42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims against private individuals require facts sufficient to show they acted under color of state law.

Brooks v. Atwood · filed 2018-01-23

The district court properly dismissed Brooks’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual defendants involved with the state probate proceedings because Brooks failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that these defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against police officers who actively assist a private repossession under color of state law.

Hyman v. Capital One Auto Fin. · filed 2018-01-23

Plaintiff's allegations, if true, plausibly support a finding that the State Trooper Defendants' conduct constituted state action.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not provide a claim against a federal employee acting under federal law.

Gilbert v. U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives · filed 2018-01-23

First, Gossard cannot assert a § 1983 claim against Arlington because she is a federal employee.

Section 1983 does not reach private retail companies and their security employees when they do not act under color of state law.

Shelton v. Crookshank · filed 2018-01-24

First, the Bivens or § 1983 claims against Walmart and K-Mart security personnel must be dismissed because the companies are private entities and their employees are not acting under color of federal or state law.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation by someone acting under color of state law.

Roemer v. Booth · filed 2018-01-30

Neither Columbia employee is a state actor. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999) (explaining that an action brought under § 1983 must be based on an alleged deprivation by an individual acting under color of state law).

Section 1983 applies only to conduct under color of state law, so it does not provide a cause of action against federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Berman v. Crook · filed 2018-02-02

42 U.S.C. § 1983 expressly applies only to those acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 can impose liability when a government employee uses official authority to violate a person’s rights, even if the conduct exceeds that authority.

Parker v. District of Columbia · filed 2018-02-05

They are not absolved of liability just because District of Columbia law does not authorize sexual assault or because Mr. Jones might have overstepped his authority through his alleged actions.

A § 1983 claim can proceed when material facts remain disputed about whether a government employee acted under color of state law during an alleged assault.

Parker v. Dist. of Columbia · filed 2018-02-05

The Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact on the question of whether Mr. Jones acted under color of law preclude entry of summary judgment for Defendants.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; claims against private individuals who do not do so cannot proceed.

Asbury v. Berryville Arkansas, City of · filed 2018-02-07

Plaintiff's claims against private individuals are also subject to dismissal, as private individuals do not act under color of law for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a federal right under color of state law.

Tigress McDaniel v. Bailey · filed 2018-02-08

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” ... Applying these principles to the record before us, we discern no reversible error.

A public defender performing traditional duties as counsel does not act under color of state law for § 1983 unless the defender conspires with state officials to deprive a client of constitutional rights.

Samuels v. McDonald · filed 2018-02-09

But nothing in Mr. Samuels’s amended complaint alleged that the public defender defendants were acting outside their traditional functions as counsel or conspiring with state officials.

Section 1983 does not treat a public official’s private lawsuit as action under color of law merely because it concerns conduct from the official’s time in office.

Shutt v. Stacy Parks Miller · filed 2018-02-09

But the fact that Shutt was sued for conduct that occurred when Parks Miller was District Attorney does not demonstrate that Parks Miller acted “under ‘pretense’ of law” by filing it.

Section 1983 requires an officer to act under color of state law; handling a department-issued firearm while off duty does not alone satisfy that requirement.

Hyun Ju Park v. City of Honolulu · filed 2018-02-12

The only relationship between Kimura's actions and his official duties was that he was carrying his unloaded HPD issued firearm and was attempting to reload it when the bullet fired. This is insufficient on its own to plausibly allege that Kimura was acting under color of state law.

A § 1983 complaint can sufficiently allege action under color of state law when a private hospital is alleged to have collaborated with county government in investigating child abuse.

N.L. Ex Rel. Arce v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles · filed 2018-02-15

We hold only that the complaint’s allegations that CHLA acted under color of state law are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private party to show that the challenged conduct qualifies as state action.

Snodgrass-King Pediatric Dental Assocs., P.C. v. Dentaquest U.S. Ins. Co. · filed 2018-02-23

A private actor's conduct must equate to "state action" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to satisfy the "under color of state law" requirement.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a municipality's detention can satisfy that requirement.

Abriq v. Hall · filed 2018-02-26

A Section 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate the denial of a constitutional right caused by a defendant acting under color of state law. ... Plaintiff adequately pleads that Metro was acting under color of state law when it seized him in April 2017.

Private store security guards who investigate suspected theft and report it to police do not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes without a close nexus to the state.

Kodenkandeth, J. v. McNabb, D. · filed 2018-02-27

Thus, we discern no error in the trial court’s determination that Appellees were not state actors for the purposes of Appellant’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 generally does not cover claims against private individuals who do not act under color of state law.

Asbury v. Pai · filed 2018-03-01

Third, Plaintiff's claims against private individuals are subject to dismissal, as private individuals do not act under color of law for purposes of § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a private individual can survive dismissal when the complaint alleges facts sufficient to show that the individual acted under color of law.

Ballock v. Costlow · filed 2018-03-09

He first determined ... that Ballock had alleged facts sufficient to show that Costlow was acting under color of law as to the § 1983 claims against her. ... Therefore, following review of the R&Rs and the record for clear error, it: ... 3) DENIES in PART the defendants’ motions to dismiss as to ... Ten, Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen (Dkt. Nos. 15, 17).

A public defender representing a client in a criminal proceeding does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Toney v. Featherson · filed 2018-03-09

A public defender is not acting under color of state law while representing a plaintiff in his criminal proceeding.

A private person acts under color of state law for § 1983 when the person willfully participates in joint action with the state or its agents.

