Complaint establishes that the Defendants are private actors who are not subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private attorneys representing clients in state court do not meet that requirement merely by doing so.

Frank C. Johnson, Jr. v. Wilbur · filed 2010-04-22

A civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 generally requires a defendant to act under color of state law. ... Here, the record shows that the defendants were private actors whose representation of their clients in state court against Johnson was merely private conduct, that did not come within any of the three exceptions listed above.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only against persons acting under color of state law.

Smith v. Albert Einstein Medical Center · filed 2010-04-28

The District Court correctly presumed that Smith’s daughters brought their constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and concluded that the facts did not suggest that Imbesi acted under ... color of state law. See Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating there is no liability under § 1983 for those not acting under color of state law).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of law in depriving the plaintiff of federal rights.

Turner v. Children's Hospital of Philadelphia · filed 2010-04-30

Turner failed to allege that the hospital acted under color of law in allegedly depriving her of her constitutional rights, see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). The hospital’s alleged infringement of Turner’s federal rights was not properly alleged to be “fairly attributable to the State,” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). For this reason alone, her section 1983 action will not lie.

A private prison chaplaincy acts under color of state law for § 1983 when it controls a prisoner’s access to religious materials and services through a duty delegated by the prison.

Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, NA · filed 2010-05-05

Because DOC policy did not permit Florer to have access to Jewish materials and services from other sources without Congregation’s approval, and because DOC policy required that Florer request those materials through the facility chaplain, who relied exclusively on Congregation’s voluntarily offered determination that Florer was not Jewish, Congregation assumed the DOC’s obligation and maintained control over Florer’s access to Jewish materials and services. Congregation therefore acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a counsel substitute who acts for an inmate rather than the state at a prison disciplinary hearing.

Armenta v. Pryor · filed 2010-05-10

Armenta’s proposed amendment would have been futile as to his claims against Johnson. As the district court noted, under our precedent, counsel substitutes act on behalf of the inmate, not the state, in a disciplinary hearing and are therefore not amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a public defender liable for performing a defense lawyer’s traditional functions because that work is not under color of state law.

Nelson v. Rapp · filed 2010-05-24

As noted by the District Court, a public defender does not act “under color of state law” and is not liable under section 1983 when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as defense counsel.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a defendant acted under color of state law, but does not require the plaintiff to plead facts about state action that are peculiarly within others’ knowledge.

Loosier v. Unknown Medical Doctor · filed 2010-06-01

In addition to alleging facts showing deliberate indifference, Loosier also had to allege facts showing that the Doctor and the Nurse were acting under the color of state law in order to state a claim under § 1983. ... As we have said in the past, we do not require plaintiffs to plead facts peculiarly within the knowledge of defendants. ... Accordingly, we remand for limited discovery on the issue of whether the Doctor and the Nurse were state actors.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Ludwig v. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity · filed 2010-06-04

A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim may be maintained only against a defendant who acts under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Private actors, such as the defendants named here, can be said to act under color of state law only if their conduct is fairly attributable to the state. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982). Ludwig makes no allegation in her complaint that would even arguably support a claim that the private defendants acted under color of state law. As a result, the § 1983 claim was properly dismissed.

A Section 1983 claim fails when the complaint does not suggest that the defendant acted under color of law.

Robinson v. Brynn · filed 2010-06-04

Notwithstanding plaintiffs reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nothing in the complaint suggests that defendant acted under color of District of Columbia law. This alone is fatal to plaintiffs civil rights claim.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that a private defendant acted under color of state law, including through a conspiracy with state officials.

Wideman v. Garcia · filed 2010-06-14

Garcia was not a state official, nor could her decision to file several family-law actions against Wideman be plausibly read as a conspiracy with Colorado officials.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

McIntyre v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-06-14

“Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.” ... Thus, McIntyre’s § 1983 claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and warrants dismissal.

Section 1983 does not cover federal officials acting under color of federal law.

