42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of law; private lawyers do not become state actors merely by representing a public hospital.

Alexander v. Clarke · filed 2011-05-03

It is evident, however, that Kidder and Bellow did not engage in state action. Although their alleged wrongful acts occurred in the course of their representation of UMCH, their association with the hospital alone is insufficient to establish that they are state actors for the purposes of a §1983 action.

Section 1983 can reach a county employee without arrest authority when she acts to assist the government in its investigatory or administrative purposes rather than for an independent purpose.

Meislin v. City of Hawthorne · filed 2011-05-17

Although Gossai was not a peace officer and did not have power to make arrests, as a county employee, she may still be liable for a Fourth Amendment violation under § 1983 if she “acted with the intent to assist the government in its investigatory or administrative purposes, and not for an independent purpose.” Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 924 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 requires a private entity to act under color of state law to be sued.

Wiggins v. String · filed 2011-05-18

We do not hesitate to conclude that the District Court properly determined that the Local Union 152 defendants are not state actors nor were there any allegations that they acted under “color of state law,” as is necessary for a private entity to be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; statements made by a candidate before taking office do not satisfy that requirement.

FERLISI v. Galvin · filed 2011-05-26

Ferlisi fails to state a § 1983 claim of reputational injury at the threshold because Galvin was not acting under color of state law when he uttered the allegedly defamatory statements.

Section 1983 requires state action; private union officers acting in their union roles are not acting under color of law.

Price v. UNION LOCAL 25 · filed 2011-06-01

Here, Boardman and Martin are private individuals who were not acting “under color of’ law when they allegedly denied plaintiff the presence of a “Shop Steward” during his discharge meeting. Given the absence of state action, section 1983 is inapposite.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a factual dispute about whether an off-duty officer acted in that capacity precludes summary judgment on that issue.

Bladdick v. Pour · filed 2011-06-07

The Court, therefore, FINDS that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether or not Pour was acting under the color of state law. While action under color of state law is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a section 1983 claim, this question of fact precludes summary judgment on this issue.

Section 1983 permits claims against private physicians who exercise delegated authority to suspend staff privileges at a public hospital because they act under color of state law.

Chudacoff v. University Medical Center of Southern Nevada · filed 2011-06-09

Consequently, the official actions of its administrative subdivisions, such as the MEC, are actions of the state, and the individual members of the MEC responsible for wrongfully depriving Chudacoff of his protected property interest in UMC staff privileges cannot escape § 1983 liability as private actors.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private actors who do not meet that requirement cannot be held liable for constitutional violations.

Carpenter v. King · filed 2011-06-17

As private actors, defendants cannot be held liable for constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires a private entity’s challenged conduct to be fairly attributable to the state; a contract with a different town does not establish that connection for private work on private property.

Gable v. Borges Constraction, Inc. · filed 2011-06-17

However, even assuming the truth of the allegations that appear in Plaintiffs’ memorandum, Plaintiffs have not explained how this contractual relationship with a different town demonstrates that Defendant Borges was acting under color of state law when it performed private work on private property.

Section 1983 does not require proof of conspiracy to hold a parking officer liable for malicious prosecution when he acted under color of state law.

Abudiab v. City & County · filed 2011-06-20

Resolving the evidence in favor of plaintiff, Georgopoulos acted under color of state law and plaintiff need not show a conspiracy in order to hold Georgopoulos liable for malicious prosecution under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a privately operated day care or its employees as state actors merely because the state licenses the facility.

Moore v. Richman · filed 2011-06-22

Indeed, the facility’s own negligence does not violate the Constitution because the act of licensing the day care facility does not convert the day care center or its employees into state actors for § 1983 purposes.

A coworker without supervisory authority or power to take official action is not acting under color of state law for § 1983 liability.

Clark v. Dominique · filed 2011-06-28

First, Clark’s allegations make clear that Kent was simply a coworker who, without any actual supervisory authority or power to compel or take official action, harassed and accosted Clark in the workplace. Thus, Kent was not acting under color of law and cannot be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach private medical treatment decisions merely because a nursing home is licensed or regulated by the state.

Bell v. HCR Manor Care Facility of Winter Park · filed 2011-06-28

Bell’s complaint targets merely private conduct, which § 1983 does not reach.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law for a claim.

Parker v. Pennstar Bank NBT · filed 2011-07-08

Parker has failed to allege that the defendants ―act[ed] under color of state law,‖ which is required for her § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law and violated a federal right.

Terry Simonton, Jr. v. Tennis · filed 2011-07-13

We affirm the District‟s order, as it properly concluded that Simonton cannot sue Inmate Seaman under § 1983 because he is not a state actor. A review of Simonton‟s complaint reveals no allegations giving rise to a plausible inference that Inmate Seaman acted under color of state law or conspired with state actors to deny Simonton his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a court-appointed defender performing traditional counsel functions because the defender does not act under color of state law.

Davis v. Hughes Reveley, Jr. · filed 2011-07-21

Because a court-appointed defender “does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding,” Davis’ former attorney cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Section 1983 claims against school officials may proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges that they acted under color of state law.

Williams v. Wicomico County Board of Education · filed 2011-07-21

Thus, construing all facts in favor of Mr. Williams, the Court finds that Mr. Williams’ Complaint sufficiently sets forth a plausible scenario in which Dr. Fredericksen, Ms. Moses and Mr. Field acted under color of state law when they allegedly engaged in the various activities about which Mr. Williams complains.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to recover for deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Blackshear v. City of Miami Beach · filed 2011-07-26

“In order to prevail on a civil rights action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.”