Dickman v. Office of the Cook County State's Attorney · filed 2018-03-16

A private person is deemed to act “under color of state law” for § 1983 purposes when he willfully participates in joint action with the State or its agents.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a public defender for inadequate representation in a criminal case because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Wallis v. Sherry · filed 2018-03-20

Thus, when the claim is merely that the public defender failed to adequately represent the client in his or her criminal proceedings, it does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a defendant fails when the plaintiff does not allege that the defendant was a state actor.

Price v. Cummings · filed 2018-03-23

Price’s assertion that he never alleged that Frank Price was a state actor confirms the correctness of this aspect of the district court’s ruling.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state, territorial, or District of Columbia law.

Karim-Panahi v. 4000 Massachusetts Apartments · filed 2018-03-27

Moreover, Plaintiff’s purported claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 26) fails as a matter of law because § 1983 applies only to individuals acting “‘under color of’ the law of a state, territory or the District of Columbia,” Hoai v. Vo, 935 F.2d 308, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting § 1983), not the private defendants sued in this case.

Section 1983 applies to defendants acting under color of state, territorial, or District of Columbia law.

Karim-Panahi v. 4000 Mass. Apartments · filed 2018-03-27

Moreover, Plaintiff's purported claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 26) fails as a matter of law because § 1983 applies only to individuals acting " 'under color of' the law of a state, territory or the District of Columbia," ... not the private defendants sued in this case.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not cover officers acting under color of federal law.

Stanko v. Oglala Sioux Tribe · filed 2018-04-10

A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege and prove the defendants were acting under color of state law in depriving plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Howard v. Clark County · filed 2018-04-16

The district court properly dismissed Howard’s claims against Sletten Construction because Howard failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Sletten Construction acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Wei v. Berg · filed 2018-04-16

Absent a showing that the defendant editors are state actors, plaintiffs claim under § 1983 fails.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private university withdrawing a student's admission does not meet that requirement.

Donoso v. New York Univ. · filed 2018-04-17

The claim alleging a violation of plaintiff's civil rights (42 USC § 1983) was correctly dismissed, because defendant, a private university, was not acting under "color of state law" ( see American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v Sullivan , 526 US 40, 49-50 [1999]; Kahn v New York Univ. Med. Ctr. , 328 Fed Appx 758 [2nd Cir 2009]; Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v State of New York , 5 NY3d 327, 347 n 14 [2005]; Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York , 65 NY2d 344, 361—362 [1985]).

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a claim fails if the plaintiff raises no triable issue on that element.

Yi v. Open Karaoke Corp. · filed 2018-05-16

The Norae defendants also established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action based on 42 USC § 1983. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether his arrest and ensuing criminal charges resulted from any action of the Norae defendants under color of state law on February 7, 2011 ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d at 324-325).

Section 1983 requires facts plausibly showing that a defendant acted under color of state law; a conclusory allegation of police affiliation does not suffice.

Jean-Baptise v. Ledbetter · filed 2018-05-17

Noel’s conclusory allegation that Jean-Baptiste had an “affiliation with [the] Fort Lauderdale police department” did not establish that Jean-Baptiste was a state actor.

Section 1983 treats a physician contracted to provide medical care to jail detainees as acting under color of state law when treating them.

Williams v. Harmston · filed 2018-05-30

Because Williams’ § 1983 claim stems from the medical treatment that Dr. Harmston provided as a medical doctor under contract at WCDF, Dr. Harmston acted under color of state law.

Section 1983’s color of law element is satisfied when the District of Columbia commissions special police officers with the power to arrest.

McGovern v. Brown · filed 2018-06-01

An element of § 1983 is that the defendants acted under “color of any statute . . . of . . . the District of Columbia.” The element was satisfied: the District of Columbia commissioned Captain Glaubach, Corporal Brown, and Officer Barton as special police officers, with the power to arrest those who violate the law.

A § 1983 claim against a private physician requires facts showing that the physician acted under color of state law.

Green v. Boone County Detention Center · filed 2018-06-18

Applying Montano’s functional approach, there is no reason to believe Dr. Lee acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private physician’s surgery does not meet that requirement without facts connecting the physician’s conduct to the state.

McCranie v. Moore · filed 2018-06-25

Applying Montano’s functional approach, there is no reason to believe Dr. Moore acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s challenged conduct to qualify as action under color of state law.

Nesbitt v. City of Methuen · filed 2018-06-26

That conduct does not meet any of the three tests for a private party acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law; a private attorney’s conduct must be fairly attributable to the state.

Moore v. Coyne · filed 2018-06-27

A § 1983 action may be maintained only against a defendant who acts under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law; a claim against them requires action under color of state law.

Webster v. Stackley · filed 2018-06-27

Here, Keefe, Lee, and Rickert are employees of the federal government, and the complaint does not allege that they acted under color of state law in any way. Therefore, Counts II and III fail to state claims against them under § 1981 and § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Webster v. Spencer · filed 2018-06-27

Critically, these provisions protect against discrimination under color of state law, not federal law. ... Therefore, Counts II and III fail to state claims against them under § 1981 and § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to act under color of state law; reporting suspected wrongdoing and detaining patrons at an officer’s direction did not make the casino defendants state actors.

Kejbo v. Caho · filed 2018-06-29

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the private defendants do not survive summary judgment because plaintiffs cannot establish that the private defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials for actions taken under color of federal law.

Canuto v. Carter · filed 2018-06-30

Indeed, Ms. Canuto has sued federal officials in their official capacities for actions taken under color of federal law. Her Section 1983 claim must be dismissed.

A private company and its employees act under color of state law for § 1983 when they provide food services for state prisons.