McIntyre v. District of Columbia Government, City of Washington, D.C. · filed 2010-06-14

The United States attorneys involved in prosecuting McIntyre did not act under color of any statute of the District of Columbia, but acted as federal officials, under color of federal law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Blythe v. Southwest Airlines Co. · filed 2010-06-18

Ms. Blythe’s complaint included no allegation that Southwest Airlines acted “under color of state law.” Thus, it failed to state a federal claim or invoke federal subject-matter jurisdiction as a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not support a constitutional claim against private parties whose alleged conduct was not carried out under government authority.

Cheeks v. Fort Myer Construction Co. · filed 2010-06-25

To the extent that Cheeks is suing private actors for alleged constitutional violations, his claims fail as a matter of law. ... There are no allegations that the private parties alleged to have conducted surveillance did so under the authority of the government; in fact, the allegations are to the contrary. ... Therefore, the Court finds that Cheeks has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against all non-government defendants.

A private citizen may be liable under § 1983 for joint action with state officials only when facts show an agreement to deprive someone of a constitutional right and willing participation in that joint activity.

Polacek v. Kemper County, Miss. · filed 2010-06-28

To sustain a claim that a private citizen is liable under § 1983 on the basis of joint action with the State or state officials, the plaintiff must allege facts showing an agreement or meeting of the minds between the state actor and the private actor to engage in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, and that the private actor was a willing participant in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private party who conspires with a state actor, but vague conspiracy allegations do not state a claim.

Brookhart v. Rohr · filed 2010-06-30

Here, the majority of the defendants are private citizens and not state actors. Liability would attach if a private party conspired with a state actor, Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, but the District Court properly concluded that the vague allegations of a conspiracy to defraud Brookhart of his property did not satisfy the plausibility standard of Rule 12(b)(6), see Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim against a court-appointed defense attorney who did not act under color of state law.

Hinton v. Rudasill · filed 2010-06-30

Because appellee did not act as a federal official or under color of state law in his capacity as appellant’s court-appointed defense attorney, appellant cannot bring a damages claim for a constitutional violation against appellee under either Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Private parties who merely report a suspected crime to police do not act under color of state law for Section 1983 without evidence of a prearranged plan or joint action with officials.

Zaidi v. Amerada Hess Corp. · filed 2010-07-12

There is no evidence that the Hess Defendants worked with Suffolk County authorities pursuant to any prearranged plan to “frame” Plaintiff for the theft at the station. Even after discovery, Plaintiff has uncovered nothing to support his claim that the Hess Defendants were sufficiently clothed with the authority of the state so as to render them state actors for the purpose of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a private animal shelter’s medical procedures when the shelter acts under its own authority rather than under state law.

Fabrikant v. French · filed 2010-07-13

To the contrary, the defendants performed the medical procedures in furtherance of the UCSPCA’s objectives and under the UCSPCA’s control rather than under some statutory delegation of authority. Accordingly, the conduct alleged in plaintiffs due process claim brought under § 1983 was not carried out under color of law, and defendants’ motion for summary judgment of Cause of Action Five will be granted.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law; allegations concerning only private actors do not satisfy that requirement.

Handley v. Chase Bank USA NA · filed 2010-07-15

In this case, Handley’s allegations concern private actors only and consequently do not implicate any federal rights under § 1983. Moreover, we agree with the District Court that nothing in the complaint allows an inference that appellees acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation to have been committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Schneller v. Crozer Chester Medical Center · filed 2010-07-20

Schneller’s civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 do contemplate a private cause of action and therefore confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court; however, we agree with the District Court that his § 1983 claim fails because Schneller failed to demonstrate that the alleged violations were committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an off-duty officer to proceed when the allegations plausibly show that he invoked police authority during an assault.

G'SELL v. Carven · filed 2010-07-21

Accordingly, the Court will deny Meuse’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for § 1983 liability at this time to allow discovery into the relevant facts and, perhaps, a fuller record for subsequent reconsideration of this admittedly close question.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; a private party does not become a state actor merely by misleading a judge in litigation.

Anderson v. Kitchen · filed 2010-07-30

Again, defendants’ actions in allegedly misleading a state court judge did not constitute joint action between defendants and the judge.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a federal detention officer who was acting under federal authority rather than color of state or D.C. law.

