42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Deavenport v. Winley · filed 2009-03-02

The district court properly dismissed Deavenport’s section 1983 claims against defendant Winley because Deaven-port made no allegation that Winley, Deav-enport’s former client and a private litigant in the arbitration, was acting under color of state law.

A § 1983 claim requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Cordova v. Blockbuster Video Corp. · filed 2009-03-04

Mr. Cordova’s claim fails to raise a substantial federal question because it does not allege that either defendant acted under color of state law, a fundamental requirement for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 reaches private parties who act jointly with state officials in the challenged conduct.

Moxley v. Town of Walkersville · filed 2009-03-06

The Private Defendants’ argument must fail, however, because Plaintiffs have not sued the Private Defendants for “merely private conduct” — instead, Plaintiffs seek to hold the Private Defendants accountable for actions they allegedly undertook in concert with the Government Defendants.

Section 1983 requires facts suggesting that the defendant acted under color of law.

Liles v. Revetaw, Inc. · filed 2009-03-06

Because Liles has failed to allege any facts to suggest that the Defendants acted under color of law, she has failed to state a claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right by a defendant acting under color of state, territorial, or District of Columbia law.

Thomas v. News World Communications · filed 1988-02-23

Even if the common law torts allegedly committed by the Times defendants did operate to deprive plaintiffs of - a “right, privilege[], or immunit[y]” cognizable under § 1983, the complaint alleges no acts taken by the Times defendants “under col- or of” any state or District of Columbia law. Accordingly, the complaint fails to satisfy the second criterion established for § 1983 actions in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., supra.

State officials acting in that capacity act under color of state law if they participate in racial discrimination.

Johnson v. Michigan Department of Corrections and Daryl Anderson, William Grant, Bruce Cummings, and Dick Kapenga · filed 1988-12-13

Since the defendants were state officials acting in that capacity, if they played a part in racial discrimination, it would of necessity be under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a witness’s testimony in a state court proceeding as action under color of state law.

Bates v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1989-09-26

A witness testifying in state court does not act under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against an athletic association that was not acting under color of state law.

Burrows ex rel. Burrows v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n · filed 1989-12-01

Consequently, under the rule of Graham, OHSAA has not acted under the color of state law and a cause of action is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and a public defender's traditional legal functions do not qualify as state action.

Bowdry v. OCHALLA · filed 2009-03-19

Defendants’ actions (or inactions) with respect to Plaintiffs mittimus were not performed pursuant to any alleged policy. And although those actions may not have been part of an adversary proceedings, the court concludes they were nonetheless traditional legal functions. The exception recognized in Polk County is therefore inapplicable here, and therefore grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 may reach off-duty police officers who invoke police authority during the challenged conduct.

Zainc v. City of Waterbury · filed 2009-03-23

There is evidence in this case that Hobart and Costanzo invoked the power of the police department during the incident in question. For example, there is evidence that they warned others present during the incident that they were police officers, and that they were conducing a search for Hobart’s missing cell phone pursuant to them police duties. Reasonable officers, even if off-duty, should know that such actions would make them liable for acting under the color of law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a correctional officer acting for purely personal reasons does not satisfy that requirement.

Rembert v. Holland · filed 1990-04-20

Yet, even assuming plaintiff’s version of the altercation is true, and even assuming plaintiff suffered “pain” of a sort cognizable under the Eighth Amendment, such offense is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if Holland acted under color of state law. ... Scrutinizing the nature of the alleged conduct, however, compels the conclusion, as a matter of law, that Holland did not act under color of law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person who, under color of state, territorial, or District of Columbia law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution and laws.

Richardson v. U.S. Department of Interior · filed 1990-06-12

Actions taken by federal officers are outside its proscriptions. ... Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law for a civil rights action.

Hobbs v. William R. Heck, Rodney C. Strong · filed 1990-12-06

Further, the defendants were not acting under color of state law as required under section 1983.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for a constitutional rights violation committed under color of state law.

Hannah v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad · filed 1990-12-18

Consequently, because plaintiff has failed to allege facts that might fulfill either the “symbiotic relationship” test or the “close nexus” test, the Court agrees with defendant that he has failed to allege that defendant was acting “under color of law” for any of his § 1983 claims other than that based on his arrest.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law and permits municipal liability only when the conduct is fairly attributable to the municipality.

Costa v. Frye · filed 1991-03-07

The evidence presented at trial demonstrates that Frye was engaged in a purely private incident which cannot be fairly attributed to the City.

Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who participates in depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of state law.

Hanshaw v. Board of Education of Carter County · filed 1991-10-17

Under § 1983, however, liability extends to anyone who participated in a deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy only for deprivations committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Amaro v. Vedder · filed 2009-03-26

As the District Court points out, Vedder is not a state actor acting under color of state law. ... Therefore, Amaro cannot bring an actionable § 1983 claim against Vedder.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff pursuing a conspiracy theory to show that state officials and private parties reached an understanding to deny constitutional rights.

Loubser v. United States · filed 2009-03-30

As a result, Ms. Loubser has failed the first prong of the § 1983 test in Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d at 785, discussed above. She has not offered evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact to show that state officials and private parties somehow reached an understanding to deny Ms. Loubser her constitutional rights, as required by § 1983. Consequently, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants on Ms. Loubser’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation by a person acting under color of state law.

Estate of Harry Smit v. City of Wilmington · filed 2009-03-27

Even if plaintiffs could establish a constitutionally protected property interest created by the Delaware statute, they submitted no evidence that they were deprived of this interest by a person acting under ... color of state law, as they were required to do under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private law firm representing a litigant is not a state actor on that basis.

Shahin v. Darling · filed 2009-03-31

The law firm defendants are not state actors, but rather law firms who represented a defendant in civil actions filed by plaintiff. Because the law firm defendants are not “clothed with the authority of state law,” the § 1983 claims against them also fail.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a defendant was a state actor or acted under color of state law.

Mele v. Hill Health Center · filed 2009-03-31

Because Mele cannot show the Hill Health Center, Grant Street Partnership, or any of the named defendants were state actors or acted under color of state law, his section 1983 claims fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 treats private creditors as acting under color of state law when they use a sheriff to serve garnishment papers that seize a debtor’s property.