Section 1983 treats a governor-elect’s statements and an agency director’s statements after confirmation as acts under color of state law, but excludes a nominee’s statements before confirmation.

International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Haley · filed 2011-08-08

In summary, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have advanced facts sufficient to state a plausible claim (1) that all of the statements attributed to Haley were made under color of law, and (2) that the post-confirmation statement attributed to Templeton was made under color of law. The statements Templeton made at the December 8, 2010 press conference and during her confirmation hearing were made in her personal capacity because her role in the Haley administration was still contingent upon approval by the South Carolina Senate. Thus, the Court concludes that Templeton’s statements were not made under color of law.

A state mental health institute and its chief executive officer act under color of state law in their official capacities for purposes of § 1983.

Settle v. Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute · filed 2011-08-12

While it is true that MTMHI and Ms. McDonald were acting under the color of state law in their official capacities, Mr. Settle cannot establish that he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; a private attorney’s misuse of a state contempt procedure does not meet that requirement.

Huls v. Llabona · filed 2011-08-15

Huls’s allegation that Llabona knowingly falsified facts in a contempt motion appears to charge a private misuse of a state contempt procedure. To the extent that Huls argues that Llabona intentionally abused the state’s civil contempt proceedings, her conduct is not attributable to the state.

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation to be caused by someone acting under color of state law; a private broadcaster’s decision to exclude candidates does not meet that requirement without a sufficiently close connection to the state.

Whitney v. Window to the World Communications, Inc. · filed 2011-08-18

There are simply no facts alleged to suggest a sufficiently close nexus between the State of Illinois and the decision to exclude plaintiffs from the debates such that could support a conclusion that the decision was the result of coercive power or significant encouragement, either overt or covert, by the State.

Section 1983 permits a private action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of constitutional or federal rights.

Santiago v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2011-08-24

Because no rational factfinder could conclude that the private defendants acted under color of state law, we uphold the district court's entry of summary judgment on the section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on federal officials merely because they coordinate with state officials; the plaintiff must allege a conspiracy or concerted action sufficient to show they acted under color of state law.

Tobey v. Napolitano · filed 2011-08-30

Plaintiffs allegations do not suggest any federal-state conspiracy or concerted action sufficient to state a claim against the Federal Defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender who fails to seek a client’s release when the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Harbeck v. Smith · filed 2011-08-30

As a result, the Court concludes that Boyle was not acting under the color of state law when he allegedly failed to take action to procure Plaintiffs release from incarceration. Therefore, Count I of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, which alleges constitutional violations under § 1983, is DISMISSED as to Boyle.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private corporation with no alleged government connection does not meet that requirement.

Forjone v. FEDERATED FINANCIAL CORP. OF AMERICA · filed 2011-09-13

In the present matter, the sole named Defendant is a private corporation not alleged to have any connection with any government body and thus has not acted under color of state law.

Private prison medical providers can be held liable under § 1983 when the state delegates prison medical functions to them.

Jones v. Bokor · filed 2011-09-28

Defendants Bokor and Wofford are considered governmental employees who can be held liable for violations of the Eighth Amendment because the state has delegated to them penological medical functions.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on a police officer’s deposition testimony and a private lawyer’s assistance when neither acts under color of state law.

Gelband v. Cunniff · filed 2011-09-30

Accepting all of the Plaintiffs allegations as true, neither PO Hondo nor Cunniff were acting under "color of state law" for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. When PO Hondo and Cunniff made the allegedly deprivatory statements, they were not cloaked in the authority ofthe state.

Section 1983 does not treat a private landlord as a state actor merely because it contracts with a public housing authority.

Reyes-Garay v. Integrand Assurance Co. · filed 2011-09-30

Landlord is clearly a private entity that has contracted with the state; the HAP between Landlord and the PHA, however, does not convert Landlord into a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private employer cannot be held liable without such action.

Murphy v. Rick Thaler, Director · filed 2011-10-12

The magistrate found that ... (8) Blanks failed to establish that Vought, a private employer, acted under color of state law to deprive him of any rights secured by the constitution or that deprived him of rights protected by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985. ... Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court and its award of attorney’s fees for the reasons set forth in the magistrate judge's reports, as adopted by the district court.

A private person may act under color of state law for Section 1983 by conspiring with state actors.

Miller v. Graham · filed 2011-10-24

Miller is correct in his argument that a private individual may be deemed to act under color of law in certain circumstances, such as when a person conspires with state actors. ... Miller has presented no specific facts showing an agreement between the private defendants and any state actor in this case.

A private casino does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely by detaining a patron and calling the police.

Swanson v. Horseshoe Hammond, LLC · filed 2011-10-25

Swanson’s contention is wrong because the power to detain and arrest is not exclusively reserved to the government and by itself does not constitute state action.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to be fairly attributable to the state; a landowner’s voluntary towing of a car after a village ticketed it does not meet that requirement.

Beyer v. Village of Ashwauben · filed 2011-11-01

Beyer’s lawsuit, then, turns on whether Lockman and Smits acted under color of state law, as required for him to proceed under § 1983. ... To have acted under color of state law, their actions must be fairly attributable to the Village.

A § 1983 claim against a private entity cannot be dismissed for lack of state action when the court cannot yet rule out that the entity acted under color of law.

Whitsitt v. Zedlitz · filed 2011-11-02

We vacate the dismissal because, at this early stage in the proceedings, we cannot say that R. Lance & Son was not acting under color of law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Hui Min Li v. City of New York · filed 2011-11-22

To the extent plaintiffs cause of action for violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 is asserted against this defendant, it should be dismissed because the record is bereft of any indication that defendant was acting under color of state law (see Rodriguez v City of New York, 87 AD3d 867 [2011]).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a state officer’s private conduct at church does not meet that requirement.

