42 U.S.C. § 1983

A public bus driver acts under color of state law when he uses his position to obtain police assistance to eject a passenger.

Louis v. Metropolitan Transit Authority · filed 2015-11-06

Because Wright’s position, allowed,him to obtain police assistance to eject Louis, Wright acted under the color of state law.

Court-appointed attorneys are not state actors under § 1983 when performing traditional functions as counsel in a criminal proceeding.

Conway v. Hecker · filed 2015-11-20

Court-appointed attorneys are not state actors for § 1983 purposes when they are performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel in a criminal proceeding.

Section 1983 permits damages suits against individual government officials only when they act under color of law and violate federal rights.

Olejnik v. England · filed 2015-11-25

England’s taking of Olejnik’s bodily specimens was wrongful, but it was an individual action not taken “under color of law,” and' thus it is not actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against private parties who act under color of state law by influencing governmental decisions that deprive a person of rights.

Forrest Construction Inc. v. City of Greenwood · filed 2003-10-07

We affirm the grant of judgment on the pleadings to the Whitsons, because Forrest did not establish the Whitsons acted only to injure Forrest and not to influence the City’s and the Council’s decisions.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Rosen v. Property Advantage Partners · filed 2015-11-30

The district court properly dismissed Rosen’s § 1983 claim because Rosen failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any defendant acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a civil rights conspiracy plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law and agreed with another defendant to deprive the plaintiff of a right.

Lawrence v. Thornburg Mortgage Home Loans Inc. · filed 2015-12-02

The district court did not err by dismissing Lawrence’s complaint against Cenlar Bank. Lawrence complained about a conspiracy to violate his civil rights, but he failed to allege that Cenlar Bank acted under color of state law, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or that it “reached an understanding” with another defendant to deprive Lawrence of any right under state or federal law, see Bailey v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Alachua Cnty., Fla., 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir. 1992).

Section 1983 permits claims against federal officers who act under color of state law through a sufficiently close nexus with state officials.

Little v. Gore · filed 2015-12-08

Given the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly pled that Faw was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 applies to persons acting under color of state or territorial law, not to actions under federal law.

Coleman v. United States · filed 2015-12-11

That statute is limited to actions under color of state (or terri- torial) law, not actions under federal law, and it applies only to “person[s]” committing such actions.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Ilaw v. Department of Justice · filed 2015-12-11

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Section 1983 because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that either Defendant acted “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires a plausible showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

McCracken v. Wells Fargo Bank NA · filed 2015-12-14

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to redress constitutional violations caused by officials acting under color of state law, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982), while Bivens authorizes a cause of action to redress constitutional violations caused by officials acting under color of federal law, 403 U.S. at 396-97. ... We agree with the District Court that nothing in McCracken’s complaint plausibly shows that Wells Fargo was acting under color of state or federal law in rejecting his debit card transactions.

A private entity acts under color of state law for § 1983 when the state compels its conduct, its conduct has a sufficiently close nexus to the state, or it performs a traditional public function.

Brinn v. Syosset Public Library · filed 2015-12-15

Brinn’s § 1983 claim against Morris Duffy fails because he has presented no evidence that the firm acted under color of state law. For purposes of § 1983, a private entity acts under color of state law when (1) “the State compelled the conduct,” (2) “there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the private conduct,” or (3) the private conduct involved a traditional “public function.”

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of law; a complaint need not allege that they acted within the scope of their employment.

Warner v. Schneiderman · filed 2015-12-23

Given that such an allegation is unnecessary in a section 1983 action, which requires only that defendants operated “under color of law,” there is merit to this contention.

Section 1983 authorizes suits only against persons acting under color of state law.

Acevedo v. Cerame · filed 2015-12-31

Section 1983 authorizes suits only against persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation to be committed by a person acting under color of state law, and government funding alone does not establish that status for a private entity.

M.J. Garcia v. Tomorrows Hope, LLC · filed 2016-01-11

A private entity does not act under color of state law for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim merely because it receives government funding. ... However, an allegation that a private entity receives government funding is insufficient to establish that the private entity acted under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not cover a private hospital’s suspension of a physician’s privileges when the decision cannot be attributed to the state.

William I. Babchuk, M.D., P.C. v. Indiana University Health, Inc · filed 2016-01-11

That was incorrect; clearly they were not acting under color of law.

Section 1983 requires a claimant to show that a person or entity acting under color of state law deprived the claimant of a federally protected right.

Littlejohn v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2007-04-27

We affirm summary judgment for the reasons cited in the magistrate judge’s August 31, 2005 report and adopted by the district court in its order entered September 15, 2005. See id. (requiring a section 1983 claimant to show that a person or entity acting under color of state law deprived him of a federally protected right); see also Goichman v. Rheuban Motors, Inc., 682 F.2d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir.1982) (no section 1983 liability on private towing company because the government has a “considerable interest in imposing the cost of removal [of a vehicle by towing] upon the vehicle owner and retaining possession of the vehicle as a security for payment.”) (internal quotation omitted).

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law, and an officer can meet that requirement while abusing state authority outside the scope of employment.