Brown v. Short · filed 2010-07-30

Because DSO Short was not a state actor who can be sued under Section 1983, DSO Short’s motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim will be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against an officer acting under federal rather than state or D.C. authority.

Brown v. Handy · filed 2010-07-30

Because DSO Short was not a state actor who can be sued under Section 1983, DSO Short’s motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim will be granted.

State agency officials acting in their capacities as government employees satisfy § 1983’s color-of-state-law element.

Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley · filed 2010-08-04

In this case, the Defendants were acting under the color of state law in their capacities as state government employees of the ODJFS; accordingly, the first element is met.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private parties for conspiring with judges to plead facts that plausibly show an agreement.

Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP · filed 2010-08-05

Thus, in order to state a claim under § 1983, Proposed Amended Complaint 3 must have adequately pled the existence of a conspiracy between Defendants, who are private parties, and the judges of the Pennsylvania court system.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a private court reporter’s conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Yevstifeev v. Steve · filed 2010-08-12

Plaintiff does not allege that Scarcelli is a state actor, or that he is employed by the New York Unified Court System, nor does plaintiff allege any basis upon which Scarcelli’s conduct may be “fairly attributable to the State.”

Section 1983 does not cover a defense attorney’s traditional work in a criminal proceeding because that work is not action under color of state law.

Hernandez-Hernandez v. Fagerberg · filed 2010-08-16

Hernandez’s allegations against his counsel were based on the traditional functions of an attorney in a criminal proceeding. His appeal of the district court’s determination that he failed to show state action is thus without merit.

A § 1983 claim against private individuals requires facts showing that they were state actors or acted under color of state law, including through a conspiracy.

Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestic Relations Sections · filed 2010-08-17

The District Court also appropriately dismissed Appellant’s remaining civil rights claims against her husband and his attorney, as she did not set forth any facts in her amended complaint sufficient to demonstrate they are state actors or acted under color of state law via a conspiracy or otherwise, as is required to pursue a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against defendants acting under color of tribal law.

Harrington v. Perry · filed 2010-08-17

A § 1983 action is unavailable “for persons alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; conclusory allegations of a conspiracy with judges do not establish that requirement for private defendants.

Mayercheck v. Judges of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court · filed 2010-08-18

Neither Barbara nor Wiker was acting under color of state law, and we agree with the District Court that Mayercheck’s assertions that they conspired with the other judicial defendants are mere conclusory allegations. Therefore, he fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats employees of a state public college created by state law as state actors.

Tann v. Ludwikoski · filed 2010-08-18

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that defendant violated “a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,” and that the deprivation of that right “was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” ... We conclude that Ludwikoski and Mateja, as employees of a state public educational institution created by state law, are state actors.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting an inference that the defendant acted under color of state or D.C. law.

McAlister v. Potter · filed 2010-08-23

The claims alleging a violation of § 1983 will be dismissed because Ms. McAlister has simply not pleaded sufficient factual content to allow the Court to draw any inference that the Postal Inspectors were acting under color of D.C. law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead that private defendants acted under color of state law.

Anderson v. Law Firm of Shorty, Dooley · filed 2010-08-26

Anderson also fails to demonstrate in her pleadings that the defendants who are private actors were acting under color of state law.

A private attorney appointed by a court does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when performing the traditional role of an attorney.

Jensen v. Douglas · filed 2010-08-26

The district court properly dismissed the action against defendant Harris, a private attorney appointed by the court to represent Amber Jensen in the child dependency proceedings, because he did not act under color of state law. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 n.7 (1981) (noting that a private attorney, even one appointed by the court, does not act under the color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing the traditional role of an attorney).

Section 1983 requires facts supporting an inference that a private defendant acted under color of state law; performing a public transportation contract alone does not suffice.