Broussard v. Waldron School District · filed 2011-11-23

In viewing the facts of this case as alleged by the Plaintiff, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Campora was acting under color of state law when he confronted Doe at church.

Private foster care providers performing a function traditionally reserved to the state may act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Woodburn v. Florida Department of Children & Family Services · filed 2011-12-01

Thus, at least for § 1983 purposes, One Hope and Our Kids qualify as acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Lomax v. Us Senate Armed Forces Serv Co · filed 2011-12-05

Lomax purported to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The District Court correctly determined that Lomax’s complaint fails to allege that any of the defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a court-appointed criminal defense attorney representing a client at a parole revocation hearing as acting under color of state law.

Sash v. Rosahn · filed 2011-12-08

Insofar as Sash raises a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we affirm the award of summary judgment because a court-appointed criminal defense attorney does not act under color of state law when representing a client, such as Sash, at a parole revocation hearing.

Section 1983 requires a challenged action to be committed under color of state law and to deprive a person of rights secured by federal law.

Hechavarria v. City and County of San Francis · filed 2011-12-22

As an initial inquiry to any § 1983 claim, we ensure that “two essential elements . . . are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Micklas v. J. Doe, No. 1 · filed 2012-01-05

His claims do not, however, involve a violation of his rights by a person acting “under color of state law” as required by § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against private defendants requires allegations that they acted under color of state law through joint action with the state or state compulsion.

Douglas v. Oregonian Publishing Co. · filed 2012-01-11

The district court properly dismissed Douglas’s claims against the private defendants who published allegedly defamatory statements about Douglas because he failed to allege that they acted under color of state law as joint actors with the state or under state compulsion.

Section 1983 can apply to a political party’s conduct of a state-authorized primary election because the party acts under color of law.

Wilson v. Birnberg · filed 2012-01-12

There is no question that a political party in its conducting of state-authorized primary elections is performing a function “under color of any statute,” and Section 1983 is potentially applicable to the conduct.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private parties in a state court dispute do not meet that requirement merely because one was a former judge or the conduct occurred in court proceedings.

Lawrence Eleuteri, Jr. v. Eleuteri · filed 2012-01-13

We agree that the Eleuteris and Hurley, who were private actors in a state court dispute with Mr. Eleuteri, Jr., did not act under color of state law. This conclusion is not altered by Mr. Eleuteri, Sr.‟s status as a former state judge or by the fact that the allegedly unconstitutional conduct occurred in state court proceedings.

A state mandate backed by penalties can support a § 1983 claim that a private party acted under color of state law.

Cohen v. World Omni Financial Corp. · filed 2012-01-30

Therefore, Cohen did present evidence in support of his claim that World Omni collected the tax under color of law.

Section 1983 requires facts plausibly showing that the defendant acted under color of state law; a bare assertion of county employment is insufficient.

Morales v. Richardson · filed 2012-01-30

None of the facts alleged in the complaint bear on the question of whether Richardson’s conduct could plausibly be said to have been undertaken under color of state law. The Moraleses’ statements amount to a mere “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” and do not state a § 1983 claim plausible on its face.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Lear v. Zanick · filed 2012-02-06

Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require conduct by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

McAlister v. Potter · filed 2012-02-21

Ms. McAlister fails to state a claim under Section 1983 against any of the Defendants because they were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 claims against private parties require evidence that they willfully colluded with the state or its agents to violate constitutional rights.

Mackall v. Cathedral Trustees, Inc. · filed 2012-02-22

Because all of the defendants are private parties, not government officials, Nicholas needed to provide evidence that they willfully colluded with the state or its agents to violate his constitutional rights.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement can be met when a public school employee uses authority from his position to solicit a student, even if some conduct occurs off campus after school.

Doe v. Fournier · filed 2012-02-22

It may be inferred from these allegations that Van Amburgh enjoyed the opportunity to harass Plaintiff and solicit sex from her by virtue of the authority he had as a high school guidance counselor and football coach. The fact that some of the relations he had with Plaintiff took place after school and not on school property does not change the fact that he was “clothed with the authority of state law” at the time.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that defendants acted under color of state or territorial law.

Gray Ex Rel. Estate of Gray v. Martinez · filed 2012-02-24

To the extent that he attempts to proceed via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he has not shown that the financial defendants ―acted under color of state or territorial law.‖ Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).

A plaintiff suing a private entity under § 1983 must show that it acted under color of state law.

Phillips v. Quality Terminal Services, LLC · filed 2012-02-29

When a plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim against a defendant who is not a government official or employee, the plaintiff must show that the private person or entity acted under the color of state law.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement can cover a public official’s statements to the press when they relate to her official duties and authority.

Bjorklund v. Miller · filed 2012-03-07

We agree with the district court that Mr. Bjorklund made a sufficient showing that Ms. Miller’s comments were made under color of state law. We therefore reject Ms. Miller’s argument on this point.

Section 1983 reaches private doctors who provide medical care to inmates inside a prison under a state contract because they act under color of state law.

Bektic-Marrero v. Goldberg · filed 2012-03-07

However, when a private doctor under contract with the state administers medical care at the prison itself, the case falls neatly under West, all else being equal.

A private person who opens a tenant’s door under police pressure is not a willful participant in state action and cannot be liable under § 1983 on that basis.

Garay v. Liriano · filed 2012-03-16

The Court thus believes that here, too, Wilson was not a willful participant; as such, she cannot be a state actor for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant jointly acted or conspired with a state actor to impose liability.