Dale v. Dooley · filed 2018-07-05

This Court determines under Luger v. Edmonson Oil Co. that the three Defendants in this case did act under color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement can be met even when an official misuses state power.

Robinett v. City of Indianapolis · filed 2018-07-09

An employee can act under color of state law, meanwhile, even when he "misuse[s]" state power.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege facts showing that the defendant acted under color of law.

Nicolaison v. Maas · filed 2018-07-10

The R&R cites two independent reasons for this failure: (1) a six-year statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and (2) Defendant cannot be liable under § 1983, because Plaintiff fails to plead facts establishing that Defendant acted under color of law when representing Plaintiff, as required for liability under § 1983. ... But even if the R&R erred in concluding that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s claim, the R&R offered additional grounds for dismissal. Plaintiff did not object to these additional grounds. And each warrants dismissal. Accordingly, after a review of the record, the Court adopts the recommended disposition.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that each defendant acted under color of state law.

Hawkins v. Dean · filed 2018-07-11

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that Separate Defendant Malek was acting under color of state law during any of the events on which this lawsuit is based. Accordingly, the Court finds that Separate Defendant Malek is not a state actor and that Plaintiff has failed to plead an actionable section 1983 claim against Separate Defendant Malek.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a private attorney for conduct undertaken while representing a criminal defendant because the attorney is not acting under color of state law.

Crowell v. Dunagin · filed 2018-07-13

Private attorneys do not act under color of law and are not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private employer merely for complying with a court order, without plausible allegations of joint action or conspiracy with the state.

Proctor v. Title 4-D · filed 2018-07-17

These allegations of compliance with a court order do not give rise to a plausible claim of any "conspiracy" or that he is "willfully" engaging in "joint" activity.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Marijan v. The University of Chicago · filed 2018-07-18

We find that plaintiff has not established that defendants are state actors under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a private security guard does not meet that requirement merely by asking police to make an arrest.

Sidney v. Alejo · filed 2018-08-01

Alejo can be liable on Sidney's section 1983 claim only if he acted under color of state law in connection with Sidney's arrest. See Wilson v. Warren Cty., 830 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2016). No reasonable jury could so find.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private parties to adequately allege that they acted under color of state law.

Anderson v. Herbert · filed 2018-08-02

To proceed with these claims, he had to show that defendants acted under color of state law (§ 1983), see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988), or that defendants’ conduct constituted state action, see United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (Fourth Amendment); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982) (Fourteenth Amendment). The district court held that he failed to satisfy this requirement as to the Private-Party Defendants and the Private-Party Attorney Defendants. We agree, and for substantially the reasons discussed in Mr. Anderson’s prior appeal, see Anderson, 389 F. App’x at 840-41, we affirm the dismissal of the federal claims against the Private-Party Defendants and the Private-Party Attorney Defendants for failure to adequately allege state involvement.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private security guard acting for his employer does not meet that requirement merely by requesting an arrest and signing a complaint.

Sidney v. Alejo · filed 2018-08-02

Alejo can be liable on Sidney's section 1983 claim only if he acted under color of state law in connection with Sidney's arrest.

Section 1983 requires facts plausibly showing that a defendant acted under color of state law; a private contractor’s relationship with the state alone does not establish that element.

Shaw v. Kaemingk · filed 2018-08-02

Shaw’s complaint does not present facts from which the court can infer that GTL plausibly acted under color of state law. Thus, Shaw’s claim against GTL fails because he has not alleged facts sufficient to meet the first element of a § 1983 claim.

A private citizen who conspires with a state actor to deprive someone of constitutional rights can be liable under Section 1983.

Mitchell v. Plano Police Department · filed 2018-08-10

Here, there is a reasonable inference that Hutson conspired with Smith to deprive Mitchell of her constitutional rights, so Hutson can be liable for the Fourth Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983's state-action requirement in a repossession case uses an affirmative aid test.

Hyman v. Morris · filed 2018-08-14

Today, the Third Circuit applies an "affirmative aid" test. ... Accordingly, to the extent that Sherry applied a different test for state action, that test was superseded by subsequent Third Circuit case law.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against private actors, including defense attorneys acting as counsel, because they do not act under color of state law.

Marcantoni v. Bealefeld · filed 2018-08-16

Thus, private actors are not amenable to suit under § 1983. Id. In addition, private attorneys do not act under color of state law and a § 1983 suit may not be maintained against an attorney based on his representation.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law.

French v. Wash. State Dep't of Health · filed 2018-08-21

The district court properly dismissed French’s § 1983 claim against the union defendant, the Washington Federation of State Employees (“WFSE”), because French failed to allege facts sufficient to show that WFSE acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private litigant’s use of court procedures, without more, as action under color of state law.

Fry v. Richard F. Davis, Susan A. Swete and Rhett Hoestenbach · filed 2018-08-23

Acts performed by private litigants in lawsuits, without more, do not support a Section 1983 claim, because “[p]rivate use of state sanctioned remedies or procedures do not rise to the level of state action,” and their acts do not happen under the color of law.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a private utility acted jointly with government officials before it can be held liable as a state actor.

Atkins v. Borough of Phoenixville, Michael Bauerly, David Boelker, E. Jean Krack Michael Speck, Phoenixville Police Dep' · filed 2018-08-27

Therefore, due to Plaintiffs' failure to point to any record evidence of the PECO Defendants' joint participation with the Borough Defendants, summary judgment shall be granted as to Plaintiffs' claim against the PECO Defendants for lack of a pre-deprivation hearing.