Lowell Buller, Dale Buller, Happy Family Farmers Co., Growing Animals Producers of Natron County, Wyoming and… · filed 1983-05-05

We believe that under the circumstances present here, we too must find that the plaintiffs satisfied the second requirement of the Lugar state action test: the defendants joint participation with state officials was sufficient to characterize them as state actors.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; under this opinion, a physician exercising independent professional judgment does not meet that requirement merely by contracting directly with the state to treat prisoners.

Quincy West v. Samuel Atkins Rae McNamara James B. Hunt · filed 1987-04-09

Thus the clear and practicable principle enunciated by the Supreme Court, and followed in Calvert, is that a professional, when acting within the bounds of traditional professional discretion and judgment, does not act under color of state law, even where, as in Dodson, the professional is a full-time employee of the state.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to have relied on an officer’s apparent authority to establish that the officer acted under color of state law.

Czarobski v. St. Kieran's Church · filed 1994-04-26

I see no reason to deny Rambo this remedy simply because he may have understood the limits of an Illinois police officer’s jurisdiction better than Daley and McGinnis. Liability under § 1983 is not predicated on detrimental reliance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for failing to report an injury unless state law also gave the person authority to control the events that caused it.

Doe v. Rains County Independent School Dist. · filed 1995-10-04

Because we find that the existence of a right of legal control is a compelling distinction in the question whether state law has located a person as a constitutional actor, we insist that a breach of a state-law duty to report cannot render a person liable under § 1983 as a responsible state actor unless that person also had a duty under state law to exercise state authority in controlling the events that produced the unreported injury.

Section 1983’s color-of-law requirement is met when correctional officials act pursuant to local law.

Gonzalez v. de Ramos · filed 1990-04-24

In order to establish a valid 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claim plaintiff must indicate that (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of law; and (2) that this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Their decisions or actions, therefore, are taken pursuant to the authority of local law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state, territorial, or District of Columbia law; the federal agents named in this complaint did not meet that requirement.

Hall v. Mueller · filed 2009-04-20

Here, there is no allegation, and there cannot be any reasonable allegation, that Director Mueller or the unknown federal agents were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat an attorney hired as legal counsel as acting under color of state law solely because of that representation.

Lafayette Brown v. Terrell · filed 2009-04-21

Further, Brown does not allege that Terrell is a state actor, see Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005), and the fact that Brown hired Terrell to represent him as legal counsel does not render Terrell a “person acting under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983.

An attorney’s work as legal counsel does not constitute action under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Lafayette Brown v. David Martin, Jr. · filed 2009-04-21

Further, Brown does not allege that Martin is a state actor, see Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005), and the fact that Martin acted as Brown’s legal counsel does not render Martin a “person acting under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-law requirement can be met by a state highway patrolman acting pursuant to state law even when his actions exceed his authority.

Stringer v. Dilger · filed 1963-01-15

The evidence here clearly establishes that Dilger was acting pursuant to state law as a state highway patrolman and he was, therefore, acting “under color of” state law even though such actions may have been in excess of his authority.

Section 1983 applies to persons acting under color of state or territorial law, not federal law.

Virgil Norton, Virgil Wesley and James Chapman v. McShane · filed 1964-07-15

Thus the person must be acting under color of state law for the section to apply, whereas the defendants in the instant suits were acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 covers deprivations of rights under color of state or territorial law, not federal law.

Ellis v. Parker · filed 1966-08-16

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 refer to the deprivation of rights under color of law of any state or territory, not under the color of federal law, thus these statutes are inapplicable.

Section 1983 covers deprivations of constitutional rights committed under color of state or territorial law, not federal authority.

Bivens v. 6 Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics · filed 1967-11-24

42 U.S.C. § 1983 confers jurisdiction upon the Federal Courts of suits against persons charged with depriving claimants of Constitutional rights while acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory”.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Motley v. Virginia Hardware & Manufacturing Co. · filed 1968-05-28

Thus an indispensable element of a plaintiff’s case in an action brought under § 1983 is a showing that the defendant (or defendants) acted “under color of” state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private university’s disciplinary proceedings do not meet that requirement without relevant state involvement.

Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University in City of NY · filed 1968-07-09

While there are other statutes cited to sustain the court’s jurisdiction, the quoted provision is sufficient to pose the vital issue as the parties have effectively formulated it — whether there is shown an alleged wrong “under color of” state law or, more familiarly, allegedly unlawful “state action,” see United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966). ... What is still more striking is the total absence of any indication that the State (or any government) is involved as a participant in the University disciplinary proceedings to which the motion for a preliminary injunction is directed.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional deprivations under color of state or territorial law.

Elkanich v. Alexander · filed 1970-01-13

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for persons who are deprived of any rights secured by the Constitution, under color of any state or territorial statute, ordinances, regulations, custom or usage. The purpose of this section is to override certain kinds of state and local laws, and to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy was inadequate in theory or practice. Clearly, petitioner does not state a claim under §§ 1981 or 1983.

Section 1983 treats the official actions of a housing authority established and controlled by state law as actions under color of state law.

Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority · filed 1972-09-15

The Housing Authority is an entity which is established and controlled by the law of the State of New York. The facts and prior case law mandate the conclusion that its official actions are actions taken under color of State law.

Section 1983 treats a public restaurant as acting under color of state law when its state liquor licensing restricts competition and confers an economic benefit.

Bennett v. Dyer's Chop House, Inc. · filed 1972-10-26

This Court concurs with the holding in the MeSorleys’ case and finds that the defendant is operating under color of law due to the licensing arrangement it has with the Ohio State Department of Liquor Control.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a defendant participated in the challenged deprivation and acted under color of state law.

Glenn W. Bricker, M.D. v. Henry D. Crane, Jr., M.D. · filed 1972-11-07

Even if it could be argued that the insurance companies and defendants-attorneys Soden and Millham were not so related to the hospital as to be entitled to invoke the doctrine, we hold in any case that since there were no allegations of their participation in the challenged denial of reappointment and no other allegations coloring their actions with state law, no cause of action under § 1983 was made out as to those defendants.