Stewart v. Victoria's Secret Stores, LLC · filed 2012-03-19

These allegations fall short of the facts necessary to support a claim of joint collaboration or conspiracy with a state actor so as to impose individual liability.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Jones v. International Ass'n of Bridge Structural Ornamental · filed 2012-03-28

Defendant District Council is not a state actor and, therefore, the plaintiff’s claim brought pursuant to § 1983 will be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted jointly with a state actor; favorable rulings alone do not establish an agreement to violate rights.

Cox v. Hon. Frank Mills, III · filed 2012-04-02

This failure to sufficiently allege a conspiracy is fatal to each of Cox’s claims, as Carlton Fields thus neither qualified as a state actor under Section 1983 nor engaged in a conspiracy in violation of Section 1985 and, derivately, Section 1986.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional deprivations under color of state law, but does not cover officers acting under color of federal law.

Pike v. United States · filed 2012-04-11

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional deprivations arising out of actions taken under color of state law — not federal law.

Section 1983 applies only to people acting under color of state or District of Columbia law.

Jackson v. Donovan · filed 2012-04-20

Furthermore, § 1983 applies only to “person[s] who [act] under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . or the District of Columbia,” i.e., state actors, which the allegations against Dixon fail to establish, and plaintiff has not pleaded facts to satisfy the pleading requirement of § 1985(3) “that the conspiracy was motivated by ‘racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.’” Mazloum, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 11 n. 5 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)).

Section 1983 conspiracy liability for a private person requires evidence that the person acted in concert with a state official.

Lewis v. Larry Mills · filed 2012-04-20

Plainly stated, there is no evidence that Corrie acted in concert with a state official—Mills or Damilano—to frame Lewis because of his participation in the FBI’s investigation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against private creditors who jointly participate with state officials in garnishing a debtor’s property under a challenged state procedure.

New v. Gemini Capital Group · filed 2012-05-02

Thus, defendants’ joint participation with state officials to garnish New’s bank account was state action sufficient to support New’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Kristy Downing v. Life Time Fitness, Inc. · filed 2012-05-15

To state a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against tribal officials for actions taken under tribal law.

Chavez v. Navajo Nation Tribal Courts · filed 2012-05-16

The court held that Mr. Chavez’s lawsuit against the Tribal officials could not be maintained in federal court under §1983 because all of his challenges to the Tribal officials’ actions relied on Tribal law. ... We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for substantially the same reasons stated by the magistrate judge (sitting by the consent of the parties) in his September 14, 2011, memorandum opinion and order.

Section 1983 requires state action by the alleged wrongdoer for liability to attach.

Slovinec v. Communications Workers for America · filed 2012-05-17

In order to bring a civil rights action under § 1983, “[t]here is a requirement of state action on the part of the alleged wrongdoer in order for liability to attach.”

Section 1983 does not reach a former government employee’s private conduct without evidence that current government officials were involved.

Marsh v. County of San Diego · filed 2012-05-29

The actions of a former government employee, without more, cannot amount to state action. Rather, there must be some evidence of involvement by current government officials in the offending conduct.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private defendants cannot be held liable without an allegation that they did so.

Caldwell v. Kagan · filed 2012-05-31

And 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows suits for violations of the Fifth Amendment against defendants acting under color of state law, see Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999), but, absent a statutory cause of action, there is no remedy for private defendants acting under color of federal law under the Fifth Amendment, see Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001). Plaintiff makes no argument that the private defendants’ actions were performed under color of state law, so he has failed to provide a legal theory under which defendants could be liable to him for their actions in this federal case.

Section 1983 applies to state actors acting under color of state law and does not cover federal officials acting under federal law.

Evans v. Ziporkin · filed 2012-06-01

Evans’s civil action against Sheryll Ziporkin, an employee of the Social ... Security Administration acting under federal law, was not proper under Section 1983, which only applies to state actors acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not make a private attorney liable for merely advising a municipality when the advice is not attributable to the state.

Dubuc v. Township of Green Oak · filed 2012-06-04

Providing legal advice is not an action that can be attributed to the state.

Section 1983 treats a decision of the New York City Board of Elections as action under color of state law.

Thomas v. New York City Board of Elections · filed 2012-06-04

For this purpose, a decision of the Board qualifies as official action under ...color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead that the defendant acted under color of state or District of Columbia law.

Ceasar v. Carnigie institute/theater · filed 2012-06-11

The complaint does not present a federal question because § 1983 applies only to "person[ s] who [act], under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia," which is not pleaded here.

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation of a federal right to be caused by someone acting under color of state law.

Brodzki v. Fox Broadcasting Co. · filed 2012-06-21

Defendant is not a state actor and, therefore the civil rights claim is without merit.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a complaint alleging action under color of federal law is properly construed under Bivens.

Ayon v. Northeast Ohio Correctional Center · filed 2012-06-22

The district court construed Ayon’s complaint as a Bivens action because there was no allegation under color of state law. ... The district court properly construed Ayon’s complaint under Bivens because a Bivens action arises out of a violation of an individual’s federal constitutional rights by one who is acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of state, territorial, or District of Columbia law.

Ceasar v. Carnegie Institute · filed 2012-06-26

Plaintiff purports to bring a civil rights claim against a private entity, and thus fails to present a federal question under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because this provision applies only to "person[ s] who [act], under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia."

A private party acts under color of state law for § 1983 only if the plaintiff establishes a connection to the state beyond compliance with a generally applicable law.