Harris v. Veolia Transportation Services, Inc. · filed 2010-09-03

These allegations are insufficient to support a finding that there is so close a nexus between Defendants’ actions and the State of Arizona that Defendants’ actions can fairly be considered state actions. The mere performance of a public contract to provide transportation services does not make the actions of the private contractor state action.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a public employee’s private defamation suit does not qualify when the employee does not use or misuse state authority.

Bradley v. Atlantic City Board of Education · filed 2010-09-07

In filing and pursuing his lawsuit, Caldwell did not exercise or misuse power derived by the authority of the state. The undisputed fact that Caldwell’s wife was also a plaintiff in the defamation suit underscores this point. Because the record does not support a conclusion that Caldwell acted under color of law when he filed his defamation suit, he is entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Rodriguez-Quiñones v. Lehigh Safety Shoe, Co. · filed 2010-09-09

There is no indication anywhere in the record that Lehigh acted, or attempted to act, under color of state law as contemplated under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a showing that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Alexander v. Salazar · filed 2010-09-13

Alexander does not argue, and there is no evidence, that any defendant took action under “color of state law.” As a result, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not an appropriate basis for the exercise of federal court jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an off-duty police officer for personal conduct unconnected to official authority.

Lawrence v. City of St. Paul · filed 2010-09-15

Because Lawrence has pleaded no facts plausibly indicating that Willner was acting under color of state law during the August 24 altercation, Willner cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against federal agencies or officials acting under color of federal law.

Smart v. US DEPT. OF VETERAN AFFAIRS · filed 2010-09-23

The VA is a federal agency acting under color of federal law and the remaining Defendants are brought into this suit in their official capacities as federal officials. Consequently, Plaintiff's claim against Defendants is not proper under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private defendant to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Nawrocki v. Wilson, et al. · filed 2010-09-28

Nawrocki has not alleged that any private-entity defendant, at any time relevant to any of his claims, was a “person [acting] under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, he has not stated a cognizable claim under § 1983 against any of the private-entity defendants.

Section 1983 applies only to individuals acting under color of state law.

Voinche v. Obama · filed 2010-09-29

Defendants correctly recognize that § 1983 applies only to individuals acting under color of state law.

Whether an officer acted under color of state law for § 1983 purposes is a different inquiry from whether the officer acted within the scope of employment, though the latter may be a factor.

Menghi v. Hart · filed 2010-09-30

Whether actions are performed “in the scope of employment” is a different inquiry as to whether those acts were made “under color of state law” for § 1983 purposes. Indeed the question of whether an off-duty police officer was acting within the scope of his employment is cited as a factor in determining whether that person was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an alderman’s attempt to enforce parking rules outside his authority does not meet that requirement.

Wilson v. Price · filed 2010-10-04

Although the alderman’s actions were reprehensible, we find that they were not made under color of state law and, therefore, cannot serve as the basis for § 1983 liability.

A § 1983 claim that a private litigant acted jointly with judges requires facts supporting an agreement or conspiracy.

Freeman v. Rice · filed 2010-10-12

Freeman’s second amended complaint does not allege any facts to support an agreement or conspiracy between Rice and the judges of the Florida District Court of Appeals. In the absence of such allegations, Freeman’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private business as a state actor merely because it collects a tax required by state law.

Cohen v. WORLD OMNI FINANCIAL CORP. · filed 2010-10-20

World Omni was obligated to follow the law, as are all citizens, and did so by collecting the tax. As noted, Cohen’s claim that the act of collecting the tax converts World Omni into a state actor is untenable.

A private party faces Section 1983 conspiracy liability only when the party and a state official agree to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

STATE EX REL. MIRBEAU OF GENEVA LAKE, LLC v. City of Lake Geneva · filed 2010-10-27

However, Mirbeau’s Section 1983 claim against LDD and Muenster simply does not indicate that the two defendants conspired with the City officials for the purpose of violating the plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law.

Section 1983 claims against private parties require that they acted under color of state law.

John Webber, Jr. v. Griffin · filed 2010-10-29

The district court properly dismissed Webber’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against certain private parties (the “Individual Defendants”) for alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments because they were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not reach private defendants when the alleged facts show no concerted or joint activity with a state judge.