Section 1983 treats a National Guard officer’s decision as action under color of state law when state law requires the officer to apply federal standards.

Zitser v. Walsh · filed 1972-12-08

Thus, his decision was made “under color of (a) statute . of (a) State” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 treats private self-help repossession as action under color of state law when state statutes comprehensively authorize and govern it.

Boland v. Essex County Bank and Trust Company · filed 1973-08-15

In our opinion, whatever authority to repossess without judicial process existed prior to the enactment of the statutes, all repossessions since their enactment are made under their color and constitute state action.

A private athletic league’s voluntary adoption of state agency rules does not make its conduct action under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Stock v. Texas Catholic Interscholastic League · filed 1973-09-17

In short, there is no mandate, compulsion, or other obligation on the part of TCIL to adopt the UIL rules and such adoption is insufficient to support jurisdiction in this cause.

Section 1983 treats a state-agency security guard’s misuse of authority conferred by his position as action under color of state law.

Reed v. Philadelphia Housing Authority · filed 1974-03-08

Clearly, Matthews was “clothed with the authority of state law”, and such power and authority as he possessed was “by virtue of state law”. Even misuse of power, under these circumstances, is action taken under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts beyond a private hospital’s receipt of public funds and state regulation to plead action under color of state law.

Barrio v. McDonough District Hospital · filed 1974-06-19

In short, to state a claim under Section 1983, it will be necessary for any amended complaint to allege facts in addition to the facts of state regulation and the receipt of public funds, if such an amended complaint is to, prima, facie, allege an action under color of state law.

Section 1983 covers a county health officer who treats a jail detainee at the sheriff’s request in his official capacity because that treatment is state action.

Robinson v. R. H. Jordan, Sheriff of Gray County, Texas and Dr. Joseph W. Gates, of Pampa, Texas · filed 1974-06-25

This holding was ... erroneous since Dr. Gates acted solely in his official capacity as a county health officer in treating appellant. This was state action.

Section 1983 requires an injury caused under color of state law; a complaint may sufficiently allege that element when read as a whole.

Robison v. Wichita Falls and North Texas Community Action Corporation, Etc. · filed 1975-01-15

An essential element in a section 1983 action is that the injury underlying the claim be the product, in some sense, of activity by state officials. ... Noting that Robison sued under Section 1983, taking the complaint as a whole, and considering the nature of the evidence adduced at trial as well as the trial court’s findings, we construe the complaint as charging that Wichita and its employees and directors deprived him of his civil rights under color of state law.

A private defendant is liable under § 1983 only when it willfully participates in joint activity with the State or its agents.

Spear v. Town of West Hartford · filed 1992-04-16

Furthermore, it is beyond reasonable contention that a private defendant may be held liable under Section 1983 only as “a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Braun v. John W. Forcum, Jeffrey Heffelfinger, James A. Heimann · filed 1992-05-11

To the extent Braun would reassert his claim against defendants Heimann and Loshe, the court notes simply that neither acted "under color of state law," a prerequisite to suit under § 1983.

Federal officials do not act under color of state law for § 1983 when they independently exercise federal authority without significant state participation in the challenged conduct.

Cabrera v. Martin · filed 1992-08-21

Far from being a symbiotic participant, whose actions could fairly be attributed to the State, we hold as a matter of law that the federal defendants' decision to resume exclusive federal jurisdiction over the State's occupational health and safety matters was taken under color of federal law and that the state played no legally significant role in the challenged activity.

Section 1983 provides a federal civil rights action only for deprivations carried out under color of state law.

Nobles v. Robert Brown, Jr., Director, Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1992-12-09

Mr. Newson was not acting under color of any state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,” see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the outrage suffered by Mrs. Nobles is simply not compensable in a federal civil rights action.

Section 1983 requires a private care facility to have acted under color of state law for its conduct to be actionable.

Doyle v. Unicare Health Serv., Inc., Aurora Center · filed 1975-03-31

To be actionable under § 1983, the plaintiffs must establish that the defendant Unieare, a private for-profit institution, was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits suit against a private contractor providing medical care to jail inmates because it acts under color of state law.

Hicks v. Frey · filed 1993-05-13

It is clear that a private entity which contracts with the state to perform a traditional state function such as providing medical services to prison inmates may be sued under § 1983 as one acting “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Snyder v. Talbot · filed 1993-10-25

More specifically, allegations against Defendant Christine Talbot pursuant to section 1983 are deficient because the Complaint fails to demonstrate that Christine Talbot was acting “under color of state law,” which is a necessary prerequisite for stating a cause of action under section 1983.

A private individual who conspires with public officials to violate constitutional rights acts under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.

Hickey v. NEW CASTLE CTY. OF STATE OF DEL. · filed 1977-03-17

I agree with plaintiff that a private individual who conspires with public officials to violate one’s constitutional rights will be considered to have acted under color of state law under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person who collaborates with a police officer acting under color of state law to deprive someone of freedom without due process.

Alexanian v. New York State Urban Development Corporation · filed 1977-03-30

These allegations state a claim against the policeman as a person acting under color of state law for deprivation of freedom without due process in violation of § 1983, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 1967), and against the driver collaborating with the officer acting under color of state law, see Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966); Canty v. City of Richmond, 383 F.Supp. 1396 (E.D. Va.1974).

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of rights under color of state law.

Phillips v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 118 · filed 1977-06-13

Section 1983 does not provide relief, since it was not alleged that the deprivation of rights in question was under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not cover a private nursing home's conduct merely because it participates in Medicaid; the challenged conduct must be attributable to the state.

Fuzie v. Manor Care, Inc. · filed 1977-07-05

It is a privately owned corporation, ... whose conduct, therefore, “however discriminatory,” ... is not within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment.

Officers executing an eviction order may be found to act under color of law for purposes of § 1983.

McDowell v. Davis · filed 1977-07-06

In the present case the evidence is clearly sufficient to support a finding by the jury that the defendants in executing the eviction order were acting “under color of law.”

Section 1983 reaches a private towing company that tows and holds vehicles at police direction under a statutory traffic enforcement scheme.