A private party may act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes by willfully joining a state official in a decision to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Mercer v. Dora B. Schriro, Comm'r of the Dep't of Emergency Servs. & Pub. Prot., the Conn. State Police Union, Inc. · filed 2018-08-28

Because the allegations in the Complaint may be construed to support a claim that they were willful joint participants in the Commissioner's decision to transfer Plaintiff from his Operations Sergeant position in SWAT, Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim that the Union Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive Plaintiff of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in violation of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; a private bank is not liable without allegations connecting its conduct to state authority.

Carter v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2018-09-05

Likewise, Mr. Carter’s claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, 1985 and 1986 fails because Chase is not a state actor nor has Mr. Carter alleged anything to suggest a conspiracy or that Chase’s actions invoked any state authority.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a public employee does not meet that requirement merely by investigating suspected wrongdoing and reporting it to police.

Defalco v. Mta Bus Co. · filed 2018-09-11

Rather, Bristow's conduct was incidental to his position as an MTA employee and would have been no different if he were an employee of a private entity.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a federal agency acting under federal authority cannot be sued under it.

Heritage Operations Group, LLC v. Norwood · filed 2018-09-18

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional or statutory right. ... Thus, Heritage’s § 1983 claim against CMS cannot proceed.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party’s use of a state court as action under color of state law.

McIndoo v. Broward County · filed 2018-09-19

Atkinson’s use of a state court constitutes no act under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats a public supervisor’s conduct as action under color of state law when the conduct is made possible by the supervisor’s government position.

Nitch v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2018-09-19

Each of these actions was only possible because Williams was Nitch’s supervisor at a government agency. It is difficult to envision a more ... straightforward case of an employee acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Wolcott v. Board of Rabbis of No & So Ca · filed 2018-09-20

The district court properly dismissed Wolcott’s free exercise and RLUIPA religious conversion claims because Wolcott failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer who files a criminal complaint as a private individual rather than under color of state law.

King v. King · filed 2018-09-20

Because Captain King did not act under color of law, he is not liable under § 1983 as alleged in Ms. King's amended complaint.

Section 1983 requires a private treatment provider to act under color of state law; a state contract alone does not establish that requirement.

Abdulrazzak v. Smith · filed 2018-09-26

Using the reasoning outlined in Rendell-Baker, Abdulrazzak has not pleaded sufficient facts to show that Kaufman acted under color of state law when he denied Abdulrazzak treatment. Abdulrazzak fails to allege any facts to suggest the State exercised any power over Kaufman’s treatment decisions in carrying out the state contract.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a government agency’s alleged violation resulted from a state custom or policy.

Miller v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority · filed 2018-10-02

Rather, the law is clear that the “under color of state law” mandate requires the state actor to have committed the alleged violation pursuant to a state custom or policy.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only against persons acting under color of state law, so it does not cover federal judges acting in federal court.

Stafne v. Zilly · filed 2018-10-09

Even if the Federal Judge Defendants were acting as mere "judicial volunteers" when they presided over Stafne's cases in federal court, they still were not acting under color of state law. Thus, Stafne's claim against the Federal Judge Defendants under § 1983 fails.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law; a private institution's conduct must be fairly attributable to the state.

Huang v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) · filed 2018-10-11

More importantly, Plaintiff does not allege that any Defendant acted under color of state law nor any facts that permit an inference that the private institution's conduct was "fairly attributable" to the state under any of the outlined tests. Plaintiff's failure to plead one of "the two essential elements to a § 1983 action" also justifies dismissal of Counts I & XII.

A private employer may be liable under § 1983 when it acts at a school district’s direction, sufficiently alleging action under color of state law.

Parker v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. · filed 2018-10-12

The Court concludes that these allegations are sufficient, at this stage of the litigation, to state a claim for relief under § 1983 on the ground that the Staffing Plus Defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for performing traditional defense counsel functions because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Howard v. Miller County Court · filed 2018-10-25

As such, the Court finds that Defendants Mitchell and Wood were not acting under color of state law for purposes of this suit and, thus, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim against them pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 allows suits against persons acting under color of state law, so it does not provide a claim against the CIA for acting under federal law.

Kucera v. Central Intelligence Agency · filed 2018-10-30

The district court first considered whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 might help Mr. Kucera. It did not. As the court explained, that section allows suits against persons acting under color of state, not federal, law. The CIA acts under the latter. Consequently, if Mr. Kucera intended to file a § 1983 action against the CIA, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear that case. ... However, we have nevertheless studied Mr. Kucera’s complaint de novo and conclude that he has not alleged facts sufficient to show that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction. We reach this conclusion for substantially the same reasons as the district court.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law; a union president does not meet that requirement merely by holding that position.

Powell v. Davis · filed 2018-10-30

Powell’s complaint also hints at a constitutional due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a District of Columbia Human Rights Act claim under D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a)(3). But the former cannot work because such claims are available only against “a person or entity acting under color of state law,” and Davis, a Union president, is not such a person or entity.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to adequately allege that the defendant was a state actor or a private party acting under color of state law.

Borrerro v. Haks Group, Inc. · filed 2018-10-31

Here, the amended complaint, as amplified by the plaintiff's affidavit, failed to adequately allege the existence of either state action or a state actor ( see Everett v Eastchester Police Dept. , 157 AD3d at 659; Dahlberg v Becker , 748 F2d 85, 92-93 [2d Cir]).

Section 1983 treats people who invoke a park district board’s authority to fire an employee as acting under color of state law.