Maimaron v. Commonwealth · filed 2007-05-14

Third, and of importance to this case, when a public official “misuses” or “abuses” the authority given him by the State (i.e., if he acts outside the scope of his employment) he nevertheless acts under color of State law where he is “clothed with the authority of [S]tote law.” ... In the circumstances of this case, it was not necessary for the arbitrator to find that Oxner had acted within the scope of employment in order to find that he acted under color of State law. To establish that prerequisite to § 1983 liability, it was necessary for the arbitrator to find only that Oxner had acted under color of State law.

Section 1983 requires a private entity’s conduct to be attributable to the state; using state courts alone does not make the entity a state actor.

Graham v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. · filed 2016-01-18

A private entity cannot be liable § 1983 unless it has acted under color of state law. ... The fact that a private entity uses the state courts does not transform the private party into a state actor.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to use the words “under color of law” when the complaint’s facts adequately allege state action.

Gerhardt v. Mares · filed 2016-01-20

Gerhardt has adequately alleged that Woods acted under color of law. ... Courts do not require use of the phrase “under color of law.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

Hutchinson v. Wexford Health Services, Inc. · filed 2016-01-22

Hutchinson brought his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Given § 1983 requires defendants to act under the color of state law, Hutchinson could not have brought the complaint unless the named defendants were state actors.

Section 1983 treats an official as acting under color of state law when he uses his supervisory authority to induce another official to harass a plaintiff.

Ecotone Farm LLC v. Edward Ward, II · filed 2016-01-28

The clear and fair implication of these allegations is that Ward wielded his supervisory position over Fox — in particular, his ability to influence whether Fox would keep his job — to convince Fox to harass the plaintiffs and share documents that facilitated Ward’s own complaints. That suffices to allege action under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing an elected official to show that the challenged conduct used state authority; holding office alone does not make private conduct state action.

O'Connor v. Williams · filed 2016-02-05

Even considering all of Williams’ acts together in the light most favorable to O’Connor, O’Connor hasn’t established that Williams used power made possible only because of her elected office in obtaining and serving the order.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law; federal officials acting under federal authority do not meet that requirement.

Quaid v. Kerry · filed 2016-02-17

Plaintiffs also fail to state a Section 1983 claim because they did not allege in their complaint that defendants were acting “under color of state law” when they revoked plaintiffs’ passports.

A private defendant may act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes by conspiring with a state actor, but the complaint must allege facts supporting an agreement to violate constitutional rights.

Olson v. Carmack · filed 2016-02-19

And although this color-of-state-law requirement can be established by allegations that a private actor conspired with a state actor, see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980), the amended complaint is devoid of any factual allegations, as opposed to unsupported conclusions, that the Neighbors reached an agreement with a state actor to violate Mr. Olson’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not reach a private university’s discipline of campus police officers when the university acts as an employer rather than under color of state law.

Collins v. Northwestern University · filed 2016-02-24

Because Northwestern is not a state actor, its motions to dismiss are granted as to the portions of plaintiffs’ claims that are brought pursuant to § 1983 contained in Count III of Collins’s complaint, Counts III through V of Webber’s complaint, and Counts IV through VI of Kramarz’s complaint.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible by authority of state law.

Arar v. Ashcroft · filed 2008-08-01

“[t]he traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’ ”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private company to allege facts showing that the company acted under color of state law.

Hirth v. Wal-Mart Stores East · filed 2016-02-25

Hirth’s Section 1983 claims fail because she has not alleged that Wal-Mart, a private company, should be treated as a state actor given the facts of this case.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state law violated a federal right.

Farrar v. McNesby · filed 2016-02-25

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person acting under color of state law and does not apply to federal defendants acting in their federal roles.

Simmons v. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · filed 2016-02-26

Second, § 1983 creates a private cause of action against a person acting under color of State law and, thus, does not apply to the federal defendants sued here.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; city employees do not meet that requirement merely by reporting an incident to police and testifying as witnesses while on duty.

Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corporation · filed 2016-03-02

Because Schaffer fails to show that the parking officers acted under color of state law as is required for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, summary judgment in favor of the parking officers was proper.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant was a state actor or acted under color of state law.

Omotosho v. Freeman Investment & Loan · filed 2016-03-09

The plaintiff has failed to allege facts that could establish that any defendant is a state actor or. acted under color of state law.

Section 1983's under-color-of-law requirement can cover an abuse of state authority outside an employee's official duties.

Washington Counties Risk Pool v. Corter · filed 2016-03-15

By contrast, the "under color of law" standard of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is intended to provide broad redress for civil rights violations and to include a remedy where an individual acting outside the scope of the duties of his or her office inflicts damage through an abuse of state authority.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of law.

U.S. Bank National Association v. Poblete · filed 2016-03-18

To the extent that Poblete’s “Section 1983” claim against US Bank is based on acts other than the false statements, it fails for failure to state a claim because he does not, and cannot, allege that US Bank was acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of . . . the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An on-duty police officer who actively participates in a creditor’s repossession acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Goard v. Crown Auto, Inc. · filed 2016-03-21

When an on-duty police officer actively participates in a creditor’s repossession, as clearly alleged in Goard’s complaint, “the officers are participating in the removal of the debtor’s property while cloaked in the mantle of their authority as agents of the state.” ... Therefore, Goard’s complaint satisfies the second requirement set forth in Gomez.