Stypmann v. The City and County of San Francisco · filed 1977-07-21

Nor is there substance in appellants’ argument that the state action required for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is lacking.

A private company acts under color of state law when it operates a company town and prevents the exercise of First Amendment rights there.

Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co. · filed 1977-09-19

From these uncontested facts, there can be only one conclusion: that Prince Crossing is a company town within the meaning of Marsh v. Alabama; and accordingly, when defendant acted through its agents to prevent plaintiffs from exercising their first amendment freedoms within the farm, it did so under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private landlord’s use of a statutory lien, without state involvement, as action under color of state law.

Hitchcock v. Allison · filed 1977-11-15

For the reasons herein stated, we conclude this case falls squarely within the rationale of Davis, supra, and that Appel-lees’ seizure of Appellants’ property pursuant to 41 O.S.Supp.1973, § 42, did not constitute State action.

Section 1983 reaches a state official who uses apparent state authority to seize someone outside his lawful powers.

Krueger v. Miller · filed 1978-01-27

Having “gotten-at” Miss Krueger in the foregoing manner, Notary Public Miller took a different tack; he pretended to possess the power by virtue of Tennessee law of one of its deputies sheriff, and he misused this pretended power to cause the plaintiff to submit to his pretended-official custody. Such misuse of power was made possible only because Mr. Miller claimed to be clothed with the authority of Tennessee law. ... For all these reasons, this Court hereby FINDS that the defendant Mr. Miller did the foregoing acts under color of the law of Tennessee.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a private hospital that is not acting under color of state law.

National Ass'n v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1978-04-07

Thus, Lau and similar cases are of no help to the plaintiffs because they are unable to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983, having sued a private hospital not acting under color of state law.

A warehouseman’s enforcement of a lien is not state action under § 1983 merely because sheriffs previously executed the eviction writ, where they do not participate in enforcing the lien.

Wegwart v. Eagle Movers, Inc. · filed 1979-04-03

There is no allegation that the defendant sheriffs participate in enforcement by the defendant warehousemen of liens created pursuant to § 407.209, Wis.Stats. Consequently, at least with respect to § 407.210, the issue is whether the warehousemen’s conduct alone, and not their conduct in conjunction with the previous conduct of the defendant sheriffs in executing the writs of restitution, is properly attributable to the State. 436 U.S. at 151-152, 98 S.Ct. 1729. As found by the Supreme Court in Flagg Brothers, it is not.

Section 1983 can cover an interstate compact agency and its officers acting under color of state law even when the compact required congressional approval.

Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency · filed 1979-04-16

The Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that the requirement of federal approval of the interstate Compact foreclosed the possibility that the conduct of TRPA and its officers could be found to be “under color of state law” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private nursing home’s eviction decision is not state action when operating the home is not a public function and the State lacks a sufficient nexus to the decision.

Wagner v. Sheltz · filed 1979-05-18

Since the operation of a nursing home does not constitute a public function and because there is lacking the necessary nexus between the private action and the State, the Court finds that there is no state action in the private defendants’ decision to evict the plaintiff.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law and does not provide a remedy for actions by federal officers under color of federal law.

Pugh v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 1979-06-07

Furthermore, a requisite for pursuing a remedy under section 1983 is that the defendant acted under color of state law. In the instant case, plaintiff complains about the actions of federal officers acting under color of federal law; therefore, section 1983 is not a remedy available to the plaintiff.

Official poll-watchers act under color of state law for § 1983 when state election law enables their challenged conduct in carrying out election duties, even if they also serve private party interests.

Tiryak v. Jordan · filed 1979-06-26

It matters not that the political party, its officials and workers are acting in furtherance of private interests; if their conduct is made possible by state election law, and if one sequela of their conduct is to further the purity of an exclusive state concern, i. e., elections, then their actions are for § 1983 purposes properly attributable to the state.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private social service agency’s public funding and tax exemption do not make its employment decision state action without a connection to that decision.

Gray v. Project More, Inc. · filed 1979-04-18

However, under certain circumstances, the actions of a private individual or entity may be sufficiently related to those of the state so that the invocation of the fourteenth amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is appropriate. ... In sum, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the activities of defendants Project More and Moore can be attributed to any governmental authority.

A private party may be sued under § 1983 for willful joint activity with state agents, but the complaint must identify the officials and specifically allege their personal involvement.

Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J. P. Stevens & Co. · filed 1979-08-03

While a private person, not himself an officer of the state, may be proceeded against under § 1983 if “he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents,” United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966), the plaintiff must in order to state a cause of action specifically identify the public officials concerned, and, as to such officials, specifically allege their personal involvement in the acts complained of.

Section 1983 requires plaintiffs to show that defendants acted under color of state law to deprive them of constitutional rights.

Edwards v. Maryland State Fair & Agricultural Society · filed 1979-08-17

To prevail in their claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate ... that the defendants acted under color of state law to deprive them of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 covers actions taken under color of state law and does not reach actions taken by private citizens.

Totaro v. Lyons · filed 1980-09-19

Similar claims brought against state officials would be governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which explicitly limits its coverage to actions taken under color of state law. Thus both Bivens and § 1983 do not reach actions taken by private citizens.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law.

Rice v. President & Fellows · filed 1981-02-03

42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that the defendant be acting under color of state law.

A private individual may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with a public official to deprive someone of rights.

Smith v. Butler · filed 1981-02-23

It is only when a private individual conspires with a public official to deprive a person of his rights that he may be subjected to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege action under color of state law to state a claim.

Lloyd v. CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AMER. · filed 1994-06-10

In order to state a § 1983 claim, plaintiff must allege action under color of state law.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for deprivation of federal rights by someone acting under color of state law.

Gonyo v. Drake University · filed 1995-03-10

In Count III plaintiffs bring a claim against defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that defendants, acting under color of state law, violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause. As a threshold matter, to sustain a section 1983 claim, the defendants must be acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Drake University is a private institution, and the individual defendants are not employed or otherwise affiliated with the State of Iowa. The undisputed facts establish that defendants are private actors, and were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law and a deprivation of constitutional rights; conclusory allegations without factual support do not state a claim.