Green v. Mallia · filed 2010-11-01

Because none of the factual allegations describe concerted or joint activity, the private Defendants did not act under color of state law, and the district court properly dismissed Appellants’ § 1983 claims.

A § 1983 claim against private attorneys requires more than unsupported allegations that they acted jointly with a judge.

Picciotto v. Zabin · filed 2010-11-09

Appellants fail to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the attorney-appellees despite their allegation that the attorneys had been “willful participant[s] in joint activity” with the judge presiding over the state case.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party when a sufficiently close nexus links that party’s conduct to the state.

Burton v. Kindle · filed 2010-11-10

While a private party can qualify as a state actor when there “is a sufficiently close nexus” between the state and the private party’s conduct, id., Burton has alleged no such connection here.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law.

Kerner v. Mendez · filed 2010-11-12

Mendez was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; compliance with state law does not itself defeat liability.

Welch v. THEODORIDES-BUSTLE · filed 2010-11-17

Indeed, acting under color of state law is a prerequisite to liability under § 1983, not a defense to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires plausible facts showing that a private defendant acted jointly with state officials; a bare assertion of joint action is insufficient.

Ennis v. City of Daly City · filed 2010-11-22

Moreover, plaintiffs bare assertion that Colvin instructed Carson employees to assault plaintiff after plaintiffs interaction with officer Kranz does not plausibly allege, beyond a speculative level, joint action sufficient to support plaintiffs section 1983 claims against Carson based on the violation of any Fourth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Donnelly v. TRL Inc · filed 2010-11-30

A review of Donnelly’s Complaint reveals no allegation giving rise to a plausible inference that Compservice acted under color of state law or conspired with state actors to deny Donnelly his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a prosecutor who reaches a suspect as a robbery victim does not act under color of state law by attacking him.

Collins v. Alevizos · filed 2010-12-09

Alevizos’s access to Collins was not made possible because he was a prosecutor, it was made possible because he was the victim of a robbery. Alevizos was thus not acting under color of state law during the alleged attack.

Section 1983 does not cover an officer’s personal conduct merely because the officer is on duty and in uniform.

Stroby v. Egg Harbor Township · filed 2010-12-10

In the present case, it is clear that Defendant Lancaster was not acting under the color of state law, even though he was in uniform and on duty. The dispute between Defendant Lancaster and Plaintiff was of a personal nature and did not in any way involve Defendant Lancaster’s role as a police officer.

Private university police officers with broad state-granted police powers can act under color of law for § 1983 even if they do not perform every municipal police function.

Boyle v. Torres · filed 2010-12-21

For these reasons, I conclude that the UCPD Officers acted under color of law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; federal employees acting under federal law cannot be liable under it.

Faylor v. Szupper · filed 2011-01-04

Faylor alleges that defendants Szupper and Tolbert were employees of HUD, a federal agency, who were acting pursuant to federal law; therefore, they cannot be liable under § 1983.

Private parties do not act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983 merely by using state statutes to pursue a state court remedy.

McCarthy v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. · filed 2011-01-11

Moreover, “[t]he mere fact that defendants utilized state statutes to pursue a state court remedy against the plaintiff does not constitute ‘state action’ by private parties.” ... Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that defendants are state actors within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a labor union to show that the union acted under color of state law, such as by acting in concert with the state.

Faragalla v. Douglas County School District RE 1 · filed 2011-01-12

The district court did not err in concluding Ms. Faragalla failed to establish that DCFCE was acting under color of state law when it declined to arbitrate her grievance.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that a private attorney acted under color of state law or conspired with state actors to deny constitutional rights.

Singh v. Harrison · filed 2011-01-24

A review of Singh’s Complaint and her filings before this Court reveals no allegation giving rise to a plausible inference that Defendant David C. Harrison, a private attorney, acted under color of state law or conspired with state actors to deny Singh her constitutional rights. Accordingly, Singh cannot recover under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Schneller v. WCAU Channel 10 · filed 2011-01-25

Schneller’s challenges under §§ 1983 and 1985(3) fail to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for his § 1983 claims do not allege that WCAU acted “under color of state law,” see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988), and his civil conspiracy claim under § 1985(3) consists of nothing more than vague, conclusory allegations.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on a private person’s conduct when the person was not acting as a government agent.