McCaskill v. Moore · filed 2018-11-06

They therefore were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of constitutional rights by someone acting under color of state law; a physician’s state license alone does not establish state action.

Adkins v. Koduri · filed 2018-11-08

To state a valid § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must allege that: (1) she suffered a violation of her constitutional rights; and (2) this deprivation was caused by someone acting under the color of state law. ... Ms. Adkins claims that because Dr. Koduri is licensed by the Kansas State Board of Healing Arts, he qualifies as a state actor. ... Accordingly, Ms. Adkins’s allegations do not permit the inference that Dr. Koduri is a state actor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a public employee’s conduct outside his official capacity unless he acts under color of state law.

K.D. v. Swafford · filed 2018-11-09

Swafford was a Board employee, but he was not acting within that capacity or under color of law when he sexually assaulted K.D. off school property.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private parties defending a personal injury action do not meet that requirement merely by litigating before a state judge.

Willliams v. Brooks Trucking Company, Inc. of Memphis · filed 2018-11-13

The private Defendants in ... this case were not acting under color of state law in defending against Plaintiff’s personal injury action.

Section 1983 can reach private parties who willfully participate with state officials in initiating criminal charges.

Anilao v. Spota · filed 2018-11-28

Thus, the Court concludes that there is evidence that raises a question of material fact as to whether the Sentosa defendants were willful participants in the joint activity with the DA's Office in the decision to initiate charges against the plaintiffs and to arrest and prosecute them, such that they are state actors for purposes of Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Marts v. Republican Party of Virginia · filed 2018-12-07

We agree with the district court that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants acted under color of state law and therefore, failed to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of state law; the court found that the correctional officers did so.

Holloman v. Maine · filed 2018-12-07

The parties agree and the Court finds that defendants were acting under color of state law on June 27, 2012.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

Holloman v. Clarke · filed 2018-12-07

The parties agree and the Court finds that defendants were acting under color of state law on June 27, 2012.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private restaurant manager does not become a state actor by reporting a suspected theft to police.

Howard v. Tribble · filed 2018-12-17

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Goodwin is not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

Orion Insurance Group v. Omwbe · filed 2018-12-19

Second, the district court correctly dismissed Taylor’s discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the federal defendants did not act “under color of state law” as required by the statute.

A physician providing care through the state’s regular prison medical system acts under color of state law for § 1983, even without a direct contract with the state.

Audette v. Carrillo, M.D · filed 2019-01-04

For those reasons, Dr. Carrillo operated under the color of state law when she provided care to Plaintiff.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement covers a public official’s ban of a constituent from a Facebook page used for official duties when the ban arises from those duties.

Davison v. Randall · filed 2019-01-07

Although no one factor is determinative, this Court has held that a defendant’s purportedly private actions bear a “sufficiently close nexus” with the State to satisfy Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement when the defendant’s challenged “actions are linked to events which arose out of his official status.” ... Considering the totality of these circumstances, the district court correctly held that Randall acted under color of state law in banning Davison from the Chair’s Facebook Page.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Prater v. Am. Heritage Fed. Credit Union · filed 2019-01-07

"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." ... Here, nothing in the Complaint suggests that any of the Defendants are state actors.

Section 1983 does not cover claims against public defenders or private citizens who did not act under color of state law.

Mateen-El v. W. Bell · filed 2019-01-08

Next, Mateen-El’s claims against the public defenders and the private citizen were not cognizable under § 1983 because those defendants did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983's color-of-law requirement is not satisfied by a coworker who lacks supervisory authority over the plaintiffs' workloads and cannot initiate discipline against them.

Shaw v. Temple Univ. · filed 2019-01-11

Rather, I conclude that the undisputed facts show that Defendant Busam did not exercise de facto authority over Plaintiffs' workloads. ... Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot establish that Defendant Busam's alleged report to Defendant Wilhelm rises to the level of "initiating a disciplinary process," given that it was up to Wilhelm as supervisor to decide whether or not to investigate.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement can be satisfied when a state senator uses his official Facebook page and position to pressure an employer to fire a critic.

Woolsey v. Ojeda · filed 2019-01-30

In sum, under the facts pled in Plaintiff’s complaint, the totality of the circumstances points to a conclusion that Defendant acted under color of state law in both posting the response video to his official Facebook page and making a phone call to Plaintiff’s employer in an effort to have Plaintiff fired.

Section 1983 applies to persons acting under color of state law, not federal law.

Morgan v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation · filed 2019-02-01

Defendants concede that Amtrak may be considered a federal actor for certain purposes, see, e.g., Dkt. 77 at 3, but § 1983 liability applies only to persons acting under color of state, not federal, law.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement can be met when off-duty officers identify themselves as police and use their handcuffs to restrain and transport someone.

Kalvitz v. City of Cleveland · filed 2019-02-21

If the officers wore their badges, announced themselves as police, and used their handcuffs to restrain and transport Kalvitz, that satisfies the state-action requirement under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; alleging that tribal officers acted under tribal authority does not satisfy that requirement.

Stanko v. Oglala Sioux Tribe · filed 2019-02-22

However, Stanko did not allege that the individual defendants were acting under color of state law, as § 1983 requires. He alleged that US/BIA Highway 27 is maintained by the Federal Government, not the State of South Dakota. Thus, his § 1983 claim was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; a medical center that is not a state actor cannot be liable under it.