Perelman v. American Bankers Insurance Company, Defendant-Apellee · filed 1995-03-30

In order to establish a Sec. 1983 claim, two elements must be satisfied: "(1) the conduct complained of must have been under color of state law, and (2) the conduct must have subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of constitutional rights." Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d at 649 (citing Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir.1976)). Mere conclusory allegations, without factual support, are insufficient to state a claim under Sec. 1983. Id. (quoting Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir.1977)). ... A private individual's action may be taken under color of state law where the state is significantly involved in the action. See Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir.1983). Perelman alleged that the State Insurance Commissioner entered into a conspiracy with American by "covering for them." His allegations are conclusory and unsupported by any facts which demonstrate how American and the State Insurance Commissioner entered into a conspiracy. Perelman contends that he notified the State Insurance Commissioner that American denied his insurance claims. A state actor's mere acquiescence in a private action, however, does not convert the action into that of the state. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978). Consequently, Perelman's notification does not transform American's denial of his insurance claim into "significant" state involvement. See id. ... Because Perelman failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that American acted under color of state law when it denied his insurance claims, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Perelman's Sec. 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires allegations showing that defendants acted under color of state law.

Parks School of Business, Inc., Dba Parks College, a New Mexico Corporation v. Fife Symington Roy A. Nicholson Sally Hei · filed 1995-04-11

Assuming arguendo that neither of these exceptions applies here, the district court nonetheless did not err when it granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the counts based on § 1983 because the complaint contains insufficient allegations showing that the defendants acted “under color of state law,” as the statute requires.

Section 1983 requires a claim to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Executive Services of Miami, Inc. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1981-05-13

It is the opinion of this Court, however, that Plaintiff has not stated a claim under section 1983. A cursory examination of Count II shows that there are no allegations that Defendant’s actions were made under color of any statute, ordinance or regulation.

Section 1983 requires defendants to act under color of state law for a claim to proceed.

Pettus v. Veterans Administration Hospital, Philadelphia · filed 1981-07-08

His claims under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must fail because he has not asserted, nor can he assert, that the defendants are acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law; a private guard’s work at a public housing building did not establish that requirement here.

Wade v. Byles · filed 1995-05-25

To recover on claim brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the defendants were acting under color of state law and that their conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution. ... Wade has failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Byles was acting under color of state law when he shot Wade.

Section 1983 does not cover private individuals who report stolen property to police and reclaim it without acting under color of state law.

Gawron v. Kurt McAllister Peter Ritter · filed 1995-07-07

Here, amendment of Gawron's complaint to add these defendants would have been futile because the named individuals did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 applies to a state employee’s conduct only when the employee acts by virtue of state authority.

Boykin v. Bloomsburg University · filed 1995-07-07

The Boykins have failed to present a viable § 1983 claim against either Samsel or Downs. Not every action taken by a state employee is deemed to have occurred under color of state law. Action is “under color of state law” only when the alleged wrongdoer is acting by virtue of his state authority.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to have been committed under color of state law.

Cevallos v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1996-01-17

The threshold inquiry in any Section 1983 action is whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, depriving the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right.

Section 1983 requires state action; a hospital’s denial of staff privileges cannot support a claim when the conduct is not attributable to the state.

Cole v. Huntsville Memorial Hospital · filed 1996-02-15

Because there was no state action, appellants cannot prevail on their constitutional causes of action or their claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches conduct under color of state law, including a private association’s conduct when it qualifies as state action.

Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n · filed 1981-11-17

Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) imposes a restriction on purely private conduct. Under the Fourteenth Amendment the limitation is on what “any State” shall do, while Section 1983 implicates only action “under color” of state law.

A Section 1983 damages claim has no immediate basis when officials have only threatened enforcement and have taken no action under color of state law against the plaintiffs.

Mid-Fla Coin Exchange, Inc. v. Griffin · filed 1981-12-16

Thus, as of yet defendants Graffis and Simpson have not taken any action under color of state law with respect to plaintiffs, much less any action that would operate to deprive plaintiffs of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States. Consequently, there is no immediate basis for the Section 1983 claim and it will be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for federal civil-rights violations by those acting under color of state law; claims against federal actors must proceed under Bivens instead.

Graham v. United States · filed 1981-12-22

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for violations of federal civil rights by those acting under color of state law. The defendants are all federal actors.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not cover deprivations by federal officials acting under color of federal law.

United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines · filed 1982-06-11

But Your-Style’s lawsuit did not invoke and could not have invoked Section 1983: It alleged deprivations by federal officials acting under color of federal law, and not (as Section 1983 requires) action under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a binding stipulation establishing that element defeats a motion to dismiss based on its absence.

Smith v. Parmley · filed 1982-06-21

The basis for such motion is Mr. Parmley’s contention that, at the pertinent times, he was not acting under color of state law, an essential element for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supra. What the movant appears to overlook, however, is that at the pretrial conference it was stipulated that at all pertinent times “ * * * the defendant Mr. Harry Parmley was a duly appointed police officer of the city of Mon-teagle, Tennessee acting under color of Tennessee law.”

Private persons jointly engaged with state officials in prohibited action act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

William A. Goichman, on Behalf of Himself and a Class of All Persons Similarly Situated v. Rheuban Motors, Inc. · filed 1982-08-05

“Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in [a] prohibited action,” act under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches a private party that jointly engages with state officials in the challenged action.

Blue Sky L. Rep. P 71,762, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 98,822 Martin-Marietta Corporation v. Bendix Corporation, United Technolo · filed 1982-09-22

In addition, where a private individual or entity jointly engages with state officials in a challenged action, as Bendix is doing in fact, the private individual or entity is acting under the color of a state statute for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the challenged conduct occurred under color of state law.

Spilman v. Crebo · filed 1982-11-30

Plaintiff’s allegation of jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq. is also clearly erroneous. There is no allegation of conduct undertaken, “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory”.

A § 1983 complaint fails to state a claim when none of the defendants acted under color of state law.