Taflinger v. Hindson · filed 2011-01-26

Further there is no evidence to show that Hindson was acting as an agent of the school when he conducted the videotaping and it is undisputed that Hindson’s purpose in videotaping was performed solely to further his own private prurient interest. Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED for the School on Taflinger’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not apply to claims against federal custodians.

Mike Mendoza, Jr. v. Strickland · filed 2011-02-03

However, because Mendoza was housed in a federal detention facility, this statute does not apply.

An official does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely by identifying herself by her official title during a personal complaint.

Zherka v. DiFiore · filed 2011-02-08

Crediting Zherka’s version of the conversation between him and DiFiore, in which he claims she first identified herself as the district attorney, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that “[t]here is no indication that [DiFiore] intended to, or did, exercise any ‘power possessed by virtue of state law.’” Spec. App’x 10.

Section 1983 requires sufficient factual allegations that an off-duty police officer acted under color of state law.

Claudio v. Sawyer · filed 2011-02-10

Like the district court, we conclude that plaintiffs failed sufficiently to allege that Sawyer, an off-duty police officer, acted under color of state law in shooting Jayson Tirado, as required for a § 1983 claim.

A private attorney and law firm did not act under color of state law merely by allegedly deceiving courts, without joint action with the judges.

Lyon v. Aguilar · filed 2011-02-11

In contrast, plaintiffs here did not allege any joint action between defendants and the various judges or courts before whom plaintiffs’ litigated. In addition, plaintiffs acknowledged in their objections to the order denying their motion to amend that their case was different from the Dennis case because “the New Mexico Courts were deceived unknowing participants,” as compared to the judge in the Dennis case who was a “coconspirator.” R. Vol. 1 at 248. Because plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint did not state a valid § 1983 claim and would have been subject to dismissal, the district court properly denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend based on futility.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; the bank and its employee did not do so in the conduct alleged.

Bridgeforth v. TD Bank NA · filed 2011-02-14

Bridgeforth purported to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Neither defendant was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires allegations that private nursing home operators acted under color of state law.

Taormina v. SUBURBAN WOODS NURSING HOMES, LLC · filed 2011-02-14

Taormina’s Complaint cannot be read to infer that Northern Health and Extendicare were acting under color of state law, and thus Taormina’s § 1983 claims fail against those defendants.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a claim fails when plaintiffs offer no basis for treating the defendant as a state actor.

Negrón-Santiago v. San Cristobal Hospital · filed 2011-02-16

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are equally ill-fated. UTIER argues that it is not a state actor and, thus, cannot be held liable for violations of constitutional rights. Plaintiffs do not provide the slightest argument as to UTIER’s acting under color of state law. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims of violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eight Amendments also fail.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is met when state police officers act within the scope of their employment.

Lane v. Bonin · filed 2011-02-16

In the instant case, all of the defendants are employees of the Pennsylvania State Police and were clearly acting under the color of state law in the scope of their employment as officers when the alleged incidents occurred.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted jointly with the state in the alleged rights violation.

Hoy v. INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF BAYVILLE · filed 2011-02-25

In the instant case, there are no allegations that the Wireless Defendants acted jointly with the Village in any way with respect to any due process violation. Thus, the Section 1983 claim against the Wireless Defendants must also be dismissed o this ground.

Section 1983 does not cover an off-duty officer’s private violence when the officer neither invokes police authority nor acts pursuant to police regulations.

Pearce v. Estate of Longo · filed 2011-03-01

Joseph A. Longo, Jr. was not acting under color of law when he murdered his wife. He was not on duty, nor was he invoking the authority of the police department or acting pursuant to a police regulation.

Section 1983 permits claims against prison employees who act under color of state law.

Roberts v. Klein · filed 2011-03-22

Because Defendants are employees of NDOC and SDCC, the entities responsible for confining Plaintiff, they are acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private company as a state actor for a conspiracy claim based only on general allegations of a relationship with police.