Keenan v. First California Bank · filed 2012-07-02

Turning to the § 1983 claims, we conclude that First California was not acting under color of state law, and therefore is not liable. In order to demonstrate that a private party acted under color of state law, a plaintiff must be able to establish an additional nexus other than mere “governmental compulsion in the form of a generally applicable law.”

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by someone acting under color of state law.

Gordon v. Sheriff John Everett · filed 2012-07-03

Section 1983 requires plaintiffs to first show that they have been “deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States” and secondly that the officers deprived them of this right acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 1733 (1978) (quotation marks omitted). Dodd was acting under the color of state law when she executed the invalid search warrant.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation under color of state law; an officer’s private misconduct does not qualify merely because the officer holds a government position.

Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach County · filed 2012-07-06

Section 1983 does not federalize all torts or other deprivations of rights committed by a person who is a law enforcement officer or other government agent. ... Because the alleged mistreatment of Butler was not inflicted under color of law, the district court correctly dismissed his § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acted under color of state law and deprived him of a constitutional or statutory right.

Gluck v. Wnin Tri-State Public Media, Inc. · filed 2012-07-18

A cause of action may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “[e]very person who, under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff bringing a cause of action under § 1983 must allege that a person was acting under the color of state law and that person deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Jones v. Stulek · filed 2012-07-23

Plaintiff does not allege that defendants were acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement is met when police officers use access gained through their positions to obtain and distribute a confidential report.

Miron v. Town of Stratford · filed 2012-07-24

As the facts of the instant case are closely analogous to the facts of McDade, it is apparent that the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show that Defendants Soto, McNeil and Farmer were acting under the color of state law in accessing and distributing Plaintiff’s background report.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state or District of Columbia law; a claim against this private landlord did not meet that requirement.

Amiri v. Gelman Management Company · filed 2012-07-31

...rights claim against a private entity, and thus fails to present a federal question under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because this provision applies only to "person[ s] who [act], under color of any statute,...ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.’

A private person’s conduct must be fairly attributable to the State to support a § 1983 claim; conclusory and speculative allegations are insufficient to establish that connection.

Binford v. Marteeny · filed 2012-08-01

Binford’s conclusory and speculative allegations regarding Marteeny’s sending of the letter, the letter itself, and the letter’s impact on either the TDCJ or the Board are insufficient to establish that Marteeny’s conduct—sending the letter—is fairly attributable to the State under any of the Supreme Court’s tests.

Section 1983 does not cover a coworker’s harassment when the coworker exercises no state-granted authority over the plaintiff.

Wyatt v. City of Barre · filed 2012-08-06

In Cindy Howarth’s case, it cannot be said that her alleged harassment occurred under color of state law. She was not the Plaintiffs supervisor and was not exercising any authority granted to her by the state. Therefore, Cindy Howarth’s actions are not covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a defendant acted under color of state law; an insufficient showing of a relationship with the state warrants summary judgment.

Loosier v. Unknown Medical Doctor · filed 2012-08-13

The record contains insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the State had a relationship with the defendants or PRMC such that defendants acted under color of state law when treating him. Summary judgment on that issue was therefore proper.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Marie Miller v. Nationstar Mortgage · filed 2012-08-14

there is no plausible suggestion that defendants were ever acting as agents of the State or under color of state law - an essential element to any such claim. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Schneck v. Yamamoto · filed 2012-08-15

The district court properly dismissed Schneck’s § 1983 action because Schneck failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendant was acting under color of state law.

A private party’s compliance with a state tax withholding order does not amount to action under color of state law under § 1983 without an additional nexus to state authorities.

Keenan v. First California Bank · filed 2012-08-15

Turning to the § 1983 claims, we conclude that First California was not acting under color of state law, and therefore is not liable.

Section 1983 requires state action, and summary judgment is proper when plaintiffs raise no genuine issue of material fact on that requirement.

PKF Mark III Inc. v. Foundation for Fair Contracting · filed 2012-08-22

We also determine that the Defendants were entitled to summary judgment because of Plaintiffs‟ failure to raise any genuine issues of material fact with respect to the threshold “state action” requirement.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; an alleged conspiracy with state judges requires facts showing agreement and concerted action.

Coulter v. Allegheny County Bar Associati · filed 2012-09-13

To allege such a conspiracy, the complaint must specifically present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action to deprive the plaintiff of his or her rights. The bare allegation of an agreement is insufficient. ... In sum, as nothing in the complaint demonstrates the existence of any concerted effort between the state court judges and the other defendants, we agree with the Magistrate Judge’s determination that Coulter failed to demonstrate that the non-judicial defendants acted under color of state law.

A correction officer may act under color of state law when conduct toward a former detainee is directly tied to their official relationship.

Dilworth v. Goldberg · filed 2012-09-13

Inasmuch as it is alleged that Bourhill was a correction officer and it may be reasonably inferred that the uniform incident relates directly to the relationship between Bourhill as a correction officer and Dilworth as a former detainee, the argument that Bourhill was not acting under color of law is rejected.

Section 1983 treats a prison officer’s confiscation of inmate property under prison policy as action under color of state law.

Harmon v. Cradduck · filed 2012-09-18

Because Harmon's property was confiscated by JLCC officers according to DOC prison policy, the taking of such items occurred under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Berman v. McManus · filed 2012-09-20

The district court properly dismissed the § 1983 claims against defendant Renée because she was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Yellen v. Boyd Gaming Corporation · filed 2012-09-21

Moreover, the district court properly determined that Yellen failed to state a viable § 1983 claim because Yellen failed to allege that defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law; a private citizen filing a motion to enforce her own rights does not meet that requirement.