A state tax investigator performing her official duties acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Brittingham v. Gove-Ortmeyer · filed 2016-03-30

There is no genuine dispute of material fact Defendant was acting under color of state law when she carried out her duties to investigate Plaintiff ’s nonpayment of taxes on behalf of Bentz Motors, nor when she certified probable cause to prosecute Plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not cover a bus driver’s citizen’s arrest made for an independent purpose when the driver has no duty or special authority to enforce the law.

Rogers v. the Orange County Transit Authority · filed 2016-04-01

Because Torres had no duty or special authority to enforce the California Vehicle Code, he answered the deputy’s questions and made a citizen’s arrest as a private citizen acting “for an independent purpose” – not under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits suit only against those acting under color of state law.

Meredith v. Kristina Deeds · filed 2016-04-06

However, only those acting under color of state law are amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 excludes merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.

Payton v. Blair's Bail Bonds, Inc. · filed 2016-04-07

“[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a constitutional or federal statutory right violation by a person acting under color of state law.

Quick Korner Market v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food & Nutrition Service · filed 2016-05-04

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law, West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). ... Here, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that plausibly suggest constitutional violations were committed by a person acting under color of state law.”

Section 1983 does not treat a private hospital or doctor as acting under color of law merely because they follow state law.

Fonseca v. Kaiser Permanente Medical Center Roseville · filed 2016-05-13

If the facts here were enough to show Kaiser and Dr. Myette had acted under color of law, then a private person would act under color of law every time he or she obeyed laws or regulations of his or her own accord, which cannot be.

Section 1983 permits claims against government actors for constitutional violations committed under color of state law.

Reyes v. North Texas Tollway Authority · filed 2016-05-16

NTTA is a government actor. ... Therefore, its actions are subject to scrutiny under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows suits only against defendants acting under color of law.

Kuri v. Matrix Center · filed 2016-05-18

Section 1983 allows suits only against people acting “under color of [law].” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not provide relief for conduct by federal actors alone.

Mufti v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-07

Because the ' Plaintiffs Complaint does not pertain to state actors — only to federal actors — § 1983 relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Valero v. Bank of America Home Loans · filed 2016-06-23

The district court properly dismissed the Valeros’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the Valeros failed to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Blankenship v. Buenger · filed 2016-06-28

Because Blankenship’s complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show that the CBWSC Defendants were acting under color of state law, the district court properly dismissed Blankenship’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 can reach an official’s abuse of state authority even when the official lacks actual authority to commit the challenged act.

Davis v. Robert · filed 2016-06-29

However, state action is made out by abuse of position or authority; thus, it is not essential that the official actually have authority to commit the challenged act.

Section 1983 does not make a private actor liable for deceiving a state official into unlawful conduct without a shared unconstitutional goal.

Wilson v. Warren County, Illinois · filed 2016-07-18

Lying to a state actor in order to induce him to participate in unlaw- ful conduct, however, is the type of unilateral action that does not create private actor liability.

Section 1983 claims require action under color of state law; a private counselor’s compliance with state licensing requirements does not alone make the counselor a state actor.

Kennedy v. American Airlines Inc. · filed 2016-07-20

Nevertheless, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be lodged only against persons acting under color of state law, see, e.g., Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir.2011), and the compliance of Defendants’ agent with state licensing requirements does not transform a private counselor role into that of a state actor.

Section 1983 treats NYCERS as an actor under color of state law.

King v. New York City Employees Retirement System · filed 2016-07-25

NYCERS is an actor under color of state law for purposes of a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 imposes liability on persons who, acting under color of state law, deprive someone of a constitutional or federal right.

Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted · filed 2016-07-29

Casey did not act under color of state law here for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a lawyer does not become a state actor merely by representing a client as an officer of the court.

DiCesare v. McAnally · filed 2016-08-04

But “a lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state law’ within the meaning of § 1983.”

Sworn police officers at a private university act under color of state authority when performing their official duties.

Dempsey v. Bucknell University · filed 2016-08-22

Although Bucknell University is a private institution, BUPS officers are sworn police officers pursuant to 22 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 501. For this reason, their official actions are taken “under color of state authority” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a claim fails when no facts connect the defendant to the government.

Pérez-Maspons v. Stewart Title Puerto Rico, Inc. · filed 2016-09-16

The first step in analyzing- any § 1983 claim is whether the defendant acted under color of state law. ... Plaintiff has alleged no facts that any Defendants were associated with the government in any way. ... The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; a claim against an employer with no government association fails.

Rodríguez-Cruz v. Stewart Title Puerto Rico, Inc. · filed 2016-09-19

The first step in analyzing any claim under § 1983 is whether the defendant acted under color of state law. ... Plaintiff admits STPR was not associated with the government in any way. (Docket Nos. 122-2 ¶ 116; 144-1 ¶ 100.) Therefore, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim fails.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; the federal government is not a state actor under the section.

Guo v. Independent Chinese Pen Center Inc. · filed 2016-09-21

First, the federal government is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts sufficient to show that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Morrison v. Dietz · filed 2016-09-21

Dismissal of the action against defendants Dietz and Guidry was proper because Morrison failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Dietz and Guidry acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private actors who are not acting under color of state law.

Reinwand v. Blackburn · filed 2016-09-23

And any attempt to amend would be futile because private ac.tors like Dr. Blackburn not acting under color of state law are not liable for constitutional violations under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats police officers as acting under color of state law when they participate in a training exercise by virtue of their official positions, even while posing as aggressors.