McReynolds v. Glenn · filed 2019-02-25

As to the remaining defendants, we agree that Wadley Medical Center was not a state actor, see Gentry v. City of Lee’s Summit, Mo., 10 F.3d 1340, 1342 (8th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that one of the two essential elements of a § 1983 action is showing that complained-of-conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law, i.e. a person who was acting on behalf of the state with authority provided by the state); and we conclude that the court was required to dismiss Dr. Christopher Wattingny for failure to serve after giving McReynolds several extensions to provide an accurate address for service, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (holding that if defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on a motion, or on its own following notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made by a certain time).

Section 1983 does not cover a state detective’s conduct on a federal task force when he acts under federal rather than state authority.

King v. United States · filed 2019-02-25

As a deputized federal agent, Detective Allen carried federal authority and acted under color of that authority rather than under any state authority he may have had as a Grand Rapids Police detective.

Private parties are not liable under § 1983 on a conspiracy theory when the complaint does not plausibly allege that they shared a plan with state officials to violate rights.

Paul Harcz, Jr. v. Boucher · filed 2019-02-26

On de novo review, we agree that the complaint fails to allege facts supporting the reasonable inference, absent speculation, that the private defendants conspired with the police to violate the appellants’ rights. ... We affirm the dismissal of the § 1983 claims against MACIL and HAAI.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have violated a federal right while acting under color of state law.

Marshall v. USA · filed 2019-03-04

Marshall did not allege that any defendant violated his federal constitutional rights while acting under color of state law as required to state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law, or conspire with a state actor, to deprive someone of federal rights.

Tiner v. Cockrell · filed 2019-03-11

Tiner relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which requires him to prove that the defendants, while acting “under color” of any state law, deprived him “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” § 1983. Tiner does not allege that the named defendants were acting under color of state law in conspiring to deprive him of his share of his father’s estate. Nor does he allege that the defendants conspired with a state actor to deprive him of his rights.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional violation by a person acting under color of state law; using state foreclosure proceedings alone does not make a private party a state actor.

Garrison v. Rock Creek Holding, LLC · filed 2019-03-13

Private parties do not become state actors merely by use of state foreclosure proceedings.

Section 1983 provides no relief against an actor acting under federal law.

Byam v. Dorset · filed 2019-03-14

Section 1983 provides no relief against such an actor.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law; joint action or conspiracy with state authorities can establish that connection.

Emrit v. Krebs · filed 2019-03-22

A private party may be held liable as a state actor; however, such liability “require[s] joint action or conspiracy with state authorities.” Carlson v. Roetzel & Andress, 552 F.3d 648, 651 (8th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff has pled no facts to suggest that the South ... Dakota Democratic Party engaged in any conduct as it pertains to plaintiff, or that it committed any action that could be construed as state action.

A private physician must act under color of state law to be liable under Section 1983.

Crumley v. Jail Nurse Jody Woods · filed 2019-03-25

As there is no reason to believe Dr. Lee acted under color of state law, the claim against Dr. Lee will be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a claim fails without sufficient facts showing state action.

Tulp v. Educ. Comm'n for Foreign Med. Graduates · filed 2019-03-26

To maintain a Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States committed by a person acting under color of state law. ... Plaintiff's constitutional claims fail because the Complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations from which the Court can conclude that Defendants' conduct constituted state action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Edwards v. Stevens · filed 2019-03-27

Further, he does not allege that the Johnson County Regional Medical Center operated under color of state law.

A private prison food contractor that assumes the state's duty to provide inmates a nutritionally adequate diet acts under color of state law for § 1983 liability.

Shaw v. Kaemingk · filed 2019-03-27

CBM holds the contract to provide a nutritionally adequate diet at both MDSP and SDSP. Providing a nutritionally adequate diet is a public function that has been traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state. Thus, the CBM defendants are fairly considered state actors for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires conduct fairly attributable to the state; a complaint alleging no basis for treating private defendants as acting under color of state law cannot support a claim.

Brown v. Progressive Specialty Ins Co. · filed 2019-03-29

We agree with the District Court that there is no basis in the complaint to suggest that the defendants, who are private actors, were acting “under color of state law,” or that they violated Brown’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional violation by someone acting under color of state law; public defenders representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding do not meet that requirement.

Dennis Davis, Jr. v. Whyce · filed 2019-04-01

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a constitutional right committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). As the district court concluded in denying relief, the public defender defendants were not acting under color of state law while ... representing Davis in a criminal proceeding. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Charnesky v. Piper · filed 2019-04-05

Because Charnesky has not plausibly alleged that Dr. Jenkins acted under color of state law, her § 1983 claims against Dr. Jenkins must be dismissed.

A state employee acting in an official capacity acts under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.

Rufus v. City of Chicago · filed 2019-04-11

A state employee acting in his or her official capacity, as Williams did in considering Plaintiff for the foreman position, acts “under color of state law.”

A private contractor acts under color of law for § 1983 purposes when it willfully participates in joint action with municipal officials.

Cherry Knoll, L.L.C. v. HDR Engineering, Incorpora · filed 2019-04-22

We find that Cherry Knoll’s well-pleaded factual allegations and supporting documents make plausible its claim that HDR was a “willful participant in joint action” with Jones and Schwendinger for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability when a defendant’s joint action with state officials causes a deprivation of rights; a factual dispute about that joint action can preclude summary judgment.

Jiggetts v. Cipullo · filed 2019-04-23

Therefore, the Court concludes that, from the evidence currently in the record, a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff’s arrest was caused by actions jointly taken by Cipullo and state actors.

A § 1983 claim against a criminal defense attorney requires an allegation that the attorney acted under color of state law.