Green v. Green · filed 2012-09-24

In this case, it is clear Mrs. Green was acting as a private citizen, filing the underlying motion to enforce her rights under the Final Judgment of Divorce and subsequent QDRO, and was not acting under the color of state law. Therefore, any claim under Section 1983 must fail.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant was a state actor or acted under color of state law.

Traylor v. Awwa · filed 2012-09-26

The Complaint fails to allege facts that could establish that CMIC is a state actor or acted under color of state law. Therefore, Counts Seven and Eight are being dismissed with respect to CMIC.

Section 1983 requires facts showing agreement and concerted action before a private attorney can be treated as acting under color of state law through a conspiracy.

Archuleta v. City of Roswell · filed 2012-09-30

Archuleta has not alleged any facts to show agreement and concerted action between private attorney Mr. Hernandez and government prosecutor, Ms. Camacho, and therefore has not sufficiently alleged that Mr. Hernandez acted under color of state law through a conspiracy.

Section 1983 covers claims against officials acting under color of state law.

Lair v. Murry · filed 2012-10-10

The Commissioner acts under color of state law and is sued in his official capacity.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging a private employer’s decision to show that the employer acted under color of state law in making that decision.

Faddis-Decerbo v. Astor Services for Children & Families · filed 2012-10-16

Plaintiffs-appellants have failed to put forth any evidence that Astor acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when it decided to fire them.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when a state election official enforces state election laws.

Service Employees International Union, Local 1 v. Husted · filed 2012-10-26

There is no dispute that the Secretary acts under the color of state law when enforcing Ohio’s election laws.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a private citizen acted under color of state law; reporting conduct to police and testifying at a preliminary hearing did not establish that requirement here.

Bennett v. Johnson · filed 2012-10-29

In its summary judgment order the district court noted that Mr. Bennett had failed to present evidence suggesting that Ms. Johnson, a private citizen, acted under color of state law when she reported Mr. Bennett’s conduct to the police and testified at his preliminary hearing. ... But having carefully reviewed de novo the record, the briefs, and the applicable law, and affording Mr. Bennett’s pleadings the solicitous consideration due pro se filings, we discern no persuasive reason to find any fault with the district court’s analysis and conclusion on any of these scores. Accordingly and for the reasons it gave, we affirm.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation under color of state law; a private college president’s expulsion decision does not meet that requirement without a connection to state action.

Cook v. Talladega College · filed 2012-11-01

As an alternative to the mootness-based dismissal discussed above, counts one (relating to freedom of speech) and two (relating to due process) as well as count four (asserting due process violations brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983) are due to be dismissed with prejudice because, while they purport to present federal constitutional issues, the counts- lack the requisite element of a deprivation committed, under “color of state law” or by state action.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivations of federal rights caused by a person acting under color of state law.

McCone v. City of Orlando · filed 2012-11-15

And McCone failed to state a claim that Ellis and Lall acted under color of state law when they revoked McCone’s parking permit.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Crosby v. Martin · filed 2012-11-16

Finally, to the extent that Crosby seeks to fashion a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we agree with the district court that he has not sufficiently alleged that state action resulted in the violation of his constitutional rights.

Whether a police officer acted under color of state law for § 1983 must go to a jury when material facts about his conduct are disputed.

Barkovic v. Terrance Hogan · filed 2012-11-19

As detailed below, there are issues of fact as to whether Hogan was acting under color of state law or purely as a private individual.

A § 1983 claim requires evidence that the defendant acted under color of state law; without sufficient evidence, summary judgment is appropriate.

Chiaro v. County of Nassau · filed 2012-11-20

Briefly stated, summary judgment was appropriate because plaintiff failed to adduce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant David Chiaro acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; federal funding of its parent company does not establish state action.

Goia v. Citifiancial Auto · filed 2012-12-03

Goia’s claim that CitiFinancial’s parent company, CitiGroup, received funding from the federal government does not show that CitiFinancial was acting under color of state law. Thus, Goia has not shown state action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only against persons who act under color of state law.

Henriquez v. El Pais Q'Hubocali.com · filed 2012-12-06

However, § 1983 grants a cause of action only against persons who acted “under the color of state law.” ... Because Henriquez has not alleged any deprivation of rights by, or with the help of, the state or federal government, his claims do not arise under § 1983 or the Constitution, thereby precluding personal jurisdiction under the national long-arm statute.

Section 1983 does not cover a state employee’s hostile conduct toward a coworker when the conduct arises from a personal dispute rather than state authority.

Finn v. New York State Office of Mental Health-Rockland Psychiatric Center · filed 2012-12-10

And Finn’s allegations of retaliation by Clarke cannot prevail either. Based on the evidence in the record, Clarke and Finn obviously had a bitter personal relationship, but Clarke was not in charge of Finn’s termination, nor did his purported hostile behavior come about because he was “clothed with the authority of state law.”

Section 1983 can reach a private party that conspires with state officials, but the complaint must plead the existence of a conspiracy.

Wellman v. PNC Bank · filed 2012-12-11

As the district court correctly held, the Wellmans failed to plead the existence of a conspiracy between PNC and the state-court judges even in a conclusory fashion.

A § 1983 claim against a private party based on a conspiracy with state officials requires facts supporting an inference of an agreement.

Hollinghead v. City of York · filed 2012-12-12

Any civil rights claims brought under Section 1983 must allege and prove that the Defendant was acting under color of state law when the Defendant' allegedly violated the Plaintiffs’ rights. ... Therefore, the § 1983 conspiracy claim leveled against Monocacy in Count V of the complaint should be dismissed in its current form.