Mitchell v. County of Nassau · filed 2011-03-24

Plaintiffs general, nonspecific allegations regarding a relationship between the defendants cannot support a finding that Cablevision was a state actor for purposes of a § 1983 conspiracy claim, and thus any such claim must fail.

For a § 1983 claim arising from a private repossession, whether a police officer acted under color of state law depends on the officer’s role under the totality of the circumstances.

Harvey v. Plains Township Police Department · filed 2011-03-28

Whether there was action under color of state law is dependent upon the role played by Dombroski in the repossession. The state action question must be addressed after considering the totality of the circumstances and cannot be limited to a single factual question.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Varma v. Fed Bureau of Prisons · filed 2011-03-28

Although not addressed by the Magistrate Judge, Varma fails to state a claim under § 1983 because none of the defendants are alleged to have acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private actors do not meet that requirement merely by receiving federal funding.

Muckle v. UNCF · filed 2011-03-30

The district court did not err in dismissing Muckle’s § 1983 claims against all seven Defendants because they are private actors who could not have acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a complaint that does not allege state action fails to state a claim.

Kolley v. ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES · filed 2011-03-31

For these reasons, the complaint does not allege that Hazel House was a state actor, and thus, does not state any § 1983 claims against the Hazel House Defendants.

Section 1983 does not treat a private person as a state actor merely for reporting suspected criminal activity to government officials.

Anilao v. Spota · filed 2011-03-31

As noted swpra, merely reporting suspected criminal activity to law enforcement or other government officials is not sufficient to render a private party a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983 liability. Accordingly, in the absence of any allegations that O’Connor or Fitzgerald were more directly involved in the investigation and prosecution of plaintiffs or took any steps in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, the § 1983 claims against O’Connor and Fitzgerald are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim, and the Court will provide plaintiffs with an opportunity to re-plead these claims.

Section 1983 covers a private contractor acting under color of state law when its work for the government and its relationship with the state make its conduct attributable to the state.

Norris v. Premier Integrity Solutions, Inc · filed 2011-04-06

Premier conducted the tests for the government after the Administrative Office of the Courts had approved Premier’s policies and methods. Premier’s Executive Vice President stated that judges in Kentucky viewed the direct observation testing method as “essential.” The relationship between the state and Premier in conducting the tests established that Premier acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right; a county council chairperson acts under color of state law when ordering someone removed from a meeting in his official capacity.

Galena Ex Rel. Erie County v. Leone · filed 2011-04-13

For Galena to succeed in this action he had to satisfy the section 1983 requirement that a plaintiff show that the defendant acted under color of state law, and, while so acting, deprived the plaintiff of his rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55 (1988). Of course, there is no doubt that Leone was acting under color of state law when, in his official capacity as chairperson of the Council, he ordered the deputy sheriff to escort Galena from the Council meeting.

Contract chaplains are not state actors under § 1983 when their decisions about religious materials and services are independent ecclesiastical judgments rather than government action.

Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A. · filed 2011-04-15

We must decide whether Defendants, private entities operating as contract chaplains within the Washington State prison system, were “state actors” for purposes of § 1983 and RLUIPA when they declined Florer’s request for a Torah, a Jewish calendar, and a rabbi visit on the ground that they did not consider Florer to be Jewish. We hold that, in the circumstances here, Defendants were not state actors.

Section 1983 does not cover claims against a federal marshal acting under color of federal law.

Johnson v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2011-04-21

At oral argument on September 24, 2010, the Court reaffirmed its finding that Marshal Dillard had acted under color of federal law as the United States Marshal for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for the same reasons outlined in its prior Order, see Mem. Op. & Order [Dkts. ## 202, 203], and dismissed all claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against Marshal Dillard.

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of state law.

Meyers v. Brooms · filed 2011-05-03

The district court properly dismissed Meyers’ § 1983 claims against defendants Brooms, Alliance Title Reverse Mortgage and Brooms’ attorneys because they did not act under color of state law.