Barnes v. Unites States · filed 2004-08-27

In its Memorandum and Order, the district court characterized Barnes’s claim as one brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, then dismissed it on the basis that, since none of the Defendants named were acting under color of state law, Barnes had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s characterization of Barnes’s Amended Complaint as a § 1983 claim and the district court’s conclusion that the Amended ... Complaint failed to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; the Department of Justice acting under federal law does not meet that requirement.

Pearsall v. Holder · filed 2009-04-28

Finally, DOJ argues, and Mr. Pearsall does not dispute, that Mr. Pearsall’s Section 1983 claim fails for several reasons — not the least of which is that DOJ “does not act under ‘color of state law' [as required by Section 1983] but rather, federal law.” Mot. at 21. ... Obviously, discovery would not cure these deficiencies. Thus, Counts Three and Four of Mr. Pearsall’s complaint and Mr. Pearsall’s claim under Section 1983 must be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; DOJ acting under federal law does not satisfy that requirement.

Pearsall v. Gonzalez · filed 2009-04-28

Finally, DOJ argues, and Mr. Pearsall does not dispute, that Mr. Pearsall’s Section 1983 claim fails for several reasons – not the least of which is that DOJ “does not act under ‘color of state law’ [as required by Section 1983] but rather, federal law.” ... Obviously, discovery would not cure these deficiencies. Thus, Counts Three and Four of Mr. Pearsall’s complaint and Mr. Pearsall’s claim under Section 1983 must be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 1983 requires defendants to act under color of state law; private status alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Smith v. British Petroleum of America · filed 2009-04-29

The district court properly dismissed the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because defendants, who are all private entities or persons, did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state or local law and does not apply to officials acting only under federal law.

Wright v. Butts · filed 1996-07-24

Accordingly, the court finds that summary judgment is due to be granted on the § 1983 claim asserted against Mr. Pena and Mr. Wilkerson, because they were not acting under the color of state or local law.

Section 1983 does not reach a private hospital contractor’s decision to terminate its employee when the public hospital did not participate in that decision.

Perdue v. Quorum Health Resources, Inc. · filed 1996-08-07

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Defendant Quorum was not acting “under color of state law” when it decided to terminate Plaintiff. Thus, Defendant Quorum’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Section 1983 claim against Quorum is dismissed.

A private corporation’s liability under § 1983 requires evidence that it acted in concert with the state to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Kenneth L. Krause David R. Bean Edward F. Wills v. Russ Hebert William Palzcewski Commercial Drapery Contractors, Inc. · filed 1996-08-16

Because appellants failed to provide evidence tending to show that prison officials took prohibited action, appellants necessarily failed to show that CDC, a private corporation, acted in concert with the state to deprive appellants of their constitutionally protected rights.

Section 1983 does not cover a private entity’s conduct merely because the entity is state regulated; the challenged conduct must have a nexus to government involvement.

Just v. Valley Telephone · filed 1996-09-24

Because no nexus was shown between the state and the complained of action, the district court correctly concluded that there was no action under color of state law that would support an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a federal right under color of state law; federal employment or private citizenship alone does not meet that requirement.

Sandles v. Randa · filed 1996-11-15

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived, under color of state law, of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. ... There is no indication that the defendants, federal employees and private citizens, acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 treats a police officer’s use of force during an arrest as action under color of state law, even if the officer was off duty.

Daniels v. City of Binghamton · filed 1996-11-20

Plainly, where a police officer is alleged to have used excessive force during the course of an arrest, that action can be said to have been taken under color of law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private defendants for a First Amendment deprivation to plead that they acted under color of law.

Vandermark v. City of New York · filed 2009-05-04

However, plaintiffs have failed to plead that the SEIU defendants acted under col- or of law in undertaking these activities.

Section 1983 requires facts showing agreement and concerted action with a state actor to treat private attorneys as acting under color of state law.

Walsh v. Quinn · filed 2009-05-07

To allege such a conspiracy, the complaint must specifically present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action to deprive the plaintiff of his or her rights.

A § 1983 claim fails against defendants who are not acting under color of state law.

Galvani v. Comm of PA · filed 2009-05-11

Galvani’s remaining federal claims also fail because neither Swartz nor the Williamses are “person[s] acting under color of state law” for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; the private physicians in this case did not meet that requirement.

Carlson v. San Mateo County · filed 1996-12-09

Regardless, the doctors Bausek and Farnham are not employees of the state, but are private physicians who are independent contractors with the hospital. Summary judgment was properly granted in favor of these appellees because they did not act under color of state law, an essential element of a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a public employee’s sexual assault when the act is unrelated to authority conferred by the state.

Barkauskie v. Indian River School District · filed 1996-12-27

The Court therefore holds in light of the above-cited authority, Dr. Toomey was not acting under color of state law if he committed the alleged sexual assault of plaintiff. Unlike the prison guard or the police officer who uses excessive force in the course of his or her authorized duties, the alleged sexual assault would be in no way related to the state authority conferred on Dr. Toomey — an educator.

Section 1983 does not treat a privately employed prison chaplain as a state actor merely because the prison permits his services and retains control over security.

McGlothlin v. Murray · filed 1997-02-13

After reviewing plaintiff’s objections and examining the ease de novo, the court adopts the Magistrate’s Report. ... Those understandings did not convert the Chaplain Service or any of its employees to agents of the VDOC, nor did they convert volunteerism into governmental function.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private misuse of state procedures alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Roemer v. Security Bancshares, Inc. · filed 1997-09-16

In this case, there are no allegations of involvement of any state actors or any facts showing that the “defendants acted under color of state law.” Private misuse of state procedures or violations of state law does not amount to state action.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Munsif v. Cassel · filed 2009-05-13

Munsif’s assertion of possible racial bias in the ABIM’s re-certification tests fails to state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as there is no allegation from which we can infer that the defendants, individually or as agents of ABIM, acted under color of ... state law.

Section 1983 does not reach a volunteer fire company’s expulsion of a member when the government does not control its leadership or pervasively intertwine with its operations.

McNally v. Stewart · filed 2009-05-18

Thus, because there is no evidence in the record that the Company is pervasively entwined with the State and neither the State nor Town government appoints a majority of the Company’s directors, the defendants, as a matter of law, were not acting under color of state law when they expelled McNally from the Company.