Section 1983 can cover an off-duty officer’s conduct when a jury could find a genuine nexus between his police authority and the alleged violation.

Anderson v. Willis · filed 2013-01-07

Given the facts before the court at this time, the court believes that a reasonable jury could decide that there was a genuine nexus between defendant Willis’ real and apparent police authority and Willis’ alleged illegal detention of plaintiff and alleged excessive force against plaintiff.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law.

Stringer v. Doe · filed 2013-01-15

The Doe defendants and the dive shop manager are non-state actors who did not commit any acts under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires evidence of joint action or conspiracy with state agents to treat a private actor as acting under color of state law.

Young v. Suffolk County · filed 2013-02-11

Thus, in order to prove that a private actor was acting under the color of state law when he engaged in allegedly unconstitutional conduct, a plaintiff must point to evidence tending to show either (1) the existence of joint activity between the private actor and the state or its agents, or (2) a conspiracy between the state or its agents and the private actor.

Section 1983 treats state contractors who provide jail medical care as acting under color of state law.

Wood v. Plummer · filed 2013-02-12

Dr. Ellis and Nurse Theresa, although they are contractors with the state, acted "under color of state law” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 applies to people alleged to have violated constitutional rights while acting under state or municipal authority.

Bagby v. President of Bank of America · filed 2013-02-22

Plaintiff mentions "the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983," z`d., but that statute by its terms applies to individuals who are alleged to have violated one’s constitutional rights while acting under the authority of a state or municipality.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private employer to show that the challenged conduct was under color of state law.

Webber v. First Student, Inc. · filed 2013-02-26

Because Webber cannot show his termination was under color of state law, I do not address his claim that the termination violated-his First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 requires facts showing agreement and concerted action before private defendants can be treated as state actors in an alleged conspiracy with a judge; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Cook v. Baca · filed 2013-03-07

Having reviewed the FAC, we conclude that its conclusory allegations of a conspiracy fail to demonstrate agreement and concerted action between Judge Baca and the other defendants to deprive Mr. Cook of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law; a private defendant’s one-time contact with a state officer does not establish state action.

Wellington v. Royal Carribbean Cruises, Ltd. · filed 2013-03-08

Because Wellington did not adequately allege that the private defendants in this case were acting under color of state law, the district court did not err in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Pinkney v. American Medical Response, Inc · filed 2013-03-21

The district court properly dismissed Pinkney’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants American Medical Response, Inc. (“AMR”), the AMR employees, Emergency Medical Services Corporation, and Service Employees International Union, Local 1107 (“Local 1107”) because Pinkney failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants or their employees acted under color of state law.

A § 1983 claim requires the defendant to have acted under color of law.

Grimes v. Fremont General Corp. · filed 2013-03-22

Second, a § 1983 claim may be asserted against only parties operating “under the color of law” — i.e., state actors. ... Both moving Defendants are private parties, and Plaintiffs make no allegations that they were acting under color of law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking individual liability to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Presley v. Graham · filed 2013-03-28

The Complaint’s allegation that Mr. Graham acted under color of law states an essential element of Ms. Presley’s § 1983 claim; it does not provide a proper basis for dismissal.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private litigants or their attorneys to allege facts showing that they acted under color of state law.

John Kulesa, Jr. v. Rex · filed 2013-03-29

Kulesa failed to allege how Rex, a private litigant, and Gold-Bikin and Lupo, Rex‟s attorneys, acted under color of state law so as to deprive him of his civil rights.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a police officer acted under color of state law when he allegedly violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Magee v. Trustees of Hamline University · filed 2013-03-29

Therefore, the Court finds that Magee’s proposed amended complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to state a § 1983 claim against Titus, because he was not acting under color of state law at the time of the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 applies only to actions taken under color of state law, so a federal officer cannot be sued under it for acting as a federal employee.

Jones v. United States of America · filed 2013-03-31

Specifically, Section 1983 claims can only arise from actions taken under color of state law. See, e.g., Abramson v. Bennett, 707 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d 809 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Because Officer Kadiev was a member of the United States Park Police, she is a federal employee, and plaintiff cannot state a claim against Officer Kadiev under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a person acting under color of federal law.

Lytle v. Berg · filed 2013-04-01

In particular, we agree with the district court that Lytle had no cognizable claim under section 1983, see Jones v. United States, 16 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 1994) (§ 1983 is inapplicable when person acts under color of federal law), and that any claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), would fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a government official who reports a private dispute without acting under color of state law.

Myers v. Murry Bowman · filed 2013-04-10

Murry did not act under color of law when he reported to police that someone had stolen his dog because, in reporting the crime, he “act[ed] only as a private individual,” Edwards, 49 F.3d at 1523, and not “in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law,” West, 487 U.S. at 50, ... 108 S. Ct. at 2255.

Section 1983 does not cover a public official’s private conduct merely because the person also holds public office.

Webb v. Morella · filed 2013-04-12

The Webbs do not dispute that Morella’s alleged conduct occurred solely in his capacity as a private attorney. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the Webbs’ § 1983 actions for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Brown v. Collins · filed 2013-04-17

To the extent Brown argued that Collins otherwise infringed his constitutional rights, he cannot recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he alleges nothing suggesting that Collins “acted under color of state law.”

Section 1983 does not permit claims against public defenders who are not acting under color of state law.

LaGordian Brown v. Harrington · filed 2013-04-17

The public defenders cannot be sued under § 1983 because they were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a federal right under color of state law; allegations that a bus driver acted under transit authority authority can support the latter requirement.