Roberts v. City of New Haven · filed 2016-09-26

Accordingly, I conclude that the defendant officers were state actors and acting under color of law for purposes of any harm for which they would otherwise be liable that occurred during the police training exercise.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law.

Clark v. Lynch · filed 2016-09-29

Further, plaintiff has not alleged that the United States acted under color of state law as required for liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege facts plausibly showing that the defendant acted under color of state law when taking the challenged actions.

Lefande v. Mische-Hoeges · filed 2016-10-20

ORDERS that Defendant's motion to dismiss, see Dkt. No. 5, is GRANTED with respect to all of Plaintiff's federal Constitutional claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts in his complaint that plausibly suggest that Defendant was acting under color of state law, i.e., performing her official duties, at the time that she engaged in any of the actions about which Plaintiff complains; and the Court further ORDERS that the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state-law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), because the Court has dismissed all of Plaintiff's federal claims.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Hosea v. Slaughter · filed 2016-10-27

Slaughter and Timmerman cannot be liable under § 1983 without any factual allegations that they acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

D'Amoun v. Villareal · filed 2016-11-02

The district court properly dismissed D’Amoun’s claims against defendant Villareal, who represented D’Amoun at his criminal trial, because D’Amoun failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Villareal was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that defendants acted under color of state law to state a plausible claim for relief.

McDaniel v. the Secretariat · filed 2016-11-03

The district court properly dismissed McDaniel’s action because McDaniel failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants were acting under color of state law, as required to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a private physician requires facts plausibly showing that the physician acted under color of state law.

Wilkins v. Chrisman · filed 2016-11-21

Khetpal is a physician at a private medical center, and Wilkins has not pleaded sufficient facts to allow the court to reasonably infer that Khetpal was acting under color of state law when he treated Wilkins after the accident.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that defendants acted under color of state law.

Loumena v. Hammon · filed 2016-11-23

Dismissal of Loumena’s action was proper because Loumena failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants were acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Loumena v. Kennedy · filed 2016-11-23

Dismissal of Loumena’s action was proper because Loumena failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any defendant was acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private party who urges officers to seize property is not a state actor when the officers make an independent decision.

Hatlee v. Olds · filed 2016-12-06

They have therefore failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Dr. Olds’s status as a state actor under § 1983.

An off-duty police officer who reports a crime and gives a witness statement without invoking police authority does not act under color of state law for Section 1983.

Fiedler v. Incandela · filed 2016-12-06

For the reasons set forth herein, Incandela was not acting under the color of law on December 20, 2011, and Plaintiffs claims against the Nassau County Defendants arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 can reach federal officials acting jointly with state actors when the plaintiff alleges a shared unconstitutional goal or substantial state cooperation or participation.

Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. v. Rhodes · filed 2016-12-12

To hold federal officials subject to § 1983 liability based on joint action, plaintiff must at least allege that federal and state actors shared a “common, unconstitutional goal,” or point to a “substantial degree of cooperative action” or “overt and significant state participation.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law in violating a federal right.

Madden v. Bob Usry Plumbing · filed 2016-12-13

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of a federal right by a defendant acting under color of state law. ... Madden’s complaint does not provide any basis to conclude that Usry acted under color of state or federal law, nor does it suggest Madden’s federal rights were violated.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a city attorney’s private email expressing personal views does not meet that requirement merely because she used her work account.

Hilton v. Mish · filed 2016-12-13

The fact that Mish used her work email to respond to Zerial’s email, while arguably done in bad judgment, does not transform Mish’s private conduct into official City business. ... Accordingly, Mish was not acting under color of state law when she responded to Zerial’s email.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private casino that detains a patron and calls police when the casino acts as an ordinary business and the police independently evaluate probable cause.

Damico v. Harrah's Philadelphia Casino & Racetrack · filed 2016-12-14

Turning to Harrah’s claims, we also find that Harrah’s did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants acted under color of law.

Holloway v. Imports · filed 2016-12-20

[T]he Amended Complaint continues to bring civil-rights claims against commercial entities and individuals who are not state actors. ... Upon de novo review, we affirm the district court for substantially those reasons set out in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, dated June 7, 2016, and the district court’s order, dated June 27, 2016.

Section 1983 provides relief only when a defendant acting under color of state law deprives a plaintiff of a federal right.

Yoder v. Morrow, Tompkins, Trueblood & Lefevre, LLC · filed 2016-12-20

Section 1983 ... provides a basis for relief only when the (1) plaintiff is deprived of a federal right, and (2) the defendant(s) who deprived her of that right acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private defendants to allege plausible facts showing that they acted under color of state law.

Reginald Eugene Grimes, Sr. v. Security Manager Lidia Sabri · filed 2016-12-22

Here, the district court properly dismissed Grimes’s complaint because it did not allege any plausible facts showing that these private defendants acted under ... color of state or federal law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendants violated a federal constitutional or statutory right while acting under color of state law.

Theede v. Jacobs, Anderson, Potter, & Chaplin LLP · filed 2016-12-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Theede’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unlawful search and seizure claim because Theede failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated his constitutional or statutory rights, or whether defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Trice v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2016-12-22

The district court properly dismissed Trice’s claim for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986 because Trice failed to establish that any of the appellees were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires plausible facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Polidi v. Bannon · filed 2016-12-28

Simply put, plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support a plausible inference that defendant Bell was acting under color of law, and thus the § 1983 count against defendant Bell fails to state a claim and lacks any arguable basis in law or fact.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when state university officials effectively expel a student.