Parker v. West Carroll Special School District · filed 2019-04-23

Additionally, he recommended dismissal of the claims against Plaintiff’s attorney, Steven West, during her disorderly conduct criminal case because West was not acting under color of state law as required to state a claim under § 1983. ... The Court has reviewed the allegations of the complaint, the Report and Recommendation, and Plaintiff’s objections and finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly applied the applicable law to Plaintiff’s claims. ... Thus, the Court adopts the recommendation that all claims be dismissed sua sponte.

Section 1983 does not make private attorneys state actors merely because they represent a city.

Quigley v. Williams · filed 2019-04-25

However, as stated above, Offutt’s, Nord’s, and Ashworth’s representation of the City, without more, does not give rise to state action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a coworker’s harassment when the coworker did not exercise authority conferred by the state.

LaFontant v. Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center · filed 2019-05-02

The Court therefore concludes that Schoonemaker did not act under color of state law in allegedly harassing and retaliating against Plaintiff.

A private party's call to police, by itself, does not constitute joint action with state actors for Section 1983 liability.

Miller v. Marriott Int'l LLC · filed 2019-05-03

The court agrees with Marriott that "the summoning of police officers is insufficient as a matter of law to constitute joint action with state actors for purposes of Section 1983."

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private party with no government role generally cannot be held liable.

Rollins v. Ballagon · filed 2019-05-13

As Defendant Ballagon is a private party who does not work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against this defendant under § 1983, and the Court dismisses him from the action.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law; purely private conduct does not support a claim.

Douse v. Metro Storage, LLC · filed 2019-05-14

Douse did not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Metro Storage, LLC (“Metro Storage”) is not a state actor and the harm to him arose from purely private conduct.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Fowler v. Martha Sroka, Judge · filed 2019-05-16

Fowler’s complaint also fails to state a § 1983 claim against Sroka. Fowler neither alleges that she is a state official nor that she was acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against private shelter employees whose provision of housing is not attributable to the state.

McIver v. Oasis Homeless Shelter · filed 2019-05-16

In providing housing to Plaintiff, the Oasis shelter and its employees were not engaged in state action or otherwise acting under color of state law. As reprehensible as the described conduct was, Plaintiff cannot state claims against the Oasis employees under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private actors to show joint activity or a meeting of the minds with a state actor.

Webster v. Tate · filed 2019-05-17

Based on Webster’s complaint, the defendants are private actors and nowhere does he allege a meeting of the minds or joint activity between the defendants and any state actor. Accordingly, Webster has failed to state a section 1983 claim against defendants and his lawsuit is dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against officers acting under federal rather than state law.

Kellom v. Quinn · filed 2019-05-21

To the extent that Count VII purports to assert a Steagald claim against Eaton or Fitzgerald under § 1983, that claim must be dismissed because it is undisputed that at the time of the events in this case these officers were acting as federal, not state officers. Thus, a claim against them is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 can treat on-duty private police officers as state actors for actions both on and off their authorized premises.

Fuller v. Carilion Clinic · filed 2019-05-21

Since this Court has determined that the defendants are state actors for actions taken on premises, this Court now finds that the defendants may also be liable as state actors for actions taken off premises as well.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private school administrators who provide information to police who independently decide to make an arrest.

Ortolaza ex rel. E. v. Capitol Region Educ. Council · filed 2019-05-23

Plaintiff's federal claim against these school administrator Defendants based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as alleged in the amended pleading, fails because these Defendants cannot be regarded as state actors, or as having acted under color of state law, in connection with the arrest of Plaintiff's son E. by the Hartford police.

Section 1983 applies to constitutional deprivations committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Edgerson v. West · filed 2019-05-29

Because Edgerson’s claims arose while he was a federal detainee at the WTDF, his claims cannot be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which applies only to deprivations of constitutional rights committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires proof that the claimed deprivation was caused by conduct under color of state law.

Yang v. City of Little Rock · filed 2019-05-30

Nor does the record reflect that the City acted under color of state law during its rescue efforts.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that each defendant acted under color of state law; a private party may be liable if it acted in concert with a state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.

Newton v. Major Development 52 Corp · filed 2019-05-31

Defendants Stark Law PLLC, Major Development 52 Corp, and David Rafoua appear to be private parties, and Plaintiff has not pleaded facts showing that they acted in concert with a state actor to commit an unconstitutional act. Plaintiff therefore has not stated a claim against Defendants Stark Law PLLC, Major Development 52 Corp, or David Rafoua under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a claim against an elected official to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges that his conduct was sufficiently connected to his official role to count as state action.

Windom v. Harshbarger · filed 2019-06-06

Taking the Amended Complaint as true, Harshbarger’s conduct as a delegate, even if private, could bear a sufficiently close nexus with the State to be fairly treated as that of the State itself. ... Given the stage of proceedings, Windom’s allegations (which must be taken as true), and the burden Harshbarger faces under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court cannot conclude that dismissal is proper on this question.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law; an inmate’s unprovoked attack alone does not meet that requirement.

Conklin v. Espinda · filed 2019-06-06

Conklin fails to state a colorable § 1983 claim against Tupuelo and this claim is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the person who deprived them of a federal right acted under color of law.

JORGE v. TORRES · filed 2019-06-06

Thus, Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded that the person who deprived him of his constitutional right was acting under the color of law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that each defendant acted under color of state law; a private hospital is not liable without allegations that it was a state actor.

Lopez v. New York City Police Department · filed 2019-06-07

Accordingly, having failed to allege that Saint Barnabas Hospital is a state actor, Plaintiff has not stated a claim under § 1983 against Saint Barnabas Hospital.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to exercise power under color of state law; federal officials acting only under federal authority do not qualify.