Andrews v. Monroe County Trans Authority · filed 2013-04-25

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that a person deprived him of a federal right and did so under the color of state law. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). Appellants have alleged that Jordan acted under MCTA authority to operate the bus.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a private company’s talent recruiter does not meet that requirement.

Flander v. KForce, Inc. · filed 2013-04-26

The first purported violation is of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As noted by the Magistrate Judge, this statute applies only to state actors. ... Flander cannot establish that Dyck, a talent recruiter working for a private company, was a state actor.

Section 1983 imposes liability only for actions taken under state law, so it does not provide a Fifth Amendment claim against a federal actor.

Koessel v. Sublette County Sheriff's Department · filed 2013-05-14

Moreover, because § 1983 imposes liability only for actions taken under state law, even if there were a federal actor involved there would be no Fifth Amendment claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 liability requires that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Jallali v. National Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, Inc. · filed 2013-05-15

As the district court correctly concluded, Jallali’s allegations, taken as true, do not establish that the Defendants acted under color of state law when they conspired to destroy Jallali’s exam materials, which is necessary for § 1983 liability.

Public defenders cannot be sued under § 1983 when they are not acting under color of state law.

LaGordian Brown v. Dove · filed 2013-05-16

The public defenders cannot be sued under § 1983 because they were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against public defenders who were not acting under color of state law.

LaGordian Brown v. Harrington · filed 2013-05-16

The public defenders cannot be sued under § 1983 because they were not acting under color of state law.

A borough solicitor who conducts a constitutionally required pretermination hearing on the borough’s behalf acts under color of state law for § 1983.

Brown v. Tucci · filed 2013-05-20

The Court holds only that Stanger’s conduct in relation to Brown was “fairly attributable to the State,” regardless of whether it was legal.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Saunders v. Law Offices of Elaine Van Beve · filed 2013-05-22

The district court properly dismissed Saunders’s § 1983 claim against Van Beveren and her law firm because Saunders failed to allege facts showing that Van Beveren acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Robinson v. United States Small Business Administration · filed 2013-06-10

By its tenns § 1983 applies only to state actors, and because the named defendants are not state actors, this case will be dismissed.

A court-appointed attorney representing a client does not act under color of state law and cannot be sued under § 1983 for that representation.

Sanders v. Murdter · filed 2013-06-14

The court also correctly concluded that appellant’s court-appointed attorney did not act under color of state law when representing appellant in District of Columbia Superior Court and therefore could not be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a private physician acted under color of state law before a claim against that physician can proceed.

Dennis v. DeJong · filed 2013-06-14

Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence that Dr. DeJong’s actions as an employee of duPont hospital constitute actions under the color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; government regulation of a bank alone does not make the bank a state actor.

Coe v. Holder · filed 2013-06-18

Banks are regulated by the U.S. government, but that alone is not joint activity sufficient to bring a bank within the purview of Section 1983.

An on-duty state trooper who calls local police from his barracks to report a potentially dangerous situation acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Thomas v. Thomas · filed 2013-06-19

But when an on-duty state trooper makes a call from his barracks reporting a potentially dangerous situation to a local police department, surely he is acting in his capacity as a police officer and therefore he is acting under color of state law for the purpose of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against him.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; treating a patient during a state-authorized involuntary mental health hold does not, by itself, make private hospital staff state actors.

Wittner Ex Rel. Wittner v. Banner Health · filed 2013-06-24

We conclude plaintiffs failed to state a claim that defendants were state actors.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not cover conduct by agents of the federal government acting under federal law.

Pérez v. Puerto Rico National Guard · filed 2013-06-28

As federal law applies, the Court finds Plaintiffs § 1983 claim to be inapplicable because the defendants were not acting under the color of state of law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party only if the party acted under color of state law.

Jae Soog Lee v. Law Office of Kim & Bae, PC · filed 2013-07-16

Private parties are not proper defendants in a Section 1983 action unless the private parties were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not cover actions by federal agencies or federal officers acting under federal law when no one acted under color of state law.

Herbst v. United States Postal Service · filed 2013-07-16

In this case, defendants’ alleged discriminatory conduct constitutes action under color of federal law because the USPS is a federal agency and defendants DeVaul, Donahoe, and Williams all acted pursuant to their duty as federal officers of the USPS. Moreover, none of the allegedly discriminatory conduct involved actions taken under color of state law. Accordingly, the plaintiffs claims under § 1983 against defendants are precluded as a matter of law.

A bank does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when it merely freezes an account in response to a state agency’s restraining notice.

Sykes v. Bank of America · filed 2013-07-24

We therefore conclude that Bank of America did not act “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of state law; federal public defenders and appointed counsel performing traditional defense functions do not satisfy that requirement.

Lay v. Otto · filed 2013-07-31

Although Lay claimed to bring a lawsuit under § 1983, he has not alleged facts showing that Defendants acted under color of state law. This element is “a jurisdictional requisite for a § 1983 action.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 315 (1981). Defendants worked for the federal public defender (or were appointed by the district court to work with the public defender), and § 1983 is “applicable only to actions by state and local entities, not by the federal government.” Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000). Moreover, even state public defenders do “not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied when a county lists a person in a statewide child-welfare database.

Castillo v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2013-07-31

Castillo’s listing on the CWS/CMS database unquestionably occurs under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private attorney authorized by a court to take adoption consents is not a state actor on that basis.

Hunter v. Ferebauer · filed 2013-07-31

A privately-retained attorney does not act under color of state law for the purposes of a § 1983 claim. ... As an attorney authorized to take consents by Utah courts, Defendant Hawkins is no different. As such, Plaintiff failed to identify any state actor who is a party to this suit. Therefore, his § 1983 claim must be dismissed.