Doe v. Baum · filed 2017-01-05

There is no dispute that the defendants were acting under color of state law when they effectively expelled Doe from a state-run university; that element of the plaintiffs § 1983 claim is satisfied.

Section 1983 requires sufficient factual allegations that a municipality acted under color of law; a bare assertion of municipal customs and policies does not suffice.

Masso-Torrellas v. Municipality of Toa Alta · filed 2017-01-09

Here, given the record, we similarly conclude that there is no sufficient allegation that the Municipality acted under color of law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law; a conclusory allegation that private hospital defendants are state actors is insufficient.

Jones v. Mirza · filed 2017-01-10

When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of federal or constitutional rights.

Johnson v. Loyola University New Orleans · filed 2017-01-20

Johnson’s mere labeling of her case as a § 1983 action is insufficient to explain how the private institution of Loyola acted under color of state law to deprive her of federal or constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal prosecutors in the District of Columbia, even when they prosecute crimes in D.C. Superior Court.

Townsend v. United States · filed 2017-02-21

Further, § 1983 claims brought in this Circuit are not available against federal prosecutors in the DC-USAO, even when those prosecutors are prosecuting crimes in D.C. Superior Court.

Section 1983 claims against private parties require action under color of state law.

Sklodowska-Grezak v. Stein · filed 2017-02-21

Because Finkelstein was not acting under color of state law and neither Stein nor Faedda are state actors, the § 1983 claims must be dismissed.

Government regulation and funding, even total dependence on government contracts and funds, do not by themselves make a private company a state actor under § 1983.

Harold v. University of Colorado Hospital · filed 2017-02-23

Neither being subject to government regulation, Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982), nor being totally dependent on government contracts and funds, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982), makes a private company’s acts under the color of state law. Mr. Harold’s private healthcare defendants do not qualify as state actors.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that defendants affiliated with nonprofit organizations acted under color of state law.

Van Dusen v. City of Oakland · filed 2017-02-27

The district court properly dismissed Van Dusen’s § 1983 claims against defendants who worked in non-profit organizations because Van Dusen failed to allege facts sufficient to show that they acted under color of state law.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is satisfied when a government office sends takedown demands on behalf of state legislators while representing itself as acting for the legislature.

Publius v. Boyer-Vine · filed 2017-02-27

The Office, a government entity, therefore provided legal services on behalf of 40 state legislators at their request and made that clear to WordPress and Hoskins when doing so. In the Court’s view, it is difficult to conceive how this could not constitute state action.

Section 1983 covers a public official’s conduct when a sufficient connection exists between the conduct and the official’s position, even if the official acts in a personal capacity.

O'Toole v. City of Walnut Grove · filed 2017-03-01

The Court finds this indicative the Cole would be seen cloaked in his official position, despite the complaint being filed in his personal capacity. For these reasons, the Court finds the factual circumstances of this case indicate the Plaintiffs claim against Cole is cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to adequately allege that the challenged conduct occurred under color of state law; a state statute authorizing private conduct does not, by itself, establish state action.

Lath v. Oak Brook Condominium Owners' Association, et al. · filed 2017-03-20

Because Lath has failed to adequately allege that any defendant was acting under color of state law when engaging in the conduct that allegedly violated his constitutional rights, he has failed to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Fidge v. Lake County Sheriff's Dept. · filed 2017-03-20

The district court properly granted summary judgment for Gaskell, Hardester, and Harper on Fidge’s unlawful arrest claim because Fidge failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants acted under the color of state law.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on a private actor for a constitutional violation unless the actor acted under color of state law.

Metz v. Herbert · filed 2017-03-20

As an initial matter, the plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims do not apply to the Ridge and are understood to be brought only against Metro, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the following reasons. Private actors are generally not liable for constitutional violations unless they acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; responding to state subpoenas alone did not establish that the defendants did so.

Abordo v. Pcs · filed 2017-03-21

The district court properly denied Abordo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, denied Abordo’s motion for summary judgment, and granted defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to Abordo’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Abordo failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any defendant was acting under the color of state law in responding to subpoenas issued by the State of Hawaii’s Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; when that issue is unresolved, the court may remand for further consideration before addressing qualified immunity.

Sanchez v. Surratt · filed 2017-03-24

Because (1) acting under color of state law is essential for a § 1983 claim, ... we remand for further development and consideration of whether Rose Surratt acted under color or state law.

Section 1983 covers conduct by privately employed special police officers when they act under their state-conferred arrest authority.

McGovern v. George Washington University · filed 2017-03-28

Accordingly, the SPOs were acting under color of state law in approaching the plaintiff and removing him from the auditorium.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Madden v. Madden · filed 2017-03-30

A § 1983 plaintiff must show that the defendant acted under color of state law; it is both an “essential element,” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988), and a jurisdictional requirement, Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 315 (1981); Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 492 (10th Cir. 1995).

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement can be met when a defendant acts in an official capacity or purports to exercise official power.

Mirabella v. Villard · filed 2017-04-04

At this level, we construe Walsh and McDonnell’s actions as being made “under color of state law” for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This requirement can be met where the defendant either: (1) acts in his or her official capacity or (2) “purports to act according to official power.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only against state actors acting under color of state law, not federal actors or contractors acting under color of federal law.