Section 1983 does not treat a private litigant as a state actor merely because a judge acquiesces in alleged fraud; conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not establish state action.

Wallace v. Federal Employees of U.S. District Court · filed 2009-05-21

It is also clear from their complaint that they neither alleged nor can allege anything that might transform the private JADO defendants into state actors for § 1983 purposes. The Wallaces allege the JADO defendants should be deemed state actors because they defrauded a court and a judge “acquiesced.” This is the very same theory of state action that we rejected in Wallace’s prior appeal. As we explained in that case, litigation “does not transform a private actor into an entity acting under color of state or federal law,” and conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not suffice.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private entity's conduct does not qualify without state involvement.

Key v. Robertson · filed 2009-06-05

As noted above, plaintiff has admitted that Regent is a private entity, and there is no suggestion in the instant case of any other form of state or federal action. Consequently, plaintiffs constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail as a matter of law for failure to fulfill the respective “state action” and “under color of state law” requirements.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant acted under color of state law.

DiNicola v. DiPaolo · filed 1998-03-31

Because Plaintiff cannot establish that Vorsheck acted “under color of state law,” Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against him fail as a matter of law.

A mere allegation that a defendant conspired with a state actor is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.

Rooney v. Wittich · filed 1998-07-13

However, the mere allegation that a party “conspired with” a state actor is insufficient to support a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation to have been committed under color of state law; action under federal law does not suffice.

Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc. · filed 1998-07-15

Because plaintiff fails to allege that U.S. Airways acted under color of state law, he may not proceed with a civil action for deprivation of rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a private bail bondsman’s conduct must be fairly attributable to the state.

Caballero v. Aamco Bail Bonding · filed 1998-07-20

The relevant issue is whether Aamco was acting “under color of state law,” a requirement to maintain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, we must first determine whether Aamco and its agents' conduct is “fairly attributable to the State.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person only when that person’s conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

B & B ENTERTAINMENT, INC. v. Dunfee · filed 2009-06-08

Because Ministry Defendants are private persons, in order to state a claim against them under § 1983, Plaintiffs must show that Ministry Defendants’ actions may be “fairly attributable to the state.”

An on-duty police officer responding to a dispatch acts under color of state law when exercising police authority during the encounter.

MACEACHERN v. City of Manhattan Beach · filed 2009-06-08

There is no dispute that defendant Thompson was on the scene as an on-duty police officer responding to a dispatch that an assault with a deadly weapon had occurred. Thus, when he engaged in a confrontation with MacEachern leading to MacEachern’s death, he was clearly functioning as a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a constitutional or federal right by a defendant acting under color of law.

Kmk v. Ak · filed 2009-06-30

Because nothing in the complaint demonstrates the existence of any joint action, concerted effort, or even a general understanding between Price and the custody court, Mother has failed to allege that Price acted under the color of state law. Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing Mother's federal § 1983 claim on this ground.

Section 1983 does not cover a police officer’s personal workplace quarrel when the officer does not act under color of state law.

Bailey v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND · filed 1999-01-29

Bailey’s § 1983 claim stops at the threshold. She has established no act by Brock that was taken under color of law.

Section 1983 can reach a private club when its relationship with a municipality, public function, and the municipality’s notice of alleged discrimination together establish state action.

Gibbs-Alfano v. Ossining Boat & Canoe Club, Inc. · filed 1999-05-03

The cumulative impact of these factors is sufficient to find that there was “state action” for purposes of § 1983, and therefore I deny the motion to dismiss that claim against the Boat Club.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private person merely for giving information to police, answering questions about a crime, or testifying at trial.

Moldowan v. Fournier · filed 2009-07-01

Providing information to the police, responding to questions about a crime, and offering witness testimony at a criminal trial does not expose a private individual to liability for actions taken “under color of law.”

A physician under contract to provide medical care to prison inmates acts under color of state law when treating them for purposes of § 1983.

Francis v. Northumberland County · filed 2009-07-07

Since Dr. Maue was under contract with NCP to provide medical services to inmates, we agree with his contention that he was acting under the color of state law when treating inmates at NCP.

Section 1983 requires state action; government appointment of a private hospital’s board does not make its suspension of a physician’s privileges state action when the government played no role in that decision.

Philips v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital · filed 2009-07-13

Although Pitt County and another state actor exercise exclusive authority to appoint members of the Board, Dr. Philips’ complaints nowhere allege that the appointing gov- ernmental entities played any role in the specific decision to terminate his privileges.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Lauter v. Anoufrieva · filed 2009-07-14

This court agrees that plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 claim because he fails to plead action under color of state law.

A federal official alleged to conspire with a state official to violate constitutional rights can act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Whitlock Construction, Inc. v. Glickman · filed 1999-10-12

It is well established that private individuals who conspire with state officials to violate the constitutional rights of another are considered to be acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 actions. ... These allegations indicate a conspiracy between Cochran and Prior to deprive Whitlock of its right to the project, and are sufficient to survive Cochran’s motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; a court-appointed lawyer’s failure to file an appellate brief did not meet that requirement.

Freeman v. Moore · filed 1999-10-21

Freeman’s § 1983 suit lacks an arguable basis in law because Moore was not acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against purely private actors who did not act under color of state law.

Kahn v. New York University Medical Center · filed 2009-07-21

Appellant’s Fifth Amendment claim was properly analyzed in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Appellant asserted his claim against purely private actors and institutions,'who were not proper section 1983 defendants because they did not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private person whose conduct is not attributable to the state.

Moldowan v. Fournier · filed 2009-07-23

In addition to being inadequately pled, see supra Part IV.C.6, we also hold that Moldowan cannot maintain an action under § 1983 against Fournier because she is not a “state actor” and did not act “under color of law.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private entity when the complaint sufficiently alleges that it acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of federal rights.