Bundy v. Sessions · filed 2019-06-10

A Section 1983 action requires that a defendant exercise power “made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” West, 487 U.S. at 49. That is not the allegation here. So the Court will dismiss Counts Five and Six, and this reasoning is an alternative ground for dismissing Count Four as well.

A § 1983 claim against a private individual requires facts showing that the individual acted under color of state law.

Thomas v. Thurston · filed 2019-06-10

In addition, claims under § 1983 may be brought only against persons “acting under color of state law.” Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 964 (2d Cir. 2015). The Complaint identifies Thurston as an individual employed by Five Star Electric; it contains no factual allegations suggesting that Thurston behaved as a state actor during his alleged involvement in Thomas’s termination. Accordingly, the Complaint must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a private landlord with no alleged government role does not satisfy that requirement.

Williams v. Pfiefer · filed 2019-06-11

The sole Defendant in this case is a private party who does not work for any state or other government body. Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against this defendant under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation caused by a person acting under color of state law; a private actor’s participation in a conspiracy with state officials can satisfy that requirement.

Knight-Bey v. Chatlelain · filed 2019-06-13

Even if Knight could legitimately claim that she was deprived of some right under a federal statute or constitutional provision, she cannot bring a § 1983 action unless the deprivation was caused by the conduct of a person acting under color of state law. ... Phillips and Chatelain, the only Defendants who are alleged to have taken any action in attempting to evict Knight, are private actors, and Knight’s allegations fall far short of showing the existence of a conspiracy.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions because that work is not under color of state law.

Kendrick v. Missy · filed 2019-06-18

Thus, under Plaintiff’s alleged facts, Defendant Biddle was not acting under color of state law while representing Plaintiff.

A § 1983 complaint must allege how the defendants acted under color of state law.

Fields v. Fields · filed 2019-06-19

Plaintiffs have failed to set forth a short and plain statement describing the Defendants’ alleged actions, how the Defendants were state actors, how the Defendants have violated their rights under the color of state law.

Section 1983 applies only to conduct under color of state law, so it does not cover ICE actions taken under federal authority.

REEVES v. HEMSLEY · filed 2019-06-21

As stated in the statute itself, § 1983 applies only in cases of persons acting under color of state law. ... Any actions taken by ICE against Reeves would have been under the authority of federal law, not state law. See Johnson, 2010 WL 2991409, at *2. Reeves accordingly cannot state a claim against ICE under § 1983, and this claim is also dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; alleging that a private attorney violated federal rights does not meet that requirement.

DREGE v. MCDOUGAL · filed 2019-06-21

In other words, a plaintiff must claim that a state or local government employee — not a private individual — violated his federal rights. Here, Plaintiff does not allege such. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Damon McDougal, a private attorney, violated his federal rights.

Section 1983 applies to deprivations of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law.

Gates v. Core Civic (C.C.A.) · filed 2019-06-21

Because Gates’s claims arose while he was incarcerated in federal prison facilities as a federal detainee, his claims cannot be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which applies only to deprivations of constitutional rights committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Durham v. Walmart, Incorporated · filed 2019-06-26

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that there was a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. ... In relevant part, the district court dismissed Durham’s complaints because the defendants were not acting under color of state law. Durham’s pleadings fail to show that he will present a nonfrivolous issue on appeal.

A private attorney does not act under color of state law merely by filing lawsuits in state court.

Loved Ones In Home Care, LLC v. Toor · filed 2019-06-27

However, because the defendant is a private attorney and not a state actor, the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against him fails.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Morelli v. Hyman · filed 2019-06-28

Even liberally construed, the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts indicating that Defendant’s conduct satisfies any of the four tests identifying state action, or was otherwise a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private attorney and law firm are not state actors without facts supporting a conspiracy with government officials.

Brown v. Philbeck · filed 2019-07-01

Here, defendants, who are a private attorney and his law firm, are not state actors. ... Plaintiff has not alleged facts permitting an inference of a civil rights conspiracy between his private attorneys and government officials. ... Therefore, plaintiff’s constitutional claim under § 1983 must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a criminal defense attorney, including an appointed public defender, does not.

Ruby v. Indiana State of · filed 2019-07-02

A criminal defense attorney, even an appointed public defender, doesn’t act under color of state law.

Section 1983 covers deprivations of rights by persons acting under color of state, territorial, or District of Columbia law.

Lamb v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives · filed 2019-07-03

But the text of § 1983 proscribes deprivation of rights by persons acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia[.]”

Section 1983 requires evidence that a private defendant acted under color of state law to sustain an excessive force claim against it.

Williams v. Tempe, City of · filed 2019-07-05

Here, as noted above, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that Safeway was a state actor during the May 10 incident. The same is true of the May 2 incident. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment for any claim of excessive force brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of law; private attorneys do not meet that requirement merely by representing a client.

Agnew v. ABE Factor & Campbell · filed 2019-07-09

Agnew has failed to show that these private attorneys acted under color of law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of law; an attorney’s representation of a client does not, by itself, satisfy that requirement.

Hallman v. Steve Gordon and Associates Attorneys and Counselors at Law · filed 2019-07-09

Thus, Hallman has not shown that his attorneys were acting under color of law, so any claim for violation of his constitutional rights asserted through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the attorney defendants must be dismissed.

A defense attorney, whether court-appointed or privately retained, does not act under color of state law when representing a client.

Jones v. Forbis · filed 2019-07-10

It is firmly established that a defense attorney, regardless of whether she is a public defender or private attorney, does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.