Irving v. PAE Government Services, Inc. · filed 2017-04-11

By. its own terms, § 1983 only applies to state actors acting under color of state law, not federal actors acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 permits an action only against a defendant who acts under color of state law.

Jones v. Mirza · filed 2017-04-13

Even if Jones’ complaint could be construed as alleging a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Jones failed to state a claim for relief. A § 1983 action may be maintained only against a defendant who acts under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Private actors, such as the non-governmental defendants named ... here, can be said to act under color of state law only if their conduct is fairly attributable to the state. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982). The District Court took judicial notice that Dover Behavioral Health is a private psychiatric facility and Dr. Mirza is one of its staff psychiatrists. Jones made no allegation that would even arguably support a claim that these private defendants acted under color of state law in any actions they took regarding his medical care.

Private defendants cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless they acted under color of state law.

Minny Frank v. Cascade Healthcare Community · filed 2017-04-20

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Frank’s § 1983 claims against defendants Cascade Healthcare Community, Inc. (d/b/a St. Charles Medical Center), Palmer, Timms, Ryan, Violet, Huffman, Lancaster, McBride, Beutler, and Nelson because Frank failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these private defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that an alleged deprivation of federal rights is fairly attributable to a state actor; restrictions enforced by private shelters do not meet that requirement without such a connection.

Cobine v. City of Eureka · filed 2017-04-25

It does not appear from the allegations in the current complaint that a state action is responsible for the alleged privacy intrusions compelled by the specific restrictions and conditions enforced by the alternative shelters offered to Plaintiffs.

A counsel substitute does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Edwards v. Martin · filed 2017-05-02

However, Edwards has not demonstrated that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to state a § 1983 claim against Brown because a counsel substitute does not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not reach an assault committed by a private student because the assailant is not a state actor.

Doe v. Columbia-Brazoria Independent School District ex rel. Board of Trustees · filed 2017-05-03

In this case, Doe’s claim does not arise from the abuse itself because no state actor committed it.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Grant v. Seabron · filed 2017-05-05

Grant alleges that her family members and nursing home defendants violated her civil rights, but she did not say in her complaint, nor is it apparent, how they acted under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law; the state official’s conduct met the color-of-law requirement here.

Brooks v. Roberts · filed 2017-05-05

To assert a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege they were deprived “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the ... laws” by a person acting under color of state law. There is no doubt defendant has acted under color of state law, and plaintiffs assert they were deprived of rights and privileges conferred by the SNAP Act and its implementing regulations.

Section 1983 requires sufficient facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

McCalip v. Ted Conferences, LLC · filed 2017-05-10

The district court properly dismissed McCalip’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 claims because McCalip failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants acted under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Credico, J. v. Unknown Court Staff · filed 2017-05-15

Second, there are insufficient facts to suggest Defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private defendants who did not act under color of state law.

Ronald Sisco, II v. Loya · filed 2017-05-18

Accordingly, the district court did not err by holding that defendants were not state actors and thus could not be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a state actor and a violation of federal law; claims against federal employees based only on state tort law do not qualify.

Cavezza v. Metcalf · filed 2017-05-19

There are no state actors; only federal employees acting within the scope of their federal employment. There are no references made to a constitutional violation or to a violation of federal law in her complaint; only allegations sounding in state tort law. Just saying § 1983 is the proper cause of action does not make it so.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against public defenders who were not acting under color of state law.

Deion Turner v. Godinez · filed 2017-05-26

The public defenders were not acting under color of state law and thus cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Edrei v. City of New York · filed 2017-05-31

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States.” Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999). For each respective alleged offense, Defendants were plausibly acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits suits against U.S. Parole Commissioners for actions taken under the Revitalization Act when they administer parole for D.C. Code offenders.

Hill v. United States Parole Commission · filed 2017-06-02

Commissioners are thus “amenable to suit under § 1983 for actions taken pursuant to that Act.” Settles, 429 F.3d at 1104 (quoting Fletcher, 370 F.3d at 1227). It would indeed be strange if they could not be sued, as they are fundamentally acting as the D.C. Board when applying D.C. parole standards to D.C. Code offenders.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; attorneys are not state actors solely because they are officers of the court.

Yoder v. MacMain Law Group LLC · filed 2017-06-28

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Attorney MacMain and his law firm are private actors—not state actors. Indeed, “[a]ttorneys performing their traditional functions will not be considered state actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court.”

A complaint can state a § 1983 false arrest claim against private parties by sufficiently alleging that they conspired with police officers to cause an arrest without probable cause.

Hall v. City of Buffalo · filed 2017-06-30

We reject defendants’ contention that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against them for false arrest in violation of 42 USC § 1983. Although defendants are not state actors, the complaint alleges that they engaged in a conspiracy with police officers to have plaintiff arrested without probable cause in order to suppress evidence of what had happened to Sager (see generally Payne v County of Sullivan, 12 AD3d 807, 809-810 [2004]; Freedman v Coppola, 206 AD2d 893, 893-894 [1994]), and we reject defendants’ contention that plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy are merely conclusory (cf. Williams v Maddi, 306 AD2d 852, 853 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 516 [2003], cert denied 541 US 960 [2004]; Ford v Snashall, 285 AD2d 881, 882 [2001]).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private festival operator does not meet that requirement merely by receiving a city permit.