Ward v. Greene, No. X04cv99-0120118s (Mar. 21, 2001) · filed 2001-03-21

Construing the allegations of the sixteenth count in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the court must do in considering a motion to strike, the court finds that the plaintiff has pleaded that the Village has acted under color of state law and that this conduct has deprived the plaintiff of certain constitutional rights. Proof of "state action" is intensively fact-bound. Accordingly, the court denies the Village's motion to strike count sixteen of the amended complaint.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party when sufficient facts show that the party’s conduct is fairly attributable to the state and that the party agreed with the state to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Nielson v. Legacy Health Systems · filed 2001-06-12

A private party may be sued under § 1983 only if sufficient facts are alleged to show that the conduct of the private party is “fairly attributable to the State” and that there was an agreement between the state and the private party to deprive plaintiff his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits claims against private parties only when they conspire or act jointly with state actors to deprive someone of federal rights.

Radcliffe v. Rainbow Construction Company · filed 2001-06-13

Because § 1983 creates liability for deprivations of federal rights "under color of state law," the Rainbow defendants cannot be liable unless they conspired or acted jointly with state actors to deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.

Private parties may be liable under § 1983 when they act in concert with state officials to deprive someone of federal rights.

Madsen v. Department of Professional Regulation · filed 2001-06-14

The private defendants could be held liable under § 1983 only if they acted in concert with state officials, i.e., if they had reached an understanding with state officials to deprive Madsen of his rights.

Section 1983 requires a state officer’s conduct to be related to official duties to qualify as action under color of state law.

Honaker v. Gary Smith, Mayor, Individually and as Mayor of the Village of Lovington and as Fire Chief of the Loving · filed 2001-06-26

As a result, acts by a state officer are not made under color of state law unless they are related in some way to the performance of the duties of the state office.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private defendant to raise a genuine issue that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Kanvick v. Reno City Police · filed 2009-07-28

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the claims against defendant City Center Limited Partnership because Kanvick failed to raise a genuine issue as to whether this defendant acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches tribal officers who use a roadblock to enforce state law against non-Indians after going beyond an inquiry into Indian status.

Bressi v. Ford · filed 2009-08-04

Once they departed from, or went beyond, the inquiry to establish that Bressi was not an Indian, they were acting under color of state law. These actions established, beyond any dispute of fact, that the roadblock functioned not merely as a tribal exercise, but also as an instrument for the enforcement of state law.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation under color of state law; private pharmacy employees and an insurance adjuster do not meet that requirement.

Charles v. Scarberry · filed 2009-08-10

Here, no matter whether Charles otherwise made allegations sufficient to state a violation of federal law, she failed to allege that any deprivation occurred under color of state law. CVS employees and an insurance adjuster do not act under the color of state law.

Private attorneys must act under color of law to be liable under § 1983.

Barnum v. Hilfiger · filed 2009-08-11

In a thorough opinion, the district court explained that the judges and prosecutors named as defendants were immune from suit because Mr. Barnum challenges their official actions, and that Mr. Barnum’s private lawyers did not act under color of law as § 1983 requires. ... Even doing so, however, we have concluded the district court’s disposition was correct for substantially the reasons given by Judge White in his opinion.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state or District of Columbia law and does not cover federal officials acting solely under federal law.

Johnson v. United States · filed 2009-08-11

Because the plaintiff does not allege that the defendants acted under color of state or District of Columbia law, the plaintiffs § 1983 claim must be dismissed against both the United States and against BOP’s Director in his official capacity.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; sharing information and assisting a state agency did not make the private credentialing organization a state actor.

Vistein v. The American Registry of Radiologist Tech · filed 2009-08-13

The district court’s findings, together with Vistein’s allegations, are insufficient, however, to show that the ARRT is a state actor under any of the tests for determining whether its challenged conduct may be fairly attributable to the State for purposes of Vistein’s due process claims.

Section 1983 does not permit a First Amendment claim against AMTRAK because it is a federal actor rather than a state actor.

Schulthies v. National Passenger Rr Corp. · filed 2009-08-17

Because AMTRAK is a federal actor and not a state actor, Plaintiff may not assert his claim for violation of his First Amendment rights under Section 1983.

Section 1983 treats prison medical personnel employed by the state as acting under color of state law.

Jones v. Natesha · filed 2001-07-12

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in West, it is clear the defendants were state actors acting under color of state law. Thus, the court denies Natesha’s motion to dismiss on this basis.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private employer’s decision to fire an employee does not meet that requirement without evidence of joint action with state officials.

Spencer v. Illinois Community Action Association · filed 2001-09-26

Thus, Plaintiffs First Amendment claims fail for failure to establish that she was fired under color of state law. Accordingly, the Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff was fired under color of state law and also finds that all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

A physician under contract with a public hospital acts under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes when supervising hospital employees.

Nieto v. Kapoor · filed 2001-10-31

We thus conclude that Dr. Kapoor, like the physician in West, acted under color of state law for purposes of section 1983 when undertaking his supervisory duties over plaintiffs’ work.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of law; a private party’s conduct must be fairly attributable to the state.

Marchese v. Mt. San Rafael Hospital · filed 2001-12-20

Section 1983 establishes a cause of action only against those individuals acting “under color of [law].”

A private evaluator does not act under color of state law under § 1983 by evaluating a county jail employee when the county has no constitutional duty to conduct the evaluation.

Blunt v. Harris County · filed 2002-03-08

Specifically, the County had no constitutional duty to conduct psychological examinations of employees placed on probationary status. We agree with the district court that this distinction between West and this case is critical, and that the rationale for the Court’s holding that the private physician in West should be treated as a state actor does not apply to Dr. Friedman.

A physician treating a prisoner does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely because she works for a public university; her function within the state system controls.

Scott v. Ambani · filed 2009-08-18

In determining whether a doctor acted under color of state law, the primary factor is “the physician’s function within the state system, not the precise terms of his employment.” ... As such, Dr. Sullivan was not performing her duties as a state actor in her treatment of Scott and dismissal of the claim against her was proper.

Section 1983 may cover an off-duty officer who joins other officers in making an arrest because that conduct can constitute action under color of state law.

Wong v. Yoo · filed 2009-08-18

This argument fails because a reasonable fact-finder could determine that defendant Ciurcina was acting under color of state law when he jointly participated with other defendant officers in plaintiff's arrest by physically holding plaintiff to the ground and handcuffing him.