Amistad Christiana Church v. Life is Beautiful, LLC · filed 2017-07-03

The district court properly dismissed the Appellants’ First Amendment claims against Life is Beautiful, a private entity, because it was not acting under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private bank’s account closure does not satisfy that requirement without a basis for attributing it to the state.

Nwachukwu v. Liberty Bank · filed 2017-07-05

In any event, Plaintiff could not utilize § 1983 as a vehicle for his claims against Liberty Bank because that section furnishes a means of redress only with respect to the conduct of those who act “under color of state law” — individuals who are, in case law vernacular, “state actors.” Absent that element, no claim lies under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private medical center’s referral and provision of documents to a state licensing board did not establish a delegated public function or joint action.

Isaacs v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, et al. · filed 2017-07-12

Because plaintiff has failed to allege any conduct in which DHMC engaged under color of state law, DHMC is entitled to the dismissal of Count VI.

Private parties who conspire with a judge can face § 1983 claims even when the judge has judicial immunity.

Alexander v. Reese · filed 2017-07-21

Thus, when private parties conspire with a judge, “it is of no consequence . . . that the judge himself is immune from damages liability”—a plaintiff can still bring a § 1983 action against those private parties.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private party merely for filing a court document or calling the police, even for an improper purpose.

Rice v. City of New York · filed 2017-07-26

Merely filing a document in court, even if procedurally improper, or calling the police, even for an improper purpose, does not create private liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private person may also be liable through joint action with a state actor.

John David Wilson, Jr. v. McFadden · filed 2017-08-02

Wilson did not allege that McFadden was a state actor herself, that the ... state was significantly involved in her conduct, or that she acted under color of state law in any way.

A defense attorney who conspires with state officials to violate constitutional rights can act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Bledsoe v. Jefferson County · filed 2017-08-04

For Rule 12(b)(6) purposes, plaintiff has alleged that Mr. Hayes acted under color of state law under § 1983 sufficiently, and his status as a defense attorney is no reason to dismiss the § 1983 claims pending against him.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Afrasiabi v. Massachusetts · filed 2017-08-08

There is no plausible allegation that those defendants acted under color of state-law as is required for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Owen v. Chuck Atkins · filed 2017-08-16

The district court properly dismissed Owen’s § 1983 claims against Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and MTC Financial, Inc. because Owen failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private complainant as a state actor merely for pressuring police to make an arrest when police independently investigate.

Moody v. Lowndes County, Mississippi · filed 2017-08-17

A jury could not reasonably infer that Farrell’s pressure destroyed the independence of Officer Cooper’s investigation. Accordingly, Moody has failed to show that the police arrested her “merely because [s]he was designated for arrest by [Farrell], without independent investigation.” Sims, 778 F.2d at 1079. The district court correctly granted summary judgment on this ground.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a prison operator and its employees as state actors when they manage a federal prison.

Ayala-Gutierrez v. John Doe 1 · filed 2017-08-28

Eltayib held that GEO and their employees are not subject to suit as state actors under § 1983 because they manage a federal prison, and § 1983 applies to constitutional violations by state--not federal--officials. ... Ayala-Gutierrez therefore has shown no error on the part of the district court in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; an unrebutted presumption that the defendant acted as a federal employee can defeat the claim.

Alexander v. City of Mesa · filed 2017-09-07

Alexander has failed to allege facts that would rebut the presumption that Jacobs was not acting as a federal employee under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; the court cannot infer that requirement from allegations that tribal officials acted under tribal authority.

Stanko v. Oglala Sioux Tribe · filed 2017-09-20

There is no allegation in the complaint that the Individual Tribal Defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a public employee’s misconduct when the employee was not acting under color of state law.

Luce v. Town of Campbell · filed 2017-09-22

A public employee’s acts occur under color of state law when they relate to official duties. ... So we agree with the district court that state law, not § 1983, provides the appropriate remedy for Kelemen’s misconduct.

A § 1983 claim may proceed when the record permits a finding that the official acted under color of state law.

O'Toole v. City of Walnut Grove · filed 2017-09-25

Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the basis that O’Toole cannot establish as a matter of law that the alleged' retaliatory acts were not taken against her under color of law.

Section 1983 requires a sufficient nexus between an official’s public position and the challenged conduct for that conduct to be under color of state law.

O'Toole v. City of Walnut Grove · filed 2017-09-26

Based on the uncontroverted facts, particularly in light of the applicable fact-intensive standard, O’Toole has not established that Cole filed the State Case under color of law. Genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether a sufficient nexus exists between Cole’s filing the State Case and his position as mayor.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a private lawyer’s alleged malpractice without an allegation that the lawyer acted under color of state law.

Lucy v. John Grow, II · filed 2017-09-28

Yet § 1983 provides no relief here because there is no allegation that Mr. Grow acted under color of state law. Mr. Lucy alleged that Mr. Grow committed malpractice in his private capacity as Mr. Lucy’s lawyer, which is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; private parties qualify as state actors only in rare circumstances.

Russell v. Redstone Federal Credit Union · filed 2017-10-03

Additionally, even though the district court erred by determining that Russell’s Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth ... Amendment, and § 1983 claims (i.e. the claims against his own attorneys in the prior bankruptcy case and against the prior bankruptcy trustees) were barred by res judicata because the parties were not identical in the underlying cases, we may affirm the decision to dismiss because the claims failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because none of the defendants are government actors.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Vela v. Chapa · filed 2017-10-06

With the benefit of liberal construction, Vela challenges the district court’s determination that Lauro Chapa, the CEO of Scorpion Drilling, Chapa’s stepson, a safety manager at Scorpion Drilling, and Joe Saenz, a tool pusher at Scorpion Drilling, are not state actors and therefore are not subject to liability under § 1983. Vela has not demonstrated that these defendants can be characterized as acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Hallett v. State of Ohio · filed 2017-10-10

As for §1983, he failed to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law, and failed to substantiate his claim with anything other than conclusory allegations.

Section 1983 can reach private parties who act jointly with a police officer to deprive someone of a federal right.

Reed v. Sell · filed 2017-10-13

Because the defendants allegedly cooperated to effect her expulsion, Reed has stated a claim that the deprivation occurred under color of state law such that the defendants may be subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a basis to conclude that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Quiroz v. Moran · filed 2017-11-15

With respect to appellant’s claims against the United States and the U.S. Public Defender’s Office, his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails as a matter of law because he offers no basis to conclude those entities acted under color of state law.

Section 1983’s color-of-law element can be plausibly pleaded by alleging that a D.C. supervisor acted under his official authority.

Creese v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-11-20

Mr. Creese also alleges that Dr. Barr was operating under his authority as a supervisor for DOC and thus acted under the color of D.C. law. Under Twombly and Iqbal, these allegations are sufficient to make out a plausible case.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law to be liable for a violation of constitutional rights.

Grant v. Alperovich · filed 2017-11-20

We affirm the district court’s conclusion that the defendants were not liable for any violation of Grant’s constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they did not act under color of state law.

A Section 1983 claim requires facts sufficient to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Jones v. Grand Canyon University · filed 2017-11-21

The district court properly dismissed Jones’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because Jones failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; an attorney’s representation of a client in a lawsuit does not satisfy that requirement.

Jackson v. Coons · filed 2017-11-22

But in any event, Mr. Jackson cannot proceed against these defendants under § 1983 because an attorney’s representation of a client in a lawsuit does not constitute action under color of state law as required by § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Finnegan v. Citi · filed 2017-11-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Finnegan’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because Finnegan failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Citibank was acting under color of state law.

A § 1983 claim against a court-appointed attorney requires allegations showing that the attorney acted under color of state law.

Green v. State of Texas Government · filed 2017-11-27

Next, we hold that Green’s claims against Johnson fail because Green’s allegations do not establish that Johnson was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that a defendant acted under color of law.

Ryan v. Hyden · filed 2017-12-08

With respect to his federal constitutional claims, Ryan failed plausibly to allege that defendants deprived him of a constitutional right, or that the private attorney defendants acted under color of law.

Section 1983 claims against private actors require facts showing that they acted under color of state law.

Hupp v. Solera Oak Valley Greens Assoc · filed 2017-12-21

The district court properly dismissed the Hupps’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the private actor defendants because the Hupps failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants acted under color of state law.

A private facility does not become a state actor under § 1983 solely by receiving Medicaid funds.

Ball v. St. Mary Residential Training, et a · filed 2018-01-02

Yet, the fact that St. Mary’s receives medicaid funds does not make St. Mary’s a state-controlled facility. ... Accordingly, Ms. Ball’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against private parties based solely on their conversations with police when no conspiracy is established.

Harcz v. Boucher · filed 2018-01-02

In sum, Plaintiffs failed to allege a sufficient factual basis to establish that MACIL and HAAI conspired with the police to exclude Plaintiffs from the ADA event. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot sue private actors MACIL and HAAI pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against private parties who willfully participate in joint action with a state official.

Velazquez v. Logan · filed 2018-01-04

We first note that Defendants Hardy and McCloskey were subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... These facts were sufficient to show that McCloskey and Hardy were “willful participant[s] in joint action” with Logan, who was a state official.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that an off-duty officer acted under color of state law, such as by invoking police authority.

Everett v. Eastchester Police Dept. · filed 2018-01-10

Here, the amended complaint alleged only, in the most conclusory fashion, that Pileggi was "acting under the color of law" when the shooting occurred. Since nothing in the amended complaint suggested that Pileggi identified himself or was recognizable as a police officer, or was otherwise engaged in any activity arguably invoking the real or apparent power of the police department, the seventh cause of action was fatally defective.

A § 1983 claim against a private person based on conspiracy with a state actor requires allegations that the conspiracy existed.

Bornschein v. Herman · filed 2018-01-18

Because Bornschein has failed to allege the existence of a conspiracy, the § 1983 claims against Walsh must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a political committee, ward leaders, or a candidate whose alleged conduct is private and who are not plausibly alleged to have acted jointly with state officials.

Acosta v. Democratic City Comm. · filed 2018-01-22

In sum, the claims against the Democratic Committee, the Six Ward Leaders, and Vazquez will be dismissed because they were not state actors and therefore cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 covers a public school principal’s conduct in his role as principal as action under color of state law.

Wormuth v. Lammersville Union Sch. Dist. · filed 2018-01-22

Here, it is undisputed Principal Yeager acted under color of state law: He committed the allegedly unlawful actions in his role as principal of a public elementary school.